BEFORE THE HON.

ARBITRATOR APPOINTED BY CENTRAL

REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES UNDER SECTION 84 OF
THE MULTI-STATE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 2002.

OFFICE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, THE COSMOS CO-OP. BANK

LTD., MIRA SAGAR BUILDING, NAVROJI LANE, GHATKOPAR
(WEST), MUMBAI – 400 086.

ARBITRATION CASE NO. ARB/COS/03 OF 2023

IN THE MATTER OF:-

THE COSMOS CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. )

A society registered under the multi-state )
Co-op. Societies Act, 2002. )

Having Registered Office at:- )

Cosmos Tower, Plot No. 6, ICS Colony, )
University Road, Ganeshwind, Shivaji Nagar, )
Pune – 411 007. )

And Having its Regional Office at:- )

Horizon Building, Recovery Department, )
01st Floor, Ranade Road, Gokhale Road North, )
Dadar West, Mumbai – 400 028 and one of its )
Branch at Borivali (West) through its )
Authorised Officer Mr. Rupa Date ) .… Claimant Bank

VERSUS

1. M/s. Muniraj Synthetics India Pvt. Ltd. )

A company registered under the Companies Act )
Having its Address at:- )
Unit No. 5-A-120, Akshay Mittal Industries )
Premises CHSL, Sanjay Building, Mittal )
Industrial Estate, Sir M. V. Road, Andheri Road, )
Saki Naka, Andheri East, Mumbai – 400 059. )

2. Mr. Narpat Deshmal Jain )

 Flat No. 1201/1202, 12th Floor, Raj Sahyog Apt. )
Opp. Navneet Hospital, 7/5 Corner Road, )
Daulat Nagar, Borivali East, Mumbai – 400 068. )

3. Mrs. Veena Narpat Jain )

Flat No. 1201/1202, 12th Floor, Raj Sahyog Apt. )
Opp. Navneet Hospital, 7/5 Corner Road, )
Daulat Nagar, Borivali East, Mumbai – 400 068. )

4. Mr. Harish Ratanchand Jain )

Flat No. 901/902, Gopal Darshan, Road No. 9, )
Next to Hinduja Hall, Daulat Nagar, )
Borivali East, Mumbai – 400 068. ) ... Respondents

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DEFENCES OF RESPONDENT NO. 2

MAY PLEASE BE YOUR WORSHIP:-

I, Mr. Narpat D. Jain, Respondent No. 2 in above referred matter

and duly authorised by Respondent No. 3 and Respondent No. 4

in above referred matter hereby solemnly affirm and state as

under.

PRIMA FACIE DEFENCES:-

(a) LACK OF INHERENT JURISDICTION:

1. We say that above referred claimant has disputed their claim

against principle debtors M/s. Muniraj Synthetics India Pvt.

Ltd. to whom said claimant alleged to have granted Cash

Credit, Working Capital Finance and Letter of Credit facilities

on various terms and conditions more briefly stated therein.

We say that basically the disputed arise with the principle

debtors and in order to enforce the claim of said principle

debtors as per provisions of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure

Code, this Hon. Tribunal do not have pecuniary jurisdiction

with regards to the declaration and enforcement of :-

a. Declaration of validity of Hypothecation

Agreement and Loan Agreement alleged to

be entered for the said facility to enforce the

claim of hypothecation debts;

b. Declaration of validity and subsisting of the

Deed of Guarantee offered by Respondent

No. 2 and Respondent No. 3 as alleged

guarantor as provisions of Multi State Co-

operative Society Act has not specifically

excluded the provisions of Section 145 of the

Civil Procedure Code and at the same time

have not allowed to pass said declaration

 while passing award under the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act; and

c. Declaration of validity and subsisting of

claim of mortgage on certain properties as

per provisions of Section 58 and Section 60

of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 34 of

the Specific Relief Act and the provisions of

Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code as the

said provisions have not been taken away

specifically by the provisions of Multi State

Co-operative Society Act;

and it being civil issue as per law laid down by Hon.

Supreme Court in the case of Nahar Industrial

Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Hongkong & Sanghai Banking

Corporation Ltd. (2009(1) DRTC SC) which states:-

“76. The terms “Tribunal” “Court” and the

“Civil Court” have been used in the CPC

differently. All “Courts” are “Tribunals” but all

“Tribunals” are not “Courts”. Similarly, all

“Civil Courts” are “Courts” but all “Courts” are

 not “Civil Courts”. It is not much in dispute that

the broad distinction between a “Court” and a

“Tribunal” is whereas the decision of the

“Court” is final the decision of the “Tribunal”

may not be.

77. The “Tribunal” however, which is

authorized to take evidence of witnesses would

ordinarily be held to be a “Court” within the

meaning of Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It

includes not only Judges and Magistrates but

also persons, except Arbitrators, legally

authorized to take evidence. It is an inclusive

definition. There may be other forums which

would also come within the purview of the said

definition.”

This Hon. Tribunal do not have pecuniary and inherent

jurisdiction to proceed against Respondent No. 2 and

Respondent No. 4 of the Arbitration Petition not only that

even the prayer made for jointly and several liability of

 Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 4 for the payment of

claim of Respondent No. 1 in such a circumstances the

prayer of joint and several liability of Respondent No. 2

and Respondent No. 4 is having lack of inherent

jurisdiction and accordingly claimant should be directed to

carry out necessary amendment in the said statement of

claimant as per provision of Order VI Rule 17 of the Civil

Procedure Code within a reasonable time failing which said

Arbitration Petition should be dismiss in limine with cost.

2. We also like to clarify that the we have not executed any Deed

of Guarantee with the Claimant Bank as alleged for which we

ask for strict proof from the Claimant Bank failing which we

will lodge necessary criminal or civil prosecution suit for

defamation on claimant bank accordingly.

(b) NON-PROVIDING VITAL AND MATERIAL EVIDENCES

FOR ADJUDICATION OF DEBTS CLAIMED BY THE
CLAIMANTS:-
3. We say that the claimant has not provided vital and material

evidences consist of :-

(a) Circumstances under which said dues has been

called up as pointed out by Reserve Bank of

India in their circulars for recalling of said

advances and how applicant bank found that

there are no chances of providing rehabilitation

and revival as per parameters and norms

provided by Reserve Bank of India to Principal

borrower;

(b) Statement of accounts more briefly directed by

Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Central

Bank of India V/s. Ravindra (AIR 2001 SC

3095) which read as under:-

“In view of the law having been settled

with this judgment, it is expected

henceforth from the banks, bound by the

directives of the Reserve Bank of India,

to make an averment in the plaint that

interest / compound interest has been

charged at such rates, and capitalized

at such periodical rests, as are

permitted by, and do not run counter

to, the directives of the Reserve Bank

of India. A statement of account shall

be filed in the court showing details

and giving particulars of debit entries,

and if debit entry relates to interest

then setting out also the rate of, and

the period of or which, the interest has

been charged. On the court being prima

facie satisfied, if a dispute is raised in that

regard, of the permissibility of debits, the

onus would be on the borrower to show

why the amount of debit balance

appearing, at the foot of the account and

claimed as principal sum cannot be so

accepted and adjudged. This practice

would narrow down the scope of

controversy in suits filed by banking

 institutions and enable an expeditious

disposal of the suits, the issues

wherein are by and large capable of

being determined by documentary

evidence. RBI directives have not only

statutory flavor, any contravention

thereof or any default in compliance

therewith is punishable under sub-

section (4) of Section 46 of Banking

Regulation Act, 1949. The court can act

on an assumption that transactions or

dealings have taken place and accounts

maintained by banks in conformity

with RBI directives.”

(c) Vital and material evidences for alleged claim

made by the applicant bank from the

defendants as said claims of debts are mortgage

debts for which it is necessary that applicant

should provide vital and material evidences as

para No. 41 of reported verdict of Bank of

Baroda, Bombay V/s. Shree Moti Industries

Ltd., Bombay (Bom. 2009 (1) Mah. L.W.J.

263) consist of :-

(1) How much amount was borrowed by

the borrowers based on the loan

documents?

(2) How much amount has been paid to

them?

(3) At what rate and to what extent

interest is charged in the loan account

of defendant No. 1 by the bank?

(4) How much amount has been repaid

by the borrower from time to time?

And

(5) What are the outstanding dues, due

and recoverable from the defendants?

view of facts that Hon. Supreme Court in the

case of Mhadagowda V/s. Shripal Balwant

(AIR 1988 SC 1200) has held that for mortgage

debts that rule of Dam Dupat is equitable rule of

 Hindu law debarring the creditor to recover at

any given time the amount of interest which is

in excess of principal amount due at that time

and accordingly this Hon. Court should comply

with said law of Hon. Supreme Court while

adjudicating of debts for recovery as per

Section 19(20) of DRT Act;

(d) Particulars of debts as per Regulation 4(2) of

DRT Regulation, 2010 divided into :-

i. principal amount based on letter of

credit / Foreign order; stock

statement, margin and other terms

and conditions of sanction

letter/agreements;

ii. interest accrued and due;

iii. interest excess charged and in

dispute including interest tax

charged and paid as per the

provisions of the Interest Tax Act;

iv. penal interest;

 v. interest charged on compounded

basis on quarterly rest on penal

interest contrary to the verdict of

Apex Court in the case of Central

Bank of India V/s. Ravindra (ibid);

vi. additional interest;

vii. rate of interest charged and its

workings;

viii. nature of expenses;

ix. basis of working out interest every

quarter and debited to account;

x. particulars of monitoring of drawing

power limit and the manner in which

said drawing power limit had met

with the sanctioned amount;

xi. nature of other expenses charged

with particulars thereof; and

xii. particulars of reversal of income as

per para 3.2 of the Master RBI

Circular on prudential Norms on

 Income Recognition, Assets

classification and provisioning

pertaining to Advances Portfolio

bearing No. DBOD. No. BP. BC.20/

21.04.048/2001-2002 dated 1 st

September, 2001.

(e) Compliance of the circulars of Reserve Bank

of India with regards to :-

i) Rate of interest charged based on bank

rate declared by Reserve Bank of India;

ii) Charging of additional interest;

iii) Charging of penal interest;

iv) Charging of interest on service

charges; and other payments

v) Charging of interest on monthly rest /

quarterly rest / half yearly rest with

agreed terms;

vi) Compliance of terms and conditions for

allowing to operate cash credit account

and bill discounting account;

 vii) Collection of interest from the account

as per parameters and norms provided

in circular known as “Prudential norms

on income recognisation, assets

classification provisioning and other

related items” of Reserve Bank of India;

(f) Why interest has been charged even though

defendant No. 1 being a principal debtor

become a sick and contrary to the judgment

of Kerala High Court in the case of Durga

Cast (I) Pvt. Ltd., V/s. Bihar State

Financial Corporation (1993 (1) Bank CLR

716) ;

(g) Why the sums have not been claimed as per

parameters and norms provided by Reserve

Bank of India for One Time Settlement as per

parameters and norms provided by Reserve

Bank of India and are mandatory to be

followed by Bank;
 (h) Compliance of various terms and conditions

of the sanctioned letter as well as various

other documents obtained to prove that all

the vital and material terms and condition of

the contract has been duly complied with;

and

(i) Other vital and material evidences.

Which clearly proves that Claimant has not disclosed all

vital and material evidences before this Hon. Tribunal.

4. Without prejudice to above facts, said Arbitration Petition is

neither verified at the end as per Order VI Rule 15 nor

affidavit as required under Order XIV Rule 3 of the Civil

Procedure Code have be deposed which act clearly proves

that said deposed reply are not truth but only allegation. In

the circumstances, Respondent relies on the law laid down by

Hon. Supreme Court in the matter of A.K.K. Nambiar V/s.

Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 652), for the verification of

affidavit as per Order XIX Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code

which in Para (11) state as under:-

 “The reasons for verification of affidavits are

to enable to Court to find out which facts can

be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence

of rival parties. Allegations may be true to

knowledge or allegations may be true to

information received from persons or

allegations may be based on records. The

importance of verification is to test the

genuineness and authenticity of

allegations and also to make the deponent

responsible for allegations. In essence

verification is required to enable the Court

to find out as to whether it will be safe to

act on such affidavit evidence. In absence

of proper verification, affidavits cannot be

admitted in evidence.”

Accordingly, this Hon. Tribunal should not dismissed the

said Arbitration Petition as per legal maxim “Expressio

Unius Est Exlcusio Alterious” which means that if a

statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular

 manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no

other manner and following other course is not

permissible.

(c) NON-COMPLIANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF DISCREATION:-

5. We say that Claimant Bank has not lodged above referred

Arbitration Petition in this Hon. Tribunal with due compliance

of the provisions of Section 19(1-A) and Section 19(1-B) of

the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution

Act (DRT Act) for applicability of the provisions of Section 19

of the DRT Act very clearly state as under:-

“(1-A) Every bank being, Multi-State co-

operative bank referred to in sub-clause (vi) of

clause (d) of Section 2, may, at its option, opt to

initiate proceedings under the Multi-State Co-

operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) to

recover debts, whether, due before or after the

date of commencement of the Enforcement of

the Security Interest and Recovery Debts Laws

(Amendment) Act, 2012 from any person

 instead of making an application under this

Chapter.

(1-B) In case, a bank being, Multi-State Co-

operative bank referred to in sub-clause (vi) of

clause (d) of Section 2 has filed an application

under this Chapter and subsequently opts to

withdraw the application for the purpose of

initiating proceeding under the Multi-State Co-

operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) to

recover debts, it may do so with the permission

of the Tribunal and every such application

seeking permission from the Tribunal to

withdraw the application made under sub-

section (1-A) shall be dealt with by it as

expeditiously as possible and disposed of

within thirty days from the date of such

application”.

Accordingly, while submitting above referred petition, the

claimant bank has not stated any reasons for selecting this
 Hon. Tribunal for adjudication of debts rather than Debts

Recovery Tribunal firm under the provisions of DRT Act.

Thus, application lodged by claimant bank are without

such vital and material pleadings of compliance of

principle of discretion stated hereinafter in their

Arbitration Petition on which ground also said petition is

liable to be dismiss with cost as said petition is arbitrary

petition.

(d) INVALID APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR:-

6. Without prejudice to above facts, We say that for the purpose

of appointment of Arbitrator, under the provisions of Section

4 of Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, Hon. Central

Registrar is empowered to appoint Arbitrator to decide

dispute among members under the provisions of Act whereby

notification number SO.216(E) issued by Central Registrar,

New Delhi has been notified for appointment of Arbitrator.

We say that said notification has been totally suppressed by

the Claimant bank and even Chairperson of this Hon. Tribunal

has confirmed his appointment without verification of said

 notification. Accordingly in order to suppressed said facts

have mislead title of the Petition, as well as notice of

arbitration issued by Hon. Registrar and thereby played fraud

with Hon. Chairperson of this Hon. Tribunal as defined by

Hon. Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu

V/s. Jagannath (AIR 1994 SC 853) which state:-

“A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with

the design of securing something by taking

unfair advantage of another it is deception in

order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating

intended to get an advantage”.

Accordingly, law laid down by Hon. Supreme Court in the

said matter appointment of Chairperson of this Hon.

Tribunal has been made by Claimant bank by playing fraud

on which ground also Chairperson of this Hon. Tribunal be

declared as ultra vires and invalid as per principle of stare

decisis applicable to this Hon. Tribunal.

(e) FRAUD:-
7. Without prejudice to said facts, We say that the Claimant bank

has suppressed facts with regards to Enforcement of action of

recovery by applying provisions of Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of

Security Interest Act (Securitisation Act) and have issued

notice under the provisions of Section 13(2) and Section

13(3) of Securitisation Act and also started recovery

proceedings under the provisions of Section 13(4) by lodging

Securitisation Application under the provisions of Section 14

of the Securitisation Act by lodging said application in the

office of Hon. District Magistrate and Collector, Pune Division,

Pune and obtained order fraudulently for dispossession of the

Respondent. In the circumstances occupied tenant of

Respondent have been much forced against its wishes to

submit rectification application to rectify said order which is

pending for disposal after arguments on both sides have been

completed by Hon. District Magistrate, Pune and order is

expected in due course of time. However, no pleadings for

same have been made in Petition and thus Claimant bank has

played fraud with this Hon. Tribunal.

(f) LACK OF INHERENT JURISDICTION:-

8. We say that this Hon. Tribunal is governed by the provisions

of law clarified a divisional bench of Hon. Orissa High Court in

the case of Gulf Fishing & Co. V/s. Orissa State Finance

Corporation (AIR 1987 Orissa 1199) which is based on the

provisions of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act

which is similar to the provisions of Securitisation Act and

Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act which is

similar to the provisions of DRT Act and laid down law

therein by stating the short but intricate question that arose

for consideration was whether the State Financial

Corporation having taken recourse to a suit against its debtor

for recovery of the loan can take recourse to the powers u/s.

29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. Allowing the writ

petition, against action taken by the Corporation under

Section 29 and releasing the trawler seized by the

Corporation, L. Rath, J. observed:-

“If the remedy of a civil suit is pursued and a decree is passed,

the claim of the plaintiff must be taken to have merged in the

decree and cannot have any independent existence thereafter

to be pursued again through the alternative mode. In law it

must be taken that the claim has reached a finality of

adjudication and nothing remains thereafter to be pursued

through the alternative procedure. To assume the contrary

would lead to untenable positions. Suppose by adjudication

on merits before in Civil Court, the plaintiffs claim is

dismissed, can it be said that the plaintiff can still have

recourse to the alternative remedy and realize the claim

against the defendant? To me, the answer is No.”

Holding that having obtained a decree for sale of the

mortgaged property the action of the Corporation under

section 29, would amount to giving up the right to sell the

same under its own authority conferred u/s. 29 of the Act, the

Corporation could not resile from that situation as the

doctrine of election will stand in its way, H.L. Agrawal, C.J., in

the same case, observed that :-

“In the present case, the suit instituted by the

Corporation, however, is not a suit based on the

debt or loan as such, but was a mortgage suit

 seeking recovery of the loan by sale of the

mortgaged property. In my considered opinion,

therefore, once the Corporation took assistance

of the Court under the general law for sale of

the mortgaged property through due process of

execution, then ‘the right to realize the property

mortgaged to the Financial Corporation was

destroyed’ as in that event the claim merged in

the decree and the second action would expose

the petitioner to double jeopardy.”

which view also taken by Hon. Patna High Court in the case

of Purnea Cold Storage V/s. State Bank of India and

Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Patna

(Civil Writ Jurisdiction case No. 8746 of 2012 decided

on 27th August, 2012). Accordingly, this Hon. Tribunal

do not have pecuniary jurisdiction to decide above

referred Petition but said facts and laws have been

suppressed by Claimant bank and accordingly also said

petition of the Petitioner claimant are without inherent

and pecuniary jurisdiction of this Hon. Tribunal prima facie

and as per law laid down by Hon. Supreme Court in the

case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu V/s. Jagannath (AIR

1994 SC 853) which state :-

“The Courts of law are meant for imparting

justice between the parties. One who comes to

the court, must come with clean hands. It can

be said without hesitation that a person whose

case is based on falsehood has no right to

approach the Court. He can be summarily

thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A

litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to

produce all the documents executed by him

which are relevant to the litigation. If he

withholds a vital document in order to gain

advantage on the other side then he would be

guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on

the opposite party”.

Hence, said Arbitration Petition of claimant should be

dismissed prima facie.

(g) WHAT IS LAW OF PRINCIPLE OF DISCTIONARY ?

9. We say that guide to Securitisation Reconstruction of

Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interests of Justice

B.P. Banerjee state in the matter of ‘Discretion’ means when it

is said that something is to be done within the discretion of

the authorities and that something is to be done according to

the rules of reason and justice, not according to private

opinion : Rooke’s case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99B: according to

law, and not humour.  It is to be not arbitrary, vague, and

fanciful, but legal and regular.  And it must be exercised

within the limit to which an honest man competent to the

discharge of his office ought to confine himself (Wilson V/s.

Rastall, (1792), 4 Term Rep at P. 757; Sharp V/s.

Wakefield, (1891) AC 173 HL, per LORD HALSBURY, L.C.,

at p. 179)..  Discretion when applied to a Court of Justice

means ‘sound discretion guided by law.  It must be governed

by rules.  It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal

and regular (State V/s. Veerapandy, 1979 Cr LJ 455 (Mad). 

When such a discretionary power is invested in an authority,

the authority would be bound to exercise that power, and the

word ‘may’ conferring discretionary power has to be read as

‘must’, except in those cases where there are grounds for not

exercising such power (Mohmedmiya Mohamad Sadik V/s.

State of Gujarat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 583).  A discretion

conferred on an authority by statute is intended to be

exercised by that authority and no other unless otherwise

intended by express words or by necessary implication. 

Discretion must be exercised according to common sense and

justice, and if there is no indication in the Act of the ground

upon which the discretion is to be exercised, it is a mistake to

lay down any rules with a view of indicating the particular

grooves in which the discretion should run.  EMM Silver

Mining Co. V/s. Grant, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 918, 926, JESSEL

M.R.   But, as LORD BLACKBURN said as to the exercise of

discretionary power by a court of equity, ‘the discretion is not

to be exercised according to the fancy of whoever is to

exercise the jurisdiction of equity, but is a discretion to be

exercised according to the rules which have been established

by a long series of decisions’.  (Doherty V/s. Allman, (1878)

3 App Cas 709, 728).  There is a duty to exercise the

 discretion conferred by the statute in every case in which

those upon whom it is imposed rules (R. V/s. Paddington

and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal, (1949) 1 KB 666).

(h) HOW IT IS APPLIED PRINCIPLE OF DISCRETION ?

10. In construing a statute said publication has observed that

we must always assume that the discretionary power

conferred upon various authorities under the statute will be

used properly and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

When a discretion is given to an authority, the exercise of that

discretion necessarily involves that application of mind and

acting reasonably and with justice, which in turn necessarily

involves the observance of natural justice which means that

the other party must be heard before any adverse order is

passed and accordingly claimant should have lodged above

referred Petition with justifiable reasons and circumstances

under which said Petition have been lodged and more

particularly said Petition are main for obtaining order for

enforcement of recovery as if decree which is similar to the

provisions of Section 31 of the SFC Act after starting with

 process of Enforcing Security as per Section 29 of the SFC Act

which is similar to the provisions of Securitisation Act and

accordingly as per law clarified in earlier para, this Hon.

Tribunal do not have pecuniary and inherent jurisdiction to

entertained above referred petition and grant relief claim by

claimants.

(i) SECTION 29A OF ACT:-

11. Without prejudice to above facts, present petition is lodged

by claimant based on the amended provisions of Section 29A

of the Act whereby for the purpose of application claimant

bank has relied on the provisions of Section 29A(2) which

read as under:-

“(2) If the award is made within a period of six

months from the date the arbitral tribunal

enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal

shall be entitled to receive such amount of

additional fees as the parties may agree”.

without considering provisions of Section 29A(1) to

Section 29A(7) of the said provisions of Section 29(A)(2)

stated above which read as under which read :-

“(1) The award shall be made within a period

of twelve months from the date the arbitral

tribunal enters upon the reference.

Explanation . - For the purpose of this sub-

section, an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to

have entered upon the reference on the date on

which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as

the case may be, have received notice, in

writing, of their appointment.

(2)

………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

(3) The parties may, be consent, extend the

period specified in sub-section (1) for making

award for a further period not exceeding six

months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period

specified in sub-section (1) or the extended

period specified under sub-section (3), the

mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate

unless the Court has, either prior to or after the

expiry of the period so specified, extended the

period:

Provided that while extending the period under

this sub-section, if the court finds that the

proceedings have been delayed for the reasons

attributable to the arbitral tribunal then, it may

order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not

exceeding five per cent for each month of such

delay.

(5) The extension of period referred to in

sub-section (4) may be on the application of

any of the parties and may be granted only for

sufficient cause and on such terms and

conditions as may be imposed by the Court.

 (6) While extending the period referred to in

sub-section (4), it shall be open to the Court to

substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one

or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the

arbitral proceedings shall continue from the

stage already reached and on the basis of the

evidence and material already on record, and

the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section

shall be deemed to have received the said

evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being

appointed under this section, the arbitral

tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to

be in continuation of the previously appointed

arbitral tribunal.”

Thus, without going through entire provisions of Section

29A of the Act has submitted application and hence on the

grounds stated hereinafter, the said application of the

Claimant bank is required to be dismissed prima facie with

cost.
(j) PARAWISE REPLY:-

12. We say that the contentions made by Claimant Bank on

respondents with regards to allegation of non-payment of

alleged debts are all void ab initio as the vital and material

facts are not disclosed by the claimant bank and hence, there

is no requirement for the parawise reply to be given in the

matter as I have already stated that no guarantee has been

provided by me in the matter.

(k) PRAYER:-

13. On the facts stated above Respondents prays that :-

a. Allow to remove Respondent No. 2 to

Respondent No. 4 as respondent in the

matter as they have not executed any Deed

of Guarantee with the Claimant Bank;

b. This Hon. Tribunal should dismiss above

referred Arbitration Petition Lodged by the

Claimant; and
 c. Any other reliefs claims and cost as this Hon.

Tribunal may deem fit.

For which act Respondents will remained oblige to this

Hon. Tribunal for ever.

Place : Mumbai

Date : 06th September, 2023 (Narpat D. Jain)

Authority Holder of
Respondent No. 2 to
Respondent No. 4
 VERIFICATION

I, Mr. Narpat D. Jain, Respondent No. 2 in above referred

matter and duly authorised by Respondent No. 3 and

Respondent No. 4 above named hereby solemnly verify that

the content of Para No. (1) to Para No. (12) are true to my

personal knowledge and belief and that I have not suppressed

any material facts.

Place : Mumbai

Date : 06th September, 2023 (Narpat D. Jain)

Authority Holder of
Respondent No. 2 to
Respondent No. 4
 BEFORE THE HON. ARBITRATOR
APPOINTED BY CENTRAL
REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETIES UNDER SECTION 84 OF
THE MULTI-STATE CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETIES ACT, 2002.

OFFICE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL,

THE COSMOS CO-OP. BANK LTD.,
MIRA SAGAR BUILDING, NAVROJI
LANE, GHATKOPAR (WEST),
MUMBAI – 400 086.

ARBITRATION CASE NO.

ARB/COS/03 OF 2023

IN THE MATTER OF:-

THE COSMOS CO-OPERATIVE

BANK LTD. .… Claimant Bank

VERSUS

M/S. MUNIRAJ SYNTHETICS INDIA

PVT. LTD. AND ORS. .... Respondents

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF
DEFENCES OF RESPONDENT NO. 2
TO RESPONDENT NO. 4.

Dated 06th September, 2023.