Ariff 2012
Ariff 2012
Ariff 2012
14.1 INTRODUCTION
206
14.2 PROSPECTS
of sovereign debt has been raging across the world since October 2010.
Second, the public has a stake in the assets of the government so they
would be less reluctant to finance the government, expenditures as such
expenditures would benefit the very same people.
Look around the Muslim countries, where there is too much foreign
borrowing while infrastructure demands are still high, yet this new instru-
ment is ideal for raising the money needed instead of raising taxes to do the
job. But little is known about how in historical periods this instrument was
used to raise public finance: some reference is found in Chapter 5, though
specific details of how much and for what purposes are not yet researched.
So there is a need for a search of the archives in Arabic, French, English,
Turkish and Urdu languages to understand this matter.
Another attraction is that the ijara-type sukuk are ideally suited to raise
long-term funds by agencies of governments such as electricity companies,
toll-road operators as well as by governments with SPCs holding treasury
assets or usufructs that provide incomes to investors where default is less
likely. The fact the yield is higher for this instrument than an equivalent
conventional note ensures that the investors would favour this over the
conventional bonds, whether the buyer is a Muslim or non-Muslim, in
any of the 56 IDB member countries. The wealthy lenders are seeking
high returns for their savings in private sukuk marketing centres in Zurich,
London, Frankfurt, and elsewhere.
If infrastructure funding is suitably met by sukuk, then these countries
need to build the infrastructure for the sukuk market to function well
so they can speedily tap the funds from the savings of their people for
infrastructural development of the type the Islamic Development Bank is
promoting across 56 member countries. Instead of borrowing in foreign
currencies, and so incurring a high-risk funding fraught with exchange
rate risk, from the World Bank or IBRD (some from the infamous Paris
Club), sourcing the money in one’s own currency would be much less
risky.
Complex instruments have their own use in the Islamic debt market.
The income patterns of economic agents are variable, so the structuring of
products must match the patterns of the income stream. A manufacturer
may need working capital to get its product on the shelves. Such a funding
need is ideally matched in istisna sukuk as working capital: a joint venture
deal with no certain income would find a musharaka sukuk ideal.
Banking regulation requires some level of statutory reserves in OIC
countries. That means there is a market for local instruments to be held
by banks to meet the reserve requirements, not forgetting additional
reserves needed as liquidity reserves. Therefore, the prospect for central
bank issues of bills and notes for reserve and liquidity purposes will be
The conventional debt market spans some 110 countries with public
trading of very standard bonds developed over some 400 years. In a
typical day funds amounting to US$500 billion are easily raised because
the markets are well established and have high liquidity: notably there is a
great deal of standardization of different products. Despite its already very
established nature, the AOSCO (Association of Securities Commissions)
A somewhat similar issue to the above has been raised with regard to
shari’ah supervisory matters. While there are national Shari’ah Boards
or Councils in each of the market locations, there is less coordination in
terms of documentation and standardization of fatwas (opinions) already
issued as clear guides in understandable forms: we may develop the kind
of tax matter rulings that are found in government tax office opinions
on questions on taxation issues as are often published as tax opinions
in developed countries. Neither is there a central consultative body to
smooth differences before differences or non-compliance become a thorny
issue at the level of the market. Potentially, any dispute (such as the 2008
fatwa on asset-backing) becomes a red flag for investors to raise their
guard against investment in these markets.
Critical reports point to the existence of some 300 shari’ah experts
Michael Skully has commented that the challenge to rating a sukuk is more
complex than is the case of straightforward conventional bonds. This is
an important statement, and is a cornerstone of the origination process
A market expert has estimated in this book that the liquidity of listed
sukuk instruments is less than 1 per cent of the outstanding value!
Another, a regulator, has commented that the market is one where the
securities are held to maturity and about 40 per cent of the issues are taken
up by financial institutions. These statistical facts appear to suggest that
sukuk markets need to think about how to spur liquidity. Without liquid-
ity markets are known to die, and sukuk markets have not been there long
enough to assure that such a fate is unlikely. In futures exchanges one in
seven new financial futures products fail for lack of liquidity. Given the
fact that even conventional bond issues have low liquidity, it behoves well
to investigate how serious are the liquidity shortfalls in Islamic financial
instruments as well as if there are sufficient issues for institutions to hold
as reserves. This is an area of urgent research priority.
Lack of liquidity is perhaps another reason why the yields in the sukuk
markets are significantly higher than in the bond markets for an identical
term and quality rating. We tend to think that the higher yield is actually
coming from the higher-risk profit-share basis of sukuk design and not
from illiquidity. But this needs to be verified, and there is thus a need to do
this as a serious inquiry to retain investor confidence in this market. Apart
from these, structural changes need to be introduced – for example market
makers need to be appointed to create liquidity. Another alternative
would be to have quotes at which market makers would buy an issue; this
information should be posted by specially appointed brokers and dealers.
Liquidity is a priority area for sustaining markets, and this requires careful
analysis.
It has been some 21 years since the first private sukuk was offered in
Malaysia (Shell Corporation issue in 1990): public-traded issues have
come on stream from 2000. Yet the public awareness of the basics of
14.4 CONCLUSION
Early stage growth statistics from the experiences of new financial instru-
ments (for example the derivative instruments in the 1980s) suggest that
at the take-off stage, their growth rates are exceptional. So is the case of
sukuk markets, where the growth rate is reportedly in excess of 20 per cent
per year. One of the contributors to this book estimates a time trend that
shows a very high demand for many more years, in fact, decades to come
for sukuk financing to grow. Hence, growth is likely to be a big driver for
this market, and that is a good thing, we all agree.
On the supply side, we have increasing revenues which ends up as
savings in governments and in private savings in more and more growing
NOTE
1. M. Ariff, F.F. Cheng and S.K. Neo (2008), Bond Markets in Malaysia and Singapore,
Selangor, Malaysia: University Putra Press.