Data Retention

Data retention
Data retention defines the policies of persistent data and records management for meeting legal and business
data archival requirements. Although sometimes interchangeable, it is not to be confused with the Data
Protection Act 1998.
The different data retention policies weigh legal and privacy concerns economics and need-to-know concerns
to determine the retention time, archival rules, data formats, and the permissible means of storage, access, and
encryption.[1]
Implementation
In the field of telecommunications, "data retention" generally refers to the storage of call detail records
(CDRs) of telephony and internet traffic and transaction data (IPDRs) by governments and commercial
organisations.[2] In the case of government data retention, the data that is stored is usually of telephone calls
made and received, emails sent and received, and websites visited. Location data is also collected.
The primary objective in government data retention is traffic analysis and mass surveillance. By analysing the
retained data, governments can identify the locations of individuals, an individual's associates and the
members of a group such as political opponents. These activities may or may not be lawful, depending on the
constitutions and laws of each country. In many jurisdictions, access to these databases may be made by a
government with little or no judicial oversight.[3][4]
In the case of commercial data retention, the data retained will usually be on transactions and web sites
visited.
Data retention also covers data collected by other means (e.g., by Automatic number-plate recognition
systems) and held by government and commercial organisations.
Data retention policies

A data retention policy is a recognized and proven protocol within an organization for retaining information
for operational use while ensuring adherence to the laws and regulations concerning them. The objectives of
a data retention policy are to keep important information for future use or reference, to organize information
so it can be searched and accessed at a later date and to dispose of information that is no longer needed.[5]
The data retention policies within an organization are a set of guidelines that describes which data will be
archived, how long it will be kept, what happens to the data at the end of the retention period (archive or
destroy) and other factors concerning the retention of the data.[6]
A part of any effective data retention policy is the permanent deletion of the retained data; achieving secure
deletion of data by encrypting the data when stored, and then deleting the encryption key after a specified
retention period. Thus, effectively deleting the data object and its copies stored in online and offline
locations.[7]
Australia
In 2015, the Australian government introduced mandatory data retention laws that allows data to be retained
up to two years.[8] The scheme is estimated to cost at least AU$400 million per year to implement, working
out to at least $16 per user per year.[9] It requires telecommunication providers and ISPs to retain telephony,
Internet and email metadata for two years, accessible without a warrant, and could possibly be used to target
file sharing.[10][11] The Attorney-General has broad discretion on which agencies are allowed to access
metadata, including private agencies.[12]
The Greens were strongly opposed to the introduction of these laws, citing privacy concerns and the
increased prospect of 'speculative invoicing' over alleged copyright infringement cases.[13][14] The Labor
Party initially opposed as well, but later agreed to passing the law after additional safeguards were put in
place to afford journalists some protection.[15][16]
European Union
On 15 March 2006, the European Union adopted the Data Retention Directive.[17][18] It required Member
States to ensure that communications providers retain data as specified in the Directive for a period of
between 6 months and 2 years in order to:
Trace and identify the source of a communication;

Trace and identify the destination of a communication;
Identify the date, time, and duration of a communication;
Identify the type of communication;
Identify the communication device;
Identify the location of mobile communication equipment.
The data was required to be available to "competent" national authorities "for the purpose of the
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national
law".
The Directive covered fixed telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, email, and VoIP. Member States
were required to transpose it into national law within 18 months—no later than September 2007. However,
they could if they wished postpone the application of the Directive to Internet access, email, and VoIP for a
further 18 months after this date. A majority of Member States exercised this option. All 28 EU States at the
time notified the European Commission about the transposition of the Directive into their national law. Of
these, however, Germany and Belgium had only transposed the legislation partially.[19]
A report evaluating the Directive was published by the European Commission in April 2011.[20] It concluded
that data retention was a valuable tool for ensuring criminal justice and public protection, but that it had
achieved only limited harmonisation. There were serious concerns from service providers about the
compliance costs and from civil society organisations who claimed that mandatory data retention was an
unacceptable infringement of the fundamental right to privacy and the protection of personal data according
to EU law.
In response to the report, on May 31, 2011, the European Data Protection Supervisor expressed some
concerns on the European Data Retention Directive, underlining that the Directive "does not meet the
requirements imposed by the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection".[21]
Criticisms of the directive aroused. The council's Legal Services was reported to have stated in closed session
that paragraph 59 of the European Court of Justice's ruling "suggests that general and blanket data retention is
no longer possible".[22] A legal opinion funded by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament finds
that the blanket retention data of unsuspected persons generally violates the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, both in regard to national telecommunications data retention laws and to similar EU data retention
schemes (PNR, TFTP, TFTS, LEA access to EES, Eurodac, VIS).[23]
The criticisms led to that Digital Rights Ireland brought the directive to the High Court of Ireland, that then
brought it further to the European Court of Justice of the European Union. The case was also joined by the
Constitutional Court of Austria. The process led to that the Court on 8 April 2014 declared the Directive
2006–24/EC invalid for violating fundamental rights, stating that ", the directive interferes in a particularly
serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal
data".[24][25]
This led further to that the member states in various degrees abolished or modified their implementations of
the directive. Since the Swedish implementation of the directive was kept in a similar manner, the Swedish
implementation was brought to the European Court by the telecom provider Tele2, and the case was merged
with a similar case from the United Kingdom, initiated by three persons with intervention by Open Rights
Group, Privacy International and The Law Society of England and Wales. Since the original directive no
longer existed, the basis for the judgment was an exception to the Directive on privacy and electronic
communications[26] in its Article 15(1), referring to the possibility to exceptionally apply data retention for
fighting serious crime. On the 21 of December 2016 the Court ruled
"https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=B902EE80BC54C2EEE4E4799A65A4C980?
text=&docid=186492&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6002190 that
"the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector must be interpreted as precluding national
legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all
traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic
communication." Blanket data retention was ruled out another time, but the actual consequences all over the
EU are varied and under discussion since then.
Czech Republic
Implementation of the directive was part of Act. No. 259/2010 Coll. on electronic communications as later
amended. Under Art. 97 (3), telecommunication data are to be stored between 6 and 12 months. The Czech
Constitutional Court has deemed the law unconstitutional and found it to be infringing on the peoples right to
privacy.[27]
As of July 2012, new legislation was on its way.[28]
Denmark
Denmark has implemented the EU data retention directive and much more, by logging all internet flow or
sessions between operators and operators and consumers.[29]
"2.2.1. Session logging (section 5(1) of the Executive Order) Providers of access to the
internet must, in respect of the initiating and terminating package of an internet session, retain
data that identifies the sending and receiving internet protocol address (in the following called
IP address), the sending and receiving port number and the transmission protocol."
"2.2.2. Sampling (section 5(4) of the Executive Order) The obligation to retain data about the
initiating and terminating package of an internet session does not apply to providers in case
such retention is not technically feasible in their systems. In that case, data must instead be
retained for every 500th package that is part of an end user's communication on the internet."
"2.2.5. Hot spots (section 5(3) of the Executive Order) In addition to the internet data that must
otherwise be retained, the provider must retain data that identifies the precise geographic or
physical location of a hot spot and the identity of the communication equipment used. This
means that a provider of internet access via a hot spot must retain data on a user's access to
the internet and, at the same time, retain data that identifies the geographic location of the hot
spot in question."
Germany
The German Bundestag had implemented the directive in "Gesetz zur Neuregelung der
Telekommunikationsüberwachung und anderer verdeckter Ermittlungsmaßnahmen sowie zur Umsetzung der
Richtlinie 2006/24/EG".[30] The law became valid on 1 January 2008. Any communications data had to be
retained for six months. On 2 March 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled the law
unconstitutional as a violation of the guarantee of the secrecy of correspondence.[31] On 16 October 2015, a
second law for shorter, up to 10 weeks long, data retention excluding email communication was passed by
parliament.[32][33][34] However, this act was ruled incompatible with German and European laws by an
injunction of the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia. As a result, on June 28, 2017,
three days before the planned start of data retention, the Federal Network Agency suspended the introduction
of data retention until a final decision in the principle proceedings.[35]
Italy
In July 2005 new legal requirements[36] on data retention came into force in Italy.
Subscriber information
Internet cafés and public telephone shops with at least three terminals must seek a license
permit within 30 days from the Ministry of Home Affairs. They must also store traffic data for a
period which may be determined later by administrative decree. Wi-Fi hotspots and
locations that do not store traffic data have to secure ID information from users before
allowing them to log on. For example, users may be required to enter a number from an ID
card or driving license. It is not clear how this information is validated. Mobile telephony
users must identify themselves before service activation, or before a SIM card may be
obtained. Resellers of mobile subscriptions or pre-paid cards must verify the identity of
purchasers and retain a photocopy of identity cards.
Telephony data
Data, including location data, on fixed line and mobile telephony must be retained for 24
months. There is no requirement to store the content of calls. Telephony operators must
retain a record of all unsuccessful dial attempts.
ISP data
Internet service providers must retain all data for at least 12 months. The law does not
specify exactly what traffic data must be retained. There is no requirement to store the
content of internet communications.
Legality
The legislation of July 2005 enables data retention by outlawing all the relevant data
protection provisions until 31 December 2007. Under the data protection provisions, service
providers are obliged to store traffic data and user data for no less than 365 days, even if
they no longer need it to process the communication or to send bills, policy requires user id
information, location, tracking data be stored and kept on file for easy access by law
enforcement and/or other authorities who request this information (permission must be
asked to view sensitive user ID data on file). The traffic data which will now be retained can
be used for anti-terrorism purposes and for general penal enforcement of criminal offences
large and small.
Italy already required the retention of telephony traffic data for 48 months, but without location data. Italy has
adopted the EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002 but with an exemption to the
requirement to erase traffic data.
Romania
The EU directive has been transposed into Romanian law as well, initially as Law 298/2008.[37] However,
the Constitutional Court of Romania subsequently struck down the law in 2009 as violating constitutional
rights.[38] The court held that the transposing act violated the constitutional rights of privacy, of
confidentiality in communications, and of free speech.[39] The European Commission has subsequently sued
Romania in 2011 for non-implementation, threatening Romania with a fine of 30,000 euros per day.[40] The
Romanian parliament passed a new law in 2012, which was signed by president Traian Băsescu in June.[41]
The Law 82/2012 has been nicknamed "Big Brother" (using the untranslated English expression) by various
Romanian non-governmental organizations opposing it.[40][42][43] On July 8, 2014, this law too was declared
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Romania.[44]
Slovakia
Slovakia has implemented the directive in Act No. 610/2003 Coll. on electronic communications as later
amended. Telecommunication data are stored for six months in the case of data related to Internet, Internet
email and Internet telephony (art. 59a (6) a), and for 12 months in the case of other types of communication
(art. 59a (6) b).
In April 2014, the Slovak Constitutional Court preliminary suspended effectiveness of the Slovak
implementation of Data Retention Directive and accepted the case for the further review.[45][46] In April 2015
Constitutional court decided that some parts of Slovak laws implementing DR Directive are not in
compliance with Slovak constitution and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.[47] According to now invalid provisions of the Electronic Communications Act, the providers of
electronic communications were obliged to store traffic data, localization data and data about the
communicating parties for a period of 6 months (in the case Internet, email or VoIP communication) or for a
period of 12 months (in case of other communication).[48]
Sweden
Sweden implemented the EU's 2006 Data Retention Directive in May 2012, and it was fined €3 million by
the Court of Justice of the European Union for its belated transposition (the deadline was 15 September
2007).[49][50][51][52] The directive allowed member states to determine the duration data is retained, ranging
from six months to two years; the Riksdag, Sweden's legislature, opted for six months.[53]
In April 2014, however, the CJEU struck down the Data Retention Directive. Following the judgement, PTS,
Sweden's telecommunications regulator, told Swedish ISPs and telcos that they would no longer have to
retain call records and internet metadata.[54] The Swedish government initiated a one-man investigation that
stated that Sweden could keep on with data-retention. After that, the PTS reversed course.[55] Most of
Sweden's major telecommunications companies complied immediately, though Tele2 appealed this order
before the Administrative Court in Stockholm claiming that the Swedish implementation should be reversed
following the directive being declared unvalid, including the fact that the Swedish implementation went
further than the directive, including registration of failed telephone calls and the geographic endpoint of a
mobile communications. The appeal was rejected. The one holdout ISP, Bahnhof, was given an order to
comply by November 24 deadline or face a five million krona ($680,000) fine.[56]
Tele2 appealed the first level court rejection to the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal, that sent the
matter to the European Court of Justice of the European Union. That led to a judgement that once again
invalidated blanket data retention of all communications of all citizens' communications to combat crime. See
under European Union above.
United Kingdom
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act came into force in 2014. It is the answer by the United
Kingdom parliament after a declaration of invalidity was made by the Court of Justice of the European Union
in relation to Directive 2006/ 24/EC in order to make provision, about the retention of certain
communications data.[57] In addition, the purpose of the act is to:
Amend the grounds for issuing interception warrants, or granting or giving certain
authorizations or notices.
Make provision about the extraterritorial application of that Part and about the meaning of
"telecommunications service" for the purposes of that Act;
Make provision about a review of the operation and regulation of investigatory powers; and for
connected purposes.[57]
The act is also to ensure that communication companies in the UK retain communications data so that it
continues to be available when it is needed by law enforcement agencies and others to investigate committed
crimes and protect the public.[58] Data protection law requires data that isn't of use to be deleted. This means
that the intention of this Act could be using data retention to acquire further policing powers using, as the Act
make data retention mandatory.
An element of this Act is the provision of the investigatory powers to be reported by 1 May 2015.[59]
Controversy
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was referred to as the "snooper's charter"
communications data bill.[60] Theresa May, a strong supporter of the Parliament Act, said in a speech that "If
we (parliament) do not act, we risk sleepwalking into a society in which crime can no longer be investigated
and terrorists can plot their murderous schemes undisrupted."[60]
The United Kingdom parliament its new laws increasing the power of data retention is essential to tackling
crime and protecting the public. However, not all agree and believe that the primary objective in the data
retention by the government is mass surveillance.
After Europe's highest court said the depth of data retention breaches citizens' fundamental right to privacy
and the UK created its own Act, it has led to the British government being accused of breaking the law by
forcing telecoms and internet providers to retain records of phone calls, texts and internet usage.[61] From this
information, governments can identify an individual's associates, location, group memberships, political
affiliations and other personal information.
In a television interview, the EU Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón highlighted the risk that the retained
data might be used illegally in ways that are "potentially detrimental to privacy or, more broadly, fraudulent or
even malicious".[61]
Retention of other data
Postal data – retention period unknown

Information written on the outside of a postal item (such as a letter or parcel), online tracking
of postal items, records of special postal items (such as records of registered, recorded or
special delivery postal items), records of parcel consignment, delivery and collection.
Banking data – seven years
The Economist reported that UK banks are required to retain data on all financial
transactions for seven years though this has not been verified.[62] It is not clear whether data
on credit card transactions is also retained for seven years.
Vehicle movement data – two years
Documents leaked from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have revealed that
the UK is planning to collect data from a nationwide network of automatic numberplate
recognition cameras and store the data for two years in a controversial new centre being
built at Hendon.[63] This data could then be linked to other data held by the government and
watchlists from the police and security services.[64]
Access to retained data
The bodies that are able to access retained data in the United Kingdom are listed in the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). These are the following:
Police forces, as defined in section 81(1) of RIPA

National Criminal Intelligence Service
Serious Organised Crime Agency, formerly the National Crime Squad
HM Customs and Excise
Inland Revenue (the latter two have been merged into HM Revenue and Customs)
Security Service
Secret Intelligence Service
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
However, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) also gives the Home Secretary powers to
change the list of bodies with access to retained data through secondary legislation. The list of authorised
bodies now includes:[65]
Food Standards Agency

Local authorities
National Health Service
Reasons for accessing retained data
The justifications for accessing retained data in the UK are set out in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act 2000 (RIPA). They include:
Interests of national security;

Preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder;
Economic well-being of the United Kingdom;
Public safety;
Protecting public health;
Assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable
to a government department;
Preventing death or injury in an emergency or any damage to a person's physical or mental
health, or of mitigating any injury or damage to a person's physical or mental health;
Any other purpose not listed above which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by an
order made by the Secretary of State.
Norway
The EU's Data Retention Directive has been implemented into Norwegian law in 2011,[66] but this will not
be in effect before 1 January 2015.[67]
Russia
A 2016 anti-terrorist federal law 374-FZ known as Yarovaya Law requires all telecommunication providers to
store phone call, text and email metadata, as well as the actual voice recordings for up to 6 months.
Messaging services like WhatsApp are required to provide cryptographic backdoors to law-enforcement.[68]
The law has been widely criticized both in Russia and abroad as an infringement of human rights and a waste
of resources.[69][70][71][72]
Serbia
On 29 June 2010, the Serbian parliament adopted the Law on Electronic Communications, according to
which the operator must keep the data on electronic communications for 12 months. This provision was
criticized as unconstitutional by opposition parties and by Ombudsman Saša Janković.[73]
Switzerland
As from 7 July 2016, the Swiss Federal Law about the Surveillance of the Post and Telecommunications
entered into force, passed by the Swiss government on 18 March 2016.[74]
Mobile phones
Swiss mobile phone operators have to retain the following data for six months according to the BÜPF:
1. Phone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls

2. SIM- (Subscriber Identity Module), IMSI- (International Mobile Subscribers Identity) and IMEI-
numbers (International Mobile Equipment Identity)
3. „the location and the electrical boresight of the antenna of the mobile phone with which the
monitored person is connected to the communications system at the time of the
communication"
4. date, time and duration of the connection
Email
All Internet service providers must retain the following data for six months:
1. type of the connections (telephone, xDSL, Cable, permanent line etc.) and if known login data,
address information of the origin (MAC address, telephone number), name, address and
occupation of the user and duration of the connection from beginning to end
2. time of the transmission or reception of an email, header information according to the SMTP-
protocol and the IP addresses of the sending and receiving email application.
Email application refers to SMTP-, POP3-, IMAP4, webmail- and remail-server.[75]
Exemptions
Switzerland only applies data retention to the largest Internet service providers with over 100 million CHF in
annual Swiss-sourced revenue. This notably exempts derived communications providers such as ProtonMail,
a popular encrypted email service based in Switzerland.[76]
United States
The National Security Agency (NSA) commonly records Internet metadata for the whole planet for up to a
year in its MARINA database, where it is used for pattern-of-life analysis. U.S. persons are not exempt
because metadata are not considered data under US law (section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act).[77] Its
equivalent for phone records is MAINWAY.[78] The NSA records SMS and similar text messages worldwide
through DISHFIRE.[79]
Leveraging commercial data retention
Various United States agencies leverage the (voluntary) data retention practised by many U.S. commercial
organizations through programs such as PRISM and MUSCULAR.
Amazon is known to retain extensive data on customer transactions. Google is also known to retain data on
searches, and other transactions. If a company is based in the United States the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) can obtain access to such information by means of a National Security Letter (NSL). The
Electronic Frontier Foundation states that "NSLs are secret subpoenas issued directly by the FBI without any
judicial oversight. These secret subpoenas allow the FBI to demand that online service providers or
ecommerce companies produce records of their customers' transactions. The FBI can issue NSLs for
information about people who haven't committed any crimes.
NSLs are practically immune to judicial review. They are accompanied by gag orders that allow no exception
for talking to lawyers and provide no effective opportunity for the recipients to challenge them in court. This
secret subpoena authority, which was expanded by the controversial USA PATRIOT Act, could be applied to
nearly any online service provider for practically any type of record, without a court ever knowing". The
Washington Post has published a well researched article on the FBI's use of National Security Letters.[80]
Failed mandatory ISP retention legislation attempts

The United States does not have any Internet Service Provider (ISP) mandatory data retention laws similar to
the European Data Retention Directive,[81] which was retroactively invalidated in 2014 by the Court of
Justice of the European Union. Some attempts to create mandatory retention legislation have failed:
In 1999 two models of mandatory data retention were suggested for the United States: What IP
address was assigned to a customer at a specific time. In the second model, "which is closer
to what Europe adopted", telephone numbers dialed, contents of Web pages visited, and
recipients of e-mail messages must be retained by the ISP for an unspecified amount of
time.[82][83][84]
The Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today's Youth Act (SAFETY Act) of
2009 also known as H.R. 1076 and S.436 would require providers of "electronic
communication or remote computing services" to "retain for a period of at least two years all
records or other information pertaining to the identity of a user of a temporarily assigned
network address the service assigns to that user".[85] This bill never became a law.[86]
Arguments against data retention

While it is often argued that data retention is necessary to combat terrorism and other crimes, there are still
others who oppose data retention. Data retention may assist the police and security services to identify
potential terrorists and their accomplices before or after an attack has taken place. For example, the authorities
in Spain and the United Kingdom stated that retained telephony data made a significant contribution to police
enquires into the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings.[87]
The opponents of data retention make the following arguments:
1. The Madrid train bombings can also be seen as proof that the current data retention level is
sufficient and hence the EU directive is not necessity.[88]
2. Schemes for data retention do not make provisions for adequate regulation of the data
retention process and for independent judicial oversight.
3. Data retention is an invasion of privacy and a disproportionate response to the threat of
terrorism.
4. It is easy for terrorists to avoid having their communications recorded. The Home Office
Voluntary Code of Practice of Data Retention admits that there are some internet protocols
which cannot be effectively monitored. It would be possible for terrorists to avoid monitoring by
using anonymous P2P technologies, internet cafés, anonymous proxies or several other
methods. Some police officers in the EU are sceptical about the value of data retention. For
example, Heinz Kiefer, president of Eurocop, the European Confederation of Police, issued a
press statement saying "it remains easy for criminals to avoid detection through fairly simple
means, for example mobile phone cards can be purchased from foreign providers and
frequently switched. The result would be that a vast effort is made with little more effect on
criminals and terrorists than to slightly irritate them. Activities like these are unlikely to boost
citizens' confidence in the EU's ability to deliver solutions to their demand for protection
against serious crime and terrorism".[89]
5. The hardware and software required to store all the retained data would be extremely costly.
The costs of retaining data would not only fall on Internet Service Providers and telephone
companies, but also on all companies and other organisations which would need to retain
records of traffic passing through their switchboards and servers.
6. Data retention gives excessive power to the state to monitor the lives of individual citizens.
7. Data retention may be abused by the police to monitor the activities of any group which may
come into conflict with the state; including ones which are engaged in legitimate protests. The
UK police have used anti-terrorism powers against groups opposed to the war in Iraq[90] and
protesters at an arms fair.[91] The definition of terrorism in the UK Terrorism Act 2000 includes
not only action, but the threat of action, involving serious violence against a person, or serious
damage to property, for the purposes of advancing a "political, religious or ideological cause".
There is concern that the definition is vaguely worded and could be applied to supporters of
animal liberation, anti-war demonstrators, and many others.
8. Even if data retention may be justified, the retention periods proposed in some cases are
excessive. It has been argued that a period of five days for web activity logs and ninety days
for all other data would be adequate for police purposes.
9. Data retention by search engines provides an unfair advantage to dominant search
engines.[92]
Protection against data retention

The current directive proposal (see above) would force ISPs to record the internet communications of its
users. The basic assumption is that this information can be used to identify with whom someone, whether
innocent citizen or terrorist, communicated throughout a specific timespan. Believing that such as mandate
would be useful is ignoring that some very committed community of crypto professionals has been preparing
for such legislation for decades. Below are some strategies available today to anyone to protect themselves,
avoid such traces, and render such expensive and legally dubious logging operations useless.
Anonymizing proxy services: Web
There are anonymizing proxies that provide slightly more private web access. Proxies must use HTTPS
encryption in order to provide any level of protection at all. Unfortunately, proxies require the user to place a
large amount of trust in the proxy operator (since they see everything the user does over HTTP), and may be
subject to traffic analysis.
P2P communications
Some P2P services like file transfer or voice over IP use other computers to allow communication between
computers behind firewalls. This means that trying to follow a call between two citizens might, mistakenly,
identify a third citizen unaware of the communication.
Privacy enhancing tools
For security conscious citizens with some basic technical knowledge, tools like I2P – The Anonymous
Network, Tor, Mixmaster and the cryptography options integrated into any many modern mail clients can be
employed.
I2P is an international peer-to-peer anonymizing network, which aims at not only evading data retention, but
also at making spying by other parties impossible. The structure is similar to the one TOR (see next
paragraph) uses, but there are substantial differences. It protects better against traffic analysis and offers strong
anonymity and for net-internal traffic end-to-end encryption. Due to unidirectional tunnels it is less prone to
timing attacks than Tor. In I2P, several services are available: anonymous browsing, anonymous e-mails,
anonymous instant messenger, anonymous file-sharing, and anonymous hosting of websites, among others.
Tor is a project of the U.S. non-profit Tor Project[93] to develop and improve an onion routing network to
shield its users from traffic analysis. Mixmaster is a remailer service that allows anonymous email sending.
JAP is a project very similar to Tor. It is designed to route web requests through several proxies to hide the
end user's Internet address. Tor support has been included into JAP.
Initiative against extensive data retention

The Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (German Working Group on Data Retention) is an association of
civil rights campaigners, data protection activists and Internet users. The Arbeitskreis coordinates the
campaign against the introduction of data retention in Germany.[94]
An analysis of federal Crime Agency (BKA) statistics published on 27 January 2010 by civil liberties NGO
AK Vorrat revealed that data retention did not make a prosecution of serious crime any more effective.[95]
As the EU Commission is currently considering changes to the controversial EU data retention directive, a
coalition of more than 100 civil liberties, data protection and human rights associations, jurists, trade unions
and others are urging the commission to propose the repeal of the EU requirements regarding data retention in
favour of a system of expedited preservation and targeted collection of traffic data.[95]
Plans for extending data retention to social networks

In November 2012, answers to a parliamentary inquiry in the German Bundestag revealed plans of some EU
countries including France to extend data retention to chats and social media. Furthermore, the German
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany's domestic intelligence agency) has confirmed
that it has been working with the ETSI LI Technical Committee since 2003.[96][97][98][99][100]
See also
Data security
Data Retention Directive
Data retention hardware
Data Protection Act 1998
Computer data storage
Customer proprietary network information
Data privacy
Electronic discovery
Lawful interception
Mass surveillance
NSA call database
Privacy
Secrecy of correspondence
Traffic analysis
I2P - The Anonymous Network
References
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legislation, codes of practice, etc.
UK Home Office: Consultation papers (https://web.archive.org/web/20050306100054/http://ww
w.homeoffice.gov.uk/inside/consults/closed/papers2003.html) on data retention and on access
to communications data.
Walker, C.; Akdeniz, Y. (2003). "Anti-terrorism laws and data retention: war is over?" (https://do
i.org/10.53386%2Fnilq.v54i2.737). Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. 54 (2): 159–182.
doi:10.53386/nilq.v54i2.737 (https://doi.org/10.53386%2Fnilq.v54i2.737).
Working Group on Data Retention: List of documents relating to communications data
retention in the EU (http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Resources) (current)
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Data Retention

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Data Retention

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Data retention

Data retention policies

Trace and identify the source of a communication;

As of July 2012, new legislation was on its way.[28]

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014

Retention of other data

Postal data – retention period unknown

Access to retained data

Police forces, as defined in section 81(1) of RIPA

Food Standards Agency

Reasons for accessing retained data

Interests of national security;

1. Phone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls

Email application refers to SMTP-, POP3-, IMAP4, webmail- and remail-server.[75]

Leveraging commercial data retention

Failed mandatory ISP retention legislation attempts

Arguments against data retention

The opponents of data retention make the following arguments:

Protection against data retention

Anonymizing proxy services: Web

Privacy enhancing tools

Initiative against extensive data retention

Plans for extending data retention to social networks

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