Generator Condition Monitor Evolution and

Capability
Clyde V. Maughan, P.E. Emeritus
Maughan Engineering Cmsultants
Schenectady, New York 12306 USA
Email: clyde@maughan..com
Web: clyde.maughan.com

Abstract: The Generator Condition Monitor (also called concern. This device would detect very early stages of
"Core Monitor") had an early history of invalid alarms due to localized overheating associated with eadt of the three failure
causes not relllled to generator overheating. Because responding mechanisms listed in the previous paragraph. Unfortlmately,
to a monitor alarm involved high cost to the owner, iJ became the technology associated with the mooitor was so sensitive
common industry practice to ignore the device. Yet even on
and sophisticated that the monitor was subject to alarm due to
the early, somewhat primitive instruments, valid altII'Im occu"ed
Because of the potentially high value of early detection of causes not related to component overheating. It took several
burning inside a generator, a large effort has been expended to years of intensive effort from several organizatims to refine
improve reliability of the device and make it easier' to use. These the design to a point whtye the equipment could be
efforts involved both present suppliers of this equipment, considered reliable. This paper will smnmarize the basic
General Electric & Environment One, as well as others. Around operating physics of the monitor, the evolution of
1989 a moture design had been reached, and since then over SOO improvements of the product, and operating experience as
of the modern devices have been put in service. these improvements have progressed.
Based on recent EPRI surveys and other data sources, the post-
1989 monitors are now performing well, with infrequent invalid
alarms. Seventeen valid alarms have been reported on n. PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION
generators, and these incidents are sUlllltUll'ized individually in
this paper. The operatim of the Generator Cooditim Mooitor is based
Although the number of valid alarms is small, because of the on the filet that thermal decomposition of organic materials,
inherently high destructive nature of these failures the potential such as epoxy and polyester resins, enamel paint and core
saving has been great. A single failure can exceed $10 million in
laminate enamel, results in the production of large quantities
repair cost alone, and forced outage time costs can far exceed
the high repair costs. Con'ect response to the infrequent monitor of very small submiaoo particulates (pyrolysate products)
alarm has been enhanced by the availability of the Distributed that range in the size from .001 to .01 micrms. Under
Control System. nmnal operating conditims, there are no particulates of this
If properly maintained and operllled, the generator condition size in the cooling gas. The presence of these small
monitor can be a valuable deviee that could mean the difference particulates can mly take place as a result of thermal
between a brief shut down for minor repairs or a major overhaul decomposition of organic materials.
involving weeks or even months ofcostly downtime. The thermal mmitor consists basically of an ion chamber
detector, an auto sampling system and the system electronics.
I. GENERATOR MONITORING CAPABILITY The ion dlamber contains a -weak alpha source that produces
negative ions. The negative ioos produced by the alpha
Generator monitoring capability has historically been source are carried into a collector assembly via piping across
limited, with many of the more common failure mechanisms the generator ventilation fan. The negative ions are attracted
monitored imptyfectly or not at all. Examples of to a positive electrode in the ion chamber detector which then
inadequately monitored failure mechanisms on generators produces a very small CWTent flow. This current is
include stator core lamination insulation failure, cracks electrmically amplified to produce an output that is typically
developing in electrical conductors, and shorts and grounds set at 800A. of full scale on a monitoring device.
developing due to field coil/tum distortim. This limitation When tbtye is no overheating taking place within the
has been troubling to gentyat<r manufacturers as well as generator, the output will remain stable at this 80% base.
power plant operating and maintenance personnel. Failure However, if overheating is occurring anywhere within the
due to overheating of the stator core iron is a particular generat<r, thtTmal decomposition will take place and produce
concern. While this type of generator failure is not common, a large quantity of submicroo particles. These particles are
whm a core fails it usually results in extensive damage to the carried to the thermal mmitor via the gentyator cooling gas
generat<r, with associated expensive repairs and outage time. system. When these submicroo particles enter the ion
The Generator Condition Monitor (a thtTmal mmitor) dtamber detector, the negative ioos attadt themselves to
discussed in this paper was developed to address this these particles. Since the submiaon particles are relatively

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heavy compared to the negative ions, the attadted pair is more panel was developed that could be located in 1he control
likely to flow past the positive electrode of the collector room. The remote panel provided operators with a recording
assembly, thus decreasing the current and lowering the output of the output, operatim of the confirmatim filter and
below the preset 50% alarm level. operatim of the test particle source which was used to test
Overheating is verified by the insertion of a confirmation the operation of the im chalnber detector.
filter at the input to the ion chamber. The confirmatim fiher At the same time as the remote panel was developed,
will remove the submiaon particles, whidt will allow the ion Westinghouse designed an auto-sampling system that was
dtamber detector current to increase, causing the output to incorporated into the mmit<r. The auto-sampling system
return to 80%, and thereby confirming the presence of provided a means to automatically collect a sample of the
thermally generated submiaon particles, i.e., overheating thermally decomposed products when an alarm condition
somewhere within the generator. occurred. The sample could thm. be analyzed by a
In <rder for the monitor to function reliably, the gas flow laboratm-y to confirm 1he validity of the alarm and in some
rate must remain constant and the im dtamber detector and cases determine the material that was overheating
electronics must be operating properly. Since the gas flow is On generators where the hydrogen was not clean and dry,
created by the generatm- cooling gas tim, gas flow will remain contaminants such as oil, rust and scaling could foul the
constant mless res1riction occurs in the piping or the speed of piping and the flow meter. Whm. this occurred, the hydrogen
the rotor changes. flow could become restricted, causing the output of the
monitor to drop, which would result in a drop in 1he output
m. EVOLUfION OF THE CONDITION MONITOR signal, resulting in an invalid alarm. The flow meter
contaminatim problem was addressed by replacing the flow
Background meter with a differential pressure gage. With this design
In 1he mid-I960s, engineers at General Electric designed an change, 1he monitor output became much more stable,
''Ion Chamber Detector" that could be used for the detection of although fouling of1he piping remained a concern.
particulates produced by the thermal decomposition of The remaining issue which raised the greatest concern
organic materials. I ,2 This Ion Chamber Detector was later relative to these early monitors was determining when an
incorporated into a prototype instrument, the ''Core Monitm-", alarm was valid. The next series of design improvements
designed specifically for the early detectim of local addressed this issue, and represented a major advancement in
overheating in large hydrogen-cooled steam turbine the level of reliability and confidence one could place in this
technology. Specifically, an auto alarm remote panel was
generators. 3,4 Several of these Core Monitors were installed
designed that would give warning levels, indicate when 1here
on generators at sites throughout 1he United States.
was a fuult with the monitor itself: indicate whm. 1he supply
Sh<rtly after installatim, a Ce.-e Monitor installed on a
power was interrupted, indicate when the hydrogen flow was
large .generator at a power plant indicated that overheating
too low, and would automatically and accurately verify
was taking place. Because the Core Mmitm- was a proto-type
when alarms were valid. In other words this improvement
instrument and yet to be field proven, a decision was made
verified the alarm, 1hus letting 1he operator know when the
to disregard the alarm. Several days later the generate.- fuiled
alarm was invalid and when the alarm was the result of
in service. Upon inspection it was found that severe core
actual overheating ofa compooent inside the generatm-. Fr(lJl
overheating had indeed taken place and that the Cm-e Mmiu..
these changes which were completed by the late 1980s, ''The
had provided an early warning.
As a result of this incident General Electric began offering New Generatm- Condition Mmitor"s could be considered as
Core Monite.-s as part of the supervisory equipment made having been produced.
available for turbine generatcrs. General Electric also signed The post-1989 Generator Cmditim Monitm- has had two
a licensing agreement with Environment One Corp<ratim additiooal improvements that further address reliability and
allowing them to manufucture and sell the monitor. performance. Because hydrogen flow influences the
Envirmment One refers to the instrument as a Generator Generator Cmditim Mmitor output, the differential pressure
Condition Mmite.-, and the latter term is used in 1his paper. gage has been replaced by a differential pressure 1ransmitter.
This improvement allows the gas flow to be remotely tracked
to determine 1he influence of flow 00 the output signal. Also,
Evolution ofMonitor Design Improvements
the present production of monitors is designed to satisfy
In addition to the ion chamber detector, confirmation
requirements for use in a hazardous area.
filter/solenoid assembly and system electronics, the early
monitors included a test particle source, and a rotometer-type
flow gage. Monitor Alarm Conditions
In most installations a signal alarm contact was connected There are four conditioos that can cause the monitor output
to an aDnmciator in the con1rol room. When an aDnmciatim to drop: 1) decrease in gas flow, 2) a fuulty im chamber
was given, operators had to go to the physical loaltion of detector, 3) fuulty system electrooics and 4), actual
the monitor, usually under the belly of the generattr, and 1ry overheating within the generator. The first three cooditions
to assess what caused the output signal to drop. To eliminate will provide an invalid alarm; misinterpretatioo of these
the need for operate.-s having to go to the monittr, a remote errmeous signals has been essen~ally eliminated by the

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evolution of modifications described above. directed specifically at modem mmitocs, produced after 1990.
The 4th conditim, actual overheating, is responsive to high Immediate responses were received :from 100 utilities; 29 of
temperatures associated with component failure anywhere these utilities reported having a total of 91 monitors in
within the generator. Typical failure modes which will result service.
in mOlite.- alarm are: core iron lamination insulation break- Summarizing the information reported by these 29 utilities:
down, cracking stator winding electrical connections, and • Quality of the maintenance of the monitors:
field winding shorts/grounds or lroken turns. Excellent - 6, Adequate - 21, Poor - o.
An additional overheating mechanism which may result in a • Quality of operator training:
monitor alarm is high local temperatures on the core clamping Excellent - 2, Adequate - 18, Poor - 9
flanges or on the copper flux shields vWtich are used at the • Experiencing of invalid alarms:
Yes-2,No-19
ends of the core by some generator manufacturers. As load
Overall, it appears that plant personnel are providing
conditions move toward leading power factor, starting ar01D1d
sufficient maintenance of the monitocs. But clearly it would
.98 lag the components at the ends of the core begin to
generate additional eddy current losses and may become
be desirable to see better attention to training. Training is
particularly important because of the infrequency with which
ra1her hot. In general, 1his condition is not harmful to the
operating personnel will be experiencing alarm ofthe monitor,
generator. But paint or contaminates such as oil on these
and because of the fundamental reiatimship between training
components may overheat and form submicron particles that
and correct operator response to mooitor alarm.
can alarm the mmitor. Since alarms :from this operating
condition will only occur at higher power-factor loading, it is Invalid alarms were reported by 2 utilities, specifically:
possible to screen out this type of falst>-positive alarm. 1) General comment stating "some fulse alarms on all of our
units, new and old".
2) Large 25-year-old generator. (No details provided.)
IV. OPERATING EXPERIENCE
Utilities reported 3 additional incidents:
1 & 2) Difficulties with gas flow calibratioo due to high
Prototype Models ofthe Core Monitor
differential pressure across a multi-stage blower.
The early versions of the Core Monitor were a relative
3) No alarm received during major rotor winding failure due
simple device, with little signal verification capability. They
to clogged sensing line.
were viewed somewhat as a glocified smoke detector,
Three previously unreported "saves" were included
although recognized as mum more sensitive and complex.
specifically: ,
If a valid signal were received, the device was capable of
1) Arcing due to rotor winding fuilure.
providing the expected alarm, and since the potential benefits
2) Burning :from rotor shooed turns.
were so great, many were installed - in excess of 1000.
But unfortunately, numerous drops in the output signals 3) Alarm due to an end winding connectim b"eak.
Several additimal comments were provided by the
occurred, resulting in invalid alarms in these early monitors. 6
respondents. These comments have been passed on to the
The invalid alarms were a result of failure modes within the
monitor suppliers, and include:
monitor itself: as well as :from contaminants such as normal
oil vapor and changes in hydrogen flow through the monitoc. • Oil filters and traps are a must in the sensor lines.
Oil contamination was plentiful, thus assuring numerous • Occasional nOl-critical alarms due to supply voltage issues
during plant startup. .
invalid alarms. The high costs associated with diagnosing sum
an alarm quickly caused the monitor to lose credibility. • Problem obtaining adequate gas flow through mooitor.
Routine monitor maintenance and operator training was also • ''Trustworthiness to operators is debatable."
neglected. As a result, these early monitors provided little • Alarms so in:frequent that operators do not remember proper
value to the generator operatocs, and operators began to response to alarm.
disregard alarms initiated by the mmitor.
v. TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
Monitor Capability During Design Evolution
Although the monitor had developed a dubious reputatiOl, Operator Training
because of high industry need for such a device, equipment Recommended steps for responding to an alarm are
manufucturers continued to expend considerable effort toward described in the Installation and Operation Manual provided
finding a reliable design. During the 25 years of this with the monitor. The individual checks are not complicated,
evolution, reliability was gradually improved by the several but alarm of the Generator Coodition Monitor is likely to
basic changes described above. However, it was not until occur so infrequently that a control-room operator may not
about 1989 that reliability appears to have reached a level recall appropriate actioo. to take upon receipt of an alarm.
where misinterpreted alarms were largely eliminated. Most power plants now incorporate a Distributed Control
System (DeS). Basic information relating to configuring the
Performance ofPost-1989 Monitors Gena-atoc Cmditim Monitoc into the nes can be obtained
In ocder to assist in preparations for this paper, the Electric :from the Installatioo and Operation Manual or directly :from
Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted an industry survey the ~anufucturer of the mmitor. The DeS can be configured
to display a checklist of appropriate actions in either a textual

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or flow-chart format in order to assist the operatm- in making burning of a miling phase cmnectim. Major stat<r winding
a timely and logical respmse to 1he alarm. firilure prevented. Repairs avoided: Full stator rewind, field
rewind, extensive machine cleaning. Estimated repair costs
Monitor Maintenance avoided: $10 million.
Reliable operation of the Gaterator Cmditim Moo.itor Baffle Rub. Alarm received during initial commissioning
requires relatively simple periodic checks. The moo.itor of turbine-generator. Inspected generator and found 1I1at 1I1e
Installatim & Operatim Manual defines these checks in temporary shipping baffles that had not been rWloved.
detail. If deficiencies are observed, associated maintenance Repairs avoided: Minor. Estimated costs avoided: Mintr.
should be promptly performed. These routine checks are Intermittent Alarm on High Loads. Poor contact between
summarized below. several tube-to-copper connection resisttrs on gas-cooled
Daily. Observe gas flow rate and adjust if necessary. stator bars, resulting in a hole burned in a cooling duct.
Verify that monitm- output is at the 80% set point; recalibrate Repairs avoided: Probably minor, but possibly stator winding
ifnecessary. failure. Estimated repair costs avoided: $10 millim..
Weekly. Push 1he ''Verificatim Filter Buttoo." to cmfirm Stator Winding Water Flow Blockage. GCM alarmed on
proper operatim ofthe filter system. load ina-ease. Inspectim revealed blocked water flow, thereby
Monthly. Perform Relay Test, Contact Test, Ke)pad Test, preventing winding fuilure. Repairs avoided: Probable stator
Output Test and Power Test. rewind Estimated repair costs avoided: $10 millime
Yearly. Oleck for hydrogen leaks m tubing, fittings, joints Stator Core Failure. GCM was in constant alarm for 30
and valve packing. Activate Auto Sampling System to minutes prior to stattr core meltdown fililure. Intermittent
coo.firm proper operatim. alarms were occurring during 1he prior several months.
Potential for avoided repairs: Restack of core and stator
VI. OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF GENERATOR rewind Estimated repair costs: Uncertain. If core repair had
CONDITION MONITORS been possible prim- to meltdown, cost saving \\1Ould have
exceeded $15 million.
There are 17 incidents known to manufilcturers of monitors Field Winding Arcing to Ground. GCM alarmed and 1I1e
where a valid alarm has resulted :from generator compment generatm- was manually tripped. Tests revealed two shorted
over-heating. Based 00. available information, which is some coils under retaining ring. Repairs avoided: Possibly:fracture
cases is limited, a brief desaiptioo. of each of these incidents of a retaining ring, with total destruction of the generat<r.
is listed below. Estimated costs avoided: Significant exposure of plant
Rough estimates of ''Repairs avoided" and ''Estimated personnel to severe injury, and multi-million dollar plant and
repair costs avoided" are also included in the tabulatim. The equipment repair.
accuracy of the individual repair estimates is not high, but Operation Without Cooling Water. GCM alarmed at 150
the estimates are provided to give an overall sense of the MW on a 650 MW generator while unit \\laS being ramped
large potential savings associated with a properly functioning up to full load. Alarm was temporarily disregarded, but unit
moo.ittr. was manually tripped at 250 MW. Inspection revealed that
the hydrogen coolers were inoperative. Repairs avoided:
Reported Monitor Alarm Incidents Possibly extensive damage to the generat<r. Estimated costs
Blockage ofLiquid Hose. An alarm gave indications of avoided: Uncertain.
slowly developing overheating. The wit was tripped and it Generator Field Ground. GeM alarmed about 40 minutes
was found 1I1at a stator winding Tefloo. cooling \\later ha;e before manual trip of the generator. Inspection and test
was becoming blocked causing overheating of two stattr bars. revealed that several rotor coils had elmgated and caused
Had failure occurred, a double ground mult \\1Ould have multiple grounds to the retaining ring. The associated arcing
r~ulted in massive arcing and burning. Repairs avoided: Full had resulted in dte GCM alarm. Repairs avoided: Possibly
stator rewind, probable field rewind, extensive cleaning of fracture of a retaining ring, with total destruction of the
core, :frame and coolers. Estimated repair costs avoided: generator. Estimated costs avoided: Significant exposure of
$10millim. plant personnel to severe injury, and multi-millim dollar plant
Arcing of Rotor Winding. Alarm resulted in shutdown and equipment repair.
where a winding mult \\laS found Repairs avoided: Possible OEM Test Protection. Use of a GCM as protection against
arc damage to forgings with major impact m overall repairs. over-temperature during acceptance test detected a stator
Estimated costs avoided: Uncertain, but possibly significant. cooling water blockage early and prevented serious damage.
Burning from Rotor Shorted Turns. Alarm resulted in Prim- tests without a GCM had resulted in over- temperature
shutdown where arcing was found between shorted turns. that des1royed an entire field Repairs avoided: Severe over-
Repairs avoided: Possibly full rewind Estimated costs heating damage to a field. Estimated repair costs avoided: $2
avoided: Uncertain, but possibly significant millime
Phase Connection Failure. Alarm at full load automatically Core Burning. GCM alarmed due to a core laminatim hot
verified. Reduced load by about 20% and alarm cleared. spot approximately two square inches in size which developed
Returned to full load and alarm retmned. Inspection revealed during normal operatim. Repairs avoided: Possibly eventual

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core meltdown. Estimated costs avoided: Uncertain. conditim initiating 1he monitoc alarm. But since the risks
Water Cooler Valved Out. GCM detected overheating in a associated with non-response to an alarm can be exceedingly
550 megawatt generator \\bile it was ramping up to full load, high, it will always be prudent to regard an alarm as valid
following a generator rewind. The GeM was the first unless known informatim cmfirms otherwise.
indicator that one ofthe water coolers was valved out. Repairs Because of the inherent nature of the fililure modes being
avoided: Possibly overheating of generat<r. Estimated costs monitored, expeditious response may be very important. Thus,
avoided: Uncertain. it would be advisable to configure the plant Distributed
BafJle Rub. During restart after statoc replacement, GCM Control System (DCS) to assist the operatoc in making a
alarmed. Inspectim of the generator revealed a rub between timely and correct response to an alarm.
the field and a gas flow restriction baftle. The GCM correctly If properly maintained and operated, the Generator
identified the particulate as a valid alarm cmditim. Repairs Condition Mmitor am be a valuable device that could mean
avoided: Minor. Estimated costs avoided: Minor. the difference between a brief shut down for minoc repairs or
Breaking of Stator Winding Connection. GCM alarmed on a major overhaul involving weeks or mon1hs of costly
fracturing of a connection, allowing unit to be shut down downtime.
without experiencing the extensive contaminatim normally
associated with such a fililure. Repairs avoided: Severe
contaminatim of generator, possible stator rewind. Estimated REFERENCES
repair costs avoided: $4 million.
1. G.F. Skala, "The Ion Chamber Detector as a Mooitor of Thermally
Field Tum Shorts. Existence of turn shorts was confirmed Produced Particulates", Sixth International Cooference 00 Coodensation
by monit<r alarm, allowing shutdown without collateral Nuclei, Albany, New York, May 9-13, 1966.
damage. Repairs avoided: Probably small impact in overall 2. Grobel, LP and Carsm, CC (1969) Overheating Detector for Gas Cooled
repairs required. Estimated costs avoided: Probably minor. Eleclrical Machines. US Patent 342 7880.
3. C.C. Carsm, S.C. Bartoo and L .P. Grobel, ''Immediate Detection of
Overheating in Gas-Cooled Electrical Machines", IEEE Winter Power
VII. CONCLUSIONS Meeting, New York, N.Y., January 31-Felruaty 5, 1971.
4. Bartoo, S.C., Carsm, C.C., Gill, R.S., Ligan, W.V. and Webb, J.L.
The Generat<r Condition Monitor is an exceptionally Implementatioo of Pyrolysate Analysis of Materials Employing Tagging
Compounds to Locate an Overheated Area In a Generatoc. lEEE PES
sensitive device. Many years of development and design Summer Meeting, July 1981.
evolution were required before reaching a state of high 5. G.F. Skala, ''The New Generatoc Cmdition Monitor and its Applicatioo to
reliability against misinterpreted alarms. That point appears to the Protection of Turbine Generators", Proceedings of the First
have been reached in about 1989. Intematiooal Power Conference, Beijin& The People's Republic of China,
1986.
The device monitors the generat<r for several adverse 6. Wallis, D.J. and S. Kilmartin, "Can You Believe your GCM?", Eighth
conditims that can initiate a valid alarm. These conditions EPRI Steam Turbine-Generator Annual Workshop and Vendor Exposition,
range from the benign to core melt-down - a spectrum frOOl Nashville, TN, August 25-27, 2003.
min<r rub to complete generator internal destruction.
Unfortunately, there will normally be at least some
uncertainty as to the exact source and urgency of the

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