Sociological Paradigms

and Organisational
Analysis
Elcmellls of the So('iolo~-:y of Corporate Life

Gibson Burrell
Lecturer in the Department of Behaviour in Organisations,
University of Lancaster, England
Gareth Morgan
Associate Professor of Organisational Behaviour and
Industrial Relations, York University, Toronto
First published 1979 by Heinemann Educational Books

Published 2016 by Routledge

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Copyright © 1979 Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Burrell, Gibson
Sociological paradigms and organisational
analysis : elements of the sociology of corporate
life.
I. Organisation
I. Title II. Morgan. Gareth
302.3’5 HM131

ISBN 9780566051487 (hbk)

ISBN 9781857421149 (pbk)

Publisher's Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this book
but points out that some imperfections from the original may be apparent.
Contents

page
List of Figures v
List of Tables v
Acknowledgements vi
Introduction viii
PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK
1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 1
The Strands of Debate 4
Analy.sing Assumptions about the Nature of Social
Sci.ence 7
2 Assumptions about the Nature ol Society 10
The Order-Conflict Debate 10
•Regulation· and ·Radical Change• 16
3 Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 21
The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms 23
The Functionalist Paradigm 25
The Interpretive Paradigm 28
The Radical Humanist Paradigm 32
The Radical Structuralist Paradigm 33
Exploring Social Theory 35

PART II: THE PARADIGMS EXPLORED

4 Functionalist Sociology 41
Origins and Intellectual Tradition 41
The Structure of the Paradigm 48
Social System Theory 49
Interactionism and Social Action Theory 68
Integrative Theory 87
Objectivism 102
The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 106
5 Functionalist Organisation Theory 118
Theories of Organisation within the Functionalist
Paradigm 121
Social System Theory and Objectivism 123
Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions 184
iv Contents
The Action Frame of Reference 189
Pluralist Theory 202
Debate within the Functionalist Paradigm 217
6 Interpretive Sociology 227
Origins and Intellectual Tradition 227
The Structure of the Paradigm 234
Hermeneutics 235
Solipsism 238
Phenomenology 240
Phenomenological Sociology 247
The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 253
7 111e Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of
Organisations 260
Ethnomethodological Approaches to the Study of
Organisational Activities 261
Phenomenological Symbolic lnteractionism and the
Study of Organisational Activities 270
The Phenomenological Challenge to Contemporary
Organisation Theory 273
Phenomenological Approaches to the Study of
Organisational Situations: Problems and Dilemmas 275
8 Radical Humanism 279
Origins and Intellectual Tradition 279
The Structure of the Paradigm 282
Critical Theory 283
Anarchistic Individualism 299
French Existentialism 302
The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 306
9 Anti-Organisation 111eory 310
Towards Alternative Realities 313
Towards an Anti-Organisation Theory 319
10 Radical Structuralism 326
Origins and Intellectual Tradition 326
The Structure of the Paradigm 333
Russian Social Theory 334
Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism 341
Conflict Theory 349
The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 357
II Radical Organisation 111eory 365
Radical Weberian Approaches to a Radical
Organisation Theory 371
Marxian Structuralist Approaches to a Radical
Organisation Theory 3n
 Contents v
Towards the Further Development of Radical
Organisation Theory 385

PART III: CONCLUSIONS

1l Future Directions: Theory and Research 395
Bibliography 403
Index 427

List of Figures
pa~te
1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature
of social science 3
3.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 22
3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionalist paradigm 27
3.3 The four sociological paradigms 29
3.4 The main schools of organisational analysis 30
4.1 Some possible types of system models 67
5.1 Functionalist approaches to the study of organisations 121
5.2 The development of social system theory and objectivism 124
5.3 Scheme for interpreting complaints and reduced work
effectiveness 135
5.4 Scheme for interpreting complaints involving soci~ inter-
relationships of employees 137
5.5 A contingency model for organisational analysis 177

List of Tables
pa~te
2.1 Two theories of society: 'order· and 'conflict' 13
2.2 The regulation- radical change dimension 18
5.1 The unitary and pluralist views of interests, conflict and
power 204
8. I Critical theory: central concepts and orientations 298-9
9.1 Key dimensions of alternative realities 318
9.2 Towards the definition of anti-organisation theory 322-3
II. 1 The unity of the radical structuralist attack upon organi-
sation theory 366-7
11.2 Some differences in emphasis between Marxian struc-
turalist and radical Weberian approaches to radical
organisation theory 385
11.3 The radical Weberian view of interests, conflict and
power 388
Acknowledgements

We have worked on this book at a pace which has varied from the
intense to the intolerable, and as a consequence we have asked and
received a great deal of our families and friends. We owe to them
all a great debt of thanks. In particular we wish to thank Christine
Burrell for her considerable patience, help and encouragement,
which were stretched up to and sometimes beyond the limits. Our
work owes much to our colleagues and students at Lancaster,
particularly those in the Department of Behaviour in
Organisations, where the stimulating and convivial combination of
critical enquiry, friendship and debate has been a major feature of
our enterprise.
The ideas expressed in the book are the product of extensive
discussion and as such are to be seen as shared. However, the
responsibility for the production of the manuscript in its present
form has fallen largely upon Gareth Morgan, who has undertaken
the task of converting early drafts into a finished text and of
imposing stylistic unity on the work as a whole. Needless to say, in
the spirit of our endeavour, responsibility, credit and blame are
jointly assumed.
Thanks are due to Jean Atkinson, Janet Fisher, Joy Howson,
Sue Lawrence and Lynne Rymarz for typing various sections of
the manuscript. The assistance of the Social Science Research
Council, in sponsoring field research which contributed to many of
the ideas presented here, is gratefully acknowledged.
Gibson Burrell would like to register his gratitude to his mother
and family, especially to Christine who, while the book was being
written, carried twins in and ex utero while he merely carried
books in and ex libris.
Gareth Morgan wishes to extend special thanks and
appreciation to his parents, ldris and Rachel Morgan, for all that
they have given.
We also wish to thank the following publishers for permission
to reproduce extracts from their books on the pages indicated:
Harvard University Press: F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J.
Dickson, Management and the Worker (1939), on pp. 134,
 136-7. 137-8. and Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 on pp. 135 and 137.
Houghton Mifflin Company: A. Rose. Human Behavior and
Social Processes (1962). on pp. 79-80.
John Wiley & Sons. Inc.: P.M. Blau. Exchange and Power in
Social Life (1964). on pp. 89, 90.
Merlin Press Ltd.: P. Thevenaz, What is Phenomenology?
(1962), on p. 241.
Methuen and Co Ltd.: Jean-Paul Sartre,Being and Nothingness
(1966). on p. 305.
Penguin Books Ltd.: Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life
and Work: A Historical and Critical Study (1973), on pp.
45-6.
Prentice-Hall, Inc.: L.A. Coser, Georg Simmel (1965), on pp.
70, 71, 72.
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.: John Rex, Key Problems in
Sociological Theory (1961), on pp. 353-4.
University of Chicago Press: H. Blumer. The Sociological
Implications of the Thought ofG.H. Mead (1966). on pp. 78,
81.

Gibson Burrell, Gareth Morgan

Lancaster, December 1978
Introduction

This book, which has devoured the last two years of our lives, is
the product of a friendship and intellectual partnership. It began as
an innocuous idea which grew with such strength that it developed
into a ·way of seeing'. It has changed the ways in which we think
about social theory, and we hope that it will do the same for others.
The book is intended to clarify and help overcome what seem to
be some of the major sources of confusion within the social
sciences at the present time. Initially it had a fairly specific objec-
tive: to attempt to relate theories of organisation to their wider
sociological context. In the course of development, however, this
endeavour widened in scope and evolved into an enterprise
embracing many aspects of philosophy and social theory in gen-
eral. As such it now stands as a discourse in social theory of
relevance to many social science disciplines, of which those in the
general area of organisation studies - industrial sociology, organ-
isation theory, organisational psychology and industrial relations
- are but special cases by which we illustrate our general themes.
Our proposition is that social theory can usefully be conceived in
terms of four key paradigms based upon different sets of
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of social science and
the nature of society. The four paradigms are founded upon mutu-
ally exclusive views of the social world. Each stands in its own
right and generates its own distinctive analyses of social life. With
regard to the study of organisations, for example, each paradigm
generates theories and perspectives which are in fundamental
opposition to those generated in other paradigms.
Such an analysis of social theory brings us face to face with the
nature of the assumptions which underwrite different approaches
to social science. It cuts through the surface detail which dresses
many social theories to what is fundamental in determining the
way in which we see the world which we are purporting to analyse.
It stresses the crucial role played by the scientist's frame of refer-
ence in the generation of social theory and research.
The situation with regard to the field of organisation studies at
the present time, as in other social science disciplines, is that a vast
 Introduction ix
proportion of theory and research is located within the bounds of
just one of the four paradigms to be considered here. Indeed, the
bulk of it is located within the context of a relatively narrow range
oftheoretical possibilities which define that one paradigm.lt is no
exaggeration, therefore, to suggest that the social-scientific enter-
prise in general is built upon an extremely narrow set of
metatheoretical assumptions. This concentration of effort in a
relatively narrow area defines what is usually regarded as the
dominant orthodoxy within a subject. Because this orthodoxy is so
dominant and strong, its adherents often take it for granted as right
and self-evident. Rival perspectives within the same paradigm or
outside its bounds appear as satellites defining alternative points of
view. Their impact upon the orthodoxy, however, is rarely very
significant. They are seldom strong enough to establish themselves
as anything more than a somewhat deviant set of approaches. As a
result the possibilities which they offer are rarely explored, let
alone understood.
In order to understand alternative points of view it is important
that a theorist be fully aware of the assumptions upon which his
own perspective is based. Such an appreciation involves an intel-
lectual journey which takes him outside the realm of his own
familiar domain. It requires that he become aware of the bound-
aries which define his perspective. It requires that he journey into
the unexplored. It requires that he become familiar with paradigms
which are not his own. Only then can he look back and appreciate
in full measure the precise nature of his starting point.
The work presented here is an attempt to take the student of
organisations into realms which he has probably not explored
before. It is a journey upon which we, the authors, unwittingly
embarked as a result of certain nagging doubts and uncertainties
about the utility and validity of much contemporary theory and
research in our subject. We were concerned about the way in
which studies of organisational activities had generated mountains
of theory and research which seemed to have no obvious links
outside narrow discipline areas. We were concerned about the
essentially ephemeral nature of our subject. We were concerned
about the academic sectarianism reflected at various times in open
hostility, ostrich-like indifference and generally poor-quality
dialogue and debate between essentially related schools of
thought. In short, we felt that our subject area called for a close
examination of the assumptions upon which it is based with a view
to seeing it in a new, and hopefully refreshing, light. Our book in
essence presents an account of our journey and a record of the
x 'ntroduction
conclusions and insights which have emerged.
We began our enterprise by considering how we could dis-
tinguish between different approaches to the study of
organisations. The view that 'all theories of organisation are based
upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' seemed to
recur time and again in our conversations and· we soon found it
defining two major dimensions of analysis. Although organisation
theorists are not always very explicit about the basic assumptions
which inform their point of view, it is clear that they all take a stand
on each of these issues. Whettter they are aware of it or not, they
bring to their subject of study a frame of reference which reflects a
whole series of assumptions about the nature of the social world
and the way in which it might be investigated.
Our attempt to explore these assumptions led us into the realm
of social philosophy. We were confronted with problems of ontol-
ogy and epistemology and other issues which rarely receive con-
sideration within the field of organisation studies. As we
investigated these issues we found that they underpinned the great
philosophical debates between social theorists from rival
intellectual traditions. We realised that the orthodoxy in our sub-
ject was based in essence upon just one of these traditions, and that
the satellite perspectives which we had observed as surrounding
the orthodoxy were, in fact, derived from quite a separate
intellectual source. We realised that they were attempting to
articulate points of view which derived from diametrically
opposed assumptions about the basic nature of the social world;
accordingly they subscribed to quite different assumptions about
the very nature of the social-scientific enterprise itself.
In investigating assumptions with regard to the nature of society
we were, at first, able to operate on firmer ground. The sociology
of the 1960s had focused upon the ·order-conflict debate' -
whether sociology emphasises the 'problem of order' or the
·problem of conflict and change'. By the late 1960s the debate had
been pronounced dead, and these two views of society were seen
merely as two aspects of the same problematic. In reviewing the
literature relevant to this debate we became increasingly con-
vinced that it had met a premature death. Whilst it was clear that
academic sociologists had convinced themselves that the 'problem
of conflict' could be subsumed under the 'problem of order',
theorists outside this tradition, particularly those interested in
Marxist theory, were actively engaged in the development of
social theories which placed the problems of conflict and change at
the forefront of their analysis. Although academic sociologists and
 Introduction xi
Marxist social theorists appeared content to work in isolation,
ignoring the contradictory perspectives which they presented, it
seemed that any adequate analysis of theories of society must take
these rival perspectives into account.
Our journey into Marxist literature took us into yet another new
realm as far as our initial interests were concerned. We were
surprised to find striking parallels between intellectual
developments within Marxist theory and academic sociology. We
found that the assumptions about the nature of social science
which had divided academic sociologists into different schools of
thought also divided Marxist theorists. In that realm, too, the
dominant theoretical framework was surrounded by satellite
schools of thought offering rival explanations. Pursuing these tra-
ditions to their source, we found that they emerged from precisely
the same bounds of social philosophy which had underwritten
divergent elements within sociology itself. It became clear that the
rival traditions emphasising 'order' as opposed to ·conflict' shared
the same pedigree as far as their roots in social philosophy were
concerned. Deriving from similar assumptions about the
ontological and epistemological status of social science, they had
been wedded to fundamentally different frames of reference with
regard to the nature of society.
Given these cross linkages between rival intellectual traditions,
it became clear to us that our two sets of assumptions could be
counter-posed to produce an analytical scheme for studying social
theories in general: the two sets of assumptions defined four basic
paradigms reflecting quite separate views of social reality. On
attempting to relate this scheme to the social science literature we
found that we possessed an extremely powerful tool for negotiating
our way through different subject areas, and one which made sense
of a great deal of the confusion which characterises much con-
temporary debate within the social sciences. The scheme offered
itself as a form of intellectual map upon which social theories could
be located according to their source and tradition. Theories rarely
if ever appear out of thin air; they usually have a well established
history behind them. We found that our intellectual map allowed
us to trace their evolution. Theories fell into place according to
their origins. Where rival intellectual traditions had been fused,
distinctive hybrid versions seemed to appear. What had first
offered itself as a simple classificatory device for organising the
literature now presented itself as an analytical tool. It pointed us
towards new areas of investigation. It allowed us to appraise and
evaluate theories against the backcloth of the intellectual tradition
xii Introduction
which they sought to emulate. It allowed us to identify embryonic
theories and anticipate potential lines of development. It allowed
us to write this book.
In the following chapters we seek to present our analytical
scheme and to use it to negotiate a way through the literature on
social theory and organisational analysis. We have aimed to pre-
sent it as clearly and directly as we can whilst avoiding the pitfalls
of oversimplification. But the concepts of one paradigm cannot
easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. To understand
a new paradigm one has to explore it from the inside, in terms of
its own distinctive problematic. Thus, whilst we have made every
effort to present our account as plainly as possible as far as the use
of the English language is concerned, we have necessarily had to
draw upon concepts which may at times be unfamiliar.
The remaining chapters in Part I define the nature of our two key
dimensions of analysis and the paradigms which arise within their
bounds. In this analysis we polarise a number of issues and make
much use of rough dichotomisations as a means of presenting our
case. We do so not merely for the purposes of classification. but to
forge a working tool. We advocate our scheme as a heuristic device
rather than as a set of rigid definitions.
In Part II we put our analytical framework into operation. For
each of our four paradigms we conduct an analysis of relevant
social theory and then proceed to relate theories of organisation to
this wider background. Each of the paradigms is treated in terms
consistent with its own distinctive frame of reference. No attempt
is made to criticise and evaluate from a perspective outside the
paradigm. Such criticism is all too easy but self-defeating, since it
is usually directed at the foundations of the paradigm itself. All
four paradigms can successfully be demolished in these terms.
What we seek to do is to develop the perspective characteristic of
the paradigm and draw out some of its implications for social
analysis. In so doing we have found that we are frequently able to
strengthen the conceptualisations which each paradigm generates
as far as the study of organisations is concerned. Our guiding rule
has been to seek to offer something to each paradigm within the
terms of its own problematic. The chapters in Part II, therefore,
are essentially expository in nature. They seek to provide a
detailed framework upon which future debate might fruitfully be
based.
Part Ill presents a short conclusion which focuses upon some of
the principal issues which emerge from our analysis.
PART 1: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK

1. Assumptions about the

Nature of Social Science
Central to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories of organisation are
based upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society'. In this
chapter we wish to address ourselves to the first aspect of this
thesis and to examine some of the philosophical assumptions
which underwrite different approaches to social science. We shall
argue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in terms
of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology,
human nature and methodology.
All social scientists approach their subject via explicit or implicit
assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in
which it may be investigated. First, there are assumptions of an
ontological nature - assumptions which concern the very essence
of the phenomena under investigation. Social scientists, for
example, are faced with a basic ontological question: whether the
·reality' to be investigated is external to the individual - imposing
itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product of
individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective'
nature, or the product of individual cognition; whether 'reality' is a
given ·out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind.
Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set of
assumptions of an epistemological nature. These are assumptions
about the grounds of knowledge - about how one might begin to
understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to
fellow human beings. These assumptions entail ideas. for example,
about what forms of knowledge can be obtained, and how one can
sort out what is to be regarded as 'true' from what is to be regarded
as 'false·. Indeed, this dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' itself pre-
supposes a certain epistemological stance. It is predicated upon a
view of the nature of knowledge itself: whether, for example, it is
possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as
being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form,
or whether 'knowledge' is of a softer, more subjective. spiritual or
even transcendental kind, based on experience and insight of a
 2 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
unique and essentially personal nature. The epistemological
assumptions in these instances determine extreme positions on the
issue of whether knowledge is something which can be acquired on
the one hand, or is something which has to be personally exper-
ienced on the other.
Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues, but
conceptually separate from them, is a third set of assumptions
concerning human nature and, in particular, the relationship
between human beings and their environment, All social science,
clearly, must be predicated upon this type of assumption, since
human life is essentially the subject and object of enquiry. Thus,
we can identify perspectives in social science which entail a view
of human beings responding in a mechanistic or even deterministic
fashion to the situations encountered in their external world. This
view tends to be one in which human beings and their experiences
are regarded as products of the environment~ one in which humans
are conditioned by their external circumstances . This extreme
perspective can be contrasted with one which attributes to human
beings a much more creative role: with a perspective where 'free
will' occupies the centre of the stage; where man is regarded as the
creator of his environment, the controller as opposed to the con-
trolled, the master rather than the marionette. In these two
extreme views of the relationship between human beings and their
environment we are identifying a great philosophical debate
between the advocates of determinism on the one hand and
voluntarism on the other. Whilst there are social theories which
adhere to each of these extremes, as we shall see, the assumptions
of many social scientists are pitched somewhere in the range
between.
The three sets of assumptions outlined above have direct
implications of a methodologic al nature. Each one has important
consequences for the way in which one attempts to investigate and
obtain 'knowledge' about the social world. Different ontologies,
epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to incline
social scientists towards different methodologies. The possible
range of choice is indeed so large that what is regarded as science
by the traditional ·natural scientist' covers but a small range of
options. It is possible, for example, to identify methodologies
employed in social science research which treat the social world
like the natural world, as being hard, real and external to the
individual, and others which view it as being of a much softer,
personal and more subjective quality.
If one subscribes to a view of the former kind, which treats the
 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 3
social world as if it were a hard, external. objective reality, then the
scientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relation-
ships and regularities between the various elements which it com-
prises. The concern, therefore, is with the identification and defini-
tion of these elements and with the discovery of ways in which
these relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues of
importance are thus the concepts themselves, their measurement
and the identification of underlying themes. This perspective
expresses itself most forcefully in a search for universal laws
which explain and govern the reality which is being observed.
If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality, which
stresses the importance of the subjective experience of individuals
in the creation of the social world, then the search for understand-
ing focuses upon different issues and approaches them in different
ways. The principal concern is with an understanding of the way in
which the individual creates, modifies and interprets the world in
which he or she finds himself. The emphasis in extreme cases tends
to be placed upon the explanation and understanding of what is
unique and particular to the individual rather than of what is
general and universal. This approach questions whether there
exists an external reality worthy ofstudy.ln methodological terms
it is an approach which emphasises the relativistic nature of the
social world to such an extent that it may be perceived as ·anti-
scientific' by reference to the ground rules commonly applied in
the natural sciences.
The subjective-objective dimension
The sub~ctivist The objectivist
approac to approach to
social science social science

Nominalism I. ontology .I Realism

Anti-positivism
I· epistemology .I Positivism

Voluntarism
I· human nature
·I Determinism

ldeograph•C I I
methodology I
I Nomothetic

Figure 1.1 A scheme for analysina assumptions about the nature fl social science
4 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
In this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological,
human and methodological standpoints which characterise
approaches to social sciences, we have sought to illustrate two
broad and somewhat polarised perspectives. Figure 1.1 seeks to
depict these in a more rigorous fashion in terms of what we shall
describe as the subjective-objective dimension. It identifies the
four sets of assumptions relevant to our understanding of social
science, characterising each by the descriptive labels under which
they have been debated in the literature on social philosophy. In
the following section ofthis chapter we will review each of the four
debates in necessarily brief but more systematic terms.

The Strands of Debate

Nominalism-realism : the ontological debate 1
These terms have been the subject of much discussion in the
literature and there are great areas of controversy surrounding
them. The nominalist position revolves around the assumption
that the social world external to individual cognition is made up of
nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to
structure reality. The nominalist does not admit to there being any
·rear structure to the world which these concepts are used to
describe. The 'names' used are regarded as artificial creations
whose utility is based upon their convenience as tools for describ-
ing, making sense of and negotiating the external world. Nominal-
ism is often equated with conventionalism, and we will make no
distinction between them. 2
Realism, on the other hand. postulates that the social world
external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard,
tangible and relatively immutable structures. Whether or not we
label and perceive these structures,the realists maintain, they still
exist as empirical entities. We may not even be aware of the
existence of certain crucial structures and therefore have no
·names' or concepts to articulate them. For the realist, the social
world exists independently of an individual's appreciation of it.
The individual is seen as being born into and living within a social
world which has a reality of its own. It is not something which the
individual creates-it exists 'out there'; ontologically it is prior to
the existence and consciousness of any single human being. For
the realist, the social world has an existence which is as hard and
concrete as the natural world. 3
 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science S

Anti-positivism-positivism: the
epistemological debate 4
It has been maintained that 'the word "positivist .. like the word
"bourgeois" has become more of a derogatory epithet than a
useful descriptive concept' .s We intend to use it here in the latter
sense, as a descriptive concept which can be used to characterise a
particular type of epistemology. Most of the descriptions of
positivism in current usage refer to one or more ofthe ontological,
epistemological and methodological dimensions of our scheme for
analysing assumptions with regard to social science. It is also
sometimes mistakenly equated with empiricism. Such conflations
cloud basic issues and contribute to the use of the term in a
derogatory sense.
We use ·positivist' here to characterise epistemologies which
seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by
searching for regularities and causal relationships between its con-
stituent elements. Positivist epistemology is in essence based upon
the traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences.
Positivists may differ in terms of detailed approach. Some would
claim, for example, that hypothesised regularities can be verified
by an adequate experimental research programme. Others would
maintain that hypotheses can only be falsified and never demon-
strated to be 'true' .6 However, both ·verificationists' and 'fal-
sificationists' would accept that the growth of knowledge is essen-
tially a cumulative process in which new insights are added to the
existing stock of knowledge and false hypotheses eliminated.
The epistemology of anti-positivism may take various forms but
is firmly set against the utility of a search for Jaws or underlying
regularities in the world ofsocial affairs. For the anti-positivist, the
social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood
from the point ofview ofthe individuals who are directly involved
in the activities which are to be studied. Anti-positivists reject the
standpoint of the 'observer', which characterises positivist
epistemology, as a valid vantage point for understanding human
activities. They maintain that one can only ·understand' by
occupying the frame of reference of the participant in action. One
has to understand from the inside rather than the outside. From
this point of view social science is seen as being essentially a
subjective rather than an objective enterprise. Anti-positivists
tend to reject the notion that science can generate objective
knowledge of any kind. 7
6 Soc·iological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Voluntarism-determinism: the 'human nature'
debate
This debate revolves around the issue of what model of man is
reflected in any given social-scientific theory. At one extreme we
can identify a determinist view which regards man and his
activities as being completely determined by the situation or
·environment' in which he is located. At another extreme we can
identify the voluntarist view that man is completely autonomous
and free-willed. Insofar as social science theories are concerned to
understand human activities, they must incline implicitly or
explicitly to one or other of these points of view, or adopt an
intermediate standpoint which allows for the influence of both
situational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities of
human beings. Such assumptions are essential elements in social-
scientific theories, since they define in broad terms the nature of
the relationships between man and the society in which he lives.•

Ideographic-nomothetic theory: the method-

ological debate
The ideographic approach to social science is based on the view
that one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-
hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It thus places
considerable stress upon getting close to one's subject and
exploring its detailed background and life history. The ideographic
approach emphasises the analysis of the subjective accounts
which one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involving
oneself in the everyday flow of life - the detailed analysis of the
insights generated by such encounters with one's subject and the
insights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries,
biographies and journalistic records. The ideographic method
stresses the importance of letting one's subject unfold its nature
and characteristics during the process of investigation.'
The nomothetic approach to social science lays emphasis on the
importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and
technique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employed
in the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing
hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour.lt is
preoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the use of
 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 7
quantitative techniques for the analysis of data. Surveys,
questionnaires, personality tests and standardised research
instruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools which
comprise nomothetic methodology . 10

Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of

Social Science
These four sets of assumptions with regard to the nature of social
science provide an extremely powerful tool for the analysis of
social theory. In much of the literature there is a tendency to
conflate the issues which are involved. We wish to argue here that
considerable advantages accrue from treating these four strands of
social-scientific debate as analytically distinct. While in practice
there is often a strong relationship between the positions adopted
on each of the four strands, assumptions about each can in fact
vary quite considerably. It is worth examining this point in more
detail.
The extreme positions on each of the four strands are reflected in
the two major intellectual traditions which have dominated social
science over the last two hundred years. The first of these is
usually described as •sociological positivism'. In essence this
reflects the attempt to apply models and methods derived from the
natural sciences to the study of human affairs. It treats the social
world as if it were the natural world, adopting a 'realist' approach
to ontology. This is backed up by a ·positivist' epistemology,
relatively 'deterministic' views of human nature and the use of
•nomothetic' methodologies. The second intellectual tradition,
that of •German idealism', stands in complete opposition to this. In
essence it is based upon the premise that the ultimate reali"ty of the
universe lies in 'spirit' or 'idea' rather than in the data of sense
perception. It is essentially 'nominalist' in its approach to social
reality. In contrast to the natural sciences, it stresses the
essentially subjective nature of human affairs, denying the utility
and relevance of the models and methods of natural science to
studies in this realm. It is 'anti-positivist' in epistemology,
·voluntarist' with regard to human nature and it favours ideo-
graphic methods as a foundation for social analysis. Sociological
positivism and German idealism thus define the objective and
subjective extremes of our model.
Many sociologists and organisation theorists have been brought
up within the tradition of sociological positivism, without
8 Sociolopiml Paradipms and Orpanisational Analysi.'l
exposure to the basic tenets of German idealism. Social science for
them is seen as consonant with the configuration of assumptions
which characterise the objective extreme of our model. However,
over the last seventy years or so there has been an increasing
interaction between these two traditions, particularly at a socio-
philosophical level. As a result intermediate points of view have
emerged, each with its own distinctive configural'ion of
assumptions about the nature of social science. They have all
spawned theories, ideas and approaches characteristic of their
intermediate position. As we shall argue in later chapters,
developments in phenomenology, ethnomethodology and the
action frame of reference are to be understood in these terms.
These perspectives, whilst offering their own special brand of
insight, have also often been used as launching pads for attacks on
sociological positivism and have generated a considerable amount
of debate between rival schools of thought. The nature of this
debate can only be fully understood by grasping and appreciating
the different assumptions which underwrite the competing points
of view.
It is our contention that the analytical scheme offered here
enables one to do precisely this. It is offered not as a mere
classificatory device, but as an important tool for negotiating
social theory. It draws attention to key assumptions. It allows one
to focus on precise issues which differentiate socio-scientific
approaches. It draws attention to the degree of congruency
between the four sets of assumptions about social science which
characterise any given theorist's point of view. We offer it here as
the first principal dimension of our theoretical scheme for
analysing theory in general and organisational theory in particular.
For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to it as the
·subjective-objec tive' dimension, two descriptive labels which
perhaps capture the points of commonality between the four
analytical strands.

Notes and References

I. For a further discussion of the nominalism-realis m debate,
see Kolakowski (1972). pp. 15-16.
2. Kolakowski ( 1972), pp. 158-9. In its most extreme form
nominalism does not recognise the existence of any world
outside the realm of individual consciousness. This is the
solipsist position, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter
6.
 A:uumption.~ about the Nature of Social Science 9
3. For a comprehensive review of 'realism', see Keat and Urry
(1975), pp. 27-45. They make much of the distinction
between 'positivism' and 'realism' but, as they admit, these
terms are used in a somewhat unconventional way.
4. For a further discussion of the positivism-anti-positivism
debate, see, for example, Giddens (1974) and Walsh ( 1972).
5. Giddens (1974). p. I.
6. See, for example, Popper (1963).
7. For a good illustration of an anti-positivist view of science,
see Douglas (1970b), pp. 3-44.
8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves many
other issues which we have not referred to here. The precise
model of man to be employed in any analytical scheme,
however, is underwritten by assumptions which reflect the
voluntarism-determinism issue in one way or another. We
have isolated this element of the debate here as a way of
treating at its most basic level a necessary assumption of all
social-scientific theories which purport to account for human
activities. Detailed propositions with regard to the precise
explanation of human activities elaborate in one way or
another this basic theme.
9. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the ideographic
approach to social science, see Blumer (1969), ch. I.
10. It is important to emphasise here that both nomothetic and
ideographic methodologies can be employed in a deductive
and inductive sense. Whilst the inductive-deductive debate
in science is a subject of considerable interest and
importance, we do not see it as being central to the four
dimensions suggested here as a means of distinguishing
between the nature of social science theories. That notwith-
standing, it remains an important methodological issue, of
relevance to both sociology and organisational analysis,
within the context of the assumptions explored here.
2. Assumptions about the Nature
of Society

All approaches to the study of society are located in a frame of

reference of one kind or another. Different theories tend to reflect
different perspectives, issues and problems worthy of study. and
are generally based upon a whole set of assumptions which reflect
a particular view of the nature of the subject under investigation.
The last twenty years or so have witnessed a number of attempts
on the part of sociologists to delineate the differences which
separate various schools of thought and the meta-sociological
assumptions which they reflect.

The Order-Conflict Debate

Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956), for example, have
sought to distinguish between those approaches to sociology
which concentrated upon explaining the nature of social order and
equilibrium on the one hand, and those which were more con-
cerned with problems of change, conflict and coercion in social
structures on the other. This distinction has received a great deal of
attention and has come to be known as the ·order-conflict
debate'. The •order theorists' have greatly outnumbered the ·con-
flict theorists'. and as Dawe has observed, 'the thesis that socio-
logy is centrally concerned with the problem of social order has
become one of the discipline's few orthodoxies. It is common as a
basic premise to many accounts of sociological theory which
otherwise differ considerably in purpose and perspective' (Dawe,
1970, p. 207). 1
Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as having
been a somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place (Cohen,
1968: Silverman, 1970: van den Berghe, 1969). Influenced by the
work of writers such as Coser ( 1956), who pointed to the functional
aspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor-
ate conflict as a variable within the bounds of theories which are
 Assumptions about the Nature of Society II
primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. The
approach advocated by Cohen, for example, clearly illustrates
this. He takes his point of departure from the work of Dahrendorf
and elaborates some of the central ideas in the order-conflict
debate to present two models of society, which are characterised
in terms of competing sets of assumptions which attribute to social
systems the characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity,
consensus, reciprocity, ccroperation, integration, stability and
persistence on the one hand, and the characteristics of coercion,
division, hostility, dissensus, conflict, malintegration and change
on the other (Cohen, 1968, pp. 166-7).
Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorfis mistaken in treat-
ing the order and conflict models as being entirely separate. He in
effect suggests that it is possible for theories to involve elements of
both models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or the
other. From this point of view, the order and conflict views of
society are but two sides of the same coin; they are not mutually
exclusive and thus do not need to be reconciled. The force of this
sort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attention
away from the order-conflict debate.ln the wake of the so-called
counter-culture movement of the late 1960s and the failure of the
1968 revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have become
much more interested in and concerned with the problems of the
'individual' as opposed to those of the •structure' of society in
general. The influence of ·subjectivist' movements such as
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory. which we
referred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended to
become much more attractive and more worthy of attention. As a
result, interest in continuing the conflict-order debate has sub-
sided under the iQfluence of issues relating to the philosophy and
methods of social science.
Our contention here is that if one reviews the intellectual source
and foundations of the order-conflict debate, one is forced to
conclude that it has met a premature death. Dahrendorf and
Lockwood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through their
writings and to restore it to a central place in sociological theory.
For the most part Marx had been largely ignored by leading
sociologists, the influence of theorists such as Durkheim, Weber
and Pareto having been paramount. Interestingly enough, these
latter three sociologists are all very much concerned with the
problem of social order; it is Marx who is preoccupied with the role
of conflict as the driving force behind social change. Stated in this
way, therefore, the order-conflict debate is underwritten by a
12 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
difference between the perspectives and concerns ofleading social
theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Modern
sociology has done little more than articulate and develop the basic
themes initiated by these pioneers of social analysis. To state that
the order-conflict debate is ·dead' or a 'non-debate' is thus to
underplay, if not ignore, substantial differences between the work
of Marx and, for example, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. Anyone
familiar with the work of these theorists and aware of the deep
division which exists between Marxism and sociology is forced to
admit that there are fundamental differences, which are far from
being reconciled. 2 In this chapter therefore, we wish to re-evaluate
the order-conflict issue with a view to identifying a key dimen-
sion for analysing the assumptions about the nature of society
reflected in different social theories.ln order to do so,let us return
to the work of Dahrendorf, who seeks to set out the opposing
issues in the following terms:
The integration theory of society, as displayed by the work of Parsons
and other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number of assump-
tions of the following type:
(I) Every society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of ele-
ments.
(2) Every society is a well integrated structure of elements.
(3) Every element in a society has a function, i.e .• renders a con-
tribution to its maintenance as a system.
(4) Every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of
values among its members ....
. . .What I have called the coercion theory of society can also be
reduced to a small number of basic tenets, although here again these
assumptions oversimplify and overstate the case:
(I) Every society is at every point subject to processes of change;
social change is ubiquitous.
(2) Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict;
social conflict is ubiquitous.
(3) Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disin-
tegration and change.
(4) Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by
others. (Dahrendorf, 1959, pp. 160-2)

The opposing adjectives which Dahrendorf's schema suggests for

distinguishing approaches to the study of society can be conve-
niently brought together in the form of a table, as follows:
 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 13
Table l.l
Two theories of society: 'order• and •conOid'
The 'order' or 'inugrationist' The 'conflict' or 'coercion'
''iew of society emphasises: view of society empha.tises:

Stability Change
Integration Conflict
Functional co-ordination Disintegration
Consensus Coercion

As Dahrendorf admits, this conceptualisation is something of an

oversimplification, and whilst providing a very useful tool for
coming to grips with the differences between the two standpoints,
it is open to the possibility of misinterpretation, in that the different
adjectives mean different things to different people. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the way in which the notion of conflict
has been treated in the sociological literature. Since Coser's
demonstration of the functions of social conflict, for example, the
role of conflict as an integrating mechanism has received a great
deal of attention. In effect, the whole notion of •conflict' bas often
been incorporated within the notion of integration. Dahrendorf's
integration/conflict dimension has been conveniently telescoped
so that it is brought within the bounds of sociology's traditional
concern for the explanation of order. The fallacy of this position
becomes clear if one considers certain extreme forms of conflict,
such as class conflict, revolution and war, which can only be
incorporated in the integrationist model by the wildest stretch of
one's imagination. Examples such as these suggest that it is mis-
leading to equate this type of macrostructural conflict with the
functional conflict identified by Coser. There is an important
question of degree involved here, which emphasises the dangers of
the dichotomisation of integration and conflict; realistically the
distinction between the two is much more of a continuum than the
majority of writers have recognised.
Another strand of the Dahrendorf scheme which can be
regarded as somewhat problematic lies in the distinction between
consensus and coercion. At first sight the distinction appears
obvious and clear-cut, focusing upon shared values on the one
hand and the imposition of some sort of force on the other. On
closer inspection there is a certain ambiguity. Where do the shared
values come from? Are they acquired autonomously or imposed
on some members of society by others? This question identifies the
14 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
possibility that consensus may be the product of the use of some
form of coercive force. For example, as C. Wright Mills has
pointed out, ·What Parsons and other grand theorists call ••value
orientations" and ••normative structure" has mainly to do with
master symbols of legitimation' (1959, p. 46).
A normative structure here - what Dahrendorf would view as
consensus - is treated as a system legitimising the power
structure. From Mills's point of view, it reflects the fact of
domination. In other words, shared values may be regarded not so
much as an index ofthe degree of integration which characterises a
society as one which reflects the success of the forces of
domination in a society prone to disintegration. From one point of
view, extant shared ideas, values and norms are something to be
preserved; from another, they represent a mode of domination
from which man needs to be released. The consensus/ coercion
dimension can thus be seen as focusing upon the issue of social
control. Consensus - however it may arise - is identified in
Dahrendorf's scheme as something independent of coercion. This
we believe to be a mistaken view since, as suggested above, it
ignores the possibility of a form of coercion which arises through
the control of value systems.
In distinguishing between stability and change as respective
features of the order and conflict models Dahrendorfis again open
to misinterpretation, even though he explicitly states that he does
not intend to imply that the theory of order assumes that societies
are static. His concern is to show how functional theories are
essentially concerned with those processes which serve to
maintain the patterns of the system as a whole. In other words,
functional theories are regarded as static in the sense that they are
concerned with explaining the status quo. In this respect conflict
theories are clearly of a different nature; they are committed to,
and seek to explain, the process and nature of deep-seated
structural change in society as opposed to change of a more
superficial and ephemeral kind. The fact that all functional theories
recognise change, and that change is an obvious empirical reality
in everyday life, has led Dahrendorf's categorisation in relation to
stability and change to lose its potential radical force and influ-
ence. It can be argued that different labels are required to identify
Dahrendorf's two paramount concerns: first, that the order view of
society is primarily status quo orientated; second, that it deals
with change of a fundamentally different nature from that with
which conflict theorists are concerned. 3
Dahrendorf's notions of functional co-ordination and disin·
 Assumptions about th~ Natur~ of Soci~ty 15
t~gration can be seen as constituting one of the most powerful
strands of thought which distinguish the order and conflict per-
spectives. Here again, however, there is room for misinterpreta-
tion. The concept of integration in Dahrendorf's work derives from
the functionalists' concern with the contribution which constituent
elements of a system make to the whole. In many respects this is an
oversimplification. Merton ( 1948) introduced the idea of manifest
and latent functions, some of which may be dysfunctional for the
integration of society.4 Again, Gouldner (1959), writing shortly
after the publication of the German edition of Dahrendorf's work,
suggests that various parts of a system may have a high degree of
autonomy and may contribute very little by way of integration to
the system as a whole. The term 'functional co-ordination' is thus
something of an oversimplification and, given the existence of the
points of view expressed above within the functionalist camp
itself, it is not surprising that the concept of 'disintegration' should
be seen as relevant and capable of being used from a functional
standpoint. •Disintegration' can be very easily viewed as an inte-
grationist concept and, as with other aspects of Dahrendorf's
scheme, this dimension has often been telescoped and brought
within the bounds of the theories of order. For this reason it may
well have been clearer if the position of conflict theory on this
dimension had been presented in more radical and distinctive
terms. There is much in Marxian theory, for example, which refers
to the notion of 'contradiction' and the basic incompatibility be-
tween different elements of social structure. Contradiction implies
heterogeneity, imbalance and essentially antagonistic and
divergent social forces. It thus stands at the opposite pole to the
concept of 'functional co-ordination', which must presuppose a
basic compatibility between the elements of any given system. To
argue that the concept of contradiction can be embraced within
functional analysis requires either an act of faith or at least a
considerable leap of imagination.
Dahrendorf's work has clearly served a very useful purpose in
identifying a number of important strands of thought distinguishing
theorists of order from theorists of conflict. However, as will be
apparent from the above discussion, in many respects the dis-
tinctions which have been drawn between the two meta-theories do
not go far enough. In particular, the insights of some twenty years
of debate suggest that the characterisation of the conflict
perspective has not been sufficiently radical to avoid confusion
with the 'integrationist' perspective. This has allowed theorists of
order to meet the challenge which Dahrendorf's scheme presents
16 Sociological Paradigms and Organisalional Analysis
to their frame of reference within the context of their order-
orientated mode of thought. In order to illustrate this point, let us
return to the work of Cohen (1968) referred to earlier.
In advocating his viewpoint Cohen appears to be misinterpreting
the distinction between the two models. His interpretation of
concepts telescopes the different variables into a form in which
they can be seen as consistent with each other. In effect his whole
analysis reflects an attempt to incorporate the conflict model
within the bounds of the contemporary theory of order. He thus
loses the radical essence of the conflict perspective and is able to
conclude that the two models are not mutually exclusive and do
not need to be reconciled. He argues that the two models are not
genuine alternatives and in effect suggests that each is no more
than the reciprocal of the other. He is therefore able to leave
Dahrendorf's analysis with the central concern of his book - the
problem of order - largely intact. The incorporation of conflict
into the bounds of the model of order de-emphasise~ its
importance. s
In line with the analysis which we presented earlier, we argue
that the attempt to reduce the two models to a common base ignores
the fundamental differences which exist between them. A conflict
theory based on deep-seated structural conflict and concerned
with radical transformations of society is not consistent with a
functionalist perspective. The differences between them,
therefore, are important and worthy of distinction in any attempt
to analyse social theory. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible
to see that many of the misinterpretations which have arisen have
done so because the models in Dahrendorf's analysis were not
sufficiently differentiated. We wish to propose, therefore, that
certain modifications be made in order to articulate the differences
in a more explicit and radical form. Since much of the confusion
has arisen because of the ambiguity of the descriptions associated
with the two models we wish to suggest the use of a somewhat
different terminology.

'Regulation' and 'Radical Change'

Our analysis has shown that the order-conflict distinction is in
many senses the most problematic. We suggest, therefore, that it
should be replaced as a central theme by the notions of •regulation'
and 'radical change'.
 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 17
We introduce the term 'sociology of regulation' to refer to the
writings of theorists who are primarily concerned to provide
explanations of society in terms which emphasise its underlying
unity and cohesiveness. It is a sociology which is essentially con-
cerned with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic
questions which it asks tend to focus upon the need to understand
why society is maintained as an entity. It attempts to explain why
society tends to hold together rather than fall apart. It is interested
in understanding the social forces which prevent the Hobbesian
vision of 'war of all against all' becoming a reality. The work of
Durkheim with its emphasis upon the nature of social cohesion and
solidarity, for example, provides a clear and comprehensive
illustration of a concern for the sociology of regulation.
The 'sociology of radical change • stands in stark contrast to the
'sociology of regulation'. in that its basic concern is to find
explanations for the radical change, deep-seated structural con-
flict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which its
theorists see as characterising modem society. It is a sociology
which is essentially concerned with man's emancipation from the
structures which limit and stunt his potential for development. The
basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man,
both material and psychic.lt is often visionary and Utopian, in that
it looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concerned
with what is possible rather than with what is; with alternatives
rather than with acceptance of the status quo. In these respects it is
as widely separate and distant from the sociology of regulation as
the sociology of Marx is separated and distant from the sociology
of Durkheim.
The distinction between these two sociologies can perhaps be
best illustrated in schematic form; extreme points of view are
counter-posed in order to highlight the essential differences
between them. Table 2.2 summarises the situation.
We offer this regulation-radical change distinction as the
second principal dimension of our scheme for analysing social
theories. Along with the subjective-objective dimension
developed in the previous chapter, we present it as a powerful
means for identifying and analysing the assumptions which under-
lie social theories in general.
The notions of ·regulation' and 'radical change' have thus far
been presented in a very rough and extreme form. The two models
illustrated in Table 2.2 should be regarded as ideal-typical
formulations. The seven elements which we have identified lend
themselves to a much more rigorous and systematic treatment in
18 Soc:ioloRical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
which their overall form and nature is spell out in detail. We delay
this task until later chapters. Here, we wish to address ourselves to
the broad relationships which exist between the sociologies of
regulation and radical change. We maintain that they present
fundamentally different views and interpretations of the nature of
society. They reflect fundamentally different frames of reference.
They present themselves, therefore, as alternative models for the
analysis of social processes.
To present the models in this way is to invite criticism along the
lines of that levelled at Dahrendorf's work. For example, it could
be suggested that the two models are the reciprocals of each other
-no more than two sides of the same coin- and that relationships
Table l.l
The regulation-radical change dimension

Thr socioiORY of REGULATION Thr socioiORY of RADICAL CHANGE

is concrrnrd with: is concrrnrd with:

(a) The status quo (a) Radical change

(b) Social order (b) Structural conflict
(c) Consensus• (c) Modes of domination
(d) Social integration and (d) Contradiction
cohesion
(e) Solidarity (e) Emancipation
(f) Need satisfactiont (f) Deprivation
(&) Actuality (g) Potentiality

Notes
• By 'consensus' we mean voluntary and ·spontaneous' agree-
ment of opinion.
t The term ·need satisfaction' is used to refer to the focus upon
satisfaction of individual or system 'needs'. The sociology of
regulation tends to presume that various social characteristics can
be explained in relation to these needs. It presumes that it is
possible to identify and satisfy human needs within the context of
existing social systems, and that society reflects these needs. The
concept of 'deprivation', on the other hand, is rooted in the notion
that the social ·system' prevents human fulfilment; indeed that
'deprivation' is created as the result of the status quo. The social
'system' is not seen as satisfying needs but as eroding the
possibilities for human fulfilment. It is rooted in the notion that
society has resulted in deprivation rather than in gain.
 A.uumptions about the Nature of Society 19
between the sub-elements of each model need not be congruent,
that is, an analysis may pay attention to elements of both.
The answer to both criticisms follows our defence of
Dahrendorfs work. To conflate the two models and treat them as
variations on a single theme is to ignore or at least to underplay the
fundamental differences which exist between them. Whilst it may
be possible to use each model in a diluted form and thus obtain two
analyses of the middle ground which approximate each other, they
must remain essentially separate, since they are based upon oppos-
ing assumptions. Thus, as we have illustrated, to discuss the
'functions' of social conflict is to commit oneself to the sociology
of regulation as opposed to that of radical change. However close
one's position might be to the middle ground, it would seem that
one must always be committed to one side more than another. The
fundamental distinctions between the sociologies of regulation and
radical change will become clear from our analysis of their
intellectual development and constituent schools of thought in
later chapters. We conceptualise these two broad sociological
perspectives in the form of a polarised dimension, recognising that
while variations within the context of each are possible, the
perspectives are necessarily separate and distinct from each other.

Notes and References

1. Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with the
problem of order, Dawe cites Parsons (1949), Nisbet (1967),
Bramson (1961), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968).
2. For a discussion of the Marxism versus social science
debate, see Shaw (1975). The division between Marxist
theorists and orthodox sociologists is now so deep that they
either ignore each other completely. or indulge in an
exchange of abuse and accusation regarding the political
conservatism or subversiveness commonly associated with
their respective points of view. Debate about the intellectual
strengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoints is
conspicuous by its absence.
3. Later in this chapter we suggest that the descriptions of
·concern with the status quo' and 'concern for radical
change' provide more accurate views of the issues involved
here.
20 Socitllogic.·ol Pt~rtldigms tlnd Or:ganisatioNC~I AnoiJisis
4. Dahrendorf acknowledges. Merton's distinction between
Jlatent and manifest functions but does not pursue th·e con-
sequence of ·dysfun,ctions· for the concept of integration
(Dahf"endorf, 1959,. pp. 171-9).
S. Other 'order' theorists who have addressed themselves to
Dahrendorf"s model tend to follow a similar path in the
attempt to embrace conflict theory within their perspective.
See. for example. van den Berghe (1969).
3. Two Dimensions:
Four Paradigms

In the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of the

key assumptions which characterise different approaches to social
theory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse these
approaches in terms of two key dimensions of analysis. each of
which subsumes a series of related themes. It has been suggested
that assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of in
terms of what we call the subjective-objective dimension. and
assumptions about the nature of society in terms of a regulatio(}-
radical change dimension. In this chapter we wish to discuss the
relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher-
ent scheme for the analysis of social theory.
We have already noted how sociological debate since the late
1960s has tended to ignore the distinctions between the two dimen-
sions - in particular. how there has been a tendency to focus upon
issues concerned with the subjective-objective dimension and to
ignore those concerned with the regulation-radical change
dimension. Interestingly enough. this focus of attention has
characterised sociological thought associated with both regulation
and radical change. The subjective-objective debate has been
conducted independently within both sociological camps.
Within the sociology of regulation it has assumed the form of a
debate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. In the
wake of Berger and Luckmann' s treatise on the sociology of know-
ledge (1966). Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology (1967) and a
general resurgence of interest in phenomenology. the questionable
status of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the
functionalist perspective have become increasingly exposed. The
debate has often led to a polarisation between the two schools of
thought.
Similarly. within the context of the sociology of radical change
there has been a division between theorists subscribing to ·subjec-
tive' and 'objective' views of society. The debate in many respects
takes its lead from the publication in France in 1966 and Britain in
22 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
1969 of Louis Althusser's work For Marx. This presented the
notion of an •epistemological break' in Marx's work and emphas-
ised the polarisation of Marxist theorists into two camps: those
emphasising the •subjective' aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and the
Frankfurt School, for example) and those advocating more ·objec-
tive' approaches, such as that associated with Althusserian struc-
turalism.
Within the context of the sociologies both of regulation and
radical change, therefore, the middle to late 1960s witnessed a
distinct switch in the focus of attention. The debate between these
two sociologies which had characterised the early 1960s disap-
peared and was replaced by an introverted dialogue within the
conte"'.t of each of the separate schools of thought. Instead of
•speaking' to each other they turned inwards and addressed their
remarks to themselves. The concern to sort out their position with
regard to what we call the subjectiv~objective dimension, a
complicated process in view of all the interrelated strands, Jed to a
neglect of the regulation-radical change dimension.
As a consequence of these developments, recent debate has
often been confused. Sociological thought has tended to be charac-
terised by a narrow sectarianism, from which an overall perspec-
tive and grasp of basic issues are conspicuously absent. The time is
ripe for consideration of the way ahead, and we submit that the two
key dimensions of analysis which we have identified define critical
parameters within which this can take place. We present them as

r----------
I
-----------,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
I
1 I
1 I
1 "Radical 'Radical 1
1 humanist' structuralist• 1
I I
I I
I I
SUBJECTIVE 1 I OBJECTIVE
I I
I I
II 1nterpretive" "Functionalist" I
I I
I I
I I
I I
'----------- __________J
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION
F"•re 1.1 Four paradipls for lhe ualysis ~ soa.llheory
 Two Dimensions: Four ParadiRms 23
two independent dimensions which resurrect the sociological
issues of the early 1960s and place them alongside those of the late
1960s and early 1970s. Taken together, they define four distinct
sociological paradigms which can be utilised for the analysis of a
wide range of social theories. The relationship between these
paradigms, which we label 'radical humanist', 'radical structural-
ist', •interpretive' and •functionalist', is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms
shares a common set of features with its neighbours on the hori-
zontal and vertical axes in terms of one of the two dimensions but is
differentiated on the other dimension. For this reason they should
be viewed as contiguous but separate- contiguous because of the
shared characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is,
as we shall demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warrant
treatment of the paradigms as four distinct entities. The four para-
digms define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis
of social phenomena. They approach this endeavour from con-
trasting standpoints and generate quite different concepts and
analytical tools.

The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms

Before going on to discuss the substantive nature of each of the
paradigms, it will be as well to pay some attention to the way in
which we intend the notion of •paradigm' to be used. 1 We regard
our four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoretical
assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of
theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate
within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasise the
commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of
theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded
as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same
problematic.
This definition does not imply complete unity of thought. It
allows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigm
there will be much debate between theorists who adopt different
standpoints. The paradigm does, however, have an underlying
unity in terms of its basic and often •taken for granted' assump-
tions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental
way from theorists located in other paradigms. The ·unity' of the
paradigm thus derives from reference to alternative views of real-
24 SocioloRica/ ParadiRms and OrRanisational Ana/ysi.f
ity which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarily
even be recognised as existing.
In identifying four paradigms in social theory we are in essence
suggesting that it is meaningful to examine work in the subject area
in terms of four sets of basic assumptions. Each set identifies a
quite separate social-scientific reality. To be located in a particular
paradigm is to view the world in a particular way. The four para-
digms thus define four views of the social world based upon differ-
ent meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of
science and of society.
It is our contention that all social theorists can be located within
the context of these four paradigms according to the meta-
theoretical assumptions reflected in their work. The four para-
digms taken together provide a map for negotiating the subject
area, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basic
similarities and differences between the work of various theorists
and, in particular, the underlying frame of reference which they
adopt. It also provides a convenient way of locating one's own
personal frame of reference with regard to social theory, and thus a
means of understanding why certain theories and perspectives
may have more personal appeal than others. Like any other-map, it
provides a tool for establishing where you are, where you have
been and where it is possible to go in the future. It provides a tool
for mapping intellectual journeys in social theory -one's own and
those of the theorists who have contributed to the subject area.
In this work we intend to make much use of the map-like qual-
ities of the four paradigms. Each defines a range of intellectual
territory. Given the overall meta-theoretical assumptions which
distinguish one paradigm from another, there is room for much
variation within them. Within the context of the 'functionalist'
paradigm, for example, certain theorists adopt more extreme posi-
tions in terms of one or both of the two dimensions than others.
Such differences often account for the internal debate which goes
on between theorists engaged in the activities of 'normal science'
within the context of the same paradigm. 2 The remaining chapters
of this work examine each of the four paradigms in some detail and
attempt to locate their principal theorists in these terms.
Our research suggests that whilst the activity within the context
of each paradigm is often considerable, inter-paradigmatic
'journeys' are much rarer. This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970)
notion of ·revolutionary science'. For a theorist to switch para-
digms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, some-
thing which, although manifestly possible, is not often achieved in
 Two Dimensions: Four ParadiRmS 25
practice. As Keat and Urry put it, 'For individual scientists, the
change of allegiance from one paradigm to another is often a
.. conversion experience", akin to Gestalt-switches or changes of
religious faith' ( 1975, p. SS). When a theorist does shift his position
in this way, it stands out very clearly as a major break with his
intellectual tradition and is heralded as being so in the literature, in
that the theorist is usually welcomed by those whom he has joined
and often disowned by his former 'paradigm colleagues'. Thus we
witness what is known as the 'epistemological break' between the
work of the young Marx and the mature Marx - what we would
identify as a shift from the radical humanist paradigm to the radical
structuralist paradigm. At the level of organisational analysis, a
distinct paradigm shift can be detected in the work of Silverman -
a shift from the functionalist paradigm to the interpretive para-
digm. We will analyse such intellectual journeys in more detail in
later chapters.
Before we progress to a review ofthe four paradigms, one point
is worthy offurther emphasis. This relates to the fact that the four
paradigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views of
social reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to under-
stand four different views of society. They offer different ways of
seeing. A synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms they
are contradictory, being based on at least one set of opposing
meta-theoretical assumptions. They are alternatives, in the sense
that one can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time,
but mutually exclusive, in the sense that one cannot operate in
more than one paradigm at any given point in time, since in accept-
ing the assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all the
others.
We offer the four paradigms for consideration in these terms, in
the hope that knowledge of the competing points of view will at
least make us aware of the boundaries within which we approach
our subject.

The Functionalist Paradigm

This paradigm has provided the dominant framework for the con-
duct of academic sociology and the study of organisations. It
represents a perspective which is firmly rooted in the sociology of
regulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivist
point of view. Functionalist theorists have been at the forefront of
26 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the order-conflict debate, and the concepts which we have used
to categorise the sociology of regulation apply in varying degrees
to all schools of thought within the paradigm.lt is characterised by
a concern for providing explanations of the status quo, social
order, consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfaction
and actuality. It approaches these general sociological concerns
from a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, determinist
and nomothetic.
The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in its
most fully developed form. In its overall approach it seeks to
provide essentially rational explanations of social affairs. It is a
perspective which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned to
understand society in a way which generates knowledge which can
be put to use. It is often problem-orientated in approach, con-
cerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems. It is
usually firmly committed to a philosophy of social engineering as a
basis of social change and emphasises the importance of under-
standing order. equilibrium and stability in society and the way in
which these can be maintained. It is concerned with the effective
·regulation· and control of social affairs.
As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter I the
approach to social science characteristic of the functionalist para-
digm is rooted in the tradition of sociological positivism. This
reflects the attempt, par excellence, to apply the models and
methods of the natural sciences to the study of human affairs.
Originating in France in the early decades of the nineteenth
century. its major influence upon the paradigm has been through
the work of social theorists such as Auguste Comte. Herbert
Spencer. Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto. The functionalist
approach to social science tends to assume that the social world is
composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relation-
ships which can be identified. studied and measured through
approaches derived from the natural sciences. The use of mechan-
ical and biological analogies as a means of modelling and under-
standing the social world is particularly favoured in many
functionalist theories. By way of illustration consider. for exam-
ple. the work of Durkheim. Central to his position was the idea that
•social facts' exist outside of men's consciousness and restrain
men in their everyday activities. The aim was to understand the
relationships between these 'objective' social facts and to articu-
late the sociology which explained the types of ·solidarity' provid-
ing the 'social cement' which holds society together. The stability
and ordered nature of the natural world was viewed as characteris-
 Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 27
ing the world of human affairs. For Durkheim. the task of
sociology was to understand the nature of this regulated order.
Since the early decades of the twentieth century. however. the
functionalist paradigm has been increasingly influenced by ele-
ments from the German idealist tradition of social thought. As will
be recalled from our discussion in Chapter I, this approach reflects
assumptions about the nature of social science which stand in
opposition to those of sociological positivism. As a result of the
work of such theorists as Max Weber, George Simmel and George
Herbert Mead. elements of this idealist approach have been util-
ised within the context of social theories which have attempted to
bridge the gulf between the two traditions. In so doing they have
forged theoretical perspectives characteristic of the least objectiv-
ist region of the paradigm, at its junction with the interpretive
paradigm. Such theories have rejected the use of mechanical and
biological analogies for studying the social world and have
introduced ideas which place emphasis upon the importance of
understanding society from the point of view of the actors who are
actually engaged in the performance of social activities.
Since the 1940s there has been also an infusion of certain Marxist
influences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. These
have been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to
·radicalise' functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that

L-----------
THE SOCIOLOGY OF
REGULATION Sociological
positivism

Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionalist paradigm

28 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
functionalism is essentially conservative and unable to provide
explanations for social change. These attempts underwrite the
debate examined in the previous chapter as to whether a theory of
·conflict' can be incorporated within the bounds of a theory of
'order' to provide adequate explanations of social affairs.
Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of the functionalist
paradigm can be understood in terms of the interaction of three
sets of intellectual forces, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Of these,
sociological positivism has been the most influential. The compet-
ing traditions have been sucked in and used within the context of
the functionalist problematic, which emphasises the essentially
objectivist nature of the social world and a concern for explana-
tions which emphasise 'regulation' in social affairs. These cross-
currents of thought have given rise to a number of distinctive
schools of thought within the paradigm, which is characterised by
a wide range of theory and internal debate. By way of overview,
again somewhat crudely, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the four
paradigms in terms of the constituent schools of sociological and
organisational theory which we shall be exploring later on. As will
be apparent, most organisation theorists, industrial sociologists,
psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach their sub-
ject from within the bounds of the functionalist paradigm.

The Interpretive Paradigm

Theorists located within the context of the interpretive paradigm
adopt an approach consonant with the tenets of what we have
described as the sociology of regulation, though its subjectivist
approach to the analysis of the social world makes its links with
this sociology often implicit rather than explicit. The interpretive
paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is,
to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the
level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the
realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the
frame of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer of
action.
In its approach to social science it tends to be nominalist, anti-
po.'iitil•ist, volunwrist and ideographic. It sees the social world as
an emergent social process which is created by the individuals
concerned. Social reality. insofar as it is recognised to have any
existence outside the consciousness of any single individual, is
regarded as being little more than a network of assumptions and
 THE SOCIOLOGY
OF RADICAL CHANGE

Russian
social
theory

SUBJECTI\/!:L...__ ,, ,. . OB JECTI V E

m
Phenomenology Hermeneutics Integrative
theory system
Phenomeno- theory
logical Objectivism
sociology I nteractionism
and social
action theory

OF REGULATION
 THE SOCIOLOGY
OF RADICAL CHANGE

Radical
organisation
theory

~ ~- OBJECTIVE
SUBJECTIVE F .. . -- "-' _,_,_"__ I .... .,. . . . . _·. ·.....
· I
~t!lk~t fi!J7tf5ti:'l<f' ''vt:~;;;~:-~~W''''""t~·~
Pluralism

Theories Social
of system Objectivism
bureaucratic theory
dysfunctions

THE .SOCIOLOGY
OF REGULATION
 Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 31
intersubjectively shared meanings. The ontological status of the
social world is viewed as extremely questionable and problematic
as far as theorists located within the interpretive paradigm are
concerned. Everyday life is accorded the status of a miraculous
achievement. Interpretive philosophers and sociologists seek to
understand the very basis and source of social reality. They often
delve into the depths of human consciousness and subjectivity in
their quest for the fundamental meanings which underlie social
life.
Given this view of social reality, it is hardly surprising that the
commitment of the interpretive sociologists to the sociology of
regulation is implicit rather than explicit. Their ontological
assumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involved in the
order-conflict debate as such. However, their standpoint is
underwritten by the assumption that the world of human affairs is
cohesive, ordered and integrated. The problems of conflict,
domination, contradiction, potentiality and change play no part in
their theoretical framework. They are much more orientated
towards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created
social world •as it is • in terms of an ongoing process.
Interpretive sociology is concerned with understanding the
essence of the everyday world. In terms of our analytical schema it
is underwritten by an involvement with issues relating to the
nature of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integra-
tion and cohesion, solidarity and actuality. 3
The interpretive paradigm is the direct product of the German
idealist tradition of social thought. Its foundations were laid in the
work of Kant and reflect a social philosophy which emphasises the
essentially spiritual nature of the social world. The idealist tradi-
tion was paramount in Germanic thought from the mid-eighteentlt
century onwards and was closely linked with the romantic move-
ment in literature and the arts. Outside this realm, however, it was
of limited interest, until revived in the late 1890s and early years of
this century under the influence of the so-called neo-idealist
movement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber. Husser! and Schutz
have made a major contribution towards establishing it as a
framework for social analysis, though with varying degrees of
commitment to its underlying problematic.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the paradigm
has been explored as far as our present interest in social theory and
the study of organisations is concerned. Whilst there have been a
small number of attempts to study organisational concepts and
situations from this point of view. the paradigm has not generated
32 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
much organisation theory as such. As will become clear from our
analysis. there are good reasons for this. The premises of the
interpretive paradigm question whether organisations exist in any-
thing but a conceptual sense. Its significance for the study of
organisations. therefore. is of the most fundamental kind. It
challenges the validity of the ontological assumptions which
underwrite functionalist approaches to sociology in general and
the study of organisations in particular.

The Radical Humanist Paradigm

The radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to develop
a sociology of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Its
approach to social science has much in common with that of the
interpretive paradigm. in that it views the social world from a
perspective which tends to be nominalist. anti-positivist, voluntar-
ist and ideographic. However. its frame of reference is committed
to a view of society which emphasises the importance of over-
throwing or transcending the limitations of existing social
arrangements.
One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of this
paradigm is that the consciousness of man is dominated by the
ideological superstructures with which he interacts. and that these
drive a cognitive wedge between himself and his true conscious-
ness. This wedge is the wedge of 'alienation' or 'false conscious-
ness', which inhibits or prevents true human fulfilment. The major
concern for theorists approaching the human predicament in these
terms is with release from the constraints which existing social
arrangements place upon human development. It is a brand of
social theorising designed to provide a critique of the status quo. It
tends to view society as anti-human and it is concerned to articu-
late ways in which human beings can transcend the spiritual bonds
and fetters which tie them into existing social patterns and thus
realise their full potential.
In terms of the elements with which we have sought to concep-
tualise the sociology of radical change, the radical humanist places
most emphasis upon radical change, modes ofdomination, eman-
cipation, deprivation and potentiality. The concepts of structural
conflict and contradiction do not figure prominently within this
perspective, since they are characteristic of more objectivist views
of the social world, such as those presented within the context of
the radical structuralist paradigm.
 Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 33
In keeping with its subjectivist approach to social science, the
radical humanist perspective places central emphasis upon human
consciousness. Its intellectual foundations can be traced to the
same source as that of the interpretive paradigm. It derives from
the German idealist tradition, particularly as expressed in the work
of Kant and Hegel (though as reinterpreted in the writings of the
young Marx).lt is through Marx that the idealist tradition was first
utilised as a basis for a radical social philosophy, and many radical
humanists have derived their inspiration from this source. In
essence Marx inverted the frame of reference reflected in Hegelian
idealism and thus forged the basis for radical humanism. The
paradigm has also been much influenced by an infusion of the
phenomenological perspective deriving from Husser).
As we shall illustrate in our detailed discussion of this paradigm,
apart from the early work of Marx, interest remained dormant until
the 1920s, when Lukacs and Gramsci revived interest in subjectiv-
ist interpretations of Marxist theory. This interest was taken on by
members of the so-called Frankfurt School, which has generated a
great deal of debate, particularly through the writings of Habermas
and Marcuse. The existentialist philosophy of Sartre also belongs
to this paradigm, as do the writings of a group of social theorists as
widely diverse as lllich, Castaneda and Laing. All in their various
ways share a common concern for the release of consciousness
and experience from domination by various aspects of the ideolog-
ical superstructure of the social world within which men live out
their lives. They seek to change the social world through a change
in modes of cognition and consciousness.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a somewhat rough and ready
summary of the manner in which this paradigm has been explored
in terms of social theory and the study of organisations. As we shall
argue in Chapter 9. the writers who have something to say on
organisations from this perspective have laid the basis of a nascent
anti-organisation theory. The radical humanist paradigm in
essence is based upon an inversion of the assumptions which
define the functionalist paradigm. It should be no surprise, there-
fore, that anti-organisation theory inverts the problematic which
defines functionalist organisation theory on almost every count.

The Radical Structuralist Paradigm

Theorists located within this paradigm advocate a sociology of
radical change from an objectivist standpoint. Whilst sharing an
34 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
approach to science which has many similarities with that of func-
tionalist theory, it is directed at fundamentally different ends.
Radical structuralism is committed to radical change, emancipa-
tion, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural
co'fflict, modes of domination, contradiction and deprivation. It
approaches these general concerns from a standpoint which tends
to be realist. positivist. determinist and nomothetic.
Whereas the radical humanists forge their perspective by focus-
ing upon ·consciousness' as the basis for a radical critique of
society, the radical structuralists concentrate upon structural rela-
tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the fact that
radical change is built into the very nature and structure of con-
temporary society, and they seek to provide explanations of the
basic interrelationships within the context of total social forma-
tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, and
different theorists stress the role of different social forces as a
means of explaining social change. Whilst some focus directly
upon the deep-seated internal contradictions, others focus upon
the structure and analysis of power relationships. Common to all
theorists is the view that contemporary society is characterised by
fundamental conflicts which generate radical change through
political and economic crises. It is through such conflict and
change that the emancipation of men from the social structures in
which they live is seen as coming about.
This paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work of the
mature Marx, after the s~called ·epistemological break' in his
work. It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade of
active political involvement and as a result of his increasing inter-
est in Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy.
Marx's basic ideas have been subject to a wide range of interpreta-
tions in the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead.
Among these Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin have been
particularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radi-
cal structuralist position outside the realm of Russian social
theory, the names of Althusser. Poulantzas, Colletti and various
Marxist sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst the
influence of Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm is
undoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a strong
Weberian influence. As we shall argue in later chapters, in recent
years a group of social theorists have sought to explore the inter-
face between the thought of Marx and Weber and have generated a
distinctive perspective which we describe as ·conflict theory'. It is
to this radical structuralist perspective that the work of Dahren-
 Two Dimensions: Four ParadiRms 3S
dorf belongs, along with that of other theorists such as Rex and
Miliband.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a general overview of the
schools of thought located within the paradigm, which we shall be
examining in some detail in Chapters 10 and II. In British and
American sociology the radical structuralist view has received
relatively little attention outside the realm of conflict theory. This
paradigm. located as it is within a realist view of the social world,
has many significant implications for the study of organisations,
but they have only been developed in the barest forms. In Chapter
11 we review the work which has been done and the embryonic
radical orKanisation theory which it reflects.

Exploring Social Theory

So much, then. for our overview of the four paradigms. Sub-
sequent chapters seek to place flesh upon the bones of this analyti-
caJ scheme and attempt to demonstrate its power as a tool for
exploring social theory. 4 Hopefully. our discussion will do justice
to the essentially complex nature of the paradigms and the network
of assumptions which they reflect, and will establish the relation-
ships and links between the various perspectives dominating social
analysis at the present time. Whilst the focus in Chapters s. 7. 9and
11 is upon organisational analysis, the general principles and ideas
discussed in the work as a whole clearly have relevance for the
exploration of a wide variety of other social science disciplines.
The scope for applying the analytical scheme to other fields of
study is enormous but unfortunately lies beyond the scope of our
present enquiry. However, readers interested in applying the
scheme in this way should find little difficulty in proceeding from
the sociological analyses presented in Chapters4, 6, 8, and 10 to an
analysis of the literature in their own sphere of specialised interest.

Notes and References

1. For a full discussion of the role of paradigms in scientific
development, see Kuhn ( 1970).1n his analysis, paradigms are
defined as •universally recognised scientific achievements
that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a
36 Soc-iological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
community of practitioners' (p. viii). Paradigms are regarded
as governing the progress of what is called 'normal science·,
in which 'the scientist's work is devoted to the articulation
and wider application of the accepted paradigm, which is not
itself questioned or criticised. Scientific problems are
regarded as puzzles, as problems which are known to have a
solution within the framework of assumptions implicitly or
explicitly embodied in the paradigm. If a puzzle is not solved,
the fault lies in the scientist, and not in the paradigm· (Keat
and Urry 1975, p. 55). 'Normal science' contrasts with rela-
tively brief periods of 'revolutionary science', in which 'the
scientist is confronted by increasingly perplexing anomalies,
which call into question the paradigm itself. Scientific revolu-
tion occurs when a new paradigm emerges, and becomes
accepted by the scientific community' (ibid., p. 55).
We are using the term ·paradigm' in a broader sense than
that intended by Kuhn. Within the context of the present
work we are arguing that social theory can be conveniently
understood in terms of the co-existence of four distinct and
rival paradigms defined by very basic meta-theoretical
assumptions in relation to the nature of science and society.
'Paradigms', 'problematics', 'alternative realities'. 'frames
of reference'. 'forms of life' and ·universe of discourse' are
all related conceptualisations although of course they are not
synonymous.
2. Some inter-paradigm debate is also possible. Giddens main-
tains 'that all paradigms ... are mediated by others' and that
within 'normal science' scientists are aware of other para-
digms. He posits that: 'The process of learning a para-
digm ... is also the process of learning what that paradigm is
not' (1976, pp. 142-4).
Interestingly, he confines his discussion to the mediation
of one paradigm by another one. We believe that a model of
four conflicting paradigms within sociology is more accurate
and that academics' knowledge of 'scientists' within the
other three paradigms is likely to be very sketchy in some
cases. Relations between paradigms are perhaps better
described in terms of 'disinterested hostility' rather than
'debate'.
3. The notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of a
biological analogy of an organism and plays no part in
interpretive sociology.
4. The sociological concerns of recent years have resulted in a
 Two Dimensions: Four ParadiRms 37
number of works which have aimed to chart a path through
the social science literature by reducing the variables of
sociological analysis to a number of key dimensions. Those
of Dahrendorf (1959), Wallace (1969}, Gouldner (1970),
Friedrichs (1970), Dawe ( 1970), Robertson ( 1974), Keat and
Urry (1975), Strasser (1976) and Benton (1977) all readily
come to mind. In a sense our work adds to this literature. Had
space permitted, we would have liked to demonstrate the
precise way in which the schemes proposed by these various
authors all fall, in a partial way, within the bounds of the
scheme developed here.
Pa rt II
The Paradigms Explore~d
4. Functionalist Sociology

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The mode of social theorising which characterises this paradigm
has a long history. Indeed. its pedigree can be traced back to the
very roots of sociology as a discipline, and the early attempts of
social philosophers to apply the ideas and methods of natural
science to the realm of social affairs. It is a paradigm which, in
many respects, has developed as a branch of the natural sciences
and, to this day, in disciplines as avowedly ·social' as sociology,
psychology, economics, anthropology and the like, natural sci-
ence models and methods reign supreme in various areas of
enquiry.
Given such an extensive history, it is difficult to locate a precise
starting point. Elements of the paradigm can be traced back to the
political and social thought of the ancient Greeks but, for conveni-
ence, we shall commence our analysis with the work of Auguste
Comte ( 1798 -1857), commonly regarded as the founding father of
·sociology' - in name if not entirely in substance.
As Raymond Aron has suggested, Comte may be regarded, first
and foremost, as 'the sociologist of human and social unity' (Aron,
1965, p. 59). He believed that knowledge and society was in a
process of evolutionary transition, and that the function of socio-
logy was to understand the necessary, indispensable and inevit-
able course of history in such a way as to promote the realisation of
a new social order. From Comte's point of view this evolution
passed through three stages of development - 'the Theological, or
fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or
positive'. He defined the positive mode of thought in the following
terms: 'In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the
vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the
universe and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the
study of their laws, i.e. their invariable relations of succession and
resemblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined are the
means ofthis knowledge' (Comte, 1853, vol.l, pp. 1-2). Comte's
vision was of a world in which scientific 'rationality' was in the
42 Sodologkul Paradigml· and Organisational Analysis
ascendancy, underlying the basis of a well regulated social order.
For Comte the ·positive' approach provided the key to man's
destiny or, as Aron has put it, the ·one type of society which is
absolutely valid' and at which 'all mankind must arrive' (Aron,
1965, p. 59).
Comte believed that all sciences passed through his three phases
of development but did so at different times according to their
complexity. He felt that the 'positive' method which had already
triumphed in mathematics, astronomy, physics and biology would
eventually prevail in politics and culminate in the founding of a
positive science of society, which is called sociology. His vision
was of a sociology based on the models and methods employed in
the natural sciences, addressing itself to the discovery of scientific
laws which explain the relationships between various parts of
society - 'social statics' - and the way in which they change over
time- ·social dynamics'. In his writings Comte made much of the
link between biology and social science. He saw biology as mark-
ing a decisive point of transition between sciences, in that it
marked a distinction between the 'organic' and 'inorganic' and
placed emphasis upon understanding and explanation within the
totality of the living whole (Comte, 1853, vol. II, pp. 111-26).
Comte thus laid the foundations for the mode of social theorising
characteristic of the functionalist paradigm. Based upon the 'posi-
tive' model of the natural sciences, utilising mechanical and
organic analogies, distinguishing between statics (structure) and
dynamics (process), and advocating methodological holism,
Comte initiated important ground rules for a sociological
enterprise geared to an explanation of social order and
regulation.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) had a m~or influence on
developments in sociology in the 1870s and 1880s. A 'positivist' in
the Comtian tradition, his principal contribution was to develop in
a more detailed and extensive manner the implications of the
biological analogy for sociology. Influenced by the work of
Darwin, he saw the study of sociology as the study of evolution in
its most complex form. Whilst regarding society as a son of organ-
ism, he used the analogy flexibly, as an explanatory instrument
yielding, in his words, a 'treasure of insights and hypotheses'. His
work did much to lay the foundations for the analysis of social
phenomena in terms of 'structure' and 'function', elaborating
Comte's notion of totality and the need to understand the parts in
the context of the whole. In this respect, however, he was more of
a methodological individualist than Comte, maintaining that the
 Functionalist Sociology 43
properties of the aggregate are determined by the properties of its
units.
Many of the notions underpinning what we now know as
structural functionalism derive from Spencer's work. In particular
the parallels which he drew between societies and organisms, and
the view that the parts of society function in ways which contribute
to the maintenance of the whole, have been highly influential.
Spencer's view of society was that of a self-regulating system
which could be understood through study of its various elements
or organs and the manner in which they are interrelated. He saw
society as being set on an evolutionary course of development in
which changes of structure were characterised by a process of
increasing differentiation and increasing integration. The highly
developed social form was, for him, characterised by both
diversity and integration. The idea of evolution had universal
applicability and was the key to the understanding of both the
social and the natural world.
It is a point of considerable importance that in developing the
analogy between the biological and social, Spencer's focus of
attention was primarily, though not exclusively, directed at the
level of the organism rather than the species. Societies were seen
as ·super-organisms'. This organismic frame of reference emphas-
ises the unity, interdependence and ordered nature of constituent
relationships. A somewhat different view emerges from an
analysis conducted at the level of the species. As Buckley has
noted, 'the particular level of biological organisation that is chosen
as the basis for a model of society determines (or may be
determined by) whether we see society as pre-eminently co-
operative or basically conflictual. If society is like an organism,
then its parts co-operate and do not compete in a struggle for
survival, but if society is like an ecological aggregate, then the
Darwinian (or Hobbesian) model of competitive struggle is more
applicable' (Buckley, 1967, pp. 12-13). Whilst Spencer did draw
parallels between the evolution of societies and the evolution of
species - emphasising the role of conflict, including warfare, as a
force for social change - it was within the context of a theoretical
perspective which emphasised the inevitable march towards more
complex and integrated social systems. Industrial society was
viewed at its most advanced form. As Parsons has commented,
'Spencer's god was Evolution, sometimes also called Progress.
Spencer was one of the most vociferous in his devotions to this
god, but by no means alone among the faithful. With many other
social thinkers he believed that man stood near the culminating
44 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
point of a long linear process extending back unbroken, without
essential changes of direction, to the dawn of primitive man'
(Parsons, 1949, p. 4).
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) explicitly recognised the
influence of Comte and Spencer upon his sociological thought, but
he approached their work in a critical vein. As Lukes ( 1973) has
noted, Comte' s influence on Durkheim was a formative rather than
a continuing one, the extension of the ·positive·, or scientific
attitude to the study of society probably being most important.
Although Durkheim specifically dissociated himself from many of
Comte's beliefs, he was firmly influenced by the Comtian notion of
a concrete social reality capable of rational scientific investigation.
This is reflected in the Durkheimian notion of the objective reality
of ·social facts'. Durkheim recognised that Comte had oversim-
plified this reality, ignoring the way in which ·society' comprised
different 'types' and 'species'. In this respect Durkheim found
Spencer's analysis more acceptable, and he incorporated many of
Spencer's insights, derived from the use of the organic analogy,
into his analysis of social institutions.
For Durkheim, however, sociology had to go much further. He
did not believe that an analysis of the parts which existed in the
social organism and the role they performed was adequate as an
end of sociological analysis. In particular, he criticised those
sociologists who 'think they have accounted for a phenomenon
once they have shown how they are useful, what role they play,
reasoning as if facts existed only from the point of view of this role
and with no other determining cause than the sentiment, clear or
confused, of the services they are called to render· (Durkheim,
1938. p. 89). Durkheim believed that causal analysis was required
in addition to what we would now call functional analysis: 'To
show how a fact is useful is not to explain how it originated or why
it is what it is. The uses which it serves pre-suppose the specific
properties characterising it but do not create them ... When, then,
the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must
seek separately the efficient cause which piOduces it and the
function it fulfills' (Durkheim, 1938, p. 89). In terms of method,
therefore, Durkheim, following Comte and Spencer, borrowed
freely from the natural sciences. A methodological holist, distingu-
ishing between causes, functions and structures, he added much in
terms of sophistication to the thought of these earlier theorists and,
as will become apparent later, provided a firm foundation for
subsequent work within the context of the functionalist paradigm.
In terms of the nature of his social theorising, Durkheim is firmly
 Functionali.ft Socioloxy 4S
located within the context of the sociology of regulation. From the
early 1880s Durkheim addressed himself to the study of the rela-
tions between the individual and society and the relations between
individual personality and social solidarity. He was concerned
with nothing less than the nature of social solidarity itself- with
the nature of the bonds which unite men. As Lukes has noted,

This, indeed, was the problem that remained central to the whole of
Durkheim"s life work: as he was to write in a letter to Bougie, 'the
object of sociology as a whole is to determine the conditions for the
conservation of societies'. At this early period the problem posed itself
as a question of determining the nature of social solidarity in industrial
societies. as opposed to that in traditional or pre-industrial societies,
and of accounting for the historical transition from the latter to the
former. Later he was to turn to the study of 'elementary' or tribal
societies, and in particular. primitive religion, in order to determine the
nature of social solidarity in general. (Lukes, 1973, p. 139)

Durkheim saw, 'traditional societies' as being held together on the

basis of a ·mechanical solidarity' deriving from similarity of parts,
with the individual's ·conscience' a 'simple appendage ofthe col-
lective type, following it [the collective conscience] in all its
movements' (Durkheim, 1938, p. 148). The 'conscience collective'
was based on a system of shared values, norms and beliefs. In the
'industrial' society, with its extensive system of "division of
labour' and functional differentiation, he saw an ·organic solidar-
ity' arising from the interdependence of parts. It was a solidarity
based upon a normative system of values, beliefs and sentiments.
Durkheim recognised that in the process of transition from 'tradi-
tional' to 'industrial' societies solidarity could break down, creat-
ing a state of 'anomie' or normlessness. However, he saw this as an
abnormal state of affairs, a 'pathological' deviation from the
natural course of development. As Lukes notes, a major problem
with Durkheim's account of anomie was that

although it pinpointed the central ills of capitalism - unregulated

competition: class conflict; routinised, degrading, meaningless work -
it characterised them all as "abnormal'. This procedure tended to
hinder any full-scale investigation oftheircauses (which were assumed
not to be endemic), especially given the evolutionary optimism Durk-
heim espoused at this stage. They were to be explained by the tempor-
ary and transitional lack of the appropriate economic controls, the
appropriate norms governing industrial relations and the appropriate
forms for work organisation - a lack that would in due course be
46 Sociologic·a/ Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
remedied by allowing the operation of interdependent functions to
produce its natural consequences. (Lukes, 1973, p. 174)

Durkheim's sociology thus reflects a powerful predilection for

·order' as the predominant force in social affairs. Judged by the
yardstick by which we have defined the 'sociology of regulation' (a
concern for 'the .<;talus quo', 'social order'. 'consensus', 'social
integration and cohesion', 'solidarity', 'need satisfaction' and
'activity'), Durkheim emerges as a sociologist of 'order' and 'regu-
lation' par excellence.
A fuller account of the origins of the functionalist paradigm
would call for the analysis of the thought of a number of other
social theorists. Alfred Marshall, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto,
John Stuart Mill, Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead and
William James, among others, all have a strong claim to be consi-
dered here along with the founding fathers. To pursue such a task,
however, would convert this work into a historical treatise well
beyond the requirements of its present purpose. We will give
specific consideration to the work of Simmel and Mead later in the
chapter, since their ideas are of direct relevance to an understand-
ing of the schools of sociological thought which are located in the
least objectivist regions of the functionalist paradigm. The work of
Weber is of similar importance, but we shall delay a full discussion
of this until Chapter 6. Weber's work can only be adequately
understood against the detailed background of German idealism,
which provided the foundations for the development of the
interpretive paradigm. Thus, although Weber's work belongs
within the functionalist paradigm, we also discuss it in our chapter
on the interpretive paradigm, to aid the presentation and intelligi-
bility of our analysis as a whole. Readers who are unfamiliar with
Weber's sociology are invited to consult Chapter 6 at appropriate
points of discussion in this and the next chapter.
We conclude our discussion of the foundations of the functional-
ist paradigm here with a discussion of certain aspects of the work
of Pareto.' It can be argued that the attention which he is often
given in reviews of the development of social theory perhaps
inflates his true importance in terms of the originality and sophisti-
cation of his ideas. His significance derives mainly from the con-
siderable impact which his work has had upon the development of
twentieth-century sociological thought, particularly through L. J.
Henderson and the Harvard School of sociologists, who fostered
what came to be known as the 'Pareto cult' during the 1930s at a
particularly important and formative stage in the history of socio-
 Functionalist Sociology 41
logy. As will become apparent from our discussion in this and the
next chapter, for this reason alone Pareto's influence calls for
consideration in any review of the background to the functionalist
paradigm.
Vilfredo Pareto ( 1848-1923) came to sociology from economics,
with a view to supplementing the scientific theories of economics,
based on their assumptions of logical and rational conduct, with a
scientific theory of non-logical or non-rational conduct. The object
of his main sociological work A Treatise on General Sociology,
first published in 1916, was toconstructarigoroussociology which
gave due recognition to the irrational elements in human behaviour.
In his words. its sole purpose was •to seek experimental reality.
by the application to the social sciences ofthe methods which have
proved themselves in physics, in chemistry, in astronomy, in
biology, and in other such sciences' (Pureto, 1934, p. 291).
Among the main features of his work which are relevant for
comment here are the fact that after establishing the extent and
significance of the non-logical in social affairs, he proceeded to
explain it in terms of a social systems model based upon the notion
of equilibrium. His view of society was that of a system of interre-
lated parts which, though in a continual state of surface flux, were
also in a state of unchanging equilibrium, in that movements away
from the equilibrium position were counterbalanced by changes
tending to restore it. Pareto saw in the concept of equilibrium a
useful tool for understanding the complexities of social life. In the
physical sciences it had provided a means of analysing the rela-
tionship between variables in a state of mutual dependence, and it
had been used successfully in the field of economics. Pareto
extended it to the social sphere, viewing society as determined by
the forces acting upon it.
Pareto's equilibrium model of society was thus based upon a
mechanical as opposed to a biological analogy. In contrast to the
theories of Spencer and Durkheim, he took his main point of
reference from the physical sciences. This is not to say that Pareto
saw the physical and social worlds as being identical in nature;
rather, he saw models derived from the former as having heuristic
utility for the analysis of the latter. This is the role which the notion
of equilibrium played in his scheme.lt was a scientific construct to
be used for the analysis of social reality. This distinction between
equilibrium as an analytical construct and equilibrium as an empir-
ical reality was by no means always spelt out as clearly as it might
have been, and subsequent social theorists who followed Pareto's
lead often adopted the equilibrium notion in its entirety.
48 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
As far as the development of the functionalist paradigm is con-
cerned, it is through the notion of equilibrium that Pareto has had
most influence. Whereas it was implicit in many earlier social
theories, after Pareto it became much more explicit as a guiding
principle. The distinction which he drew between the logical and
non-logical elements in human conduct has, as we shall see, also
been of some importance.

The Structure of the Paradigm

The functionalist paradigm has provided the dominant framework
for academic sociology in the twentieth century and accounts for
by far the largest proportion of theory and research in the field of
organisation studies.
Its structure reflects the dominant influence of sociological
positivism, as described in the previous section, fused at its junc-
tion with the interpretive paradigm with elements of German ideal-
ism. It contains many separate schools ofthought, each occupying
a distinctive relationship one with another. Our task in the remain-
der of this chapter is to trace these relationships in terms of the two
dimensions which define the paradigm.
To facilitate this task, we identify four broad categories offunc-
tionalist thought and address each in turn. We describe them as: (a)
social system theory, (b) interactionism and social action theory,
(c) integrative theory, (d) objectivism.
Each of these broad categories occupies a distinctive position
within the paradigm, as illustrated in Figure 3.3 Social system
theory represents a direct development of sociological positivism
in its most pure form. Adopting mechanical and biological
analogies for the study of social affairs, it is most clearly re-
presented in the schools of thought described as structural
functionalism and systems theory.
lnteractionism and social action theory is the category of
thought which directly combines elements of sociological positiv-
ism and German idealism and, as such, can be considered as
defining the most subjectivist boundary of the paradigm.
Integrative theory occupies a central location within the para-
digm, seeking to bridge the gap between social system theory and
interactionism. It is not fully committed to either of these two
categories: it takes something from both and contributes some-
thing to both. It is truly a brand of theory characteristic of the
middle ground, and is reflected in the schools of thought which we
 Functionalist Sociology 49
des.cribe as conflict functionalism. morphogenic systems theory,
Blau's theory of exchange and power, and Mertonian theory of
social and cultural structure.
The category ofthought which we describe as objectivism (com-
prising behaviourism and abstracted empiricism) is very closely
related to social system theory, in that it again is firmly committed
to the tradition of sociological positivism. We identify it as a
separate category, in recognition of the fact that it reflects a par-
ticularly extreme form of commitment to the models and methods
of the natural sciences. Behaviourism, for example, derives from
physiological models employed in psychology. Abstracted empiri-
cism is dominated by quantitative methodologies which often have
no distinctly social qualities.
We commence our analysis with a consideration of social sys-
tem theory.

Social System Theory

Under this heading we consider two schools of thought which, in
many respects, have provided the dominant framework for
analysis in contemporary sociology - structural functionalism and
systems theory. Both have had a particularly important impact
upon the field of organisational analysis.
The terms 'structural functionalism· and 'systems theory' are
often seen as interchangeable. Whilst there is some measure of
justification in equating the two as far as the majority of current
systems applications are concerned, to do so represents an over-
simplification, since systems theory is consistent with theoretical
perspectives which extend beyond the confines of the functionalist
paradigm. However, these remain largely undeveloped at the pre-
sent time. In the following sections we trace the development of
the two perspectives and the relationships which exist between
them, arguing that the similarities only exist if they draw upon a
similar analogy, that of the biological organism. Whereas struc-
tural functionalism inevitably draws upon this analogy, systems
theory is in principle consistent with the use of many others.

Structural functionalism
It is through the notion of structural functionalism that the use of
the biological analogy in the tradition ofComte, Spencer and Otuk-
SO Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
heim has had its major impact upon sociological thought. Building
upon the concepts of holism, interrelationship between parts,
structure, functions and needs, the biological analogy has been
developed in diverse ways to produce a social science perspective
firmly rooted in the sociology of regulation. Treating the external
social world as a concrete reality, governed by observable func-
tional relations amenable to scientific investigation through
nomothetic methods, structural functionalism developed as the
dominant paradigm for sociological analysis during the first half of
the twentieth century. Indeed, by the 1950s its influence was so
pervasive that in certain quarters functional analysis was equated
with sociological analysis per se (Davis, 1959).
Significantly, it was not within sociology itself that structural
functionalism received its first coherent expression as a theory and
method of analysis. This took place within the realm of social
anthropology, an area of enquiry which, in addressing itself
primarily to the study of small-scale societies, provided an ideal
situation for the application of holistic views of society in a man-
ageable empirical context. Two names stand out as particularly
influential in this endeavour - those of Malinowski and
Radcliffe-Brown. 2
Malinowski's overriding contribution was to establish the
importance of field-work. Surprising as it may now seem, social
anthropology was predominantly an 'armchair' discipline. As Jar-
vie notes, 'with the exception of Morgan's study of the Iroquois
(1851), not a single anthropologist conducted field studies till the
end of the nineteenth century' (Jarvie, 1964, p. 2). Malinowski's
call was in effect to ·get off the verandah' and get involved in
field-work and direct observation. In opposition to the ·evolution-
ist' and 'diffusionist' explanations of primitive society prevalent in
the early 1920s, Malinowski advocated a 'functionalist' explana-
tion, which argued that the unusual or special characteristics of
primitive social systems could be understood in terms ofthefunc-
tions which they performed. His view was that society or ·culture'
should be regarded as a complex whole and understood in terms of
the relationships between its various parts and their ecological
surroundings. Social organisation, religion, language, economy,
political organisation, etc., were to be understood not so much as
reflecting a primitive mentality or stage of ·underdevelopment'
but in terms of the functions performed. In Malinowski's own
words, the functional analysis of culture.
aims at the explanation of anthropological facts at all levels of
development by their function, by the part which they play within the
 Functionalist Sociology 51
integral system of culture, by the manner in which they are related to
each other within the system, and by the manner in which this system is
related to the physical surroundings. It aims at the understanding of the
nature of culture, rather than at conjectural reconstructions of its
evolution or of past historical events. (Malinowski, 1936, p. 132)

Malinowski developed the notion of functional analysis against the

prevailing orthodoxy in anthropology but without specifically
grounding it within the context of earlier social theory. Radcliffe-
Brown, on the other hand, was much more systematic in this
respect. He specifically recognised that the concept offunction, as
applied to human societies, was based upon an analogy between
social life and organic life,and that it had already received a certain
amount of consideration in philosophy and sociology. He took his
own particular starting point from the work of Durkheim and
sought to elaborate the parallels which existed between biological
organisms and human societies. 1
Radcliffe-Brown's analysis was a sophisticated one. He argued
that the concept of function in social science involved the assump-
tion that there are necessary conditions of existence for human
societies. Developing the analogy with animal organisms, he
argued that societies could be conceptualised as networks of rela-
tions between constituent parts - 'social structures' - which had
a certain continuity. In animal organisms the process by which this
structural continuity is maintained is called life. The same applies
in societies. Whilst recognising that societies in normal circum-
stances do not die in the manner of organisms, Radcliffe-Brown
argued that the ongoing life of a society could be conceived in
terms of the functioning of its structure - hence the notion of
'structural functionalism'. He illustrates his position as follows:

To turn from organic life to social life, if we examine such a community

as an African or Australian tribe we can recognise the existence of a
social structure. Individual human beings, the essential units in this
instance, are connected by a definite set of social relations into an
integrated whole. The continuity of the social structure,Jike that of our
organic structure, is not destroyed by changes in the units. Individuals
may leave the society, by death of otherwise; others may enter it. The
continuity of structure is maintained by the process of social life, which
consists of the activities and interactions of the individual human
beings and of the organised groups into which they are united. The
social life of the community is here defined as the functioning of the
social structure. The function of any recurrent activity, such as the
punishment of a crime, or a funeral ceremony, is the part it plays in the
52 Socio/of?ical ParadiF?ms and OrF?anisational Analysis
social life as a whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the
maintenance of the structural continuity.
The concept offunction as here defined thus involves the notion of a
structure consisting of a .~et of relations amongst unit entities. the
mntinuity of the structure being maintained by a /ife-proce.u made up
of the aC'li1·ities of the constituent unite;. (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, p.
180)

Radcliffe-Brown saw this type of analysis as focusing attention

upon three sets of problems relevant to the investigation of human
society and of social life:

(a) The problems ofsocial morphology - what kinds of social

structure are there? What are their similarities and differ-
ences? How are they to be classified?
(b) The problems of social physiology - how do social
structures function?
(c) The problems of development - how do new types of
social structure come into existence?

In specifying these problem areas, however, he was careful to

recognise that the organismic analogy had a number of limitations
as far as the study of society was concerned. First, whereas in the
case of organisms it was possible to study organic structure inde-
pendently of its functioning, in the case of societies it was not. As
he put it, 'in human society the social structure as a whole can only
be obsera•ed in its functioning' (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, p. 181). In
other words, he placed emphasis upon the essentially processual
nature of social life, arguing that a social morphology could not be
established independently ofa social physiology. Second, he drew
attention to the problem of morphogenesis. Societies are able to
change and elaborate their structural types without any breach of
continuity; organisms cannot. As he put it, 'a pig does not become
a hippopotamus' ( 1952, p. 181). Third, he drew attention to the fact
that the functional analysis of society, with its emphasis upon the
contribution which the part makes to the continued existence and
functioning of the whole, is based upon the hypothesis of func-
tional unity .It implies that society has a 'functional unity' in which
'all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient
degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e. without producing
persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved or regulated'
( 1952, p. 181). Radcliffe-Brown argued that functionalists should
test this hypothesis by systematic examination of the facts.
 Functionalist Sociology 53
With Radcliffe-Brown, therefore, we arrive at a quite sophisti-
cated statement of the nature and limitations of the structural
functionalist perspective. It is a point of view which recognises the
processual relationship of mutual influence between structure and
its functioning, and the dangers involved in pursuing the analogy
between societies and organisms to an extreme. Not all functional-
ists were in complete agreement with Radcliffe-Brown, notably
Malinowski, and it is as well to draw attention to some of the
differences in points of view. Malinowski, for example, tended to
seek explanations of society in terms of basic human needs. His
version of functionalism tended to pursue the organismic analogy
to an extreme and often resulted in teleological explanations. This
was something Radcliffe-Brown consciously sought to avoid. He
recognised the self-fulfilling nature of explanations based on
·needs' at both the individual and social level, and preferred to talk
in terms of 'necessary conditions of existence'. This allowed for
the possibility of the existence of some social phenomena which
did not necessarily have a function to perform. Radcliffe-Brown
had a preference for explaining social phenomena in terms of their
·survival value' to the society. He saw social institutions as con-
tributing to the 'integration', 'stability' and ·maintenance' of the
social system as a whole. He explained the nature of society in
'social' terms above and beyond the needs of its individual mem-
bers. Though avoiding the problem of teleology, he ran danger-
ously close to the problem of reification. 4
Subsequent developments in the functionalist tradition have
drawn heavily upon the work of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown
and have fanned out in many directions. Indeed, there has been
considerable debate over whether functionalism or structural
functionalism can be regarded as a unified approach, and a number
of varieties of functionalism have, in fact, been identified
(Demerath, 1966). The major distinction commonly drawn be-
tween approaches revolves around the issue of level of analysis:
whether the focus in functional analysis is on the part or the whole,
on the individual institution or the social system. In addition to this
distinction, however, it is also desirable to draw attention to at
least two other lines of development. The first follows on from
Radcliffe-Brown's focus on structure in the tradition of ·social
morphology' .In defiance (or at least ignorance) of his warning that
'the social structure as a whole can only be observed in its func-
tioning', the notion of structure has become increasingly reified as
some social theorists sought to identify its key elements. The
'search for structure' has led to an increasingly hard and indis-
.54 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
criminate application of the models and methods of the natural
sciences to the study of social phenomena. In an extreme though
pervasive form, much of contemporary structural functionalism
manifests itself in terms of a host of empirical snapshots of reified
social structures.s In the attempt to focus upon, define and meas-
ure 'structures', the notion of functional process - so central to
the conceptualisations of both Malinowski and Radcliffe-Bro wn-
has been lost. There has been a swing towards a highly objectified
and static view of social reality - towards a positivism of an
extreme, narrowly empirical and, indeed, atheoretical form. We
shall pursue this in our discussion of abstracted empiricism later in
this chapter.
The second line of development has focused upon what
Radcliffe-Brown called the ·problems of social physiology', that
is, upon explaining the way in which social systems function. For
the most part these studies have drawn heavily upon the
organismic analogy, attempting to understand the functioning of
social systems in terms of system needs or conditions of existence.
This is particularly evident, for example, in the work of Talcott
Parsons and his analysis of the social system ( 1951). 6 Parsons takes
as his point of departure the system as a whole and analyses the
conditions necessary for its survival, functioning, evolution and
change. As Rocher notes, in Parsons' perspective 'the term func-
tion refers to various solutions to a particular complex ofproblems
that a system can adopt in order to survive, and 'survival' here
includes persistence, evolution and transmutation. So for Parsons,
functional analysis consists in establishing a classification of the
problems which every system must resolve in order to exist and
keep itself going' (Rocher, 1974, p. 155). This leads Parsons to the
notion of what are called 'functional prerequisites' or 'functional
imperatives' - the functions which must be performed if a society
is to survive. As Parsons has put it, ·any social system is subject to
four independent functional imperatives or "problems" which
must be met adequately if equilibrium and/or continuing existence
of the system is to be maintained' (Parsons, 1959, p. 16). These are
most clearly illustrated in his so-called AGIL scheme, which
identifies the four basic functional imperatives which Parsons
regards as being relevant to the analysis of all social systems. 7
Simply put, these are:
Adaption the complex of unit acts which serve to establish
relations between the system and its external
environment.
 Functionalist Sociolol(y 55
Goal attainment
the actions which serve to define the goals ofthe
system and to mobilise and manage resources and
effort to attain goals and gratification.
Integration ~he unit acts which establish control, inhibit
deviancy, and maintain co-ordination between
parts, thus avoiding serious disturbance.
Latency or pattern maintenance
the unit acts which supply actors with necessary
motivation.

As Radcliffe-Brown noted, the notion of needs or conditions of

existence is implicit in the use of the analogy of a biological
organism for social analysis. In placing them at the centre of
analysis, however, Parsons ignores the limitations of this analogy
for the study of society which Radcliffe-Brown was so careful to
specify and redirects the main thrust of functionalist enquiry. Both
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown had assumed that social
'structures' were implicit in the operation of social systems, and
that the problem of empirically based social analysis was to
identify the functions which the various elements of structure
performed. Parsons in effect inverts this problematic: starting with
the functions which must be performed, the problem of empirical
social science becomes that of identifying the structures or ele-
ments of social systems which serve given imperative functions.•
As David Lockwood (1956) has observed, Parsons' approach to
the analysis of the social system has been heavily weighted by
assumptions and categories which relate to the role of normative
elements in social action, and especially to the processes whereby
motives are structured normatively to ensure social stability. This
normative orientation has attracted the charge that Parsons'
scheme is inherently conservative, geared to a reaffirmation of the
status quo and unable to deal with change. 9 Parsons, in the tradi-
tion of Comte. Spencer and Durkheim, has underwritten his
approach by the implicit assumption that modern industrial society
rests at the pinnacle of human achievement, and that the pre-
dominant problem is that of regulation. As Lockwood notes, one
of the central themes emerging from Parsons' classic early work
The Structure of Social Action is that ·order is possible through the
existence of common norms which regulate .. the war of all against
all" • (Lockwood, 1956, p. 137). Parsons' later work strongly
reflects this basic orientation, though he has in fact been aware of
56 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the need to make his model a dynamic one capable of accommodat-
ing and explaining change.
Valid as the charge of a normative orientation in Parsons' work
might be, it is also important to recognise that a certain degree of
conservatism is imposed by adherence to the organismic analogy
itself. 10 This is a point of particular significance in view of the fact
that many structural functionalists do not specifically follow Par-
sons' normative orientation. Although the Parsonian model is often
seen as dominating the contemporary structural functionalist
perspective, there are other models which have developed inde-
pendently. These other models also encounter difficulty in hand-
ling high degrees of change. As Radcliffe-Brown noted, this is a
limitation inherent in the use of the organismic analogy.
Radcliffe-Brown identified as his third set of problems those of
development - that is, how do new types of social structure come
into existence? It is of great significance that the structural
functionalists have had the most difficulty with this issue and that it
remains the least well explored.
Interestingly enough, the principal contributions to this problem
area have come from theorists who have sought to provide a
critique of structural functionalism as a whole or to provide alter-
native methods of analysis. Merton's contribution, for example,
provides a good illustration of the former and Buckley's mor-
phogenic systems theory an example of the latter. We will examine
both later in this chapter under the broad heading of integrative
theory. The positions which they develop represent a move away
from the dominant perspectives which characterise social system
theory; it takes these theorists to a different location within the
functionalist paradigm.
By way of summary, therefore, we conclude our discussion of
structural functionalism with the observation that from its start it
has been dominated by the use of biological analogy for the study
of society. Different varieties can be observed in practice. There
are those approaches which focus upon system parts rather than
upon systems as a whole. There are approaches in the tradition of
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown which are most concerned with
establishing the functions which various elements of society per-
form. There are those which focus upon •social morphology' and
often result as abstracted empiricism. There are those which focus
upon functional imperatives or system needs and which seek to
analyse society in whole or part with this perspective in mind. All
these approaches adopt an approach to social science characteris-
tic of the objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm. Ontolog-
 Functionalist SocioiOKY S1
ically, epistemologically and methodologically, structural func-
tionalism has been based upon models derived from the natural
sciences. For the most part, this has carried with it a relatively
determinist view with regard to human nature. In terms of its
characterisation of society, the overriding fact that the ·needs' or
·necessary conditions of existence' of social systems underwrite
the very notion of function has inevitably committed structural
functionalism to a perspective located within the sociology of
regulation.
The current state of structural functionalism ranges from ·grand
theory' to 'abstracted empiricism' with a general emphasis in the
latter upon structure rather than function. The notion of functional
process which was so important to its founding fathers has, for the
most part, either been ignored or lost. The qualifications which
were identified in drawing analogies between biological and social
phenomena seem largely to have gone astray. Fostered by
utilitarian demands for pragmatic theory and research geared to
piecemeal social engineering - political, managerial,.and the like
-theoretical insights have been largely submerged under a deluge
of empirical research. Indeed, structural functionalism as re-
presented in the work of Radcliffe-Brown has proved a rare and
transient phenomenon.

Systems theory
Since the early 1950s the 'systems approach' has assumed increas-
ing importance in various branches of social analysis. ! n sociology,
psychology, anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, organisation
theory, industrial relations and many other social science subjects,
systems theory has become established as an important method of
analysis. Among the more prominent studies, it is worth citing by
the way of illustration the work of Parsons (The Social System,
1951), Homans (The Human Group, 1950), Katz and Kahn (The
Social PsychoiOKY of Organisations, 1966), Easton (The Political
System, 1953) Dunlop (Industrial Relations Systems, 1958) and
Buckley (SocioiOKY and Modern Systems Theory, 1961).
Despite its popularity, however, the notion of •system' is an
elusive one. Many books on systems theory do not offer a formal
definition of the systems concept, and where a definition is attempt-
ed, it is usually one of considerable generality. 11 For example,
Angyal suggests that •there is a logical genus suitable to the treat-
S8 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ment of wholes. We propose to call it system· (Angyal, 1941, p.
243). Again, in the words of von Bertalanffy, the founding father of
general systems theory, 'there are corresponoences in the princi-
ples which govern the behaviour of entities that are intrinsically,
widely different. This correspondence is due to the fact that they
all can be considered, in certain respects, as .. systems .. , that is,
complexes of elements standing in interaction' (von Bertalanffy,
1956, pp. 1-2).
The notions of 'holism' and 'interaction • of parts are not exclu-
sive to systems theory, and skeletal definitions such as these have
led many social scientists to the view that systems theory often
represents little more than old conceptualisations dressed up in
new and needlessly complex jargon. For many, it is another case of
the emperor having no clothes.
However, the situation is, in fact, much more sophisticated than
this. Von Bertalanffy wishes to use the notioo of ·system' as a
means of cutting through the substantive differences which exist
between different academic disciplines. The subject matter of
chemistry, physics, biology, sociology, etc., are linked in his view
by the fact that they study 'complexes of elements standing in
interaction', that is, ·systems'. The task of his general systems
theory is to discover the principles of organisation which underlie
such systems. One of his general aims is to achieve a ·unity of
science' based upon 'the isomorphy oflaws in different fields • (von
Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 8).
In many respects von Bertalanffy's aim can be regarded as
archetypical of the positivist perspective: it is based upon epis-
temological assumptions dominated by a concern to search for and
explain the underlying regularities and structural uniformities
which characterise the world in general. However, his perspective
differs from that of most positivists, in that he does not take his
point of departure from the traditions of conventional science.
Indeed, the contrary is true. Von Bertalanffy is firmly set against
the reductionism which characterises most areas of scientific
endeavour, with its emphasis upon modes of enquiry based upon
the methods and principles of conventional physics. He views his
general systems theory as providing an alternative to this; instead
of reducing all phenomena of study to physical events, he advo-
cates that we study them as systems. His positivism is thus of a
non-traditional kind and is dominated by the metaphor of 'system·
as an organising concept.
Von Bertalanffy makes much use of 'the limitations of conven-
tional physics' as a means of advocating his general systems
 Functionalist SocioiOI~'V S9
approach. In this the difference between 'closed' and 'open' sys-
tems plays a very important part. Von Bertalanffy argues that
conventional physics deals mainly with closed systems, that is.
systems which are considered to be isolated from their environ-
ment. The method of the controlled experiment, in which the
subject of study is taken out of its environment and subjected to
various tests, provides a very good example of this. Such closed
systems are characterised by equilibrium. As von Bertalanffy puts
it, ·a closed system must, according to the second law of ther-
modynamics, eventually attain a time independent equilibrium
state, with maximum entropy and minimum free energy. where the
ratio between its phases remains constant' (von Bertalanffy. 1950).
Open systems are quite different, in that they are characterised
by an exchange with their environment. They engage in transac-
tions with their environment, 'importing' and •exporting' and
changing themselves in the process. 12 A living organism provides a
good example of an open system, since it maintains itself through a
process of exchange with its environment. during the course of
which there is a continuous building up and breaking down of
component parts. The concept of an open system is thus essen-
tially processual. Whilst a closed system must eventually obtain an
equilibrium state, an opens ystem will not. Given certain conditions,
an open system may achieve a steady state, homeostasis, in which
the system remains constant as a whole and in its phases. though
there is a constant flow of the component materials. However, such
a steady state is not a necessary condition of open systems.
This is a point of the utmost importance. and it needs to be
emphasised. An open system can take a wide variety of forms.
There are no general laws which dictate that it must achieve a
steady state, be goal directed, evolve. regress or disintegrate. In
theory. anything can happen. One of the purposes of open systems
theory is to study the pattern of relationships which characterise a
system and its relationship to its environment in order to under-
stand the way in which it operates. The open systems approach
does not carry with it the implication that any one particular kind of
analogy is appropriate for studying all systems. since it is possible
to discern different types of open system in practice.
The above point has not been clearly articulated and stressed in
the literature on systems theory, at least not in the systems litera-
ture most often read by social scientists. As far as most social
scientists are concerned, there are two types of system perspec-
tives - open and closed. The fact that the former encompasses a
whole range of possibilities is hardly ever recognised.
60 Sociological Paradigms and Organi.wtional Analysi.~

As a theoretical perspective in social science, the notion of a

closed system tends to be avoided like a dreaded disease. Von
Bertalanffy's argument that closed systems are characterised by
isolation from their environment has proved overwhelmingly suc-
cessful in persuading social theorists that the closed systems
approach is inappropriate as a guiding principle for the concep-
tualisation of social phenomena. Indeed, it has become almost
obligatory for social systems theorists to decry the inadequacies of
closed system theorising, and the sport of attacking exponents of
this now redundant perspective has become an extremely popular
one. In the field of organisation studies, for example, an attack
upon the closed system thinking implicit in Weber's model of
bureaucracy or classical management theory provides a conve-
nient springboard for lauding the praises of the contemporary
perspective of open systems theory.
Paradoxically, however, as a method of analysis the notion of a
closed system is still dominant in many areas of social enquiry. The
use of controlled experiments and interview programmes, and the
attempt to measure social phenomena through attitude ques-
tionnaires, all provide examples of closed system methodologies
based upon the assumption that the environment generated by the
investigation has no impact upon the subject of study. The paradox
is compounded by the fact that such dosed system methodologies
are often employed within the context of theoretical perspectives
which emphasise the importance of an open systems approach.
This link between theory and method is an extremely problematic
one in many areas of social science.
Despite the widely recognised deficiencies of the closed system
as a theoretical construct in social science, the full implications of
an open systems approach have not been pursued in any real
depth. The concept has been adopted in a very partial and often
misleading way. For many theorists, the adoption of an open
systems perspective has been a very limited venture, confined to
recognising and emphasising the environment as ani nfluence upon
the subject of study and reformulating traditional models in terms
of systems concepts. More than anything, the call to adopt an open
systems approach has been interpreted as a call to take heed of the
environment and often little else. As Buckley has noted, 'though
there is a fair amount of superficial (and often incorrect) use of the
newer terminology (it is almost de rigueur to mention
''boundary-maintenance", input-output, "cybernetic control"
(sic), feedback and the like), the underlying conceptions show little
advance over the mechanical equilibrium model of earlier
 Functionalist Sociology 61
centuries' (Buckley, 1967, p. 7). As we will argue below, the
openness of the majority of systems models has been fundamen-
tally constrained by the nature of the analogy used as a basis of
analysis.
The majority of systems models used in the social sciences tend
to be based upon mechanical and biological analogies, though in
recent years increasing attention has been paid to cybernetic mod-
els as a basis of analysis. 13 The mechanical models have been
derived directly from the physical sciences and tend to be under-
written by the assumption that the system has a tendency to
achieve an equilibrium state. Since, as we have already noted,
equilibrium is only possible in closed systems, does this imply that
all those theorists using mechanical models are working upon
closed system principles? To the extent that most of these theorists
recognise the influence of the environment, the answer is no.
Though adhering to the underlying concept of equilibrium - albeit
mistakenly in theoretical terms - they modify their analysis to
allow for the fact that disequilibrium is a very common feature of
the system; or that the situation is one of dynamic equilibrium,
with the system moving from one equilibrium state to another; or
that the system is characterised by homeostasis. All these three
strategies can be understood as attempts to save the notion of
equilibrium as an organising concept in open system situations
where it is fundamentally inappropriate. Homeostasis is an
acceptable open systems concept, but it implies an organismic as
opposed to a mechanical analogy as an organising principle.
Mechanical models of social systems, therefore, tend to be
characterised by a number of theoretical contradictions and are
thus of very limited value as methods of analysis in situations
where the environment of the subject of study is of any real
significance.
Among the most sophisticated and systematically developed
mechanical equilibrium models in social science are those
developed by the Harvard School of sociologists, who took their
lead from Pareto and L. J. Henderson. Of these the models of
Parsons ( 1951), Homans ( 1950), Barnard (1938), Mayo (1933) and
Roethlisberger and Dickson ( 1939), are perhaps the best known
and most readily recognised. It will be recalled from our discussion
earlier in this chapter that Pareto saw society as a system of
interrelated parts which, though in a continual state of surface flux,
were also in a state of underlying equilibrium. His notions were
avidly received by Henderson at Harvard and, through him, by the
whole generation of social theorists who came under his strong
62 Sociological Paradigms and Organi.tational Analysis
influence during the 1920s and t930s.• 4 Henderson was a
biochemist who, through the now famous Fatigue Laboratory,
developed his contact with the Business School and with social
theory. He was particularly interested in the potential contribution
which Pareto's equilibrium systems analysis could make to socio-
logy, particularly as a means of studying. complex social
phenomena comprising many variables in a state of mutual
dependence. The notion of equilibrium had provided a powerful
analytical tool for research in the physical sciences, and its exten-
sion to the social sciences appeared a natural and logical develop-
ment. Cannon's use of the notion of homeostasis to describe
equilibrium in the blood, also developed at Harvard, was seen as
extending the power and relevance of the equilibrium notion.
As we noted earlier, in Pareto's work the concept of equilibrium
had an ambiguous status, in that it is not always entirely clear
whether he intended it to serve as an analytical tool or as a descrip-
tion of reality.' In the work of the Harvard Group this ambiguity
disappears, and the concept is used to serve both purposes.
Mayo's analysis of industrial problems, Homans' study of the
human group, Barnard's study of the organisation, and Parsons'
study of the social system all reflect the assumption that their
subject of study has a tendency to achieve a state of equilibrium.
Given that the notion of equilibrium plays such a central role in
their analysis, the influence of the environment, whilst recognised
as important, is necessarily reduced to a secondary and very
limited role. Environmental change is of principal significance as a
source of disequilibrium. The possibility that environmental
change may influence the very structure and essential nature of the
system is negated to some extent by assumptions that equilibrium
will eventually be restored. The use of a mechanical equilibrium
analogy thus severe:y constrains the openness of the system under
investigation.
Similar problems relate to the use of biological analogies in
systems analysis. Since von Bertalanffy's advocacy of the merits
of an open systems approach, the choice of a biological organism
as a model for systems analysis has proved increasingly popular
and has more or less replaced the older mechanical analogies.
Indeed, the biological analogy of an organism - with its emphasis
upon characteristic features such as energic input, throughput and
output, homeostasis, negative entropy, differentiation, and.equi-
finality15 - has often been equated with the open systems
approach per se. Von Bertalanffy's enthusiasm for illustrating the
open systems notion with analogies drawn from biology, his former
 Functionalist Sociology 63
discipline, has led many social systems theorists to confuse what
was intended as an illustration with a point of principle. For many,
the adoption of an open systems approach has been equated with
the adoption of an organismic analogy as a basis of analysis. As we
are arguing here, this represents but one of a number of possible
open systems analogies.
As noted earlier, the organismic analogy is built into Parsons'
(1951) analysis of the social system.'" It is also found in the work of
Katz and Kahn (1966). the Tavistock group of researchers, for
example, Miller and Rice (1967), and countless other systems
theorists, particularly those who have addressed themselves to the
study of organisations.
Such analyses are usually organised around general principles
such as the following:
(a) that the system can be identified by some sort of boundary
which differentiates it from its environment;
(b) that the system is essentially processual in nature;
(c) that this process can be conceptualised in terms of a basic
model which focuses upon input, throughput, output and
feedback;
(d) that the overall operation of the system can be understood
in terms of the satisfaction of system needs geared to
survival or the achievement of homeostasis;
(e) that the system is composed of subsystems which contri-
bute to the satisfaction of the system's overall needs;
(0 that these subsystems, which themselves have identifiable
boundaries, are in a state of mutual interdependence. both
internally and in relation to their environment;
(g) that the operation of the system can be observed in terms
of the behaviour of its constituent elements;
(h) that the critical activities within the context of system
operation are those which involve boundary transactions,
both internally between subsystems and externally in rela-
tion to the environment.
Most of these general principles apply to open systems of all
kinds. Of particular importance as far as the organismic analogy is
concerned are those which imply that the system has ·needs'; that
these are necessarily geared to survival or homeostasis; and that
the subsystems contribute to the well-being of the system as a
whole. As will be recalled from our discussion of the structural
functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown, the notion that a system has
needs which must be fulfilled and the notion of functional unity
both derive directly from the use of the analogy of the biological
64 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
organism for the study of society. The notions of homeostasis and
survival are characteristic of biological analogies at the level both
of the organism and of the species.
As in the case of the mechanical equilibrium systems model, the
use of the organismic analogy constrains the manner in which the
system is viewed in relation to its environment. First, the system,
like an organism, is cast in a responding role. Despite the fact that
the relationship between system and environment is seen in theory
as one of mutual influence, the organismic analogy encourages the
view that it is the environment which influences and the system
which responds. The emphasis is upon the environment acting
upon the system rather than the other way around. Secondly, the
organismic analogy tends to presume a relatively stable system
structure. The system responds through recognisable channels,
the constituent elements of which have a function to perform
within the context of the system as a whole. Third, the general
nature of the response is seen as being determined by the 'needs· of
the system. These needs act as a reference point for interpreting
the activities of the system as a whole. Full openness. however,
requires that the system be allowed to act unfettered by such
assumptions.
There are thus many points of similarity between the perspec-
tive of the systems theorist who adopts the organismic analogy as a
basis for analysis and that of the structural functionalist. The
models of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, for example. are very
similar to the notion of a homeostatic open-systems model. Both
emphasise the processual nature of social affairs. 'structure' being
a very transient phenomenon, temporarily expressing a relation-
ship between system parts and their ·ecological' context. Whilst
some systems models perhaps provide a more rigorous statement
of the implications of the biological analogy -for example. with
regard to concepts such as input, throughput, output,
homeostasis, negative entropy, equifinality. etc. - at a conceptual
level they usually add little to the structural functionalist's insight
with regard to the essence of social affairs. Radcliffe-Brown's view
that 'the social structure as a whole can only be observed in its
functioning' well anticipates the essential nature of the systems
view. Indeed. the parallels between the two perspectives can be
seen as being even closer than this. As in the case of the structural
functionalists, social systems theorists have largely restricted
themselves to two of the problem areas identified by Radcliffe-
Brown. those of social morphology and social physiology. Many
theorists working under the banner of systems theory, for exam-
 Functionalist SociolORY 6S
pie, have concerned themselves with the measurement of
structures, with the social morphology of systems. There are many
prominent examples within the field of organisation studies. The
work of the Aston group of researchers, for example, Pugh and
Hickson (1976), Richard Hall (1972) and almost any issue of
Administrative Science Quarterly present excellent illustrations.
Their systems models are constructed around .ftructural notions
such as size, configuration. centralisation. technology.
environmental domain, etc. Systems theorists who have con-
cerned themselves with the problem of social physiology have
usually followed Parsons • lead and have focused upon the notion
of functional imperatives in one form or another. Examples
reflected in the work of Katz and Kahn ( 1966), and the notion of the
socio-technical system (for example, Trist and Bamforth, 1951;
Rice, 1958). among others. will be discussed in some detail in the
next chapter. Both these lines of development are open to the same
sort of evaluation and criticism which we have discussed in rela-
tion to structural functionalists who have focused upon social
morphology and social physiology. The social morphologists have
tended to emphasise structure at the expense of process and. along
with the social physiologists. have tended to provide explanations
of social affairs which are geared to providing explanations of the
status quo. Both have largely ignored or underplayed the third set
of problems identified by Radcliffe-Brown - those of social
development. Systems theorists who base their work upon
mechanical and organismic models are not well equipped to
explain situations in which the elaboration and change of basic
structure are the essential features of the phenomena under
investigation. They find difficulty in handling the problem of
morphogenesis and discontinuous forms of change which lead to
system disintegration. disappearance or destruction.
Walter Buckley ( 1967) has provided a critique of the
inadequacies of conventional models used in social science in
similar terms. He argues that in the realm of human activity it is the
morphogenic nature of social arrangements which is all important,
and that systems models adequate for the task of analysing these
processes need to be adopted. Buckley's morphogenic view of
society takes him away from that of the majority of more conven-
tional social systems theorists, in that he sees social structure as
emerging from the process of social interaction. This view of social
process is in line with that of Radcliffe-Brown, though Buckley is
not constrained by any adherence to the organismic analogy. His
morphogenic systems theory is consistent with a more subjectivist
66 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
position within the context of the functionalist paradigm, and we
shall thus consider it in more detail ina later section of this chapter.
Buckley's analysis opens up new horizons as far as systems
theory in social science is concerned. It illustrates that systems
analysis need not be confined to the use of a particular kind of
well-worn analogy, such as that of the organism. Other choices
offer themselves for consideration. One of these, which has
already been explored to a certain extent, is that of the cybernetic
model. 17 Cybernetics has concerned itself with the study of
phenomena which behave as if they had goals. More specifically, it
is concerned with the theory of complex interlocking ·chains of
causation' from which goal-seeking and self-controlling forms of
behaviour emerge. Cybernetic models seek to cut through the
substantive differences which exist between, for example,
machines and organisms, in an attempt to focus upon common
organisational principles which define the nature of self-regulating
systems. Such models offer a useful alternative to the traditional
social system analogies in situations where the study of social
regulation or social engineering is a primary concern.
Other analogies also offer themselves as a basis for systems
analysis. As we shall argue in later chapters, if the concern is to
study situations in which conflictual relationships tend to pre-
dominate, then an analogy which emphasises that the system has a
tendency to break up or divide may be more appropriate. 'Fac-
tional' or ·catastrophic' systems models may provide a better
explanation of the subject under study. One of the central
problems facing the systems analyst is that of choosing an analogy
which reflects the basic nature of the phenomena to be investi-
gated.
Figure 4.1 presents an array of systems models arranged along a
continuum describing the extent to which they emphasise order
and stability as opposed to conflict and change as a normal
tendency in system operation. In certain respects a rough parallel
can be drawn between this continuum and the regulation--radical
change dimension of the analytical scheme which we are using to
differentiate between paradigms in social theory. Generally speak-
ing, the mechanical, organismic and morphogenic models are con-
sistent with a perspective characteristic of the functionalist para-
digm; the other two models are more characteristic of the radical
structuralist paradigm.
The emphasis in our discussion here has been placed upon the
fact that systems theory in principle is not linked to the use of any
one particular type of analogy. The fact that most applications
TYPI QIF Mechanicll Q,rganismio M~rphogenic FectiOntl Cetastroplilic
SYSTIM
AINAlOGY

PFUNCIPAL ·Equilibrium IHO!Ifttoltlail S·tfluctU!II Turbulent Com1Ptet•

TINIDENCY tlaborttion dlivilion reorganisation

ORDER AND COINFUCT ANID

STAIIUTY CHANG I
Fi&tn 4.1 So•• possi.blc twes of sys~em model$
68 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
have been based upon the mechanical and organismic models,
especially the latter, has often disguised this fact. The focus in
modern systems theory is upon the way in which a system is
organised internally and in relation to its environment. It seeks to
penetrate beyond the substantive nature of machine, organism or
whatever to reveal its principle of organisation. ·Systems theory is
about organisation - the organisation of 'complexes of elements
standing in interaction', to use von Bertalanffy's words ( 1956, p.
2). The automatic selection of one particular kind of analogy to
represent a system pre-empts systems analysis, since each kind of
analogy presumes a specific kind of structure and concommitant
pattern of information process, exchange, behaviour and the like.
The selection of a particular type of analogy to represent a system
in advance of a detailed analysis of its structure and mode of
operation is akin to prescription in advance of diagnosis. This has
been the principal problem with systems analysis in social science.
Social theorists have generally reached for some simple mechani-
cal or organismic analogy in advance of any study of the system to
which it is to be applied. In doing so, they have meted out rough
justice to the essential nature of the social phenomena which they
are investigating.
It will be clear from the above discussion that systems theory is
not intrinsically tied to any specific view of social reality. except
insofar as its general positivist orientation implies a social world
characterised by some form of order and regularity which can be
captured fn the notion of 'system'. Insofar as it has been applied
through use of mechanical and biological models. however, it has
been committed to a highly objectivist view ofthe social world. By
implication, the principles of physics and biology have been seen
as capable of explaining the nature of the social world. In this
respect there are direct parallels with structural functionalism and
the development of a functionalist perspective stretching back to
Durkheim, Spencer and other theorists before. We represent this
overall perspective under the notion of social system theory,
which occupies an area of that functionalist paradigm akin to that
illustrated in Figure 3.3. Its relatively objectivist location will
become all the more apparent as we move to consideration of other
schools of thought located within the paradigm.
lnteractionism and Social Action Theory
In terms of intellectual tradition, interactionism and social action
theory can both be understood as representing a fusion of certain
 Functionalist Sociology 69
aspects of German idealism and Anglo-French sociological
positivism. We have already considered sociological positivism in
some detail and will be devoting attention to the idealist tradition in
Chapter 6. As a means of presenting the essential characteristics of
interactionism and action theory here, therefore, we will confine
our attention to their immediate intellectual history. We will show
how the foundations ofinteractionism were largely laid by Georg
Simmel and George Herbert Mead, two theorists whose thought is
characteristic of what has come to be known as the neo-idealist
tradition. We will show how action theory derives from the work of
Max Weber, another neo-idealist. Whilst sharing a similar position
in relation to the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme, their thought is differentiated because they focus upon
different elements of social process.

Interactionism
Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was, to use Merton's words, a man of
innumerable seminal ideas. 18 A philosopher and historian turned
sociologist, he contributed freely to a wide range of areas of
enquiry, and his thought defies simple and straightforward
classification. His eclectic approach led to the development of a
brand of sociology containing many strains and tensions which
have never been fully reconciled. Essentially he was an academic
renegade, shunning many aspects of both major contemporary
schools of thought. He drove a middle way between idealism and
positivism, retaining only those aspects of each which lent
themselves to his own particular needs.
The German idealist tradition held that there was a fundamental
difference between nature and culture and that natural laws were
inappropriate to the realm of human affairs, which were character-
ised by the autonomy of the human spirit. Society was regarded as
having no real existence above and beyond the individuals which
composed it; no social scie11ce was possible. As we have seen, the
Anglo-French tradition. on the other hand, held that society did
have an objective existence and in many respects could be likened
to a biological organism. Accordingly, it was characterised by the
operation of laws which were amenable to investigation through
the methods of natural science. Simmel rejected the extremes of
both positions and argued in favour of an analysis of human
association and interaction. Beneath the variety and complexity of
70 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
individual affairs. he argued, there was a pattern. Beneath the
content, an underlying form. He favoured a sociology focusing
upon an intermediate level of analysis. In Coser's words, he was
concerned with the study of society as
an intricate web of multiple relations established among individuals in
constant interaction with one another ... The larger superindividual
structures - the state, the clan. the family. the city. or the trade union
- turn out to be but crystallizations of this interaction, even though
they may attain autonomy and permanency and confront the individual
as if they were alien powers. The major field of study for the student of
society is, hence, association rather than society. (Coser, 1965, p. S)

Simmel thus focused his attention upon human beings in their

social context. a theme which reverberates throughout his many
works. He was interested, above all else. in what he describes as
'interactions among the atoms of society'. As he put it,
They account for all the toughness and elasticity. all the colour and
consistency of social life, that is so striking and yet so mysterious.
Sociology asks what happens to men and by what rules they behave,
not insofar as they unfold their understandable individual existences in
their totalities. but insofar as they form groups and are determined by
their group existence because of interaction. (Simmel, 1950, pp.
10-11)

Beneath the mystery and individual character of interactions lay

the 'form'. or what Coser describes as the 'geometry' or
'grammar', of social life. For Simmel. the basic patterns lay hidden
beneath the ·content' of social life and had to be extracted through
formal analysis. Much of his work was devoted to an analysis of
these forms and their influence upon human action and behaviour.
His analysis of social forms such as dyadic and triadic relation-
ships, group processes and the influence of group size on
activities, provide good illustrations of the general orientation of
his relativist, though firmly nomothetic, approach to the study of
social life.
Despite his concern for form and pattern in social affairs,
Simmel was by no means a strict determinist. In his view of human
nature he again occupies a middle ground between the German and
Anglo-French traditions. He saw social life as being characterised
by a continuous conflict between the individual and his social
world. His work is characterised by what Coser describes as an
emphasis on a 'dialectical tension between the individual and
 Functionalist Sociology ·11
society', in which the individual, though a product of his social
world also stands apart. 'The individual is determined, yet deter-
mining, acted upon, yet self-actuating' (Coser, 1965, pp. 10, 11).
In terms of the subjective-objective dimension of our ana-
lytical scheme. therefore, Simmel occupies an interesting and
complex position. On the ontological strand, he stands mid-way
between the Anglo-French 'realism' and German ·nominalism'.
On the epistemological strand, his belief in underlying form and
pattern in human affairs places him towards the positivist position.
In terms of the methodological strand his position is clearly.
nomothetic. On the human nature strand, he occupies an
intermediate position. For these reasons we identify his brand of
theorising as characteristic of the least objectivist fringe of the
functionalist paradigm.
Simmel's interest in sociology at a micro-level of analysis led to
many insights with regard to the dynamics of social life. The theme
of conflict between the individual and the institutional context, for
example, is one which runs throughout many aspects of Simmel's
work and provides a valuable guideline as to where he stands in
relation to the regulatio~radical change dimension of our ana-
lytical scheme.
F~r Simmel, conflict was inherent in social life. As Coser notes,

Simmel would have rejected any attempt to understand societies by

way of models emphasising exclusively those processes making for
harmony, consensus, and balance among component individuals and
groups. To Simmel, sociation always involves harmony and conflict,
attraction and repulsion, love and hatred. He saw human relations as
characterised by ambivalence, precisely because those who are con-
nected in intimate relations are likely to harbour for one another not
only positive but also negative sentiments.
An entirely harmonious group, Simmel argued, could not exist
empirically .It would not partake of any kind of life process; it would be
incapable of change and development. Any social relationship needs
attractive and repulsive forces, harmony and disharmony, in order to
attain a specific form. (Coser, 1965, p. 12)

The inherent conflict between the individual and his situation

provides the basis of a penetrating analysis of the alienated state of
modern man, particularly in works such as The Stranger and The
Metropolis and Mental Life. Simmel presents the trend to mod-
ernity as reflecting a preponderance of what Nisbet has called 'the
tyrrany of objectivism' - the preponderance of 'the object spirit'
over the 'subjective spirit' (Nisbet, 1967, pp. 305-12).
72 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
The individual, for Simmel, had 'become a mere cog in an
enormous organisation of things and powers which tear from his
hands all progress, spirituality, and value in order to transform
them from their subjective form into the form of a purely objective
life' (Simmel, 1950, p. 422). His analysis of 'alienation' could well
have led him to a sociological perspective diametrically opposed to
the interests of the status quo. However, he did not follow this
path. As Nisbet notes, the notion of 'alienation' became for
Simmel a kind of methodological tool with which ·ever more
minute aspects of the social order are brought into view' (Nisbet,
1966, p. 311).
Within the context of his overall sociological perspective 'con-
flict' and 'alienation' were interpreted as playing an essential and
positive role in society. This view was an essential aspect of his
notion of the 'fallacy of separateness'. For Simmel, each aspect of
interaction had to be understood in terms of its reciprocal context.
Thus conflict and order were two aspects of the same reality; a
measure of alienation was an essential ingredient of man's aware-
ness of himself as a person. From this point of view, all social
phenomena could be interpreted as playing an essential part in the
maintenance of the wider society. This aspect of his thought brings
Simmel very close to a functionalist interpretation of society, a
view clearly reflected in his view of the latent positive functions of
conflict. 19 As Coser notes, Simmel argued that

Social conflict necessarily involves reciprocal action and is. hence,

based on reciprocity rather than unilateral imposition. Conflict might
often bind parties which might otherwise withdraw. It might serve as a
safety valve for negative attitudes and feelings. making further rela-
tionships possible. For example, conflict might lead to a strengthening
of the position of one or more parties to the relationship, increasing
their dignity and self-esteem through self-assertion. Thus. conflict
might produce new ties among the participants, strengthening their
existing bonds or establishing new ones. In this sense, conflict might be
considered a creative force rather than a destructive one ... The good
society -far from conflict-free- is, on the contrary, ·sewn together'
by a variety of criss-crossing conflicts among its component parts.
(Coser, 1965, p. 12)

Simmel's brand of social theorising, therefore, is firmly rooted

within the context of the sociology of regulation. Whilst recognis-
ing alienation and conflict as essential ingredients of social affairs,
he incorporates them within an explanation of the status quo rather
than as forces for radical change. Simmel's view of conflict has
 Functionalist Sociology 73
been particularly influential in establishing the 'problem of order'
as the central problem of sociological analysis. 20 His writings have
influenced developments in a number of areas, particularly those
of urban sociology, experimental small-group research, reference
group behaviour, role theory and conflict functionalism. In these
diverse ways, Simmel's influence upon the functionalist paradigm
has been of a major importance. 21
The second theorist whom we identify as having made a major
contribution to the interactionist movement is George Herbert
Mead (1863-1931). Mead was an American social philosopher
who, like Simmel, was influenced by the major cross-currents of
thought flowing in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and
the early decades of the twentieth century. In his wide-ranging
contribution to social philosophy and social psychology, we again
witness a fusion of the biological models derived from the Anglo-
French tradition of social theorising with elements of German
idealism. The product is a distinctive and complex system of
thought containing many strains and tensions and is one which
defies simple and straightforward treatment. The position is com-
plicated by the fact that Mead published relatively little of his
work. The books which appear under his name were assembled
and edited posthumously from various notes and manuscripts held
by former students and associates. Mead's position has thus
necessarily been greatly influenced and modified by the interpreta-
tions placed upon it by students and editors alike and, as we shall
argue below, his impact upon developments in social theory have
been rather one-sided. Certain aspects of his thought have been
developed at the expense of others.
Mind, Self and Society (1934), Mead's most influential work, is
subtitled 'From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist'. Although
Mead only used this term on one occasion ( 1934, p. 6), it is the term
by which he and his work are most often identified and described.
In point of fact, his work is much more wide-ranging than this, and
a strong claim can be made that in his other books he moves away
from this position towards a much more phenomenological
stance. 22
In Mind, Self and Society Charles Morris, its editor, suggests
that 'philosophically, Mead was a pragmatist; scientifically, he
was a social psychologist' (Mead, 1934, p. ix). The pragmatist
movement sought to interpret the concepts of mind and intelli-
gence in biological, psychological and sociological terms, in line
with post-Darwinian views of the evolutionary nature of change
and development.u It was a movement which can be clearly
74 Soci()/ogical Paradigm.<; and Organisational Analysis
identified with the Anglo-French tradition of social theory. Mead,
through his social psychology, sought to combine the biological
models being used in psychology with the notion of ·society' or
·social interaction' .24 His theories, as reflected in Mind, Self and
Society, combined a modified form of behaviourism with elements
of German idealism, such as the Hegelian notion of the social
nature of self and morality. 25
In Mind, Self and Socie'? Mead seeks to establish how 'mind'
and 'self' arise within the context of social conduct and interac-
tion. His explanation places emphasis upon the role of gestures in
the interaction process. Mead views the notion of ·gesture' in
social terms -as part of an 'act'. In interaction between animals
the social act or 'conversation of gestures' can be understood in
terms of a series of symbols to which the various parties respond
according to the interpretation placed upon the various gestures.
Such action can be regarded as a form of communication, in which
the various gestures or symbols involved influence later stages of
the act. However, in the case of animals the meanings are not in
the mind. Animals are not consciously communicating selves.
Each animal determines its behaviour according to what the other
is beginning to do.
With human beings the situation is somewhat different, since
through ·vocal gestures' or language the individual has the capac-
ity to become conscious of what he is doing. For Mead, it is the
mechanism oflanguage which underlies the development of'mind'.
Through the operation of 'mind', the individual can become the
object of his own thoughts. It is this process which underlies the
development of'self' .In Morris's words, 'Mead's endeavour is to
show that mind and the self are without residue social emergents;
and that language, in the form of the vocal gesture, provides the
mechanism for their emergence' (Mead, 1934, p. xiv).
Thus, tor Mead, the conscious human being evolves through a
social process, a process of interaction which involves the
development of language and hence 'mind' and 'self'. The human
being, unlike other animal organisms, has the capacity to become
aware of what he is about. For this to happen, he must be able to
interpret the meaning of his personal gestures. This involves an
internal ·conversation' or process of thinking from the standpoint
of what Mead called 'the generalised other' (Mead, 1934, p. 155).
As Morris puts it,

Behaviouristically, this is to say that the biological individual must be

able to call out in himselfthe response his gesture calls out in the other,
 Functionalist Sociology 15
and then utilise this response of the other for the control of his own
further conduct. Such gestures are significant symbols. Through their
use the individual is 'taking the role of the other' in the regulation of his
own conduct. Man is essentially the role-taking animal. The calling out
of the same response in both the self and the other gives the common
content necessary for community of meaning (Mead, 1934, p. xxi).

In providing a bio-social explanation of the emergence of'mind'

and 'self', Mead drives mid-way between the idealist view of
society as a subjectively constructed entity and a biological view
which ignores the influence of the social aspects of human
development. Ontologically, Mead's views, as expressed in Mind,
Selfand Society, are predicated upon the existence of an external
world which influences human thought and action. Society is
ontologically prior to ·mind' and ·self'.26 However, his position is
far from being deterministic. Rejecting the notion of simple
stimulus-response models of human behaviour ,27 Mead recognises
the role played by human beings in influencing their environment,
particularly through symbolic interpretation of the consequences
of various types of environmental conditions and modes of interac-
tion. Individual actors are thus accorded at least a mediating and
interpretive, if not entirely controlling or creative, role in relation
to their environment. Epistemologically, on the basis of Morris's
interpretation, Mead again occupies a middle ground. The world of
science is conceived as essentially social in nature:

composed of that which is common to and true for various observers -

the world of common or social experience as symbolically formu-
lated ... The experienced world is conceived by Mead as a realm of
natural events, emergent through the sensitivity of organisms, events
no more a property of the organism than of the things observed.
Philosophically the position here is an objective relativism: qualities of
the object may yet be relative to a conditioning organism. A certain
portion of the world, as experienced, is private, but a portion is social
or common, and science formulates it. Private experience and common
experience are polar concepts; the private can only be defined over
against that which is common. (Mead, 1934, p. xix)

Mead's position is presented by Morris as being essentially that

of 'objective relativism in regard to universals ... By making univ-
ersality relative to the act it is brought within the scope of an
empirical science and philosophy' (Mead, 1934, p. xxviii). Mead
was essentially a theorist who drew upon empirical examples to
illustrate his concepts and point of view.
76 SociohJRical Paradigms and OrRanisational Analysis
In terms of the four strands of the subjectiv~objective dimen-
sion of our analytical scheme, therefore, Mead's position as
reflected in Mind, Self and Society can be interpreted as being
close to that of Simmel. Although their theories and ideas differ in
many important respects, 28 they are both committed to an interac-
tionist form of analysis focusing upon individuals in a social con-
text. For both, the realm of social affairs is essentially processual
in nature, characterised by an underlying form expressed through
social interaction. The study of this interaction is central to their
social theories, which in the case of both writers are firmly geared
to providing an explanation of the status quo.
For these reasons we could identify Mead as essentially a theor-
ist of •regulation', whose thought, along with that of Simmel, can
be regarded as characteristic of the least objectivist fringe of the
functionalist paradigm. On the basis of the way in which Mead's
thought has been interpreted and used by subsequent theorists and
researchers, there is a large measure of justification for doing this,
since, as we shall argue later, Mead's work as interpreted above
has had a considerable influence upon various aspects of interac-
tionist thought. However, this whole mode of interpretation has
been criticised as unrepresentative of Mead's true position and,
following this line of argument, a case can be made for locating
Mead within the interpretive paradigm -even though the work of
most of his so-called followers and adherents would, without ques-
tion, remain firmly located within the context of the functionalist
paradigm. 29
Maurice Natanson ( 1973c), in a very clear and coherent analysis
of Mead's work, argues that the categorisation of Mead as a ·social
behaviourist' misrepresents his position, and that his theory of
social reality is of a more open-ended and developmental charac-
ter. He argues that Mind, Self and Society, The Philosophy of the
Present ( 1932b) and The Philosophy of the Act (1938) signify three
implicit directions in Mead's overall position, and that the funda-
mental themes explored ·bear amazing resemblance to the prob-
lems of phenomenological philosophising in the tradition of
Edmund Husser)' (Natanson, 1973c, p. 4). Natanson's view is that
as Mead moved in his development away from •pragmatic'
philosophers such as James, Cooley and Dewey, to philosophers
such as Bergson, Alexander and Whitehead, the nature of his
thought moved •from a problematic empiricism toward an idealis-
tic and subjectivistic account of the nature of social reality'
(Natanson. 1973c, p. 4). The three m;yor directions in Mead's
development are seen as:
 Functionalist Sociology 77
(a) 'the attempt to explore and describe experience within
society, treating consciousness, language, communica-
tion, and meaning as emergents from the social process';
(b) 'the re-approach to the same phenomena in terms of sub-
jectivity, treating the given in experience as arising epis-
temologically and experientially within what Mead terms
the "Act'";
(c) 'the attempt to describe what is given in experience by
means of a radical theory of temporality which takes the
present as the locus of reality' (Natanson, 1973c, p. 5). 30
In terms of our analytical scheme the three directions represent
a progressive movement away from the context of the functionalist
paradigm towards the interpretive paradigm. In the course of his
intellectual development Mead's meta-theoretical assumptions
with regard to our subjective-objective dimension changed sub-
stantially, and it is this change which accounts for many of the
strains and contradictions which Natanson and others have iden-
tified in his work. In other words, Mead's adherents have inter-
preted his work from the context of their meta-theoretical assump-
tions. As Douglas ( 1970b, p. 17) has noted, and our above analysis
suggests, it is possible to distinguish between 'two parallel, but
conflicting strains of interactionist thought: "behavioural interac-
tionism" and "phenomenological interactionism" '. The
'behavioural interactionists' have interpreted Mead within the
context of the functionalist paradigm; the ·phenomenological
interactionists' within the context of the interpretive paradigm.
Whilst recognising their indebtedness to a common heritage, they
have used Mead's work in fundamentally divergent ways.
So much, for the moment, for the theories and ideas of Mead and
Simmel. To many readers the attention which we have devoted to
them may appear disproportionate within the context of our work
as a whole. We justify our position on the basis that their theories
and ideas have provided important foundations for developments
in sociology and social psychplogy which are not always fully
recognised. Simmel is given little prominence in modern sociologi-
cal texts; in the literature on social psychology he is rare!y men-
tioned. Yet his pioneering work underpins much contemporary
theory in both these fields. The influence of Mead, though often
recognised, is rarely treated comprehensively and his ideas are
interpreted in a partial and often misleading way.
It is through the melting pot of what has come to be known as
'Chicago sociology' that the influence of Simmel and Mead have
had the greatest impact upon contemporary sociological theory. 3 •
78 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Under the influence of leading intellectual figures such as Albion
Small, W. I. Thomas, James Dewey, G. H. Mead, R. E. Park, E.
W. Burgess and E. Faris, the Department of Sociology at Chicago
had a major impact upon developments in American sociology
from the 1890s until at least the beginning of World War II.
Although each of these men made an original and distinctive con-
tribution to philosophical and sociological thought, it is the work of
Mead and Simmel which has had the most lasting influence. 31
Many of the interactionist ideas which characterise Chicago
sociology can be directly traced to one or other of these two key
figures or seen as representing a fusion of their respective con-
tributions.33 A full account of interactionist theory and research
would call for a volume in itself. Our discussion here, therefore,
will be restricted to an analysis of its dominant form - symbolic
interactionism.

Symbolic interactionism
The term •symbolic interactionism' has come to be associated
with a very wide range of interactionist thought. Essentially, the
notion derives directly from the work of Mead and the distinction
which he drew between ·non-symbolic' and ·symbolic' inter-
action. As Herbert Blumer, one of Mead's ex-students and most
prominent interpreters, has put it:

In non-symbolic interaction human beings respond directly to one

another's gestures or actions; in symbolic interaction they interpret
each other's gestures and act on the basis of the meaning yielded by the
interpretation. An unwitting response to the tone of another's voice
illustrates non-symbolic interaction. Interpreting the shaking of a fist
as signifying that a person is preparing to attack illustrates symbolic
interaction. Mead's concern was predominandy with symbolic interac-
tion. Symbolic interaction involves interpretation, or ascertaining the
meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person, and definition,
or conveying indications to another person as to how he is to act.
Human association consists of a process of such interpretation and
definition. Through this process the participants tit their own acts to
the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in doing so. (Blumer,
1966, pp. 537-8)l4

Whilst owing general allegiance to this notion, the symbolic

interactionist movement in sociology and social psychology has
not developed in anything like a consistent manner and has no
 Functionalist SocioiORY 79
single integrated body of theory which defines its position. 15
Rather, it constitutes a general orientation which is concerned to
understand social phenomena through the micro-analysis of
human affairs. Mead's basic ideas and concepts appear under the
guise of 'role theory' ,36 'reference group theory' ,n 'self theory' ,31
'dramaturgical theory' ,19 and the like. All represent varieties of
symbolic interactionist thought which tend to emphasise one
aspect of Mead's work at the expense of another.
Although one can identify a range of symbolic interactionist
thought in terms of categories such as those listed above, this
misses a very important point, since the fundamental issue which
divides symbolic interactionists relates to the position which they
occupy on the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme. As has been suggested earlier, it is possible to distinguish
between so-called 'behavioural interactionism' and
'phenomenological interactionism'. The differences between
these two modes of theorising and research are so fundamental
that it is definitely misleading to regard symbolic interactionism as
a coherent school of thought.
The distinctions between these two strains of symbolic interac-
tionism can be clearly illustrated by comparing the views of Rose
and Blumer presented in the former's collection of specially com-
missioned readings on interactionism (Rose, 1962). In the intro-
ductory chapter Rose, recognising that there is no complete
agreement on concepts, premises and propositions among those
who regard themselves as symbolic interactionists, seeks to
restate Mead's theory as expressed in Mind, Self and Society in
'simple, systematic and researchable form'. More specifically, he
is concerned to state it 'in terms that will fit the frame of reference
of the behaviourist or Gestaltist so as to make it more generally
understandable' .In order to do this Rose identifies (and elaborates
upon) the following assumptions and propositions:
ASSUMPTION I Man lives in a symbolic environment as well as a
physical environment and can be 'stimulated' to act by symbols as well
as by physical stimuli ...
ASSUMPTION 2 Through symbols, man has the capacity to stimu-
late others in ways other than those in which he is himself stimu-
lated ...
ASSUMPTION 3 Through communication ofsymbols, man can/earn
hu.~e numbers of meanings and values - and henu ways of acting -
from other men ...
GENERAL PROPOSITION (DEDUCTION) I Through the/earning
ofa culture (and subcultures, which are the specialised cultures found
in particular segments of society), men are able to predict each other's
80 Sociolof(ica/ Paradif(ms and Organisational Analysis
behaviour most of the time and {i!auge their own behaviour to the
predicted beha~·iour of others ...
ASSUMPTION 4 The symbols - and the meanings and values to
which they refer - do not occur only in isolated bits, but often in
clusters, sometimes large and £·omplex ...
GENERAL PROPOSITION (DEDUCTION) 2 The indi1•idual defines
(has a meaning for) himself as well as other objects, actions, and
characteristics ...
ASSUMPTION 5 Thinking is the process by which possible symbolic
solutions and other future courses ofaction are examined, assessed/or
their relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of the values of
the indh·idual. and one of them choun ... (Rose. 1962, pp. 5-12).411
This interpretation of Mead's work is clearly in the mould of the
'social behaviourist'. The essential concepts relating to symbolic
interactionism are interpreted within the context of a framework
which views man as living within an essentially 'realist' world of
symbolic and physical objects. It is a world to which man reacts
and which he influences, though the emphasis in Rose's work
appears to be on the former. The concern to deduce propositions
reflects a predilection for a positivist epistemology; specific
hypotheses are put forward in other contributions to Rose's book
and the methodologies employed are usually of a firmly nomothe-
tic character. Rose's overall standpoint provides a clear illustra-
tion of Strauss's observation that sociologists who tend to be social
determinists read Mead as if he too were a social determinist
(Strauss, 1964, pp. xii-xiii).
By way of contrast, Blumer, in an article in the same book of
readings, adopts a more subjectivist position. He argues that rec-
ognition of the process of interpretation in human affairs has
fundamental implications for an understanding of the human
being, human action and human association, and, in consequence,
he adopts an ontology which is much more nominalist than that of
Rose. As Blumer puts it, 'Instead of the individual being sur-
rounded by an environment of pre-existing objects which play
upon him and call forth his behaviour, the proper picture is that he
constructs his objects on the basis of his ongoing activity' (Blumer,
1962, p. 182). His view on human nature is also much more volun-
tarist: 'The second important implication of the fact that the human
being makes indications to himself is that his action is constructed
or built up instead of being a mere release' (Blumer, 1962, p. 182).
In line with this analysis, Blumer develops a view of society which
constitutes a process of symbolic interaction, in which individual
'selves' interpret their situation as a basis for action. Group or
collective action is seen as consisting of an alignment of individual
 Functionalist SocioloRY 81
actions •brought about by the individuals' interpreting or taking
into account each other's actions' (Blumer, 1962, p. 184). In this
article, Blumer is concerned to establish the credentials of sym-
bolic interaction in preference to other elements of sociological
thought, particularly those based on organic rather than interac-
tionist models (structural functionalism and social systems theory,
for instance). Accordingly, he does not elaborate his particular
view of symbolic interaction in any real depth. 41 This is left to later
works, in which he adopts an increasingly subjectivist orientation.
In his 1966article discussing the work of G. H. Mead, for example,
he presents Mead as advocating a distinctly nominalist ontology
and goes on to draw out its implications for individual and group
action:

for Mead objects are human constructs and not self-existing entities
with intrinsic natures. Their nature is dependent on the orientation and
action of people toward them ... This analysis of objects puts human
group life into a new and interesting perspective. Human beings are
seen as Jiving in a world of meaningful objects - not in an environment
of stimuli or self-constituted entities. This world is socially produced in
that the meanings are fabricated through the process of social interac-
tion. Thus different groups come to develop different worlds - and
these worlds change as the objects that compose them change in
meaning. Since people are set to act in terms of the meanings of their
objects, the world of objects of a group represents in a genuine sense its
action organisation. To identify and understand the life of a group it is
necessary to identify its world of objects; this identification has to be in
terms of the meanings objects have for the members of the group.
Finally, people are not locked to their objects; they may check action
toward objects and indeed work out new lines of conduct toward
them. This condition introduces into human group life an indigenous
source of transformation. (Blumer, 1966, p. 539)

Blumer goes on to present symbolic interactionism as being

essentially concerned with the meanings which underlie the
process of interaction and as an attempt to understand society in
these terms. 42 It is presented as a form of analysis geared to under-
standing the way in which people align themselves with different
situations. This essentially phenomenological standpoint is
developed further in his 1969 study and reinforced by a call for
interactionist methodology to ·respect the nature of the empirical
world' (Blumer, 1969, p. 60).
This split in orientation between behavioural and
phenomenological symbolic interactionism which we have
82 Sociolof1ical Paradi11ms and Organisational Analysis
illustrated in relation to the work of Rose and Blumer is mirrored
on a wider scale in the work of the so-called Iowa and Chicago
approaches to symbolic interaction. 41 The former have been
particularly concerned to operationalise their approach and, in so
doing, have become increasingly committed to a structural as
opposed to a processual view of the phenomena which they are
concerned to investigate. As Manis and Meltzer have observed,
this is very evident in the work on self theory, where there has been
a tendency to abandon the non-empirical concepts in Mead's
thought and focus upon the measurement of essentially abstract
concepts (Manis and Meltzer, 1967, p. vi). It also characterises a
great deal of the work on role theory, where the concern has been
to identify and measure the nature of the external situation in
which the particular actors under investigation find themselves.
Essentially, the Iowa interactionists, as a result of their commit-
ment to a positivist epistemology and nomothetic methodology ,44
have tended to violate their ontological assumptions.
It is this distinction which lies at the heart of the difference
between behavioural and phenomenological symbolic interaction-
ism. The difference between the two approaches is largely one of
epistemology and methodology. Whilst both recognise, at a con-
ceptual level, the processual nature of symbolic interaction, and
the significance of meaning and interpretation from the point of
view of the actors involved, their empirical work often fails to do
full justice to the nature of their theory .45 Indeed, on occasions it
bears little relation to the theory from which it is derived and ends
up as little more than an 'abstracted empiricism'. There is a parallel
to be drawn here with developments in the fields of structural
functionalism and systems theory. We noted in our discussion of
these approaches how the notion of 'functional process' became
lost in an empirical ·search for structure' .lnteractionism has often
suffered the same fate, many studies resulting in little more than a
series of empirical snapshots of reified concepts which defy the
processual nature of the interactionist perspective per se.

Social action theory

The theory of social action, sometimes described as 'the action
frame of reference'. derives largely from the work of Max Weber
(1864-1920) and the notion of verstehen. As we argue in some
detail in Chapter 6 on the sociology of the interpretive paradigm,
the method of verstehen or interpretive ·understanding' plays a
 Functionalist Sociology 83
crucial role in neo-idealist social thought. Introduced by Wilhelm
Dilthey, and elaborated by Weber, it was seen as a method of
analysis particularly suited to the investigation of social affairs, for
which the subjective meanings of events was all important. In
contrast to the natural sciences, the cultural or social sciences
were viewed by the nco-idealists as being concerned with subject
matter of a fundamentally different kind. Whereas the natural
sciences were seen as dealing with the study of external processes
in a material world, the cultural sciences were seen as being
concerned with the internal and intangible processes of human
minds. Special approaches and methods were regarded as
necessary for an understanding of this world of human affairs. The
method ofverstehen -of placing oneself in the role of the actor-
was seen as a means of relating inner experience to outward
actions.
As we argue in our discussion of the interpretive paradigm,
Weber was something of a positivist in his general epistemology, in
that he wished to construct an objective social science capable of
providing causal explanations of social phenomena, yet one which
avoided what he regarded as glaringly obvious deficiencies in
positivist explanations of society. He saw the sociological positiv-
ists of his day as drawing too close an analogy between the natural
and social worlds.
For Weber, explanations of the social world had to be ·adequate
on the level of meaning'. Explanations of social affairs, he argued,
had to take account of the way in which individuals attached
subjective meaning to situations and orientated their actions in
accordance with their perceptions ofthose situations. Sociology,
from his point of view, had to be essentially 'interpretive' in
nature. Social action theory is based upon this Weberian view of
the nature of social science, but Weber's methods are not always
taken up in a systematic fashion.
Weber, in line with his method of analysis based on ideal types,
constructed a typology of social action which distinguished be-
tween: (a) action orientated to tradition; in essence this was con-
ceived as action dominated by a habitual response; (b) action
dominated by emotional factors - that is, spontaneous expres-
sions of feelings; (c) action which was rationally orientated
towards some absolute value- wertrational action; and (d) action
which was rationally orientated towards the achievement of
specific ends, and in which the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of alternative means are taken into account - zweck-
rational actions. It was Weber's view that these 'types of action',
84 Sociological Paradigms and Or!]anisational Analysis
albeit oversimplifications, could provide a useful sociological tool
for analysing the modes of orientation of social action in practice
(Weber, 1947. pp. 115-24). This scheme has normally been
neglected in favour of a more generalised interpretation of the
action perspective, which focuses upon the way in which individu-
als interpret the situation in which they find themselves. For
example, Cohen has suggested that the theory of action can be
regarded as consisting of a number of assumptions which provide a
mode of analysis for explaining the action and conduct of typical
individuals (actors or social actors) in typical situations. These
assumptions are stated as follows:
(i) The actor has goals (or aims, or ends); his actions are carried out
in pursuit of these.
(ii) Action often involves the selection of means to the attainment of
goals; but even where it appears that it does not, it is still
possible for an observer to distinguish analytically between
means and goals.
(iii) An actor always has many goals; his actions in pursuit of any
one affect and are affected by his actions in pursuit of others.
(iv) The pursuit of goals and the selection of means always occurs
within situations which influence the course of action.
(v) The actor always makes certain assumptions concerning the
nature of his goals and the possibility of their attainment.
(vi) Action is influenced not only by the situation but by the actor's
knowledge of it.
(vii) The actor has certain sentiments or affective dispositions which
affect both his perception of situations and his choice of goals.
(viii) The actor has certain norms and values which govern his selec-
tion of goals and his ordering of them in some scheme of
priorities. (Cohen, 1968, p. 69)
Interpreted from this viewpoint, the effect of Weberian action
theory has been to inject a measure of voluntarism into theories of
social behaviour by allowing for the fact that individuals interpret
and define their situation and act accordingly. 46 Within the context
of the functionalist paradigm, Weberian action theory defines a
position which stands in contrast to the determinism which
characterises theories in the most objectivist regions, such as
Skinner's behaviourism, which we shall discuss in a later section
of this chapter.
Most prominent among the social action theorists is the name of
Talcott Parsons, who in his classic work, The Structure of Social
Action (1949), argued that there was a tendency for the work of
Durkheim, Marshall, Pareto and Weber to converge in terms of a
 Functionalist Sociology 85
·voluntaristic theory of action'. Parsons advocated this
'voluntaristic theory' as a general sociological perspective, but in
point of fact it was relatively short-lived. In Parsons' hands the
theory of social action became steadily more deterministic and was
eventually incorporated into his theory of the social system which,
as we have argued earlier in this chapter, is located in a more
objectivist region of the paradigm. There has been much debate
over the nature of the changes reflected in Parsons' thought. 47 In
terms of our analytical scheme, he has journeyed across the
functionalist paradigm from a position on its subjectivist boundary
consonant with Weber's theory of social action to a position firmly
located within the bounds of social system theory. This positivist
inclination has always been evident in Parsons' work. The
Structure of Social Action is undoubtedly an impressive piece of
scholarship, thoroughly deserving of the description 'classic'. but,
given the range of social theorists whom Parsons considered, it is
hardly surprising that their thought converges within the bound-
aries of the functionalist paradigm. Durkheim, Marshall, Pareto
and Weber are all located in terms of their meta-theoretical
assumptions within this perspective. Giddens ( 1976, p. 16) has
observed that 'there is no action in Parsons' "action frame of
reference", only behaviour which is propelled by need-
dispositions or role expectations. The stage is set, but the actors
only perform according to scripts which have already been written
out for them.' Such is the nature of the functionalist perspective;
its underlying meta-theoretical assumptions only allow for a
limited m~~sure of voluntarism in human behaviour. As will
become apparent from our discussion of the social thought
characteristic of the interpretive paradigm, the social action
perspective reflected in the Weberian and Parsonian theories
represents a very limited excursion into the realm of the subjec-
tive. Weber, in attempting to synthesise idealism and positivism
within the bounds of an epistemology orientated towards the lat-
ter, necessarily committed himself to an intermediate position in
terms of the subjective>-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme.
Social action theory has never really obtained a firm foot-
ing in the USA. In addition to Parsons's intellectual journey away
from the Weberian position towards social system theory. other
factors account for the lack of interest and popularity. First, and
perhaps most important, Weber's work was not available in
English until the mid 1940s. Second, the dominant influence was
that of the symbolic interactionist movement. As we have argued
86 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
earlier in this section, as a result of the efforts of the Chicago
School, interactionism in the Meadian and Simmelian traditions
became firmly established from the early 1920s onwards. Their
position with regard to the subjectiv~objective dimension of our
analytical scheme was broadly equivalent to that of Weber and
provided a happy compromise position between raw idealism and
sociological positivism. The focus was placed firmly upon 'interac-
tion', within which the study of 'action' and subjective meaning
played an important part. Given the interest in micro-social pro-
cesses, the thought of G. H. Mead in particular was immeasurably
richer than that of Weber, infused as it was with much stronger
elements of the phenomenological tradition.•• Weber had moved
towards positivism; Mead was moving towards phenomenology.
Weber·s typology of social action appears pale when compared
with Mead's notions about the genesis of self. In addition, W. I.
Thomas's ideas on 'the definition of the situation' had close links
with Weber·s notion of meaningful action. In the USA the
Weberian theory of social action thus confronted a strong, popu-
lar, tailor-made alternative and made relatively little impression as
far as its potential adherents were concerned. It was Weber·s fate
to be embraced by his critics. As we shall discuss in the next
chapter, the notion of the 'ideal-type' bureaucracy and the concept
of purposive rationality were utilised by objectivists, social system
theorists and bureaucracy theorists in a way Weber never
intended. His conceptual tools were used by theorists located
within the objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm which he
had devoted much of his intellectual energy to avoiding at all costs.
Moving in the opposite direction, his work was used as a starting
point for Schutz's development of ·existential phenomenology'.
As we shall see in our chapter on the interpretive paradigm.
Schutz's analysis, whilst full of praise for Weber, revealed
Weber's position for what it was- a compromise between subjec-
tivist and objectivist views of social life. With the resurgence of
interest in the subjective approach to sociology which took place
on the West Coast of the USA during the 1960s. therefore. it was
the work of Schutz rather than that of Weber which provided the
stimulus for further developments. Ethnomethodology and
phenomenoiQgical symbolic interclctionism had little use for
Weber's analysis. In addition. as will become clear from our dis-
cussion of radical humanism in Chapter 8, Weber's work was also
subjected to a through-going critique from yet another perspective
in the work of Herbert Marcuse. As far as the USA is concerned.
therefore. the Weberian influence has been perverse; the critics of
 Functionalist Sociology 81
Weber have arguably been more influential than Weber himself.
In Europe the Weberian tradition has achieved quite a lot more
prominence, though here again the interpretations placed upon
Weber's work are in many cases contrary to those Weber would
have wished. In particular, his work has been used by what we
shall call radical Weberians operating within the context of the
radical structuralist paradigm in their debate with Marxist theory,
who have produced a radical conflict theory of society. The work
of Dahrendorf ( 1959), which we have already discussed to an
extent in Chapter 2. provides a prominent example of this perspec-
tive, though we shall have yet more to say about it in our discussion
of radical structuralism in Chapters 10 and II. As far as Weber·s
theory of social action is concerned, since the early 1960s it has
received attention, in general terms, in the work of Rex ( 1961) and
Eldridge ( 1971) and is reflected in the empirical studies conducted
by Gold thorpe and his colleagues ( 1968) on orientations to work. It
has also achieved prominence through Silverman's (1970) advo-
cacy of tbe action frame of reference as an alternative to the
·systems orthodoxy' in organisation theory. We shall devote
further attention to some of these works in our discussion of
organisation theory in Chapter 5.
By way of conclusion. we note here that social action theory,
like the interactionist thought of Mead and Simmel, can be under-
stood in terms of an attempt to weld together idealist and positivist
approaches to the study of society. In essence, they define an
intermediate position in relation to the subjectiv~objective
dimension of our analytical scheme, characteristic of the subjectiv-
ist boundary of the functionalist paradigm. However, as we have
seen, they are often employed in practice in a manner consistent
with a whole range of ontological, epistemological and
methodological assumptions.

Integrative Theory
We use the term •integrative theory' to characterise the brand of
sociological theorising which occupies the middle ground within
the functionalist paradigm.ln essence, it seeks to integrate various
elements of interactionism and social systems theory and, in cer-
tain cases, to counter the challenge to the functionalist perspective
posed by theories characteristic of the radical structuralist para-
digm, particularly those of Marx. It is by no means a coherent body
of theory, and we shall discuss it under the following four bead-
88 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ings, which identify its most important variations: (a) Blau's
exchange and power model; (b) Mertonian theory of social and
cultural structure: (c) conflict functionalism: (d) morphogenic sys-
tems theory.
Each of these four strains of thought rests upon the assumption
that the achievement of social order within society is in some way
problematic and calls for explanations which are not normally
provided within the bounds of social systems theory.
Blau's theory emphasises the role of exchange and power as a
central source of integration in social life. Merton's theory of
social and cultural structure tends to emphasise the functions
performed by elements of social structure in the integrative pro-
cess. Conflict functionalism tends to focus upon the 'positive·
functions served by conflict. Morphogenic systems theory
emphasises the importance of information transmission as a cen-
tral variable of analysis. In the following sections we will briefly
discuss each in tum, demonstrating how they have drawn upon
various aspects of the cross-currents of sociological thought
reviewed earlier in the chapter and have been shaped into a distinc-
tive theoretical perspective.

Blau 's exchange and power model

Blau's theory of exchange and power in social life ( 1964) sets out to
analyse the processes which govern human association, with a
view to establishing the basis for a theory of social structure. His
theory attempts to link the micro- and macro-levels of social
analysis - to build a bridge between interactionism and social
system theory. In this Blau draws heavily upon the perspectives
generally developed by Simmel and by Homans (1958 and 1961).
Blau, following Simmel, regards the study of social association
as the central task of sociology. and in this respect he is clearly
'interactionist' in his approach. However, he is firmly set against
reductionist explanations of society, since they ignore what he
calls the ·emergent properties' of human interaction. For Blau,
society is more than the sum of its parts. Social structure cannot be
reduced to a series of constituent elements; it has to be understood
as an emergent social process.
In Blau's hands the notion of 'exchange' is given a limited but
powerful role and is used as an analytical tool for tracing the
emergent properties of social interaction.49 For Homans, all
 Functionali.tt Sociology 89
human behaviour and interaction can be understood in terms of
exchange based upon a form of economic calculus. Blau rejects
this. He recognises that what he identifies as 'social exchange' 50
only accounts for a part of the whole range of human action and
behaviour and thr.t Homans 's economic calculus only applies to an
element of this. His analysis of the process of social exchange
leads him to identify the ways in which status and power become
differentiated, and the way in which power makes it possible to
organise collective effort. He traces the manner in which the
legitmation of power has its source in the social approval its fair
exercise evokes among subordinates. His analysis recognises that
normative consensus is by no means automatic, and that the exer-
cise of power will not always be legitimised. Power, legitimised or
not, is thus a central variable in his analysis, providing a major
factor in accounting for social integration and control. 51
Blau is concerned to shift the balance in sociological theory
away from an emphasis upon normative consensus-orientated
explanations of social integration towards analysis of social
associations, the processes that sustain them, the forms they attain
and the complex social forces and structures to which they give
rise. He summarises the situation as follows:

A concern with social action, broadly conceived as any conduct that

derives its impetus and meaning from social values, has characterised
contemporary theory in sociology for some years. The resulting preoc-
cupation with value orientations has diverted theoretical attention
from the study of the actual associations between people and the
structures of their associations. While structures of social relations are,
of course, profoundly influenced by common values, these structures
have a significance of their own, which is ignored if concern is exclu-
sively with the underlying values and norms. Exchange transactions
and power relations, in particular, constitute social forces that must be
investigated in their own right, not merely in terms of the norms that
limit and the values that reinforce them. to arrive at an understanding
of the dynamics of social structures. (Biau. 1964. p. 13)

His analysis emphasises the role of exchange and power in the

emergence of social structure and thus their role as integrative
forces in any explanation of society as an ongoing process. The
Simmelian view of society as 'sewn together' by a variety of
cross-cutting conflicts between its component parts is prominent
in Blau's work. He analyses the relationships between sub-
elements of society and the way in which conflicts produce a
pattern of dialectical change. As he puts it,
90 Sociological Paradigms and Organisalional Analysis
The cross-cutting conflicts and oppositions in complex. modem
societies, with many intersecting organised collectivities and interlock-
ing memberships in them, are a continual source of social reorganisa-
tion and change. The pattern eX change is dialectical, since each basic
reorganisation has wide repercussions that create new problems and
stimulate fresh oppositions. The cross pressures resulting from multi-
group affiliations and the recurrent alignments eX overlapping collec-
tivities in different controversies prevent conflicts over issues from
becoming cumulative and producing a deep cleavage between two
hostile camps. (Biau, 1964, p. 311)
Blau 's analysis thus builds from an interactionist view of associ-
ation towards a theory of social change which, inhis interpretation
of the spirit of a dialectic, involves neither evolutionary progress in
a straight line nor recurring cycles but alternating patterns of
intermittent social reorganisation along different lines. It is a per-
spective which sees society oscillating under the influence of
recurrent dis-equilibrating and re-equilibrating· forces. Although
recognising conflict as inherent in all social affairs, Blau's view is
thus firmly rooted in the sociology of regulation. His work on
exchange and power in social life represents an attempt to develop
the interactionist perspective into an 'integrative theory' of social
structure.

Mertonian theory of social and cultural

structure
This second brand of integrative theory builds upon the work of
Robert Merton, who in many respects can be regarded as the
integrative sociologist par excellence. His work reflects the direct
influence of writers as widely diverse as Durkheim, Marx, Mead,
Parsons, Simmel and Weber, and has been subject to a wide range
ofinterpretations. 52 As we shall argue, Merton's work is integra-
tive in the sense that it seeks to link a number of conceptually
distinct theories within the context of the functionalist paradigm.lt
is also integrative in the sense that it seeks to link micro- and
macro-levels of analysis, empiricism and grand theory, through
what Merton has described as theories of the 'middle range'
(Merton, 1968). Although integrative theory as defined here would
for the most part correspond with Merton's specification of the
·middle range', it is not identical with it, since it is possible to
develop 'middle-range' theories in a number of areas within the
functionalist paradigm.
We take our point of departure here, from Merton's early work
 Functionalist Sociology 91
on 'reference groups' and 'anomie theory', which seeks to under-
stand how sub-groupings arise within the context of the social
structure (Merton, 1968). In his paper 'Social Structure and
Anomie'. first published in 1938, Merton seeks to discover how
social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in a
society to engage in non-conforming behaviour. His perspective is
described as that of a 'functional analyst who considers socially
deviant behaviour just as much a product of social structure as
conformist behaviour' (Merton, 1968, p. 175). In essence, his
paper represents a direct attempt to counter the tendency preval-
ent within functional analysis of explaining social behaviour in
terms of its orientation towards a system of central normative
values. Merton's work thus stands out against the sort of explana-
tions offered in Parsonian systems theory and attempts to modify
the functionalist perspective so as to introduce elements capable of
explaining the process of social change. By tracing the possible
relationships between two elements of social structure - 'cultural
goals' and the 'institutionalised means' of achiev-ng them -
Merton is able to develop a typology of individual adaptation
which, in addition to ·conformity', allows for aberrant behaviour
associated with 'innovation'. 'ritualism', 'retreatism • and
'rebellion' (Merton. 1968, p. 194).
Merton's analysis must be understood as an attempt to streng-
then functionalism. His treatment of aberrant or deviant behaviour
stands in stark contrast to a symbolic interactionist view. which
would stress the emergent character of norms and values. From an
interactionist perspective, norms and values are socially generated
and sustained by human beings in their everyday interaction with
others. For Merton. they are part of a predefined social context
within which social action takes place. Thus, whilst Merton's
functional analysis of deviance moves some way from social sys-
tem theory towards an interactionist perspective, it remains fun-
damentally distinct in terms of the position occupied on the
subjectivo-objective continuum of our analytical scheme.
This intermediate position is also evident in Merton's analysis of
reference group behaviour. As he suggests, his work in this area
represents an effort to utilize functional analysis in the study of
reference groups as an important component of social structure
(Merton, 1968, p. 181). According to Merton, 'reference group
theory aims to systematise the determinants and consequences of
those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal in which the indi-
vidual takes the values or standards of other individuals or groups
as a comparative frame of reference' (Merton, 1968, p. 288).
92 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
This view of reference groups is a direct development of Mead's
'generalised other' - a notion used by Mead to explain the
emergence of self through interaction (Mead, 1934, pp. 152-64).
Merton thus uses an interactionist concept for the analysis of
social structure. In doing so, he again integrates certain aspects of
interactionism with social system theory. This is clearly evident in
his concern for the problem of identifying 'functional types' of
reference groups and subsequent research directed towards this
endeavour. Kelley ( 1968), for example, has distinguished between
two kinds of reference groups according to the two functions they
perform in the determination of attitudes. The first of these - the
normative function - is seen as being concerned with the setting
and enforcing of standards, a possibility which arises whenever a
group is in a position to deliver rewards or punishments for con-
formity or non-conformity.n The second- thecomparisonfunc-
tion - refers to the role of a reference group in providing a standard
or point of comparison against which a person can evaluate himself
or others.
Merton's contribution to both reference group theory and
anomie theory has provided a fruitful basis for further detailed
theorising and empirical research. As an examination of Hyman
and Singer's ( 1968) collection of readings on reference groups and
Clinard's ( 1964) readings on anomie and deviant behaviour will
reveal, the manner and context in which the notions have been
applied is quite diverse. Some of it is true to the integrative style
characteristic of Merton's work and occupies a similar position
within the context of the functionalist paradigm. The remainder is
often much more objectivist in orientation and in certain cases is
more appropriately classified as abstracted empiricism. As in
other areas of the functionalist paradigm, positivist methodology
has often done rough justice to the more subjectivist elements of
the underlying theory on which the research is ostensibly based.
Merton's sociology is complex and wide-ranging. In the areas of
theorising discussed above. emphasis tends to be placed upon the
problematic nature of social order. Merton seeks to demonstrate
that whilst the process of social integration is not as straightfor-
ward as many social systems theorists have presumed, an analysis
of the relationship between human behaviour and social structure
can demonstrate the ways in which order or deviance arise. In the
work which we have discussed thus far problems of change and
conflict are recognised but not pursued in any depth. In later work
Merton becomes increasingly involved with these problems and
lays the basis for another brand of integrative theory - conflict
 Functionalist Sociology 93
functionalism. His article 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personal-
ity' (Merton, 1968, pp. 249-60) marks the point of transition to this
perspective. Using functional theory in the analysis of bureaucra-
tic activities, he demonstrates how conformity to regulations can
be dysfunctional for realising the objectives of the structure and
the groups in society the bureaucracy is intended to serve.'" In
other words, Merton demonstrates that conformity to normative
standards can actually provide a force for the disintegration of the
social order, a perspective which is further developed in his
analysis of manifest and latent functions discussed below.

Conflict functionalism
This third category of integrative theory developed as a response
to the charges that functionalist theories of society are unable to
provide explanations of social change and are essentially conser-
vative in orientation. It represents a fusion of the functionalist
tradition with the theories of Simmel and an incorporation of the
work of Marx. Whilst most of its leading proponents, such as
Merton and Coser, pose as critics of functionalism, they have
perhaps done more than its enthusiastic adherents to establish the
overall dominance of the functionalist approach over the last
twenty-five years. Their 'radical' critique has done much to
remedy the deficiencies of more conventional approaches to the
extent that certain theorists have argued that there is now a con-
vergence between the analytical characteristics of Marxism and
functionalism. ss
The basis of conflict functionalism was in many respects laid in
Merton's classic article of 1948, 'Manifest and Latent Functions'
(reproduced in Merton, 1968). This piece set out to codify and
bring together the diverse strands of functionalism and to provide a
comprehensive critique. Merton's argument was directed against
three central postulates of traditional functional analysis which he
argued were debatable and unnecessary to the functional orienta-
tion as such. These were(a) the 'postulate of the functional unity of
society' - that is. 'that standardised social activities or cultural
items are functional fortheentire social or cultural system'; (b) the
'postulate of universal functionalism· - that is, 'that all social and
cultural items fulfil sociological functions'; (c) the 'postulate of
indispensability' - that is, 'that these items are consequently
indispensable' (Merton, 1968, pp. 79-91).
94 Sociologic·al Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Merton discussed each of these postulates in relation to cases
drawn from functionalist anthropology and demonstrated that they
were by no means always true. In essence he argued that (a)
societies are not unitary in nature - certain elements may be
functionally autonomous and hence the degree of integration is an
empirical variable; (b) societies may have non-functional ele-
ments, such as 'survivals' from the past, which need not necessar-
ily make a positive contribution; (c) societies are quite capable of
dispensing with certain activities without prejudice to their survi-
val and, in any case, are capable of developing alternatives.
This critique of traditional functionalism led to a focus upon a
number offactors which are usually excluded from consideration.
Most importantly, it introduced the notion of 'dysfunctions' and
the problematical nature of social integration, and it recognised
that a particular social unit or activity may have negative con-
sequences for society as a whole or for some particular part of it. It
also attacked the concept of 'functional prerequisites' or ·precon-
ditions functionally necessary for a society', thus questioning the
•indispensability' of certain cultural forms. It opened the way for a
consideration of 'functional alternatives', 'functional equivalents'
or 'functional substitutes'. Merton recognised that functional
needs are permissive rather than determinant and that there is a
range of variation in the structures which fulfil any given function
(Merton, 1968, p. 88).
Merton's critique paved the way for an approach to functional
analysis which, in contrast to traditional functionalism, sees the
nature of social order as essentially problematic, allows analysis to
take place from a variety of perspectives and gives full recognition
to the process of social change. As Gouldner has noted, one of the
strengths of Merton's approach is that it 'prevents either prema-
ture commitment to, or premature exclusion of, any given struc-
ture as an element in the social system' (Gouldner, 1959, p. 194).
Merton is concerned to establish functionalism as an essentially
neutral analytical tool. He recognises that its previous use has
been tainted with ideology and demonstrates how in different
hands it has attracted the charges of being both 'conservative' and
'radical'. On the basis of this he argues that functional analysis
does not entail any necessary or intrinsic ideological commitment
- ideology is an extraneous factor resulting from the manner in
which functionalism is used. In order to demonstrate this he pre-
sents a detailed point-by-point comparison of dialectical material-
ism and functional analysis. Taking Marx and Engels' statements
on dialectical materialism as a starting point, Merton specifies an
 Functionalist Sociology 9S
equivalent statement in terms of functional analysis. His overall
purpose in doing so is unclear. Whilst it directly illustrates his point
about ideology, it also leaves the reader wondering whether Mer-
ton is suggesting that functional analysis can be substituted for the
Marxist dialectic or whether he is merely seeking to introduce
certain Marxist notions to his functionalist audience. Whatever the
motive, its impact on sociological thought is clear. Merton's article
has above all served the purpose of suggesting that the problems
addressed by Marxism can be handled through appropriate forms
of functional analysis. As will become evident from our discussion
below, conflict functionalism, in essence, can be seen as the func-
tionalists' response to Marx.
Perhaps significantly, Merton did not choose to follow the
"radical' implications of his critique of traditional functionalism.
As we shall argue later, the notions of •dysfunction' and •func-
tional autonomy', if followed to their logical conclusion, lead
towards the notion of contradiction. The task of following this path
was left for one of his students, Alvin Gouldner (1959). In the
remainder of his article Merton contents himself with an analysis
of the problem of the items to be subjected to functional analysis
and the issue of manifest and latent functions. s• As Merton notes,
the notions of manifest and latent functions have a particularly
important contribution to make to functional analysis. In particu-
lar, they can clarify the analysis of 'seemingly irrational social
patterns' and also direct attention to theoretically fruitful fields of
investigation. Indeed, the notions have provided sociologists with
a means of directing their enquiry beyond the familiar and super-
ficially related patterns of social activities towards analysis of un-
recognised functions. The discovery of latent functions provided
yet another means of explaining the ordered pattern of social
affairs - through the identification of ways in which the 'un-
intended consequences • of social action perform positive
functions within its context of the wider social system.
The influence of these ideas is particularly evident in the work of
Coser (1956 and 1967). His analysis of social conflict represents in
large measure an attempt to extend Simmel's insights into the
subject through the perspective developed by Merton. In essence,
it represents an analysis of the latent functions of social conflict.
Coser builds upon a central thesis running through Simmel's
work -that ·conflict is a form of socialisation' and that no group
can be entirely harmonious. Paraphrasing Simmel, he suggests
that:
96 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
no group can be entirely harmonious, for it would then be devoid of
process and structure. Groups require disharmony as well as harmony.
dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no
means altogether disruptive factors. Group formation is the result of
both types of processes ... both ·positive' and ·negative' factors build
group relations. Conflict as well as co-operation has social functions.
Far from being necessarily dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is
an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group
life. (Coser, 1956, p. 31)
In his essay Coser takes a series of propositions from Simmel's
work and systematically analyses the manner and ·conditions
under which social conflict may contribute to the maintenance,
adjustment or adaption of social relationships and social struc-
tures' (Coser, 1956, p. 151). As the title of his work suggests, Coser
is specifically concerned with the functions of social conflict, and
he builds up to a conclusion which emphasises the fundamental
importance of the relationship between conflict and its institu-
tional context in determining the stability of the overall social
system. Coser's essay ends with a classic formulation of the plural-
ist perspective on social organisation, in which conflict is viewed
as an essential ingredient of social life, creating strains and ten-
sions with which the institutional structure must cope if the social
system is to stabilise itself and evolve in an ordered manner. As we
shall show in Chapter 5, this pluralist view is of considerable
significance as far as the study of organisations is concerned.
In an essay written at the same time as 'The Functions of Social
Conflict', Coser extends his analysis to cover situations in which
social systems actually break their boundaries and lead to the
establishment of new ones (Coser, 1967, pp. 17-35). The focus is
upon the problems of social change, and an attempt is made to
·specify the structural conditions under which social conflicts lead
to inner adjustments of social systems or the break-up of existing
social orders and the emergence of a new set of social relations
within a new social structure' (Coser, 1967, p. 18). In addition to
generating new norms and new institutions, conflict is seen as
stimulating technological innovation and economic change.
Coser's analysis draws simultaneously on the work of such diverse
theorists as Weber, Marx, Parsons and Veblen, although the ideas
of none are followed in depth to their logical conclusion. Coser
seems less interested in understanding the process of social change
than in identifying the situations in which change can be con-
strained by institutional mechanisms. Whilst Coser follows
Merton in his views on the ideological misuse of functionalism,
 Functionalist Sociology CJ7
there is, in fact, a strong normative undertone in his writings. His
analysis of change is strongly orientated towards the development
of a theory which explains how conflicts can be controlled and
channelled through a system of normative regulation. This general
orientation is very evident in Coser's other papers on, for example,
the termination of conflict, the social functions of violence and its
role in conflict resolution, and the fu.nctions of deviant behaviour
and normative flexibility (Coser, 1967). Coser's whole theory of
conflict is essentially pluralist in its ideological stance.
Both Merton and Coser, though critical offunctionalism, are in
essence committed to its problematic. It is for this reason that we
identify their work as conflict functionalism. They recognise that
social integration is by no means the straightforward process
implicit in the work of normative functionalists such as Parsons,
and they do much to recognise the role of conflict in social life.
However, their view is firmly rooted in the sociology of regulation,
a paradox clearly illustrated by the way in which conflict, particu-
larly in Coser's hands, can be used as a conceptual tool for explain-
ing social order. Despite their protestations to the contrary, their
problematic is that of social order- they are principally concerned
to explain why it is that society tends to hold together rather than
fall apart.
Their position in this regard is clearly illustrated when compared
with the critique of functionalism presented by Gouldner (1959).
Taking the concept of system as a starting point, Gouldner argues
that if one compares the work of Merton and Parsons, one finds
many differences in approach but an underlying similarity with
regard to the ·strategic place of the concept of a system. especially
as an explanatory tool' (Gou!dner, 1959, p. 198). He demonstrates
that Merton,like Parsons, is concerned with explaining the persis-
tence of social factors and in so doing tends to provide a ·partial
and one-sided' explanation, since he fails to give specific attention
to the concept of 'functional reciprocity'. For this reason explana-
tions are likely to be incomplete. since, as he puts it, 'the only
logically stable terminal point for a functional analysis is not the
demonstration of a social pattern's function for others, but the
demonstration of the latter's reciprocal functionality for the prob-
lematic social pattern' (Gouldner, 1959, pp. 199-200).
In other words, it is necessary to demonstrate functionality
within a reciprocal context. This concept of 'functional reciproc-
ity' is crucial to the notion of interdependence of parts which is so
central to functional analysis. It is quite remarkable, therefore,
that it has not been given more systematic consideration by func-
98 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
tional analysts, since if functional reciprocity is asymmetrical,
then the whole notion of interdependence becomes open to ques-
tion. In recognising this, Gouldner arrives at a conclusion similar
to Merton's but by a different route. For Merton, it is the recogni-
tion of •dysfunctions' that leads him to view social integration as
problematic.
However, in contrast to Merton, Gouldner carries the logic of
his analysis much further. The notion of varying degrees of inter-
dependence among the parts of a system leads him to the concept
of •functional autonomy' which, operationally speaking, relates to
the probability of a system part's survival in separation from the
system. High system interdependence means low functional
autonomy of parts, and vice versa. This notion of functional auton-
omy is important, since it reflects a view which focuses upon the
parts of a system (albeit in their relation to each other). This is in
direct contrast to the more usual systems view, which tends to
focus upon the whole and sees the parts in their relation to the
whole. Gouldner's analysis is important, in that it focuses atten-
tion upon interchanges where functional reciprocity may not be
symmetrical and thus directs analysis to tension-producing
relationships. In this way Gouldner, starting from a systems per-
spective, arrives at the notion of •contradiction', with a focus upon
incompatible elements of a social system. Building upon the idea
that the parts of a system may seek to maintain their functional
autonomy, he shows how attempts at system control are likely to
generate conflict. Moreover, system parts may take positive steps
to resist incorporation and containment, and may generate
changes in the system itself which are consistent within their
overall autonomy. Different parts are likely to have ·greater or
lesser vested interest in system maintenance' (Gouldner, 1959, p.
211).
This focus upon functional autonomy thus raises many issues
which contradict the tenets of traditional systems theory and func-
tional analysis. It places the parts rather than the whole at the
centre of analysis. The focus upon contradictions provides an
explanation of change and conflict which contributes to the inter-
ests and independence of the constituent elements of a system
rather than the abstract whole. Although Gouldner only makes
passing reference to Marx on two occasions in the whole of the
article and couches his discussion almost exclusively in terms of
the functionalist problematic, this piece of work represents a
cautious but, in essence, truly radical critique of the functionalist
approach to social analysis. It contains many signs and elements of
 Functionalist Sociology 99
the thought of the 'Marxist outlaw' which finds much clearer and
more direct expression in some of Gouldner's later work. 57
Gouldner's critique clearly serves to illustrate the extent to
which Merton and Coser are committed to a view of society rooted
in the sociology of regulation. Although they recognise the prob-
lematic nature of social integration and the relevance of Marxist
theory, they do not pursue the full implications of these issues. As
in the case of other conflict functionalists who have followed in
their footsteps, they have incorporated and reinterpreted the con-
cerns of Marx within the problematic of functionalism. Although
they have recognised the existence of 'dysfunctions' within social
systems and some of the consequences which this entails, they
have stopped short of a theory of contradiction. As Gouldner has
suggested. they have remained 'functionalists' at heart, in that
they have not chosen to develop 'dysfunctionalism' as an alterna-
tive (Gouldner, 1970, p. 336). As we shall see, this would have led
to a perspective characteristic of the radical structuralist para-
digm.

Morphogenic systems theory

This brand of integrative theory is principally associated with the
work of Buckley (1967) and the 'process model' which he advo-
cates for the study ofsociety.ln essence, Buckley·s work attempts
to introduce to the social sciences the modern systems theory
reflected in cybernetics, information and communication theory
and general systems research. His work attempts to present a
systems model with the capacity to explain the way in which
societies change and elaborate their basic structures. His process
model embraces and attempts to synthesise the whole range of
thought contained within the functionalist paradigm - from
interactionism to social systems theory - and makes passing
reference to some of the ideas of Marx. It represents an extremely
sophisticated attempt to develop an integrative systems model
characteristic of the middle ground of the paradigm.
Buckley begins his analysis by recognising that the usual
mechanical and organic systems models employed in the social
sciences are inherently inadequate for their task, parti cu larl y when
it comes to analysing factors such as 'structurally induced and
maintained conflict and dissensus; the structure elaborating and
changing feature of all societies; the theoretical status of less
100 Socioloeical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
structured "collective" behaviour as a neglected but Important
aspect ofthe social system; the systemic status of "deviance" and
"social control' .. (Buckley, 1967, p. 4). He is thus essentially
interested in the same kinds of functionalist issues as other integra-
tive theorists, especially Merton, though his analysis and proposed
solutions are quite different.
Buckley maintains that mechanical and organic systems models
are inadequate, since they are based upon an outdated view of
science and do not recognise the special qualities of socio-cultural
systems. 5 8 He argues that in the twentieth century there has been a
shifting scientific perspective, reflected in the growth of cyberne-
tics, information and communication theory and general systems
research, which 'marks the transition from a concern for eternal
substance and the dynamics of energy transformation to a focus on
organisation and its dynamics based on the ''triggering" effects of
information transmission' (Buckley, 1967, pp. 1-2). He argues
that the social sciences need to adopt this perspective in recog-
nition of the true character of socio-cultural systems whose mor-
phogenic properties distinguish them from other types of biolog-
ical and physical systems.
After providing a comprehensive critique of the mechanical and
organic systems models, with specific reference to those of
Parsons (1951) and Homans (1950), Buckley develops a process
model which, in essence, represents a fusion of various strains of
interactionism and modern systems theory. Buckley seeks to re-
interpret the work of theorists such as G. H. Mead, Simmel, Small,
Park, Burgess, Blumer and other members of the Chicago School
of sociology within the context of cybernetics and information
theory.
Buckley's model attempts to link micro- and macro-levels of
analysis, building from the Meadian notion of the ·act' and the
basic symbolic interaction process, through the notion of 'role'
and role dynamics, to the emergence of organisations and institu-
tions. The socio-cultural system is viewed as a ·set of elements
linked almost entirely by way of the intercommunication of infor-
mation (in the broad sense) rather than being energy- or
substance-linked as are physical or organismic systems' (Buckley,
1967, p. 82). It emerges from a network of interaction among
individuals in which information is selectively perceived and
interpreted in accordance with the meaning it holds for the actors
involved. The model is processual rather than structural in nature.
'Information', for example, is regarded as a 'carrier of meaning'
rather than as 'an entity that exists some place or flows from one
 Functionalist Sociology 101
place to another' (Buckley. 1967. p. 92).1t is a relation rather than a
thing. Society is viewed as an organisation of meanings which
emerge from the process of interaction between individuals deal-
ing with a more or less common environment. Meanings may be
sufficiently stable or clear to become generalised as codes. rules or
norms for behaviour. However, these norms are not to be con-
fused with 'the actual organisational process they partly inform'
(Buckley, 1967. p. 94). Society remains an intangible process of
interaction which ultimately rests with the actors directly involved
and the way in which they choose to interpret and respond to their
environment. The essentially processual nature of socio-cultural
systems is not to be confused with the structure or organisation its
components may take on at any particular time.
Buckley has undoubtedly made an important contribution to the
application of systems theory in the social sciences. His argument
that socio-cultural systems are not amenable to adequate study
through the use of equilibrium or homeostatic models challenges
the validity and usefulness of virtually all the social systems
studies which have been made to date. Conceptually, his process
model represents a considerable advance over these earlier
approaches, restoring the processual element so essential to the
very notion of system.
At first sight Buckley's interest in interactionist thought could
be seen as an argument for locating him on the subjectivist boun-
dary of the functionalist paradigm. This, however, would be an
error. Buckley gives a great deal of attention to the work of
interactionists such as Mead, because he interprets their work as
being consistent with his own, at least in contrast to that of social
theorists such as Parsons. Buckley is able to argue that the interac-
tionist perspective represents a step in the right direction as far as
social research is concerned, being 'congenial to- even anticipa-
tive of- basic principles of cybernetics' (Buckley, 1967, p. 17). If
one has to rank his priorities, one can fairly conclude that Buckley
is systems theorist first, interactionist second. His main concern is
to translate the work of the interactionists into the concepts and
language of cybernetics, which, as part of a general systems pers-
pective, he sees as providing a framework for organising the
insights derived from interactionist research. Buckley's work can
best be understood as that of a systems theorist concerned to
synthesise various elements within the functionalist paradigm. He
attempts to bridge the gulf between interactionism and social sys-
tems theory from a systems perspective.
Our discussion of Buckley's work concludes our brief review of
102 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
integrative theory. In their different ways, all four of the brands
which we have considered seek to bridge the gap between interac-
tionism and social system theory. Conflict functionalism also
attempts to bridge the gap between the functionalist and radical
structuralist paradigms. Placing emphasis upon different analyti-
cal variables, they have all made a substantial contribution to the
development and general sophistication offunctionalist theory by
seeking to synthesise its potentially divergent elements.

Objectivism
We use the term 'objectivism' to refer to the considerable amount
of sociological work located on the objectivist boundary of the
functionalist paradigm. It is characterised by an extremely high
degree of commitment to models and methods derived from the
natural sciences.
The relationship between social systems theory and objectivism
is thus obviously a close one. The difference between them hinges
upon what may be described as the difference between metaphor
and reality. Social systems theorists use the biological and physi-
cal world as a source of analogies for studying the social world, as a
source of hypotheses and insight. Objectivists, on the other hand,
treat the social world exactly as if it were the natural world; they
treat human beings as machines or biological organisms, and social
structure as if it were a physical structure. We identify two broad
types of objectivism - behaviourism and abstracted empiricism.

Behaviourism
The notion of behaviourism is most often associated with the work
of B. F. Skinner, who has attempted to develop causal theories of
behaviour based upon an analysis of stimulus and response. 59 For
this purpose man is treated, like any other natural organism, as
entirely the product of his environment. Man, in essence, is
regarded as little more than a machine, responding in a determinis-
tic way to the external conditions to which he is exposed. In
Skinner's work all reference to subjective states of mind are consi-
dered irrelevant- indeed, counterproductive- as far as scientific
enquiry is concerned. As Skinner has put it,
the practice of looking inside an organism for an explanation cl
behaviour has tended to obscure the variables which are immediately
 Functionalist Sociology 103
available for scientific analysis. These variables lie outside the organ-
ism. in its immediate environment and in its environmental history.
They have a physical status to which the usual techniques of science
are adapted, and they make it possible to explain behaviour as other
subjects are explained in science. (Skinner, 1953. p. 31)

Skinner's approach to the study of human behaviour is very

much geared to the use of experimental methods typical of those
utilised in the natural sciences. He is committed to the view that
one learns about phenomena under investigation by careful man-
ipulation of particular stimuli in controlled situations in which all
other environmental influences are either excluded or accounted
for in some way. It is a method which approximates a closed
system form of analysis. The study of human behaviour from this
perspective is very much an activity aimed at the discovery of
universal laws and regularities which underlie the science of man.
These laws exist out there in the external world. The social scien-
tist's task is to discover them.
Skinner's perspective is a highly coherent and consistent one in
terms ofthe four strands of the subjectiv~objective dimension of
our analytical scheme. Ontologically, his view is firmly realist;
epistemologically, his work is the archetype of positivism; his view
of human nature reflects a determinism of an extreme form; the
highly nomothetic methodology reflected in his experimental
approach is congruent with these other assumptions.
On the regulatio~radical change dimension Skinner occupies
an equally extreme position. His view of the social world is one
which emphasises the possibility and desirability of both predic-
tion and control. He has been greatly concerned to develop a
technology of behaviour modification and to spell out its relation-
ships in a wider social context (Skinner, 1972). His theory is truly
regulative in orientation. in that. given the correct conditioning
environment, Skinner believes that human behaviour can be
moulded and transformed into a perfectly ordered and regular
pattern. We argue that Skinner's behaviourism occupies a position
at the extremities of both dimensions of the functionalist paradigm.
Skinner's theorising reflects a behaviourisf!t of an extreme form
which. outside the realm of experimental psychology, has not
served directly as a model for theory and research in the social
sciences. However, there are a number of behavioural theories
which are directly related to Skinner's model, such as the
exchange theory developed by Homans ( 1958 and 1961). There are
also many theories which share Skinner's assumptions in relation
104 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
to the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme.
Those which attempt to explain behaviour in terms of universal
psychological Jaws fall into this category. For example, many
studies examining work group behaviour and motivation at work
are based upon this type of thinking. 60 Wider social or environ-
mental influences are ignored, and indeed in many experimental
and research designs a deliberate attempt is made to exclude them;
the rationale of 'controlled' experiments and research constitutes
the epitome of such closed system thinking. Another related
category of theory is found in the work of those theorists some-
times labelled determinists. Their focus of interest rests not upon
the psychological make-up of the individuals to be studied but
upon the environment in which they operate. Their energies are
addressed to establishing situational laws which determine human
behaviour. Studies of the relationship between .work behaviour
and technology, leadership styles, payment systems, etc., often
provide illustrations of this perspective. The 'situational deter-
minant' is viewed as all-important; individuals are assigned essen-
tially passive and responding roles in relation to the conditions
which they encounter in their immediate environment.
These types of theorising and research have had considerable
influence in the field of organisational studies and will receive
further attention in Chapter S. We close our discussion here by
re-emphasising their behaviouristic nature and the close parallels
which exist with Skinner's work. Like Skinner. the theorists who
~vocate such views occupy a clear and consistent position in
terms of the four strands of the subjective-objective dimension of
our analytical scheme. Their determinist stance is paralleled by
equally objectivist assumptions in relation to ontology, epistemol-
ogy and methodology. However, in relation to the regulation-
radical change dimension they are usually committed to a position
which allows for more flexibility and variation than Skinner·s
model.

Abstracted empiricism
At certain points in our discussion of the schools of thought associ-
ated with interactionism, integrative theory. and social system
theory, we have referred to the fact that the work of various
theorists and researchers has ended up as abstracted empiricism.
Systems theorists who spend their energies measuring •struc-
 Functionali.'it SocioloKY 105
tures'; interactionists who utilise static measurements of
'attitudes' and •role situations'; integrative theorists who attempt
to produce quantitative indices of 'power', ·conflict', 'deviancy'
and the like - all provide illustrations of abstracted empiricism, in
that they engage in empirical research which violates the assump-
tions of their theoretical perspective.
The term 'abstracted empiricism' has entered popular usage
largely through the work of C. Wright Mills ( 1959) who, in his
critique of theory_ and method in the social sciences, has used it to
describe the output of researchers who have allowed
methodologies derived from the natural sciences to dominate their
work. 61 We use it here in a related but more specific and limited
sense. Stating the position in terms of the subjective-objective
dimension of our analytical scheme, abstracted empiricism re-
presents a situation in which a highly nomothetic methodology is
used to test a theory which is based upon an ontology, an
epistemology and a theory of human nature of a more subjectivist
kind. It represents a situation in which a nomothetic methodology
is incongruent with the assumptions of the other three strands of
the subjective-objective dimension. It is with regard to this in-
congruence that abstracted empiricism differs from behaviourism.
As we have illustrated, Skinner and other behaviourists adopt a
perfectly coherent and congruent perspective in relation to the
four elements of the subjective-objective dimension. Their
engagement in the wholesale use of experimental and other
research methods derived from the natural sciences is consistent
with the nature of their theorising. Abstracted empiricism arises
in situations where the methods used are inconsistent with the
underlying theory.
It is a regrettable fact that a major proportion of research work in
the social sciences at the present time results in abstracted empiric-
ism. The drive to obtain research funding to sustain teams of
research workers tends to favour the collection of large quantities
of empirical data. Indeed, the collection and processing of such
data is often equated with the total research effort and is regarded
as an essential ingredient of any proposal likely to meet the ·quality
control' requirements of research funding institutions. The
demands for pragmatic results from social science research pro-
grammes also tends to favour some form of substantive informa-
tion output. Under the pressure of such forces, research pro-
grammes often become tailored to the requirements and methods
of their data base, to the extent that theoretical assumptions with
regard to basic ontology, epistemology and human nature are
106 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
relegated to a background role and are eventually violated by the
demands of empiricism. It is no exaggeration to suggest that there
is scarcely a theoretical perspective within the context of the
functionalist paradigm which has not been translated into abstract
empiricism of one form or another.
We identify abstracted empiricism as being characteristic of the
objectivist boundary of the functionalist paradigm. We locate it
here in recognition of the fact that the bulk of such work arises as a
result of extreme commitment to nomothetic methodologies in
which quantitative measures of reified social constructs dominate
the reseach endeavour. It represents research in which the social
world is treated methodologically as if it were a world of hard,
concrete, tangible reality, whereas theoretically it is conceived as
being of a more subjectivist nature. The problem of adopting
methodologies appropriate to the nature of the phenomena under
investigation is a crucial one in contemporary social science. As
we shall see, it is also encountered by sociologists working within
the context of the interpretive paradigm. Problems of incongru-
ence between theory and method raise issues of concern to
sociologists of all kinds.

The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm

The functionalist paradigm contains a wide range of theorising. At
a superficial level. it is its diversity which is most apparent. The
contrasts between social system theory and interactionism, for
example, cannot fail to catch one's attention. The differences
between the many schools of thought which we have identified are
clear. Beneath the diversity, however. there is an underlying unity
and form. The paradigm is characterised by a fundamental com-
monality of perspective in terms of basic, 'taken for granted'
assumptions, which provide a hidden link between its constituent
theories and which distinguishes them from those in other para-
digms. Indeed, it is this underlying unity which the very notion of
paradigm reflects.
Theorists located in the functionalist paradigm are linked by a
shared view of the fundamental nature of the socio-scientific real-
ity to which their work is addressed. They are committed to a view
cl the social world which regards society as ontologically prior to
man and seek to place man and his activities within that wider
social context. Merton has noted that 'the concept of function
 Functionalist Sociology 107
involves the standpoint of the observer, not necessarily that of the
participant' (Merton, 1968, p. 78). Theorists located within the
context of the functionalist paradigm tend to assume the stand-
point of the observer and attempt to relate what they observe to
what they regard as important elements in a wider social context.
This perspective is common to the interactionist, the integrative
theorist, the social system theorist and the objectivist.
The functionalist view of this wider social context also tends to
have many common reference points. It is a view which assumes a
continuing order and pattern. It is geared to providing an explana-
tion of what is. Allowing for various but limited degrees of order
and disorder, consensus and dissensus, social integration and dis-
integration, solidarity and conflict, need satisfaction and frustra-
tion, the overall endeavour is to provide an explanation of why the
social fabric of society tends to hold together. It is geared to
providing an explanation of the regulated nature of human affairs.
The paradigm is based upon an underlying norm of purposive
rationality. This concept provides a direct link between the two
dimensions which define the paradigm's regulative and objectivist
view of the social world. The conception of science which under-
lies the paradigm emphasises the possibility of objective enquiry
capable of providing true explanatory and predictive knowledge of
an external reality .It is a conception which assumes that scientific
theories can be assessed objectively by reference to empirical
evidence. It is a conception which attributes independence to the
observer- an ability to observe what is, without affecting it. It is a
conception which assumes there are general external and universal
standards of science which can serve as a basis for determining
what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is observed. It is
a conception which, above all else, assumes that there are external
rules and regulations governing the external world.
The essential rationality reflected in this view of science is put to
use by the functionalist to explain the essential rationality of soci-
ety. Science provides a frame of reference for structuring and
ordering the social world, a frame of reference which emphasises
an order and coherence similar to that found in the natural world.
The methods of science are used to generate explanations of the
social world consistent with the nature and philosophy of science
itself. Science, in the functionalist's hands, becomes a tool for
imposing order and regulation upon the social world - order and
regulation from the standpoint of the observer.
The diversity of thought which exists within the context of the
functionalist paradigm is a diversity within the confines of this
108 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
overall view of science and society. The various broad categories
and schools of thought differ in the degree and manner in which
they subscribe to and address themselves to common basic
assumptions. It is important to emphasise this. The difference
between theories within the paradigm is one of degree rather than
offundamental perspective, a feature which becomes clearly evi-
dent when theories are compared with those located in other
paradigms.
As we have attempted to show, differences within the paradigm
reflect the intellectual response to the interaction between the
main currents of sociological thought which have come into prom-
inence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Building upon
basic models derived from the natural sciences (as modified by
Comte, Spencer, Pareto and Durkheim), sociologists have
responded to the external challenge and threat posed by alterna-
tive intellectual traditions through both fusion and incorporation.
As we have seen, elements of German idealism have been fused
with the Anglo-French tradition to produce interactionism.
Aspects of the work of Marx has been incorporated into integrative
theory. In each case the rival intellectual tradition has been sucked
into the paradigm and used in a manner which defies certain of its
basic assumptions. In other words, these different intellectual
traditions have been reinterpreted from a functionalist perspec-
tive.
This process of fusion and incorporation is reflected in the
position which the resulting theory occupies on the two analytical
dimensions of the paradigm. The German idealist tradition has
influenced the emergence of functionalist theories of a more sub-
jectivist orientation. The Marxist tradition is reflected in func-
tionalist theories which focus upon conflict and change. The dif-
ferences thus generated account in large measure for the ongoing
debate within the paradigm between rival schools of thought, and
also for the nature of the issues discussed. Thus integrative theor-
ists criticise structural functionalists and systems theorists on the
grounds that the latter cannot handle the problems of conflict,
change and deviancy. The interactionists criticise them for being
too orientated towards structural considerations and for ignoring
the emergent nature of social organisation. Process versus struc-
ture, voluntarism versus determinism, become the issues for
debate here. We end this chapter by emphasising the limited nature
of this debate. Conducted within the paradigm, it reflects little
more than a disagreement about the variations which characterise
a commonly accepted theme.
 Functionalist Sociology 109

Notes and References

I. Our review of the intellectual foundations of the functionalist
perspective has been necessarily terse. Readers interested in
more extensive analyses of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim
and the relationships between them might usefully consult
Parsons (1949), Aron (1965), Gouldner (1970), Lukes (1973)
and Keat and Urry(l97.5). For a general discussion of Pareto,
see Parsons (1949), Homans and Curtis (1934) and Russett
(1966), pp. 8.5-101.
2. For a discussion of the emergence of functionalism in social
anthropology, see Jarvie (1964). The concept of functional-
ism in psychology predates its appearance in anthropology-
see, for example, James (1890) and Angell (1902). Psychol-
ogy at this time was, of course, primarily physiological in
orientation.
3. For a clear exposition of his views, see Radcliffe-Brown
(19.52). especially his article 'On the Concept of Function in
Social Science', pp. 178-87.
4. For a further discussion of these issues, see, for example,
Jarvie (1964) pp. 182-98 and Cohen (1968) pp. 37-4.5 .
.5. The literature on sociology is replete with studies which
focus upon the empirical measurement of 'social structure' in
one aspect or another. See, for example, our discussion of
research on organisations in Chapter .5.
6. For two excellent analyses of Parsons's writings, see Rocher
(1974) and Black (1961).
7. Rocher (1974) presents a very clear analysis of the AGIL
scheme. Our categorisation here draws upon this source.
8. It is never entirely clear in Parsons's work whether these
functional imperatives exist empirically or whether they are
purely analytic constructs for making society intelligible
from a functionalist standpoint. Although he maintains a
posture of ·analytical realism', he does not appear to dis-
courage others from engaging in empirical research in rela-
tion to his theoretical scheme. It is from this dualism that
ambiguity regarding his position arises.
9. See, for example, Gouldner ( 1970) and C. Wright Mills
( 19.59). Other writers however, have argued to the contrary.
See, for example, Rocher (1974) and Martins (1974).
10. Parsons's own version of structural functionalism builds
largely upon the work of Durkheim and Pareto, and on
Weber's notion of the action frame of reference. It fuses the
110 Sodolof(ica/ Paradif(ms and Orf(anisational Ana/y.tis
biological approach of Durkheim with the mechanical
equilibrium approach of Pareto. In this his scheme is some-
what inconsistent. The Social System contains no reference
to Radcliffe-Brown, and it is clear that Parsons differs quite
considerably in the way in which he uses the concept of
structure and function .In his later work Parsons prefers to be
identified with systems theory rather than structural func-
tionalism as such.
11. A common approach is to take the concept of 'system' as
self-evident and confine discussion to the difference between
'closed' and ·open' systems.
12. Buckley ( 1967) adds to this definition: 'That a system is open
means not simply that it engages in interchanges with the
environment, but that this interchange is an essential factor
underlying the system's viability, its reproductive ability or
continuity, and its ability to change' (p. 50).
13. For an excellent and detailed analysis of this field, see Buck-
ley (1967).
14. For a discussion of Henderson and his influence, see, for
example, Russett (1966), pp. 111-24.
15. For a discussion of these concepts, see Katz and Kahn
(1966), pp. 19-26.
16. In point of fact. Parsons' model fuses the mechanical and
organismic analogies.
17. For a clear discussion of the principles of cybernetics, see
Wisdom (1956) and Dechert (1965).
18. For a clear and comprehensive discussion of some of the
major aspects ofSimmel's work, see Coser (1965) and Wolff
(1950).
19. A detailed presentation of his views on conflict can be found
in Simmel (1955).
20. As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter 2, Sim-
mel, particularly through the work of Coser ( 1956), has pro-
vided the main platform for sociologists to argue that the
order-conflict debate is dead.
21. A short time before his death Simmel wrote: 'I know that I
shall die without intellectual heirs - and that is as it should
be. My legacy will be. as it were, in cash. distributed to many
heirs, each transforming his part into use conformed to his
nature: a use which will reveal no longer its indebtness to this
heritage' (Georg Simmel, 1919, p. 121). As Coser notes (1%5,
p. 24), this is indeed what happened. No clear-cut school of
thought has emerged around Simmel's work, and his influ-
 Functionali.ft Socio/OflY Ill
ence is not always specifically recognised. Yet his impact has
been important and diverse, particularly through the work of
Coser (1956), Merton (1949), Blau (1964), the work of the
Chicago School of sociologists and the 'formal sociology' of
von Wiese at Cologne.
22. See, for example, Natanson (J973a, band c). If Mind, Self
and Society is interpreted within the context of Mead's other
work, the term ·social behaviourist' becomes increasingly
inappropriate as a means of describing his overall position.
Mead takes the behaviourism of Watson as a starting point
for his analysis, but from the outset recognises the necessity
for a much wider approach.
23. For a discussion of pragmatism, see 'The Philosophies of
Royce, James and Dewey in their American Setting' ,Inter-
national Journal of Ethic.f, XL ( 1930); its historical genesis is
discussed in Mead's Movements of Thought in the
Nineteenth Century ( 1932).
24. In Mind, Self and Society Mead traces the process by which
biological considerations forced psychology through the
stages of associationism, parallelism, functionalism and
behaviourism, and, against this background, introduces
essentially ·social' concepts (for example, the notion of the
gesture derived from Wundt) to formulate his own distinctive
position. As noted above, his 'social behaviourism' can only
be regarded as a behaviourism in the very widest of senses.
25. Early in his intellectual development, Mead became
interested in Hegelian idealism, largely through the influence
of Royce. Indeed, there are indications that at one time (circa
1887 -8) Mead was more attracted to idealism than to prag-
matism (see, for example, Miller, 1973, p. xiv). It is also
likely that he was influenced by other aspects of German
idealism, in the same manner as Simmel, during a period of
study at Leipzig and Berlin (1888-91).
26. In Morris·s words, 'instead of beginning with individual
minds and working out to society, Mead starts with an objec-
tive social process and works inward through the importation
ofthe social process of communication into the individual by
the medium of the vocal gesture' (Mead, 1934, p. xxii).
27. In this Mead, along with Dewey and the ideas expressed in
the latter's paper of 1896, 'The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology', stressed the correlation between stimulation
and response.
112 Sociolopical Paradipms and Organisational Analysis
Aspects of the world become parts of the psychological envi-
ronment. become stimuli, only in so far as they effect the further
release of an ongoing impulse. Thus. the sensitivity and activity
of the organism determine its effective environment as genuinely
as the physical environment affects the sensitivity of the form.
The resulting view does more justice to the dynamic and agres-
sive aspects of behaviour than does Watsonism, which gives the
impression of regarding the organism as a puppet, whose wires
are pulled by the physical environment. (Mead, 1934, pp.
xvii- xviii)

28. Their interactionist perspective served different purposes.

For Mead, the study of human interaction provided a key to
understanding the genesis of 'self. For Simmel, it was more
of an end in itself - reflecting the underlying 'form' and
characteristics of human association.
29. See, for example, our discussion of symbolic interactionism
later in this chapter.
30. The account which we have presented of Mead's work in the
preceeding pages draws heavily upon Mind, Self and Society
and largely relates to point (a) above. Points (b) and (c) are
reflected more clearly in The Philosophy of the Act, and The
Philosophy of the Present. An analysis of the thought con-
tained in the latter two works is beyond the scope of the
present enquiry (the reader is referred to Natanson 's ( 1973c)
extremely comprehensive discussion). Since the
phenomenological aspects and interpretations of Mead's
work have largely been neglected, it is significant that Natan-
son's excellent analysis from this point of view has only
recently been republished in the wake of the 1960s'
enthusiasm for phenomenological ideas. In the present work
we shall confine discussion of Mead's 'phenomenology' to
the impact it has had upon symbolic interactionism, particu-
larly through the work of Herbert Blumer.
31. For a discussion of the background and dynamics of 'Chicago
sociology' during the period 1920-32, see Faris (1967).
32. Simmers ideas had an important impact upon 'Chicago
sociology' through Robert Park. who was arguably the lead-
ing figure at Chicago during the 1920s. Park, like other
Chicago scholars such as Mead, studied in Germany and was
directly influenced by Simmers ideas. In their famous intro-
duction to the Science of Sociology ( 1921) Park and Burgess
present a view of sociology which Faris has described as
geared to 'the pursuit of objective scientific knowledge con-
 Functionalist Sociology 113
ceming the nature of society and social organisation, groups,
and institutions. the nature and effects of processes of social
interaction, and the effects of these forms and processes on
the behaviour of persons • (Faris, 1967. p. 41). This approach
to sociology has a distinctly Simmelian flavour.lnterestingly
though, Park's teachings in the 1920s paid little attention to
the work of Mead (Strauss, 1964. p. xi).
Although interactionist thought is sometimes presented as
having developed independently at Chicago and in Germany,
a strong claim can be made that the two schools of thought
derive from a common Germanic source.
33. Simmel and Mead have also had an influence upon the
development of the integrative theories relating to social
exchange, social control and conflict functionalism which
will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. These
theories build upon interactionist concepts.
34. Although Blumer is generally recognised as interpreting
Mead's thought from a more phenomenological perspective
than many other theorists, there would probably be little
dispute over the essentials of symbolic interactionism as
described in this quotation.
35. The variety of thought can be clearly seen by consulting one
of the popular readers on symbolic interaction; see. for exam-
ple. Rose ( 1962), and Manis and Meltzer( 1967). For a review
of the trends in symbolic interactionism theory in the
twenty-five years from 1937-62. see the article by Manford
H. Kuhn in Manis and Meltzer (1967), pp. 46-7.
36. The development of role theory owes much to the Chicago
School of sociologists, including Mead, and also, though this
is rarely recognised, to Simmel. For a discussion of role
theory and concepts such as role taking, role sets, role con-
flicts, see, for example, Grosset a/. (1958) and Newcomb
( 1950 and 1953).
37. The notion ofreferencegroups owes much to Mead's notion
of 'the generalised other'. and has been most systematically
developed by Merton in the classic articles 'Contributions to
the Theory of Reference Group Behaviour' and 'Continuities
in the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure' in
Merton ( 1968). This work also draws very heavily upon S. A.
Stouffer's The American Soldier ( 1949), particularly the con-
cept of ·relative deprivation'. and Simmel's concept of the
'completeness' of a group (Merton, 1968, pp. 242-6).
For a further selection of writings on reference group
114 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
analysis, see the articles in Rose ( 1962), Manis and Meltzer
(1967) and Hyman and Singer (1968).
38. Self theory in symbolic interaction (not to be confused with
the psychological theory of Carl Rogers) embraces a wide
range of research directed at analysis and application of this
aspect of Mead's work. As Manis and Meltzer (1967) point
out, it includes those who see ·self' as a dynamic process of
viewing and responding to one's own behaviour; those who
see 'self' as a structure of internalised roles; and those who
conceive ·self' as a set of attitudes or evaluations (p. 215).
For a selection of articles reflecting these points of view,
see Manis and Meltzer (1967). pp. 215-366.
39. Dramaturgical theory, closely related to self theory, is most
often associated with the work of Erving GotTman and his
studies of the active self in social situations. His perspective
presents the individual as an actor shaping his social situation
through the images which he presents. See, for example.
GotTman (1959, 1961, 1963 and 1967).
40. In addition to these general assumptions and propositions,
Rose goes on to specify four further assumptions in relation
to the process of socialisation of the individual child (Rose,
1962, pp. 13-18).
41. Indeed, it could be argued that in his attempt to meet the
structural functionalists on their own ground. Blumer is
drawn into a position which to an extent goes against his view
of ontology quoted earlier (Rose, 1962, p. 182). For example.
towards the end of his article he places much more emphasis
upon action 'with regard to a situation • (p. 187) and the fact
that 'human society is the framework inside of which social
action takes place' (p. 189).
42. In his 1966 article Blumer presents symbolic interactionism
as an approach which is capable of covering 'the full range of
the generic forms of human association. It embraces equally
well such relationships as co-operation. conflict, domina-
tion. exploitation, consensus. disagreement, closely knit
identification, and indifferent concern for one another. The
participants in each of such relations have the same common
task of constructing their acts by interpreting and defining the
acts of each other' (Blumer, 1966, p. 538). He goes on to
criticise those theorists who tend to impose a particular
frame of reference on the nature of interaction: 'Their great
danger lies in imposing on the breadth of human interaction
an image derived from the study of only one form of interac-
 Functionalist Socio/ofu 115
tion. Thus, in different hands. human society is said to be
fundamentally a sharing of common values; or. conversely. a
struggle for power; or. still differently. the exercise of con-
sensus and so on' (Blumer, 1966, p. 538).
Blumer is thus. in essence. advocating symbolic interac-
tionism as an approach capable of occupying a wide range of
positions in relation to the vertical dimension of our analyti-
cal scheme. Theoretically, it can be conceptualised as rang-
ing along the whole of the vertical dimension within the
context of the sociology of regulation.
43. For an analysis of the distinctions between these two ver-
sions, see, for example. Meltzer and Petras (1973), and
Meltzer eta/. (1975).
44. As Reynolds and Meltzer ( 1973) have put it. the Chicago
interactionists 'tend to prefer phenomenological approaches,
participant observation and "sensitising concepts". all
linked with a logic of discovery'. This is in contrast with the
Iowa researchers who 'have preferred operational
approaches. The Twenty Statements Test and "definitive
concepts". all linked with a "logic of verification"'.
45. For a clear and articulate discussion of some of the issues
involved here, see Williams (1976).
46. Cohen ( 1968). p. 69. This statement of the assumptions of the
theory of action draws upon the work of von Mises and
Parsons. as well as that of Weber. It provides a good illustra-
tion of the way in which Weber's ideas are adapted to suit the
purposes of individual authors. Cohen provides a good
description and critique of action theory in general. and
rightly emphasises that it should be regarded as a method
rather than a theory as such (Cohen, 1968. pp. 70-94).
47. See, for example, the analysis of Parsons's epistemological
and other movements presented in Scott ( 1963).
48. On the other hand, the strength of Weber's work (as opposed
to that of the interactionist tradition) lay in its conscious
attempt to link the concept of social action to wider aspects of
social structure. particularly through the notion of 'legitimate
order'. Given the priorities of the functionalist paradigm, this
is indeed a strength of Weber's work; social action, with its
emphasis on the individual's interpretation of the situation, is
always related to the wider context of that action.
49. Blau's version of exchange theory is often linked to that of
Homans (1958 and 1961). Whilst the work of these two
writers has developed through a process of mutual influence,
116 Sociological Pamdi,::ms and Organisational Analy.fis
they are, in fact, quite different and occupy conceptually
distinct locations within the functionalist paradigm.
SO. Blau's notion of 'social exchange' is restricted to behaviour
orientated towards ends that can only be achieved through
interaction with other persons and which seeks to adapt
means to achieve those ends. It thus represents action which
is purposive and calculative. It is wider than the notion of
economic exchange because of the unspecified obligations
incurred within it and the trust both required for and pro-
moted by it. It excludes behaviour based on the 'irrational
push' of emotional forces, that based on coercion and that
orientated towards ultimate values and issues of conscience
rather than towards immediate rewards (Biau, 1964, pp.
4-8).
51. The conceptualisation of power found in Blau is very similar
to that of Emerson (1962). Emerson stresses the need to see
power as a relationship, as the propeny of interaction rather
than as the attribute of individuals or of groups.
52. See, for example, the interpretations of Gouldner ( 1970),
Horton (1964) and Strasser (1976).
53. The concept of 'normative function' in relation t.o reference
groups builds upon another Meadian idea- that of the social-
ised 'self - and converts it into an instrument for explaining
social control. Mead was interested in 'self as a process. As
Strauss notes, in the theory of reference groups (and also in
Parsonian functionalism) the notion is used in a very
restricted way, largely for the purposes of explaining how
norms get internalised and how self-control is, in essence, a
reflection of social control (Strauss, 1964, p. xii).
54. Applying Veblen's concept of 'trained incapacity', Merton
argues that bureaucrats may develop blind spots - abilities
function as inadequacies. He suggests that bureaucratic per-
sonnel may overconform to the normative structure of the
enterprise which emphasises strict devotion to regulations.
This process stifles initiative and, under changed conditions,
produces inappropriate responses and impairs the efficient
performance of organisational tasks.
55. See, for example, the argument put forward by van den
Berghe suggesting that the basic postulates of functionalism
and the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic are capable of synthesis
(van den Berghe, 1963).
56. Merton defines 'manifest functions' as 'those objective con-
sequences contributing to the adjustment or adaption of the
 FunctionaliJt Sociolo~y 117
system which are intended and recognised by participants in
the system. •Latent functions' are •those which are neither
intended nor recognised' (Merton. 1968, p. 105). The distinc-
tion is introduced to differentiate and avoid confusion 'be-
tween conscious motivation.<; for social behaviour and its
objecth·e con.tequence.<;' (Merton, 1968, p. 114).
51. See, for example, Gouldner (1973 and 1976).
58. The term ·socio-cultural' is used by Buckley •to make
explicit the difference between the human level of organisa-
tion and the lower, merely .. social" ,level of certain animal
or insect species' (Buckley. 1967, p. 1). As Buckley argues in
dealing with socio-cultural systems, one is not only con-
cerned with the issue of structure maintenance, as in biologi-
cal systems, but also with the structure-elaborating and
structure-changing feature of the inherently unstable system,
i.e. morphogenesis (Buckley. 1967, pp. 14-15, 58-62).
59. See, for example, Skinner (1953, 1957 and 1952).
60. See, for example, some of the work presented in Cartwright
and Zander ( 1968) and Landy and Trumbo ( 1976), pp.
293-335.
61. Mills uses the term to castigate those researchers who, along
with ·grand' theorists, have abandoned what he sees as being
the central task of sociology, that of grasping •history and
biography and the relations between the two within soci-
ety, .. To recognise this task and this promise is the mark of
the classic social analyst ... No social study that does not
come back to the problems of biography, of history and of
their intersections within a society. has completed its intel-
lectual journey' (Mills, 1959, p. 12). On the basis of this
criterion, the work of most theorists who engage in empirical
work would be categorised as abstracted empiricism. Our
definition is more limited, in that it relates to empirical work
which is abstracted from its theoretical context.
5. Functionalist Organisation
Theory
In recent years the study of organisations has established itself as
an increasingly significant area of social-scientific investigation.ln
terms of the number of research studies conducted, the volume of
literature produced and its establishment as a recognised field of
study within academic institutions,the study of organisations has a
good claim to being regarded as a distinct branch of social science
of some importance.
Yet in many respects it is a confusing field. It is usually pre-
sented as comprising of at least three lines of development, each
drawing upon a number of different intellectual traditions. First,
there is what may be described as organisation theory, which
addresses itself to the study of 'formal organisations' and builds
upon the work of the so-called 'classical school' of management
and administrative theory. As Salaman and Thompson have noted,
this is often seen as the ·orthodox approach' to the study of
organisations and 'tends to adopt theories and models of organisa-
tional functioning, and to focus on areas of empirical investigation,
that are highly oriented towards managerial conceptions of organ-
isations, managerial priorities and problems. and managerial con-
cerns for practical outcomes· (Salaman and Thompson, 1973, p. I).
The foundations of classical theory were largely laid by practising
managers with little or no social science background. Second,
there is the approach which is sometimes described as the sociol-
ogy of organisations. For the most part this builds upon the founda-
tions laid by Max Weber, and it approaches the study of organisa-
tions from a sociological as opposed to a managerial perspective.
Third, there is the approach which is essentially concerned with
the study of the behaviour of individuals within organisations. This
builds upon the work of the human relations movement and for the
most part approaches the subject from a psychological standpoint,
though a significant number of industrial sociologists have also
contributed to work conducted from this point of view.
These three lines of development thus draw upon a variety of
perspectives and academic disciplines. In the course of their
development they have often had a significant influence upon each
 Functionalist Organisation Theory J 19
other, and it is not uncommon for them to be fused and described
under the guise of a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of
•organisational behaviour'. Many theorists shy away from this
fusion, recognising that the different theories are not always com-
patible and that the term ·organisational behaviour' reflects a
reification of the subject of study. However, the term is often used
to denote interest in a whole range of organisation studies, embrac-
ing theories of organisation, theories of the individual in the work
situation and the way in which both relate to the wider social
environment.
In this chapter we intend to examine a wide range of these
theories, particularly with regard to the assumptions on which they
are based. As we have noted earlier, all theories of organisation are
founded upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society,
whether the theorists are aware of it or not. To many this may
appear an unduly banal and simplistic statement. However, within
the context of an analysis of the field of organisation studies it
seems more than justified. Many theorists appear to be unaware
of, or at least ignore, the assumptions which various theories
reflect.
This is particularly evident, for example, in the way in which
reviewers of the field are normally content to rely upon simple
linear explanations of the historical development of the subject as a
means of presenting the current state of the art. It is also reflected
in the host of rival typologies which attempt to classify the subject
area. Both are symptomatic of a reluctance to penetrate to the
foundations of the discipline. The typical analysis of the historical
development of the subject, for example, usually traces how clas-
sical management theory, Weber's theory of bureaucracy and
human relations theory existed side by side until synthesised in
terms of open systems theory during the 1950s, and how subse-
quent research has sought to explore the ramifications of the
systems approach at an empirical level. Theorists who choose
typologies as a means of organising the subject area vary quite
considerably in approach. Pugh ( 1966), for example, identifies six
approaches: management theory, structural theory, group theory,
individual theory, technology theory and economic theory. Whyte
(1969) identifies seven schools of thought and activity: event-
process analysts, structuralists, organisational surveyors, group
dynamicists, decision making theorists, psychiatric analysts and
technological structuralists. Eldridge and Crombie (1974), in a
review of the typologies which have been used by various organ-
isation theorists, differentiate between typologies based on
120 Sodologictll Paradigms and Organisational Anc1ly.o;is
functions (for example, Katz and Kahn, Tavistock, Blau and
Scott), technology (for example, Woodward. Blauner, Thomp-
son), regulation (Etzioni) and structure (for example, Ackoff,
Vickers). As many of the authors who engage in the construction
of such typologies readily recognise, the classifications thus pro-
duced are rough and ready and have many imperfections. They
tend to emphasise certain aspects of the work under review whilst
ignoring others. Again. it is not uncommon to find that a particular
theory can be legitimately classified under more than one of the
typologies produced.
It is our view that although they are helpful in identifying some of
the detailed differences between various approaches to the study
of organisations, both the simple linear historical description and
the construction of descriptive typologies are inherently limiting in
perspective unless they seek to e:cplore the basic theoretical
assumptions of the work which they purport to. describe. Unless
they do this, such analyses can be positively misleading, in that in
emphasising differences between theories, they imply a diversity
in approach. Insofar as these differences are identified in terms of
superticial characteristics rather than fundamental assumptions,
the diversity is more apparent than real. As w.ill become clear from
the discussion conducted in the rest of this work, we believe this to
be the case in the field of organisation studies. Whilst superficially
there appears to be a dazzling array of different kinds of theory and
research, in point of fact the subject tends to be very narrowly
founded indeed. This becomes evident when the theories which
comprise the field are related to the wider background of social
theory as a whole. As will become apparent, most are located
within the context of what we have called the functionalist para-
digm. The other social science paradigms remain almost com-
pletely unexplored as far as theories of organisation are con-
cerned. Moreover, within the context of the functionalist para-
digm, the majority of existing theories tend to be located within a
relatively narrow range of academic territory. Despite the appar-
ent diversity reflected in current debate, the issues which separate
the parties in academic controversy often tend to be of minor
rather than of major significance. The really big issues are rarely
discussed, lying hidden beneath the commonality of perspective
which induces organisation theorists to get together and talk with
each other in the first place.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 121

Theories of Organisation within the

Functionalist Paradigm
Figure 5.1 presents a very rough overview of the location of
contemporary theories of organisation within the context of the
functionalist paradigm. It identifies four principal theoretical
perspectives.

Plural ism

Act ion Theories

Social
f rame of
system Objectivism
of bureaucratic
theory
reference dysfunct ions

Figure .5.1 Functionalist approaches to the study of organisations

1. Social system theory and objectivism

This perspective, which characterises the most objectivist region
of the paradigm, is of overwhelming significance as far as con-
temporary theories of organisation are concerned. The vast major-
ity of writers on organisational issues adopt a perspective located
here. It corresponds with the categories of social theory identified
in Chapter4 as social system theory and objectivism. In the field of
organisation studies there has been a continuous interaction be-
tween these two categories of theory. since the conceptual distinc-
122 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
lions between them have not often been recognised. We will
attempt to follow some of these interactions and show how various
theories have evolved. The overall perspective broadly corres-
ponds to what Silverman (1970) has described as the •systems
orthodoxy', though, as we shall argue, it is positively misleading to
view many of the theories located within it as systems theories in
anything but name. It embraces a small amount of genuine social
system theory and a larger element of behaviourism, but it is
dominated by abstracted empiricism.

2. The action frame of reference

This perspective, which occupies the subjective boundary of the
paradigm, is considerably less developed. Deriving principally
from the work of Weber. it has received its clearest expression and
formulation in the work of Silverman (1970). Contrary to Silver-
man's view, we do not see it as constituting an alternative para-
digm for the study of organisations. We see it as an alternative
perspective which remain~ essentially within the context of the
functionalist paradigm. It is a perspective which, in terms of the
analysis contained in Chapter4, is akin to symbolic interactionism
and social action theory.

3. Theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions

This perspective builds upon the category of integrative theory
described in Chapter 4 as Mertonian theory of social and cultural
structure. It embraces a relatively small number oftheorists, who
have specifically developed Merton's work and have carried the
perspective to a position approaching that of conflict functional-
ism.

4. Pluralist theory
This is another category of integrative theory akin to the ·conflict
functionalism' discussed in Chapter 4. Theorists have arrived at
this perspective by different routes. In terms of numbers they are
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 123
relatively few, but the perspective is of growing importance within
the subject area as a whole.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a systematic analysis of
theories of organisation agaiust the theoretical background defined
by the functionalist paradigm as discussed in Chapter 4. We
attempt to penetrate beyond simple historical and typological
analysis to the essential theoretical foundations which underlie
contemporary work in the subject.

Social System Theory and Objectivism

The dominant perspective within the field of organisation studies is
characterised by a close and interactive relationship between
social system theory and objectivism. In the rest of this section we
intend to sketch the relationships between some of its prominent
landmarks. In order to provide an overview, albeit in rough and
ready terms, Figure 5.2 illustrates the general course of develop-
ment.
Our plan for negotiating this complex field of theory and
research is as follows. We take our starting point from the work of
the classical management theorists and the industrial psycholog-
ists who were the fore-runners of the human relations movement.
We argue that, despite the detailed differences in the theories
which they expounded, both occupied a similar position hard
against the most objectivist boundary of the functionalist para-
digm. The perspective of both sets of theorists reflected a raw
determinism, in which objective factors in the work environment
were treated as of paramount importance to the analysis and
explanation of behaviour in organisations. As we have attempted
to illustrate in Figure 5.2, both approaches are alive and well
today. They have flourished throughout the period and are most
evident in the work of ergonomists, work study theorists and the
management theorists who continue to prescribe rules of organisa-
tion.
We move from these early examples of objectivism to a consid-
eration of the social system theory reflected in The Hawthorne
Studies. We argue that the theoretical model which emerged from
this work was, for its time, quite sophisticated, though the insights
it offered were largely lost in the ensuing debate which tended to
focus upon the empirical results of the study. As a result, post-
Hawthorne research on work behaviour usually reverted to the
objectivism of earlier years. We devote our next section to a
 1100 1110 1920-1930 1940 1950 1960 1970----
I 1 I I I I I I I

-'Y-··-····--
I Early industrial psychology 1

r-1~ost·Hawthorne objectivism: human relations research

0 on job satisfaction, group dynamics, leadership, etc.
i
>
c Socio·
0 technical Job design theory
~d~:·r- - - - - - - - systems
"'~ theory Quality of
:1 working life
Equilibrium movement
~ Decision makingJmodels
en theories of
> organisation Organisations
en
~ as open
c systems
u Structural
functionalist Contingency
i approaches to theory
organisation

:1 Empirical studies of
!a organisational
characteristics
~
iJ Scientific management and l Work study, 0 and M. and management theory
0 I classical management theory_ _ I
Figure .5.2 The development of social system theory and objeclivism
 Functionali.'it Organi.wtion Theory 12S
consideration of this post-Hawthor ne objectivism which has
dominated the human relations movement and research on job
satisfaction, group dynamics, leadership and managerial styles,
etc., right up to the present day. This is followed by a short section
on socio-technical systems theory, which in essence represents a
direct development of the theoretical insights generated in the
Hawthorne research, and which has had such a major influence
upon the theory of job design.
A consideration of socio-technical systems theory leads natur-
ally to an examination of the open systems approach to the study of
organisations. In order to provide an adequate account of this,
however, it is necessary to return to the Hawthorne studies and
trace another line of development, which begins with Barnard's
theory of organisation. Barnard's work represented one of the first
attempts at developing a comprehensive model of an organisation.
All the other research which we have just mentioned focuses
attention upon behaviour within organisations and is concerned
with the individual, social group and work environment. Barnard's
work represented a clear move towards an organisational level of
analysis. Later in this chapter we consider Barnard's theory, along
with the work of Herbert Simon, as equilibrium theories of organ-
isation.
Barnard's theory, heavily influenced by the Hawthorne
resear~h. tended to emphasise social aspects of organisation. He
was concerned, first and foremost, to see the organisation as a
social enterprise. This tendency was modified by subsequent
theorists such as Philip Selznick and Herbert Simon who, influ-
enced by Weber and some of the classical theorists, gave the
rational/legal or bureaucratic aspects of organisation greater
prominence. Simon did so within the context of an equilibrium
model embracing rational and social factors. Selznick did so within
the context of a structural functionalist approach to organisation.
Developing certain principles derived from the use of an
organismic analogy, structural functionalism has had an important
influence upon organisation theory. Our next section. therefore, is
devoted to a consideration of Selznick's early work as an example
of the structural functionalist approach to organisation.
Having considered these foundations for a theory of organisa-
tions, we will then be in a position to link up with our previous
discussion of socio-technical systems theory, and we devote a
section to a consideration of some of the theories which emerged in
the 1960s treating organisations as open systems. These models
incorporate the insights of earlier approaches and tend to place
126 ScJcicJ/ogical Paradigm.<; and Organisational Analysis
primary emphasis upon the relationship between organisation and
environment.
In the following section we consider some empirical studies of
organisational characteristics which reflect a movement away
from social system theory and towards objectivism. These studies,
along with the open systems models of the 1960s. paved the way
for a major synthesis in terms of contingency theory. This
approach, which has dominated organisation theory during the
1970s, is the subject of our penultimate section.
We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the quality of
working life movement. This too has come into prominence in the
1970s and in essence fuses the perspectives of job design theorists
with those deriving from open systems theory. Drawing upon the
notion of post-industrialism, it links the traditional concerns of the
human relations movement and socio-technical systems theory
with changes taking place within the context of contemporary
society as a whole.

Classical management theory and industrial

psychology
F. W. Taylor ( 1856-191 S), the founder of 'scientific management'
was very much a man of practical affairs. A chief engineer of a
large steel works who had worked his way up from the position of
ordinary labourer on the shop floor. he was interested in manager-
ial action and its immediate measurable results. We learn that he
developed the work study techniques for which he has become so
famous as a result of problems experienced as a gang boss seeking
to increase output by putting pressure on the men. A serious
struggle ensued which Taylor finally won but at the expense of
considerable soul-searching. He gave the matter thought and
decided that the primary cause of such conflict was that manage-
ment, without knowing what constituted a proper day's work,
tried to secure output by pressure. He felt that if management
knew what work was possible, they could then ascertain output by
demonstration. He decided to experiment to discover what was a
proper day's work for every operation in the steel shop (Taylor,
1947).
Taylor continued his experiments throughout his career in the
steel industry and later as a consultant, communicating his findings
to other managers through meetings of the American Society m
Mechanical Engineers, for example, and through the publication
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 127
of papers such as 'Shop Management· ( 1903) and 'The Principles of
Scientific Management' (1911) (see Taylor, 1947). These works
bristle with a meticulous concern for the detailed analysis of
everyday work activities, such as the process of earth shovelling,
pig-iron handling, etc. Taylor realised that by matching men, tools
and the tasks they were required to perform, it was possible to
increase productivity without placing increased physical burdens
upon the men. He sought to convert the process of management
from an art form based upon experience and rule of thumb to •a
true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and princi-
ples, as a foundation' (Taylor, 1947, p. 7).
Most of Taylor's work was conducted in relation to shop floor
management. Whilst recognising that the scientific approach could
be applied to all kinds of human activities, even 'the work of our
great corporations, which call for the most elaborate co-
operation', Taylor did not pursue the latter to any real extent. This
was left to other members of the so-called classical school of
administrative and management theory, many of whom found
great inspiration in Taylor's work.
Henri Fayol (1841-1925) was a French mining engineer who
rose to the top of the managerial hierarchy. After thirty years as
managing director of a group of coal mines he turned his attention
to popularising his 'theory of administration' which articulated
various principles relating to the task of general management
(Fayol, 1949). Whereas Taylor had concentrated on work con-
ducted on the shop floor, Fayol concentrated upon the problems of
work at a managerial level. Planning, organisation, command,
co-ordination and control were the focus of his interest; he defined
various principles which could be taught to managers. He saw the
need for a theory of management.
Subsequent members of the "classical school' for the most part
built upon the foundations laid by Taylor and Fayol. Gulick, Mary
Parker Follett, Mooney, Urwick and others concerned themselves
with formulating and popularising principles of management.
Their work related broadly to what would now be regarded as
problems of organisation structure, leadership style and effi-
ciency, and constituted a guide to managerial action rather than a
theory of organisation in any formal sense.
The theories of Taylor, Fayol and the classical management
school as a whole are founded upon assumptions which charac-
terise the most objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm.
The world of organisations is treated as if it were the world of
natural phenomena, characterised by a hard concrete reality which
128 Socioloxical Paradixm.f and Orxanisational Analysis
can be systematically investigated in a way which reveals its
underlying regularities. Above all else it is a world of cause and
effect: the task of the management theorist is seen as the identifica-
tion of the fundamental laws which characterise its day-to-day
operation. Given this overall view, the individual is assigned an
essentially passive and responding role; the individual and his
behaviour at work is seen as being determined by the situation to
which he is exposed. From this, the golden rule of scientific man-
agement emerges: 'Get the situation right, and the appropriate
human behaviour and organisational performance will follow' .•
By the beginning of World War I another movement which was
to have a considerable impact upon theories of behaviour in organ-
isations was well under way in the USA, Britain and certain other
European countries. Unlike scientific management, however,
which was the subject of controversy from its earliest days, 2 the
industrial psychology movement adopted a lower profile. For the
most part it was a consultancy-orientated concern, supplying
advice to industrial managers on problems associated with indus-
trial fatigue, employee selection, individual differences and the
like. 1 As such, most of the work conducted was practice- rather
than research-orientated and its results often confidential. As an
academic discipline, therefore, its development was severely con-
strained until after 1915, when as part of the war effort in Britain,
the Health of Munitions Workers Committee was established. The
Committee and its successor, the Industrial Fatigue Research
Board (established in 1918), did much to sponsor research into
problems offatigue and health at work, with a view to contributing
to the general efficiency of industry. The results of the research
studies conducted were published on a systematic basis and did
much to launch industrial psychology as a field of enquiry. The
research papers stimulated discussion of the psychological prob-
lems of industry and further research, particularly in the USA.
From its earliest days the industrial psychology movement was
at pains to emphasise its humanitarian as well as its managerial
interests. In particular it was anxious to disassociate itself from
any connection with Taylor and scientific management, with
which it was often identified by working men. As Lupton has
noted, when the National Institute of Industrial Psychology (a
private foundation supported mainly by industry) was set up in
Britain in 1921, 'there was some suspicion that it was practising
Taylorism under another name, whereupon it was explained that
the work of the NIIP was based upon sound psychology rather
than on a mechanical analogue of the human being.lt sought not to
 Functionalist Organiscllion Theory 129
push the worker from behind but to ease his difficulties, and by this
to increase his output and his personal satisfaction' (Lupton, 1971,
p. 30). The industrial psychology movement has adhered to this
standpoint as a guiding principle more or less throughout the sixty
or so years of its history. It has always presented itself as vigor-
ously humanitarian and opposed to Taylorism. Indeed. the attacks
upon Taylor and his system have at times been particularly sca-
thing, as Taylor's notion of 'The One Best Way' and his over-
simplified model of ·economic man' have been subjected to
systematic criticism and sometimes ridicule. 4 In most com-
parisons of scientific management and industrial psychology it is
the differences bet ween the two approaches which tend to be given
prominence, 5 and any casual observer of the debate may well be
forgiven for believing that it is the differences rather than the
similarities between the two approaches which are all-important.
Ho"wever. probing well beneath the surface, one finds many
points of similarity between Taylor's approach and that of the
industrial psychologists. The work of the early psychologists, for
example. was largely directed at establishing the causes offatigue
and monotony at work and their effects upon performance and
efficiency. Among the factors studied one finds the degree of
mechanisation and routineness of work, methods of payment, job
rotation. hours of work, the introduction of rest pauses and the
influence of social groups receiving attention. All these factors
(which, incidentally, are still, fifty years on, receiving much atten-
tion from industrial psychologists) had been the subject of research
by the late 1920s. There can be little doubt that Taylor would have
been interested in the results of these studies and would have
applauded the attempt to bring science to bear upon these prob-
lems, even though it has not been the science of the stop-watch
which was reflected in his predilection for time and motion study.
Taylor himself had, in fact, addressed some of the problems
examined by the psychologists (for example, payment systems,
rest pauses, job design, etc.). The research reported by Elton
Mayo ( 1933) on the problems of telegraphists· cramp, the perfor-
mance of 'spinning mule' workers (who were all provided with
sacking so that they could lie down in comfort by their machines
during rest pauses) and the illumination experiments which pre-
ceded the Hawthorne studies are all reminiscent of Taylor's inter-
est in earth shovelling and pig-iron handling.
The work of the industrial psychologists, like Taylor's, was
based upon the assumption that objective factors in the work
situation have a rJUUOr influence upon behaviour in organisations.
130 Sociologkcll Paradigms and Organisational Anttlysis
This view, as we have indicated earlier. is informed by a highly
objectivist ontology and epistemology. The world of work is
treated as a world of hard concrete reality characterised by
uniformities and regularities which can be understood in terms of
cause and effect. Given these assumptions, the individual is
accorded an essentially passive role; his behaviour is regarded as
being determined by the work environment. The main difference
between Taylorism and the work of the early industrial psychol-
ogists is thus one not so much of principle as of detail. They differ
in the sophistication of their determinism. Within the context of
Taylor's scheme it is crude; man is no more than a machine. Within
the industrial psychologists' scheme man is a more complex
psychological entity; the relationship between his environment
and his behaviour can only be unravelled and understood through
the use of a more complex psychological model.lt is this which lies
at the heart of the difference between Taylorism and traditional
industrial psychology and gives rise to the different conclusions
which they draw from their research. Among the psychologists a
behavioural as opposed to a mechanical analogy is preferred; man
is treated as a sophisticated machine which can only be understood
through detailed analysis of the complex relations of stimulus and
response. As will become clear from subsequent discussion, the
history of industrial psychology largely reflects a sequence of
attempts to plug different models of man into an essentially deter-
ministic theory of work behaviour characteristic of the objectivist
boundary of the functionalist paradigm.

The Hawthorne studies

Over the last twenty-five years or so the Hawthorne studies have
been subjected to an increasing barrage of criticism, to the extent
that in many quarters they are now largely discredited as a piece of
social research. They have been criticised for ignoring the role of
conflict in the work place; for being ideologically biased in favour
of management; for being paternalistic; for adopting an inapprop-
riate view of man and society; for ignoring unions and the role of
collective bargaining; for giving insufficient attention to the role of
factors in the outside environment; for being very unscientific in
their approach to their research; and for misinterpreting the evi-
dence which they collected (Landsberger, 1958; Carey, 1967).
Given these criticisms, almost all of which are valid in varying
degrees, it is often difficult to know precisely what to make of the
 Functionalist OrRanisation Theory 131
Hawthorne studies. Most theorists would agree that their signifi-
cance from a historical viewpoint is beyond dispute. Whether right
or wrong, they have drawn the attention of researchers to the role
of social factors within the work place and what has been called the
informal organisation. The Hawthorne studies have had a massive
impact upon subsequent developments in industrial psychology
and sociology, particularly in relation to the so-called human rela-
tions movement. 6
In many respects the Hawthorne research has entered the realm
of mythology. Few students of organisations now read either
Mayo's The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation (1933)
or the more comprehensive report Management and the Worker
by Roethlisberger and Dickson ( 1939). They tend to learn about the
Hawthorne studies at second or third hand. The literature is
replete with oversimplified accounts and reports of the Hawthorne
investigations which tend to focus for the most part upon their
practical implications for management. Schein presents a good
illustration of this, concluding that:
what this study brought home to the industrial psychologist was the
importance of the .<wcial factor - the degree to which work perfor-
mance depended not on the individual alone, but on the network of
social relationships within which he operated. As more studies of
organisations were carried out, it became highly evident that informal
associations and groups are to be found in almost any organisational
circumstances and that these profoundly affect the motivation to work,
the level of output, and quality of the work done. The Hawthorne
studies were one of the major forces leading to a redefinition of 'indus-
trial psychology as industrial social psychology·. (Schein, 1970, p. 34)

From the point of view of this sort of interpretation, the main

significance of the Hawthorne studies is that it identified the exist-
ence of 'social man· in the work situation.
To focus upon what the Hawthorne studies found out about man
in the work situation is, however, to miss the point. Its substantive
conclusions, given all the criticisms of the way in which the studies
were conducted, do not stand up to detailed cross-examination.
Moreover, subsequent research in the human relations tradition
bears out this point. in that its results have proved equally ambigu-
ous with regard to the identification of any relationship between
the satisfaction of social needs and behaviour at work. 7 ln evaluat-
ing the studies some fifty years after they began, it now seems less
important to discuss them in terms oftheir results than in terms of
the theoretical approach upon which they were based. This is
132 Soc-iologkal Paradigm.<; and Organi.wtionc1l Ant~ly.ti.'r

important because, despite all the criticism which has been

levelled at the Hawthorne studies, the model which the
researchers finally adopted for l'xplaining their results has been
used in more or less unchanged form by numerous subsequent
theorists and researchers. This point has been clouded by the
smoke screen generated in the debate about thetr ideology. results
and detailed methodology. As we shall show below. the explanat-
ory model presented by Roethlisberger and Dickson moves away
from the narrowly behavioural and deterministic approach
characteristic of scientific management and early industrial
psychology and towards a mechanical equilibrium systems model
based upon the ideas of Pareto. It represents a conscious shift from
objectivism to social system theory, albeit of a limited kind, which
contains within it the core notions characteristic of what later came
to be known as socio-technical systems theory. Whilst criticising
and often dismissing the contribution of the Hawthorne research, a
large proportion of the theorists and researchers working within
the field of organisation studies have continued to base their
perspectives upon elements of the Hawthorne model. elevating the
importance of different parts to meet their own particular research
interests. The Hawthorne studies are thus of principal signifi-
cance, not so much because they focused attention upon 'social
man' as because they constituted an important landmark in the
application of the systems approach to organisational situations.
As we shall see. despite all the criticisms, organisation theory has
not progressed far beyond the perspective emerging from the
Hawthorne work; indeed, in some areas of enquiry it has actually
regressed. With these points in mind, we will proceed to a brief
examination of the Hawthorne model. Needless to say. the reader
unfamiliar with the original work can unmask many myths by
consulting it for himself and is strongly encouraged to do so.
The Hawthorne experiments reported by Roethlisberger and
Dickson ( 1939) began in 1927. As they state, 'at the beginning of
the enquiry the general interest was primarily in the relation be-
tween conditions of work and the incidence of fatigue and mono-
tony among employees. It was anticipated that exact knowledge
could be obtained about this relation by establishing an experimen-
tal situation in which the effect of variables like temperature,
humidity and hours of sleep could be measured separately from the
effect of an experimentally imposed condition of work' (Roeth-
lisberger and Dickson, 1939, p. 3). The experiments were thus in-
itially cast in the highly objectivist mould which characterised
Taylor's scientific management and early industrial psychology.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 133
The experimenters were simply concerned to identify cause and
effect relationships between physical work conditions and em-
ployee performance and efficiency. In the course of the experi-
ments the influence of rest pauses, hours of work, wage incentives,
supervision and social factors all came to play a part, whether by
design or by default.
Roethlisberger and Dickson's lengthy report on the research is
packed with background information and details of the experi-
ments conducted and the results obtained. The emphasis in the
first half is upon reporting what happened and the way in which the
research changed as the initial hypotheses failed to command the
expected support. They report that the results of the experiments
were very confused, and that the controlled experiment approach
was replaced by an attempt to describe and understand the social
situations under examination as ·a system of interdependent ele-
ments' (1939, p. 183). Gradually attention shifted from the physical
characteristics of the work environment towards factors such as
supervision and the attitudes and preoccupations of employees. In
order to investigate these latter factors, the Hawthorne manage-
ment, impressed by 'the stores of latent energy and productive
co-operation which clearly could be obtained from its working
force under the right conditions', agreed to the initiation of an
interview programme with employees {1939, p. 185). It was con-
ducted as a sort of action research project designed to improve
supervisory training. As Roethlisberger and Dickson note, this
interviewing programme marked a turning point in the research
and for a time overshadowed all the other activities of the research
group. After describing at length the approach and findings of the
interview programme, the authors finally set out their systems
model which informs the second half of their work.lt is this model
which literally stands at the centre oftheir analysis. Derived from
the early Hawthorne work, and informing and directing interest in
the later stages of research, it provides the best statement of their
research perspective as a whole.
The model is presented as part of a conceptual scheme for the
understanding of employee dissatisfaction. 1 Like the rest of their
substantive conclusions, the model is almost submerged beneath a
deluge of data presenting the approach and empirical findings of
the interview programme. In their analysis of employee attitudes
thej make much of the difference between 'fact' and 'sentiment',
and between 'manifest' and 'latent' complaints. These distinctions
are important, since they led the researchers to treat certain com-
plaints no longer ·as facts in themselves but as symptoms or indi-
134 Sociological ParadiRml and OrRanisational A naly.fi.f
cators of personal or social situations which needed to be
explored' (1939, p. 269). Employee complaints characterised by
exaggeration and distortion came to be seen as symptomatic of
states of personal disequilibrium. It is worth reproducing the con-
clusions of the researchers in full. They report that

in order to fit their findings into a coherent whole, the investigators had
to evolve a new way of thinking about the worker and those things
about which he complained. Their conclusions emerged in terms of a
conceptual scheme for the interpretation of employee complaints,
which can be stated as follows:
I. the source of most employee complaints cannot be confined to
some one single cause, and the dissatisfaction of the worker, in
most cases, is the general effect of a complex situation;
2. the analysis of complex situations requires an understanding of
the nature of the equilibrium or disequilibrium and the nature of
the interferences;
3. the interferences which occur in industry can come from changes
in the physical environment, from changes in the social environ-
ment at work. or from changes outside the immediate working
environment, and the 'unba,ances' which issue from such inter-
ferences may be organic (changes in the blood stream), or me mal
(obsessive preoccupations which make it difficult to attend to
work), or both;
4. therefore, to cloak industrial problems under such general
categories as 'fatigue', ·monotony'. and 'supervision' is some-
times to fail to discriminate among the different kinds of inter-
ferences involved. as well as among the different kinds of dis-
equilibrium;
S. and if the different interferences and different types of disequilib-
rium are not the same ill in every instance, they are not suscept-
ible to the same kind of remedy. (1939, p. 3)
Roethlisberger and Dickson illustrate this position with the aid
of a diagram which has been reproduced here as Figure 5.3. They
suggest that this schema

shows the major areas from which interference may arise in industrial
situations and the kind of responses which can be expected if unbal-
ance arises. It is apparent that this way of thinking substitutes for a
simple cause and effect analysis of human situations the notion of an
interrelation of factors in mutual dependence: that is, an equilibrium
such that any major change in one of the factors (interference or
constraint) brings about changes in the other factors. resulting in a
temporary state of disequilibrium until either the former equilibrium is
restored or a new equilibrium is established. ( 1939, p. 326)
 Functionalist Orflanisation Theory 135
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF INTERFERENCE RESPONSES

Outside Within Within

factory Factory organism
G...--.,..----....,
Physical
conditions
of work
A,.------,
Complaint
0,------L---,
Organism or
Social individual in
conditions equilibrium
outside factory
Reduced
work
effectiveness

Figure 5.3 Scheme for interpreting complaints and reduced work effectivene!ls
souRCE: F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Manal!ement and the Worker
(Harvard University Press. 1939) p. 327.

Before proceeding to a full critique and evaluation of this overall

position. it will be as well if we pause awhile and consider the
advances over earlier thinking reflected in this model. 9
(a) It is quite explicit in rejecting the utility of the traditional
approach of scientific management and industrial psychology as a
means of investigating social situations within organisations. In
terms of the model presented in Figure 5.3. these approaches had
tended to concentrate upon the relationships between the elements
in boxes C, D and G. The Hawthorne model emphasises that
employee attitudes and work behaviour can only be understood in
terms of a complex network of interacting elements both within
and outside the work situation and also within the individual
himself.
(b) This systems approach is consciously 'open' in nature, in
that it recognises the influence of outside forces (box H), though
attention is mainly paid to them insofar as they affect the personal
136 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
history of individuals (box F), and their possible effects are moder-
ated by the concept of equilibrium.
(c) The analysis of factors within the factory identifies the ele-
ments of the socio-technical systems approach to the study of
organisations (boxes G and H).
(d) In line with point (a) above, the investigators specifically
reject the view that any one factor can be identified as a source of
industrial problems. They mention 'fatigue·, 'monotony' and
·supervision'; with hindsight they would undoubtedly have added
·social needs •.
Roethlisberger and Dickson proceed to apply this model to the
evidence collected in the research and then develop certain
aspects in more detail. In brief, they suggest that the evidence
collected shows that the set of relationships characterised by
boxes G. C. D, A and Band those characterised by boxes F. E, D,
A and B are less important as a source of disequilibrium at work
than those associated with I. H, E. D, A and B. In other words,
they conclude that the balance of evidence of their research places
most emphasis upon social factors both outside and within work as
influences upon employee attitudes and work effectiveness. On
the basis of this conclusion, they focus upon these factors in their
subsequent investigations and analysis, and they identify the
notions of the 'formal' and 'informal' organisation and the con-
tribution made by social factors to equilibrium in the work place.lt
is important to stress that these conclusions. for which the studies
are best remembered, result from the empirical aspect of the
enquiry and the interpretations placed upon the evidence col-
lected.
One further point in relation to their theoretical model is worthy
of note. Having identified the importance of individual attitudes in
the work situation, Roethlisberger and Dickson go on to elaborate
a further conceptual scheme for understanding employee satisfac-
tion and dissatisfaction, reproduced here as Figure 5.4. It

attempts to show in terms of their relations to one another those factors

which have to be taken into account when considering employee con-
tent or discontent. According to this interpretation it is not possible to
treat, as in the more abstract social sciences, material goods. physical
events, wages, and hours of work as things in themselves, subject to
their own laws. Instead they must be interpreted as carriers of social
value. For the employee in industry, the whole working environment
must be looked upon as being permeated with social significance.
Apart from the social values inherent in his environment the meaning to
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 137
the employee of certain objects or events cannot be understood. ( 1939,
p. 374) .

Social organization
of
company

Events. objects.
Position or status Satisfaction
persons in company;
technical changes: r--- of or
individual dissatisfaction
policies of company

Social demands

Figure 5.4 Scheme for interpreting complaints involving social interrelationships

of employees
SOURCE: F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the Wor!er
(Harvard University Press, 1939) p. 375.

To the list of advances over earlier thinking reflected in the

Hawthorne model, we can thus add:
(e) An anticipation of what has later come into prominence as
the 'action frame of reference'. The Hawthorne researchers
emphasised that explanations must be adequate at the level of
meaning to the individual involved. 10 Their insights here, how-
ever. were clouded by their euphoria about the importance of the
social organisation, which led them to view meaning and signifi-
cance as arising primarily from within the context of the internal
organisation. As they put it:
to understand the meaning of any employee's complaints or griev-
ances. it is necessary to take account of his position or status within
the company. This position is determined by the social organisation of
138 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the company: that system cl practices and beliefs by means cl which
the human values d the organisation are expressed, and the symbols
around which they are organised - efficiency, service, etc ..•.
But the relation of the individual employee to the company is not a
closed system. All the values dthe individual cannot be accounted for
by the social organisation d the company. The meaning a person
assigns to his position depends on whether or not that position is
allowing him to fulfill the social demands he is making of his work. The
ultimate significance of his work is not defined so much by his relation
to the Company as by his relation to the wider social reality. ( 1939, pp.
374-5)

These important theoretical insights relating to the employee's

interpretation of his situation were not developed and. along with
many other aspects of the Hawthorne model, were largely buried
under the deluge of empirical research generated by the study.
In any evaluation of the Hawthorne studies, therefore, it seems
important to be clear about whether one is assessing them in terms
of their contribution to theory or in terms of their substantive
conclusions. Whilst there is undoubtedly a relation between these
two factors, they are by no means synonymous, and much of the
current confusion over the value of the studies has arisen because
critics have not always distinguished between these factors.
In theoretical terms the Hawthorne model can best be under-
stood as representing a fusion of elements from the sociology of
Pareto and Durkheim. As we noted in Chapter 4, Pareto had a
massive impact upon the 'Harvard Group' of sociologists in the
1920s and 1930s, and his idea of a social system in equilibrium
provides the core notion underlying the Hawthorne model. The
research also reflects Pareto's interest in ·non-logical' conduct.
The notion of 'sentiments' derives directly from Pareto's work and
is used by the Hawthorne team to describe attitudes which are not
based upon 'facts'. The distinction between 'facts' and ·sen-
timents' plays an important part in guiding the Hawthorne
analysis.
The notion of 'social facts' is, of course, reminiscent of Durk-
heim's work, and Roethlisberger and Dickson duly acknowledge
his influence upon the way in which they sought to analyse the
situations encountered in the research. 11 However, the Durk-
heimian influence is much more extensive than this. It will be
recalled from our discussion in Chapter4 that Durkheim addressed
himself to the study of the relations between the individual and
society, and the relation of the individual personality to social
solidarity. Now, it is precisely this theme which dominates the
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 139
substantive content of the Hawthorne research. Whilst Pareto's
notion of a system in equilibrium provides an organising
framework for the research, it is the Durkheimian notion of anomie
that receives central attention. The Hawthorne studies address
themselves to what is perceived as a situation of anomie - the
disjuncture between the individual and his work. It is this
Durkheimian influence which accounts for the emphasis placed
upon social factors. Crudely put, the Hawthorne interest in ·social
man' does not derive so much from the researchers' interest in the
psychological make-up of man (as much of the post-Hawthorne
literature would lead us to believe) as from an interest in
Durkheim's analysis of the process of social change.
Interestingly enough, in Roethlisberger and Dickson's account
of the studies, the Durkheimian influence upon their theoretical
perspective is not specifically elaborated in any degree. 12 In
Mayo's (1933) account, however, it receives much greater atten-
tion. The spirit of Durkheim is present throughout and is clearly
reflected in Mayo's suggestion that human problems are to be
understood in relation to the erosion of social values brought about
by the dictates of economic and technical change. Concluding his
review of some of the findings of the Hawthorne experiments, for
example, Mayo remarks that
Human collaboration in work, in primitive and developed societies,
has always depended for its perpetuation upon the evolution of a
non-logical social code which regulates the relations between persons
and their attitudes to one another. Insistence upon a merely economic
logic of production - especially if the logic is frequently changed -
interferes with the development of such a code and consequently gives
rise in the group to a sense of human defeat. This human defeat results
in the formation of a social code at a lower level and in opposition to the
economic logic. One of its symptoms is ·restriction'. (Mayo, 1933, pp.
120-1)

This statement clearly reflects the central principles which

inform the theoretical perspective of the Hawthorne studies. So-
ciety is to be understood in terms of a system tending towards
equilibrium; if this equilibrium is disturbed, forces are set in
motion to restore it. The equilibrium of modern society has been
upset by technological change prompted by the dictates of an
economic logic; as a result social forces have been set in motion to
restore the balance. This equilibrium model, as applied at the
societal level, is transferred in more or less unchanged form to an
analysis of the work situation. The individual now becomes an
140 SodoloRical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
equilibrating system, influenced by the various elements which
comprise the situation within and outside work. Behaviour at work
is understood in terms of attempts to maintain or restore an
equilibrium position. In the work place where the influence of
technology and economics are paramount the social organisation
acts as one of the principal forces for restoring equilibrium. It is
this fusion of Paretian and Durkheimian perspectives which gives
the Hawthorne model of the organisation as a social system its own
distinctive flavour.
In evaluating the theoretical contribution of the Hawthorne
studies, therefore, it is important to distinguish between the
Paretian and Durkheimian influences upon their model. Both ele-
ments are open to criticism. As will be apparent from our discus-
sion in Chapter 4, the Paretian equilibrium model is not particu-
larly well equipped for the study of an open system such as that
envisaged by the Hawthorne researchers. As we have argued, the
notion of equilibrium is indeed incompatible with an open systems
view, but in the case of the Hawthorne analysis this may amount in
the end to no more than a semantic confusion. The Paretian model
is infused with the notion of the individual as an organism; it thus
reflects a fusion of mechanical and biological analysis. In this
situation the notion of homeostasis rather than equilibrium pro-
vides the relevant organising concept. (This is perhaps a fine point
and one which should not be pursued too far.)
The real limitation of both equilibrium and homeostatic models
for the study of open systems is that they place severe constraints
upon the openness of the system. The system is only allowed to
vary within fairly narrow constraints in predefined ways. The
equilibrium notion is particularly restrictive in this respect, since it
focuses attention almost exclusively upon the internal relation-
ships which characterise the system. External factors are gener-
ally considered only insofar as they cause disequilibrium; the
causes of such disequilibrium and the mechanisms by which it is
restored tend to be at the focus of interest. Indeed, the use of an
equilibrium analogy encourages a search for these equilibrating
mechanisms. The use of such a model thus carries with it a con-
servative orientation. The influence of the environment upon the
system is constrained by the nature of the assumptions by which it
is defined, and explanations of system operation are guided
primarily by the assumption that some form of balance will be
restored. As will be clear from our discussion of systems theory in
Chapter 4, the Hawthorne model is open to its environment, but
only partially so.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 141
Thus in evaluating the model from this perspective one must
recognise that, despite the advances which it reflects over the
traditional theories of classical management and industrial
psychology, as a social systems model it is severely constrained.
However, as will become clear as we progress through this chap-
ter, other social systems models employed for the study of organ-
isations often show little advance over the Hawthorne model;
sometimes they are considerably less sophisticated. In criticising
Hawthorne on this ground, therefore, one is likely to be criticising
social system theory in general. The biological analogies most
commonly employed show little advance over the modified
Paretian model described above.
Many of the criticisms directed at the Hawthorne model have, in
fact, been of this nature. They represent criticisms of social system
theory in general and have often been launched from the perspec-
tive of 'pluralist theory', which we shall be discussing later in this
chapter. The major criticism from this point of view is that the
Hawthorne model treats the organisation as a unitary system in
which the normal state of affairs is characterised by co-operation
and harmony; such a view underplays the role of power and
conflict as factors in organisational afTairs.u
Moving on to consider the Durkheimian elements of the model,
it will be clear from our analysis, presented earlier, that the influ-
ence of Durkheim accounts in some measure for the focus upon
social factors within the organisation. It is no doubt an oversim-
plification to suggest that the Hawthorne analysis was provided by
Pareto and the conclusions by Durkheim, but it is an interesting
proposition nonetheless. In all empirical research the results are
largely determined by the nature of the ·problematic' or 'theoreti-
cal framework' adopted, and the suggestion that the Hawthorne
researchers were guided in their interpretation of evidence by a
Durkheimian interest in social solidarity remains highly persua-
sive. As we have noted earlier, the notion of 'social man' as it
emerged from the Hawthorne studies owes more to Durkheim than
to any analysis of psychological needs. This is a point which has
often been lost in the post-Hawthorne mythology. The psycholog-
ists who have dominated the human relations movement have
made Hawthorne so much their own that many students of organ-
isations may be forgiven for not realising that the studies were
primarily informed by a sociological rather than a psychological
perspective.
Insofar as criticisms of the Hawthorne model are directed at its
detailed conclusions and results about the relative influence of
142 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
economic, social and other factors upon work behaviour, there-
fore, it is the Durkheimian influence upon the model that is being
challenged. A number of critics have attacked the studies on these
grounds, without necessarily recognising the Durkheimian influ-
ence.•• The attack is launched on the basis of detailed methodol-
ogy and the interpretation of results. Interestingly enough, in not
addressing the assumptions built into the Hawthorne model - its
equilibrium tendencies, for example - such criticisms implicitly
endorse the model used as a legitimate method of analysis. The
problem with the studies, from this point of view, lies in the way
they have been implemented; whilst endorsing the theoretical
framework, criticism is levelled at the way in which it has been
used.
Hopefully, the above discussion goes some way towards sorting
out the confusion which surrounds the interpretation of the
Hawthorne studies. The view that they are worthless in them-
selves and merely of importance because of their historical impact
derives largely from the fact that they are judged only from the
point of view of their conclusions and results. The majority of
criticisms have been of this sort. This can be explained to some
extent by the fact that the results of the studies were available
before the theoretical model. Roethlisberger and Dickson's
detailed account, for example, was preceded by numerous publi-
cations. Those of Mayo were of a polemical nature and undoub-
tedly did much to provoke criticism of the studies. Whitehead's
( 1938) detailed presentation of results also drew attention to their
substantive conclusions rather than to their theoretical orienta-
tions. Numerous other publications have laid stress upon their
practical relevance. As a result, the Hawthorne studies have been
judged largely in terms of their contribution to the empirical know-
ledge of work behaviour as opposed to the analysis of work situa-
tions. In terms of the latter, their record fares much better. The
quality of the systems theory propounded, whilst highly deficient
when judged from a perspective outside the bounds of social
system theory as a whole, stands up well to many contemporary
models of the work place. By way of redressing the unfavourable
balance against the Hawthorne model, but at risk of presenting the
model in too favourable a light, we conclude our discussion here by
re-emphasising that the research, whatever its drawbacks, marked
a clear advance in sophistication over the simple factor explana-
tions offered by the classical management theorists and industrial
psychologists. The research represented one of the first attempts
at viewing an organisational situation in terms of a system of
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 143
interrelated parts, and anticipated a number of future develop-
ments in relation to the notion of socio-technical systems theory
and, to a lesser extent, the action frame of reference.

Post-Hawthorne objectivism: job satisfaction

and human relations
Despite the basic theoretical insights implicit in the Hawthorne
social systems model, the majority of social theorists interested in
the study of work behaviour remained largely uninfluenced by the
systems notion until some twenty years later, when the idea of
•socio-technical' system began to hold sway .In the interim, and to
a lesser extent throughout the post-Hawthorne period as a whole,
research on work behaviour has been characterised by a return to
the objectivism of traditional industrial psychology discussed ear-
lier in this chapter. From the point of view of most researchers, it
was the results of the Hawthorne work which commanded atten-
tion, and the studies were used largely as a source of new
hypotheses for informing and guiding further empirical enquiries in
the traditional mould. The systems model was largely left behind in
favour of a continued search for causal relationships between new
variables identified in the Hawthorne work.
As will be recalled from our previous discussion, the early
industrial psychologists had concerned themselves with the study
of relationships between employees, their work environment and
their work performance. In this endeavour concepts such as
'fatigue' and ·monotony' had provided the central focus of inter-
est. In the post-Hawthorne era the notion of 'job satisfaction' has
replaced them at the centre of attention. Interest has been directed
towards the identification of the determinants of job satisfaction
and its relationship to work performance. Thus, whereas the pre-
Hawthorne concern was for studying the relationships between
work,fatigue, monotony and performance, post-Hawthorne con-
cern has been for studying the relationship between work ,satisfac-
tion and performance.
The first comprehensive study ofjob satisfaction was conducted
by Hoppock ( 1935). It focused upon general job satisfaction among
employed adults within a small community, and concluded that
factors such as occupational level, fatigue, monotony, working
conditions and achievement could all have an influence upon job
satisfaction. This was followed by a host of other empirical studies
144 Socio/o1fical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
focusing upon specific work variables such as supervision ,leader-
ship style, promotion opportunities, remuneration, status, job
content, working conditions, social environment, attitudes to the
company and technology .Is Many of these studies also sought to
link job satisfaction, both in relation to specific job factors and in
general terms, to levels of employee work performance, absence
from work, rate of employee turnover, accidents, etc. The method
of analysis adopted in these studies focused upon measurement of
the variables involved and a study ofinter-correlation coefficients.
As Vroom noted, whilst these studies suggested some sort of
negative relationship between job satisfaction and the probability
of resignation, absence from work and accidents, there was no
simple relationship between job satisfaction and job performance
(Vroom, 1964, pp. 101-5). Subsequent reviewers of job attitudes
and motivation have also concluded that the field is characterised
by studies yielding a host of unrelated fragments but little real
understanding of the subject area (for example, Miner and
Dachler. 1973).
The absence of a clear relationship between factors in the work
environment and job satisfaction has 'inevitably led to an increas-
ing focus upon the nature of man. The attempts to identify and
define what constitutes job satisfaction has carried with it a need to
understand the process of motivation at work. In the light of
post-Hawthorne research the classical view of economic man has
been increasingly discredited. The research of Roethlisberger and
Dickson (1939), Whyte's study of the restaurant industry (1948),
Walker and Guest's study of the assembly line ( 1952), Likert's
work on leadership and supervision ( 1961 and 1967), an«i the work
of Lewin et at. on leadership and group dynamics (1939), among
countless other research studies, have been interpreted as evi-
dence in support of the view of man at work as a social being
motivated by affective needs. These and other researches, such as
the job satisfaction studies of Herzberg et at. (1959), have also
been used in support of the view that man at work attempts as well
to satisfy higher-level psychological needs for recognition,
achievement, self-actualisation, etc.
In essence, the attempt to identify and test through empirical
research the validity of different models of man can be understood
as a search for a substitute for Taylor's 'economic man'.
Behaviourist and determinist theories of human behaviour only
have utility if it can be shown that man is predictable. Much of the
objectivist research on work behaviour has aimed essentially to
show precisely this. It has been underwritten by the assumption
 Functionalist Organistltion Theory 145
that the nature of man can be revealed through systematic empiri-
cal investigation of his attitudes and behaviour.
In the attempt to identify an appropriate model of man for the
study of work behaviour, industrial researchers have made much
use of the work of humanistic psychologists such as Abraham
Maslow, whose theory of a hierarchy of human needs has proved
influential (Maslow, 1943). Some specific attempts have been
made to test his model at an empiricallevel, 16 though the more
common approach has been to use it as a point of reference for
interpreting results achieved independently of the model as such.
In both cases the data generated has proved inconclusive. Even in
the case of Herzberg eta/. ( 1959) simple two-factor theory of job
satisfaction, which is in essence related to Maslow's ideas,
research has again proved inconclusive.lts results are consistently
supported only when those authors' own highly idiosyncratic
method of testing the theory is used. 17
Since the 1960s the inability of such models of man to provide
consistent explanations of work motivation and behaviour has led
to increasing interest in cognitive models of the motivational pro-
cess, particularly ·expectancy theory' -•• This is a theory based
essentially upon what Locke has described as ·a form of calcula-
tive, psychological hedonism in which the ultimate motive of every
human act is asserted to be the maximisation of pleasure and/or
the minimisation of pain. The individual always chooses that
course of action which he expects will lead to the greatest degree of
pleasure or which will produce the smallest degree of pain' (Locke,
1975, p. 459). In effect, expectancy theory has given the kiss of life
to objectivism in the waning years of the Hawthorne influence. It
has generated a spate of empirical studies and now stands as the
most popular approach to motivation among industrial researchers
(Locke, 1975, p. 457). Somewhat paradoxically, it turns the wheel
of industrial psychology right back to the days ofTaylorism, in that
in place of rational economic man it seeks to substitute rational,
calculative, hedonistic man.
This course of development clearly underlines the essentially
objectivist nature and orientation of industrial psychology, even in
the post-Hawthorne era. As will be recalled from our discussion of
the work of the early industrial psychologists, the distinction be-
tween their concerns and Taylorism largely boils down to different
conceptions of what the industrial worker was like. The differ-
ences in the substantive conclusions which their theories generate
arise as a result of the different models of man included in their
analytical schemes. The industrial psychologists have come to see
146 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the nature of man as increasingly complex and problematic as far
as explaining behaviour in organisations is concerned. They have
searched for solutions in humanistic and cognitive psychology,
primarily with a view to slotting complex psychological man into
the framework of a deterministic theory of work behaviour, albeit
one based upon a contingency rather than a universal mode of
explanation. This essentially determinist stance is the classic mark
of objectivist theory, and it is for this reason that much contempor-
ary work in this area, along with the theory and research of the
early industrial psychologists, Taylor, and the classical manage-
ment theorists, can be regarded as representative of the most
objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm.

Socio-technical systems theory

As we have noted, the elements of socio-technical systems theory
were built into the structure of the Hawthorne model for analysing
work situations. In the immediate post-Hawthorne years, how-
ever, these important insights were largely neglected in favour
of objectivist studies of job satisfaction, group dynamics, leader-
ship style and other factors of interest to the human relations
movement. Certain studies had paid attention to the relationships
between technology and social structure, 19 but it was not until the
1950s that anything approaching what might be called a socio-
technical systems approach came into being.
The term 'socio-technical system' was first used by members of
the Tavistock Institute to characterise the interaction of technolog-
ical and social factors in industrial production systems. It derived
largely from a study conducted by Trist and Bamforth (1951),
which was directed at examining the effects of the introduction of
the long-wall method of coal mining in certain British mines. This
mechanised, mass production-type system of coal mining, which
replaced the traditional 'hand-got' method, involved a complete
reorganisation of work and social relationships within the pit. The
study, which was heavily informed by a psycho-analytical per-
spective focusing upon the importance of group relationships, led
the researchers to view the work situation in terms of the inter-
relations between social and technological factors. The working
group was regarded not as just a technical system or a social system,
but as an interdependent socio-technical system. Like the Haw-
thorne studies, the Tavistock work was underwritten by the
 Functionalist Organi.ration Theory 147
assumptions of an equilibrium model. The technological change
reflected in the new long-wall method was seen as disturbing the
·pre-mechanised equilibrium'. and the responses of the miners
interpreted as reactions to this disturbance. The situation in the pit
was analysed in terms of a field of psychological and social forces.
the balance of which was influenced by the interaction between
technical and human factors.
The study was of importance in recognising that socio-
psychological factors were built into the nature of work technol-
ogy. and that the work organisation also had social and psycholog-
ical properties of its own which were independent of technology.
However, the socio-technical systems notion remained in an
embryonic rather than an explicit and well developed form, await-
ing refinement through further research. This was conducted by
various members of the Tavistock group throughout the 1950s and
resulted in a number of important publications. 20 These reflect an
increasing preoccupation with the notion of system as an organis-
ing concept, not just at the level of the work group but for the study
of the organisation as a whole, and a move away from the equilib-
rium model to one based upon an organismic analogy.
The notion of the socio-technical system has had a major impact
upon developments within the field of job design, particularly
since the middle 1960s, and upon the quality of working life move-
ment which we shall be considering later in the chapter. For a
number of years, however, its use was most prominent in British
research, particularly that of the Tavistock Institute. Research
conducted in the USA during the 1950s was not so clearly informed
by the systems concept, though it addressed itself to similar con-
siderations. The work of Argyris provides the most impressive and
outstanding example. As early as 1952 Argyris published his study
of The Impact of Budgets upon People, followed in 1957 by Per-
sonality and Organisation. Both these studies investigate the con-
flicts between the needs of human personality and the characteris-
tics of formal organisation, recognising that an adequate analysis
of behaviour in organisations must take account of individual
factors, small informal group factors and formal organisation fac-
tors (staff-line, chain of command, specialisation of tasks, produc-
tion layout and control, etc.). 21 Argyris is concerned to integrate
relevant behavioural science research through the use of a sys-
tematic framework for the study of what he describes as organisa-
tional behaviour, and he generates many insights which parallel
those which characterise socio-technical systems theory. His
work, like its British counterpart, is underwritten by the notion of
148 Sociolo~:ica/ Paradi~:ms and Orf{ani.'lational Analysis
equilibrium. Certain elements anticipate an open systems view of
organisations, and indeed the underlying model is specifically
updated and rewritten within the context of this open systems
approach in a subsequent volume (Argyris, 1964).

Equilibrium theories of organisation:

Barnard and Simon
Chester Barnard (1886-1961) was for many years a prominent
figure in management thought in the USA. A president of a large
corporation, he had a great deal of contact with the 'Harvard
Group' of sociologists led by Henderson and Mayo during the
1930s, and in response to their encouragement, set out his thoughts
on management and organisation in his famous essay The Func-
tions of the Executive, published in 1938. This work reflects the
dominant perspectives and orientations of the Harvard Group, in
that it is underwritten by a concern to analyse organisations as
social systems whose activities can be understood with reference
to the concept of equilibrium. Barnard's essay represented one of
the first systematic attempts to lay the basis of an academic theory
of organisations and has been extremely influential upon subse-
quent thought. Indeed, Perrow has gone so far as to suggest that 'it
would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the field of
organisational"theory is dominated by Max Weber and Chester
Barnard, each presenting different models. and that the followers
of Barnard hold numerical superiority' (Perrow, 1972, p. 75).
Barnard argues that his work presents two treatises. The first is
described as an 'exposition of a theory of co-operation and organ-
isation', and the second as ·a study of the functions and of the
methods of operation of executives in formal organisations' (Bar-
nard, 1938, p. xii). The underlying theme is that organisations are
by nature essentially co-operative systems but require sensitive
management to maintain them in states of equilibrium. His essay
as a whole seeks to establish the basis of a theory of management
which will contribute to this overall aim.
Barnard defines a formal organisation as ·a system of con-
sciously co-ordinated activities or forces of two or more persons'
(1938, p. 73), and argues that 'an organisation comes into being
when (I) there are persons able to communicate with each other,
(2) who are willing to contribute action, (3) to accomplish a com-
mon purpose' (1938,p. 82). Barnard argues that these three factors
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 149
- communication, willingness to serve and common purpose -
are necessary and sufficient conditions found in all formal organ-
isations. The organisation, therefore, is a co-operative enterprise
of individuals in pursuit of a common purpose. It is essentially
·unitary' in nature. In Barnard's work the notions of co-operation
and purpose assume a moral flavour. Barnard argues that it is the
natural state of affairs for human beings to co-operate, and he cites
physical, biological, psychological and social arguments in sup-
port of his case. He regards people ·unfitted for co-operation' as
pathological cases, insane and not of this world ( 1938, p. 13). For
Barnard, the fact that members of an organisation participate and
co-operate willingly is taken as an endorsement of the purpose of
the organisation. As he puts it, ·a purpose does not incite co-
operative activity unless it is accepted by those whose efforts will
constitute the organisation' (1938, p. 86).
It is against this sort of background that Barnard develops his
theory of executive functions. In his scheme executives within
organisations are charged with the task of sustaining the organisa-
tion in a state of equilibrium and hence ensuring its survival.
Barnard recognises that disequilibrium is a very common state of
affairs and that in practice even the willingness of persons to
co-operate may be in doubt. He thus devotes considerable atten-
tion to considering ways in which equilibrium can be restored
through appropriate executive management. The executive is
urged to give consideration to necessary adjustments in relation to
the environment and within the organisation. In relation to the
latter he is urged to alter the conditions of behaviour of individuals,
including conditioning of the individual by training, by the inculca-
tion of attitude and by the construction of incentives ( 1938, p. 15).
Thus, although the co-operation of individuals is seen as the
defining characteristic of an organisation, Barnard's theory of
executive functions is based upon somewhat contradictory
assumptions. This is a major weakness in his theory and one which
has not perhaps been recognised sufficiently clearly by those
theorists who have built upon Barnard's work. His theory of
•inducements' and ·contributions', which is developed to explain
the continued participation of members of the organisation, seems
particularly paradoxical within the context of an organisation
characterised by a common purpose. Similarly Barnard's view
that one of the functions of the executive is to "indoctrinate' those
at lower levels of the organisation with its general purposes seems
equally paradoxical ( 1938, p. 233). Again his view that •the final
test' of his ·conceptual scheme is whether its use will make poss-
150 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ible a more effective conscious promotion and manipulation of
co-operation among men' (1938, p. 74), also contradicts his basic
assumptions about the co-operative nature of organisations.
Barnard's theory of organisations,like the Hawthorne studies to
which it was so closely related, is of some importance but must be
approached with caution. Given that Weber's theory was not yet
available to the English-speaking world, Barnard's contribution
was for many students the first theory of organisation which they
encountered. Its influence has been enormous and its assumptions
are reflected in much contemporary theory, particularly that
which approaches organisation from a managerial perspective. It
offered a view of and an approach to the study of organisations
which differed quite remarkably from the conventional approach
of management theorists of the day. Although a major section of
his book is devoted to the theory and structure of formal organisa-
tions, there is, in point of fact, very little discussion of structure in
the classical management sense. Barnard was less concerned with
describing managerial hierarchies, lines of command, spans of
control, job design, etc., than with delineating the relationship of
individual members to the ongoing executive process. Whilst
interested in the co-ordination of activities in pursuit of the general
purpose of the organisation, Barnard approached the problems
which this posed in terms of the motivation of individual members.
For Barnard, the theory of formal organisation was largely con-
cerned with the relationships between people.
This perspective, then, differed substantially in emphasis from
the approach of the classical theorists. Whilst being at one with
these theorists in viewing organisations as goal-seeking entities,
Barnard devoted considerably less attention to the formal and
technical aspects of organisation in terms of structure. On their
part, the classical theorists paid very little attention to the role of
individuals, their motivation and behaviour. By the 1940s, there-
fore, the time was ripe for a fusion of these two perspectives and
the creation of a goal-orientated theory of organisation which took
due consideration of both human and structural factors. The foun-
dations of such a perspective were laid in two quite different ways
by Herbert Simon and Philip Selznick.
Simon, in his famous book Administrative Behaviour, first pub-
lished in 1945, integrates the motivational and structural
approaches to organisation within the context of a theory of
equilibrium. His analysis, like Barnard's, is comprehensively
underwritten by Paretian ideas, though this is not specifically
acknowledged. Simon focuses upon decision making within organ-
 Functionalist Organisation Theory lSI
isations, and he seeks to reconcile the principle of rationality
which underwrites the theory of formal organisation and adminis-
tration with the fact that the behaviour of individuals never reaches
any high degree of rationality. For Simon, the notion of 'economic
man' characteristic of classical theory is plainly at odds with the
view of man revealed by the psychologists and, indeed, that which
emerges from observations in everyday work experience. One of
his solutions is to introduce a new model of man - 'administrative
man' - based upon the notion of 'bounded rationality' and the
assumption that man 'satisfices' rather than ·maximises' in his
work behaviour.
Thus, for Simon, 'the central concern ofadministrative theory is
with the boundary between the rational and non-rational aspects
ofhuman social behaviour. Administrative theory is peculiarly the
theory of intended and bounded rationality - of the behaviour of
human beings who satisfice because they do not have the wits to
maximise' (Simon, 1957, p. xxiv). Simon is specifically concerned
to build a theory of administrative behaviour around a theory of
human choice or decision making which is sufficiently broad and
realistic to accommodate the rational aspects of choice which have
interested economists and the elements of decision making and
behaviour which have interested psychologists. It is this theory
which is placed at the centre of his equilibrium (inducement-
contribution) model of the organisation and from which he derives
various propositions of interest to the administrator.
Simon's theory of administration has proved tremendously
influential and has stimulated considerable interest in decision-
making approaches to the study of organisations. The basic themes
implicit in Simon's analysis were updated in an important volume
by March and Simon ( 1958), which in essence sought to codify and
define the field of organisation theory in terms of a series offormal
propositions. The bounded rationality of 'administrative man' as
opposed to the maximising behaviour of 'economic man' again
emerges as the focus of analysis and is used to develop links with
the structure of organisations. The characteristics which are seen
as defining human problem-solving processes and rational human
choice are seen as determining the basic features of organisation
structure and function (March and Simon, 1958, p. 169). In this
way the model of organisation which emerges from the authors'
analysis reflects their assumptions with regard to the nature of
man. Essentially the theory presented reflects a modified form of
behaviourism. Whilst allowing for an element of ·subjective
rationality' deriving from the individual's frame of reference,
152 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
human behaviour is seen as being shaped by influences in the
environment. These provide the initial stimulus to which humans
respond in the somewhat mechanistic manner of 'administrativ e
man' - defining the situation in 'limited' ways, 'searching' and
·satisficing'.
The March and Simon model has been further developed by
Cyert and March (1963), who view the organisation as an 'adap-
tively rational' system coping with a variety of internal and exter-
nal constraints in arriving at decisions. It sees the firm as an
information-processing and decision-making system which has to
cope with various conflicts from both within and outside its
boundaries. It focuses upon the internal operations of the firm,
develops the analysis of conflict presented in March and Simon's
work and arrives at a theoretical perspective which, although
dominated by the notion of equilibrium. has many points of similar-
ity with the pluralist theories of organisation discussed later in this
chapter.

The structural functionalist approach to

organisation
Philip Selznick (1948), like Simon, sought to develop a goal-
orientated theory of organisation which took due consideration of
both human and structural factors. However. whereas Simon
focused upon organisations as decision-making entities, Selznick
chose to develop a structural functionalist view.
Selznick begins his analysis by reviewing two definitions of an
organisation, one from the work of J. M. Gaus. a classical theorist
in the public administration field, and the other from Barnard's
work. Gaus defined 'organisation' as 'the arrangement of person-
nel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose
through the allocation of functions and responsibilities' (1936, p.
66). Barnard, it will be recalled, defined a formal organisation as 'a
system of consciously co-ordinated activities or forces of two or
more persons' (Barnard, 1938, p. 73). Selznick suggests that
'viewed in this light, formal organisation is the structural expres-
sion of rational action' (1948, p. 25). As in the case of Simon,
Selznick thus links his view of organisation with the notion of
rationality and also recognises that organisations are far from
rational in their actual operations. In line with the conclusions of
the Hawthorne studies, Merton's research on bureaucratic
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 153
dysfunctions, and Barnard's analysis of co-operative systems, he
argues that ·as we inspect these formal structures we begin to see
that they never succeed in conquering the non-rational dimensions
of organisational behaviour. The latter remain at once indispens-
able to the continued existence of the system of co-ordination and
at the same time the source of friction, dilemma, doubt and ruin'
(Selznick, 1948, p. 25). In other words, Selznick argues that,
although organisations are formally rational, in actual practice
they are greatly influenced by the informal and social aspects of
organisation. He argues that individuals never submit as •wholes'
to the dictates of formal structure. He also argues that the institu-
tional environment within which an organisation finds itself exerts
pressure upon the formal and social structure of the organisation,
again deflecting it from the rational model. 22 He proceeds to
suggest that organisations should be viewed as both 'an economy'
(that is, a system of relationships which define the availability of
scarce resources and which may be manifested in terms of effi-
ciency and effectiveness) and as an 'adaptive social structure'. He
argues for a combination of the perspectives reflected in Weber's
view of bureaucracy and the classical management theorists'
definition of organisation on the one hand, and on the other, that
reflected in Barnard's co-operative system, which emphasises the
importance of 'inducements' to members as a basis of ensuring the
maintenance of the organisation and the authority system which it
reflects. As Perrow( 1972) has noted, Selznick's analysis goes right
to the heart of many issues which have continued to attract the
attention of organisation theorists to the present day. The relation-
ships between formal and informal organisation, mechanistic and
organic management (discussed in terms of the problems of delega-
tion). individual and organisation goals and the problem of explain-
ing the way in which changes in organisational structure come
about are all briefly addressed.
Having integrated the social and the formal, economic or techni-
cal aspects of organisation in this way, Selznick then proceeds to
advocate that a structural functional form of analysis be adopted.
He recognises that a sociological analysis of formal structures is
inadequate as an end in itself and that a theory of organisations
capable of understanding adaptive processes is required. He views
structural functional analysis as being adequate for this end and
develops a model based upon the analogy of a biological organism.
It is of importance, in that it represents a clear break from the use
of the mechanical equilibrium model derived from Pareto which
had characterised earlier theories. Selznick largely follows the
154 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Parsonian scheme described in the previous chapter, in that he
seeks to identify the functional 'imperatives' which serve the
overall need of the 'maintenance of the system' as a whole.
Thus, whilst setting otT from a position similar to Simon's,
Selznick follows a different route in the development of his theory
of organisation. However, in both theories the notion of rationality
remains central. Simon begins and ends with rationality as a
dominant concept, even to the extent that a new model of man -
'administrative man• - is developed to reconcile the contradic-
tions between formal and informal aspects of organisational
activities. 'Administrative man' (who satisfices because he does
'not have the wits to maximise') in essence preserves rationality as
the pre-eminent concept. The nature of man is redefined to serve
the theory of formal organisation. In Selznick's model the notion
of rationality is allowed to occupy a background role though an
extremely pervasive one in terms of the purposi'!e nature of organ-
isation. The organisation is presumed to operate in a goal-directed
manner, geared to maintaining itself internally and in relation to its
environment. The adoption of an organismic analogy as a basis of
analysis leads to the identification of a ~eries of functional impera-
tives which serve the needs of the organisation as an 'economic'
and 'adaptive social system'. Purposive rationality is still the
dominant concept, though -in contrast to Simon's scheme- the
individual is conspicuously absent; purposive rationality becomes
a characteristic of the system as a whole. As we shall see, the
concept of purposive rationality, particularly in relation to the
notion of organisational goals, is an important characteristic of
many social system theory approaches to the study of organisa-
tions.

Organisations as open systems

Since the mid-1950s the open systems approach has established
itself as a popular means of studying organisations. The reign of
structural functionalism as a descriptive term in this field was
relatively short-lived, though, as we have argued in Chapter 4,
there is, in effect, little difference between structural functionalism
and open systems theory when the latter is limited to the use of
organismic system analogies. In the late 1950s, therefore, many
structural functionalists began to describe themselves as open
systems theorists and a number of old functionalist models began
to appear in new guises. Theorists who had adopted equilibrium
 Functionalist Organisation Theory ISS
models also began to cast their analyses within the context of an
open systems approach. In this section we will give specific con-
sideration to some examples which illustrate the principles of open
systems theory as it has been applied to the study of organisations
and which illustrate the general trend referred to above.
It will be recalled from our discussion of the work of the
Tavistock Institute that the concept of socio-technical system was
formulated within the context of a study adopting a mechanical
equilibrium model as a basis of analysis (Trist and Bamforth,
19Sl). By 1958 the concept had been incorporated into a much
wider open socio-technical systems approach for the study of
organisations based upon an organismic analogy. Rice's (1958)
analysis of the Tavistock Institute's research in an Indian textile
firm provides a clear illustration of this. The industrial enterprise is
viewed as a socio-technical system which must satisfy the financial
conditions of the industry of which it is part. The social, technolog-
ical and economic dimensions of the organisation are all seen as
interdependent but with values of their own. Stated more bluntly,
the argument is that in an industrial system there are technological,
social and economic imperatives which must be satisfied if an
optimum industrial system is to be achieved. The aim of the
Tavistock researchers, in their capacity as consultants, was to
establish new systems in which all three elements were more
adequately related than before.
Rice's analysis of the textile firm is explicitly based upon the
model of a firm as a living organism which is ·open• to its environ-
ment. The firm is seen as maintaining itself through the exchange
of materials with its environment - importing capital, raw materi-
als, equipment and supplies, and exporting dividends, invest-
ments, waste products and finished goods. It is assumed that if
there is neither import nor export, the organisation will die. The
study is guided by the notion of •primary task'. Each system, or
subsystem is regarded as having, at any one given time, a •primary
task- the task which it is created to perform' (Rice, 19S8,p. 32).1n
the case of private enterprise in a Western economy, the primary
task is regarded as being that of making profits. Rice treats the
primary task as a factor which unites the whole organisation, in a
manner which is reminiscent of Barnard's concept of a co-
operative system. As Rice puts it,

The performance of the primary task is supported by powerful social

and psycholoRicalforus which ensure that a considerable capacity for
co-operation is evoked amonR the members of the orRanisation ere-
156 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ated to perform it, and that, as a direct corollary. the effective
performance of a primary task ,·an provide an important source of
satisfaction/or those enRaRed upon it. In other words. there i3, among
the members of any organisation, a need, whether latent or manifest, to
get on with the job. They take pride in doing it well. (Rice. 1958. pp.
33-4)

The organisation is thus viewed as a unitary system under the

umbrella of a common task. The social system is viewed as a
positive force contributing to task achievement. Technology is
viewed as a force which imposes constraints upon possible modes
of organisation. but within which choice is possible. The important
variable, therefore. is organisational design. The design of an
appropriate mode of work organisation which satisfies the
demands of technology and the needs of employees is seen as the
key to producing a harmonious and effective organisation. The
notion of an open socio-technical system is used as a tool for
analysing the textile firm with this overall perspective in mind. The
complex relationships between systems and subsystems which are
identified - 'operating systems'. 'managing systems'. 'governing
systems'. etc. -derive their significance as conceptual tools from
the context of this overall view of the industrial firm. 23 It is a
systems view which is based upon a philosophy of social engineer-
ing and which in essence seeks to ameliorate the problems created
by technological change. 24
The- sophistication of the open socio-technical systems
approach to the study of organisations has been further elaborated.
within the context of the above problematic, through other
research conducted by various members of the Tavistock l nsti-
tute. ln this work the relationship between the organisation and its
environment is given more and more attention. ln his book The
Enterprise and its Environment. published in 1963. for example,
Rice now defines the primary task of an organisation as 'the task
that it must perform to survive' and the primary task of leadership
as 'to manage the relations between an enterprise and its environ-
ment so as to permit optimal performance of the primary task of the
enterprise' (Rice, 1963, pp. 13-15). The environment of the
enterprise is regarded as consisting of its total political, social and
economic surroundings; for a part of an enterprise the environ-
ment is regarded as including the other parts and the whole (Rice,
1963, p. 15). ln line with the increased attention devoted to
'environment', the notion of boundary regulation and management
is also given increased prominence, particularly in Miller and
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 151
Rice's work (1967). Boundary regulation is seen as 'the essential
managerial control in any enterprise' and considerable attention is
given to the problems and importance of boundary definition of
control systems both within enterprises and between enterprises
and their environment. This work explicitly views the organisation
'as a tool designed primarily for task performance', in which
'human needs - for satisfaction and for defence against anxiety -
should be regarded as constraints upon task performance' (Miller
and Rice, 1967, p. vi). The systems analysis which Miller and Rice
offer is geared to a search for optimum solutions to the problems
posed by the fact that the demands of an organisation's various
subsystems do not always coincide.
The nature of organisational environments has also received a
great deal of attention from the Tavistock team in recent years. In
1965 Emery and Trist published their well-known article, 'The
Causal Texture of Organisational Environments'. This study
shifted the focus of open systems theory away from a specific
concern for what Dill ( 1958) has described as the 'task environ-
ment' towards a more general concern for the ·appreciation' ofthe
social environment as a quasi-independent domain. 25 The turbul-
ence of the world environment as a whole and its implications for
the future have come to be seen as important contextual influences
upon organisational activities. This wider concern for context has
led to an interest in the field of 'social ecology' (Emery and Trist,
1972). The attempt to understand organisations as open socio-
technical systems has carried with it a concern for understanding
the patterns of life characteristic of post-industrial society. the
manner in which these patterns are changing and the implications
which they carry for the understanding and the influencing of the
operation of organisations as complex adaptive systems. This
interest in social ecology has led to a fusion between socio-
technical systems theory and theories of ·post-industrialism'.
which has led the researchers involved away from an exclusive and
narrowly based concern for theories of organisation and organisa-
tional change towards a concern for social theory and social
change. Their theorising now reflects that of the social engineer
operating on a truly macro-scale.
Our second illustration of the open systems approach to the
study of organisations is taken from the work of Katz and Kahn.
Their study The Social Psychology of Organisations ( 1966), has
established itself as a classic in the field and provides one of the
most frequently cited systems models of an organisation. In
essence it constitutes a structural functionalist model of organisa-
158 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
tion, presented in the terminology and jargon of open systems
theory. Their basic approach to the study of social phenomena is
very much in the tradition of Radcliffe-Brown, in that they
emphasise the need to regard a social system as a 'structuring of
events or happenings rather than of physical parts' and as having
·no structure apart from its functioning' (Katz and Kahn. 1966. p.
31). They see the open systems approach as a means of analysing
the social and institutional context within which people live, and
they develop a processual model for understanding organisations
in terms of energic •input', •throughput' and •output'. Their
analysis is largely based upon the assumption that social systems
are homeostatic, possessing the characteristics of negative
entropy, feedback, differentiation and equi-finality. 26
Within the context of this open systems approach Katz and
Kahn go on to argue that there are five generic types of subsystem:
PRODUCTION OR TECHNICAL SUBSYSTEMS
primarily concerned with organisa-
tional throughput;
SUPPORTIVE SUBSYSTEMS which carry on the environmental
transactions in procuring the input
or disposing of the output or aiding
in these processes;
MAINTENANCE SUBSYSTEMS for attracting and holding people in
their functional roles;
ADAPTIVE SUBSYSTEMS concerned with organisational
change;
MANAGERIAL SUBSYSTEMS which direct and adjudicate among
all the others.
(Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp. 39-47)

This classification is reminiscent of Parsons's four •functional

imperatives' discussed in the previous chapter and reflects Katz
and Kahn's predilection for explaining the factors which they see
as ·creating and maintaining a stable system' (1966. p. 107). They
are primarily concerned with explaining the way in which social
systems maintain themselves. and their whole analysis is geared to
this endeavour. They explicitly recognise the limitations of the
mechanical model as a means of studying social affairs, and argue
that the use of such models ignores the significance of system
openness with respect to production and maintenance inputs and
neglects the overriding importance of the maintenance input for
the social system ( 1966. p. 31). They argue that special attention
must be given to these maintenance inputs.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 159
Thus for Katz and Kahn the adoption of an open systems
approach is linked to the traditional sociological concern for
explaining order in social affairs. The openness of the system is
constrained by the assumption that the system is stable. In point of
fact, Katz and Kahn give relatively little substantive attention to
the nature of the environment of organisations. Their main con-
cern is with the process of input-throqghput-output in a con-
ceptual sense. For modelling this process they select what
amounts to a qualified biological analogy - qualified in the sense
that they recognise that social systems do not have a physical
structure and are more complex in their maintenance require-
ments. However, it is the biological analogy. characteristic of
much functionalist analysis in social science, that dominates their
work.
The Tavistock and Katz and Kahn models represent two of the
most prominent systems approaches to the study of organisations
and serve the purpose of illustrating the state of the art at the
present time. Open systems theory has undoubtedly .had a major
impact upon approaches to the study of organisations, particularly
with regard to the emphasis which is now placed upon understand-
ing the nature and influence of environment and in studying
organisations as processes rather than as structures. Concep~u­
ally, these advances have become well embedded in contemporary
organisation theories.
As we have noted. open systems models of organisation are
invariably based upon the analogy of a biological organism. The
organisation is regarded as essentially purposive in nature and as
having certain needs or 'functional imperatives' which must be
fulfilled if the organisation is to continue to exist. 27 Thus systems
models of organisation are often predicated upon the assumption
that organisations, like organisms, aim at survival. This is con-
ceptualised in terms of a ·primary task' or in terms of some sort of
goal-setting process. The organisation and its subsystems are then
viewed as being orientated towards the achievement of this overall
aim and assumed to be intelligible with this reference point in
mind. A norm of purposive rationality. which this orientation to an
end state implies, thus underwrites the whole approach. Sub-
systems are defined and their actions judged with reference to their
influence upon the ability of the system to achieve its primary task.
The approach is based upon the assumption that the system has a
'functional unity•. If the system is not working well, it is implied
that certain 'imperatives• are not being met. Thus the whole
approach is geared to defining the imperatives which make the
160 Sociolo~:iccll Paradil(ms and Or~:anisational Analysis
system work. The notion ofthe socio-technical system, for exam-
ple, is based essentially upon the idea that human and technical
imperatives must be satisfied in the interests of the system as a
whole. People, technology, resources, etc., are regarded as inputs
to a purposively rational process geared to the achievement of end
states.
The use of the biological analogy for the study of organisations is
a popular one because it is well suited to the purposes of social
engineering. It is this which accounts for its popularity within
the context of management theory, a point to which we shall return
at the end of this chapter.
We close our discussion of open systems approaches to the
study of organisations with a point which has links with our next
section: the problem of operationalising systems notions within an
empirical context. Most systems analyses, such as that of Katz and
Kahn, are pitched at a theoretical level and, with appropriate
qualifications with regard to factors such as the dynamic and
intangible nature of 'structure', the need to avoid ·reification' and
·oversimplification·, are able to present systems theory in pro-
cessual terms. Theorists who attempt to operationalise such a
scheme within an empirical context, however, often find their
open systems approach rapidly turning into a more traditional
structural functional analysis, with an emphasis upon structure.
As a heuristic device the dynamic essence of the systems concept
can be maintained as events are conceptualised in terms of an open
field of continuous action. At an empirical level, however, the
issue of boundary definition almost inevitably leads to an attempt
to identify relatively static system parts. Open systems theory,
when put into practice at an empirical level, often ends up as an
abstracted form of empiricism which defies the processual nature
of the systems concept.

Empirical studies of organisational

characteristics
In an earlier section we described how research into behaviour in
organisations in the post-Hawthorne period reverted to the
objectivism characteristic of early industrial psychology. The
systems notions implicit in the Hawthorne studies were largely
abandoned in favour of a search for correlations between indi-
vidual behaviour, job satisfaction. work performance and
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 161
"objective· characteristics in the work situation. As we have
argued, this objectivist search for the determinants of behaviour in
organisations is alive and well today and in evidence in most of the
leading journals in the subject area.
A similar approach is prominent in much of the empirical work
directed at the study of organisations. Since at least the early 1950s
there has been a distinct and growing trend towards the measure-
ment and inter-correlation of organisational characteristics.
Alongside developments in the systems approach there has been a
strong surge of objectivism. This has fed upon two sources. First,
it has sought to spell out, operationalise, measure and search for
relationships between ideas deriving from the work of the classical
management theorists and from the sociological writings of Max
Weber. Second, it has sought to do the same with regard to insights
and hypotheses generated within the context of systems theory.
Somewhat paradoxically, the systems approach has spawned a fair
number of empirical investigations characteristic of the objectivist
mode of scientific enquiry which many systems theorists initially
set out to counter and replace.
One of the earliest and certainly one of the most significant
organisational studies in the objectivist tradition was that con-
ducted by Joan Woodward in the early 1950s. Woodward ( 1958 and
1965) set out to discover whether the principles of organisation laid
down by the classical management theorists correlated with busi-
ness success when put into practice. Since most of these manage-
ment principles were concerned with the design of organisation
structures. her survey of firms in south-east Essex involved the
collection of quite a wide range of quantitative data relating to the
organisation of the firm, manufacturing processes and methods,
commercial success and general history. The now-famous results
of her study suggested that there was an empirical relationship
between the nature of production systems (technology), patterns
of organisation and business success. Whilst rejecting the
hypotheses derived from classical management theory, the study
generated a new one: that technical methods were the most
important factor in determining organisation structure and had an
important influence upon human relationships within the firm.
This study and its results were very much in line with the con-
clusions emerging from research conducted elsewhere. The
interest in the relationship between technology and social
organisation was very much in the ascendency. The work ofTrist
and Bamforth (1951), Walker and Guest (1952), Burns and Stalker
(1961), Sayles (1958) and many others was yielding similar find-
162 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ings. What is important about Woodward's work for our present
purposes was that it focused upon an organisational level of
analysis and employed simple quantitative descriptions of
organisations which could be subjected to statistical analysis. 21 It
opened the floodgates to a new style of research based upon the
objectivist assumption that organisations are hard, concrete,
empirical phenomena which can be measured.lt was seen that the
traditional methods of empirical science could be set to work in a
new social terrain.
Our discussion of objectivist research on organisations since
Woodward's study can be no more than illustrative. We shall
confine our attention to the most prominent pieces of work, direct-
ing the reader interested in obtaining a more encompassing view to
issues of Administrative Science Quarterly over the last ten years
or so. This journal is literally packed with reports on research in
the objectivist tradition; indeed, one might say that it has helped to
raise objectivism as applied to the study of organisations to the
status of an orthodoxy.
The work conducted by the Aston group of researchers on
organisations in Britain during the 1960s and early 1970s repre-
sents one of the most prominent, systematic and sustained
attempts to study organisations from an objectivist perspective.
Their most important articles have recently been brought together
in a number of edited volumes, which provide a convenient over-
view of their approach, areas of interest and detailed results (Pugh
eta/., 1976).
In essence, the Aston research has sought to conceptualise and
measure organisational structures, and the context in which they
are set, with a view to examining the relationships between them
through a multi-variate analysis of data. Organisational structures
were conceptualised in terms of a number of dimensions -
specialisation, standardisation, formalisation, centralisation, con-
figuration and flexibility - which largely derive from Weber's
conceptualisation of bureaucracy in terms of an 'ideal type'. The
notion of 'context' was conceptualised in terms of factors such as
origin and history, ownership and control, size, charter, technol-
ogy, location, resources and interdependence (with other
organisations). The empirical data generated through the research
has led to revision and refinement of the various dimensions and
associated scales for measuring organisational characteristics, and
has permitted the comparison of 'profiles' of different types of
organisations. It has shown that the notion of bureaucracy is by no
means unidimensional, and an empirical taxonomy of organisa-
 Func·tionalist Organisation Theory 163
tiona) forms has been constructed upon the basis of key
characteristics. The analysis of relationships between context and
structure has drawn attention to factors such as size, dependence
and what the researchers describe as the 'charter-technology-
location nexus'. In subsequent work the influence of technology
upon organisational structure has received particularly close
attention and has Jed to detailed examination of the nature and
measurement of technology in a wide range of studies.
In the USA work which shares many similarities with the Aston
approach has been conducted by numerous researchers, of whom
Richard Hall, Hage and Aiken and Peter Blau are among the most
prominent. Much of this research is conveniently summarised in a
recent text produced by Hall (1972), which, like the Aston
volumes, gives a good overall perspective on the objectivist
approach to the study of organisations. Hall has been concerned
mainly with the empirical measurement of bureaucracy, using
Weber's 'ideal type' as a reference point, and arrives at similar
conclusions with regard to the multidimensional nature of the
concept. He too has constructed an empirical taxonomy of
organisations. Hage and Aiken (1967) have mainly concerned
themselves with the measurement and explanation of organisa-
tional structure. Blau in recent years (1971 and 1974) has greatly
concerned himself with the relationships between structure and
size. 29
The development of objectivist approaches to the study of
organisations over the last ten years has consumed the intellectual
energy of an increasing proportion of organisation theorists;
indeed, it is possible that a majority of organisation researchers are
now working within the context of this area of the functionalist
paradigm. There is scarcely an organisational variable which has
not been measured in some form and even correlated with itself in
the objectivist search for ·significant' relationships which eventu-
ally will prove ·determinate'.30 The 1976 and early 1977 issues of
Administrative Science Quarterly, for example, contain
objectivist research on the familiar topics of technology and
structure, size and structure, structure and effectiveness and
structure and environment, as well as many objectivist articles on
the traditional human relations issues. Even romantic relation-
ships within organisations have been subjected to this type of
analysis (Quinn, 1977).
The extremely high degree of commitment to the models and
methods of the natural sciences which characterises this sort of
work has firmly established itself as a dominant perspective within
164 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
organisation theory. It seeks to advance knowledge and under-
standing of organisations through empirical analysis of a reified
social world. It is based upon an ontology, epistemology, method-
ology and view of human nature characteristic of the most
objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm.

Contingency theory: the contemporary

synthesis
The contingency approach to the study of organisations has come
into increasing prominence during the 1970s as a loose sort of
framework for synthesising the principal notions of open systems
theory with the results of objectivist research conducted at all
levels of organisational analysis. The results of empirical research
on individual motivation, job satisfaction, leadership style,
organisation structure, technology and many other organisational
variables have been interpreted within the context of a manag-
erially orientated set of propositions, which assert that the
effective operation of an enterprise is dependent upon there being
an appropriate match between its internal organisation and the
nature of the demands placed upon it by its tasks, its environment
and the needs of its members.
The idea of a contingency theory of organisation was first pre-
sented in an explicit way by Lawrence and Lorsch in their book
OrRanization and Environment (1967), which reported the results
of an empirical study often organisations operating in a variety of
environmental conditions. The study was directed at answering
the basic question 'What kind of organisation does it take to deal
with various economic and market conditions?' The study adopted
an open systems framework based upon an organismic analogy
and viewed the organisation as a system of interrelated elements
which were subject to influence by their environment. The authors
express their view of the organisation as a system as follows:
At the most general level we find it useful to view an organization as an
open system in which the behaviors of members are themselves interre-
lated. The behaviors of members of an organization are also
interdependent with the formal organization, the tasks to be
accomplished, the personalities of other individuals, and the unwritten
rules about appropriate behavior for a member. Under this concept of
system, the behavior of any one manager can be seen as determined not
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 165
only by his own personality needs and motives, but also by the way his
personality interacts with those of his colleagues. Further. this rela-
tionship among organization members is also influenced by the nature
of the task being performed, by the formal relationships, rewards. and
controls, and by the existing ideas within the organization about how a
well-accepted member should behave. It is important to emphasize
that all these determinants of behavior are themselves interrelated.
(Lawrence and Lorsch. 1967, p. 6)
To this they add that the understanding of the behaviour of mana-
gers in large organisations necessitates a central concern with two
other aspects of the functioning of systems. First, they argue that
as systems have become large they have been divided into parts
(differentiated), the functioning of which has to be integrated ifthe
system as a whole is to be viable. They draw an analogy here with
the organs of the human body, which are integrated through the
nervous system and the brain. Second, they argue that an
important function of any system is adaption to what goes on in the
world outside (1967, p. 7).
Thus, the Lawrence and Lorsch study places emphasis upon the
organisation as a system which is internally differentiated and
which must achieve an adequate level of integration if it is to adapt
to the conditions which it encounters in its environment. 31 On the
basis of the results of their empirical research, the authors con-
dude that the most effective organisations are those which
succeed in achieving a degree of differentiation and integration
compatible with environmental demands. As they put it, 'in a more
diverse and dynamic field, such as the plastics industry, effective
organisations have to be highly differentiated and highly
integrated. In a more stable and less diverse environment, like the
container industry, effective organisations have to be less
differentiated, but they must still achieve a high degree of integra-
tion' (1967, p. I 0). The research results suggested that effective
organisations in all environments employed effective methods of
conflict resolution in order to maintain the required state of
differentiation and still achieve the required integration ( 1967, pp.
109-32).
The findings of the Lawrence and Lorsch study provided a
direct challenge to the tenets of both classical management and
human relations theory. As we have suggested, the former sought
to specify universal principles of organisation as a guide to
managerial action. The Lawrence and Lorsch study suggested that
different organisational principles were appropriate in different
environmental circumstances and indeed within different parts of
166 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the same organisation. The human relations theorists had stressed
the importance of adopting organisational structures and manager-
ial styles which permitted the satisfaction of psychological needs
through, for example, participation in decisions, the carrying of
responsibility, etc. In other words, they were generally in favour of
an approach to organisation which moved away from the formal
and mechanistic bureaucratic model towards a more flexible,
loosely structured and open organic model. The Lawrence and
Lorsch study suggested that the highly structured bureaucratic
model, from the point of view of business success, may be the most
effective in certain circumstances.
The time was ripe, therefore, for a reconciliation of the detailed
propositions of classical management theory and human relations,
which for many years had stood in opposition to one another. 32
Lawrence and Lorsch's contingency approach appeared to show a
way forward, suggesting that the appropriateness of management
principles depended upon the nature of the situation in which they
were applied. Moreover, other important empirical studies were
generating similar results. Woodward's (1958) study had demon-
strated that commercially successful firms organised themselves
in a manner compatible with their technology. Burns and Stalker
( 1961) had demonstrated that successful firms adopted an approach
to organisation and management which was consistent with
demands placed upon them by their environment, particularly with
regard to the degree of market and technological change. Emery
and Trist (1965), were also drawing attentioil to the importance of
environmental demands upon organisations and, along with other
Tavistock colleagues, had long argued that organisation was a
variable open to choice (Trist eta/., 1963). The empirical work on
organisation structures conducted in the 1960s by the Aston group
(Pugh et al., 1976), and Richard Hall (1972), among many others
(for example, Udy, 1959), was pointing to the range and diversity of
organisational forms and directing attention to the need for some
form of explanation. Fiedler ( 1967) had developed a contingency
theory of leadership. Thompson had suggested that 'the basic
function of administration appears to be co-alignment, not merely
of people (in coalitions) but of institutionalised action - of
technology and task environment into a viable domain, and of
organisational design and structure appropriate to it' (Thompson,
1967, p. 157). Burns and Stalker had urged that 'the beginning of
administrative wisdom is the awareness that there is no one
optimum type of management system' (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.
125). In short, it appeared that a contingency theory of organisa-
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 167
lions was necessary to provide an opportunity for reconciling and
synthesising the conclusions emerging from the work of this
diverse body of theorists studying organisations and behaviour
from a managerial point of view. And this was precisely what
Lawrence and Lorsch suggested. However, in the ten years since
the Lawrence and Lorsch study was first published there has been
little progress towards the articulation of a contingency theory as
such. Lawrence and Lorsch devoted their own attention to the
managerial implications of their contingency approach,
particularly with regard to problems of organisational design
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1970, for example). Many others followed
their lead, or confined themselves to further empirical tests of
various aspects of the contingency model in its skeletal form.n As
a result, there is within the subject of organisation theory at the
present time a body of research which may be described as repre-
sentative of a ·contingency view' or ·contingency approach', but
no clear and consistent statement of the nature of ·contingency
theory' at a conceptualleveJ.34 In its present state the contingency
approach really stands for little more than a loosely organised set
of propositions which in principle are committed to an open
systems view of organisation, which are committed to some form
of multivariate analysis of the relationship between key organisa-
tional variables as a basis of organisational analysis, and which
endorse the view that there are no universally valid rules of
organisation and management.
In the rest of this section we attempt to draw together the various
strands of the contingency approach and provide a systematic
statement of the principles upon which it is based. Insofar as one
wishes to analyse organisations as social systems from a manager-
ial point of view, the contingency model which we present goes a
long way towards an integration of contemporary issues and con-
cerns and provides a framework for examining the status and
utility of theory and research in this area.

A contingency model for organisational

analysis
I. The contingency theory of organisation postulates that
organisations and their functioning can be understood in
terms of principles which apply to biological organisms.
2. It is based upon an open systems view which regards an
168 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
organisation as existing within the context of a wider
environment.
3. The organisation and its environment are seen as being in a
state of mutual influence and interdependence. In principle
the organisation is seen as representing a subsystem of a
wider social system of which its environment is part.
4. However, as organisational analysts. contingency theorists
focus upon the organisation as a unit in its own right, dis-
tinguished from this wider environment by a notional
boundary.
5. The contingency theory of organisations is concerned to
understand and represent the key associations which
characterise relationships between the organisation and its
environment.
6. It is assumed that the key relationship between organisation
and environment can be understood in terms of the organisa-
tion's ·need' to survive.
7. The organisation, in line with the use of an organismic anal-
ogy, is viewed as comprising a series of interdependent sub-
systems, each of which has a function to perform within the
context of the organisation as a whole.
8. In other words, the organisation as a system comprises a
series of functional subsystems, each of which may interact
with elements of the environment external to the organisa-
tion. Because of their importance to the survival needs of
the organisation as a whole, each can be conceptualised in
terms of a 'functional imperative'.
9. Contingency theorists are not in complete agreement as to
which subsystems or functional imperatives characterise, or
should be singled out to represent, the system as a whole.
They also frequently confuse functional subsystems with
their structural manifestations at any given point in time.
However. the following subsystems are frequently identified
in one form or another in the literature, and they are pre-
sented here as functional imperatives of direct relevance to
the contingency theorists' concern to explain the survival of
an organisation within the context of its wider environment.
The strategic control subsystem The organisation as a
system is viewed as being in need of strategic guidance aimed
 Functionalist OrRanisation Theory 169
at maintaining an appropriate balance between the organisa-
tion and its environment. This functional imperative is usu-
ally viewed as the role ofthe 'policy makers' or top manage-
ment. As we have seen, it has been portrayed within the
context of the work of some of the Tavistock researchers as a
problem of managing the boundary between the enterprise
and its environment. This is usually seen in terms of monitor-
ing market, technological, economic, political and social
change, with a view to taking key decisions which (a) set the
goals and direction of the organisation as a whole, (b) set in
motion the internal mechanisms which will produce an
appropriate balance and relationship between subsystems
within the organisation and thus (c) ensure the viability,
legitimacy and survival of the organisation within the context
of its wider environment.
The operational subsystem The organisation is viewed as
being involved in some form of purposive activity geared to
the achievement of the goals and objectives set by its policy
makers. In industrial organisations this activity involves the
transformation of inputs - labour, raw materials, capital,
etc. - into outputs in the form of material goods. In non-
industrial organisations this transformation process involves
the conversion of inputs into service-type outputs. This
transformation process reflects the 'operational imperative'
characteristic of goal-orientated organisations. This impera-
tive receives tangible expression through the way in which
productive roles are organised. In broad terms it is often
characterised as the technology employed. The concept of
'technology' as used by most organisation theorists is a par-
tial and shorthand way of referring to the way in which the
operational subsystem expresses itself through the
'structure' of the organisation. Technology is not consonant
with the operational system, which is essentially processual;
it is merely a partial structural expression of it.
The human subsystem The role of human beings in organisa-
tions is accorded a special status within most contemporary
theories of organisation. Individuals are recognised as having
certain needs which must be satisfied if they are to be
attracted and encouraged to stay within the organisation and
to apply themselves to their functional roles in a manner
consistent with the requirements of the system as a whole. In
other words, human needs have acquired the status of a
170 Sociolc,gical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
functional imperative. Theorists differ with regard to the
nature of this imperative, according to the model of man to
which they subscribe. From a system standpoint, ·economic
man', 'social man', ·self-actualising man' or whatever,
implies a different form of human imperative, with implica-
tions for all the other subsystems which comprise the organ-
isation as a whole.ln all important respects, the debate about
models of man within the context of contemporary organisa-
tion theory has in essence been a debate about the nature of
the imperatives of the human subsystem.
The managerial subsystem The internal integration and con-
trol of the organisation is the function of the managerial
subsystem. As has been argued, the functional differentia-
tion of organisations calls for some method of integration, in
order to. satisfy the demands of, and reconcile conflicts
within and between, the 'production' and 'human' sub-
systems and to ensure that they are in harmony with the
requirements imposed by the 'strategic control'· subsystem.
In most contemporary theories of organisation, management
is viewed as a functional imperative; the notion of self-
regulating human and production subsystems is not often
encountered, though the trend towards the use of autonom-
ous work groups is something which moves in the direction of
this state of affairs and, to some extent, undermines the
notion of a managerial imperative. The operation of the
managerial subsystem expresses itself in two principal ways.
First, it receives structural expression through the organisa-
tion's authority structure as reflected, for example, in organ-
isation charts, job descriptions, budgetary control systems
and the like. Second, it is expressed through the managerial
styles adopted by individual managers in day-to-day
interpersonal relationships.
By way of summary oftheabovepoints, therefore, the organ-
isation is viewed as a process of mutual influence and interac-
tion between four functional imperatives or subsystems and
the environment in which they are located.

10. Contingency theory assumes that each of the four sub-

systems is open to a range of variation; it stresses strategic
choice, technological choice (that is, choice of operational
methods) and organisational and managerial choice, and it
recognises that the nature of the human subsystem is con-
 Functionalist OrRanisation Theory 171
tingent upon the personalities and orientations of organisa-
tional members. It also recognises that each of the sub-
systems can reflect a range of variation within any given
organisation.
II. The variation in environments and organisational sub-
systems has received considerable attention in theory and
research conducted over the last twenty years or so, and
there appears to be an emerging consensus that the
differentiation of these variables can be characterised in the
following terms.
(a) The environment

Stable Turbulent
and and
certain unpredictable
A common theme running throughout recent research on the
nature of organisational environments focuses upon the con-
cept of uncertainty as a pre-eminent characteristic for dis-
tinguishing between different types of environment. The
research and writings of Burns and Stalker(l961), Emery and
Trist ( 1965), Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1967), Thompson ( 1967),
Terreberry ( 1968) and Child ( 1972), among many others, all in
their different ways characterise environments in terms of
the degree of uncertainty.
One of the difficulties encountered in attempting to apply
this concept of uncertainty to the analysis of an organisa-
tion's environment revolves around the definition of what
constitutes a particular environment. The distinction
between 'task environment' (Dill, 1958) and 'context'
(Emery and Trist, 1965) is particularly relevant here. Viewed
from the standpoint of the latter, all contemporary organisa-
tions are located in an uncertain and turbulent environment,
in which technical, economic, market, social and political
change is rapidly becoming a norm characteristic of post-
industrial society. From this point of view, the age of the
stable, certain organisational environment is over.
172 Sociological Paradigm.f and Orf(anisational AnalyJi.f
(b) Stratef(ic control

Operational Creation of
goal ) learning
setting systems

Within the context of contingency views of organisation the

primary task of top management - ensuring survival - has
usually been interpreted in terms of the need to relate the
organisation to its environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961;
Rice, 1958 and 1963). From this point of view, the nature of
this primary task is contingent upon environmental
circumstances. Thus the primary strategic task of an
organisation in a highly uncertain and turbulent environment
may be regarded as being to facilitate organisational/earning
and adaption to change. In a more stable environment the
primary task may be conceptualised in terms of tt.e achieve-
ment of more static goals. Given stability, the primary task of
an organisation can be much more operationally orientated
towards the maintenance of this stability and survival of the
organisation through the efficient and effective achievement
of pre-set goals. The dimension of strategic control can thus
be conceptualised from a contingency standpoint, in terms of
operational goal setting versus the generation of learning
within the organisation. This characterisation reflects the
implications of environmental circumstance for strategic
decisions.
(c) The operational subsystem

Routine Complex
low-discretion ( ) high-discretion
roles roles

The operational subsystem of an organisation, as defined

here, relates to all activities - production, sales, personnel,
finance, research and development- which contribute to the
overall transformation process with which the organisation is
concerned. The diversity of its elements, therefore, adds
difficulties to its conceptualisation in terms of a single dimen-
sion. and this is very much reflected in the literature on
 Functionalist OrRanisation Theory 173
organisation theory. Two related concepts are prominent in
contemporary research - those of •technology' and ·opera-
tional task'. The former term often causes confusion, since it
is frequently identified in the popular eye with machine
technology. However, in recent years steps have been made
towards a conceptualisation of technology which has general
applicability across all the activities of an organisation. Most
prominent are the contributions of the Aston group of
researchers (Hickson eta/. , 1969 and Charles Perrow, 1967).
The Aston group have suggested a distinction between the
following technologies:
'Operations technology':
This refers to the techniques used in workflow
activities. It is seen as having a number of
characteristics, such as ·automation', •work-
flow rigidity' and the exactness of standards
against which operations can be evaluated.
Other factors, such as the degree of ·con-
tinuity', are also seen as being relevant in cer-
tain cases.
'Materials technology':
This concept, also used by Perrow. relates to
the characteristics of the material used in the
workflow, particularly its ·uniformity' and
'stability'.
'Knowledge technolo!ly':
A concept, again used by Perrow, which
relates to the knowledge used in the workflow,
a factor greatly influenced by the predictability
and familiarity of problems encountered.
All three of these elements of technology combine to
influence the nature of individual jobs or •tasks' within organ-
isations, and many writers have chosen to analyse the impact
of technology at this level of individual roles. The
characteristics of the three dimensions of technology
referred to above appear to correlate in terms of the ·routine-
ness' or 'discretionary content' of work, a factor which has
been investigated and conceptualised in various ways by
Jaques (1962) and Turner and Lawrence (1965), among
others. This 'degree of routineness' of work tasks provides a
means of differentiating between the characteristics of opera-
174 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
tional subsystems, ranging from those dominated by the
mass-production type of technology, which creates low-
discretion work, to the complex, highly discretional form of
work characteristic, for example, of many executive-type
roles, or enriched jobs.
(d) The human subsystem

Economic man Self-actualisi ng

instrumental man
orientation to ( ) work a central
work life interest

Ever since the Hawthorne studies, the needs of the human or

social subsystem within an organisation have received
increasing attention. The broad line of argument has been
that Taylor's vision of 'economic man', who views work in a
purely instrumental fashion, grossly misrepresents the needs
and aspirations of people at work. Alternative visions of
human motivation, which (following Maslow and other
humanistic psychologists) emphasise the importance of the
satisfaction of 'higher-level' needs, have been advocated by
many theorists as providing a more realistic model of man for
understanding work behaviour. The theories of Argyris ( 1957
and 1964), Herzberg et al. ( 1959) and many other neo-human
relations theorists have presented this point ofview and have
argued that the satisfaction of higher-level needs at work is an
imperative as far as human growth and development, job
satisfaction and effective work performance are concerned.
The different models of man advocated by Taylor on the one
hand, and the neo-human relations theorists on the other,
thus offer a way of conceptualising the nature of the human
subsystem in terms of the imperatives set by the nature of
human needs. However, the situation is more complicated
than this, in that as our discussion of post-Hawthorne
objectivism has shown, the empirical evidence in support of
this imperative is far from clear-cut, and the relationship is
not as deterministic as many theorists have suggested. One
important supplementary idea, which certain theorists have
drawn upon to maintain the validity of the 'model of man
approach' in the light ofthis evidence, relates to the question
of orientation to work. Research by a number of theorists,
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 175
notably Dubin (1956) and Goldthorpe and his colleagues
( 1968), has demonstrated that work is by no means always a
central life interest, and that people may seek to minimise
their commitment to work and obtain satisfaction (in terms of
psychological needs, goals and personal values, or what-
ever), elsewhere. Thus this 'orientation to work' factor must
be placed alongside the 'model of man' analysis in any
attempt to conceptualise the dimensions of the human sub-
system. The psychological analysis in terms of needs is thus
modified in terms of the sociological factors which influence
attitudes to work.
(e) The managerial subsystem

Bureaucratic ( ) Organic

Authoritarian ( )
Democratic
(Theory X) (Theory Y)

As we have argued, the managerial subsystem within an

organisation expresses itself through the formal authority
structure and through the nature of the personal styles of
behaviour of individual managers. In principle, both are cap-
able of varying independently, though it can be argued that
particular types of organisations attract and develop
particular types of managers.
The formal authority structure of organisations has
received a considerable amount of attention in the literature
on organisation theory, and it has become more or less
orthodox to compare organisations in terms of their degree of
bureaucratisation, using Weber's ideal-type 'bureaucracy'
as a basis for analysis. The distinction offered by Burns and
Stalker (1961) between mechanistic (bureaucratic) and
organic organisations has become well established, and the
research of Woodward ( 1958), the Aston group (Pugh et al.,
1976) and Richard Hall (1972), referred to earlier has added
empirical substance to the notion that organisations do in fact
vary in terms of formal structure.JS
Managerial or leadership styles have also received consid-
erable attention from researchers operating in the human
176 SocioloRical Paradil(ms and Orl(ani.~ational Analysis
relations tradition. McGregor's ( 1960) distinction between
'Theory X' as a label for highly authoritarian. directive styles
of management and 'Theory Y' for flexible, open,
democratic. 'motivating' styles provides a conveni~nt way of
characterising this dimension of the managerial subsystem.
Further research has added considerable depth and
sophistication to McGregor's original analysis which, in the
neo-human relations tradition, placed principal emphasis
upon 'human needs' as the primary determinant of the
effectiveness of a managerial style. However, the
authoritarian-democratic characterisation remains central
and is reflected, for example, in the schemes offered by
Likert (System I as opposed to System 4) ( 1967), Blake and
Mouton's managerial grid (9.1 and 9.9styles) ( 1964), the Ohio
State leadership studies (initiating structure and considera-
tion) (reviewed in Blum and Naylor, 1968). The distinction
between Theory X and Theory Y will thus serve to capture
the common element which distinguishes those managerial
styles which seek to direct, coerce and control and those
designed to integrate the individual and the organisation
through a more open, democratic style which emphasises the
importance of delegation, trust and intrinsic job satisfaction.

12. Contingency theory postulates that the effectiveness of the

organisation in coping with the demands of its environment is
contingent upon the elements of the various subsystems
which comprise the organisation being designed in
accordance with the demands of the environment (or. more
accurately, sub-environments) with which they interact; this
implies that the elements of different subsystems must be
congruent in terms of the characteristics along each of the
basic dimensions by which they are defined. We shall call this
the congruency hypothesis.
The congruency hypothesis warrants further elucidation,
which can be most easily achieved with the aid of Figure 5.5.
This seeks to bring together the main elements of the con-
tingency framework developed in the preceding para-
graphs. The congruency hypothesis postulates that a
necessary condition for the effectiveness of an organisation
in meeting the demands of its environment is that the rela-
tionships between subsystem characteristics be congruent; it
is postulated that organisations will be less effective in deal-
ing with the demands of its environment when such relation-
 eg
sales
ENVIRONMENT
Turbulent+ /
unpredictable
GANISATIONAL,
SUBSYSTEMS
Strategic Operational
goal setting >-----<ll~Crea~lon . of
learn1ng system
Routine, I
y
Operational low di$cretion Complex, /
roles high discretion
. ~~
E
. conom1c man;
Human m~trum~ntal -'(AJI----~~...;::::. Self-actualising man· '
or.entat1on to work a central '
work life interest
Managerial Bureaucratic 8 0 rgan1c
· /
~
Authoritarian
(theory xl Democratic
(theory rl
is contingent upon a differentilltion of the organisation in accordance with the demands of
GANISATIONAL the environment. characterised by congruency between sub-system elements. and supplemented
by an appropriate process of integration.
EFFECTIVENESS These conditions are expressed within the context of the overall model in terms of the
congruency hypothesis, and the integration hypothesis.

Figure S.S A contingency model for organisational analysis

178 Socioloxical Paradixms and Orf(ani.wtional Analysis
ships are incongruent. It is hypothesised. for example. that
an organisation or part of an organisation dealing with a
highly stable and certain environment can operate effectively
when:
(a) the strategic subsystem is geared to operational goal
setting;
(b) the operational subsystem employs a technology which
leads to high specialisation and division of labour in
accordance, for example, with the principles of
scientific management;
(c) employees are content with economic rewards and
have low expectations with regard to work;
(d) the organisation is structured in a bureaucratic fashion;
(e) the organisation is managed in a highly authoritarian
and directive way.
Conversely, it is hypothesised that when an organisation
or an element of an organisation is dealing with a turbulent
and unpredictable environment, the appropriate element of
the organisation needs:
(a) strategic management which fosters the ability of the
organisational unit to learn and respond to the
environment by
(b) adopting an operational system characterised by com-
plex, high-discretion roles, which are
(c) filled by 'organisation men' who see work as their
central life interest and attempt to satisfy higher-level
psychological needs through their work experience,
and
(d) who are managed within the context of an organic form
of organisation structure by
(e) managers who adopt an open and democratic style of
management, and gear their efforts to creating a situa-
tion in which it is possible for the individuals being
managed to satisfy their own personal goals through the
achievement of organisational objectives.
These two hypothesised relationships characterise
extreme positions with regard to modes of organisation and
management, and are illustrated in Figure 5.5 by the broken
lines marked A and B respectively. The contingency model
allows for intermediate positions with regard to the nature of
organisational environments and subsystems. Each
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 119
dimension should be regarded as a contiuum rather than a
dichotomy, varying in accordance with the characteristics
discussed under point II above.
The congruency hypothesis applies to all these intermed-
iate positions. maintaining that congruency with the demands
of the environment is an essential characteristic of subsystem
elements if an organisation is to succeed in its primary tasks.
An intermediate stage of congruency is illustrated by the
broken line marked C. Jhe continuous line marked D illus-
trates a position characterised by incongruency; it is
hypothesised that such an organisation would be less
effective than that illustrated by line C. given that they
operate under similar environmental conditions.
13. The adaption of subsystem elements to environmental
demands leads to a differentiation within the organisation
which calls for appropriate boundary management to achieve
an adequate state of integration for the system as a whole.
This integration is one of the ongoing functions of the
managerial and strategic subsystems. As Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967) have argued, integration is as important as
differentiation in influencing an organisation's success in
coping with the demands posed by its environment. Con-
gruency between subsystem elements is thus a necessary
condition for success but not a sufficient one. It needs to be
supplemented by what may be called the integration
hypothesis. This postulates that an organisation, once
differentiated, must achieve an appropriate state of
reintegration if it is to be fully effective.
We have attempted to illustrate this requirement in Figure
5.5 by adding a third dimension to our model of the relation-
ships between organisational environment and subsystems.
This illustrates that various elements of an organisation may
be differentiated in relation to the environment and all ofthe
subsystems. We have chosen to demonstrate this by placing
three departments in locations consistent with supposed
environmental characteristics. 36 The congruency hypothesis
requires that the nature of all subsystems be congruent with
this environmental characteristic, as argued under point 12
above. The integration hypothesis calls for adequate
boundary management to ensure appropriate links between
these different elements of the organisation.
14. Bringing the congruency and integration hypotheses
180 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
together, therefore, the contingency model outlined above
postulates that the success of an organisation in dealing with
the demands made on it by its environment is contingent
upon appropriate differentiation characterised by a con-
gruency between subsystem elements and the achievement
of an appropriate state of integration.

The contingency model outlined above provides a theoretical

framework for analysing organisations from a managerial point of
view, and represents a synthesis of the concepts and ideas implicit
in a great deal of contemporary organisation theory. Much of the
empirical research on organisations conducted during the 1960s
and 1970s has been informed by various elements of the model,
though it is very questionable whether it has been true to the basic
ontological and epistemological foundations upon which the model
is based. We have in mind here the distinction between 'process'
and 'structure' (Cooper, 1976) which we have already referred to
on a number of occasions in this and the previous chapter. The
contingency model, based as it is upon an open systems approach,
is essentially processual in nature. The subsystems are viewed in
terms of functional imperatives which interact with the environ-
ment in a manner geared to achieve the survival of the system as a
whole through appropriate adaption to environmental circum-
stances. This system process expresses itself in a partial and
transient manner through various 'structural' characteristics such
as 'technology' and the degree of 'bureaucratisation'. It is these
temporary structural manifestations of a more fundamental and
ongoing process which organisational researchers tend to seize
upon for the purpose of empirical research. The organisation is
often equated with these structural characteristics, while the pro-
cessual aspects of system are ignored. Much of the research which
has been conducted under the guiding ftotion of the contingency
approach has been of this nature and as such stands as an
abstracted form of empiricism. 17 The incongruence between
theory and method which this reflects is a fundamental problem
facing social systems theorists in general. The processual nature of
'system' does not lend itself to meaningful study through the use of
quantitative snapshots of objectified social structures. Social
systems theorists who wish to operationalise contingency theory
thus face very real problems, in that a new methodology is needed
which is consistent with the ontology and epistemology of a true
open systems approach.
Our final remarks on contingency theory here will focus upon
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 181
some of the conceptual implications of the model which we have
presented. The first of these emerges from the role of the strategic
control subsystem within the context of the model as a whole. As
we have argued. one of the functions of this subsystem is to
interpret what is happening in the environment and to guide and
adapt the organisation in an appropriate manner. It follows that the
relationship between elements of subsystems and their environ-
ment is contingent upon the decisions emerging from the strategic
control subsystem and also, at a lower level within the organisa-
tion, those emerging from the managerial subsystem. Thus, a
search for determinate relationships between contextual factors
and organisational characteristics, and between the elements of
different subsystems, is ill-founded. The pattern of relationships is
the product of human decision, and is influenced by choice. 38
The congruency hypothesis spells out many implications for
theories of organisational change and development. It suggests,
for example, that attempts to change the operational subsystem
through some programme of job redesign has implic~tions for all
the other subsystems within the organisation. Any analytical
framework for studying and prescribing organisational change
must therefore pay due adherence to the elements of the model as a
whole. We shall give further consideration to this point in the next
section on the quality of working life movement.
A third point of some importance arises from the fact that the
role of 'choice' draws attention to the issue of power as an
organisational variable. Within the context of social systems
theory the issue of power within organisations is virtually ignored.
An organismic systems model stresses the functional unity of
system parts, and views the organisation as being geared to the
achievement of end states shared by the system as a whole. Func-
tional imperatives and unity of purpose tend to dominate the
analysis. Although the contingency model implicitly identifies
power as a variable, it does not address it in any specific fashion.
To do so in a meaningful sense involves a shift in perspective away
from the bounds of social systems theory. We will discuss such
perspectives later in this chapter, and in our discussion of the
radical structuralist paradigm.

The quality of working life movement

We conclude our analysis of social system theory with a short
discussion of the quality of working life movement which has come
182 SocioloRical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
into prominence during the 1970s. In essence this movement seeks
to apply the insights of open systems theory, particularly through
the notions of open soci~technical systems theory and the theory
of job design, to the problems which its followers see as
characterising post-industrial societies. It is based upon a philos-
ophy of piecemeal social engineering which seeks to solve the
problems posed by the transition from the industrial to the post-
industrial society.
The key perspectives are well illustrated in the recent volumes
of readings edited by Davis and Cherns (1975). The authors argue
that there is a growing crisis which calls into question the viability
of present relationships between work, economic production, man
and society, and the ability of organisations to adapt to the rapid
pace of environmental change. The solution to many of these
problems is seen as the creation of an improvement in the quality of
working life. As they put it, ·confronting us is the need to accept, as
a national goal, both public and private responsibility for the
quality of working life in all of productive society, particularly in
facing the transition into the post-industrial era, if we are to
develop useful social policy and devise workable responses to
problems' (Davis and Cherns, 1975, p. 5). They argue thai the key
to the problem revolves around the •humanization of work·, which
•far from impo~ing economic costs. yields societal, personal and
economic gains' ( 1975, p. 6). They argue that there is a need to build
upon the body of knowledge, research and techniques which is
currently available and to formulate
a coherent body of theory and prtlctice on how to create the conditions
for a humane workinR life in its relevant .wcial environments.
Researchers and practitioners must learn how to define the situation,
how to study ongoing social systems. how to intervene in such situa-
tions with enhanced probability of success, how to identify and
measure a successful outcome, how to develop conceptual bases
within institutions which will support the diffusion of outcomes, and
how to assure that continued adaptation will take place.· ( 1976, p. 8)
Viewed within the context of the contingency model presented
in the previous section, therefore. the quality of working life
movement urges a programme of organisational change based
upon the assumption that a more humane working situation is a
functional imperative within the context of the system as a whole.
The argument is that social change within the wider environment is
such that people are beginning to demand more satisfying work,
and that organisations need to make operational and managerial
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 183
subsystems congruent with these demands. This is a familiar
theme, which has long been the concern of neo-human relations
theorists and, more generally, those concerned with the theory of
organisational development (for example, Bennis, 1966): the
quality of working life movement represents a logical development
of these traditions. Its propositions run counter to those of con-
tingency theory, which stresses that in stable environments rigid,
dehumanising work structures may be appropriate for achieving
organisational effectiveness. The quality of working life theorists
tend to stand against such a proposition, arguing that the nature of
the post-industrial environment ('context' as opposed to 'task
environment') is such that in the long run open, flexible organisa-
tional design and management will prove the more effective. The
argument is pitched not merely at the organisational level: the
organisation is seen as a subsystem of the wider society, and the
view propounded is essentially that it is a functional imperative
that the quality of working life be improved to sustain society as a
whole. The notions of 'social responsibility' and. 'individual
responsibility' are often summoned to bridge the gap between
organisational or personal interests on the one hand and societal
interests on the other. Social responsibility thus becomes a func-.
tiona I imperative as far as the maintenance of the social system as a
whole is concerned.
The quality of working life movement is often seen and pre-
sented as a radical action-orientated response to the current
problems facing modern Western industrial societies. However,
their stance is essentially a regulative one, concerned to make
piecemeal adjustments designed to improve the viability of the
technological society characteristic of the present era. Their
fundamental commitment to existing social forms is evident when
one compares their approach, for example, with the theories
characteristic of the radical humanist paradigm discussed in Chap-
ters 8 and 9. Although committed to humanitarian concern for the
development of human growth and potential through the satisfac-
tion of 'higher-level' psychological needs, their 'selling pitch' is
invariably geared to the contribution which this will make to the
stability and survival of the system as a whole. This is clear, for
example, from the way in which Davis and Cherns emphasise the
economic benefits to be derived from improving the quality of
working life.
The 'hardware' or conceptual apparatus of the quality of work-
ing life movement is firmly based upon open socio-technical
systems theory. The socio-technical approach to job redesign is
184 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
given prominence, though the movement turns away from an
exclusively psychological perspective to embrace wider socio-
logical concerns. In particular, there are strong links with the
industrial democracy movement, which at times approaches a
pluralist view of organisations.
This review of the quality of working life movement completes
our analysis of social system theory and objectivism. We shall
return to an evaluation of the perspective as a whole at the end of
this chapter. For the moment we will close with the somewhat
oversimplified but at heart realistic observation that whereas con-
tingency theory stands as the contemporary equivalent of classical
management theory, the quality of working life movement stands
as the contemporary equivalent of the industrial psychology and
human relations movements. Whilst there has been a shift in per-
spective away from objectivism and towards a social systems
approach, the dominant concern is still to provide an understand-
ing of organisations, and the behaviour of individuals within them,
from an essentially managerial point of view.

Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions

In this section we wish to devote some attention to the work on
organisations conducted by Robert Merton and three of his most
prominent students, Selznick, Gouldner and Blau. A case could be
made for treating this work as just one link within the overall chain
of development of social system theory, as presented in Figure 5.2;
indeed, we have already discussed the structural functionalist
orientation which characterises some of Selznick's work in that
context. However, separate treatment seems warranted on at least
two grounds. First, much of the work of Merton and his colleagues
is addressed to the theory of bureaucracy as developed by Max
Weber. It does not specifically seek to develop a functionalist
theory or organisations; it seeks to provide a critique of an
important element of Weber's work. A second and related point is
that the work of these theorists is primarily addressed to the study
and explanation of •dysfunctions'. Subject to a qualification with
regard to some of Selznick's work, it reflects an explicit break with
the use of an organismic analogy stressing the functional unity and
functional interdependence of system parts. Merton and his col-
leagues have been less concerned with explaining the unity and
interdependence of social systems than with explaining dis-
 Functionalist Orxanisation Theory J85
equilibrium and change, in line with Merton's general sociological
concern to explain how socially deviant behaviour can be seen as
a product of social structure. As we have argued in Chapter 4,
Merton's work characterises the middle ground of the functionalist
paradigm and his work on the study of organisations is no excep-
tion. His influential study of the 'bureaucratic personality' pro-
vides an illustration of his approach to the analysis of 'deviant' or
'non-conforming' behaviour in action, and it Jays the basis for
further studies of the 'unanticipated consequences' and 'dysfunc-
tions of bureaucracy' which stand at the centre of the analyses
offered by Selznick, Gouldner and Blau. In the rest of this section
we will review the essential features of these studies. 39
Merton's article on 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personality'
(1968) focuses upon the internal stresses and strains which he sees
as characterising bureaucratic activities. Observing that the formal
Weberian theory of bureaucracy places emphasis upon the
positive attainments and functions of bureaucratic organisation.
Merton seeks to approach the subject from the opposite point of
view. As he puts it, 'Weber is almost exclusively concerned with
what the bureaucratic structure attains: precision, reliability.
efficiency. This same structure may be examined from another
perspective ... What are the limitations of the organisations
designed to attain these goals?' (Merton, 1968, p. 252). Merton
argues that bureaucratic operations. with their emphasis upon
method, prudence, discipline and conformity, may have such an
impact upon the bureaucrat that the adherence to rules and regula-
tions. originally conceived as means to wider purposes, become
ends in themselves. There thus occurs a 'displacement of goals'-
'an instrumental value becomes a terminal value' (1968, p. 253).
This pattern of behaviour of the bureaucrat provides an example of
what Merton classifies in his typology of adaption as ·ritualism•. It
is an example of a ritualistic situation where culturally defined
aspirations (in this case organisational goals) are abandoned, and
behaviour is governed by an almost compulsive adherence to
institutional norms (in this case bureaucratic rules and regula-
tions). Merton goes on to argue that the problems which the
rigidities create (for example, in dealing with the bureaucracy's
clients) generate further responses within the organisation which
reinforce the importance of conformity to rules and regulations.
The situation thus becomes cumulatively worse, as bureaucrats
proceed to defend their actions against outside pressures.
Bureaucratic behaviour and operation becomes increasingly
ritualistic in nature, characterised by the ·red tape' image so
186 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
familiar to the public eye. Merton stresses, in line with his general
sociological concern to explain the structural sources of deviancy,
that the •trained incapacity' of the bureaucrat is a product of the
bureaucratic structure within which he works. His model of
bureaucratic functioning is one which stresses the dysfunctions
which emerge from the overall attempt to achieve structural con-
trol over the operations of the organisation.
Philip Selznick's famous empirical study of organisation, 7VA
and the Grass Roots ( 1949), is informed by the Mertonian concern
for the study of unanticipated consequences and dysfunctions and
by Robert Michels's ideas on the 'iron law of oligarchy' .It is also
informed by Selznick's concern to construct a structural
functionalist theory of organisations.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) was, at the time of
Selznick's study, riding upon the crest of a wave. It was regarded
as a model of democratic organisation and a symbol of the aspira-
tions characteristic ofthe New Deal policy in the USA. Selznick's
study in essence shows that behind the democratic fa~ade lay a
bureaucratic oligarchy. The main thrust of the study is the notion
that ·an formal organisations are moulded by forces which are
tangential to their rationally ordered structures and stated goals'
(Selznick, 1966, p. 251). As we have discussed earlier in this
chapter, Selznick believed that the formal aspects of organisation
never succeed in conquering the non-rational human aspects of
behaviour. His study of TVA demonstrates this, through a detailed
analysis of administrative processes both within the organisation
and in its relations with its environment. More specifically, he
shows how the delegation of authority within the organisation
leads to specialisation within limited spheres of activity and the
orientation of groups of individuals to various sub-goals associated
with these specialised interests. The division of labour within the
bureaucratic structure in terms of expertise is thus seen as leading
to a focus upon operational goals which may be in conflict with each
other and detrimental to the overall purposes of the organisation as a
whole. 'Commitment' is seen as a basic mechanism in the genera-
tion of unanticipated consequences. The struggle for control which
results from these various commitments and conflicts of interest is
seen as reinforcing the division of the organisation and commitment
to sub-unit ideologies and goals. As in the case of the Merton model,
therefore, the dysfunctional consequences are cumulative and
self-reinforcing. They thus become increasingly embedded within
the nature of the organisation as a whole, potentially diverting it
further and further away from its formal objectives.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 187
Thus far the analyses of Merton and Selznick show a high degree
of similarity. Whilst Merton's study focused upon the dysfunc-
tional influence of rules as a form of bureaucratic control, Selznick
focused upon the dysfunctional consequences of delegation and
specialisation. However, from this point on their studies diverge
since, as we have noted, Selznick was also concerned to interpret
organisation from a more conventional structural functionalist
perspective. He thus resorts to the use of an organismic model
which stresses the relevance of•needs' and the process ofadaption
to the external environment in the interests of survival. The prob-
lem becomes that of establishing how the organisation limits the
cumulative and potentially destructive influence of the dysfunc-
tions. Selznick identifies two principal mechanisms. The first
relies upon the use of •ideology' to achieve conformity and loyalty
in the organisation. The second relates to the process of •co-
optation', through which various sectional interests within the
organisation and its environment are brought into a power-sharing
situation.ln these ways formal organisations such as TV A are seen
as being able to stem their dysfunctions, adapt and survive.
Selznick thus arrives at a structural functionalist view of organ-
isations which also has many similarities with the pluralist theories
discussed later in this chapter.
Alvin Gouldner's study of a gypsum factory reported in Patterns
ofIndustrial Bureaucracy (1954a) and Wildcat Strike (J954b) pro-
vides a third example of the Mertonian approach to the study of
bureaucratic dysfunctions. Gouldner addresses his work to certain
•obscurities' and •tensions in Weber's theory' (Gouldner, 1954a,
pp. 19-20), particularly with regard to the notion that the
effectiveness of bureaucratic functioning depends upon organisa-
tional members accepting the legitimacy of the rules or •legal
norms', whether these are established by agreement or imposition.
Gouldner points out that the manner in which rules are initiated
(for example, by agreement as opposed to imposition) may have a
fundamental influence upon the dynamics and effectiveness of
bureaucratic operations. His empirical analysis of managerial
succession within the gypsum factory, and the impact which this
has upon bureaucratic rules and employee activities, leads him to
conclude that the manner in which rules are initiated is of consid-
erable importance. On the basis of his analysis he identifies three
types of bureaucracy, ·mock', ·representative' and ·punitive',
each of which is characterised by different patterns of rule setting
and enforcement, different modes of social organisation and
different levels of tension and conflict.
188 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Gouldner's study thus leads to important modifications of the
notion of bureaucracy as conceived by Weber. His mode of
analysis focuses upon the way in which the human element of
organisation modifies the formal or technical aspect. His study of
the way in which bureaucracy develops through the creation and
use of impersonal rules emphasises the unanticipated conse-
quences which result because of their effect upon interpersonal
relations within the organisation. Rules are shown as being used by
managers and workers for fundamentally different ends and in
ways which are dysfunctional for the formal aims ofthe organisa-
tion. In the process of his analysis Gouldner illustrates quite
clearly that organisations as such only have goals or ends in an
abstract or ·metaphorical' sense, and that the reality of organisa-
tional life is one dominated by individuals and groups striving
towards different ends. As in the case of Selznick, therefore,
insofar as the focus on dysfunctions takes the analysis of organisa-
tion away from the social system postulate of functional unity, a
pluralist view of organisation emerges, though it is not developed
to its full extent. Whose goals is the organisation trying to achieve?
For whom are the rules useful as a rational device? Questions such
as these are central to pluralist views and emerge quite clearly from
Gouldner's analysis.
A fourth study relating to the dysfunctional aspects of
bureaucratic organisation is presented in Peter Blau's The Dynam-
ics of Bureaucracy ( 1955). In this work Blau sets out to apply the
principles contained in Merton's ·paradigm for functional analysis·
to the daily operations and interpersonal relations of government
officials in two bureaucratic agencies. His analysis focuses upon
the factors which generate disequilibrium and change within the
organisation, and confirms many of the bureaucratic dysfunctions
identified by Merton and his colleagues, such as overconformity
and goal displacement. It demonstrates how bureaucracies, far
from being the static structures supposedly envisaged in Weber's
ideal type, are the scenes of an ongoing process of interpersonal
relationships which generate new elements of organisation. The
study also demonstrates the part played by the latent as opposed to
the manifest functions of bureaucratic procedure. Blau 's analysis
of the way in which employee performance is evaluated through
the use of statistical records, for example, demonstrates that in
addition to serving as a performance control, the system also has
the latent function of maintaining cordial relations between super-
visors and subordinates. The study emphasises the importance
of tracing these unanticipated consequences as a basis for under-
 Functiont1list Or~:cmi.tation Theory 189
standing the true significance of any particular organisational
characteristic. It clearly demonstrates the futility of confining
attention solely to the rational or manifest functions of organisa-
tion.ln Blau's analysis such factors are seen as lying at the heart of
explanations of organisational change. Bureaucratic structure,
like other aspects of social structure, is seen as generating forces
which lead to its own transformation.
This work of Merton, Selznick, Gouldner and Blau thus presents
a coherent and systematically developed critique of the notion of
bureaucracy they saw as reflected in Weber's ideal type. 4 °Coming
as it did in the wake of the Hawthorne studies and the development
of the human relations movement, it is understandable that so
much attention should be devoted to the human or informal
aspects of organisation. However, in contrast to the perspective
reflected in the human relations movement and, indeed, social
system theory in general, the work of Merton and his colleagues
was specifically addressed to providing explanations of change in
social systems. They sought to inject a dynamic element into the
functionalist perspective. As we argued in Chapter4. the notion of
'dysfunction' and its corollary. 'functional autonomy', contained
the potential for a radically different theory of organisation. How-
ever, with the exception of Gouldner·s steps in this direction in his
article 'Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory' (1959),
this path was not followed. As we shall argue in a later chapter, it
was left to theorists approaching organisations from a fundamen-
tally different standpoint to develop the implications of this line of
enquiry. 41 Merton and his colleagues were largely content to dwell
upon the implications which their modified version of functional-
ism suggested.

The Action Frame of Reference

As will be clear from our discussion in Chapter 4, social action
theory or the action frame of reference is a perspective
characteristic of the most subjectivist boundary of the
functionalist paradigm. We have demonstrated how, along with
behavioural symbolic interactionism, it has developed largely as a
result of the fusion between positivist and idealist approaches to
social science. Whereas the action frame of reference was first
articulated by Max Weber, symbolic interactionism is largely the
product of the theoretical perspectives of Simmel and Mead.
190 Sc1cioloRkal ParadiRms and Organisaticmal Analysis
Strictly speaking, it would be appropriate to give consideration
to both these schools of thought in any detailed analysis of the
theory of organisations, since, as we have argued, whilst reflecting
a similar perspective in terms of the subjective-objective
dimension of our analytical scheme, their focus of attention is
often somewhat different. However, we shall not do so here
because, for one reason or another, symbolic interactionism has,
in a pure sense, had relatively little impact upon the theory of
organisations. Whilst there have been many studies of interaction
at work, they have rarely been true to the assumptions
characteristic of the subjectivist region of the paradigm. More
often than not such studies have been conducted within the con-
text of a systems approach to organisations (for example, Homans,
1950; Lupton, 1963) or have been cast as studies of ;deviant
behaviour' or 'informal organisation' (for example, Roy, 1960).
Yet others have ended up as an abstracted form of empiricism.
Similarly, the action frame of reference has rarely been con-
ceptualised or implemented in the pure form envisaged by Weber.
Its adherents have often taken as much of a lead from writers such
as Schutz, Blumer, Mead or even Merton as they have from
Weber:42 The lack of appreciation of the basic ontological,epi-
stemological and methodological assumptions which differentiate
the perspectives of these key writers has often led to hybrid
schemes of analysis which one can say are characteristic of the
subjectivist boundary of the functionalist paradigm but no more.
For this reason we are going to discuss them all under the heading
of the action frame of reference which, at least in Britain, has been
generally used as a label for describing a major proportion of the
work to be considered here. Whilst the work of GotTman and
Turner can be regarded as typical of symbolic interactionism, the
work of Gold thorpe and Silverman is more explicitly aligned with
the action frame of reference. However, this division, for the
reasons discussed above, is by no means a rigid one, there being
many points of overlap, particularly between the perspectives of
GotTman, Turner and Silverman.
Erving GotTman has established himself as the foremost expo-
nent of the "dramaturgical' approach to symbolic interactionism. A
product of the Chicago School of sociology, the principal
orientation of his work has been to demonstrate the way in which
individuals shape and influence their social reality. One of his
earliest and most famous works, The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life ( 1959), otTers a view of individuals in ordinary work
situations as engaged in a 'theatrical performance', in a process of
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 191
'impression management'. as putting on a show through which
they attempt to guide and control the impressions which people
form ofthem. The purpose of GotTman's analysis is to identify the
features which characterise the patterns of everyday life. In line
with the perspective of Si mmel, he is concerned to penetrate to the
underlying 'form' of human affairs. As he observes in the introduc-
tion to another of his books, he is interested in building up a picture
of human interaction from basic elements such as glances,
gestures, positioning and verbal statements, with a view to
uncovering the normative order of social affairs (GotTman, 1967).
His analyses focus upon the rituals and routines which
characterise human interaction.
However, GotTman does not restrict himself merely to the study
of the rules. He is also concerned to show how people relate to
them, either conforming or adapting them to their purposes. Roles
and institutional patterns are not seen as determining individual
behaviour in any sense; rather, they provide a framework within
which the process of social life is acted out. Ontologically, in the
tradition of behavioural symbolic interactionism, society is seen as
being prior to self, but the individual is accorded a creative role in
the production of self, or at least the impression of self created as a
result of performance management. In these respects GotTman's
analysis of interaction is much more subjectivist in orientation
than that of many other interactionists operating within the
functionalist paradigm. Compare his work, for example, with the
studies of behaviour in organisations offered by those theorists
who cast their analysis within a more managerially orientated
frame of reference and emphasise the systemic nature of life in an
organisational context (for example, Lupton, 1963; Roy, 1960).
GotTman's approach to the analysis of human interaction clearly
has implications for the study of behaviour in organisations in a
general sense. In addition, GotTman himself has made a number of
studies of institutional behaviour, particularly within the context
of mental institutions. On the basis of these studies he has offered
an analysis of the nature of 'total institutions', a term which is used
to characterise organisations such as prisons, mental hospitals,
concentration camps. ships, monastries, etc., in which people
spend whole periods of their lives, sleeping, playing and working
within institutional boundaries. GotTman depicts such institutions
as being characterised by the fact that all aspects of life are con-
ducted in the same place and under the same single authority; that
each member is in the company of a large group of others who are
treated alike and required to do the same things together; that the
192 Sociological Paradigms and Organi.wtional Analysis
phases of the days' activities are tightly scheduled, with the
patterns imposed from above; that the various enforced activities
are brought together to form a single rational plan supposedly
designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution (Goffman,
1961).
For Goffman one of the most important aspects of such institu-
tions is that, whilst the authorities attempt to define the situation
for the inmates - through rules, regulations, indoctrination, dis-
cipline, etc. - the individuals who live within them ·make out' by
adjusting in various ways. They 'develop a life of their own that
becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal once you get close to
it' (Goffman, 1961, p. 7). Such adjustments take the form of 'con-
formity' (behaving as a 'normal' member) or it may be achieved
through unauthorised means. Goffman's work focuses upon these
adjustment processes, revealing what he calls the ·underlife' of the
organisation -the ways in which inmates 'make out' in an attempt
to defend themselves against the onslaught of the system upon
their impressions of self.
As Eldridge and Crombie (1974), have noted, in addition to
illuminating the concept of self, Goffman's study of 'total institu-
tions' also informs us about the processes of sociai control within
them and teaches us generally about the life and mechanisms
which operate in all formal organisations. Those who are familiar
with Goffman's work can approach the interactionist-type studies
reflected in the work of more management-orientated theorists,
such as those referred to earlier, with a fresh and critical eye. The
difference in approach reflects their relative positions with regard
to the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme.
Another example of interactionist research, of relevance to the
study of organisations and characteristic of the subjectivist region
of the functionalist paradigm, is presented by Barry Turner in his
monograph Exploring the Industrial Subculture ( 1971). Turner
was a member of Joan Woodward's research team investigating
management control within organisations, a piece of work
characteristic of social system theory in the more objectivist
region of the paradigm (Woodward, 1972). Turner informs us that
his own particular book was written as a result of his dissatisfac-
tion with the prevailing forms of organisational analysis in general
and the management control project in particular. He was con-
cerned about the high levels of abstraction which characterised
much of this work and its remoteness from what seemed to him to
be ·real' industrial life. He was more interested in developing a
sociology of organisations which concerned itself 'with discover-
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 193
ing the way in which people in industry define their life-positions,
with learning the sets of symbolisms which they adopt in the
definitions, and with examining the collective or organisational
consequences of these views which they hold of themselves •
(Turner, 1971, p. vii). In the course of his research for the
management control project, he also kept notes on his own
informal research observations of life in the organisation with
which he was concerned. It is this informal material which
provides the basis for his analysis of the industrial subculture.
Having collected his data, Turner searched the literature for
relevant concepts and theories which would make sense of his field
of observations, and he informs us in the course of his book that the
ideas of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, and Weber had particular
relevance. From Schutz he seems to take the view that one of the
tasks of sociologists should be to analyse the 'taken for granted'
assumptions of everyday life. Turner sets out to do this with regard
to what he calls the 'industrial subculture' - a feature of organisa-
tional life worthy of understanding in its own right but which most
researchers take for granted or dismiss in summary terms.
Although Turner takes Schutz as his point of reference, his
analysis is by no means representative of the phenomenological
sociology to be discussed in our chapter on the interpretive para-
digm. Rather, it is much more orientated towards an analysis of
'meaning', fused with the concerns of what we have described as
'behavioural symbolic interactionism'. The general orientation of
Turner's study is clearly indicated in his opening paragraph, in
which he defines his view of the notion of 'subculture' and the way
in which it is maintained. As he puts it,
A subculture is a distinctive set of meanings shared by a group of
people whose forms of behaviour differ to some extent from those of
wider society. The distinctive nature of the set of meanings is
maintained by ensuring that newcomers to the group undergo a process
of learning or socialisation. The process links the individual to the
values of the group, and generates common motives, common reaction
patterns and common perceptual habits. Distinctiveness is also
maintained by the use of sanctions which are operated against those
who do not behave in appropriate ways. (Turner, 1971, p. I)
Turner is thus concerned to study the way in which subcultures
evolve and are sustained. His focus is upon 'meaning' and the way
in which it becomes shared through ·communicative exchanges'.
In his analysis of meaning Turner again makes reference to the
work of Schutz, particularly in relation to the notion of ·reflexiv-
194 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ity', though, in point offact, his overall perspective on this is much
more closely related to the symbolic interaction model outlined by
Rose discussed in Chapter 4. There is undoubted confusion with
regard to ontology in this aspect of Turner's work. In contrast to
the Schutzian position, Turner's ontology is much more realist in
nature. However, this aside, his primary concern is to follow
Schutz in the study of the nature of meaning patterns and the
mechanisms by which they are conveyed. In this he pays consider-
able attention to the role of language and the ritualistic role of
objects.
Turner's thorough and clearly presented analysis of basic con-
cepts and their relationship to his empirical evidence results in a
valuable study of the informal aspects of organisational life. His
perspective is a very refreshing one. In contrast to most
interactionist studies of informal organisation, which are often
implicitly informed by a managerial perspective which regards
'informal' as 'deviant', Turner approaches the industrial sub-
culture on its own terms. He is concerned to reveal it for what it is,
without bringing in too many assumptions and preconceptions in
advance of detailed analysis. Although aspiring to a
phenomenological perspective, tor reasons which have been
argued above, it should be regarded as a piece of theory and
research on organisational life typical of the subjectivist region of
the functionalist paradigm.
A third example of theory and research typical of this region of
the paradigm is found in the work of those members of the Chicago
School who have concerned themselves with the sociology of
occupations. Among these Everett Hughes is particularly promi-
nent for the work which he himself has conducted (for example,
Hughes, 1958) and for his influence upon other scholars who have
chosen to follow his lead. Their work is characterised by an
attempt to penetrate to the level of subjective meaning in an
exploration of occupational roles. In contrast to other role
theorists, who often tend to be concerned with the structural
aspects of role and tangible role behaviour, the Chicago theorists
have interested themselves in the study of what work means for the
individual, and the way in which this is related to attitudes and
relationships within the work place. These theorists tend to start
with the individual and build out from there in the construction of
his organisational world. Thus we are given an inside view of what
it is like to be 'in the basement' as an apartment janitor or to be a
cab-driver relating to his 'fares' (Gold, 1964; Davis, 1967). Taken
together, such studies build up a picture of work experience in
 Functionali.'>t Organi.wtion Tlreory 195
contemporary society. as viewed by the workers themselves
rather than by a ·detached' observer. 41 The approach draws
heavily upon ethnographic accounts and participant observation
techniques, and tends to focus upon process as opposed to static
structure as a means of characterising the principal features of
the world of work and everyday life.
The work of the occupational sociologists moves very close to
the use of an action frame of reference, in that they are primarily
concerned with the general orientation of individuals to their roles
and with the meaning of work at a subjective level. A similar
perspective characterises the work of Goldthorpe and his col-
leagues (1968), in their study of industrial workers' orientations to
work, though little explicit interest is shown in the analysis of
subjective meaning as such, particularly in its processual and
emergent aspects. 44 Their study of ·affluent' manual workers in
the context of their industrial employment attempts to describe
and explain 'orientations to work·. This perspective has much in
common with Weber's attempt to construct a typology of social
action based on four kinds of orientations - traditional, emotional,
value-rational and purposively rational. Goldthorpe and his col-
leagues do not employ Weber's typology as such or, for that
matter, make much reference to his work, though there are clear
and obvious links. They argue that among the workers studied a
particular orientation to work is predominant- one of a markedly
instrumental kind. As Eldridge (1971) has noted, the analysis of
Goldthorpe et al is closely linked to the use of reference group
analysis, in that one of the primary concerns of the research is to
examine the relationship between orientations to work and the
worker's place in the class structure. This research on orientation
to work is cast within the context of a wider study concerned to test
the widely acknowledged thesis of working-class embourgeoise-
mem: that is, as manual workers and their families become more
affluent. they become progressively assimilated into the middle
class. Thus in this study the action frame of reference is given a
background role: it is a tool to be used in relation to but a small part
of the research project as a whole. It does, however. present one of
the few well-known British attempts to operationalise the action
frame of reference, albeit in this limited sense.
Most prominent among the advocates of the action frame of
reference as a basis for organisational analysis has been the name
of David Silverman. Indeed, it was he who, for the most part,
introduced the term to organisation theorists, arguing in his book
The Theory of Organisations ( 1970) that it provides an alternative
196 Sociological Pamdi!(m.'l and Or!(anisational Analysis
to systems theory. Silverman suggests that the systems approach,
as applied to organisations, has 'severe logical difficulties',
particularly in its assumption that organisations as systems have
'needs' or are ·self-regulating' .45 He points out that to attribute
such characteristics to organisations, except as a heuristic device,
involves the problem of 'reification', a process whereby social
constructs are accorded the power of thought and action. He
argues that explanations of social change at a systems level usually
involves these problems of reification, since attention is drawn to
the purposive actions of the system, which is seen as recognising
threats to its existence and as adapting accordingly. The systems
view of organisations is thus seen as being pitched at a level of
analysis which does not take into account, or provide explanations
in terms of, the actions of the individual human beings who are its
constituent members. In opposition to this systems view Silver-
man argues that social scientists should build their theories upon
foundations which view social reality as being socially con-
structed, socially sustained and socially changed. In other words,
Silverman wishes to place man as a social actor at the centre of
the stage, insofar as the analysis of social phenomena such as
organisations are concerned. In recognition of the fact that social
life is an ongoing process, sustained and ·accomplished' by social
actors, Silverman advocates the action frame of reference as pro-
viding an appropriate basis for analysis.
Silverman's view of the action frame of reference, which is
based upon the work of a number of writers, is summarised in
terms of the following seven propositions:

I. The social sciences and the natural sciences deal with entirely
different orders of subject-matter. While the canons of rigour
and scepticism apply to both, one should not expect their
perspective to be the same.
2. Sociology is concerned with understanding action rather than
with observing behaviour. Action arises out of meanings which
define social reality.
3. Meanings are given to men by their society. Shared orientations
become institutionalised and are experienced by later genera-
tions as social facts.
4. While society defines man, man in turn defines society.
Particular constellations of meaning are only sustained by con-
tinual reaffirmation in everyday actions.
S. Through their interaction men also modify, change and trans-
form social meanings.
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 197
6. It follows that explanations of human actions must take account
of the meanings which those concerned assign to their acts; the
manner in which the everyday world is socially constructed yet
perceived as real and routine becomes a crucial concern of
sociological analysis.
7. Positivistic explanations, which assert that action is determined
by external and constraining social or non-social forces, are
inadmissible. (Silverman, 1970, pp. 126-7)

In developing these propositions Silverman draws very heavily

upon ideas characteristic of the work of Dilthey, Weber and
Schutz. 46 His distinction between the subject matter which charac-
terises the natural and social sciences (Proposition 1), for example,
follows Dilthey's distinction between Naturwissenschaften
(natural sciences) and Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences).
As we argue in Chapter 6 on the interpretive paradigm, this dis-
tinction is central to an understanding of the German idealist
tradition of social thought. The cultural sciences were seen as being
distinguished by their essentially 'spiritual' character, and it was
held that they could not be understood through the approaches and
methods of the natural sciences. The idealists rejected positivist
epistemology and the nomothetic methods employed by the natural
scientists as simply inappropriate to the realm ofsocial and cultural
affairs. They held that man was 'free' and did not behave and act in
accordance with positivist-type laws. As a means of bridging this
gap between idealist and positivist perspectives, theorists such as
Dilthey and Weber concerned themselves with problems of
'understanding' in the realm of human affairs. The notion of
verstehen or 'interpretive understanding' which they developed
was seen as providing a method appropriate to the social sciences.
As developed by Weber, the notion of verstehen was used as a
methodological tool which drew attention to the importance of
understanding the subjective meaning which lay behind social
action. For Weber explanations of social phenomena had to be
'adequate on the level of meaning'.
It is precisely this point which Silverman seeks to emphasise in a
number of the propositions of his action schema. Proposition 2, for
example, emphasises that ·sociology is concerned with under-
standing action rather than with observing behaviour', and that
·action arises out of meanings which define social reality·. This is
firmly in line with the Weberian position. Social action is seen as
deriving from the meaning which is attributed to the social world
198 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
by individual actors. It is imperative, therefore, that the sociologist
understand these subjective meanings if he is to understand the full
significance of individual acts. Thus to focus upon the behaviour of
individuals in the tradition of positivist social science is to miss the
point, since patterns of behaviour may mean different things to
different people. The action of men is meaningful to them. They
construct their social world by attributing meaning to it. Action
arises from meanings, so it is necessary to understand social
activities at the level of subjective meaning. This point is again
emphasised by Silverman in Proposition 6, which states that
'explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings
which those concerned assign to their acts; the manner in which
the everyday world is socially constructed yet perceived as real
and routine becomes a crucial concern of sociological analysis'.
In Proposition 3 Silverman asserts that ·meanings are given to
men by their society. Shared orientations become institutionalised
and are experienced by later generations as social facts'. Here we
are concerned with the issue of ontology, and we find Silverman
adopting a 'realist' position in which society is seen as being
ontologically prior to man. In developing his position on this point
Silverman makes specific reference to Durkheim and the view that
men are constrained by social facts which determine their actions
and their consciousness. Following Durkheim, Silverman suggests
that meanings reside in social institutions and that individuals play
roles that are given to them as a result of their location upon the
social map. As he puts it, 'by participating in society, they are
given expectations about the appropriate acts of themselves and of
others when in various status positions. They are able to
apprehend the meanings associated with the actions of other
people and to form a view of self based on the responses of others'
(1970, p. 131). In order to explain why people should meet the
expectations of others Silverman invokes explanations presented
by Talcott Parsons in The Social System, which emphasise the
tendency to order in social affairs - 'common values must pre-
dominate if the system is to survive' ( 1970, p. 131). Ontologically,
therefore, Silverman's position appears to be as 'realist' as that of
anyothertheorist within the functionalist paradigm. He argues, for
example, that 'the social world is given to us by the past history
and structure of our society', and that ·social reality is .. pre-
defined" in the very language in which we are socialised.
Language provides us with categories which define as well as
distinguish our experiences' (1970, p. 132). We are thus left in no
doubt that individual actors occupy a 'realist' social world which is
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 199
external to the individual and has a reality which is independent of
any individual's social construction of it.
However, in Proposition 4 Silverman immediately proceeds lO
qualify this 'realism' by asserting that 'while society defines man,
man in turn defines society'. He emphasises that 'particular con-
stellations of meaning are only sustained by continual reaffirma-
tion in everyday actions'. In developing this proposition Silverman
emphasises that whilst individual actors may operate in
accordance with the 'common-sense' belief that the social world
exists outside themselves, in point of fact this common-sense
notion only holds insofar as it is sustained and reinforced through
the everyday actions of the actors directly involved in any given
social situation. It thus has a precarious existence. 'The existence
of society depends upon it being continuously confirmed in the
actions of its members' (1970, p. 134). In support of this view he
argues, following Berger and Pull berg ( 1966), that social structure
'has no reality except a human one. It is not characterisable as
being a thing able to stand on its own ... [and) exists only insofar
and as long as human beings realise it as part of their world'. He
goes on to argue that to attribute to society an existence separate
from and above its members is to reify it. Again following Berger
and Pullberg, Silverman suggests that 'social roles and institutions
exist only as an expression of the meanings which men attach to
their world- they have no "ontological status"' (1970, p. 134).1n
other words, Silverman is suggesting that reality is socially con-
structed. He is advocating an ontology which is essentially
'nominalist' in orientation.
Propositions 3 and 4 thus tend to qualify one another, in that
the former suggests a 'realist' ontology, and the latter a
·nominalist' ontology. As we shall argue in Chapter 7, Silverman is
unclear on this point in most of his work and he oscillates pre-
cariously from one position to another according to his purpose.
His overall position seems to be that whilst recognising that there
is an external world which is ontologically prior to man, its crucial
significance as far as the study of social affairs is concerned lies in
the way in which its ·meaning' resulted from the interpretations
placed upon it by individual actors.
In emphasising the way in which individuals have the ability to
interpret and attribute meaning to their social world, Silverman in
effect directs attention to the voluntaristic nature of human
activities. This receives specific attention in PropositionS, which
asserts that 'through their interaction men ... modify, change and
transform social meanings'. In elaborating this proposition he
200 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
places emphasis upon the ways in which individuals can choose to
interpret the roles which they play, and how they can disrupt
prevailing views of reality by engaging in disruptive activities of
one kind or another. In his analysis Silverman qualities his position
with regard to Parsons' view of the nature of social order referred
to earlier, and recognises that because of the choices available to
the individual, social integration may, in fact, be problematic.
In the elaboration of his action schema Silverman thus presents
a view of the social world which emphasises the processual nature
of human affairs. It is a world where human actors interpret the
situation in which they find themselves and act in ways which are
meaningful to them. Social reality is thus seen as being in a process
of continual flux, as human beings interpret and redefine, through
their actions, the world in which they live. It follows that special
methods are required to study this social world. Thus Silverman,
in line with his -opening proposition on the distinction between the
natural and social sciences, concludes by asserting that
'positivistic explanations, which assert that action is determined
by external and constraining social or non-social forces, are
inadmissible' (Proposition 7). Explanations of social affairs must
be adequate, on the level of meaning, for the actors directly
involved. The action frame of reference is offered as a perspective
adequate for this end.
As will become apparent from our analysis in Chapter 6, Silver-
man's action approach has much more in common with the work of
Weber than with that of Schutz. Although Silverman makes
frequent reference to Schutzian concepts, his perspective is far
r.emoved from the 'existential phenomenology' which
characterises Schutz's work. Silverman, in The Theory of
Organi:wtions, seems primarily concerned, like Weber, to develop
a method of analysis appropriate to the nature of social
phenomena, and he advocates the action frame of reference as a
method of analysing social relations within organisations. It repre-
sents a perspective characteristic of the subjectivist boundary of
the functionalist paradigm. While quite voluntarist in terms of its
assumptions with regard to the way in which individuals define and
interpret the situations in which they find themselves, it is based
upon an ontology which is essentially realist in orientatio11. As
advocated by Silverman, in terms of epistemology the perspective
is set against the extreme form of positivism characteristic of the
most objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm, but does not
reject the positivist approach in its entirety. Silverman, for exam-
ple, is in favour of a measure of 'generalisation' in the social
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 201
sciences, but emphasises that the 'generalisations which the social
sciences develop' are 'fundamentally different from the laws of the
natural sciences' (1970, p. 128).
There has been a tendency in recent years for writers on
organisations to equate the action frame of reference with schools
of thought such as ethnomethodology and phenomenology. This
represents a gross misstatement of the actual position. Whilst
action theorists often make reference to the work of
phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists, they do not follow
the full implications of the latter's point of view. In the manner of
other theorists within the paradigm, they tend to incorporate the
insights of 'outsiders' insofar as they serve useful ends. Action
theorists have used notions derived from the phenomenological
perspective to shore up and support the functionalist pointofview.
As will be clear from our discussion in Chapter 6 this is clearly
evident in the work of Weber, who used idealist notions in a
positivist way. The same is true of Parsons and of Silverman.
Silverman, for example, in addition to concluding that the action
frame of reference is no more than a method of analysis, suggests
that it may 'be a useful source of propositions in organisational
analysis' (1970, p. 143). This view is firmly in line with the
positivist attitude to the whole concept of verstehen and clearly
emphasises its location within the context of the functionalist
paradigm. In Silverman's work the action frame of reference
becomes no more than a different way of studying the same reality.
Emphasis is placed upon the importance of developing scientific
explanations at an individual as opposed to a systems level of
analysis, because of the problems of reification. The ontological
and epistemological assumptions remain firmly grounded in the
functionalist perspective. As will become clear in our discussion in
Chapters 6 and 7, phenomenology and ethnomethodology in their
true form are predicated upon fundamentally different views with
regard to the ontological nature of social reality itself.
Silverman did not adhere to the position articulated in The
Theory of Organi.wtions for long. As we will see in Chapter 7, his
subsequent work led him to a perspective firmly located within the
context of the interpretive paradigm. A comparison of this later
work with the approach presented in The Theory of Organisations
clearly illustrates the essentially intermediate position which the
latter reflects in terms of the subjectivo-objective dimension of
our analytical scheme. Silverman's early and later works are para-
digms apart.
202 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Pluralist Theory
The issues of power and conflict within organisations have long
attracted the attention of organisation theorists but have rarely
received sustained and systematic consideration. We intend to
argue here that many of the ideas and research findings which this
interest has generated anticipate, and point the way towards, the
development of a pluralist theory of organisations characteristic of
the conflict functionalism discussed in Chapter 4. Taken together.
they lay the basis for the analysis of organisations as pluralist
political systems - according to which organisations and their
environment are viewed principally as arenas of conflict between
individuals and groups whose activities are orientated towards the
achievement of their own personal goals, values and interests.
Many current theories of organisation contain elements of this
view but stop some way short of a fully developed pluralist theory
of organisations. Power and conflict are often studied as isolated
phenomena or used as concepts in schemes geared to wider ends.
They are rarely regarded as defining the nature of organisation
itself.
As Eldridge and Crombie ( 1974) have noted, the use of the term
"pluralism' is fraught with danger because of the wide range of
interpretations which have come to be placed upon it. It will be as
well, therefore, if we set out in a little more detail the way in which
we intend to use it here. Broadly speaking, we see a "pluralist' as
opposed to a ·unitary' view of organisations as reflecting three sets
of assumptions relating to what we shall describe as interests.
conflict and power .47
The different assumptions with regard to interests are clearly
reflected in the distinction which Fox (1966) has drawn between
the industrial organisation as a 'team' striving towards the
achievement of a common objective and as a coalition with
divergent interests. Whereas the unitary view of organisations
tends to stress that an organisation is a co-operative enterprise
united in the pursuit of a common goal, the pluralist view stresses
the diversity of individual interests and goals. Whereas from a
unitary perspective organisations are viewed as instruments of
rational and purposive activity. from a pluralist view they rep-
resent a network of sectional groups interested in the wider pur-
pose of the organisation as a whole only insofar as it serves their
own individual ends. From a pluralist perspective the formal goals
of an organisation have the status of little more than a legitimising
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 203
fa~ade, an umbrella under which a host of individual and group
interests are pursued as ends in themselves.
The unitary view of organisations regards conflict within
organisations as a rare and transient phenomenon which, when
present, can easily be eradicated or controlled through appropriate
managerial action. Because interests are regarded as being
characterised by a harmonious order, conflict within organisations
is regarded as an alien, obstrusive and unwelcome force and one
which is largely the creation of deviants and troublemakers. From
a pluralist perspective, on the other hand, conflict within organisa-
tions is viewed as an inevitable and ineradicable feature of every-
day life. The organisation is seen as a web of cross-cutting con-
flicts between the individuals and interest groups which give it life.
Rather than advocating its removal, the pluralist view emphasises
the possibilities of its playing a constructive role within the context
of the organisation as a whole. For the pluralist, conflict must be
institutionalised in some way, so that it can find expression and
'work itself through' without prejudice to the survival of the
system as a whole.
Within the context of a unitary view of organisation the ques-
tion ofpower is largely ignored. Since the organisation is viewed as
a harmonious and conflict-free enterprise, striving uniformly·
towards the achievement of what is common and in the interests of
all, questions about the source and use of power do not often arise.
Concepts such as authority, leadership and control are preferred
ways of describing the 'prerogative' of managers to guide the
organisation as a whole towards desired goals and aims. Power in
this sense is little more than a neutral resource which oils the
wheels of the system as a whole. The pluralist view, on the other
hand, regards the power of various groups within the organisation
as a crucial variable for understanding what happens in everyday
affairs. Power is seen as the medium through which conflicts of
interest are settled. Organisational life, from a pluralist standpoint,
is a power-play between individuals and groups who draw upon
their various sources of power in order to control their work
situations and to achieve whatever objectives they value. The
organisation is viewed as a plurality of power holders who derive
their influence from a plurality of sources. The organisation is
regarded as a loose coalition which moves towards the achieve-
ment of its plurality of aims through an uncertain process of
bargaining and mutual adjustment of respective claims. Consider-
able emphasis is pla"ed upon the importance of devising a network
of rules and regulations which allow this process to occur in an
204 Sociolo~:ical Paradi~:ms and Or~:anisational Analysis
orderly fashion and without undue prejudice to the survival of the
organisation as a whole.
Thus, by way of summary, the two views of organisation can be
illustrated as in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1
1be unitary and pluralist views of interests, connict and power

Th~ unitt1ry vi~w Th~ pluralist vi~w

laterests Places emphasis upon the Places emphasis upon the

achievement of common diversity of individual and
objectives. The organisation group interests. The
is viewed as being united organisation is regarded as a
under the umbrella of com- loose coalition which has but
mon goals. and striving to- a remote interest in the for-
wards their achievement in mal goals of the organisation.
the manner of a well integ-
rated team.

Coafllct Regards connict as a rare and Regards connict as an inher-

transient phenomenon which ent and ineradicable
can be removed through characteristic of ·organisa-
appropriate managerial tional affairs and stresses its
action. Where it does arise it potentially positive or func-
is usually anributed to the tional aspects.
activities of deviants and
troublemakers.

Power Largely ignores the role of Regards power as a variable

power in organisational life. crucial to the understanding
Concept~ such as authority, of the activities of an
leadership and control tend organisation. Power is the
to be preferred means of medium through which con-
describing the managerial nicts of interest arc alleviated
prerogative of guiding the and resolved. The organisa-
organisation tow;ords the tion is viewed as a plurality of
achievement of common power holders drawing their
interests. power from a plurality of
sources.

The unitary view of organisation is epitomised in the classical

theory of organisations which tends to view the organisation as a
machine geared to the achievement of formal goals. From this
point ofview the organisation is an instrument of purposive ration-
ality, which directs its members in an effective and efficient
 Functio11alist Orgalli!illtion Th(•ory 205
manner. The members of the organisation are viewed as respond-
ing to incentives which secure their commitment to the formal
goals of the organisation. The enterprise is thus envisaged as a
unitary phenomena in which the goals of all members can be
simultaneously satisfied; the task of management is to ensure that
the organisation is appropriately structured. directed and con-
trolled so that effective operation is achieved.
The unitary view is also reflected in many of the other theories
which we have reviewed in earlier sections of this chapter.
Barnard's view of an organisation as a 'co-operative system'. the
human relations concern to integrate individual and organisational
needs and the open systems view of an organisation as being
geared to the process of survival. all in varying degrees reflect
elements of this perspective. Above all else the organisation is
viewed as a functionally integrated system, the operations of
which can be understood with reference to the organisational goals
which it is concerned to achieve. However, ever since the Haw-
thorne studies, increasing attention has been devoted to the role of
conflict within organisations, and it is now rare to find theoretical
perspectives which reflect the unitary view in an extreme sense.Jn
broad terms. developments in organisation theory over the last
fifty years have been away from the unitary and towards the
pluralist view of organisations. However, as we noted earlier, this
movement has been incomplete, so that many theories reflect
elements of a pluralist perspective but stop some way short of a
fully developed pluralist theory. To this extent many of the
theories which we have discussed in earlier sections of this chapter
are of a hybrid nature. Some are more pluralist than others. As a
means of developing the pluralist perspective in a little more detail,
therefore, it will be useful if we return to some of the theory and
research which we have already considered and examine the way
in which it has treated interests, conflict and power. We will then
proceed to examine the work of other theorists who have con-
tributed to the pluralist perspective.

Pluralist elements in social system theory

Many theories located within the bounds of social system theory
tend to move towards the pluralist perspective with regard to
conflict and, to a lesser extent, with regard to interests. But with
regard to power they remain firmly embedded within the unitary
standpoint. Conflict is recognised to occur in many forms. For
example, theorists in the human relations tradition, or those who
206 Soc·iological Paradigms and Or~:anisational Analysis
adopt a socio-technical systems perspective, have emphasised the
conflicts which can arise between human needs and the
characteristics of formal organisation structure (for example,
Argyris, 1952 and 1957), technology (Trist and Bamforth, 1951)
and the like. Other theorists and researchers have pointed towards
the conflicts which can arise between formal organisational roles
(for example, Dalton, 1959; Katz and Kahn, 1966) and to conflicts
between the different sub-units of an organisation (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967). Others have documented conflicts in the work
place between individual workers, work groups and their
supervisors (for example, Lupton, 1963; Whyte, 1955). Theorists
who have focused upon decision-making processes within
organisations have emphasised the conflicts which occur between
managers (for example, Cyert and March, 1963). Social system
theory thus contains many examples of theory and research which
treat organisational life as based upon a plurality of conflicts.
However, these theories do not always recognise organisations
as being characterised by a plurality of interests. The human
relations theorists, for example, in focusing upon human needs,
tend to underplay the fact that individuals may have goals which
are in conflict with those of the organisation. Their perspective is
based upon the premise that it is somehow possible to satisfy
individual needs through the achievement of wider organisational
goals. The emphasis upon needs thus tends to present the organisa-
tion as a unitary phenomena which has the capacity to operate as a
well integrated team. The potential divergence of goals is de-
emphasised as a consequence of the focus upon universal needs.
Again, those theorists who have been concerned with the study of
conflicts between organisational roles and sub-units often stress
the structural determinants of conflict as opposed to the plurality
of individual and group orientations and interests, which, as Dubin
(1956) and Goldthorpe and his colleagues (1968) have demon-
strated, may be brought into the organisation from outside.
Similarly, the organisation theorists who have focused upon
decision-making processes within organisations also often tend to
de-emphasise the plurality of interests. This is particularly evi-
dent, for example, in the work of Simon ( 1957), March and Simon
(1958) and Cyert and March ()963), and in the notions of 'bounded
rationality' and ·administrative man·. Such conceptualisations
attempt to reconcile the unitary view of organisation as a rationally
ordered enterprise with the observations that organisational
activities do not in practice follow the pattern that the rational
model would lead us to expect. Their theories favour a unitary
 Functionalist Orl(anisation Theory 207
view of organisation. based upon a qualified principle of rational-
ity. as opposed to a pluralist view. which gives full recognition to
the variety of orientations and interests of individual members.••
Most social system theories completely ignore the issue of
power within organisations. As we have argued at some length,
these theories are usually based upon assumptions that organisa-
tions are social processes characterised by equilibrium or
homeostasis. Theories based upon an organismic analogy, for
example, tend to stress the functional interdependence and unity
of the system and emphasise the functions which are performed in
the interests of the survival of the whole. The exercise of authority
and control is thus seen as an essential process geared to the
achievement of this overall state of affairs. The emphasis upon
common purpose and functional unity tends to deflect attention
from a consideration of the power of constituent elements. Issues
involving the use of power tend to be interpreted as issues or
problems of authority and control which are of direct relevance to
the effectiveness of the organisation in the achievement of its
formal goals (see, for example, Tannenbaum, 1968).

Pluralist elements in theories of bureaucratic

dysfunctions ·
Moving on to consider the theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions,
we find that they usually reflect a pluralist view with regard to
interests and conflict and tend, to an extent, to recognise the
importance of power as a variable in organisational analysis. As we
have seen, the work of Merton (1968), Selznick (1949), Gouldner
(1954a and b) and Blau (1955) all demonstrated, in one way or
another, the unintended consequences of formal organisation. In
cases where these unintended consequences were dysfunctional
as far as the formal goals of the organisation were concerned, it
was usually because they were functional for other interests within
the organisation. Merton's 'bureaucratic personalities' adopted a
defensive and ritualistic posture to protect themselves from the
possibility of criticism from outside the organisation; the dysfunc-
tions of specialisation and goal displacement revealed by Selznick
arose because the specialists sought to further their own interests;
the bureaucratic rules in Gouldner's gypsum factory were used by
the workers and managers to serve their own quite different
purposes; Blau's study of government agencies revealed
208 SocioloRical Paradigms and Organimtional Ana/pi.~

numerous examples of group and sectional interests. The very

notion of dysfunction inevitably raises questions such as. func-
tional or dysfunctional for whom'? Whose goals is the organisation
attempting to achieve? Whose interests are the rules rational for?
A theory of interests is thus a direct corollary of the theory of
dysfunctions. As Gouldner (1959) has noted, the notion of
dysfunctions directs attention towards issues such as the degree of
functional reciprocity which characterises the relationships
between system parts. To the extent that reciprocal relationships
are asymmetrical, interdependence of parts is less than perfect and
gives rise to various degrees of functional autonomy or inde-
pendence of parts within the context of the system as a whole. It is
this principle of autonomy which lies at the heart of the pluralist
theory of interests.
The role of conflict is also given considerable prominence in the
theories of Merton and his colleagues. These studies of
bureaucracy were, in many respects, stimulated by the Hawthorne
findings on the relationship between formal and informal
organisation, and they are permeated by the theme of conflict
between the rational and human aspects of organisation. Conflicts
between bureaucrats and their clients, between sectional groups
and coalitions within the organisation, and between management
and workers are all given prominence in one or more of these
studies. Conflict is central to the theory of bureaucratic dysfunc-
tions.
The work of Selznick ( 1949) and Gouldner (1954a and b), also
draws attention to the plurality of power relationships within
organisations, but the insights generated are not followed up to
their full extent. Selznick traces the struggle for control which
ensues from the different commitments and patterns of interest
within the organisation, and the process of co-option through
which they are brought within the bounds of the decision-making
system. However, his general orientation is the study of the
manner in which an organisationlimit.f the influence of its dysfunc-
tions and is not so much concerned with tracing them to their
source, as a fully developed view of power would require.
Similarly, Gouldner gives much attention to the process of subor-
dination and control within 'punitive' bureaucratic structures, but
stops short ofa full analysis of the power relationships between the
workers and managers under investigation. These studies both
point the way towards a pluralist view of power, but since they are
essentially orientated towards the specific study of the dysfunc-
tions of bureaucratic structures, they only treat the subject insofar
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 209
as it has relevance to this purpose. Their focus upon bureaucratic
structure necessarily overemphasises the role and importance of
formal authority as opposed to other forms of power relationships.
Nonetheless, in terms of general orientation and approach their
overall theoretical stance has much in common with, and has
contributed immeasurably towards, more fully developed pluralist
views of organisation, notably that of Crozier (1964).

Pluralism and the action frame of reference

Theorists who adopt the action frame of reference as a basis for
their analysis of organisational situations usually do so in recogni-
tion of the fact that any social situation is characterised by a
plurality of interests. They also frequently point to the conflicts
which exist within the situations studied, and occasionally draw
attention to the role of power as a variable worthy of analysis.
However, their standpoint upon the last issue tends to be implicit
rather than explicit, and is not developed systematically to any
degree.
As will be clear from our earlier analysis, the action frame of
reference owes much to the Weberian view that explanations in
social science must be 'adequate on the level of meaning'. It is
based on the view that the various actors in a social situation
interpret and define that situation in ways which have meaning for
them, and act accordingly. The idea that there will be a plurality of
such definitions is central to this standpoint; if this were not so,
then the action frame of reference would prove unnecessary. That
organisational situations are characterised by a plurality of
interests is clearly evident in the work of Goffman (1961), Turner
(1971), Goldthorpe et a/. (1968), and Silverman (1970), as dis-
cussed earlier. It is also evident in the work of many of the so-
called behavioural symbolic interactionists referred to in
Chapter 4.
The conflicts which arise as a result of the different definitions of
organisational situations have often provided the action theorist
with excellent case material for illustrating his particular point of
view. It is clearly evident in Goffman·s (1961) analysis of the
'underlife of total institutions' and in Eldridge's analysis of
restrictive practices (Eldridge, 1971, pp. 45-9). Silverman's
reinterpretation of Gouldner's Wildcat Strike in terms of a social
action perspective also provides an excellent illustration of the
ways in which conflicts in expectations, modes of involvement in
210 Sociolol(ica/ Paradil(ms and Orl(anisational Analy.ris
an organisation and general conflicts in the definition of situations
can account for change within organisations (Silverman, 1970, pp.
155-63). Indeed, the scheme which Silverman suggests for the
comparative analysis of organisations from an action perspective
has many characteristics which emphasise the pluralistic nature of
organisations. He summarises the issues which ought to be
addressed as follows:
I. The nature of the predominant meaning-structure and associated
role-system in different organisations and the extent to which it
relies on varying degrees of coercion or consent.
2. The characteristic: pattern of involvement of the actors: differing
attachment to rules and definitions of their situation.
3. The typical strategies used by different actors to attain their
ends.
4. The relative ability of different actors to impose their definition
of the situation upon others. The nature and sources of the
symbolic 'sticks' (resources) available to the actors; their
relative effectiveness.
S. The origin and pattern of change of meaning-structures
(institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of meanings) in
different organisations. (Silverman, 1970, pp. 171- 2)

Points I and 4 draw attention to the role of power within

organisations, which is seen from an action standpoint largely in
terms of the ability to impose one's definition of a situation upon
others. Many action theorists have referred to this. GotTman's
definition of 'total institutions', for example, emphasises that such
organisations assume much of their special character because
those in authority are able to impose their definitions of the situa-
tion upon inmates. However, action theorists do not tend to
involve themselves in an analysis of the nature and sources of
power as such. Power is often seen as a variable relevant to the
explanation of the 'meanings' which prevail but is rarely analysed
in detail. Nevertheless, the action theorists have much in common
with more fully developed pluralist views of organisation.

Other movements towards pluralist theory

Since the early 1960s an increasing number of social theorists have
concerned themselves with the development of theoretical
perspectives which are essentially pluralist in nature. The work of
Peter Blau ( 1964) on exchange theory, for example, provides a
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 211
clear illustration of this. As will be apparent from our discussion in
Chapter4, Blau·s 'Exchange and Power Model' provides a theory
of social integration which is explicitly based upon the variables
which are central to pluralist theory. Following Simmel, Blau
focuses upon the emergent properties of human interaction and
attempts to account for the nature and patterns which exist within
society in terms of the process of exchange. Social exchange
geared to the satisfaction of different needs and interests is seen as
creating inequalities of power and as generating a host of cross-
cutting conflicts and oppositions which lie at the heart of changes
within society as a whole. Blau thus provides a processual theory
of social interaction which is firmly based upon pluralist principles
but which, as he recognises, allows for further development. 49
Another step in the direction of a pluralist theory of organisation
has been taken by Michel Crozier( 1964). However, he approaches
the subject from a different direction. Whereas Blau has developed
his theory from an interactionist stance, Crozier's theory repre-
sents a direct development in the mould of the theories of
bureaucratic dysfunctions discussed earlier. His analysis of the
bureaucratic character of two French administrative organisations
leads him to a theory of bureaucracy which identifies power as 'the
new central problem of the theory of organisation' (Crozier, 1964,
p. 145). His analysis traces the conflict of interests and the bargain-
ing process which characterise relationships between groups
within an organisation, particularly at different levels of the
organisational hierarchy. It demonstrates how the various groups
attempt to gain control of their work situations by drawing upon
the various sources of power at their disposal, and the way in
which this influences the organisation structure. In line with other
theorists in the pluralist tradition, Crozier sees the power struggle
within organisations as being limited by certain stabilising factors,
such as the need to maintain minimum standards of efficiency, and
other social factors which ensure that the organisation continues
as an ongoing concern. In the true tradition of conflict functional-
ism, therefore, contlict is seen as having its limits.
A third example of the move towards a pluralist perspective is
found in the work ofEtzioni (1961), whose comparative analysis of
organisations in terms of the ·nature of compliance' focuses upon
the relationship between power and employee commitment. The
nature of compliance is viewed as being related to many other
organisational variables, such as the goals that organisations
pursue, the kind, location, power and interaction of elites, the level
of consensus attained, etc. Etzioni's analysis has done much to
212 Sodolo~ical Parc~Ji~ms cmJ Or~tmi.wtional Analysis
draw attention to the role of power as a variable in organisational
analysis, but his treatment of the different 'interests' and ·con-
flicts' within organisations falls well short of what a more fully
developed pluralist theory would require.
In the field of industrial relations pluralist-type theories have
become well established. The perspective is clearly evident, for
example, in the opening words of the Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (1965-8;
Chairman, Lord Donovan), which describes the nature of the
business enterprise in the following terms:

The running of large businesses is in the hands of professional

managers ... While in the long term shareholders, employees and
customers all stand to benefit if a concern flourishes, the immediate
interests of these groups often conflict. Directors and managers have to
balance these conflicting interests, and in practice they generally -.eek
to strike for whatever balance will best promote the welfare of the
enterprise as such.

This viewpoint is in line with an intellectual tradition which finds

expression in other literature in the industrial relations field such
as that of Clark Kerr and his colleagues ( 1964). Their view of
·pluralistic industrialism' emphasises a movement towards a soci-
ety in which the state, organisations and employee associations
will be united through a web of rules which govern and settle
conflicts between interest groups. Others have built upon such a
perspective - notably Alan Fox ( 1966), who has been prominent in
advocating the pluralistic frame of reference as a means of under-
standing the nature of work organisations and. more recently ( 1973
and 1974), in emphasising its inherent weaknesses and
deficiencies. Within the context of the industrial relations field the
debate over pluralism has in many respects focused upon the
nature of power. Those advocating the pluralist perspective have
usually underwritten their views with the assumption that there is a
rough balance of power between the competing interest groups,
and that all groups are united in preserving the system as an
ongoing concern. It is also assumed that the survival needs ofthe
organisation, or those of society, impose limits on the degree and
nature of conflict.
A fifth line of development which moves in the direction of a
pluralist theory of organisations is witnessed in the increasing
number of research studies which have focused upon the study of
power as a variable in organisational analysis (for example, Kahn
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 213
and Boulding, 1964; Zald, 1970, Hickson eta/., 1971). Most of
these studies are cast within the wider perspective of social system
theory but represent a temporary excursion outside the bounds of
the dominant model. As we have argued, power as a variable does
not figure prominently in functionalist systems theory, so the
fascination of these theorists with it can be seen as especially
significant. In many respects it can be understood as symptomatic
of a desire to forge a radical perspective within the context of the
functionalist paradigm akin to the movement towards conflict
functionalism described in Chapter 4. Organisation theory has
frequently attracted the charge of being conservative in orienta-
tion, unduly biased towards a managerial perspective and gener-
ally supportive of the status quo. A number of organisation
theorists who have wished to avoid this charge have directed their
attention to the study of power in organisational life. Yet other
theorists, more firmly committed to a managerial view, have
chosen to study power in the belief that an understanding of the
subject may facilitate better managerial control. Whatever the
reason, the result has been a series of studies in which power is the
focus of interest and its underlying definition essentially pluralist
in orientation.
A final trend in the direction of pluralist theory worthy of men-
tion here is found in the work of those theorists who have sought to
study decision making within organisations as an explicitly ·politi-
cal' process. The recent study by Pettigrew ( 1973), for example, is
illustrative of this general trend and goes a long way towards
presenting a pluralist theory of decision making in which the rela-
tionships between interests, conflict and power are spell out in
some detail. In essence, it develops the elements of pluralism
which we have described as characterising the decision-making
theories of Herbert Simon and Cyert and March, taking them to
their logical conclusion. In Pettigrew's theory man is accorded a
·political' rather than an 'administrative' orientation, which is
consistent with the nature of the •political system' within which he
operates.

Towards a clearer statement of pluralist

theory
In the previous sections we have sought to show how elements of
functionalist organisation theory converge upon various factors
214 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
which characterise a pluralist approach to the study of organisa-
tions. The movement to this position has been gradual and
piecemeal rather than the response to the various research findings
which have demonstrated that models based upon unitary assump-
tions are inadequate for an understanding of the dynamics of
modern organisations. We have thus arrived at a point at which
pluralist models of organisation have developed in advance of a
clear statement of the pluralist perspective as such, except in its
relationship to the unitary view.
The lack of a clear perspective is well illustrated in relation to
the way in which the concept of power is handled in pluralist-type
theories of organisation. Where it is recognised as a key variable,
the major concern is usually to locate its source and measure the
extent to which it exists. Relatively little attention is devoted to the
nature of power as such. Many theorists favour Dahl's ( 1967)
conceptualisation of power, namely, that the power of a person A
over a person 8 lies in the ability of A to get 8 to do something that
he would not have done otherwise, and go hardly any further in
terms of an attempt to define the nature of the phenomenon under
investigation. Yet the problem of defining power seems to be a
crucial issue.
One ofthe few orthodoxies in the 'What is power?' debate is the
view that power refers to a 'relationship' rather than a 'thing'. Ever
since the publication of Emerson's influential paper, 'Power-
Dependence Relations' ( 1962), it has become fairly well
established that the concept ofpowerinevitably involves the ques-
tion: ·power over whom?' However, this still leaves many issues
unresolved. Among the most important of these, we may cite the
following:

(a) Power or social control? Is it possible or meaningful to

identify power independently of a wider process of ongo-
ing social control? For example, processes of socialisation
have been shown to be important regulators of social
behaviour. Where does one draw the line between social
control and power? Is power utilised in the social control
of a child's behaviour within the nuclear family? Is it
meaningful to equate this with the type of control
exercised by some form of elite through the mass media or
the control of workers through board-room decisions?
Wrong ( 1968) has suggested that it is necessary to restrict
the use of power to the intentional efforts of groups or
individuals to control others, and many pluralist theorists
 FunL"Iionalist OrRalli.mtion Theory 215
follow his lead. However, the concept of social control
does undermine the utility of the notion of power. It shows
it to be at best a partial and incomplete conceptual tool for
the analysis of social affairs. The validity and utility of the
notion of power as a concept for organisational analysis is
thus worthy of much more detailed consideration and
attention than it has received up to now.
(b) /.f power 'zero-sum' or 'non-zero-sum'? Assuming that
one accepts that it is valid to treat power as a variable in
organisational analysis, the question of whether it is
·zero-sum' becomes an issue. Is power something which
benefits one group at the expense of another, or is it
something which can benefit everyone? Talcott Parsons
(1963) supports the latter view, arguing that power is a
resource generated by the social system in a manner akin
to the generation of wealth, and whilst some people may
have more of it than others, the use to which power is put
is of as much interest as its distribution. Giddens ( 1972a)
has referred to these as the 'collective' and 'distributive'
aspects of power.
(c) Illegitimate or legitimate power? This distinction serves
to undermine the simplistic equation found in some work
that power equals coercion. Parsons (1963) has argued
that the use of open force is an indication of a shallow and
unstable power base. Where authority is pervasive, for
example, power (in a coercive sense) will not be in
evidence. Thus questioning of the relationship between
power and coercion immediately draws attention to the
distinction often made in the literature between authority
and power. The term ·power' is often used simply to
characterise the non-legitimised use of power. A full
development of the concept of power must also concern
itself with the way in which it becomes legitimised in the
form of authority. Whilst organisation theory has paid
considerable attention to the notion of ·authority', it has
paid relatively little to the concept of power in a wider
sense.
(d) Negative or po.fitive power? An important distinction can
be drawn between the notion of 'positive power' - the
ability to get things done - and ·negative power' - the
ability to stop things being done. A focus upon negative
power is normally accompanied by an emphasis upon the
role of 'veto groups' in organisational life. A fully
216 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysi.f
developed conceptualisation of power must take account
of both positive and negative elements of power.
(e) Actual or potential power? Power does not have to be
exercised to be present. The distinction between actual
and potential power is fundamental at both theoretical and
methodological levels. Those who are concerned to
operationalise power often restrict their attention to the
visible use of objective manifestations of power. ignoring
essential background elements which, whilst extremely
potent in their effects, may be hidden from view. The
distinction which we have in mind here is clearly related to
Wrong's (1968) view of power as an 'episodic' as opposed
to a "dispositional' concept. The former refers to specific
behavioural events, whereas the latter refers to the way in
which situations are defined by the individuals concerned.
The distinction between actual and pot~ntial power is thus
very much influenced by the way in which the situation is
perceived by the actors involved.
(f) /ntercursive or integral power? Is power something which
is spread around? Or does it derive from one source or a
small number of sources? This distinction, which is again
found in Wrong's discussion of power, is of crucial
relevance to the pluralist perspective. Pluralism is based
on the notion that power is intercursive and that no indi-
vidual or group dominates totally. It regards power as
deriving from many sources and as varying from situation
to situation and issue to issue. In other words, it assumes
that there are spheres of influence in which different indi-
viduals and groups have different degrees of power.

This brief and somewhat oversimplified overview of issues

relevant to a theory of power. serves to illustrate some of the major
problems facing pluralist organisation theory at the present time.
The foundations have simply not yet been fully explored. Pluralist
theory implicitly assumes that power is intercursive, and major
attention is devoted to an identification of relevant sources. The
classifactory scheme offered by French and Raven ( 1968), for
example, and the 'strategic contingencies' theory of power offered
by Hickson and his colleagues (1971), provide two prominent
examples of this endeavour. Their search for the bases of power
presumes answers to questions which they simply do not raise.
Future developments with regard to a pluralist theory of
organisation would thus seem to call for a much more systematic
 Functionalist OrKanisation Theory 217
statement of the theory of power upon which it is based. so It also
calls for a much more systematic statement of the theory of
interests and the theory of conflict upon which it is founded. At the
present time assumptions with regard to these other two issues are
vague and underdevelope d. Interests tend to be equated with
individual. group or sub-unit goals; conflict tends to be seen as an
endemic but bounded and potentially constructive element of
organisational lire. These and other related assumptions are in
need of systematic elaboration, so that a systematic theory of the
relationships between interests, conflicts and power can be
developed.
Such an endeavour would lead to the consideration of some
major issues. A theory of interests, conflict and power at an
organisational level necessarily implies a theory of interests, con-
flict and power at a societal level. This focus would thus encourage
organisation theorists to form a clearer idea of the relationship
between organisations and society, within both a contemporary
and a historical context. It would bring them to a direct considera-
tion of the nature of the assumptions which define their location
within the functionalist paradigm as opposed to the radical
structuralist paradigm. As will become apparent from our dis-
cussion of radical structuralism in Chapters 10 and II. theorists
located there have also given consideration to a theory of interests,
conflict and power, and their stance is radically different from that
of the pluralist. At a sociological level, the confrontation of ideas
drawn from the work of Marx and Weber has produced a conflict
theory which offers a view of organisations substantially different
from those reviewed here within the context of the functionalist
paradigm.
So much, then, for our discussion of pluralist theory. Our review
of this perspective completes our analysis of contemporary
schools of thought located within the functionalist paradigm.
Clearly, they vary considerably in terms of general orientations
and underlying assumptions. In the concluding section of this
chapter we will examine briefly the way in which these differences
are reflected in terms of ongoing debate within the context of the
paradigm as a whole.

Debate Within the Functionalist Paradigm

Having completed our review of the different approaches to the
study of organisations characteristic of the functionalist paradigm.
218 SociolcJRica/ Paradigms and Orl(ani!wtional Antlly.'ii.'i
it will be useful by way of conclusion if we turn our attention to
examine some of the issues of debate within the paradigm. Anyone
familiar with the literature on organisational analysis cannot have
failed to notice the differences of opinion which exist between
members of different schools of functionalist thought. We intend
to argue here that much of this debate can be understood in terms
of the positions which its participants adopt in relation to the two
dimensions of our analytical scheme. Whilst they are committed to
the overall view of science and society which characterises the
paradigm, they differ in the degree and manner in which they
subscribe and address themselves to these common basic assump-
tions. It is these differences which underwrite the nature of the
debate.
We will take the dominant perspective within the paradigm,
social system theory and objectivism. as our starting point. Putting
aside for the moment debate concerning •levels of analysis' (that
is, whether it is fruitful to focus upon individual: group, organisa-
tional or societal issues as topics of analysis), 5 1 we find that debate
within this perspective tends to focus upon points of detail. It is
usually •friendly' and ·constructive' in tone, and it focuses upon
the ways in which particular models can be refined and research
methods improved, and what the precise meaning and significance
of a particular set of empirical results might be. The debate is often
about the technical improvements which might be made within the
context of the perspective as a whole.
Criticisms that this dominant perspective is characterised by an
undue and extreme commitment to positivism and a na·ive empiric-
ism, and that it is characterised by a complete disregard for the
nature of the phenomena under investigation, tend to be of a
different order. Whilst such charges are often levelled from out-
side the paradigm by interpretive theorists or radical humanists,
they are also levelled within the paradigm by theorists who adhere
to a subjectivist position typical, for example, of the action frame
of reference. From the standpoint of action theory. the work of the
social system theorist and objectivist is dubious because it reflects
too strong a commitment to the models and methods of the natural
sciences as a basis for social analysis. These criticisms are often
founded on the charge that social system theorists and objectivists
•reify' their subject of study.
The charge that social system theorists and objectivists are
overdeterministic in their view of human nature also arises from
the same source. The voluntarism which characterises the action
approach, for example, is often set in opposition to the technologi-
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 219
cal or structural determinism characteristic of much of the theory
and research located in the more objectivist regions of the para-
digm.
Another charge levelled at social system theory and objectivism
is that it is ideologically biased in favour of a managerial view of
organisation. This charge has come from all directions. The action
theorists have claimed that the meanings which managers attribute
to organisations are given undue prominence and that the mean-
ings and orientations of other organisational actors are, relatively
speaking, ignored. The theorists who have focused upon
bureaucratic dysfunctions have stressed the non-managerial
interests which account for much of organisational activity. The
pluralists have criticised social system theorists for adopting a
unitary frame of reference and for ignoring the role of power as an
organisational variable. All in their various ways have contributed
to the view that social system theorists and objectivists are little
more than the handmaidens and functionaries of those in control of
organisational life.
For their part the social system theorists and objectivists are
often at a loss to understand the basis of such charges. They may
not be consciously aware of being managerially biased and may see
their overall endeavour as directed at increasing the effectiveness
of 'the organisation' or the satisfaction and productivity of the
work force in the interests of all. Such is the nature of the unitary
frame of reference which underwrites their approach. However,
the issue runs much deeper than this. Their conservative or
managerially orientated stance is rooted in the models which they
adopt for the purpose of analysis. We have already devoted con-
siderable space to a discussion of the assumptions which under-
write different approaches to the study of organisations, but it is
worth re-emphasising them here.
Social system theory and objectivist approaches to the study of
the organisations are built around the common-sense, 'taken for
granted' assumptions that organisations are purposive, goal-
seeking enterprises. The question 'What is an organisation?' is
rarely given very much attention; the answer is taken to be self-
evident. The problem of defining an organisation is usually tackled
in three or four lines, which form a convenient springboard for
moving on to the issues which are regarded as being of real con-
cern. Yet it is the question 'What is an organisation?' that should
lie at the heart of organisational analysis. Different paradigmatic
locations yield different answers to this question.
If a social theorist takes the definition of the phenomena which
220 Sodo/ogical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
he is attempting to investigate as largely self-evident, it is also
likely that he will adopt a model for analysis which is similarly
unquestioned. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the mechani-
cal and organismic models. particularly the latter. have proved
such popular analytical tools for the study of organisations. The
notion of equilibrium which characterises the mechanical analogy
is well suited for the study of organisations- which, by definition,
are tl.uumed to be relatively stable entities. The notions of func-
tional unity. homeostasis. adaptability and survival which
characterise the organismic analogy lend themselves well to the
study of organisations. if they are assumed to be rational.
purposive. goal-seeking, adaptive enterprises coping with the
demands of an environment. As we have argued in Chapter4, as a
result of the distinction drawn between ·cJosed' and ·open'
systems, it has now become almost routine to view organisations
as ·open' rather than 'closed' and to view the organismic analogy
as providing an appropriate basis for analysis. The adoption of an
open systems approach has been mistakenly regarded as
synonomous with the use of an organismic analogy. As a result the
use of organismic models for the study of organisations has been
regarded as being as self-evident and obvious as the common-
sense definition of the phenomenon which they are used to
analyse.
The upshot of our argument. therefore, is that the conservatism
or ideological and managerial bias which many theorists have
suggested characterises social system theory and objectivism is
built into the models which are used as a basis of analysis. For this
reason many theorists are not conscious of being biased one way or
another. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the work of
many socio-technical system theorists or human relations
theorists who, whilst attracting the charge of conservatism and
managerialism, actually see themselves as perhaps taking a 'radi-
cal' stand in favour of employees and their job satisfaction. What
they fail to realise is that their radicalism is constrained by the
nature of the models upon which their work is implicitly based.
Insofar as they adopt organismic models which presume a func-
tional unity of system parts, with certain imperative functions
which must be satisfied if the organisation is to survive, their
analyses are constrained by the requirements chacteristic of a
managerial point of view. It is this consonance between the nature
of the organismic analogy and the requirements of managerialism
which underwrites the dominance of organismic models within the
field of organisation theory.
 Functionalist OrKanisation Theory 221
Notes and References
1. For an extended discussion of classical management theory.
see, for example, Massie ( 19655.
2. Taylor, hard, direct and abrasive in approach, soon became
embroiled in a battle with organised labour and was seen as
the arch-enemy of the working man. By 1912 his system of
scientific management had become the subject of a hearing
before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
3. For an overview of the early work and history of the
industrial psychology movement, see Rose (1975), pp.
6.5-100. For a discussion of some early research, see Mayo
(1933), pp. 1-54.
4. See, for example, Myers (1924).
5. See, for example, Schein (1970), pp. 55-76.
6. For a critical discussion of the human relations movement,
see Perrow ( 1972).
7. For a review of the research conducted, see Vroom (1964)
and Locke (197.5).
8. Part Ill of their book is devoted to this conceptual scheme
(1939, pp. 255-376).
9. As we have mentioned earlier, and will discuss further later
in this chapter, the model can be more accurately regarded as
the product of the Harvard School under Henderson and
Mayo. Mayo ( 1933) sets out some of the notions underlying
the model in a somewh~t crude and incomplete form.
Barnard ( 1938) also uses the notion of an equilibrating social
system, though his model is much more general in nature.
10. It is interesting to note that many early social researchers
were at pains to avoid attributing to social phenomena too
concrete a reality. See,forexample, Mayo(l933),pp. 33-4.
II. Roethlisberger and Dickson ( 1939), p. 272. Other significant
influences, in addition to those of Pareto and Durkheim,
included Freud, Piaget, Jung, Levy-Bruhl, Malinowski and
Radcliffe-Brown.
12. Roethlisberger and Dickson refer to Durkheim on only two
occasions in the whole of their work.
13. Many of the criticisms reviewed by Landsberger (19.58) are
launched from a pluralist perspective.
14. See, for example, the critique offered by Carey ( 1967). This is
subtitled ·A "Radical .. Critique', but in addressing itself to
problems of methodology and interpretation of results op-
erates within the problematic set by the Hawthorne model.
222 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
15. For an overview see, for example, the following collections
of readings: Vroom and Deci (1970), Warr (1971), Davis and
Taylor ( 1972).
16. For a review of these, see Miner and Dachler (1973).
17. For a review of recent evidence, see, for example, Locke
(1975).
18. Most contemporary 'expectancy' models are based upon
that developed by Vroom (1964).
19. See. for example, Warner and Low ( 1947), especially pp.
66-89, and Homans (1950).
20. See, for example, Rice (1958 and 1963) and Trist et at. (1963).
21. The relationship between human and structural aspects of
organisation was also explored in a systematic fashion by
Merton, Selznick, Gouldner, Blau and others. Taking
their point of departure from the bureaucratic theory of
Max Weber. they sought to show how dysfunctions arise as a
result of the unanticipated responses of organisation mem-
bers. As will be apparent from our discussion of Mertonian
theory in Chapter 4, Merton's and his colleagues' study of
dysfunctions reflects a perspective which falls outside the
bounds of social system theory. We shall be considering this
important work in detail in a separate section later in this
chapter.
22. The non-rational or informal aspects of organisation are
given detailed attention in some of Selznick's earlier works.
See, for example, Selznick (1943).
23. See, for example, Miller and Rice (1967).
24. See, for example, Rice's discussion on the management of
change (Rice, 1958, pp. 248-54).
25. The notion of •appreciation' is derived from the work of
Vickers (1966).
26. For a discussion of these terms, see Katz and Kahn (1965),
pp. 25-8.
27. Most open systems models for the study of organisations can
usually be expressed in terms of a series of assumptions
about 'functional imperatives'. The apparent diversity of
such systems models usually disappears when they are
stripped down to the basic assumptions deriving from the use
of an organismic analogy.
28. In point offact, Woodward's work also involved case studies
which incorporated the use of some interesting methodologi-
cal approaches. However, it is the hard quantitative results
of her survey which are given the most prominence in reports
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 223
of the research and which have been most influential.
29. The references cited here are illustrative. The writers con-
cerned have produced a large number of publications in this
area.
30. It can be argued, for example, that in attempting to correlate
the technology and structure of organisations, researchers
are examining two aspects of the same variable - viz. the
method of control.
31. The notion of differentiation and integration of social
systems was utilised by Herbert Spencer, who, as we have
argued, was one of the earliest social theorists explicitly to
develop the implications of the biological analogy.
32. As we have already discussed, the general concerns of the
classical management school (structures) and those of the
human relations school (human and social factors) had
already been integrated within the context of a framework for
the study of organisations by both Simon and Selznick.
However, this synthesis did not reconcile the detailed pro-
positions with regard to what constituted ideal management
practice.
33. Administrative Science Quarterly contains numerous reports
on research testing various aspects of the Lawrence and
Lorsch model. See, for example, Osborn (1974).
34. Kast and Rosenweig ( 1973) present many good and relevant
ideas on the contingency approach in a book of readings
which brings together some of the well-known articles in this
area.
35. The utility of and reliance which can be placed upon these
studies is qualified later in this section in terms of the distinc-
tion which we draw between the importance of •process' as
opposed to ·structure'.
36. The choice of these departments is arbitrary and an oversim-
plification. It is unlikely that a whole department - a struc-
tural manifestation of process - would comprise an element
on its own account. It is very easy to fall back upon structural
characteristics as a means of describing the differentiation of
an organisation, to the detriment of an overall systems view.
See below our qualifications on this point in our discussion of
the distinction between structure and process.
37. Even the research of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suffers
from this problem. They virtually ignore the processual
aspects of system and resort to hard quantitative measures of
structures and attitudes as a means of testing their scheme.
224 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
The methodology employed in this study is nowhere near as
sophisticated as the conceptual ideas which they present.
They equate subsystems with structural features within the
organisation: structure rather than system provides the start-
ing point for their analysis. The same problem is found in the
extension of the contingency approach presented in Lorsch
and Morse ( 1974); this study does little to advance the con-
cepts and methods presented in the earlier work. Insofar as it
is presented under the guise of systems theory as opposed to
determinism, the work of Pugh and Hickson (1976) and Hall
(1972) also stands as abstracted empiricism.
38. A similar point of view is presented in the work of Burns and
Stalker(l961), Rice(l963), Tristet a/. (1963) and Child (1972).
However, it could be argued that the choice available to the
strategic decision makers is, in fact, fairly restricted,
bounded by the structural constraints imposed by the envi-
ronment.
39. For an excellent presentation of some of the central features
of the work of Merton, Selznick. and Gouldner, see March
and Simon (1958), pp. 36-47.
40. The work of these writers diverges quite considerably after
the publication of these case studies on bureaucracy. We
have already referred to the way in which Selznick follows
the implications of a fairly traditional structural functionalist
approach to organisation. Peter Blau makes a specific break
with the case study as a method of organisational analysis in
favour of empirical studies of formal organisational struc-
tures, as referred to in an earlier section of this chapter. In
essence this line of development reflects an attempt to follow
Merton's call for 'middle-range' activities linking theory to
research. We would argue that much ofBiau's recent work in
this area represents a form of abstracted empiricism, in
which methods dominate theoretical perspectives. We also
referred in Chapte:- 4 to Blau's theory of exchange and
power, which reflects another 'middle-range' investigation
characteristic of a different region of the functionalist para-
digm - that of interactionism. Blau's work is thus charac-
teristic of a number of distinct areas. Blau presents a useful
outline on the development of his general research interests
in the introductory chapter of his book of essays On the
Nmure of Organi.o;ations ( 1974).
The work of Alvin Gouldner demonstrates the greatest
change of all. Since his early work on bureaucracy. Gouldner
 Functionalist Organisation Theory 22.5
has ranged very considerably in general orientations. From
the cautious but potentially radical critique offunctionalism
presented in his 'Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional
Theory' published in 1959, he has moved to what constitutes
an all-out attack upon the functionalist perspective. This is
most clearly illustrated in The Coming Crisis of Western
Sociolol(y (1970), which provides a somewhat rambling
·reflexive sociology' characteristic of the general trend to
individualism and subjectivism in sociology during the 1960s.
It is a perspective which, whilst moving towards the view of a
radical humanist seems much more concerned to develop a
subjectivist attack upon functionalism than to focus upon a
sociology of radical change. This dimension is much more
evident in The Ditllectic of Ideology and Technology ( 1976).
41. See, for example, our discussion of radical organisation
theory in Chapter 11.
42. Schutz and Weber are discussed elsewhere in this text. The
work of Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Ret~lity (1966), presents a strange mixture of sociological
positivism and phenomenological sociology in the neo-
idealist mould. Their ideas have influenced many theorists
located in this area of the functionalist paradigm, including
David Silverman, whose work we shall be considering in a
later section.
43. See also. the collection of ethnographic accounts of work
presented in Fraser (1968).
44. As we argue below,the action frame of reference only figures
as an element in their overall work, which viewed in its
totality draws heavily upon much more objectivist
methodologies. We include it here as an example of the
action framework with considerable qualification and,
indeed, reservations. It is often cited as an example of the
action approach, but its links with the Weberian perspective
are at times very tenuous.
45. Silverman (1970), pp. 3-4. This view of the systems
approach implies that it is necessarily associated with the use
of a biological analogy. Whilst this is true in relation to the
majority of systems applications within the field of organisa-
tion theory, it is not a necessary characteristic of the systems
approach as such. Please see our discussion in Chapter 4 for
further elaboration of this point.
46. Silverman acknowledges the influence of the following
writers: Weber ( 1947), Schutz ( 1964), Berger and Luckmann
226 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
(1966), Berger and Pullberg (1966), Rose (1962), GotTman
(1959), Cicourel (1964) and Cohen (1968).
47. The distinction between 'unitary' and "pluralist' frames of
reference has come into prominence through the work of Fox
(1966). It is also possible to introduce a third category - the
'radical' frame of reference (Fox, 1973, 1974a, 1974b). We
are excluding the radical perspective from our discussion
here because it belongs to a different intellectual tradition,
one characteristic of the radical structuralist paradigm. See
Chapter 11 for a discussion of this radical organisation
theory.
48. The view put forward in March and Simon ( 1958), for exam-
ple, is that whilst members of an organisation have different
goals and values, the major implication for a theory of
organisations is that they have to be motivated to produce
and to remain members of the organisation. Hence their
elaboration of the 'inducement-contribution' theory first
introduced by Barnard (1938).
49. For a review of some ofthese developments, see Chadwick-
Jones ( 1976).
.SO. An extensive literature on the theory of power does already
exist upon which organisation theorists can draw. See, for
example, the wide range of articles in Olsen ( 1970) and the
discussion presented by Lukes (1974). Lukes' distinction
between different views of power has much in common with
the distinction which we have drawn between the
functionalist and radical structuralist paradigms.
Sl. We will return to this in our concluding chapter.
6. Interpretive Sociology

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The interpretive paradigm embraces a wide range of philosophical
and sociological thought which shares the common characteristic
of attempting to understand and explain the social world primarily
from the point of view of the actors directly involved in the social
process. Its history is firmly rooted in the German idealist tradi-
tion, and in the view that the ultimate reality of the universe lies in
•spirit' or •idea' rather than in the data of sense perception. This
tradition, which runs counter to that of sociological positivism,
owes much to the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1803), who was
one of the first philosophers to articulate its basic ontological and
epistemological foundations. Kant, whose philosophy is open to a
wide range of interpretations, posited that a priori knowledge must
precede any grasp or understanding of the sense data of empirical
experience. He argued that there must be inherent, in-born
organising principles within man's consciousness by which any
and all sense data is structured, arranged and thus understood. A
priori knowledge was seen as independent of any external reality
and the sense data which it ·emits'; it was seen as the product of
·mind' and the interpretive processes which go on within it. Whilst
the world in which men live may be the product of a complex
interrelationship between a priori knowledge and empirical reality,
for Kant the starting point for understanding this lay in the realm of
•mind' and 'intuition'. It is this basic, uncomplicated assumption
which underlies the whole of German idealism.
The development of idealism has, however, been far from
uniform. Subject to diverse influences ranging from the ·romantic'
writings of Goethe and Schiller to the somewhat dogmatic philoso-
phy of Hegel, its fortunes have been mixed. From a period of
ascendency in European thought during the later eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, it was thereafter more or less forced
into a secondary place by the •practical' achievements of sociolog-
ical positivism. However, by the end of the nineteenth century a
revivial of interest was underway, giving rise to the so-called
neo-idealist, or neo-Kantian movement.
228 Sodolo!(ical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
As H. Stuart Hughes has so clearly argued, the period
1890-1930 was a time of considerable intellectual ferment
characterised by a concern with the subjective aspects of scientific
enquiry. The major intellectual figures of the 1890s 'were
obsessed, almost intoxicated, with a rediscovery of the non-
logical, the uncivilised, the inexplicable' (H. S. Hughes, 1958, p.
35). This interest in the subjective and irrational was reflected in
the work of writers as widely diverse as Freud, Weber and
Husser!, each of whom responded in his own distinctive fashion.•
In addition to focusing attention upon the essentially complex and
problematic nature of human behaviour and experience, the work
of this generation of theorists returned to the basic problems of
epistemology identified by Kant, which confronted both the
natural and social sciences. The positivist position came to be seen
as increasingly unsatisfactory and problematic on at least two
counts. First, within the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) it
became clear that human values intruded upon the process of
scientific enquiry. It was evident that scientific method could no
longer be regarded as value-free; the frame of reference of the
scientific observer was increasingly seen as an active force which
determined the way in which scientific knowledge was obtained.
Within the realm of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)
a second set of difficulties were also seen as arising, since their
subject matter was distinguished by its essentially spiritual charac-
ter. It was realised that man as an actor could not be studied
through the methods of the natural sciences, with their concern for
establishing general laws. In the cultural sphere, it was held, man
was 'not subject to law in the physical sense, but was free. An
intellectual apprehension of his life and action could be attained
only by the speculative methods of philosophy, especially by a
process of the intuition of the total wholes (Gestalten) which it was
illegitimate to break down by "atomistic" analysis' (Parsons,
1949, p. 475). As a result of this disenchantment with sociological
positivism, idealism assumed a new lease of life. In short, there
was a distinctive shift in the focus of intellectual attention along the
subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme, which
involved certain theorists in clarifying the intellectual foundations
of what we describe as the interpretive paradigm.
Among the theorists who have contributed to these intellectual
foundations, we identify Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber and
Edmund Husser) as having been particularly influential. In
fundamentally distinct ways they have done much to define the
character and issues which have commanded the attention of
 Interpretive Sociology 229
interpretive sociology during the twentieth century.
Dilthey (1833-1911) and Weber (1864-1920) were particularly
concerned to bridge the gulf between idealism and positivism, or at
least place the cultural sciences upon a firm foundation in terms of
their 'objective validity'. 2 If the cultural sciences were defined by
their spiritual character. then the ·spirit' of a social situation or
type of institution was of key importance. This posed considerable
problems for social philosophers, who were concerned to provide
explanations of social and historical affairs without reverting to the
methods of positivism. The idealist process of'the intuition of total
wholes' provided a means of organising the historical process but
got no closer to an understanding of it. It often resulted in an
entirely relativistic view of history as a series of unique and essen-
tially unconnected systems. Explanations in the idealist tradition,
it seemed, could only be provided through recourse to intuition or
metaphysics.l
Dilthey's solution to the problem was found in the notion of
verstehen (understanding). In drawing a distinction between the
natural and cultural sciences, he maintained that the difference
between them was essentially one of substance, and that the two
types of science addressed themselves to fundamentally different
kinds ofsubject matter. Whereas the natural sciences investigated
external processes in a material world, the cultural sciences were
essentially concerned with the internal processes ofhuman minds.
Even though these processes may be translated into relatively
tangible cultural phenomena such as art, poetry, institutions and
the like, it was maintained that they could only be fully understood
in relation to the minds which created them and the inner experi-
ence which they reflected. Cultural phenomena were, in essence,
seen as the external manifestations of such inner experience and
hence, it was argued, could only be fully appreciated with this
reference point in view. In these situations the approach and the
methods of the natural sciences, with their emphasis upon the
search for general laws and causal explanations, were deemed
inappropriate. The cultural sciences needed a new analytical
method based on verstehen, through which the investigator could
seek to understand human beings, their inner minds and their
feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions
and achievements. In short, the outward manifestations of human
life needed to be interpreted in terms oft he inner experience which
they reflected through the method of verstehen.
We wish to place emphasis here upon the word method since, as
conceptualised by Dilthey and later by Weber, this was its essen-
230 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
tial status. Verstehen was viewed as a method which could be used
in the cultural sciences to generate scientific knowledge of an
objectivity comparable with that obtained in the natural sciences.
The notion of verstehen provided a means of studying the world of
human affairs by reliving or re-enacting the experience of others.
As we shall see, Dilthey''i view ofverstehen has had an important,
direct and formative influence upon the hermeneutic school of
thought which we discuss later in this chapter. In more general
terms, his social philosophy had a marked but indirect influence
upon the development of many other elements of thought
characteristic of the interpretive paradigm. Indeed. the notion of
'understanding' in one form or another is a defining characteristic
of all theories located within this paradigm.
Despite Dilthey's importance and underlying formative influ-
ence. it is through the work of Weber that the notion ofverstehen
as method has had the greatest impact on sociological thought. and
nowhere is the bridge-building exercise between idealism and
positivism more evident. 4 As Hughes ( 1958), Runciman ( 1972) and
others have suggested, Weber was fighting a war on at least two
fronts. He was dissatisfied with the superficialities which he
regarded as characterising positivist explanations of society, and
also greatly concerned with the subjective and 'unscientific'
nature of idealist thought. His solution to the problem is found in
his methodological writings, in which he develops the view that
explanations of social affairs must be ·adequate on the level of
meaning', and that the essential function of social science is to be
'interpretive', that is. to understand the subjective meaning of
social action. He defines sociology as ·a science which attempts
the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to
arrive at a causal explanation of its courses and effects ... Action
is social insofar as, by virtue ofthe subjective meaning attached to
it by the acting individual (or individuals). it takes account of the
behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented in its course' (Weber,
1947. p. 88). 5
This definition clearly reflects the attempted fusion of idealist
and positivist perspectives. He adheres to the positivists' concern
for providing causal explanations of social phenomena but insists
that such explanations must be reduced to the level of the indi-
vidual. As Schutz notes, 'Weber reduces all kinds of social rela-
tionships and structures, all cultural objectifications. all realms of
objective mind, to the most elementary forms of individual
behaviour' (Schutz, 1967, p. 6). His view of sociology is thus one
which is concerned to provide causal explanations of social
 Interpretive Sociology 231
phenomena whilst avoiding the pitfalls of reification. He is con-
cerned to build an objective science of sociology upon the founda-
tions of subjective meaning and individual action.
In this task Weber's notion of the 'ideal type' plays a central
part. 6 Indeed, Weber insists that objectivity in the social sciences
is only made possible through the use of ideal types, which allow
for the ordering of elements of reality. Through the use of these
constructs Weber attempts to reconcile the method of verstehen
with the need to develop an objective social science. Ideal types
incorporate the ·spirit' which characterises individual phenomena
into a wider generalised whole. In certain important respects,
therefore, the method ofverstehen is assimilated into a typological
scheme of analysis whit:h provides a means of ordering and
explaining human action.
Weber thus seeks to balance and reconcile the potentially
divergent perspectives of idealism and positivism. Whilst stressing
the importance of subjective meaning in explanations of social
affairs, he at the same time seeks to contain and limit the role of
these subjective factors. This is clearly evident, for example, in his
classification of behaviour into different types such as ·rationally
purposive'. ·rationally value-orientated', 'emotional' and 'tradi-
tional'. Although the central task of his sociology is to understand
and interpret social action, he constrains this endeavour by the
implicit assumption that behaviour can be causally explained with
reference to fairly narrowly defined typologies of action.
Viewed critically. therefore, Weber's stand with regard to
'interpretive sociology' can be seen as reflecting certain strains
and tensions. Interpretation and the notion of verstehen in
Weber's hands acts as little more than a methodological tool for
overcoming obvious deficiencies in positivist method. Essentially,
Weber is interested in developing a causal theory of social explana-
tion rather than in pursuing the full implications of the idealist view
of the nature of social reality. As Schutz (1967) has observed,
Weber was most concerned with confronting concrete problems
and was interested in the more fundamental epistemological issues
only insofar as they had a contribution to make towards this end.
Weber can be seen as a ·sociologist of regulation •, in that one of
his central concerns was to provide a thorough-going analysis of
social order. In this the notion of rationality was accorded a central
role. Whether he can be more appropriately described as a
positivist rather than an idealist will no doubt continue to be
debated. 7 As far as the four strands of the subjective-objective
dimension of our analytical scheme rs concerned, he appears to
232 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
occupy an intermediate and somewhat incongruent position. In
terms of methodology, his interpretive perspective would suggest
a location on the boundary of the interpretive paradigm, along with
Dilthey's hermeneutics. His position with regard to ontology,
epistemology and human nature would appear to be more
objectivist. For Weber, the objective reality of the social world is
not a central issue. It is the way in which it is interpreted by human
actors that is important. In this his position directly parallels the
theoretical perspective which we have described as behavioural
symbolic interaction within the context of the functionalist para-
digm. As we have suggested, theory and research based upon the
action frame of reference, which derives more or less directly from
Weber's explorations in methodology, is most appropriately
located there, and it would seem that a similar case can be made in
relation to much of Weber's other work.
What, then, is Weber·s significance as far as the interpretive
paradigm is concerned? We argue that it arises from his role as a
point of departure for other writers, notably Schutz, who have
taken Weber's work as a base from which to develop a much more
subjectivist view of sociology. It will be apparent from our dis-
cussion later in the chapter that the notion of verstehen in other
hands has assumed a significance beyond that of mere method. As
Giddens has noted, from a phenomenological point of view •it is
the very ontological condition of human life in society as such'
(Giddens, 1976, p. 19). This ontological status of verstehen is
clearly evident, for example, in the work of Edmund Husserl, and
it will be helpful if we conclude our discussion of the origins and
intellectual traditions of the interpretive paradigm with a brief
review of his work. The extremely subjectivist position which he
adopts will also serve to illustrate the essentially intermediate
perspective reflected in Weber.
Edmund Husser) ( 1859-1938) is widely regarded as the founder
and leading exponent of the phenomenological movement in
philosophy. As will become apparent from our discussion later in
the chapter, it is not altogether a coherent movement and does not
lend itself to any simple and straightforward definition. Maurice
Natanson, one of phenomenology's leading contemporary
spokesmen, offers the following characterisation:

Phenomenology is a presuppositionless philosophy which holds con-

sciousness to be the matrix. of all phenomena, considers phenomena to
be objects of intentional acts and treats them as essences, demands its
own method, concerns itself with prepredictative experience, offers
 Interpretive Sociology 233
itself as the foundation of science, and comprises a philosophy of the
life world, a defence of Reason. and ultimately a critique of philosophy.
(Natanson, 1973b, p. 19)

Husserlian phenomenology is based upon a fundamental ques-

tioning of the common-sense, 'taken for granted' attitudes which
characterise everyday life and the realms of natural science. As
Natanson has suggested, 'the central endeavour of phenomenol-
ogy is to transcend [what Husserl calls] the natural attitude of daily
life in order to render it an object for philosophical scrutiny and in
order to describe and account for its essential structure'
(Natanson, 1966, p. 3). The view that there is an objective external
world which exists in space and time and is real for all men is
subjected to thorough scrutiny. The presuppositions of science are
reduced to implicit metaphysical commitments. In the process the
external world is shown to be an artefact of consciousness;
phenomena are shown to be willed into existence through
intentional acts. Man is shown to live in a world created through
consciousness.
Husserl thus adopts an extremely subjectivist position in rela-
tion to the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme. Ontologically, the world constitutes a stream of con-
sciousness; it is experiential; the subjective is the source of all
objectivities. The task of epistemology is to explore and reveal the
essential types and structures of experience. Phenomenology
studies essences and clarifies the relationships between them; it
seeks to delve into experiences and clarify the very grounds of
knowledge. In this endeavour the methods of 'direct intuition' and
'insight into essential structures' are offered as the principal means
of penetrating the depths of consciousness and transcending the
world of everyday affairs in search of subjectivity in its pure form.
The procedure of epoche - whereby the phenomenologist
suspends his complicity and participation in the 'natural attitude'
- also plays a central role. As Natanson puts it, 'believing-in-the
world is the paradigm of normality. The philosopher's task is not to
ridicule it but to understand it and point out its implications. Any
attempt lo examine such believing will be prejudiced, however, by
the philosopher's own believing unless he finds a way to free
himself of the very attitude he seeks to elucidate' (Natanson,
1973b, p. IS). Epoche, or suspended complicity, provides a
means of entering the realm of subjectivity which phenomenology
seeks to analyse and describe.
Compared with the philosophy of Husserl, Weber's
234 SocioloKical ParadiKms mrd Orflanisational Am1lysis
'interpretive sociology' thus emerges as a very limited excursion
into the realm of the subjective. It is perhaps fair to say that it does
little more than attribute an element of voluntarism to the indi-
vidual's interpretation of his world which more positivist theories
typical of the functionalist paradigm tend to deny, or at least
ignore.
Interestingly enough, Husser!, like Weber, began to articulate
his distinctive intellectual position as a result of his dissatisfaction
with conventional science. He began his academic career as a
mathematician and physicist but soon became concerned with
what he regarded as defects in their essential foundations.• He was
passionately committed to the ideal of a 'rigorous science' and
looked to philosophy and logic for answers to what he saw as the
fundamental problems. Disappointed with what he found, his
desire to penetrate to the sources of science led him to an increas-
ingly subjectivist position, and the conclusion that philosophy
required a phenomenological reorganisation which would •assist
even the objective scientist in the clarification and critique of his
unclarified fundamental concepts and assumptions' (Spiegelberg,
1965, p. 79).
Like Weber, Husserl was highly dissatisfied with positivist sci-
ence, with its uncritical study of mere facts and its inability to cope
with problems of ultimate truth and validity. However, whilst
Weber concerned himself with the refinement of methodology and
addressed himself to what he saw as the fundamental problems of
social science, Husser! travelled in another direction. Addressing
himself to fundamental problems of ontology, epistemology and
methodology, he embarked upon an intellectual journey leading to
a radically subjectivist form of transcendental phenomenology.ln
so doing he laid the foundations for further exploration in the
highly subjectivist region of the interpretive paradigm.

The Structure of the Paradigm

Whilst its intellectual roots can be traced back to the work of the
early German idealists, the interpretive paradigm has been most
decisively shaped and influenced by the works of Dilthey, Husser!
and Weber. For the most part, therefore, it can be regarded as a
twentieth-century phenomenon.
 Interpretive Sociology 235
We argue that the paradigm can be considered in terms of four
distinct but related categories of interpretive theory, distinguished
for the most part by their degree of 'subjectivity' in terms of the
four strands of the subjectiv~objective dimension of our analyti-
cal scheme. 9 We identify them as (a) solipsism; (b) phenomenol-
ogy; (c) phenomenological sociology; (d) hermeneutics. Their
location within the paradigm is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The Hermeneutic school occupies the least subjectivist region of
the paradigm. Deriving largely from the work of Dilthey and the
notion ofverstehen, it first evolved as a method of study especially
adapted to an idealist view ofthe world. More recently, under the
influence of Gadamer, it has assumed a new dimension and has
developed in broader theoretical terms, particularly in relation to
the role and influence of language in social life. Its contemporary
importance within the context of the interpretive paradigm is
rapidly increasing, though up to now has been largely over-
shadowed by its use in critical theory within the context of the
radical humanist paradigm. We identify solipsism in the most
subjectivist region of the paradigm. It belongs to the realm of
metaphysics rather than sociology and is included here to highlight
the ultimate dilemma facing all philosophical and sociological
perspectives which emphasise the subjective in an extreme form.
Phenomenology occupies the middle ground of the paradigm.
We distinguish between the transcendental phenomenology of
Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Schutz. The latter
attempts to link themes drawn from the sociology of Weber and the
philosophy of Husserl.
aosely related to phenomenology, but distinct from it, we
identify two branches of sociological thought which combine the
phenomenological perspective with elements drawn from
elsewhere. Ethnomethodology fuses phenomenology and ele-
ments of ordinary language philosophy. particularly that typical of
the work of the later Wittgenstein and Winch. Phenomenological
symbolic interactionism interprets the work of G. H. Mead from a
phenomenological perspective, in the manner discussed in an
earlier chapter.
We will examine each broad category and school of thought in
tum.

Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting and understanding
the products of the human mind which characterise the social and
236 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
cultural world. Ontologically, its proponents adopt an 'objective
idealist' view of the socio-cultural environment, seeing it as a
humanly constructed phenomenon. Human beings in the course of
life externalise the internal processes of their minds through the
creation of cultural artefacts which attain an objective character.
Institutions, works of art, literature, languages, religions and the
like are examples of this process of objectification. Such
objectifications of the human mind are the subject of study in
hermeneutics.
As we have already noted, it is largely through the work of
Dilthey that hermeneutics has achieved the status of a school of
thought within the context of contemporary social theory. 10 In
Dilthey's hands it was essentially a methodology for studying the
objectifications of mind. It played a central role in his overall
scheme for generating objectively valid knowledge in the
Geisteswissenschaften through the method of verstehen.
Verstehen, we recall, was the means by which we comprehend the
meaning of a historical or social situation or cultural artefact. It
was a method of understanding based upon re-enactment. In order
to be comprehended, the subject of study needed to be relived in
the subjective life of the observer. Through this process, Dilthey
claimed, objective knowledge could be obtained.
Dilthey argued that one of the main avenues for verstehen was
through the study of empirical life assertions -institutions, histor-
ical situations, language, etc. - which reflected the inner life of
their creators. The study of these social creations was seen as the
main avenue to an understanding of the world of objective mind.
The method was that of hermeneutics. As he puts it,
Re-creating and re-living what is alien and past shows clearly how
understanding rests on special, personal inspiration. But, as this is a
significant and permanent condition of historical science, personal
inspiration becomes a technique which develops with the development
of historical consciousness. It is dependent on permanently fixed
expressions being available so that understanding can always return to
them. The methodical understanding of permanently fixed expressions
we call exegesis. As the life of the mind only finds its complete,
exhaustive and, therefore, objectively comprehensible expression in
language, exegesis culminates in the interpretation of the written
records of human existence. This method is the basis of philology.
The science of this method is hermeneutics. (Dilthey, 1976, p. 228)

Dilthey singled out hermeneutics as a key discipline and method

in the human sciences. He advocated that social phenomena of all
 Interpretive Sociology 237
kinds should be analysed in detail, and interpreted as texts, to
reveal their essential meaning and significance. The method of
hermeneutics thus involved human scientists adopting the style of
literary analysts rather than natural scientists. Textual analysis of
meaning and significance was regarded as more appropriate than a
scientific search for knowledge of general laws. Oil they was con-
cerned that the basic rules of hermeneutics should be defined, so
that the insights of interpreters of rare genius could be utilised by
others.
Dilthey's overall approach to hermeneutics is clearly illustrated
in the notion of the so-called 'hermeneutic circle'. He recognised
that the social whole cannot be understood independently of its
parts, and vice versa. Words in a sentence have to be understood in
terms of their total context. Whilst one can attribute a particular
meaning to words on their own account, they may assume a
different meaning in the context of other words. So, too, with
social phenomena. Dilthey recognised that this part-whole rela-
tionship was characteristic of the social world and that a
systematic approach was necessary. The desire to formulate
methodical rules of interpretation, therefore, was accompanied by
a recognition that 'there are no absolute starting points, no self-
evident, self-contained certainties on which we can build, because
we always find ourselves in the middle of complex situations which
we try to disentangle by making, then revising, provisional
assumptions' (Rickman, 1976, p. II). In this way the methodolog-
ical rules of hermeneutics were seen to move in a circular and
iterative fashion towards an increased understanding of the
objectifications of mind.
In recent years the hermeneutic tradition has assumed a new line
of development particularly through the work of Gadamer
( 1965). 11 He argues that the circle of understanding, as envisaged,
for example, by Dilthey, is not a 'methodological' circle, but
describes an ontological structural element in understanding. Tak-
ing Heidegger's description and existential account of the
hermeneutic circle as a point of departure, he argues that we
cannot relate, for example, to a historic tradition as if it existed as
an object apart from us, since there is an interplay between the
movement of tradition and the interpreter. In order to understand
social or cultural phenomena, the observer must enter into a
dialogue with the subject of study. As Giddens puts it,

Understanding a text from a historical period remote from our own, for
example, or from a culture very different from our own is, according to
238 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Gadamer. essentially a creative process in which the observer, through
penetrating an alien mode of existence. enriches his own self-
knowledge through acquiring knowledge of others. Ver:uehen consists,
not in placing oneself "inside" the subjective experience of a text's
author, but in understanding literary art through grasping, to use
Wittgenstein's term, the "form of life" which gives it meaning. (Gid-
dens, 1976, p. 56)

With Gada mer, verstehen is not so much concerned with ·re-

living' or entering into the subjective experiences of others as it
was for Dilthey. It is more concerned with appreciating the
interchange of the frames of reference of the observer and the
observed.ln this process the role oflanguage is given a central role
•as the medium ofintersubjectivity and as the concrete expression
of "forms of life", or what Gadamer calls traditions' (Giddens,
1976, p. 56). Language is the mediator between frames of reference
or traditions, and is thus central to the process of understanding.
Extended and developed in this way, hermeneutics in
Gadamer's hands becomes relevant to all areas of. enquiry: ·a
universal mode of philosophy' and not just a methodological
foundation for the cultural sciences. The role of language assumes
ontological status and brings Gadamer's view of hermeneutics
close to a phenomenological perspective. Language, for Gada mer,
is more than a system of symbols for labelling the external world; it
becomes an expression of the human mode of 'being in the world'.
As Gadamer says, 'Being is manifest in language'. 12
From the perspective of sociology as opposed to that of philoso-
phy, the hermeneutic school of thought has as yet received
relatively little attention within the context of the interpretive
paradigm. Its main impact has been upon the radical humanist
paradigm, where the insights of Gadamer have generated interest
in the role of language within the context of critical theory,
particularly as developed by Habermas.

Solipsism
Solipsism represents the most extreme form of subjective ideal-
ism, in that it denies that the world has any distinct independent
reality. For the solipsist, the world is the creation of his mind.
 Interpretive Sociology 239
Ontologically, it has no existence beyond the sensations which he
perceives in his mind and body . 13
The solipsist view is most often associated with the work of the
Irish cleric Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753), though in point of
fact he did not adhere to such an extreme standpoint himself. 14
Berkeley questioned the common-sense belief that man is sur-
rounded by a world of external objects such as trees, mountains,
tables, streams, chairs, etc .• and suggested that they may be
merely the products of our perception. He argued that they may
have no distinct existence, being no more than our ideas. They
may exist only in our mind. What we mean when we say that a
thing exists is that it is perceived. An object may have no existence
beyond this ideal perception.
The solipsist perspective often attracts scorn and ridicule from
those who wish to continue to subscribe to a common-sense view
of an everyday world with a hard and fast external reality. How-
ever, Berkeley's argument is often equal to the challenge and not
easily refuted. Boswell reports how Berkeley's contemporary, Dr
Johnson, kicked a nearby stone saying, 'I refute it thus' (Boswell,
1953, p. 333). Dr Johnson's experience, however, in Berkeley's
terms, was reducible to the perception of pain and bodily sensa-
tions which Johnson may have located in his toe. The attempted
refutation was thus consistent with Berkeley's thesis that the
world is no more than what we perceive it to be.•s
The solipsist position results in a complete relativism and scep-
ticism. Given that there is no external point of reference, knowl-
edge must be limited to what we as individuals experience. It is an
entirely individual and personal affair; there is nothing beyond
oneself and one's ideas. The solipsist position is thus one which is
logically permissible but inward-looking and self-sustaining, and it
offers no scope for the development of a philosophy or social
theory which can be shared in any realistic sense.
We characterise solipsism as occupying the most subjectivist
region of the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme. The notions of regulation and radical change clearly have
no significance within a solipsist perspective; solipsism is thus
consistent with both the interpretive and radical humanist para-
digms. Its significance within the context of each is, for the most
part, a negative one, in that it presents a potential danger to social
theorists who wish to develop social theories with a subjective
emphasis. Subjectivist philosophic~ run the danger of being
grounded upon Sartre's •reef of solipsism', of entering an entirely
individualistic and subjectivist view of reality in which no mean-
240 Socioloxical Paradixms and Orxanisational Analysis
ingful discourse is possible. As we shall find in later discussion, the
'reef of solipsism' has been seen as a potential threat to a number of
social philosophers, notably Husser!.
In a more positive sense, in emphasising extreme sub_iectivism
solipsism defines the essentially intermediate and more moderate
status of other subjectivist philosophies. In adopting a completely
relativist position it illustrates the extent to which other views of
social reality and knowledge of the world are based essentially
upon shared meanings. It also highlights the equally extreme
nature of the common-sense notion of a world of hard-and-fast
objective reality.
Solipsism is thus located within the context of the interpretive
and radical humanist paradigm as a logically tenable position, but
one which is of little importance within the context of contempor-
ary sociology.

Phenomenology
As we have already noted, the phenomenological movement is not
altogether a coherent one, since it reflects a number of lines of
development. Taking the work ofHusserl as a point of departure, it
branches off in a number of directions according to the perspective
of its particular exponent. Writers such as Scheller, Heidegger,
Schutz, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have all made significant and
distinctive contributions towards its overall development. 16
We will discuss phenomenology here under two broad headings.
First, we shall devote attention to what is known as 'transcenden-
tal' or ·pure' phenomenology. which is most often associated with
the work ofHusserl. Second, we will consider a derivative of this,
'existential' phenomenology, particularly as reflected in the work
of Schutz.

Transcendental phenomenology
It will be recalled that Husser! was a mathematician and physicist
who. early in his career. became concerned with what he regarded
as the precarious foundations of logic and science. It was
characteristic of the man that he should decide to investigate the
sourceofthesefoundations.ln so doing he embarked upon a life's
 Interpretive SocioiORY 241
work, throughout which he was preoccupied by the problem of
foundations.
One of his earliest observations was that science was
characterised by 'intentionality'. Despite the fact that the results
of science were always approximate and imperfect, the scientist
was guided by the intention of absolute objectivity. It was this aim
of science, this idea of science rather than its results, that was
important in distinguishing it as a discipline worthy of its name.
In his quest for the objective foundations of science, Husser!
attempted to open up a new direction in the analysis of conscious-
ness. Bringing a mathematical mind to the subject, he contented
himself with the manipulation of ideal essences. Rather than
bother with factual realities or the formulation of hypotheses, he
addressed himself to the central question of meaning. He put
reality aside (or in his term, •in brackets') and sought to penetrate
to the level of the phenomenon. In other words, he sought to
practise phenomenology. As Thevenaz puts it.
Phenomenology is never an investigation of external or i'nternal facts.
On the contrary. it silences experience provisionally. leaves the ques-
tion of objective reality or of real content aside in order to turn its
attention solely and simply on the reality in consciousne.u, on the
objects insofar as they are intended by and in consciousness, in short
on what Husser! calls ideal essences. By this we must not understand
mere subjective representations (which would leave us on the plane of
psychology) nor ideal realitie.~ (which would 'reify' or hypostasise
unduly the data of consciousness and would put us on the level of
metaphysics), but precisely the 'phenomena' ... The phenomenon
here is that which manifests itself immediately in consciousness: it is
grasped in an invitation that precedes any reflexion or any judgement.
It has only to be allowed to show itself, to manifest itself: the
phenomenon i.~ that whkh Rive.~ itu/f (Se/b.<agehungJ. The
phenomenological method then. faced with the objects and the con-
tents of knowledge, consists in neglecting what alone counts for
philosophers and scientists, namely their value. their reality or unre-
ality. It consists in de'>cribing them such as they give themselves, as
pure and simple intentions (t·i.fee.v) of consciousness, as meanings, to
render them visible and manifest as such. In this We:ft'n.~dwu, the
es'>ence (We.ft'll) is neither ideal reality nor psychological reality. but
ideal intention (l"i.\'ee), intentional object of consciousness. immanent
to cono;ciouo;ness. (Thevenaz, 1962, pp. 43-4)

Such is the nature of the phenomenon which Husser! sought. In

his quest for the source, for the foundations of logic and the
sciences and eventually the whole of philosophy, Husserl began to
242 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
develop his phenomenological analysis. In his search he quickly
realised that phenomenological analysis had to penetrate way
beyond superficial description of appearance or intuition. With
Husser!, knowledge, which in ordinary pre-philosophical thought
is the most natural thing in the world, assumes the status of a
·mystery'. The search was for the primary. absolute evidence
which, like the phenomenon, was complete. clearly established
and in need of nothing outside itself to give it form.
In this endeavour the method of epoche, to which we have
already referred, was to play a central role, opening the way for the
'phenomenological reduction' and the exploration of a new and
fundamental level of meaning - the transcendental field. In this
transcendental philosophy Husser! attempts to grasp 'the world as
phenomenon' - to grasp it not as an object. but as pure meaning.
The fundamental. original and essential purpose of the reduction is
to 'bring to light [the) essential intentional contact between con-
sciousness and the world' (Thevenaz, 1962, p. 47).
The phenomenological reduction thus leads to a conjunction
between pure consciousness and the world phenomenon. All the
assumptions of everyday life are brushed aside in the pursuit of
pure subjectivity, of transcendental consciousness, the intention-
ality of which is the source of all meaning. This notion of intention-
ality - the idea that consciousness always has an object that con-
stitutes it- plays a crucial role in Husserl's philosophy. It denies
the possibility of there being an independent reality of any kind. At
the same time, reality is not constructed by consciousness; it is
revealed to it through the act of intentionality. This pursuit of
transcendental consciousness brought Husser! perilously close to
solipsism. As the external everyday world was swept away in
search of the transcendental, pure consciousness was left in splen-
did isolation, its intentionality the sole link with any semblance of a
wider reality. It occupied an isolated and self-contained realm of
its own. All else was a product of its intentional nature. Accord-
ingly, there was no external means of validating its existence. The
·reef of solipsism' loomed near.
This was a problem which greatly concerned Husser! during his
later years, and he fought hard to find a way out of this solipsist
dilemma, particularly through the notion of'intersubjectivity'. He
sought 'to show how the transcendental ego constitutes other egos
as equal partners in an intersubjective community, which in turn
forms the foundations for the 'objective' (that is, the intersub-
jective) world. His arguments in this direction were not altogether
convincing, given that the transcendental aspects of his
 lnterpreth·e Sociology 243
philosophy were to be maintained intact, but, as we shall see, they
laid important foundations for the development of 'existential
phenomenology', particularly as developed by Shutz. Most of
Husserl's followers were content to dwell on the lived-in world of
experience. 17 They were not prepared to follow the road to tran-
scendentalism and largely abandoned this aspect of Husserl's
philosophy. As far as the interpretive paradigm is concerned, tran-
scendental phenomenology has been the subject of very little
further development. Occupying a position towards the sub-
jectivist extreme of the paradigm, its main significance has been as
a springboard, or at least a point of departure, for less subjectively
orientated brands of phenomenology. We will discuss the most
important of these in the next section.
Interestingly enough, Husserl's transcendental notions have
been adopted to a certain extent by theorists operating within a
perspective characteristic of the radical humanist paradigm.
Transcendence, from their point of view, has been seen as indicat-
ing a potential for release from the bonds of everyday life. The
work of Sartre, in particular, reflects the direct influence of
Husser!, and we will return to a discussion of this in a later chapter.

Existential phenomenology
The existential wing of the phenomenological movement is most
often associated with the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre and Schutz. They share a common concern for what
Husserl called the •Jife-world' (Lebenswelt), for the world of
everyday experience as opposed to the realm of transcendental
consciousness. However, apart from this concern with the •Jife-
world' and the way in which men exist within it, it is misleading to
view their work in similar terms. Each develops a theoretical
perspective which, whilst adhering to a roughly similar position in
terms of the various strands of the subjective-objective
dimension of our analytical scheme, addresses itself to quite
different issues and problems. 18 We will confine our discussion of
existential phenomenology here to the work of Schutz who, in his
attempt to develop a ·phenomenology of the social world'. brings
the subject down from the realm of philosophical discourse to
something approaching a sociological perspective.
The work of Alfred Schutz ( 1899-1959) can be characterised as
a sustained effort to relate the idea of phenomenology to the
problems of sociology. In essence, it seeks to link the perspectives
244 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analy:~is
of Weber and Husser!, drawing also upon the philosophy of
Bergson.
Schutz commences his classic work The Phenomenology of the
Social World, first published in 1932, by stating that it is based
upon an intensive concern of many years' duration with the
theoretical writings of Max Weber. Whilst convinced that Weber's
approach was correct and that it provided •a proper starting point
for the philosophy of the social sciences', Schutz felt sure that it
'did not go deeply enough to lay the foundations on which alone
many of the problems of the human sciences could be solved'
(1967, pp. xxxi).
Driving down to these foundations, in the manner of Husser!,
Schutz identified a number of ambiguities in Weber's position and
subjected them to thorough philosophical analysis. While agree-
ing with Weber that the essential function of social science was to
be interpretive, that is, to understand the subjective meaning of
social action, he felt that Weber had failed to state the essential
characteristics of •understanding' (verstehen), ·subjective mean-
ing' and ·action'. For Schutz, a thorough-going analysis of these
concepts was essential in order to place the subject matter and
methods of the social sciences upon a firm basis.
Schutz embarks upon a phenomenological analysis of meaning,
searching for its origins in the 'stream of consciousness'. This
notion, which he derives from Bergson, is crucial to his analysis,
since it introduces the temporal dimension which underlies the
concept of ·renexivity'. Schutz argues that consciousness is
fundamentally an unbroken stream of lived experiences which
have no meaning in themselves. Meaning is dependent upon
renexivity- the process of turning back on oneself and looking at
what has been going on. Meaning is attached to actions
retrospectively; only the already-experienced is meaningful, not
that which is in the process of being experienced.
Schutz also argues that this process of attributing meaning
renexively is dependent upon the actor's identifying the purpose
or goal which he or she is supposedly seeking. This introduces
the notion of being able to attribute meaning. in advance, to future
experiences. The concept of meaningful action thus contains ele-
ments of both past and anticipated future; intrinsically it has a
temporal dimension. Schutz's analysis of this ·constituting pro-
cess in internal time consciousness' is a direct application of the
•phenomenological reduction' as described by Husser!. The
natural attitude towards the 'world-given-to-me-as-being-there' is
suspended in the manner ofthe epoche, in an attempt to penetrate
 Interpretive Sociolo~y 245
to the essence of consciousness and meaning. Whilst appropriate
for the above purpose. Schutz specifically recognises that the
analysis of meaning in everyday social life does not require the
transcendental knowledge yielded by the phenomenological
reduction. As he proceeds to the study of the social world. there-
fore, he abandons the strictly phenomenological method. He
accepts the existence of the social world as presented in the natural
attitude and focuses upon the problem of intersubjective under-
standing, 'by-passing a whole nest of problems' identified by
Husser! in relation to the issue of transcendental subjectivity and
intersubjectivity· (Schutz, 1967, p. 94).
Schutz's analysis of intersubjectivity is thus principally
informed by a sociological as opposed to a phenomenological
perspective. It reflects a predilection for the 'life-world' as
opposed to that of transcendental philosophy. Basically, Schutz is
concerned to throw light upon the way in which we come to know
the lived experience of others. In this he makes a fundamental
distinction 'between the genuine understandin~ of the other
person and the abstract conceptualisation of his actions or
thoughts as being of such and such a type' (1967. pp. xxv). Genuine
understanding means the intentional grasping of the experience of
the other. in a manner akin to looking into the other's stream of
consciousness. It reflects the true comprehension of subjective
meaning. The abstract conceptualisation does not refer so much to
understanding. as to 'self-elucidation'; it is merely an ordering of
one's own experience into categories. Genuine understanding is
possible in face-to-face 'we-relations'; it depends upon direct
exchange and interaction. As we pass from these situations of
direct interaction to modes of indirect experience of others, we
have to resort to more and more abstract conceptualisation.
For Schutz, the process of understanding the conduct of others
can be understood as a process of typification. whereby the actor
applies interpretive constructs akin to 'ideal types' to apprehend
the meanings of what people do. These constructs are derived from
the experience of everyday life and the stock of knowledge or
common-sense understandings which comprise the natural
attitude. It is through the use of typifications that we classify and
organise our everyday reality. The typifications are learned
through our biographical situation. They are handed to us accord-
ing to our social context. Knowledge of everyday life is thus
socially ordered. The notion of typification or ideal type is thus not
a merely methodological device as envisaged by Weber, but an
inherent feature of our everyday world. 1"
246 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Schutz argues that the stock of knowledge which we use to
typify the actions of others and understand the world around us
varies from context to context. We live in a world of ·multiple
realities·. each of which is defined in terms of 'finite provinces of
meaning·. The social actor shifts between these provinces of mean-
ing in the course of his everyday life. As he shifts from the world of
work to that of home and leisure or to the world of religious
experience, different ground rules are brought into play. Whilst it
is within the normal competence of the acting individual to shift
from one sphere to another, to do so calls for a 'leap of conscious-
ness • to overcome the differences between the different worlds. 20
For Schutz, therefore, the problem of understanding the mean-
ing structure of the world of everyday life was a central concern.
'To see this world in its massive complexity. to outline and explore
its essential features. and to trace out its manifold relationships
were the composite parts of his central task. the realization of a
philosophy of mundane reality. or. in more formal language, of a
phenomenology of the natural attitude' (Schutz, 1962, p. xxv). The
central task of social science. according to Schutz. was to under-
stand the social world from the point of view of those living within
it, using constructs and explanations which are intelligible in terms
of the common-sense interpretation of everyday life. 21
Schutz thus attempts to link phenomenology and sociology in an
analysis of the world of everyday affairs. His attempt, whilst
generating many insights, is only partially successful. The sub-
stantive links with the transcendental philosophy of Husserl are at
times very tenuous. particularly with regard to the issue of
intersubjectivity. This notion is crucial to Schutz•s analysis, yet
extremely problematic within the context of transcendental
phenomenology, for reasons which we have already discussed.
The inner world of intentional consciousness and the outer
manifestations of the world of everyday life are at times uneasy
bedfellows. The phenomenological enterprise per se encounters
serious difficulties in attempting to deal with any reality outside the
individual's consciousness, and Shutz's work reflects this
dilemma.
Judged from the standpoint of his other major intellectual point
of departure - the theoretical work of Max Weber - Schutz's
phenomenology of the social world must be considered a major
advance in social theory. In essence. Schutz pursues the ontologi-
cal assumptions implicit in Weber's methodology and develops an
overall approach which reflects a consistent and coherent stance in
terms of the four strands of the subjective-objective dimension of
 Interpretive Sociology 247
our analytical scheme. Schutz demonstrates that the notions of
subjective meaning, understanding and social action have much
wider ramifications than those reflected in Weber's work. In com-
parison with Schutz, Weber's location within the context of the
functionalist as opposed to the interpretive paradigm becomes
clearly evident.

Phenomenological Sociology
Both schools of thought identified in this category of interpretive
theory occupy a similar position in relation to the two dimensions
of our analytical scheme. We distinguish between them largely
because they have developed from parallel but somewhat different
phenomenological traditions. Ethnomethodology derives largely
from the phenomenology of Schutz, and phenomenological
symbolic interactionism from the work of G. H. Mead.

Ethnomethodology
Ethnomethodology is grounded in the detailed study of the world
of everyday life. Essentially, it seeks •to treat practical activities,
practical circumstances, and practical sociological reasoning as
topics of empirical study, and by paying to the most commonplace
activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary
events, seeks to learn about them as phenomena in their own right'
(Garfinkel. 1967, p. 1). It is concerned to learn about the ways in
which people order and make sense of their everyday activities and
the ways in which they make them ·accountable' to others, in the
sense of being ·observable and reportable'. Interactions between
people in everyday life can be regarded as ongoing accomplish-
ments, in which those involved draw upon various assumptions,
conventions, practices and other types of resources available
within their situation to sustain and shape their encounters in
various ways. Ethnomethodology seeks to understand such
accomplishments in their own terms. It seeks to understand them
from within.
The term •ethnomethodology' was invented by Harold
Garfinkel as a result of his work on a •jury project' (Garfinkel,
1968). The proceedings of a jury had been bugged. It was
248 Soc:iological PaTlldit.:m.f and Orgturi.wtional Analysis
Garfinkel's job to listen to the tapes, to talk to the jurors and to
consider the broad question 'What makes them jurors?' Garfinkel
and a colleague were interested in establishing 'how the jurors
knew what they were doing in doing the work of jurors'. They
recognised that the jurors, in going about their work, were adopt-
ing various methods for making their activities as jurors account-
able to themselves and to others. They were engaged in a process
of 'making sense' of the practice of jury work. They were con-
cerned with such things as 'adequate accounts', 'adequate descrip-
tion' and 'adequate evidence'. They sought to avoid being
'common-sensical', they sought to act in the manner that they
thought jurors should act. The term 'ethnomethodology' was
coined to characterise the jurors' engagement in a methodology
relating to a specific area of common-sense knowledge. They were
engaged in a process which called upon them to use a specific set of
practices for making sense of a particular social a.ctivity. However.
ethnomethodology has come to mean many different things. As
Garfinkel ( 1968) has noted, 'it has turned into a shibboleth'. and he
frankly disclaims any responsibility for what persons have come to
make of ethnomethodology. 22 Many would not accept Garfinkel's
disclaimer. His writings are unnecessarily obscure and convoluted
and they stand in a somewhat paradoxical relationship to the fact
that ethnomethodology is concered with understanding the every-
day world of simple practical activities and the realm of common-
sense knowledge.
The work of ethnomethodologists is very much concerned with
identifying the 'taken for granted' assumptions which characterise
any social situation and the ways in which the members involved,
through the use of everyday practices, make their activities ·ration-
ally accountable'. In this analysis the notions of 'indexicality' and
·reflexivity' play an important part. Everyday activities are seen
as being ordered and rationally explicable within the context in
which they occur. The way in which they are organised makes
use of expressions and activities which are shared and not
necessarily explicitly stated (indexicality): this depends upon the
capacity to look back on what has gone on before (reflexivity). The
social situation is viewed as a process of accountable action which
is sustained by the efforts of the participants; the participants are
seen as attempting to order their experience· so as to sustain the
everyday, common-sense suppositions which characterise the
routine of everyday life.
Following Douglas ( I970b), it is convenient to distinguish
between two types of ethnomethodologists, linguistic and situa-
 Interpretive Sociolo(ly 249
tiona!. The linguistic ethnomethodologists (for example. Cicourel.
1972; Schegloff and Sacks. 1973) focus upon the use of language
and the ways in which conversations in everyday life are
structured. Their analysis makes much of the unstated, 'taken for
granted' meanings, the use of indexical expressions and the way in
which conversations convey much more than is actually said. The
situational ethnomethodologists (McHugh, 1968, for example)
cast their view over a wider range of social activity and seek to
understand the ways in which people negotiate the social contexts
in which they find themselves. They are concerned to understand
how people make sense of and order their environment. As part of
their method ethnomethodologists may consciously disrupt or
question the 'taken for granted' elements in everyday situations, in
order to reveal the underlying processes at work.
Ethnomethodology is thus firmly committed to an understand-
ing of the 'life-world'. Garfinkel acknowledges an intellectual debt
to Husser!, Schutz and Parsons, and his work can perhaps be best
understood as a particular type of response to Schutz'~ concern for
analysing the natural attitude. As Giddens notes, Garfinkel
is concerned with how the 'natural attitude' is r'trli.~~d as a
phenomenon by actors in day to day life ... This leads him away from
phenomenology. with its Cartesian emphasis upon the (essential or
existential) primacy of subjective experience. towards the study of
·situated actions· as ·publicly' interpreted forms. It is not hard to see
that the direction of movement is toward Austin and toward the later
Wittgenstein. For the notion of illocutionary acts. or as Wittgenstein
says, 'that the words are also deeds'. although serving descriptive
rather than philosophical ends. fits fairly closely with Garfinkel's
preoccupations. (Giddens. 1976. p. 36)
Giddens makes much of the convergence of interest in
phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy (as expressed
in the work of the later Wittgenstein and his followers) upon the
everyday world, and we shall have more to say of this in the
concluding section of this chapter.
Garfinkel's debt to Parsons is expressed through his concern for
the problem of social order. Ethnomethodology is clearly geared to
providing explanations of the ordered nature of the social world,
and it is largely for this reason that, along with phenomenologists
and symbolic interactionists, the ethnomethodologists have been
labelled the ·new conservatives' in sociology (McNall and
Johnson, 1975). However, the ethnomethodological approach to
order differs significantly from that which characterises the Parso-
nian scheme and other schools of thought characteristic of the
250 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
functionalist paradigm. The concern is not to explain any ordered
structure or patterning of events or regularities in human
behaviour; rather. it is to provide an explanation of the way in
which individual actors appear to order their world through the use
of various ·accounting' practices. The ethnomethodologists are
interested in the way in which actors make evident and persuade
each other that the events and activities in which they are involved
are coherent and consistent. They are interested in understanding
the methods which characterise this accounting process. From the
ethnomethodological point of view, ·order' in human affairs does
not exist independently of the accounting practices employed in its
discovery. 23
Many ethnomethodologists resist very strongly any attempt to
link their work with the conventional problems and concerns of
academic sociology. For them. every man is his own sociologist,
committed to an understanding of his everyday life. In this connec-
tion, Garfinkel draws the distinction between •Jay' and •pro-
fessional' sociologists, the activities of both being open to
ethnomethodological analysis. The sociology of the professional,
like that of his lay equivalent, can be regarded as a particular type
of accounting practice. As Giddens puts it, ·social science is a
practical accomplishment like any other rationally accountable
form of social activity, and can be studied as such· (Giddens, 1976,
p. 39). Many ethnomethodologists specifically dissociate
themselves from orthodox sociology as such. particularly from its
orientation towards "constructive analysis', and confine their
efforts to studying the indexicality of everyday accounts and the
ways in which they are made rationally accountable.
The substance of ethnomethodology thus largely comprises a set
of specific techniques and approaches to be used in the study of
what Garfinkel has described as the ·awesome indexicality' of
everyday life. It is geared to empirical study. and the stress which
its practitioners place upon the uniqueness of the situations
encountered projects an essentially relativist stance. A commit·
ment to the development of methodology and field-work has
occupied first place in the interests of its adherents. so that related
issues of ontology, epistemology and human nature have received
less attention than they perhaps deserve.

Phenomenological symbolic interactionism

It will be recalled from our discussion in Chapter 4 that it is
possible to distinguish two strains of symbolic interactionism -
 Interpretive Sociology lSI
behavioural and phenomenological. The latter is typified by its
emphasis upon the emergent properties of interaction, through
which individuals create their social world rather than merely
reacting to it. Meaning is attributed to the environment, not
derived from and imposed upon individual actors; action is built up
instead of being a response or mere release mechanism. Both
groups of interactionists normally acknowledge their principal
intellectual debt to the work of G. H. Mead, though, as we have
argued, they tend to interpret this in fundamentally different ways.
The differences between the phenomenological and the
behavioural interactionists is not always as clear as it might be,
since the former have often been attracted by positivist research
methods which go against their basic theoretical orientation. As
Douglas has noted, •the general problem of the interactionist tradi-
tion of thought and research in sociology is that its practitioners
have rarely seen clearly and consistently the fundamental theoret-
ical and methodological differences between a positivistic
(absolutist) sociology and a phenomenological or existential
sociology' (Douglas, 1970, p. 18).
This confusion is also reflected in the debate over whether there
can be a genuine synthesis between symbolic interactionism and
ethnomethodology. Norman Denzin, a prominent symbolic
interactionist, has argued that a synthesis is possible; Don
Zimmerman and Lawrence Wieder, two prominent
ethnomethodologists, have argued that it is not. 24 Interpreting
interactionism from a phenomenological rather than a behavioural
perspective, Denzin's case rests largely on the view that both
symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology cover largely the
same ground. As he puts it,

symbolic interactionism encompasses a large number of the problems

and peculiarities now taken as the special province of ethnomethodol-
ogy - namely, that the study of human conduct, within any type eX
social order, demands consideration of how interacting selves co-
operate in the construction of a routine, and for the moment a taken-
for-granted set of meanings necessary for joint action For the
interactionist any social order emerges through the process of interac-
tion in a situation where selves take the point of view of one another.
The foundation of such orders is to be found in the meaning interacting
selves bring to the objects and acts at hand. ·Meaning arises out of
interaction, and not the other way around. The task of the interactionist
is to discover how interacting selves come to agree upon certain mean-
ings and definitions for co-ordinated action. The central role of the self
in shaping such definitions is of paramount importance. • • It is
2.52 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
necessary to note only that such a conception of the interaction process
demands a special view of empirical research ... a cardinal feature of
interactionist research is the casting of the researcher's self into the
position of those he is studying. (Douglas, 1970, pp. 295-6)

The ethnomethodologists claim that one of the primary ways in

which they differ from this standpoint is that they have a funda-
mentally different view of the problem of social order and its
analysis. Zimmerman and Wieder claim that whilst the interaction-
ist treats the point of view of the actor as only one aspect of the
problem of order, seeking to relate it to a wider context in terms of
scientifically valid description and explanations, the
ethnomethodologist limits his activities to the actor's world. He is
not very interested in going beyond this. As they put it, 'the
ethnomethodologist is not concerned with providing causal
explanations of observably regular, patterned, repetitive actions
by some kind of analysis of the actor's point of view. He is
concerned with how members of society go about the task of
seeing ,describing, and explaining order in the world in which they
live' (Douglas, 1970, pp. 287-9). The ethnomethodologist sees
himself as being much more fully committed to the perspective of
the actor than the interactionist is - there is a much greater
commitment to studying the actor on his own ground. Denzin
disputes that there is any radical difference between the two
approaches on this point and the debate remains inconclusive.
For our purposes here it would seem that the similarities
between the two approaches are of the utmost importance, since
they clearly define the way in which both ethnomethodology and
phenomenological symbolic interactionism differ from other
schools of thought. Both follow the phenomenological tradition of
attributing to social reality a very precarious ontological status. It
is recognised that social reality comprises little more than a com-
plex set of typifications which may be intersubjectively shared.
The notion of the 'ideal type', which in Weber's approach to
interpretive sociology is offered merely as a methodological tool,
assumes ontological status within the context of phenomenologi-
cal sociology. Phenomenological sociologists recognise that social
reality is created and sustained through the use of typifications or
'ideal types', as individuals attempt to order and ·make sense' of
the world in which they live. Linguistic ethnomethodologists
attempt to focus upon this by understanding the way in which
'accounting practices' develop, and they emphasise language as
the central medium through which people see and create their
 Interpretive Sociology 253
social world and through which intersubjectively shared meanings
may arise. The ·situational ethnomethodologists', like the
phenomenological symbolic interactionists, are more concerned
to study the way in which social reality reflects a precarious
balance of intersubjectively shared meanings, which are con-
tinually negotiated, sustained and changed through the everyday
interaction of individual human beings. Social reality is for them
either reaffirmed or created afresh in every social encounter.

The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm

Theorists of all schools of thought within the interpretive paradigm
tend to share a common perspective, in that their primary concern
is to understand the subjective experience of individuals. Their
theories are constructed from the standpoint of the individual actor
as opposed to the observer of action; they view social reality as an
emergent process - as an extension of human consciousness and
subjective experience. Insofar as a wider social env.ironment is
accorded ontological status, it is regarded as the creation and
extension of the subjective experience of the individuals involved.
Ontologically, theories characteristic of the interpretive paradigm
are indisputably nominalist; with regard to human nature, they are
essentially voluntarist.
All theories constructed in the context of the interpretive para-
digm are anti-positivist. They reject the view that the world of
human affairs can be studied in the manner ofthe natural sciences.
In the context of the interpretive paradigm the central endeavour is
to understand the subjective world of human experience. To retain
the integrity of the phenomena under investigation, an attempt is
made to get inside and to understand from within. The imposition
of external form and structure is resisted, since this reflects the
viewpoint of the observer as opposed to that of the actor directly
involved. Ideographic rather than nomothetic methods of study
are favoured from this point of view.
In these respects theories characteristic of the interpretive para-
digm are significantly different from those of the functionalist
paradigm. Though certain theorists within the latter have
attempted to incorporate ideas and insight5 from the former,
particularly in terms of method (for example, Weber and his use of
the notion ofverstehen), the two types of theory remain fundamen-
tally distinct. The ontological assumptions of a truly interpretive
theory do not permit a functionalist perspective; the two types of
254 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
theories are based upon fundamentally different assumptions with
regard to the ontological status of the social world.
At the same time there are points of similarity between
interpretive and functionalist theories - similarities which become
clearly evident when these theories are compared with their
counterparts in the radical humanist and radical"structuralist para-
digms. Interpretive and functionalist theories reflect a common
concern for the sociology of regulation. By and large, interpretive
theories concentrate on the study of ways in which social reality is
meaningfully constructed and ordered from the point of view of the
actors directly involved. They present a perspective in which indi-
vidual actors negotiate, regulate and live their lives within the
context of the status quo. The fact that interpretive theories are
cast in the mould of the sociology of regulation reflects the frame of
reference of their proponents rather than basic ontological and
methodological assumptions. As will be seen in Chapter 8,
hermeneutics in the hands of Habermas and phenomenology in the
hands of Sartre are directed towards quite different ends within the
context of a socioiQJlY of radical chanJte.
If one were required to draw a single li11e of division between the
theories located within the context of the interpretive paradigm,
perhaps the most significant would be that between the highly
subjectivist orientation of solipsism and transcendental
phenomenology on the one hand and existential phenomenology,
phenomenological sociology and hermeneutics on the other.
Whereas the former embark upon a journey into the realm of pure
subjectivity and remain within the bounds of purely philosophical
discourse, the latter are more concerned with the 'life-world' and
are amenable to study from a more sociological perspective.
Within the context of the latter it is worth noting a convergence of
interest upon the role of language as a medium of practical social
activity. Existential phenomenology. ethnomethodology and
hermeneutics have features in common with the theory oflanguage
as developed in the work of the later Wittgenstein (1963) and his
followers. 25 All of these areas of analysis emphasise the
importance of meaning in context. As Wittgenstein puts it, •an
expression only has meaning in the flow of life. 'In language, as in
other areas of social activity, the process of communication is an
ongoing accomplishment characterised by indexicality and
reflexivity. All human activity takes much for granted, and what
constitutes reality depends upon the rules which underlie what
Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'.
These notions have fundamental implications for our view of
 Interpretive Sociology 255
science, since it follows that what poses as science is no more than
a particular form of life or language game. Science is based on
'taken for granted' assumptions, and thus, like any other social
practice, must be understood within a specific context. Traced to
their source, all activities which pose as science can be traced to
fundamental assumptions relating to everyday life and can in no
way be regarded as generating knowledge with an 'objective',
value-free status, as is sometimes claimed. What passes for sci-
entific knowledge can be shown to be founded upon a set of
unstated conventions, beliefs and assumptions, just as everyday,
common-sense knowledge is. The difference between them lies
largely in the nature of the rules and the community which
recognises and subscribes to them. The knowledge in both cases is
not so much 'objective' as shared.
This view has close parallels with the view of science articulated
by Kuhn ( 1970) and the notion of paradigm. In essence, his work
represents a theoretical perspective characteristic of the
interpretive paradigm - a theory in the tradition of Schutz's
analysis of multiple realities and Wittgenstein's 'forms of life'.
Scientific knowledge here is in essence socially constructed and
socially sustained; its significance and meaning can only be under-
stood within its immediate social context.
This view of science is explicitly recognised in the work of
phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists operating within the
interpretive paradigm. It explains in large measure their
indifference to the functionalist and radical structuralist para-
digms, or the deep-seated scepticism with which they view the
work of theorists operating within these contexts, and their
vigorous efforts to construct social theories based upon a
fundamentally different view of the role and nature of science.

Notes and References

I. Hughes identifies the generation of writers influential during
the period 1890-1930 as follows: Freud (born 1856), Durk-
heim ( 1858), Mosca ( 1858), Bergson ( 1859), Meinecke ( 1862),
Weber ( 1864), Troeltsch ( 1865), Croce ( 1866), Benda ( 1867),
Pirandello (1867), Alain (1868), Gide (1869), Proust (1871),
Peguy ( 1873), Jung ( 1875), Mann ( 1875), Michels ( 1876),
Hesse ( 1877).
To this list he adds Dilthey (1833), Gramsci (1891),
Spengler ( 1880), Wittgenstein ( 1889) and Mannheim ( 1893).
256 Sociological Paradigms and Organisationa l Analysis
He could well have added Simmel (1858) and Husserl ( 1859),
who were also very much influenced by the German idealist
tradition.
The responses of these writers to the problem of the 'sub-
jective' has indeed been diverse. Durkheim, for example,
found a solution consistent with a functional orientation;
Sorel veered in the direction of Marxism and Freud into the
realm of psychoanalysis. As Hughes notes, most of these
theorists concerned themselves 'with the irrational only to
exorcise it. By probing into it they sought ways to tame it, to
canalise it for constructive human purposes' (Hughes, 1958,
p. 36). For the most part they addressed the irrational from a
standpoint characteristic of the sociology of regulation.
2. The contribution to the development of modern Western
philosophy and social theory made by Wilhelm Dilthey is
coming increasingly to be seen as of importance. He has
made a considerable contribution to basic issues of epis-
temology and methodology, and his work has had a signifi-
cant influence upon social theorists such as Weber, Husser!,
Heidegger and others. The similarities between the
methodological contributions of Dilthey and Weber are
particularly striking. Unfortunately , the major part of
Dilthey's work is still not available in English. For a sample
of what is available so far, see Rickman ( 1976).
Dilthey was concerned to explore the epistemological
problems of the cultural sciences, particularly history, and
devise ways of generating objective knowledge that would
meet the traditional requirements of science. For a clear
discussion of his attempt, see Tuttle (1969). For a general
discussion of his work and influence, see Hodges ( 1952) and
Makkreel ( 1975).
3. For a further discussion of some of these issues, see Parsons
( 1949), vol. II, pp. 473-87 and Hughes ( 1958), pp. 183-200.
4. Weber's principal works on methodology can be found in
Weber ( 1949).
S. To this definition it may well be useful to add a further
comment on Weber's view of 'action': 'In "action" is
included human behaviour when and insofar as the acting
individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this
sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it
may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or if delib-
erately refraining from such intervention, or passively
acquiescing in the situation' (Weber, 1947, p. 88).
 Interpretive SocioiORY 2S1
6. Hughes conveniently summarises the essential characteris-
tics of the 'ideal type' construct in the following terms:

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or

more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse,
discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent t.·om·rete
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those
one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unifiedanalytical con-
struct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be
found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia ...
It has the significance of a purely ideallimitinl( concept with
which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for
the explication of certain of its significant components. Such
concepts are constructs in terms of which we formulate relation-
ships by the application of the category of objective possibility.
By means of this category, the adequacy of our imagination,
orientated and disciplined by reality, is judged. (Hughes, 1958, p.
312)

The notion of an 'ideal type' thus represents a heuristic

which can be used as a means of analysis in many realms of
scientific enquiry. Concepts such as bureaucracy, economic
man and capitalism are examples of 'ideal types' - useful
fictions against which the real world can be compared.
7. For a perspective on some of the issues involved here, see
Runciman (1972), pp. 16-19 and Gerth and Mills (1948), pp.
S5-61.
8. For a full discu~sion of the life and work of Husserl, see
Natanson (1973b) and Spiegelberg (1965), vol. I, pp.
73-167.
Spiegelberg's analysis indicates quite clearly how
Husserl's thought progresses in successive stages to an
increasingly subjectivist position. Only after 1906 does
Husserl's philosophy become that of a pure phenomen-
ologist.
9. We have chosen to present the interpretive paradigm in terms
offour broad categories of theory to reflect the key divisions
from a sociological perspective. since this is what is central
to our present task. At a philosophical level, it would perhaps
be more appropriate to characterise it in·terms of three broad
categories, solipsism, subjective idealism (comprising
phenomenology and phenomenological sociology) and
objective idealism (comprising hermeneutics). These three
categories of philosophical thought are discussed in the text.
2S8 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
10. For an analysis of the hermeneutic tradition, see, for exam-
ple, Palmer (1969).
11. Unfortunately, most of Gada mer's work is not yet available
in English. For a useful discussion of his work, see Giddens
(1976).
12. Quoted in Giddens ( 1976), p. 57. As Giddens notes, there are
remarkable parallels between Gadamer's hermeneutics and
post-Wittgensteinian philosophy as developed by Winch in
The Idea of a Social Science ( 1958). Both lines of enquiry,
which appear to have developed independently of each
other, arrive at similar views on the nature and significance of
language in social life (Giddens, 1976, pp. 54-5).
13. For a comprehensive discussion of the phenomenological
basis of solipsism and its variations, see Todd ( 1968).
14. Berkeley's own position can perhaps be more accurately
described as that of an 'immaterialist' rather than a solipsist.
He did not deny that there was an external world; he asserted
that everything is relative to mind; see Berkeley ( 1962) (this
work was originally published in the early eighteenth
century).
15. In a similar vein of levity, it is also said that Berkeley, on a
visit to the house of Dean Swift, was left standing on the
doorstep on the pretext that if immaterialism was a tenable
position, he would be able to walk through the door without
its being opened for him.
16. For a full discussion of the phenomenological movement,
including an analysis of the intellectual debt of Husser! to his
teacher, Franz Bretano, and fellow pupil. Carl Stumpf. see
Spiegelberg (1965), vols I and II. The essay by Thevenaz
(1962) presents a very clear account of the development of
the central notions. See also Husserl's own account of
phenomenology in the Encyc/optzdia Britannica, 14th ed.
(1929).
17. In his later writings Husser! also devoted increased attention
to the idea of the Lebenswelt ('life-world'), in the hope that it
would throw light on intentionality in action. This notion was
taken up by Husserl's followers, in line with their increased
interest in the lived-in world as opposed to the transcenden-
tal. We shall have more to say of this in the next section.
18. Heidegger interested himself primarily in the meaning of
'being'. He saw in phenomenology a means of establishing
the categories of human existence for a 'fundamental ontol-
ogy'. Towards this end he developed a 'hermeneutic
 Interpretive Sociology 259
phenomenology' designed to interpret the ontological mean-
ings of various human conditions (being in the world, anxi-
ety, etc.).
For a comprehensive discussion ofHeidegger's version of
phenomenology, see Spiegelberg (1965), pp. 271-357 and
Thevenaz (1962), pp. 53-67.
Merleau-Ponty has played a key role in the development of
the phenomenological movement in France. For a discussion
of his work, see Spiegelberg (1965), pp. 516-62. The work of
Sartre will be discussed in Chapter 8.
19. For a full discussion of the role of typification in Schutz's
analysis, see Schutz (1964), part I.
20. For a full discussion of multiple realities, see Schutz (1967),
pp. 207-59.
21. For an overall perspective on Schutz's methodology, see
Schutz (1967), pp. 3-47.
22. As will be clear from our discussion below,
ethnomethodology has developed in a number of directions.
For some useful reviews of the subject as a whole, see
Douglas (1970b), Dreitzel (1970), Filmer et al (1972) and
Giddens (1976).
23. For a discussion of an ethnomethodologist's view of the
problem of order. see the article by Zimmerman and Wieder
in Douglas ( 1970b). pp. 286-95.
24. The debate is presented in Douglas (1970b). pp. 259-84,
285-98; see also Meltzer el al. (1975).
25. It is important to note that the work of the early and later
Wittgenstein is based upon fundamentally different ontologi-
cal assumptions. Although we are unable to consider this at
length here, it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein's early
philosophy reflects assumptions consistent with the
functionalist paradigm; the later philosophy reflects the
assumptions of the interpretive paradigm. Wittgenstein.like
a number of other social philosophers discussed here (for
example, G. H. Mead, Husser!, Marx), embarked during his
lifetime upon an intellectual journey which involved a change
in basic paradigm.
7. The Interpretive Paradigm
and the Study of Organisations

As will be clear from our discussion in the previous chapter, the

intellectual history of the interpretive paradigm is as complex and
conceptually as rich as that of the functionalist paradigm. The
underlying assumptions of the interpretive paradigm with regard to
the ontological status of the social world reject the utility of con-
structing a social science which focuses upon the analysis of
·structures' .It rejects any view which attributes to the social world
a reality which is independent of the minds of men. It-emphasises
that the social world is no more than the subjective construction of
individual human beings who, through the development and use of
common language and the interactions of everyday life, may create
and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning.
The social world is thus of an essentially intangible nature and is in
a continuous process of reaffirmation or change.
Such a view does not allow for the existence of 'organisations' in
any hard and concrete sense. Whilst certain schools of thought
accept the concept of organisation and its use as an 'accounting
practice' by which people attempt to make sense of their world,
they do not recognise organisations as such. From the standpoint
of the interpretive paradigm, organisations simply do not exist.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the notion of there being a theory of
organisations characteristic of the interpretive paradigm is some-
what contradictory. However, in recent years a number of
theorists located within this paradigm have involved themselves in
a debate about various aspects of organisational life. They have
done so as sociologists concerned to demonstrate the validity of
their point of view as against the prevailing orthodoxy
characteristic of the functionalist paradigm. As will be apparent
from our discussion in ChapterS, most organisation theorists tend
to treat their subject of study as a hard, concrete and tangible
empirical phenomenon which exists ·out there' in the ·real world'.
The interpretive sociologists are firmly opposed to such 'structural
absolutism', arguing that social science should be based upon
The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 261
fundamentally different assumptions about the ontological status
of the social world. In order to demonstrate this point, they have
engaged in research designed to illustrate the fallacy of the
functionalist standpoint. They have sought to show how the
supposedly hard, concrete, tangible and 'real' aspects of organisa-
tional life are dependent upon the subjective constructions of
individual human beings. In doing this they have produced a cer-
tain amount of literature which has considerable relevance for our
analysis here, since it opens up a debate about the assumptions
which underwrite the contemporary orthodoxy in organisation
theory. This literature, however, is not without its problems, since
in attempting to undermine the notions informing more orthodox
functionalist approaches to the study of organisational life, the
interpretive sociologists have often been drawn into a battle fought
upon their opponents' ground. In adopting a reactive stance they
often endorse, by implication, the validity of certain background
assumptions which define the functionalist problematic. Con-
sequently, their stance is often somewhat contradictory, and there
tends to be a divergence between theoretical pronouncements and
the assumptions reflected in empirical research.
In this chapter we hope to move some way towards clarifying the
issues involved here. We shall review some of the literature and we
shall attempt to evaluate it in terms of the assumptions upon which
it is based. This literature is confined to the perspectives described
in the previous chapter as ethnomethodology and phenomenologi-
cal symbolic interactionism, though, as we have suggested, we do
not wish to place too much emphasis upon the importance of this
distinction.

Ethnomethodological Approaches to the

Study of Organisational Activities
One of the earliest ethnomethodological critiques of functionalist
organisation theory is found in Egon Bittner's article, 'The Con-
cept of Organisation', first published in 1965. In this article Bittner
argues that organisation theorists, who define organisations as
'stable associations of persons engaged in concerted activities
directed to the attainment of specific objectives', tend to take the
concept of organisation structure as unproblematic. He argues that
this notion of structure represents no more than a common-sense
assumption of certain actors within a given situation. To take this
262 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
common-sense assumption at face value, and use it as a basis for
organisational analysis, is thus fraught with difficulty. He argues,
in effect, that the sociologist who uses such a concept as a
·resource' for explaining organisational activities is committing a
fundamental error, and that such concepts should be the 'topic'
rather than the tool of analysis. In the course of his argument
Bittner illustrates his case in relation to the work of Selznick and
Weber, and suggests that their theories are based upon a whole set
of unstated presuppositions and theoretical shortcuts which build
a protective mantle around the subject of study. The concept of
bureaucracy. for example, builds upon background information
that normally competent members of society take for granted as
commonly known. In building upon this Bittner suggests that
Weber is in collusion with those about whom he theorises. He
summarises his views very forcefully in the following terms: 'If the
theory of bureaucracy is a theory at all. it is a refined and purified
version of the actor's theorising. To the extent that it is a refine-
ment and purification of it, it is, by the same token, a corrupt and
incomplete version of it; for it is certainly not warranted to reduce
the terms of common-sense discourse to a lexicon of culturally
coded significances to satisfy the requirements of theoretical pos-
tulations' (Bittner, 1974, p. 74).
In the place of this ·corrupt' and 'incomplete' version of the
actor's theorising about organisational structures. Bittner suggests
the study of organisation as a common-sense construct in which
the ·methodologist' must be concerned with the procedures and
considerations which actors invoke in the construction of their
world. In the last part of his paper Bittner goes on to develop an
explicitly ethnomethodological approach to the rational construc-
tions subsumed under the concept of organisation, which reflects a
programme of enquiry rather than a specific interest in producing a
theory of organisations as such. In this Bittner assumes that the
actor in an organisation is not a disinterested bystander but a
toolsmith using the concept of organisation in a certain relatively
specific way and for certain variable reasons. He suggests that
organisational actors can, for example, use the concept of rational
organisation as a 'gambit of compliance', in which certain rules of
conduct are invoked simply by using the term. On the other hand,
there is an 'open realm offree play' within and outside these rules
which presents us with the opportunity 'to attain a grasp of the
meaning of the rules as common-sense constructs from the
perspective of those persons who promulgate and live with them'.
Moreover. the concept of 'formal organisation • acts as a 'model of
The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 263
stylistic unity' and as a 'corroborative reference', two interrelated
notions concerned with the regulation and discipline of behaviour
in organisational contexts. Taken together with the ·gambit of
compliance', they form three ways within organisations in which
'competent users' of the term 'formal organisation' utilise it as a
mechanism for control. In these ways Bittner's analysis points
towards an understanding of the manner in which the organisa-
tional world is constructed by the actors involved.
The main thrust of Bittner's article lies in its suggestion that the
concept of organisation, and related issues such as structure,
hierarchy and efficiency, are problematic social constructs. He
argues that these constructs should be the topic of research in
sociological analysis and should not be taken for granted. In sub-
sequent work, however, Bittner and his followers have not always
proved true to these requirements. His article 'The Police on Skid
Row' (1967), for example, illustrates this very clearly.
Bittner's research with the police departments of two large
urban areas used the accounting practices of the police officers as
its analytical focus of attention. By centring attention on Skid
Row, which is seen by the police as a special area, divorced from
society at large, characterised by gratuitous violence, uncertainty
in human behaviour and a shifting, uncommitted population of
deviant misfits, Bittner is able to depict the policeman as the
'definer of the situation' par excellence. The 'peace-keeping' role
adopted by the police on Skid Row allows them considerable
freedom of action, relatively unconstrained by the judiciary and
central authority, as a result of which they are free to define local
people's behaviour, motivation and past actions in terms of their
expectations only.
Bittner, nevertheless, is at pains to point out that Skid Row is
unusual, in that the men who patrol it are not subject to ·any
systems of external control'. Implicitly, then, and by the back door
of his analysis, the notion of social and organisational structure
appears on the stage. At one point in his analysis Bittner
introduces the concept of 'structural determinants' but attempts to
define them in a subjective way as 'the typical situations that
policemen perceive as demand conditions for action without
arrest' . 1 What he seems to be implying, here and throughout the
article, is that structural factors at both social and organisational
level tend to have less impact in the role performance of policemen
on Skid Row than elsewhere. The article does not question the
problematic nature of the concepts of 'external control'. 'society
in general', ·normalcy' and 'superiors'. Somewhat paradoxically,
264 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
therefore, rather than the study of Skid Row representing an
ethnomethodological refutation of the importance of structural
factors, its very unusualness seems to underline the crucial impact
of structure upon ·normal' everyday life. Bittner"s research is of
importance in demonstrating the role of accounting practices in the
social construction of 'reality', but it is presented in such a way as
to rekindle the probing reader's belief in the existence of
·structure' within the vast segment of society which is not Skid
Row. Thus, whilst Bittner's theoretical article 'The Concept of
Organisation' warns about the danger of 'collusion' or complicity
within the subject under investigation, the empirical work of some
two years later seems to fall into the self-same trap. The article's
own schema of background assumptions is predicated upon a
series of organisational and societal relationships which seem to be
accepted unquestioningly.
This discrepancy between theoretical pronouncement and
empirical research also characterises the work of Don Zimmerman
and his associates. In certain articles Zimmerman adheres to a
nominalist ontology characteristic of the interpretive paradigm,
but in others he veers in a much more objectivist direction. In the
article wrinen with Wieder ( 1970), for example, the social world is
regarded as the direct product of human consciousness. The
authors specifically reject the notion that there exist
intersubjectively shared meanings, norms and values to which the
activities of individuals are orientated. Instead they account for
the seeming presence of such phenomena by suggesting that
human beings 'continuously rely on, and if pressed, insist upon,
the capacities of others to find a presumptively shared sense in
what they are saying' (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970, p. 294). In
other words, they emphasise that the social world is created
through the accounting practices of individuals as they engage in
the routine activities of everyday life. The nominalist ontology
reflected in this point of view is perfectly consistent with the
assumptions which characterise the interpretive paradigm.
In two articles presenting the results of empirical work
Zimmerman takes a different line. We have in mind here 'The
Practicalities of Rule Use' (1970a) and 'Record Keeping and the
Intake Process in a Public Welfare Organisation' (1970b). Both
pieces of work are based upon research at the offices of a State
Bureau of Public Assistance, the first looking at the ·reception
function', not so much in terms of the prescribed work, but from
the point of view of the receptionists themselves. As a paper it
examines certain aspects of the work activities of these
The Interpretive ParadiRm and the Study of OrRani.fations 265
bureaucratic actors. particularly their role in inducting applicants
for public assistance into their organisational routine. Following
Bittner, Zimmerman attacks the notion that a formal organisa-
tional structure is an unproblematic facticity. pointing out that 'the
issue of what rules. policies, and goals mean for the bureaucratic
actor upon the concrete occasion of their use (for example, to
guide, to account for, or to justify action) must be treated as
problematic' (Zimmerman, 1970a, p. 224). The piece shows quite
clearly that individuals use the rules ofthe organisation to relate to
their work and for reconciling organisational and individual
requirements. For Zimmerman, it is the receptionist's interpreta-
tion which is crucial rather than the supposed fact that rules and
regulations exist 'outside' the individuals involved in any fixed,
unbending, objectively defined sense. The 'competent use' of a
rule, which in itself can never be fully determinate of behaviour,
lies behind the reproduction of a day-by-day, ·normal' state of
affairs. However, Zimmerman clearly accepts the facti city of
organisational structures and the existence of externally imposed
rules. What he suggests as Bittner did before him, is that move-
ment within this structure is possible. Ontologically, this stands in
stark contrast to the theoretical article written with Wieder ( 1970).
Although a marked measure of voluntarism is common to both
articles, since human beings as ·competent rule users' are
relatively free to create their own social world, the ontological
foundations seem to differ between the theoretical and empirical
works. In the former the social world is largely a product of
consciousness: in the latter a vague disquieting ambience of
'structure'. dark and threatening but not quite fully discernible, is
felt to be the 'real' core of social reality.
A structural 'presence' is also evident in Zimmerman's other
empirical piece on 'sensible intake work' ( 1970b). The social
welfare caseworker, like the receptionist, is engaged in an ongoing
process of interpretation of how much of a client's story is fiction
and how much 'fact'. Documentation is crucial here, and the case
record is of particular importance as an example of an attempt to
assemble the world of a client, which is inherently rule-governed
and made accountable through post facto reconstruction in a way
reminiscent of Schutz's notion of reflexivity. These documented
sets of 'facts' then assume a concrete facticity and immutability,
and are seen as objective, detached and inherently reliable. For the
caseworker the world is viewed as non-problematic, indeed as
'obvious', and the case records come to reflect this assumption.
Zimmerman admits that external constraints are important. For
266 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
example, he states that speed and verification are central to the
caseworker's role, but the reader is left to infer that this is because
of the caseworker's position within an organisational hierarchy
with its own rules and disciplinary procedures. This acceptance of
the ontological status of organisational structures is not consonant
with the nominalist ontology characteristic of Zimmerman's more
theoretical work.
The theory and research of both Bittner and Zimmerman is thus
characterised by what may be usefully described as a form of
'ontological oscillation'. Analytically, they stress a highly sub-
jectivist stance which denies the existence of social structures and
concrete social reality of any form. Yet the attempt to operational-
ise their ideas within an empirical context frequently leads them to
admit a more realist form of ontology through the back door.
Whilst this is unintended, it does pose great difficulties for students
attempting to understand their work and to distinguish it from
research typical, for example, of the action frame of reference and
the interactionism characteristic of the functionalist paradigm. Yet
this ontological oscillation is prevalent in all forms of
phenomenological sociology which attempt to illustrate its basic
propositions through the empirical study of situations drawn from
everyday life.
It is characteristic, for example. of the work of David Silverman
who, since his advocacy of the action frame of reference
(Silverman. 1970), has produced work with a significantly different
orientation. As we have argued in Chapter 5, Silverman,like many
other theorists who have adopted the action frame of reference as
a basis of analysis, has frequently drawn inspiration from the
writings of more phenomenologically orientated theorists, partic-
ularly Schutz. However, following Weber, they have used the
action framework as a tool for studying a relatively ·realist' social
reality, largely ignoring the ontological implications which their
framework reflects. As we have shown in Chapter 6, the true
significance of phenomenological sociology rests in its recognition
of the ontological status of typifications or 'ideal types· which
comprise the core of social reality. In The Theory of Organisations
(1970), Silverman recognises that reality is socially constructed,
socially sustained and socially changed, yet he interprets this
essentially as indicating the need for social· theories to adopt a
more voluntaristic theory of action and to avoid the reification of
social phenomena. In other words, as we have argued at length in
Chapter 5, Silverman ( 1970) adheres to a highly voluntaristic view
of human nature but to an ontology, an epistemology and a
 The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 267
methodology characteristic of the subjectivist region of the
functionalist paradigm. The Theory of Organisations is addressed
to organisation theorists who hold to a functionalist view of social
reality; its main contribution lies in its advocacy of a particular
methodology for studying that reality.
In his more recent work (Filmer eta/.• 1972; Silverman, 1975a,
1975b; Silverman and Jones, 1973, 1976), Silverman has pursued
the latent phenomenological issues which occupy a background
role in The Theory of Organisations and has adopted a theoretical
position firmly located within the context ofthe interpretive para-
digm. A comparison of this body of work with The Theory of
Organisations clearly illustrates the implications of a paradigm
change. To organisation theorists located within the functionalist
paradigm, Silverman's recent work usually appears confusing, if
not unintelligible, and is largely dismissed as unhelpful, if not
irrelevant. Yet from the standpoint of the interpretive paradigm, it
contains many genuine insights and has contributed a great deal to
the debate in contemporary circles interested in phenomenological
sociology.
Silverman's recent work seeks to provide an ethnomethodologi-
cal interpretation of various activities within the context of
organisational situations. 2 The publication of New Directions in
Sociological Theory (1972), written in conjunction with Filmer et
al, marks an explicit move to an ontology characteristic of the
interpretive paradigm. In this work Silverman and his colleagues
seek to shift sociological perspectives away from the functionalist
orthodoxy and towards more phenomenologically inspired
approaches. Chapter 6 is of particular interest, since it partly
concerns itself with the specific study of organisational activities.
In it Silverman attacks functionalist organisation theory for its
excessive belief in ·social facts' and, by drawing upon the work of
Bittner (1965), Zimmerman (1970a) and Sudnow (1965), argues
that organisational "rules' are, in point offact, the 'ongoing practi-
cal accomplishments' of organisational members. Silverman is at
pains to reject the 'structural absolutism' of most sociological
theorising, particularly for ignoring the 'processual relationship
between subject and object in the social world, i.e. acknowledge-
ment of the intersubjective character of social life' (Filmer et al.,
1972, p. 168). In this piece of work Silverman sees phenomenologi-
cal sociology as concerned not so much with 'unique experience'
as with the commonalty of ·raw materials'. notably language,
which underpin social experience as a whole. Silverman
appears to accept that there is an intersubjectively shared reality
268 Sociolol!ical Paradigms and Or!!anisational Analysis
which offers itself for investigation by the phenomenological
sociologist.
In 'Getting In: The Managed Accomplishments of "Correct"
Selection Outcomes' (Silverman and Jones, 1973), a shift of atten-
tion is evident, in that considerable emphasis is placed not so much
upon the commonality of raw materials which underpin social
experience, but upon the conflicting views of reality which
characterise any given situation. The stud}' presents a preliminary
report of empirical research on staff selection interviews within a
large organisation. It shows the manner in which the interview
situation is built around verbal and non-verbal exchanges in which
motives and personal qualities are attributed to others through the
use of typifications. and how the interview can be seen as an
accounting process influenced by the need for 'authoritative
accounts' through which it can be made accountable to others.
Silverman and Jones demonstrate how the interview situation is
characterised by multiple realities. as people attempt to make
sense of the situation. As they note. their theoretical focus is the
idea that ·an account of any reality derives its rationality not from
its direct correspondence with some objective world but from the
ability of its hearers (readers) to make sense of the account in the
context of the socially organised occasions of its use (and thereby
to treat it as corresponding to an objective world)' (Silverman and
Jones. 1973, pp. 63-4). This focus clearly reflects a nominalist
ontology characteristic of the interpretive paradigm, with Silver-
man and Jones emphasising how reality is specific to particular
social contexts. However, as with so many other phenomenologi-
cal studies, the presence of structure in the form of hierarchical
influence and 'scientific peer groups'lurks in the background as a
force influencing the need for ·authoritative accounts' of events
and the achievement of 'correct' selection outcomes.
In 'Accounts of Organisations' Silverman returns to a position
approaching that reflected in his 1972 piece. with a critique
of functionalist conceptions of organisation from an
ethnomethodological standpoint. In this he stresses the need, for
example, to understand organisational activities in terms of
accounting practices and to understand bureaucracy as not 'in
itself .. an object" but a language-category which provides for the
object-like qualities of an activity' (Silverman, 197Sa, p. 296). Its
ontological premises, whilst consistent with a position within the
interpretive paradigm, are not as subjectivist as those reflected in
'Oetting In' (Silverman and Jones, 1973).
Organisational Work (Silverman and Jones, 1976) bears witness
The Interpretive ParadiRm and the Study ofOrRanisations 269
to yet another change. This book presents the final report of their
empirical work on the staff-selection process within an organisa-
tional situation and focuses upon the power and authority relations
reflected in the language used in organisational contexts. Silver-
man and Jones report how a 'fresh look' at their interview tapes
revealed that organisational members in their interaction and
accounting procedures had 'lay' conceptualisations of a
'hierarchy'. Whilst this is seen as providing evidence in fa.vour of
the phenomenological construction and reconstruction of
organisational structure (that people create structure through their
accounting practices), Silverman and Jones argue that it is not 'to
be construed as a solipsistic denial of the factual character of
organisational structures', for their reality is ·undeniable' (Silver-
man and Jones, 1976, p. 20). Such an assertion on the ontological
status of structures, which attributes to them an existence on their
own terms, is quite out of keeping with the positions articulated in
the earlier work referred to above and testifies to what appears to
be a major change in theoretical orientation. Whilst Silverman and
Jones do not deny the role which individuals play in the construc-
tion of their social world, they proceed to argue that the nature of
accounting practices sustain ·our all too real technologi-
cal/bureaucratic community', and that our speech and language of
discourse tends to lock us into a relatively passive role as ·mere
functionaries' within our present society. They illustrate their
point of view through the evidence of their empirical research on
interviews, demonstrating 'the grading of language' in which
speech and written reports come to reflect the hierarchical nature
of the context in which they are located. The hierarchical or
grading element in the interview process, for example, is seen as
being linked to 'the canons of rationality' in which there are (I)
premises all can accept, (2) steps all can follow and (3) conclusions
all must accept. These canons come to be used within organisa-
tions as legitimate devices for defining the ·seriousness' or
authentication of community accounts. The parallels between this
analysis and Habermas's theory of 'communicative distortion·,
which we discuss in the next chapter, is particularly striking,
though the authors do not specifically acknowledge the link. They
do, however, identify parallels with the work of Heidegger and
Marx. Silverman and Jones argue that selection interviewing is a
form of evaluation, and that this involves stratification within a
society whose 'form of life' is seen, in essence, as a market in
which language and speech constitute commodities. Both Heid-
egger and Marx are seen as having recognised this in their different
270 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
ways. Grading and accounts of grading become, for Silverman and
Jones, alienated labour, 'in which men are related to their mode of
speech as to an alien object; in which they use speech to do things
(like grading) but in using it are mastered by it since the form of life
which makes that speech intelligible dehumanises human activities
(makes them something)' (Silverman and Jones, 1976, p. 172).
Alienated labour then forms a nexus with the hierarchical nature of
our mundane existence and with the predominance of 'exchange
value' as the standard of discourse within our society. Thus
Silverman and Jones conclude that our present social structure
requires a grading of language, which itself affirms ·market
hierarchy and a separation of Being from Writing'. 'What,' they
ask, 'might it be like to write no longer merely as a functionary?'
(Silverman and Jones, 1976, p. 180).
In discovering the power and authority relationship within
accounting practices, language and 'speech acts', Silverman and
Jones are, in effect, articulating a perspective characteristic of the
hermeneutic approach to critical theory within .the radical
humanist paradigm. As we have noted above, it has much in
common with the work of Habermas and must be regarded as a
m~or change in theoretical orientation. The ontological oscillation
characteristic of the earlier work is resolved, perhaps unwittingly,
through the recognition of a dimension of power and domination
beneath the ongoing process through which social reality is created
and sustained. This power dimension is able to account for the
seeming presence of structural factors in the background of reports
on empirical work, but it is not entirely consistent with the
phenomenological sociology characteristic of the interpretive
paradigm, since it implies that the social construction of reality is
underwritten by a pervasive form of ideological domination. The
essentially conservative orientation of interpretive sociology, with
its concern for understanding how individuals create and impose
order upon their world, is displaced along the regulation-radical
change dimension of our analytical scheme by the radical humanist
concern for understanding how individuals become trapped as
'mere functionaries' within the context of a social formation alien
to the nature of their true being.

Phenomenological Symbolic Interactionism

and the Study of Organisational Activities
The focus of interest of the phenomenological symbolic
interactionist differs from that of the ethnomethodologist in the
 The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 271
degree of attention devoted to the manner in which social reality is
negotiated through interaction. Whereas the ethnomethodologist
usually focuses upon the way in which individual actors account
for and make sense of their world, the phenomenological symbolic
interactionist focuses upon social contexts in which interacting
individuals employ a variety of practices to create and sustain
particular definitions of the world. They demonstrate how 'reality'
and 'facts· are essentially social creations. negotiated through
the interaction of various competing themes and definitions of
reality. We will consider here, two studies which illustrate this
approach.
David Sudnow in 'Normal Crimes' (1965), attempts to demons-
trate the way in which criminal sentences in certain courts in the
USA are negotiated through interaction between the District
Attorney, the Public Prosecutor, the Public Defender and the
defendant. Sud now explains how, in an attempt to speed up prog-
ress through the courts and reduce the work load, the defendant
may be persuaded to plead guilty in exchange for a red_uced charge
and sentence. This occurs in the context of a deal consisting of an
offer from the District Attorney to alter the original charge. How-
ever, such an offer is shown to depend on whether the crime
committed by the defendant fits one of the 'typifications • classified
by the legal parties in their mental case-files as a ·normal crime'.
The legal process, which is usually regarded as governed and
bound by the nature of the penal code, is thus shown to operate
through a process of interaction and negotiation mediated by the
socially constructed realities adhered to by the parties involved. It
thus demonstrates that the legal code and criminal statistics, which
are commonly treated as hard 'social facts', are by no means
reliable and clear-cut descriptions of particular social realities. The
implication is that social reality is socially negotiated and socially
sustained, even within the context of rule-bound and tightly con-
trolled bureaucratic situations.
A similar perspective is evident in Joan Emerson's 'Behaviour
in Private Places' ( 1970). In this article Emerson seeks to illustrate
how a dominant definition of reality may be invaded by counter-
realities which oppose or qualify the dominant definition in various
ways. The gynaecological examination presents a situation in
which different realities are precariously balanced. The situation is
characterised by an impersonal, clinical and medical definition on
the one hand, and a personal, intimate, sexual definition on the
other. Emerson clearly demonstrates how the sexual aspect can
unintentionally invade the clinical definition, so that the parties
272 SocioloRical ParadiRms and Orflanisational Analysis
involved have continually to strive to define the situation as a
'gynaecological examination going right', a situation in which no
one is embarrassed and no one is thinking in sexual terms. She
demonstrates very clearly how this occurs, with the gynaecologist
and nurse acting in concert to sustain the dominant definition
through a particular kind of language and technique. When the
dominant definition breaks down (through, for example, the
patient blushing. or refusing to co-operate through modesty), a
whole battery of interventions and techniques is brought into play
to restore the balance. The reality of the gynaecological examina-
tion is shown to rest upon a complex and sustained series of
negotiations between all the parties involved.
Emerson maintains that the precarious balance of competing
realities found in the gynaecological examination represents but an
extreme case illustrative of the ongoing process which
characterises a wide range of situations in everyday life. It merely
exaggerates the internally contradictory nature of definitions of
reality which are found in everyday situations, at work, in social
encounters, or whatever. The study emphasises how individuals
have to involve themselves in a deliberate effort to maintain a
balance between the connicting themes reflected in any given
social situation, and how the social reality which emerges is essen-
tially negotiated by the actors directly involved.
As in the case of Sudnow's study, Emerson's work, whilst
distinctly phenomenological in its basic orientation with regard to
the socially created status of reality, does admit of a more concrete
form of social organisation in the background. Reality in each case
is constructed upon what appears to be a pre-set stage by actors
who have already been allocated roles. In neither study is this
background subjected to scrutiny; the focus is upon the ways in
which the actors construct the scene in which they find
themselves.
As in the case of the ethnomethodological studies considered
earlier, certain ontological problems are reflected in this research.
Later in this chapter we will consider the dilemma which
phenomenological sociologists face in engaging upon empirical
work of this kind. For the moment, however, we will turn to
consider the implications which this type of phenomenologically
orientated research, despite its problems, has for organisation
theorists located within the functionalist paradigm.
 The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 273
The Phenomenological Challenge to
Contemporary Organisation Theory
The challenge which phenomenological sociology presents to con-
temporary organisation theory is clearly of a very fundamental
kind. 3 It suggests that the whole enterprise of' organisation theory'
is based upon very dubious foundations. The ontological assump-
tions which characterise the functionalist paradigm stand in
fundamental opposition to those which underwrite the
phenomenological perspective. For phenomenologists, organisa-
tions as tangible and relatively concrete phenomena simply do not
exist; the social world is essentially processual and emerges from
the intentional acts of human beings acting individually or in con-
cert with one another. The social reality 'created' in the course of
this process consists of little more than images of reality which can
be understood in terms of a network of typifications. They do not
comprise a solid definition; they gloss over complexity; the com-
plex nature of social reality only emerges when individuals are
forced, through the pressures of interaction with one another, or in
attempting to make sense oftheir world, to dive deeper and deeper
for new or modified typifications to account for and make sense of
their situation. The complex and tangible nature of reality ·out
there' is, from this point of view, a socially constructed
phenomenon of dubious intersubjective status and as transient as
the moment in which it is viewed.
Organisations, therefore, are seen, from the phenomenological
perspective, as social constructs; an organisation stands as a con-
cept which means different things to different people. As a univer-
sal concept, its intersubjective status is extremely dubious.
Organisation theorists are seen as belonging to a small and self-
sustaining community which believes that organisations exist in a
relatively tangible ontological sense and theorises about them.
From the phenomenological standpoint, organisation theorists
theorise about concepts which have very little significance to
people outside the community which practises organisation theory
and the limited community which organisation theorists may
attempt to serve.
For the phenomenologists, organisation theorists sustain their
enterprise by colluding with those whom they·attempt to serve, or,
more appropriately, those to whom they feel they need to make
their activities rationally accountable. It is for this reason that
contemporary organisation theory is accused of having a manager-
ial bias. It uses managerial concepts in order to construct its
274 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
theories. These concepts are used as a 'resource', whereas, as
Bittner ( 1965) suggests, from the phenomenological point of view
they should provide the 'topic' of analysis.
The phenomenological challenge to contemporary organisation
theory is total and complete, because the issue at dispute is that of
ontology. It follows from this that all the concepts which the
organisation theorist uses to construct his view of organisational
reality are open to criticism. The concepts of organisation
structure, job satisfaction, organisational climate, etc., are all
reifications which are often confused with social reality. Should
the organisation theorist claim that they are merely of heuristic
value, then the question of •ownership' arises, and the unwitting or
conscious collusion which this implies. Much of the
phenomenological research which we have considered in this
chapter can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate to theor-
ists located within the functionalist orthodoxy that they are over-
concretising the social world. The studies which have demon-
strated, for example, how individuals create the rules within an
organisational context, negotiate the nature of 'crime' and hence,
of criminal 'statistics', demonstrate that to view reality in terms of
these rules, structures and statistics is to view the world in terms
which are all too simple. The core of social reality lies in what
Garfinkel ( 1967, p. II) has described as 'the awesome indexicality'
of everyday life. Reality does not exist on the surface of human
affairs, offering itself for straightforward study as the functionalist
organisation theorist so often assumes. Social reality lies deep
within the network of typifications which individuals, if pressed,
will summon to make sense of the situation in which they find
themselves.
The implications of a phenomenological sociology true to the
ontological assumptions of the interpretive paradigm are com-
pletely destructive as far as contemporary organisation theory is
concerned. The phenomenological sociologist and the organisa-
tion theorist occupy different social realities to all intents and
purposes; they live in different intellectual worlds. The con-
temporary organisation theorist cannot build his theories within
the context of the interpretive paradigm.
What, then, can the contemporary organisation theorist learn
from the phenomenologist? What can he incorporate within the
bounds of the functionalist paradigm? It would seem that here
there is some scope for integration - a potential which others have
already tried to explore. It will be recalled from the previous
chapter that the concern to integrate the perspectives of idealism
The Interpretive Paradigm and the Study of Organisations 215
and positivism was a preoccupation of many social theorists in the
years of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was
one ofthe major problems to which Dilthey and Weber addressed
themselves, for example, and, as we have suggested, social action
theory and certain varieties ofinteractionism can be understood as
the direct products of this concern. In many respects these schools
ofthought represent the functionalist reaction to the idealist view
of social reality which underwrites the phenomenological perspec-
tive, and offer scope for further development within organisational
theory. Silverman's book The Theory of Organisations (1970), for
example, suggests one possible line of development.
Clearly, there is much more that can be done within the context
of functionalism to explore the implications of studying a social
reality which is far less clear-cut, certain and solid, and more
processual, than has been envisaged in theory to date. There is
more scope for recognising the role of individuals in interpreting
and sustaining particular views of social reality than is generally
recognised. There is scope for adopting an epistemology, a view of
human nature and a methodology consonant with this revised view
of the ontological status of the social world. In short, contempor-
ary organisation theory can usefully assess and reappraise its basic
orientation with regard to its assumptions on each of the four
strands of the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme.• Such action would represent a response which meets the
phenomenological challenge upon the functionalist's own ground.
As far as the phenomenologist is concerned, it would be an
inadequate response. At heart, the basic challenge of
phenomenology to functionalist theory is to respect the nature of
the social world and, for the phenomenologist, this is just not
possible within the bounds of the functionalist problematic. s

Phenomenological Approaches to the Study

of Organisational Situations: Problems and
Dilemmas
Adopting the standpoint of the phenomenological sociologist
rather than that of the functionalist organisation theorist, what
implications emerge from the discussion and analysis presented in
earlier sections of this chapter? Clearly, there are many problems
for the phenomenological sociologist concerned to study the
nature of organisational situations, since he is often unwittingly led
276 SocioloRical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
to recognise and acknowledge features within any given situation
which, if pressed, he would be forced to deny. We have made
much of this point in our discussion of the 'ontological oscillation'
between theoretical and empirical work.
It would seem that many of these problems arise because the
researchers concerned have not been sufficiently explicit about
what they are attempting to demonstrate, Focusing upon the four
elements of the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical
scheme, it is unclear whether the empirical work of these theo1ists
aims to illustrate a particular view of ontology, to demonstrate the
superiority of a particular approach to epistemology and
methodology, or merely to emphasise the voluntarism which they
see as characterising human affairs. No doubt some of the studies
attempt to achieve all these aims, though their success is question-
able.
If the concern of the phenomenological sociologist is to tackle
the problem of ontology, as his theoretical perspective requires,
then it is important that he be explicit about this. It is important to
emphasise that the reality which his work reflects is fundamentally
different from that conceptualised by, for example, the
functionalist theorist. Insofar as he confines himself to illustrating
movement within organisational rules or against the background of
a bureaucratic structure, as some of the studies discussed earlier
have sought to do, then his work tends to affirm the basic existence
of the reality upon which functionalist theory, for example, is
based. The choice of unusual situations for research such as Skid
Row, which are far removed from the realm of everyday life for the
majority of people, also tends to reaffirm the concrete status of
everyday reality in situations which are not Skid Row. If the
phenomenologist is concerned to tackle the problem of ontology, it
would seem that it is necessary to study situations in which people
are typically regarded as having relatively little discretion in the
way in which they mould their reality. Up to now phenomen-
ological research has focused upon what the functionalist theorist
would regard as high-discretion roles, such as those of the
receptionist, district attorney, police officer, gynaecologist, etc.
Phenomenological studies of what are usually seen as low-
discretion situations (characteristic of the assembly line, for
example) tend to be conspicuous by their absence.
A focus upon the ontological problems involved here would
require the phenomenological sociologist to take a firm stand on
the precise status of the concepts of organisation, hierarchy,
bureaucratic rules, etc., and other background features inherent in
The Interpretive ParadiRm and the Study of OrRanisations 211
much of the empirical work produced to date. It would clarify
whether they actually intend to dispute the realist ontology which
characterises the functionalist orthodoxy, or whether they are
merely attempting to illustrate the complex and voluntaristic
nature of human actions and the inadequacies of positivist
epistemology and nomethetic methodology for developing an
adequate understanding of this process. It would bring them face
to face with the basic assumptions which underwrite the
interpretive paradigm, since they would be obliged to be specific
about the precise status of social reality and the form which it
takes. As we noted in our discussion on the work of Silverman and
his colleagues, the attempt to deal with a socially contructed and
socially sustained reality which appears all too ·real' has
introduced a new dimension into his work consonant with ·critical
theory' within the radical humanist paradigm. The attempt to
handle the seeming presence of pattern and structure reflected in
the social construction of reality has led to a focus upon ideological
issues intimately related to the regulation-radical change
dimension of our analytical scheme. Phenomenological sociology
characteristic of the interpretive paradigm is underwritten by the
basic assumption that there is a tendency towards order in social
affairs. Insofar as a part of this order is reflected in a pattern and
structure which provides a context within which reality is created,
it needs to be explained. It is precisely this concern which has led
many social theorists who wish to continue to subscribe to a
nominalist perspective characteristic of the idealist tradition to
forge alternative frameworks.
As we shall find in the next chapter, this concern is very much
reflected in the work of Hegel and in the problem of the dialectical
relationship between subject and object worlds. It is also reflected
in the work of the young Karl Marx, Jean-Paul Sartre and, more
recently, Habermas. In their different ways they have sought to
demonstrate that the socially created world can become all too real
and provides a framework which constrains the actions and
orientations of human beings, as if it had an existence on its own
account. We do not wish to imply here that phenomenological
sociology can only be further developed within the context of the
radical humanist paradigm. Our intention is to pose the issues
which arise if phenomenological sociologists acknowledge the
seeming presence of structure which hangs in the background of
their current work. By confronting the basic ontological problem
which this involves, they will clarify the nature of their enterprise.
For those who remain convinced that social reality is entirely the
278 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
creation of autonomous human beings involved in the flow of
everyday life, the problem will be to develop epistemologies and
methodologies adequate for studying the nature of this world. For
those for whom structure and pattern in social reality appear all too
'real', a consideration of the power dimension inherent in the
ability of the individual to create his reality is likely to prove a
major issue and, pursued to its logical end, will undoubtedly call
for a major reorientation in theoretical perspective. It will call for a
perspective which has much more in common with radical human-
ism than with the sociology of regulation which characterises the
interpretive paradigm.

Notes and References

1. Silverman, in defence of Bittner's view, has suggested that
he uses 'structural determinants' in a highly specific sense
(Silverman in McKinlay, 1975, p. 282).
2. We shall not consider here Silverman's book Reading
Castaneda (l975b), which seeks to provide an
ethnomethodological analysis of Castaneda ( 1970) and thus
does not focus upon practices within organisational contexts.
3. We shall confine our discussion here to the implications of
phenomenology for theories characteristic of the
functionalist paradigm. It is clear that there are also implica-
tions for theories located in the other paradigms.
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of our present
endeavour to address these here.
4. For a discussion of some of the epistemological and
methodological implications of phenomenological sociology,
see, for example, Blumer (1969), Cicourel (1964), Douglas
(1970b). Many of their arguments are conveniently brought
together in Mennell ( 1974).
S. We wish to emphasise here the point made in note 3 above.
The nature of the concept of paradigm, as used here,
necessarily implies that the legitimacy of the world view
reflected in a particular paradigm is fundamentally opposed
by the perspectives characteristic of the other three.
8. Radical Humanism

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The intellectual origins of the radical humanist paradigm can be
traced back to the tenets of German idealism and the Kantian
notion that the ultimate reality of the universe is spiritual rather
than material in nature. It thus derives from the same intellectual
source as the interpretive paradigm, though the essentially subjec-
tivist orientation which the two paradigms have in common are
made to serve fundamentally different ends.
The interpretive and radical humanist paradigms are both
founded upon the notion that the individual creates the world in
which he lives. But, whereas the interpretive theorists are content
to understand the nature of this process, the radical humanists
subject it to critique, focusing upon what they regard as the essen-
tially alienated state of man.
This critique proceeds along two avenues of discourse. One of
these is associated with a 'subjective idealist' position, which
derives from the same source as the philosophy of Husser! and
other phenomenologists discussed in Chapter 6. Although the
roots of the subjective idealist tradition can be traced back to the
philosophy of Kant and earlier, it is in the work of Fichte
(1762-1814) that it first receives its most explicit and coherent
expression.' Fichte was a follower of Kant, and his brand of
subjective idealism rested upon the assumption that individual
consciousness is a continuously creative entity generating a per-
petual stream of ideas, concepts and perspectives through which a
world external to mind is created. From Fichte's point of view, any
understanding of this created reality involved understanding the
nature, structure and functioning of conscious mind. However, he
was at pains to distinguish between this internal domain of con-
sciousness and what was created by it and thu·s made external to it.
In so doing he was able to steer clear of the solipsist perspective by
recognising the existence of an external world, thus establishing a
position some way between the immaterialism of Bishop Berkeley
and the perspective of 'objective idealism' as, for example,
280 Sociolo~:ical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
reflected in the work of Hegel ( 1770-1831). For Fichte, the exter-
nal world was to be understood in terms of the projection of
individual consciousness. Fichte saw human beings as externalis-
ingtheirexperiences into a form of reality which in turn is reflected
back upon them, and through which they became conscious of
themselves and their actions. As noted above, this perspective has
had a widespread influence upon contemporary philosophy and
social theory through the work of Husser! and other
phenomenologists. Its influence upon the radical humanist para-
digm is most clearly evident in the work ofSartre and his followers
within the French existentialist movement. In essence, they have
radicalised the phenomenological perspective which characterises
the subjective idealist's position, viewing the individual as trapped
within the mode of existence which he creates. Ontologically, they
view the world as the product of individual consciousness: con-
sciousness is seen as being projected onto the. external through
acts of intentionality, thereby creating it. The subjective idealists
within radical humanism focus upon the pathology of intentional-
ity. whereby, in creating the external world, man separates himself
from his true 'Being'.
The second avenue of discourse within radical humanism is
based upon the tradition of 'objective idealism·, which received its
earliest and most comprehensive expression in the work of Hegel. 2
The Hegelian system of thought rests upon his first and perhaps
most significant work, The Phenomenology of Mind, which
investigates the ontological status of human knowledge. In this
book Hegel seeks to demonstrate how knowledge passes through a
series of forms of consciousness until a state of 'absolute knowl-
edge' is reached, wherein the individual is at one with the 'absolute
spirit' which pervades the universe. For Hegel. the ultimate reality
rests in 'spirit' (Geist). 'Absolute knowledge' rests upon the real-
isation that consciousness is 'spirit' and that the object of con-
sciousness is nothing other than itself. Hegel presents human
beings as living in a world characterised by a constant interplay
between individual consciousness and its objectification in the
external world. Consciousness and the external world are viewed
as two sides of the same reality. They are locked in a dialectical
relationship in which each defines and influences the other. 3 For
Hegel, everything is its own opposite. The truth lies on both sides
of every question in an antagonistic relationship to itself. As a
method of analysis the dialectic stresses that there is a basic
antagonism and conflict within both the natural and the social
world which, when resolved, leads to a higher stage of develop-
 Radical Humanism 281
ment. This dialectical process is seen as a universal principle,
which generates progress towards the state of ·absolute knowl-
edge' in which the distinction between subject and object is over-
come and human consciousness becomes aware of its location
within 'absolute spirit'.
Hegel, like Fichte, saw individual consciousness as a focal point
for the understanding of the nature ofthe social world. However,
whereas in Fichte's brand of subjective idealism, the individual
creates his world, in Hegel's brand of objective idealism, indi-
vidual consciousness is subservient to an external pattern of uni-
versal reason which reflects the existence of a universal force or
spirit above and beyond the individual. Human consciousness and
human history, for Hegel, are to be understood in terms of the
unfolding of the universal spirit which will lead with certainty to
the perfect society. In his later years, Hegel increasingly saw the
Prussia of his day as the embodiment of the 'absolute spirit', the
perfect society in which the individual became subservient to the
state.
Hegel's philosophy thus became wedded to a very conservative
political creed, and has been subjected to a wide range of inter-
pretation. Early on a deep cleavage of opinion arose between the
perspectives of the so-called 'Right Hegelians', who more or less
accepted Hegel's system of philosophy in its entirety, and the
views of the 'Left' or 'Young Hegelians', who directed Hegel's
system of thought to fundamentally different ends.
Prominent among the 'Young Hegelians' was the young Karl
Marx (1818-1883), who in essence inverted the Hegelian system
and united it with a critique of the society of his day. 4 1n sodoinghe
laid the basis for the development of a radical humanism in the
objective idealist mould. Marx employed Hegel's historical per-
spective and dialectical method of analysis within the context of a
philosophy which placed the individual rather than ·absolute
spirit' at the centre of the stage. Marx, along with the other Young
Hegelians. particularly Feuerbach, 5 argued that there was no abso-
lute above man. They argued that religion and the State were the
creations of man rather than reflections of any 'absolute spirit'.
They emphasised that all objectifications encountered in the social
world were humanly created and pointed the way to an emancipat-
ory philosophy which stressed how individuals, through self-
consciousness, could create and thus change the society in which
they Jived. Marx, in particular, started from the premise of the
alienation of man. He saw the society of his day as dominating
human experience; objectified social creations reflected back
282 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
upon man as an alienating force, dominating his essential being and
nature. This point of view is expressed most forcibly in Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts ( 1844), in which Marx demon-
strated how the capitalist system of production lay at the heart of
man's alienation. 6 Whereas for Hegel alienation was a necessary
phenomenon on the path to self-realisation and ·absolute
knowledge', for Marx it became a concept wedded to an attack
upon the status quo and the shortcomings of the totality of capital-
ism.
In later work Marx moved away from the idealist perspective to
one rooted in a more realist interpretation of the nature of the
social world. In The German Ideology ( 1846), written with Engels,
Marx sought to settle accounts with German idealism, and this
work is often seen as defining the so-called 'epistemological break'
in Marx's thought (Aithusser, 1969). From the point of view ofthe
analytical scheme presented here, it signifies Marx's break with
radical humanism, and the beginning of a move towards radical
structuralism. The perspectives characteristic of the latter para-
digm, which are explored in Chapter 10, receive increasing atten-
tion in Marx's Grundrisse and Capital.
Despite these early origins, the radical humanist perspective
remained dormant until the early 1920s, when Lukacs, under the
influence of neo-idealism, sought to re-emphasise the influence of
Hegel upon Marx. The discovery of the lost Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts some ten years later reinforced, and in
some ways legitimated, this interest, which found its expression in
a radical humanist critical theory. The growth of critical theory,
along with French existentialism, its subjective idealist
counterpart, can largely be understood as the radical response to
the renewal of interest in the idealist tradition which, as we have
seen from Chapter 6, emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.

The Structure of the Paradigm

As will be apparent from the above discussion, the radical human-
ist paradigm comprises the subjective and objective idealist strains
of thought, both of which have their origins in German idealism.
These constitute the principal philosophical perspectives. In addi-
tion, it is possible to identify the shaping influence of solipsism and
a category of anarchist thought which, though deriving largely
from Hegelianism, must be regarded as having followed a different
 Radical Humanism 283
line in terms of detailed development. We may consider the work
located within this paradigm under four broad headings: (a) solips-
ism; (b) French existentialism; (c) anarchistic individualism; (d)
critical theory.
The broad interrelationships between these four categories of
social theory are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Solipsism characterises the most subjectivist region of the para-
digm,just as it does within the interpretive paradigm. As we have
argued, it represents a philosophical position without sociological
equivalent, although some social theories, when taken to their
logical extremes, run dangerously close to what Sartre (1969) has
described as the ·reef of solipsism'. Since we considered this
perspective in Chapter 6, we will not discuss it further here.
French existentialism occupies the middle range of the para-
digm. It represents a perspective in the tradition of subjective
idealism. Deriving largely from the work of Fichte and Husser!, it
receives its clearest expression in the work of Sartre. This variety
of existentialism has influenced literary interpretation and some
psychiatry, as well as philosophy.
Anarchistic individualism, most usually associated with the
thought of Max Stirner, occupies a position in the least subjectivist
and most change-orientated region of the paradigm. It is a category
of thought which few subscribe to, but it is worthy of consideration
as an example of an extreme social theory which advocates radical
change, focusing upon individual consciousness as the basic unit
of analysis.
Critical theory represents the principal line of development in
the objective idealist tradition and is located in the least subjectiv-
ist region of the radical humanist paradigm. Within critical theory
we recognise three broad schools of thought based upon Lukac-
sian sociology, Gramsci's sociology and the work ofthe Frankfurt
School. These differ considerably at a substantive level but are all
predicated upon Marx's inversion of the Hegelian system of
thought.
We begin our detailed consideration of these categories of
thought with 'Critical Theory'.

Critical Theory
Critical theory represents a category of sociological thought built
explicitly upon the work of the young Marx. 7 As a term it is often
284 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
used as a synonym for the work of the Frankfurt School of social
theorists, but we wish here to expand its usage to cover three
interrelated yet discrete schools of thought. The Frankfurt School
owes much to the work of Lukacs, which, in turn, bears a remark-
able similarity to that of Gramsci, so that these approaches have
substantial areas of overlap. Critical theory is a brand of social
philosophy which seeks to operate simultaneously at a philosophi-
cal, a theoretical and a practical level. It stands firmly in the
idealist tradition of critique deriving from Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason; its proponents seek to reveal society for what it is, to
unmask its essence and mode of operation and to lay the founda-
tions for human emancipation through deep-seated social change.
It is an overtly political philosophy, in that it stresses the need to
follow the logic of one's philosophical and sociological analysis
with practical action of a radical kind. Lukacs, Gramsci and the
Frankfurt School, whilst sharing this overall aim, differ in the
nature and methods of their specific critiques. We will examine
each in turn.

Lukacsian sociology
In the early 1920s Georg Lukacs (1885-1974) sought to develop a
critical theory which offered an alternative to the orthodox Marx-
ism of his day. 8 In essence, he was concerned to overhaul its
socio-philosophical foundations, by emphasising and restoring the
strong Hegelian influence which characterised Marx·s work
before the so-called 'epistemological break' .In particular. Lukacs
sought to develop a theory of revolution which laid strong
emphasis upon the role of the proletariat and its class conscious-
ness in the overthrow of capitalist society. For Lukacs, as we shall
see, the proletariat provided a solution to the epistemological,
theoretical and practical issues facing Marxism in the 1920s.
Lukacs's influence, like that of his one-time teacher Simmel, is
dissipated and fragmented. Lukacsian sociology consists not so
much of Lukacsians who are dogmatically faithful to his key texts,
problems and conceptualisations, as of a widely constituted body
of thought which uses, to a greater or lesser extent. Lukacs's key
notions. This influence has been felt internationally. so that in
France Lukacs's work has been developed by Lucien Goldmann,
in Britain by Meszaros and in the USA by Alvin Gouldner, who has
gone so far as to describe Lukacs as 'the greatest Marxist theorist
of the twentieth century' (Gouldner, 1976, p. x).
 Radical Humani.~m 285
It is important to note, however, that Lukacs' influence stems
from his early work and that his later output is steadfastly ignored.
In fact, Lukacs is a thinker whose work can be located on at least
three points on the subjective-objective dimension of our analyt-
ical scheme. He began his career in Hungary with the publication
of a series of books connected with the theory of the novel, in
which he acknowledges his position to be that of subjective ideal-
ism. Lukacs had been attracted to subjective idealism under the
influence of Dilthey's approach to the Geisteswissenschaften and
Husserl's phenomenology through his studies at Berlin and later
Heidelberg. At Heidelberg Lukacs was introduced to Hegel's
work and by 1923 had produced a collected series of essays entitled
History and Class Consciousne.u. Based upon Hegelian objective
idealism, this work represented an attempt to emphasise the
humanist, more subjective aspects of Marxism some ten years
before the rediscovery of Marx's Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844. The reaction against History and Class Con-
sciousness within orthodox Marxism was such that Lukacs was
labelled an ultra-Leftist and a heretic insofar as Engels' interpreta-
tion of dialectical materialism was concerned. 9 As a result, he
retracted his views on the link between Hegel and Marx and moved
to a position of middle-of-the-road materialism. This was done,
one might suggest without exaggeration, in order to survive in
Stalinist Russia at a time when the life expectancy of heretical
intellectuals was not high. In our terms, Lukacs made a complete
paradigmatic shift in the face of this threat. So total was his
embrace of materialism, and so unexceptionable his treatment of
it, that Lichtheim maintains that Lukacs's writings in the thirties
were 'the work of a man who had performed a kind of painless
lobotomy upon himself, removed part of his brain and replaced it
by slogans from the Moscow propagandists' (Lichtheim, 1970, pp.
83-4).
In the sixties, however, relations with the West were 'normal-
ised' and Stalirl's intellectual and political influence explicitly
rejected. Lukacs could assert again that History and Class Con-
sciousness, although flawed, was a book he was prepared to dis-
cuss and see republished under his name. This book has had a quite
crucial impact upon Marxism and is significant in that 'material-
ism' and the ideas of Engels play only a ·minor role. Lukacs
stresses the role ofsuperstructural factors within society and their
part in its transformation. Emphasis is placed upon consciousness,
ideology, literature and art, which are seen not as epiphenomenal
to the relations and means of production, but as quite central to any
286 Socio/()gical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
understanding of capitalism. Consciousness, in particular, is
assigned key importance, for proleterian consciousness was cru-
cial to both Lukacs's philosophy and his political methodology.
Class consciousness was central for Lukacs, because he saw it
as the escape route from a fundamental problem associated with
Hegel's notion of alienation. For Hegel, alienati9ns occurred as a
result of the objectification of 'ideas' in the external world which
reasserted themselves within man's consciousness. The ability to
move beyond alienation within this dialectical loop was provided
by the existence of an 'identical subject-object' which is ·at one'
with itself and not internally alienated. Hegel explained this
through the notion of 'absolute spirit'; Lukacs replaced this notion
with that of the proletariat, which becomes an 'identical subject-
object' not alienated within itself if and when it acquires true or
'imputed' consciousness of the reality of capitalism and of its
ability to transform and overthrow it. 10 The class consciousness of
the proletariat then both provides a philosophical solution to one of
the Hegelian puzzles and represents the means whereby existing
society can be overthrown. By this device Lukacs seeks to evade
some of the primary epistemological and practical problems facing
Marxism.
The proletariat represents an identical subject-object not only in
its ability to transcend alienation, but also in its position in the
centre of the world historical stage, from which it can comprehend.
more than any other group or class, the 'totality' of capitalist
society. 11 Lukacs's notion of 'totality' serves to unify His tory and
Class Consciousness, but it is a difficult concept to comprehend.
In a most general sense it refers to the Hegelian and Marxist view
that everything must be grasped as a whole; the whole dominates
the parts in an all-embracing sense. Marx used the notion of
'totality' to conceptualise the process of social change. 'Stages' in
societal development represent specific 'totalities', so that each
transformation of society replaces one totality by another. Capital-
ism is one such totality, quite distinct from feudalism or commun-
ism, and it is one in which objective and subjective elements are
combined within a complex, dynamic, structured process which
can only be comprehended holistically. This implies that one
cannot understand any aspect of capitalism without first under-
standing capitalism itself in its entirety. As we have seen, for
Lukacs it is the proletariat which has the ability to comprehend
society, to see the internal connections of the parts within
it and the whole network of relationships in the total social
structure. Once this totality is subjected to analysis it is unmasked
 Radical Humanism 287
and stands revealed to all men in the moments of history before its
overthrow.
A central aspect of this notion of totality lies in the intimate
connection, first postulated by Hegel, between objective and sub-
jective dimensions within social reality, which are synthesised,
according to Lukacs, within the class consciousness of the pro-
letariat. The process whereby these dimensions are made falsely
discrete and differentiated, so that they are no longer seen as
'identical', Lukacs calls 'reification'. This has clear links with both
Hegelian and Marxist views of alienation, which revolve in differ-
ent ways around the separation of objective and subjective factors.
Arguably, ·reification' is one of the central concepts ofHistory and
Class Consciousness, for it provides the focus for Lukacs's
critique of the capitalist form of society. Reification, of course,
refers to the fact that whilst men in their day-to-day productive
activities create their social world, these activities and what results
from them are seen as divorced from men, as independent,
objectified 'things'. Whilst objectification of man-made artefacts is
probably necessary and inevitable in all forms of social life,
Lukacs, like Marx, seeks to stress the political, constraining
aspects of reitication and the effective barrier it provides to the
comprehension, by the working class, of the totality in which they
live. Put simply, for Lukacs alienation in the form of reification is
something to be overcome, since it is the key to the release of the
explosive energies of the proletariat, which is so necessary for the
transformation and reconstruction of capitalist society.
In terms of our major analytical dimensions, Lukacsian
sociology occupies a position on the least subjectivist wing of the
radical humanist paradigm. Ontologically, it invokes the
omnipresent dialectic, since social processes are seen to consist of
the 'objective' acting upon the ·subjective' and of the ·subjective'
acting in its turn upon the 'objective'. For Lukacs, then, the
ontological nature of the world is neither crudely nominalist nor
crudely realist. Lukacsians invoke the dialectic to meet the need to
synthesise objective and subjective factors within an integrated
harmonious socio-philosophical approach. However, since
revolutionary proletariats have rarely, if ever, succeeded, and
since they have rarely understood the totality which is capitalism,
the achievement of the 'identical subject~object' through the
dialectic has remained an unfulfilled promise. 12
Epistemologically, Lukacs takes up an interesting position. He
maintained that Marxism was a revolutionary methodology rather
than a set of laws or truths. For Lukacs, truth was always histori-
288 Sociological Paradigms and Or!fanisational Analysis
cally specific, relative to a given set of circumstances, so that one
did not search for generalisations or the laws of motion of capital-
ism. For example, success within a revolution was not guaranteed
by the immanent dynamics of the capitalist system; there was no
law of nature or history which said that it would be so. Revolution
depended upon the actions of the working class and the tactics
developed by its leaders. Lukacsians, then. are not epistemolog-
ical positivists seeking general laws of societal development.
They are tacticians and methodologists of revolt and revolution
stressing the scope of action open to the proletariat. They indicate
the voluntarist aspects of life within capitalism, not the determinist
ones, continually pointing to the freedom of choice in the type of
class consciousness the proletariat accepts. Almost by an act of
will, the ·actual' class consciousness of the vast majority of the
proletariat could become 'true' class consciousness through an
intellectual grasp of the totality of capitalism. Lukacsians seek to
change the world; their epistemology and methodology blend to
form a body of thought which seeks not general laws for future
contemplation but practical methods for radically transforming
society here and now.

Gramsci' s sociology
The influence of Antonio Gramsci ( 1891-1937), an Italian Marxist
theoretician and political activist, has been rapidly increasing in
Western academic circles since the early 1960s, when English
translations of his work started to become more readily available.
His ·philosophy of praxis' represents not only a rigorous social
theory, but also a political methodology for the working class.
Gramsci's Marxism,like that of Lukacs, presents a radical human-
ist critique of capitalism and also a methodology for achieving its
overthrow. As Boggs has noted, 'the Marxism that emerges from
the pages of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks can be defined as a
critical theory that fuses elements of structure and consciousness,
science and philosophy, subject and object - a conception which,
however unsystematically formulated, is a marked advance upon
what, until the 1920s, was the paradigm of orthodox Marxism'
(Boggs, 1976, p. 32).
Gramsci's ideas, which developed independently of Lukacs, are
extremely similar to the Hungarian's. While studying at Turin,
Gramsci became influenced by the Hegelianism of Benedetto
 Radical Humanism 289
Croce, which stood opposed to orthodox Marxism. Gramsci
believed that the Marxism of his day had lost its revolutionary zeal
through a misguided incorporation of positivist notions and a crude
almost mechanistic determinism which totally ignored the
voluntarist, practical aspects of working-class radical
potentialities. 13 He felt that what was needed was a truly dialecti-
cal theory which transcended the classical philosophical anti-
nomies of voluntarism-determinism, idealism-materialism and
the subjectiv«:>-objective. Such a theory would constitute a
'philosophy of praxis' which would represent a total world view, in
that it would transcend in itself, all previous philosophical
dichotomies and the philosophies based upon only one element
within them. As Gramsci put it, 'the philosophy of praxis is "suffi-
cient unto itself' in that it contains in itself all the fundamental
elements needed to construct a total and integral conception of the
world, a total philosophy and theory of natural science and not
only that but everything that is needed to guide life to an integral
practical organisation of society, that is, to become a total integral
civilisation' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 406).
This 'philosophy of praxis', this truly 'critical theory', sought to
introduce into orthodox Marxism comprehension of and sympathy
for an understanding of 'superstructural' factors within capitalist
societies. Gramsci believed that power and domination in capital-
ism rested not only with the materially located means of coercion
and oppression, but also within men's consciousness, through
'ideological hegemony' . 14 The ruling class, it was maintained,
always seeks to legitimate its power through the creation and
perpetuation of a belief system which stresses the need for order,
authority and discipline, and consciously attempts to emasculate
protest and revolutionary potential. For Gramsci, it was precisely
in the area of ideological hegemony in the schools, family and
workshop that capitalism was most likely to develop and increase
the unseen power of the ruling class, by attacking or infiltrating the
consciousness of the individual worker. But this is the crucial
weakness of ideological hegemony, too. For whilst hegemony
creates alienation, the individual worker is still his own theorist,
his own source of class consciousness, and is therefore the most
able to resist the forces of hegemony. It is from such ideological
resistance in the day-to-day life of workers that, for Gramsci,
revolutionary struggle and victory would first come. Conscious-
ness was not treated as being abstract and spiritual; it was a
concrete force for a political end.
Gramsci's ·philosophy of praxis' stressed practical involvement
290 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
in politics, and he, more than any of the other critical theorists,
became engaged in revolutionary activity. He aimed to produce
within Italian society a ·network of proletarian institutions',
mainly factory councils, which were to be the foundations upon
which the workers' State could be built. This activity of his
declined in the years after 1920, as the factory occupations which
had taken place were gradually ended. In 1926 Gramsci was
imprisoned by the Fascists for his role in the Communist Party,
and whilst in prison he wrote his Prison Notebooks, upon which
his reputation stands today.
Gramsci's sociology is clearly orientated to action and radical
change. More than any other critical theorist, Gramsci stresses the
importance of ·praxis' - the unification of theory and practice.
Whilst his conceptualisation of the critical problems within society
differs from those of other critical theorists, his location in terms of
the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme is
much the same. Like that of Lukacs, Gramsci·s approach to Marx-
ism stresses the Hegelian influence. Reality does not exist on its
own account in a strict materialist sense. but it exists in a historical
relationship with the men who modify it. His position reflects an
objective idealism in the tradition of critical theory and the work of
the young Karl Marx.

The Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School's claim on critical theory as its own property
owes much to Horkheimer's famous essay of 1937 (reprinted in
Horkheimer, 1972), which drew a distinction between traditional
science and critical theory. In this, Horkheimer attempted to relate
Marx's Critique of Political Economy to the German idealist tradi-
tion. Just as Marx attacked bourgeois political economy, so Hork-
heimer differentiated between the traditional approach to social
science and the critical theory perspective. Whereas traditional
science rested upon the distinction between the observer and his
subject and the assumption of value freedom, critical theory
emphasised the importance of the theorist's commitment to
change.
The 'Frankfurt School' is now used as a generic title for a
well-known group of German scholars who have shared,
through their links with the Institute for Social Research, common
academic and political interests over a number of decades and in a
 Radical Humanism 291
number of places. Under the influence of members such as Hork-
heimer. Adorno. Benjamin, Fromm. Kirschheimer, Lowenthal,
Marcuse, Habermas and many others, critical theory has
developed in many directions. 15 Based upon the ontological and
epistemological foundations reflected in the theories of the 'Young
Hegelians' particularly Marx, these critical theorists have forged a
wide-ranging perspective which has consistently aimed to reveal
the niiture of capitalist society for what it is. They have sought to
lay bare its underlying nature and set the basis for social change
through a revolution of consciousness. In this endeavour they
have subjected a wide range of social practice to critique in the
tradition of critical theory: they have provided thorough-going
Kulturkritik of the superstructure of capitalism. Positivist science,
modes of rationality, technology, the legal system, the family
unit, patterns of bureaucracy, language, art, music, literature,
the authoritarian personality and psychoanalysis have all been
subjected to critique from a radical humanist perspective. Thus
critical theory in the Frankfurt tradition embraces a polymathic
critical philosophy geared to emancipatory aims. As in the case of
Lukacsian sociology and that of Gram sci, it developed in reaction
to developments within orthodox Marxism, with its emphasis
upon historical determinism, and the general trend towards
totalitarianism in the USSR and Nazi Germany. It has also
developed in reaction to the positivist tradition in a more general
sense, particularly as reflected in the sociology of the functionalist
paradigm. In many respects, critical theory inverts the functional-
ist problematic, subjecting its tools and basic concepts to
thorough-going analysis. The antithetical stances of critical theory
and the functionalist paradigm are clearly illustrated, for example,
in the philosophical debates between Adorno and Popper, 16 and
the writings of the social theorists to be considered in this section
and the following chapter. In recent years critical theory has also
developed in opposition to trends in interpretive sociology and, as
we shall see, has sought to incorporate central notions in the
hermeneutic tradition within the bounds of its critical philosophy.
In contrast to the work of Lukacs and Gramsci, critical theory in
the Frankfurt tradition places far less emphasis upon political
action. Its proponents tend to be theoreticians rather than activ-
ists, and with the passage of time, the School has moved increas-
ingly towards philosophy and intellectual criticism rather than
revolutionary practice. Interestingly enough, after playing a rel-
atively minor role from the 1930s to the early 1960s, it came into
increasing prominence in the wake ofstudent revolution in France
292 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
and the counter-culture movement in the USA. Critical theory in
the Frankfurt tradition provided the ideal intellectual counterpart
to the ·revolution through consciousness' sought by the idealists of
the early 1970s. Within the limited context of our present work it is
impossible to provide a detailed overview and analysis of the work
of the Frankfurt School as a whole. In the rest of this section,
therefore, we will focus upon the ideas of Herbert Marcuse and
Jfirgen Habermas, two of the School's leading contemporary
theorists, whose work may be regarded as illustrative of the critical
theory perspective.
Marcuse has become well known for his scathing attack upon
the 'one-dimensional' nature of modern technological society,
particularly under capitalism. His work stands in the true
Hegelian-Marxist tradition of critical theory, and represents a
conscious attempt to present an emancipatory philosophy which
stands against both the phenomenology and the sociological
positivism characteristic of the sociology of regulation. For
Marcuse, phenomenology is inadequate, in that it ignores the
scope for, and influence of, human potentiality: positivism is also
inadequate, because of its false assumptions with regard to value
neutrality and its role as an instrument of control in the interests of
the status quo. Marcuse's special contribution to critical theory
lies in his auempt to incorporate the ideas and insights of Freud
and Weber within the Hegelian-Marxist perspective characteristic
of much of the radical humanist paradigm. 17 His critique is most
forcibly expressed in two of his major works -Eros and Civilisa-
tion (1966; first published in 1955) and One-Dimensional Man
(1964).
In Eros and Civilisation Marcuse, following Adorno and
Fromm, seeks to develop the links between human personality and
the totality in which it is located, taking the Freudian concepts of
the 'pleasure principle' and the •reality principle' as the starting
points for analysis. In the Freudian perspective civilisation rests
upon the repression of man's internal drives. The •pleasure princi-
ple' by which these drives are allowed to follow an unconstrained
search for satisfaction is seen as being subjugated in a civilised
society by the 'reality principle', according to which men are
prepared to postpone self-gratification in the interests of social
order. Marcuse starts from the position that tile •reality principle'
is a historically specific element. It is found of necessity only in
eras of scarcity, which presuppose the need to master nature in
order to survive. Marcuse maintains that scarcity is no longer a
characteristic of modern, technologically advanced societies,
 Radical Humanism 293
since they are able to put an end to material shortages of all kinds.
The need to repress instinctive desires in such a society is thus no
longer so strong. However, it continues, and the level of repres-
sion we now find in the advanced industrial state is that of 'surplus
repression' - constraint over and above that which is necessary to
maintain civilisation. Surplus repression, perceived and retained
within the psyche, and supporting the system of production, is
seen by Marcuse as lying at the core of man's psychological
domination by, and alienation within, the modern world. He sees
human emancipation from this dominating social order as being
brought about by ridding society of surplus repression, thus giving
more emphasis to the 'pleasure principle' expressed through libid-
inal drives. The message of Eros and Civilisation is an optimistic
one which views advanced technology as a force for liberation in
its ability to eliminate material scarcity.
In One-Dimenional Man Marcuse moves to a more Weberian
stance, though the direct links with Weberian sociology are not
specifically acknowledged or developed to any degree. 18 It is a less
optimistic book, in that the liberalising potential of Eros i$ seen as
undermined by the 'one-dimensional' nature of technological
societies, in which the centrifugal forces in human and social life
are dominated by technology and a one-sided commitment to
efficiency and material progress. Marcuse puts forward the thesis
that
technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and
c~ordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to
reconcile the forces opposing the system to defeat, or refute all protest
in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domina-
tion. Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing social
change - qualitative change which would establish essentially differ-
ent institutions, a new direction of the productive process, new modes
of human existence. This containment of social change is perhaps the
most singular achievement of advanced industrial society. (Marcuse,
1964, p. 10)

Marcuse argues that modern society is essentially totalitarian, in

that the technical apparatus of production and distribution
imposes itself upon the whole society. Its products and the indi-
viduals it ostensibly serves are moulded to serve its own internal
requirements. Technology is seen as a political force, a system of
domination which evolves new, increasingly effective and ·more
pleasant' means of social control and cohesion. It produces the
'one-dimensional' society, in which there is a flattening out of the
294 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
difference and conflict between actuality and potentiality; in which
alternatives appear to be increasingly unrealistic; in which the
industrial system appears to have a logic of its own. Marcuse
argues that affluence and the creation of false needs impedes the
development of radical protest against the established order. Con-
sciousness is seen as being moulded and controlled through the
media. The welfare state and the ·warfare state' are seen as
instruments for maintaining the level of consumption necessary for
sustaining a 'happy' workforce. All are seen as part of the ·one-
dimensional' nature of the totality of modern technological soci-
ety, in which the logic of purposive rationality pervades modes of
thought and the organisation of the material world. For Marcuse, it
is the task of critical theory to investigate the roots of this
'totalitarian universe of technological rationality', and to examine
their historical alternatives, as a means of revealing unused
capacities for improving the lives of human beings.
Within the last few years the writings of Jurgen Habermas have
attracted increasing attention as his major works (Habermas,
1970a and b. 1971a and b, 1972. 1974 and 1976) have become
available in English translation. A leading exponent of contempor-
ary critical theory, his work is impressive for its range and ability
to utilise ideas and concepts drawn from a variety of perspectives
in the service of a radical humanism. In essence, his work can be
understood as a reaction against the shortcomings of interpretive
sociology and sociological positivism. Habermas believes that the
discourses of these two traditions are inadequate and that they
reflect and serve the interests of those who use them. He distin-
guishes between the empirical/analytic sciences of a positivist
orientation, which serve the interests of control; the histori-
cal/hermeneutic sciences of the phenomenological tradition,
which aim at understanding meaning without influencing it; and
the critical science perspective characteristic of the Frankfun
School, which aims both to understand the world and to change it
(Habermas, 1972). The critical theory which he favours incorp-
orates notions derived from Parsonian systems theory and its
latter-day German equivalents; hermeneutics, as reflected, for
example, in the work of Gadamer ( 1965); and various concepts
drawn from psychoanalysis. These diverse perspectives are
welded together into a critical theory which for Habermas must be
emancipatory, dialectical (in transcending the philosophical anti-
nomies of subject and object, observer and observed, fact and
value), and hermeneutic in its endeavour to understand the socio-
cultural world in which subjective meaning is located.
 Radical Humanism 29.5
Habermas has attempted to shift the attention within Marxism
away from a consideration of the economic structure of capitalism
towards some of the key features of post-capitalist societies.
Whereas Marcuse has created a similar shift in attention by point-
ing towards the Weberian minotaur of purposive or technical
rationality, Habermas has stressed the structure of domination
embedded within our language and everyday discourse. For Hab-
ermas, the structure of language, its nature and use, provide a key
with which to unlock many insights into the fundamental mode of
operation of different social formations.
Recent developments in linguistics and ordinary language
philosophy demonstrate to Habermas's satisfaction that today the
'problem of language' has replaced the traditional 'problem of
consciousness'. In order to deal with these developments, he has
developed a theory of ·communicative competence', which
borrows conceptualisations from hermeneutics in order to provide
the link between the political macro-structure and speech acts
within a context of symbolic interaction. Habermas develops the
concept of an 'ideal speech situation', in which 'symbolic interac-
tion' is possible since genuine consensus is arrived at between
parties in communication and is recognised as a consensus without
the operation of power. This 'ideal speech situation' is contrasted
with one characterised by ·communicative distortion', in which a
supposed consensus is arrived at through discourse within the
context of an unequal power distribution.
Habermas illustrates the difference between these two situa-
tions through the concepts of 'work' and 'interaction'. These are
seen as being fundamentally different categories of social life, with
purposive rationality dominating the former, and symbolic interac-
tion the latter. 'Work' is viewed by Habermas as the dominant
form of social action within capitalist industrialised society. He
sees this social form as based upon a purposive rationality which
stresses the importance of goal attainment, defined in terms of
means--ends relationships. The system develops technical rules
to guide action and modes of thinking, and places stress upon the
learning of skills and qualifications. Social life is compartmental-
ised and language is 'context-free'. The rationalisation of the sys-
tem of action as a whole lies in the growth of productive forces and
the extension of power of technical control; 'Work' is seen as a
form of'communicative distortion' characterised by asymmetrical
choice in the use of speech acts which reflects an unequal power
relationship.
'Interaction', on the other hand, is based on communicative
296 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
action between men in which shared norms develop and are
reflected in an intersubjectively shared ordinary language.
Implicitly, 'interaction' is seen as more typical of societies in the
pre-capitalist era, with their low levels of specialisation and rela-
tively undeveloped division of labour. 'Interaction' subsumes
'labour' as a cohesive and integral part of social life. Within this
social form there are reciprocal expectations about behaviour,
violations of which attract widely based social sanctions. The
norms and values which govern social affairs are acquired through
a process of role internalisation. The rationalisation of this system
of action lies in ·emancipation', 'individuation' and the ·extension
of communication free of domination' (Habermas, 1971b).
'Interaction' is seen as based upon 'ideal speech' situations in
which man is emancipated from 'work' and domination. Haber-
mas 's vision is of a post-modern world based on 'interaction', with
equal access to speech acts afforded to all and an equality of
opportunity within discourse. As Schroyer ( 1971) has noted, to the
extent that Habermas 's version of critical theory is based upon the
liberating potential of self-reflexive language, the new form of
critical science which he advocates is essentially based upon a
·pathology of communication'.
Despite the emphasis placed upon language as a focus for social
analysis, Habermas is also at pains to stress that the theory of
communicative competence must be linked to the fundamental
assumptions of historical materialism if it is to be adequate and
effective. In his more recent works, however, in which he deals
with the variety of crises which might affect modern society, the
crucial area is seen as the legitimatory superstructure of the
political system (Habermas, 1976). He argues that a permanent
economic crisis is no longer likely within advanced capitalism
because of the pervasive intervention of the State. Thus, Marx's
analysis, with its dependence on class struggles and their relation-
ship to economic crises, is implicitly seen as outdated. For
Habermas, the key problem within advanced capitalism is the
'legitimation crisis'. 19 Therefore, whilst recognising the analytical
importance of material production, his concern is primarily with
·superstructural' factors, which are normally seen within orthodox
Marxism as epiphenomenal to any understanding of the economic
foundations of society. The materialist and idealist strands within
Habermas's work are always yoked in a relationship of great
tension, and his theoretical orientation aims at their reconciliation.
Like Marcuse, Habermas has sought to update the Hegelian-
Marxist critique of contemporary society and, in so doing, has
 Radical Humanism 297
drawn heavily upon developments taking place within the socio-
logy of regulation for the purpose of analysis. Their work clearly
demonstrates the way in which critical theory in the Frankfurt
tradition inverts the concerns and problematic of regulative social
theory, particularly that characteristic of the functionalist para-
digm. The functionalist tends to accept the norm of purposive
rationality, the logic of science, the positive functions of techno-
logy, and the neutrality of language, and uses them as building
blocks in the construction of supposedly value-free social theories.
The Frankfurt theorists concentrate upon demolishing this struc-
ture, indicating the essentially political and repressive nature of
the whole enterprise. They seek to demonstrate the way in which
science, ideology, technology, language and other aspects of the
superstructure of modern capitalist social formations are to be
understood in relation to the role which they play in sustaining and
developing the system of power and domination which pervades
the totality of this social form. Their function is to influence the
consciousness of the people living within it, with a view to eventual
emancipation and the pursuit of alternative forms of life.
The focus of critical theory upon the 'superstructural' aspects of
capitalist society is highly significant, in that it reflects the attempt
of theorists working within this tradition to move away from the
·economism· of orthodox Marxism and to elevate the Hegelian
concern for the role of the dialectic in social affairs. It is through
the dialectic that the objective and subjective aspects of social life
are thought to be reconciled. The ·superstructure' of capitalist
society is of key interest to the critical theorists, partly because it is
the medium through which the consciousness of human beings is
controlled and moulded to fit the requirements of the social
formation as a whole. It thus lies at the interface between subjec-
tive and objective worlds. In early Hegelian-Marxist theory vari-
ous elements of the superstructure, such as religion and the State
were seen as the sources of human alienation. As Marx argued in
his early writings, these 'intermediaries' which exist between man
and his experience of the world ·mystify', projecting a spurious
unity and order. He argued that they stood as seemingly indepen-
dent and alienating forces, created by man, yet reflecting back
upon him as independent presences. It was the task of the work of
the youthful Marx to 'de-mystify' through critique, in the true
idealist tradition.
The critical theorists reviewed in this section are all firmly
located in this intellectual tradition, and their work is to be under-
stood in similar terms. The relationship between key concepts
298 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
such as 'totality', 'consciousness', 'alienation' and 'critique'
which seem to permeate Marx's early work are not always spell
out and, indeed, do not always attract specific attention in the
writings of critical theorists. We wish to close our discussion here
by emphasising how crucial these four notions are to the per-
spective upon which critical theory is built, and we present Table
8.1 as a means of demonstrating some of the links which exist
between the work of the writers which we have considered here.

Table 8.1
Critical theory: central concepts and orientations

Totality

The notion that any understanding cl society must embrace in their entirety
the objective and subjective worlds which characterise a given epoch. Total-
ity embraces everything; it has no boundary. An understanding of this
totality must precede an understanding cl its elements, since the whole
dominates the parts in an all-embracing sense.

Consciousnrss
The force which ultimately creates and sustains the social world. Con-
sciousness is internally generated but influenced by the forms which it
assumes through the process of objectification and the dialectic between
subjective and objective worlds.

Alirnation
The state in which, in certain totalities, a cognitive wedge is driven between
man's consciousness and the objectified social world~ so that man sees what
are essentially the creations of his own consciousness in the form of a hard,
dominating, external reality. This wedge is the wedge cl alienation, which
divorces man from his true self and hinders the fulfilment cl his poten-
tialities as a human beina.
 Radical Humanism 299
Table 8.1 (continued)
Critiqu~

In their critique of contemporary society, critical theorists focus upon the

forms and sources of alienation, which they see as inhibiting the possibilities
of true human fulfilment. The various exponents of this perspective
approach it in somewhat different ways, at varying levels of generality.
Lukacs focuses upon the concept of r~iflcation. which provided the
socio-philosophical solution to the epistemological and practi-
cal problems facing Marxism in the 1920s.
Gramsci focuses upon the notion of id~oloRical h~g~mony as reflecting
a belief system among the proletariat fostered by the ruling
class. In his view, the belief system stressed the importance of
ord~r. authority and disciplin~. and was propagated throulh
institutions such as the family, school and workplau.
Marcuse through his notion of on~-dim~nsional man, focuses attention
upon the alienating characteristics which he sees as being
embedded in the growth of purposiv~ rationality within
advanced industrial societies. In particular. he emphasises the
alienating role of t~chnoiORY· sci~nc~ and logic. These sup-
plement other forces identified in his earlier work relating to
the excessive repression of libido and the maintenance of a
happy work force throulh the creation of qf}lu~nc~ andfals~
~~~~ds.

Hab~rmas focuses upon the role which lanfluag~ plays as an alienating

force in all aspects of soclal life. His theory of communicativ~
comp~unc~ seeks the common denominator in human interac-
tion, whether verbal, sexual, productive or whatever, and
seeks to show bow in contemporary Western societies there is
an element of communicativ~ distortion which lies at the heart,
and most basic level, of man's alienation.

Anarchistic Individualism
Like so many large-scale inte11ectual movements, anarchism is not
so much a relatively unified, political and theoretical position as a
clustering of perspectives. Anarchistic individualism represents
one such perspective, advocating total individual freedom,
untrammelled by any form of external or internal regulation. 20
Anarchistic individualism is a doctrine closely associated with
Max Stimer, a German school-teacher, whose inversion of the
Hegelian system of philosophy went far beyond that of Marx in its
rejection of all social institutions and the notion of the •absolute' in
any form. 21 His position resembles that of the existentialists in
300 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
some respects, since his notion of the ego comes close, as we shall
see, to Sartre's concept of 'being-for-self. Stirner emphasised the
primacy of individual existence and totally rejected any search
for universal laws governing social life. Far from sharing the
Hobbesian vision of the cataclysmic ·war of all against all' as the
crucial problem facing man, Stirner celebrates such a 'war' as the
solution toman'sproblems. Only through a 'union of egoists'- men
who pursue ruthlessly, without constraint, their own individual
interests - can true release and human freedom be attained.
Stirner studied at Berlin under Hegel and became associated
with the Left-Hegelians about the same time as Karl Marx. On
the publication of his principal work, The Ego and His Own
(1907), Stirner became branded as a fanatic and a dangerous
revolutionary, not only by those committed to maintenance of the
status quo, but also by his less violently disposed anarchist and
socialist colleagues. His book focused upon what we might now
term the forces of the id and argued that only by releasing these
from all restraints and restrictions could true human freedom be
attained. Human freedom, for Stirner, is freedom not for the
human species but for the individual ego. The Hegelian concept of
individual freedom within State control is totally overthrown in
this perspective, which emphasises emancipation through the
entire removal of the State and its trappings.
The State, in Stirner's eyes, was the greatest enemy of human
freedom, since it represented a regulatory collectivity which, in
de-emphasising the individual's happiness, stood for all he
rejected. Its overthrow and demolition was envisaged not through
revolution but through rebellion and insurrection. In The Ego and
His Own Stirner suggests:
Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous.
The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established
conditions or status, the State or society, and is accordingly apolitical
or .wcial act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a
transformation d circumstances, yet does not start from it, but from
men's discontent with themselves,is not an armed rising, but arising of
individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements that
spring from it. (Woodcock, 1977, p. 167)
Stimer saw such a rebellion as being initiated by 'the union of
egoists', not acting in concert in any organised way, but as indi-
viduals carrying out disruption of an ostensibly similar order.
Anarchist individualism meant putting anarchist notions into prac-
tice immediately, without awaiting any societal transformations.
 Radical Humanism 301
The core issue was the cognitive disposition of the individual, his
attitude of mind, rather than structural constraints or any external
ideological hegemony. Stirner·s book is in the tradition of objec-
tive idealism and focuses upon the subjective dispositions within
the individual as the starting point for any radical transformation of
society, in which, indeed, the whole notion of society is itself
threatened.
Anarchistic individualism has never made a great impact,
although it enjoyed a brief revival with the artistic resurgence of
interest in individualism of all kinds before World War I. There are
few anarchists today who accept or adhere to Stirner·s position,
although Woodcock maintains that 'as late as the 1940s I encoun-
tered a group of anarchist working men in Glasgow for whom
[Stirner's book} was still a belated gospel' (Woodcock, 1975, p.
91).
However. many of Stirner's ideas have been incorporated into
the canons of ·mainstream' anarchism, and his emphasis upon
·cognitive liberation· and 'freedom for the ego' have been taken up
by writers such as Murray Bookchin (1974). Although himself
committed to the more objectivist ·anarchistic communism',
Bookchin echoes some of Stirner's feelings when he emphasises
the subjective aspects which link our understanding of society with
the individual psyche. As he suggests, 'anarchists have probably
given more attention to the subjective problems of revolution than
any other revolutionary movement. Viewed from a broad his-
torical perspective, anarchism is a libidinal upsurge of the people,
a stirring of the social unconscious that reaches back, under many
different names, to the earliest struggles of humanity against
domination and authority' (Bookchin, 1974, p. 19). 22
Stirner's work is a political document, designed as an exhorta-
tion to individuals of all classes to rebel. The nature of the rebellion
envisaged, with its total commitment to the rejection of all exist-
ing social institutions, identities anarchistic individualism as one of
the most extreme theories of radical change that one is likely to
encounter. Since there is scarcely any room for 'society' in such a
conceptualisation, this brand of anarchism has come in for much
criticism, particularly from Marxists. Anarchistic individualism's
rejection of the ·sociological' category places it outside the Marx-
ist concern for replacing one form of society with another through
revolutionary means. For many Marxists, anarchism of this kind is
seen as essentially reactionary. From our point of view here, it
provides a good example of a philosophy of radical change
emphasising the imponance of subjectivist factors. Whilst not
302 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
claiming many sociological adherents, it serves as an illustration of
an extreme perspective within the radical humanist paradigm.

French Existentialism
French existentialism reflects a philosophical perspective firmly
located in the subjective idealist tradition deriving from the work
of Fichte and Husser!. In terms of our subjective-objective
dimension, it occupies a position between solipsism and the objec-
tive idealism characteristic of critical theory. Phenomenology and
existentialism are often seen as related schools of thought, and are
sometimes considered identical. 21 In line with our distinction be-
tween the perspectives characteristic of the sociologies of regula-
tion and radical change, we find it helpful to emphasise the distinc-
tion between them. Existential phenomenology characteristic of
the work of Schutz, as discussed in Chapter 6, is quite different
from the existentialism characteristic of the work of Sartre, to be
discussed here. Whilst from a distance they may appear to focus
upon similar areas of enquiry and to lend each other mutual sup-
port, their basic orientations are fundamentally distinct. Whilst the
work of Schutz focuses upon the social construction of everyday
life as a basis for understanding (almost as an end in itseiO, the
existentialism of Sartre is concerned with the understanding of the
pathology of such constructions, with a view to changing them.
Existentialism differs from phenomenology in its vigorous human-
ism and its political commitment to the desirability of change in the
existing social order.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that existentialist
philosophers and social theorists comprise a coherent school of
thought in the manner, for example, of the Frankfurt School.
Rather, existentialism stands for a somewhat broad and amorph-
ous movement, comprising theorists who acknowledge a common
debt to Kierkegaard. Among these theorists Jean-Paul Sartre has
emerged as by far the most important, and it is through a considera-
tion of his work that we wish to characterise the essential orienta-
tion of French existentialism as an illustration of the existentialist
movement as a whole.
It is the early writings of Jean-Paul Sartre which have established
him as a leading exponent of the French existentialist mode of
thought. Sartre's philosophical and literary works are extremely
diverse and wide-ranging, and they testify to the direct influence of
 Radical Humanism 303
a number of social theorists including Hegel, Husserl, Kier-
kegaard, Lukacs and Marx. 24 His existentialist views reflect a time
when the influence of the first three of these theorists was in the
ascendency and are expressed most forcibly in Being and
Nothingness, first published in 1943, and Existentialism and
Humanism, published just a few years later in 1948. In his later
work Sartre moved to a philosophical position consonant with a
Hegelianised form of Marxism, and the concepts emerging from
his existentialist works are harnessed in a critique of society in the
mould of a critical theory reflecting a more objective idealist view
of the world. This is mostevident,forexample,in Sartre'sCritique
of Dialectical Reason (1976).
Sartre defines existentialism in the tradition of Kierkegaard as
the conviction that 'existence comes before essence'; this belief
implies that ·we must begin from the subjective' - that is, the
individual located within existence is the fundamental concern of
the philosophical enterprise. It precedes any emphasis of interest
in the 'essences' of the 'real' world and in the make-up of external
reality. The individual is actively involved in the creation of his
world and not a mere observer or reflection of it. As Sartre puts it,
we do not 'survey the world' but rather, 'are engaged' by it. Sartre,
in the tradition of phenomenology, takes the consciousness of man
as a starting point for his philosophical enquiry and weds it to
humanism and a basic concern for human freedom. It is this theme
which preoccupies his early work. For Sartre, existentialism is
humanism, and he is concerned to demonstrate the way in which
·nothingness' and 'freedom' are essential aspects of the ontologi-
cal relationship between subjective and objective worlds as
experienced by individual human beings.
Before one can get to grips with Sartre's concept of 'nothing-
ness' and its intimate relationship with 'freedom', it is essential
first to understand his three concepts of 'modes of being', which
have their origins, more or less, in Hegel'sPhenomenoiORY. Sartre
identifies 'being-in-itself (en-soi), the world of external reality or
the stuff of which this real world is made up; 'being-for-self
(pour-soi) which denotes consciousness and the inner subjectivity
of men; and 'being-for-others'. Sartre's problem, like that of so
many idealist philosophers before him, is the nature of the rela-
tionship, if any, betweenpour-soi and en-soi • between conscious-
ness and reality. His treatment of this central issue rests upon the
idea that consciousness is always ohomethinR in the real world, so
that the relationship between pour-soi and en-soi is that between
the knower and the known. This relationship, however, depends
304 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
upon a distance or gap between the real world and the conscious-
ness of individual men, so that the separation between them is
always evident. Such a vacancy Sartre calls 'nothingness', for
herein lies the ability to conceptualise that which does ~•ot exist.
'Nothingness' allows men to think beyond the limitations of today
and this place and to imagine non-objects, new forms of social life
or any type of alternative reality in the future. 'Nothingness'
represents freedom, therefore, in the sense that it is here that man
has total freedom to dream and to hope. The measure of a man's
freedom, then, is the degree to which he can conceive of non-
objects and can look to potential actions rather than be constrained
by the pre-existing actuality of the en-soi. For Sartre, individuals
who retain the ability to conceive of 'nothingness' are free and
unconstrained, their lives bounded only by what amounts to a
voluntarist theory of action or, more precisely, interaction.
Sartre's position is interactive not so much in a sociological
sense but in terms of man's consciousness, in a way faintly redo-
lent of Mead's phenomenological concepts of the 'I' and ·me'. To
myself, I am obviously pour-soi (a 'being-for-self), since I am a
conscious, sentient being. Howe~er, to other men, I am but a real,
external, physically concrete object - a 'being-in-itself (en-soi).
This paradoxical relationship between human beings in social con-
texts creates the third category of being - 'being-for-others',
which is the interface between different individuals' conscious-
ness in which en-soi and pour-soi meet in day-to-day interaction.
It is from this analysis that Sartre's notion of 'bad faith' emerges.
Sartre uses this concept to refer to situations in which self-imposed
constraints are placed upon human freedom; in which men come to
accept external constraints from outside their pour-soi and conse-
quently reduce the ·nothingness' or gap in consciousness which
forms the core of their humanity. To the extent that men accept a
determining, outside interference, their internal ability to concep-
tualise 'nothingness' is reduced. Sartre illustrates this clearly by
indicating the way in which men often become imprisoned by their
roles. Instead of being 'free', we become what we are, just as an
oak tree is an oak tree. A waiter is a waiter and a father is a father,
incapable of being radically free and unable to escape at will from
the roles which they play. Sartre maintains that to live in one's role
is a form of self-deception. We know that as conscious individuals
it is false to see ourselves from outside ourselves as objects, but
this process is part of an attempt to escape from the problem of
'anguish •. As Sartre puts it. 'We flee from anguish by attempting to
apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a thing •
 Radical Humanism 305
(Sartre. 1966. p. 82). It is in the flight from 'anguish' that 'bad
faith' appears. Sartre's most famous example of this is his con-
sideration of the waiter in Being and Nothingness:
Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and
forward. a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the
patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too
eagerly: his voice, his eyes, express an interest a little too solicitous for
the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in
his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while
carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope walker by putting
in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he
perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All
his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his
movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other:
his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms: he gives
himselfthe quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is
amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long
before we can explain it: he is playing at heing a waiter in a cafe. There
is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and
investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it. to
take inventory of it: the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in
order to realiu it. This obligation is not different from that which is
imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of ceremony.
The public demands of them that they realise it as a ceremony: there is
the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they
endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer,
an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer,
because such a grocer is not wholly grocer. Society demands that he
limits himself to his function as a grocer ,just as the soldier at attention
makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard which does not
see at all, which is no longer meant to see. since it is the rule and not the
interest of the moment which determines the point he must fix his eyes
on (the sight 'fixed at ten paces'). There are indeed many precautions to
imprison a man in what he is, as if he lived in perpetual fear that he
might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his
condition. (Sartre, 1966, pp. 101-2)

The waiter here is playing at a role in a way which implies a

fundamental alienation from his true being. The concept of 'bad
faith • which it is intended to illustrate has much in common with
Marx's concept of alienation, in which individuals meekly accept
their social situation to the detriment of their true human poten-
tialities. No doubt, for Max Stirner. Sartre's 'bad faith' would
succinctly describe the constraining phenomenon his 'union of
egoists' would seek to overthrow.
306 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Whilst he has attracted few really committed disciples, Sartre's
influence has been widespread. His brand of existentialism has
been important as far as certain developments in psychoanalytic
theory are concerned, particularly through the work of R. D.
Laing, and as a result of the influence of his novels and other
literary work. However, the reaction to Sartre's work in general
has been somewhat confused. His shift in intellectual position to a
form of Hegelianised-Marxism, his writings and activities in con-
nection with the magazine Les Temps Modernes, and his political
activism, particularly since the events of 1968, have drawn criti-
cism and indeed abuse from many sides. Despite all this, however,
his contribution to the development of French existentialism is
beyond dispute and stands as a major achievement in its harness-
ing of the phenomenological approach in the service of radical
humanism.

The U nder1ying Unity of the Paradigm

The work of theorists located within the radical humanist paradigm
is underwritten by a common concern for the freedom of human
spirit. Radical humanists focus upon human consciousness within
the context of the totality which characterises a particular social
formation. There tends to be a concern with what may be
described as the ·pathology of consciousness', by which men come
to see themselves as trapped within a mode of social organisation
which they both create and sustain in their everyday lives. Radical
humanists are concerned with understanding the manner in which
this occurs, with a view to setting human consciousness or spirit
free and thus facilitating the growth and development of human
potentialities.
Like theories characteristic of the interpretive paradigm, radical
humanist approaches to the study of social affairs are rooted in a
subjectivism which recognises the precarious ontological status of
the social world. Whilst varying in their degree of subjectivism, the
different schools of thought within the paradigm are at one in
emphasising that reality is socially created and socially sustained.
Thus their perspective stands in fundamental opposition to
approaches characteristic of the radical structuralist and
functionalist paradigms. This opposition is clearly reflected in the
ontological and epistemological divides within Marxism and the
rare, but generally hostile, exchanges between social theorists
 Radical Humanism 307
adhering to the radical humanist and functionalist traditions. The
divisions between the latter two are compounded by the fact that
the ontological and epistemological distinctions are wedded to
fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of society. They
are divided in terms of both the dimensions of our basic analytical
scheme. According to the radical humanist, functionalist social
theorists create and sustain a view of social reality which
reinforces the status quo and which is to be understood as
but one aspect of the network of ideological domination which
pervades contemporary Western society. The functionalist
usually dismisses radical humanists as Utopian radicals hell-bent
upon fanning the flames of revolutionary consciousness, or as
mindless existentialists who will not or cannot adjust to the
world of everyday 'reality' and accept the inevitable march of
'progress'.
Many contemporary radical humanists have developed their
critique of society with the functionalist perspective firmly in mind
and, consequently, are able to attack it on many fronts. Thus, as
we have seen, within critical theory specific attention has been
paid to demonstrating the role of science, logic, rationality,
technology, language and other aspects of the superstructure of
capitalism as vehicles of cognitive domination, which, from the
radical humanist perspective, act as alienating 'intermediaries'
which present a barrier to the achievement of full humanness. In
the tradition of the work of the young Marx, the radical humanists
are concerned with the alienation of modern man. They start from
the premise that man lives in a world which constrains rather than
develops his full range of possibilities, and they are committed to
providing an analysis and critique of the way in which this occurs.
It is a critique which reflects a complete inversion of the functional
problematic and the view of society which it represents.
It is the emphasis which is given to consciousness in general and
alienation in particular which distinguishes the substance of the
radical humanists' thought from that of the radical structuralists.
Theorists in both these paradigms are committed to revolutionary
changes in society but, as we shall see, the radical structuralists
tend to place much more emphasis upon deep economic and politi-
cal 'structures' in their analysis. As we shall see, within the con-
text of the radical structuralist paradigm, the concepts of 'totality'.
·structure', ·contradiction' and ·crisis' take over as unifying fea-
tures from those of 'totality', ·consciousness', 'alienation' and
'critique', which can serve as a convenient shorthand for the
common concerns not only of critical theory, but also of the
308 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
essential orientation of the radical humanist paradigm in more
general terms.

Notes and References

I. For a general discussion of Fichte's work, see the introduc-
tion to Fichte (1970).
2. For a discussion of the Hegelian system of thought, see Hegel
(1931) and Kaufmann (1966).
3. For a discussion of the Hegelian use of 'dialectic', see
Kaufmann (1966), pp. 167-75.
4. For a discussion of Marx's views at this time, see McLellan
(1975 and 1976).
5. The influence of Feuerbach is of considerable importance
and calls for much greater attention than it is possible to give
here. For more extensive discussion, see Althusser (1969)
and McLellan ( 1976).
6. For a further discussion of Marx's theory of alienation. see
Avineri (1968), McLellan (1976), Meszaros (1970b) and
Oilman (1971).
7. For a further discussion of critical theory, see. for example,
Jay (1973), Connerton (1976) and O'Neill (1977).
8. As will become evident from our discussion in Chapter 10,
orthodox Marxism in the 1920s was based upon an extreme
interpretation of the radical structuralism characteristic of
Marx's later work.
9. For a discussion of Engels' influence on the interpretation of
Marx's work, see Chapter 10.
10. For a discussion of Lukacs's concept of the dialectic, see the
article by Meszaros in Parkinson (1970).
11. For a discussion of Lukcic~·s use of 'totality', see Lukacs
(1971) and the article by Pascal in Parkinson (1970).
12. For a further discussion of this point in relation to the con-
sciousness and action of the working class, see Mann ( 1971).
13. See, for example, Gramsci's attack on positivism in 'Critical
Notes on an Attempt at Popular Sociology' in Gramsci
(1971).
14. For a discussion of this important concept, see Gramsci
(1971) and Boggs (1976).
IS. Jay ( 1973) provides an excellent analysis of the role of these
key figures in the development of the Frankfurt School and
its work.
 Radical Humanism 309
16. Fora good discussion, see, for example, Frisby(l972). Inter-
estingly enough, the work of both Popper and Adorno is
directed against totalitarianism; their different responses
reflect their different paradigmatic perspectives.
17. The possibility of a marriage between the ideas of Marx and
Freud has received increasing attention in recent years. For a
discussion of some of the issues involved, see Rieff (1959)
and Brown (1973).
18. See, however, Marcuse (1968) and Habermas (1971b).
19. In LeRitimation Crisis ( 1976), especially Part II, 'Crisis
Tendencies in Advanced Capitalism', Habermas deals with
four types of crisis, of which one is ·economic crisis' in the
classic Marxist mould.
20. For a discussion of anarchism in general and 'anarchistic
individualism' in particular, see Woodcock ( 1975 and 1977).
21. Woodcock comments upon this most extraordinary man in
the following terms:
STIRNER MAX, ( 1806-1856). Kaspar Schmidt was a German
school-teacher, employed in a Berlin academy for young ladies,
when he wrote his single important book The Ef(o and His Own.
This extremely individualist anarchist was closely associated
with the Radical Young Hegelians who clustered around Arnold
Ruge and Bruno Bauer, and took the nom-de-plume of Max
Stirner because of the loftiness of his brow (stirn). The victim of
an unhappy marriage, he became in his later years a hack trans-
lator. and The ERo and His Own, which influenced Nietzsche,
remains his only work of real significance. (Woodcock, 1977, p.
379)

22. Bookchin's paper 'Listen Marxist' (1974) also makes inter-

esting reading in this respect, whether or not one is being
directly addressed.
23. For a discussion of some important differences as well as
links between the two schools of thought, see Lee and
Mandelbaum (1971).
24. For a discussion of Sartre's life and work, see Murdoch
(1967), Spiegelberg (1965), Warnock (1965) and Natanson
(1973a).
9. Anti-Organisation Theory

In the previous chapter we describe d the nature of the radical

humanis t paradigm. tracing its broad line of development and the
way in which its basic tenets are reflected in contemp orary schools
of thought. As a paradigm within the context of social theory as a
whole it must have some relevanc e for the study of organisations.
but as yet it is almost completely unexplo red from this point of
view.• We intend toargue heretha t iftheimp lication s of the radical
humanist paradigm are developed in relation to the study of organ-
isations. the result will be an anti-organisation theory. Since the
radical humanist perspect ive stands in fundamental opposition to
that of the functionalist paradigm, reflecting a complet e inversion
of assumptions about the nature of science and of society. anti-
organisation theory will stand in fundamental opposition to con-
temporary organisation theory.
From any perspect ive characte ristic of the radical humanis t
paradigm, organisations as middle-range phenom ena have a very
precarious ontological status. At best, they are allowed an exist-
ence as intersubjective, reified social construc ts, by means of
which individuals relate to the world in which they live. The
perspectives of the various schools of thought within the paradigm
vary quite significantly on this score; consequ ently, they have
differential contributions to make to an anti-organisation theory.
The solipsist and existentialist perspect ives reflect a form of
•subjective idealism' which does not allow for the existenc e of
organisations outside the realm of individu al consciou sness. The
intersubjective status of the concept of organisation is extreme ly
problematic. Whilst Sartre's notion of'bad faith' has a great deal to
offer towards an understanding of the relationship between indi-
viduals and what are regarded as their occupational roles, 2 subjec-
tive idealist perspectives have a limited contribution to make to a
theory of organisations as such. Within the context of objectiv e
idealism the scope is much greater, and we wish to argue here that
it is within the bounds of critical theory that the radical humanist
anti-organisation theory has the most scope for develop ment.
Critical theory contributes to our anti-organisation theory in a
 Anti-Organisation Theory 311
number of ways. As will be clear from our analysis presented in the
previous chapter, the critical theorist is concerned with four core
concepts: totality - the notion that the social world must be
understood in its entirety before one can comprehend its parts;
consciousness - the force which ultimately creates and sustains
the social world; alienation - the cognitive wedge between con-
sciousness and totality and which divorces man from his true
being; critique - the analysis ofthe sources and forms of alienation
which inhibit the possibilities of true human fulfilment.
These concepts emphasise the central importance of the rela-
tionship between consciousness and totality, and reduce the status
of organisations to middle-range reified social constructs which
intervene between the consciousness of individual human beings
and their appreciation of the nature of the totality in which they
live. Organisations are examples of the 'intermediaries' which,
from a radical humanist perspective, contribute to man's aliena-
tion from his true being. It is through the critique of such alienating
'intermediaries', which reflect and sustain particular modes of
social life, that critical theory bas sought to contribute its own
particular brand of insight into our understanding of the relation-
ship between man and society. Within the context of this critique,
emphasis tends to be placed upon revealing the nature and signifi-
cance of the ·spirit' or mode of organisation reflected in a particu-
lar totality; understanding this mode oforganisation in terms of the
principles which it reflects is given greater priority than detailed
analysis of its specific empirical forms. Thus whilst organisations
as reified social constructs lend themselves as a focus for critique,
it is always within the context of the mode of organisation which
they reflect.
The critical theory perspective thus suggests an approach to
organisational analysis which is an anti-organisation theory on a
number of counts. It is anti-organisation in that it views organisa-
tions as having a precarious ontological status. It is anti-
organisation in that it stresses the importance of the mode of
organisation reflecting a particular totality, rather than the impor-
tance of organisations as discrete middle-range units of analysis
worthy of attention in their own right. It is anti-organisation in the
sense that it views the reitied social constructs labelled ·organisa-
tions' as alienating 'intermediaries' which serve to mystify human
beings in their attempt to comprehend and appreciate the nature of
the totality in which they live. The perspective constitutes an
anti-organisation theory in that its presuppositions stand in fun-
damental opposition to those of functionalist organisation theory;
 312 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
as we shall see, anti-organisation theory inverts the functionalist
problematic on almost every count. It is also an anti-organisation
theory in the sense that it views functionalist theory as itself
serving to mystify our understanding of the significance of organ-
isations within everyday life. Functionalist organisation theory, in
focusing upon the exclusive study of middle-range reifications, is
seen as perpetuating the divorce between human consciousness
and totality. It is seen as an alienating 'intermediary'; as an objec-
tification of mind which hinders man's appreciation of the totality
in which he lives. Organisation theory is viewed, from the perspec-
tive of anti-organisation theory, as an alienating force, concerned
with the wrong issues and the wrong problems, as an essentially
conservative enterprise which underpins the present system of
ideological domination within contemporary society.
In its present state of development, anti-organisation theory can
be regarded as no more than embryonic in form,.at best comprising
a few isolated and fragmentary case studies and discussions which
have approached the study of organisational activities from a
perspective consonant with critical theory. We shall return to
these in a later section of this chapter. As a means of illustrating the
general issues with which anti-organisation theory would concern
itself, we will review here a part of the burgeoning body of litera-
ture which seeks to provide a critique of contemporary culture.
Whilst approaching this endeavour in a variety of ways, and often
claiming no specific allegiance to an intellectual tradition of any
kind, much of this literature stands firmly in the radical humanist
mould. It echoes the concerns and issues which have occupied the
thoughts and attention of many idealist social philosophers who
have pondered upon the human condition. Much of this literature
has surfaced as part of the general resurgence of interest in the
subjective aspects of human existence reflected, for example, in
the developments in existentialism, phenomenology and eth-
nomethodology which took place during the 1960s and 1970s. Its
particular trademark is that it combines its interest in the subjec-
tive with a radical critique of contemporary society.
We have in mind here the work of writers such as lllich ( 1973)
and Dickson (1974) on alternative technologies; Castaneda (1970)
and Pirsig (1976) on alternative realities; Roszak (1969) and Reich
( 1972) on counter-cultures; and Meakin ( 1976) and Anthony ( 1977)
on work as ideology. In different ways these works advocate
alternative forms of culture or 'alternative realities' to those which
predominate within advanced capitalist societies. They range over
a variety of disciplines, assuming the form of novels or academic
 Anti-Organisation Theory 313
texts, and are increasingly found on the recommended reading lists
of social science courses, as reflecting relevant and interesting
points of view which do not quite tit the orthodoxy in the particular
subject area. However, as we hope to demostrate in the next
section, they have much in common with the perspective of critical
theory, particularly as reflected in the writings of Marcuse ( 1964),
Habermas ( 197Ia and b) and Gouldner ( 1976). In the style of our
nasc\!nt anti-organisation theory, these writings seek to foster and
point the way towards alternative realities through a radical
humanist critique of the status quo. In so doing, they identify
many of the concerns and constituent elements which a more
systematically stated anti-organisation theory might seek to
embrace.

Towards Alternative Realities

Many contemporary writers have pointed to the need. for alterna-
tive technologies as a means of creating and sustaining alternative
cultural forms. David Dickson in Alternative Technology and the
Politic.t ofTeclrnical Change ( 1974), for example, seeks to demon-
strate the links between technology, politics and social control,
particularly those reflected in the nature of advanced technology
and capitalism. It is Dickson's general thesis that the problems
associated with contemporary technology might be resolved
through the design of an 'alterative technology' which ·would
embrace the tools, machines and techniques necessary to reflect
and maintain non-oppressive and non-manipulative modes of
social production, and a non-exploitative relationship to the
natural environment' (Dickson, 1974, p. II). However, in contrast
to functionalist theorists who argue in favour of alternative tech-
nologies as a means of creating alternative modes of social life,
Dickson emphasises the nece~sity of creating political change as a
basis for technological and social change. In his view, alternative
technologies on any significant scale can only be developed within
the framework of alternative societies. Alternative technologies
do not of themselves create alternative societies. This is seen as
essentially a political task. As he puts it, 'the struggle for emanci-
pation from an apparently oppressive and manipulative technol-
ogy coincides with the struggle for emancipation from oppressive
political forces which accompany it. To argue that technological
change is per se able to bring about a more desirable form of
314 Sociological Paradigms and Organi.tatimral Analysis
society is technological determinism carried to Utopian extremes'
(Dickson, 1974, p. 13). Technology, for Dickson, operates both
materially and symbolically to reinforce a particular form of social
organisation and control. It is seen as functioning politically to
promote, within capitalism, the interests of a dominant class,
particularly through ideologies which stress technology's role
within society as a natural, progressive, inevitable and essentially
non-political force. For Dickson, contemporary technology is
inextricably linked with the fundamental nature of the totality of
capitalism, and its significance and influence can only be under-
stood in these terms.
Ivan lllich, in his book Tools for Conviviality (1973), focuses
upon a related theme, arguing that society is in need of a 'convivial
reconstruction' to restore what the development of technology has
destroyed. lllich sees social and institutional development as hav-
ing passed through two watersheds. At one stage knowledge and
technique were utilised in the solution of specific problems; at
another, the success of technique was exploited to ~emonstrate
the existence of problems and needs previously unrecognised. He
presents technological progress, backed by the interests of institu-
tional elites, as fostering demands for further technological prog-
ress, through which men become en!tlaved by the tools which were
originally intended to serve their needs. Illich argues that the crisis
which has been created can only be solved
if we learn to invert the present deep structure of tools: if we give
people tools that guarantee their right to work with high, independent
efficiency, thus simultaneously eliminating the need for either slaves or
masters and enhancing each person's range of freedon. People need
new tools to work with rather than tools that 'work' for them. They
need technology to make the most of the energy and imagination each
has. rather than more well-programmed energy slaves. (lllich, 1973,
p. 23)
Society, in lllich's view, needs to be reconstructed to facilitate
'conviviality' - autonomous and creative intercourse among per-
sons and in their relations with their environment. The convivial
society is characterised by technologies which ·serve politically
interrelated individuals rather than managers', and by 'responsibly
limited tools' (lllich, 1973, p. 12). Like Dickson, Illich points to the
political dimension of technology. and calls for a political inversion
of the 'managerial fascism' which characterises our present mode
of organisation.
In The Greening of America ( 1972) Charles Reich calls for a
 Anti-Organisation Theory 315
change in contemporary society through a revolution in con-
sciousness based upon the values and ideals of the counter-culture
youth movement of the late 1960s. Reflecting the unbashed optim-
ism of the period, Reich boldly claims:
There is a revolution coming ... It will originate with the individual and
with culture. and it will change the political structure only as its final
act. It will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be success-
fully resisted by violence. It is now spreading with amazing rapidity,
and already our laws. institutions and social structure are changing in
consequence. It promises a higher reason. a more human community
and a new liberated individual. Its ultimate creation will be a new and
enduring wh~leness and beauty - a renewed relationship of man to
himself, to other men. to society. to nature and the land. (Reich, 1972,
p. II)

Reich's vision is similar in many ways to those of Dickson and

lllich, in that it seeks a restoration of the non-material and spiritual
elements of man's existence, and aims to confer on .science and
technology a background and supportive role. In contrast to their
work, however, Reich places his faith in revolution through revela-
tion, as opposed to critique and political action. His book may be
seen as reflecting the aspirations rather than the analysis of the
radical humanist perspective.
Theodore Roszak's book of es·says, The Making of a Counter
Culture (1969) reflects similar themes, which are specifically
linked to a variety of analytical perspectives characteristic of the
radical humanist paradigm. His central focus is the struggle be-
tween •youth culture' and the 'technocracy' characteristic of con-
temporary industrial, bureaucratised society. He examines the
way in which the technocracy seeks to define reality in terms of an
objective form of consciousness in ways which appropriate the
whole meaning of 'reason·, ·reality', ·progress' and 'knowledge',
and speculates upon the ways in which this enterprise can be
ovenhrown as a means of restoring human values and poten-
tialities to a central place. His vision is of a community of love and
affection, supponed by honourable and enjoyable labour, in which
personal vision replaces objective knowledge and the scientific
expen is deposed by someone akin to the Indian village shaman.
The question of access to an alternative reality is also explored
by Carlos Castaneda in the Teachings of Don Juan ( 1970) and its
sequels, which report Castaneda's attempt to investigate and
understand the world of don Juan, a Yaqui Indian sorcerer or ·man
of knowledge'. The book neatly counterposes alternative realities,
316 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
and illustrates the impossibility of embracing ·non-ordinary'
modes within the logic of the scientific ethos which dominates
Western culture.
In Robert Pirsig'sZen and the Art of Motor-Cycle Maintenance
( 1976) similar themes are presented, but they are explored in a
radically different way. Whereas in Castaneda's work the focus is
upon the difference in world view of a Yaqui Indian and a Califor-
nian anthropology student trying to get his Ph. D., in Pirsig's novel
it is upon the struggle between the competing world views which
exist within the central character's own psyche. Pirsig describes
the way in which ·romantic' and •cJassical' forms of understanding
compete for dominance in the protagonist's attempt to negotiate
and define everyday ·reality'. Whilst apparently remote in its
implications for an academic anti-organisation theory, Pirsig's
work, like that of Castaneda, Roszak, Reich, lllich, Dickson and
many others who have addressed similar themes, provides good
illustrations of the essential concerns of the radical humanist
ethos. The struggle is between competing realities and the means
by which they can be achieved. The conflict, crudely put, is
between the commonly accepted and all too ·real' dominant reality
of the functionalist paradigm, and the aspirations and vision of the
radical humanist paradigm. Understood in these terms. all the
works considered above counterpose functionalist and radical
humanist perspectives and. in their different ways, clearly illus-
trate the inversion of fundamental assumptions upon which the
two paradigms are built and from which they derive their distinc-
tive perspectives upon the social world. They illustrate very
clearly, too, how the two paradigms define alternative realities.
Returning to literature more consciously located in an
·academic' frame of reference, in that its mode of presentation
adheres to a more conventional •scientific' format, we find similar
themes expressed. Gouldner, for example, in The Dialectic of
Ideology and Technology (1976) focuses upon ideology as a •sym-
bol system', and seeks to demonstrate the intimate relationship
between ideology and technology as modes of social domination.
His work draws heavily upon critical theory, particularly the work
of Habermas. As will be apparent from our discussion in the
previous chapter of Habermas 's theory of ·communicative distor-
tion'. there are many links between his distinction between work
and interaction and the ideas of the writers considered here.
Gouldner, in the tradition of critical theory, talks of present-day
'technocratic consciousness' and its links with science, positivism
and technology, and contrasts it with ·romanticism'. His call is for
 Anti-Organisation Theory 317
an overthrow of the technocratic mode of consciousness and the
establishment of more humanly orientated forms of life.
The distinctions between work and interaction, and ·scien-
tific/technological rationality' and 'romanticism', as modes of
social life are also reflected in the recent writings of two British
theorists who have investigated conceptions of work and its social
context. Though approaching the issue from the perspectives of
quite different disciplines and adopting different styles, their writ-
ings reflect strikingly similar themes. David Meakin in Man and
Work (1976) approaches the subject from a literary perspective,
focusing upon the literature and culture of industrial society. Peter
Anthony in The Ideology of Work (1977) approaches the subject
from the perspective of an industrial relations theorist, and traces
the relationship between attitudes to work and technological pro-
cess. Both writers seek to provide a radical critique of the nature of
work in contemporary society, and of the possible alternatives:
they favour the romantic ideals of writers such as John Ruskin and
William Morris, who stress the creative possibilities typical, for
example, of the craft ethic. Meakin calls for a new ideology in
which the distinction between ·art' and 'work' is lost, and Anthony
calls for an end to the 'ideology of work' and its replacement by an
ideology in which ·pleasure' and 'use' are the two guiding princi-
ples.
Table 9.1 seeks to counterpose the main concepts which the
writers reviewed here utilise to present the key dimensions of the
alternative realities with which they are concerned. Clearly, there
is a considerable convergence of interest in their work, which will
become all the more apparent from a reading of the original texts.
However, even from the necessarily abbreviated and somewhat
superficial reviews presented here, clear themes characteristic of
the radical humanist perspective are quite evident.
First, there tends to be an overriding concern with what Mar-
cuse has described as the ·one-dimensional' nature of modern
society. These various writers tend to present society as reflecting
a form of totalitarianism based upon the all-pervasive influence
and control offactors such as work, rationality, science and tech-
nology, which shape, channel and control men's consciousness.
Their concern is to articulate the nature of this influence and
control, and stress that this totalitarianism makes men oblivious to
alternative modes of consciousness and existence. They are con-
cerned to demonstrate that alternatives are available. Alternative
realities, alternative cultures, alternative technologies, alterna-
tives to work - these lie at the centre of their attention.
318 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Table 9.1
Key dimensio-. of alternative rea&ties

Conc~pt us~d to cltart1ct~ris~ Conc~pt us~d to cltaracuris~

of
tit~ crucial asp~ct r~ality tit~Cl'llcial asp«t of r~ality
witltin conumporary capitalist within ndtHIIi~naud mod~s
Autltor social formations ofb~ing

Dickson 'Industrial capitalism' •Alternative technology'

lllich 'Productivity' 'Conviviality'
Gouldner 'Technocratic consciousness' 'Romanticism'
Roszak 'Objective consciousness• 'Personal vision'
Reich 'Consciousness II' 'Consciousness Ill'
Pirsig Classical mode of thought Romantic mode of thought
Castaneda Ordinary reality Non-ordinary reality
Habermas 'Work' 'Interaction'
Anthony 'Work' 'Craft'
Meakin 'Work' 'Creativity'

Second, this literature tends to be characterised by a posture

which is fundamentally opposed to positivist science. Science as
viewed from the perspective of the functionalist paradigm is totally
rejected; the idea of progress through science completely inverted.
Functionalist science is seen as creating rather than solving
societal problems. Such problems are viewed as being the result of
the ideology of domination upon which positivist science is based.
The radical humanist sees the scientific ethos which has been used
to conquer man's environment as having dominated man himself.
Man is seen as the prisoner of science and the calculative rational-
ity which it reflects. Problems characteristic of, for example, the
ecological crisis figure prominently in the analysis of the ills of
modern society, to the otherthrow of which the radical humanist is
deeply committed. In place of science-dominated Western soci-
ety, they advocate a return to a situation in which man lives in
harmony with nature, as opposed to controlling and exploiting
nature. For this purpose they often look to philosophies of the past
or to those characteristic of different cultures. Hence the interest
in the Eastern way of life, for example, and the philosophy of Zen.
The search is for a vision of a world uncontaminated by the ethos of
science and the worship of 'progress'. In line with C. P. Snow's
celebrated distinction between the scientific and literary modes of
thinking, (the 'two cultures' which exist within advanced Western
societies), the body of literature under discussion often looks to
art, drama, literature and the cinema for its references. It is to this
 Anti-Organisation Theory 319
culture that they turn for the source of their problems, analysis and
solutions. Put simply, their humanism is derived from and reflects
the humanities.
A third major theme in this literature is reflected in its ·objective
idealism' .It views man-made notions and artefacts as objectified
products of human consciousness which, within industrial society,
come to be seen as alienating forces which lie outside man's
control. In line with the tradition of critical theory, it is the alien-
ated state of man in modern society that is ultimately the focus of
attention.
These three related themes clearly reflect the romanticism and
idealism which lie at the roots of the radical humanist philosophy.
Alternatives to the present are sought in the past: windmills not
power stations, craftsmanship not work, Zen not instrumentality.
In its idyllic view of the past, this literature has a great deal in
common with the communist vision of the young Marx, according
to which men ·do one thing today and another tomorrow ..• hunt in
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening,
criticise after dinner,just as I have a mind, without ever becoming
hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic' (Marx, 196S, pp. 44-5).
This idyllic and Utopian image of society is underwritten by the
assumption that scarcity is no longer a problem. Indeed, the notion
of scarcity is seen as part of the system of ideological domination
within which man lives. It is the overthrow of the concept of
scarcity that man's salvation is, in large part, seen to lie, enabling
him to live in harmony with nature whilst avoiding the physical
deprivations commonly associated with a return to previous
modes of life. The abolition of the concept of scarcity is seen as an
avenue leading to the attainment of man's release from the domina-
tion of existing modes of social life.

Towards an Anti-Organisation Theory

In addition to the general work discussed in the previous section, a
small number of isolated papers and case studies have been pro-
duced which can best be understood as attempts to articulate
elements of the radical humanist approach to the study of organisa-
tions. Here again, these works have found their way on to the
reading lists of many courses in organisation analysis and, again,
stand in somewhat anomalous relationship to much of contempor-
ary theory. We have in mind work such as that produced by
320 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Beynon on Working for Ford (1973), Clegg on Power, Rule and
Domination ( 1975) and a paper produced by the People and Work
team atthe Open University(Esland et al, 1975).1n addition, there
are signs towards the end of Organisational Work by Silverman
and Jones (1976) of a move towards a perspective consonant with
critical theory. All this literature is British. No doubt comparable
European and American studies also exist, though it has not
attained a level of any prominence within the British context.
All these works are characteristic of the critical theory perspec-
tive and reflect many of the ideas articulated in other contexts by
writers such as Marcuse and Habermas. The links, however, are
often far from explicit, and it is quite clear that some of the writers
have arrived at their respective positions by quite different routes.
The People and Work team express their views in general terms,
emphasising that sociology is in need of a critical perspective.
They criticise the sociology of organisations as being too little
concerned with the study of organisations within a socie-tal con-
text, and as being too coy in its treatment of alienation and depriva-
tion. They seek to replace industrial sociology, occupational
sociology and the sociology of organisations with a 'critical sociol-
ogy of work'. Their aims in this respect are clearly illustrated in the
following quotation:
a critical sociology concerned with the question of contemporary forms
of domination and alienation has to take on increasingly the enorm-
ously self-evident legitimacy of applied positivism and technologised
control, just as workers who attempt to move from economism to
conflict over control and authority within the enterprise have to be
prepared, in their attack on managerial ·rights', to question the whole
system of inter-connected legitimations and assumptions of which any
particular "right' is a part. The combination of rational planning with
politically neutralised bureaucracies serving the goal of economic
progress has done much to desensitise workers and sociology itself as a
way of understanding contemporary society. It is important that the
sociology of work regains ... political and social awareness ... and
that work activity and experiences should be seen in the context of
more comprehensive critiques of capitalist society and mass capitalist
culture. ( Esland et al, 1975, p. 32)
These concerns are clearly related to the perspective of critical
theory. Their anti-positivism, their emphasis upon totality, aliena-
tion, domination and control, and their desire to develop a critique
of capitalist culture, are all firmly set within the context of critical
theory, with the focus upon 'work' as the central subject of
analysis. 1
 Anti-Organisation Theory 321
The work of Beynon (1973), Clegg (1975) and Silverman and
Jones (1976) focuses upon very specific issues, and in essence
presents empirical case studies which can be interpreted as con-
sonant with a critical theory, though the links with this are, again,
undeveloped. Beynon in Working for Ford focuses upon the car
workers' experience of factory work, and the •factory-class con-
sciousness' which arises along with their understanding of the
work situation and the realisation that they are being exploited by
the management. Clegg's Power, Rule and Domination presents
an analysis of power relationships on a construction site, and
argues that they can only be fully understood as part ofthe rules of
the game laid down within the context of a wider •form oflife'. The
ideas and analysis reflected here are firmly in line with the her-
meneutic critique offered by Habermas and other critical theorists
interested in the role of language in the construction of social life.
Silverman and Jones's Organisational Work also moves in this
direction, with their analysis of the hierarchical nature of the
language of organisational life, which has much in common with
Habermas's theory of •communicative distortion'.
The development of a systematic critical theory of organisations
calls for a clear and explicit statement of basic assumptions,
priorities and concerns. Only against such a background can the
significance of the above studies be fully appreciated and the
ground rules laid for more systematic research within this area.
Such a development calls for a movement away from the reactive
stance to functionalism reflected in much of the literature which
has been produced so far, and for an explicit statement of the
anti-organisation theory which derives logically from the underly-
ing tenets of the radical humanist paradigm. In order to facilitate
this, Table 9.2 seeks to spell out some of the characteristics which
an anti-organisation theory might assume, so that organisation
theorists can begin to appreciate the substantive implications of
critical theory and the way in which it is fundamentally opposed to
the orthodox view of organisational reality. It is a perspective
which challenges, at a most fundamental level, the very basis of the
enterprise in which most contemporary organisation theorists are
engaged. In order to illustrate the strength of this challenge, we
seek to juxtapose elements of the defining characteristics of anti-
organisation theory with those of organisation theory. Table 9.2
identifies sixteen issues on which these perspectives are funda-
mentally opposed. The list is not exhaustive, but it does go a long
way towards delineating the precise ways in which the competing
frameworks diverge, and serves to emphasise the basic coherence
322 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
and breadth of anti-organisation theory as a perspective in its own
right. Insofar as anti-organisation theory is launched in a reactive
and partial sense, it almost cenainly appears as an attack upon
functionalism and as a negative and destructive force. However, it
is clear that, viewed from a wider vantage point, it is coherent.
integrated and self-sustaining, since it draws upon a fundamentally
different intellectual tradition. Its existence is not predicated upon
the functionalist perspective per se; it does not feed upon it in any
way and can operate within an intellectual preserve which is
entirely its own. If offers an alternative view of the reality of
organisational life.

Table 9.1
Towards the definition of anti-organisation theory

Organisation Anti·orgomsorion
lhrory throry

I. Paradigmatic location Functionalism Radical humanism

2. Intellectual source of Science The humanities

problems, metaphor and
eltample

3. Conceptual focus Organisations Mode of social

(level of analysis) organisation

4. Society conceptualised as: System Totality

.s. Focus of ontology Structures Consciousness

6. Predominant socio- Widespread lack of Universal alienation

economic problem job satisfaction

7. Generic term for Industrial society; Capitalism, One

contemporary society post-industrial dimensional society;
society corporate state;
managerial fascism,
etc.

8. Man's relationship to Exploitative/ Harmonious

nature seen as: competitive

9. Predominant means of Industrial, factory- Alternative

production based technology technology (non-
urban, small-scale,
co-operative)
 Anti-Organisation Theory 323
Table 9.2 (continued)
OrRanisation Anti-orRanisation
theory theory

10. Concern for maximisation Productivity Human creativity

of

II. Technology seen as a: Positive or neutral Neptive forc:e

force

12. Current status of Universal sc:arcity Widespread

production and shortaaes economic surplus
available withia
capitalism

13. Predominant productive Work/labour Craft

mode advocated

14. Predominant mode of human Loaic Intuition

cognition

IS. Human behaviour in accord Purposive rationality Value rationality

with

16. Ethico-political stance To understand: To understand:

possibly to alter the certainly to induce a
system new totality

Stated in more specific terms, anti-organisation theory seeks to

demonstrate the sources of alienation inherent within a totality,
which converge in an organisational context. It provides a sys-
tematic critique, in the tradition of critical theory, by identifying
the factors which impinge upon and dominate human conscious-
ness in the form of seemingly objective social forces over which
man appears to have no form of direct control. Among the factors
worthy of critique, the following are usually accorded consider-
able importance:
The concept of purposive rationality as the dominant and
I.
most valued mode of cognition within organisational con-
texts.
2. Rules and control systems which monitor the exercise of
rational action.
3. Roles which constrain and confine human activities within
narrowly defined limits.
4. The lanRUaRe of organisational life which reflects a situation
of 'communicative distortion'.
324 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
S. The ideological mechanisms through which the worker is
habituated to accept the roles, rules and language of the
work place.
6. The worship of technology as a liberating force.
7. Reification, such as the concepts of work, leisure, scarcity
and profitability, which serve to mystify the relationship
between workers and the world they live in.

Anti-organisation theory, through critique, seeks to unmask the

alienations reflected in the organisational mode of life. It seeks to
stress how such alienations are intimately linked with the nature of
the totality in which they are located, and hence to point towards
the desirability of alternative modes of reality and social life.
At the present time anti-organisation theory exists in an
embryonic form. Our above analysis provides no more than the
roughest of frameworks upon which future developments might be
based. It seeks to move towards the definition of the range of
territory over which the fully-fledged anti-organisati~n theorists
might be expected to roam. The perspective as a whole can only be
developed systematically against the intellectual background of
the radical humanist paradigm. It is necessary, therefore, for the
anti-organisation theorist to~be thoroughly conversant with the
German idealist tradition and the way in which it is reflected in the
various schools of thought discussed in Chapter 8. It is not some-
thing which can be developed in isolation as a practical critique of
contemporary organisation theory. The tenets of anti-organisation
theory are set so fundamentally against the principles which
underpin the functionalist paradigm that the writer, researcher or
student who seeks to align himself with the former, must, if he is to
be consistent with his underlying assumptions, end up by rejecting
the latter. To embrace radical humanism involves the rejection of
organisation theory as a naive, misconceived and politically dis-
tasteful enterprise. It involves entering another paradigm, another
intellectual world - indeed, an alternative reality.

Notes and References

I. At first sight the literature relevant to the field of organisation
studies which advocates a radical form of humanism may
seem truly extensive. However, as will be clear from our
analysis of the functionalist paradigm, the word 'radical' is
 Anti-Organisation Theory 325
much overused, in that many theorists who profess a radical
point of view do little more than take a mildly deviant stand-
point in relation to their immediate reference group. All the
so-called neo-human relations theorists who advocate a
humanist approach to the design of organisations, techno-
logy, etc., do so from a perspective firmly grounded in the
functionalist problematic. Their humanism represents a plea
for reform rather than a well-founded and consistent theoret-
ical perspective committed to an alternative view of society.
For the most part, their perspective is grounded in a philos-
ophy of social engineering and piecemeal reform within the
problematic which defines the status quo. Once this seem-
ingly 'radical' literature is placed on one side, the field is
dramatically reduced in size. Even prominent 'radical' works
such as those of Berger et al (1974), Ellul (1964) and Douglas
( 1970a) disappear from the sociology of radical change on this
score.
Radical humanism, as defined here, refers to a well-
grounded intellectual tradition whose basic problematic is
described and defined in some detail in the previous chapter.
2. For a discussion of 'bad faith' and occupational roles, see
Eldridge (1971), pp. 158-65.
3. In point offact, the papers presented in Esland et al. (1975)
range beyond the bounds of critical theory, and include
f"aper~ characteristic of the functionalist and radical struc-
turalist perspectives. The overall picture which they present
is thus somewhat inconsistent in terms of underlying meta-
theoretical perspectives.
10. Radical Structuralism

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The radical structuralist paradigm is rooted in a materialist view of
the natural and social world. It is based upon an ontology which
emphasises the hard and concrete nature of the reality which exists
outside the minds of men. The social world, like the natural world,
is seen as having an independent existence. Its facti city is taken for
granted; it is seen as being material rather than spiritual in nature.
This ·realist' view of social reality is supplemented by an essen-
tially positivist epistemology which is geared to discovering and
understanding the patterns and regularities which characterise the
social world. Little distinction is drawn between the assumptions,
aims and methods of the natural and social sciences. The radical
structuralist tends to see himself as engaged in ·science', and in
this endeavour shares many points of similarity with the approach
of the functionalist. However, for the radical structuralist, ·sci-
ence' is made to serve fundamentally different ends.
Radical structuralism is aimed, first and foremost, at providing a
critique of the status quo in social affairs. It is a perspective which
is concerned not just to understand th~ world, but to change it. The
underlying focus of interest tends to be upon the structures within
society, and particularly the way in which they interrelate. Writers
within the paradigm tend to view society as composed of elements
which stand in contradiction to each other. They are interested in
the effects of these contradictions, particularly with regard to the
role which they play in creating economic and political crises.
Radical structuralism is a view which focuses upon the essentially
conflictual nature of social affairs and the fundamental process of
change which this generates. Deep-seated conflict is viewed as the
means by which man achieves emancipation from the structures of
the social world in which he lives. It is a sociology of radical change
but, in contrast to that of the radical humanist paradigm, one which
tends to place relatively little direct emphasis upon the role and
nature of man as an individual human being. However,common to
both is the underlying aim of man's release from the various forms
 Radical Structuralism 327
of domination which are seen as characterising contemporary
industrial society.
The intellectual foundations oft he radical structuralist paradigm
were laid in the second half of the nineteenth century in the work of
Karl Marx. As a theoretical perspective it has had a chequered
history, in that Marx's work has been subjected to a wide range of
interpretations, vulgarisations and misunderstandings. Nowhere
is this better illustrated than in the term 'Marxism'. Whilst from
within it represents a ·heterogeneous and widely differentiated
body of social theory, from outside it is often identified as a narrow
and polemical political creed. Analytically, there are many
varieties of Marxism. As we have seen the work of the young Marx
had a major impact upon certain developments within the radical
humanist paradigm. In this chapter we intend to trace the effect
which his later work has had upon the radical structuralist p&.ra-
digm. As we shall see, the contemporary structure of Marxist
thought within this paradigm is extremely complex, calling for
careful analysis in terms of the two dimensions which define our
analytical scheme. In essence, the radical structuralist paradigm
constitutes a body of social theory as complex, conceptually rich
and widely differentiated as any of the other three paradigms
considered in this work.
As we have noted in our discussion of the radical humanist
paradigm, in his early work Marx was principally involved in a
reinterpretation of the Hegelian system of philosophy, inverting its
central tenets to produce a radical critique of contemporary Ger-
man society. With the publication of The German Ideology in 1846,
however, a distinct move away from his earlier preoccupation with
and commitment to Hegelian idealism can be detected. In particu-
lar, he sought to turn from the objective idealism which character-
ised his earlier work to a position reflecting a more materialist view
of the social world. It represented the beginning of a general
movement away from philosophical concerns to those of political
economy, and an attempt to develop the outlines of a radical social
theory capable of meeting contemporary positivism on its own
ground. It signified a redirection of his overall thought which was
to receive a fuller and more explicit treatment in later work such as
the Grundrisse, and Capital, written in the late 1850s and early
1860s. 1 These works were produced after more than a decade of
active but unsuccessful political involvement which embraced the
·vear of Revolutions' of 1848. In essence, they reflect Marx's
attempt to obtain ·self-clarification' on the operation of the histor-
ical process and the economic structure of the capitalist mode of
328 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
production. In terms of analysis, they place emphasis upon con-
ceptualisations derived from political economy: the idealist con-
cerns of his early work receive much less emphasis. Although
there is considerable debate about the extent to which the Hegelian
influence was to stay with Marx throughout his life, a claim is often
made that his writings in the period after 1850 reflect a major
epistemological break when compared with his earlier work. In
terms of our analytical scheme, they involve a shift in perspective
away from the radical humanist and towards the radical structural-
ist paradigm.
Given the wide range of interpretations which have been placed
upon Marx's later work, it is extremely difficult to provide any
authoritative, clear-cut statement of his precise perspective. Our
plan in the rest of this section, therefore, will be to provide an
overview of Marx's central concerns and then to proceed to dis-
cuss some of· the widely different interpretations placed upon
them. As we shall see, these interpretations have dictated-in large
measure the precise development of the radical structuralist para-
digm.
At the most basic level, Marx's model of society, as expressed in
his later work, consists of two elements -the ·superstructure' and
the 'substructure'. The metaphor 'substructure' was used to refer
to the economic base of society, in which production was given the
central role. His analysis of this distinguished between (a) the
·mode of production' (capitalism, feudalism or communism); (b)
the 'means ofproduction' (technology,land, capital, labour); and
(c) the 'relations of production' (producers and non-producers,
owners and non-owners, the class system). Marx argued that
within each mode of production there were particular associations
between the 'means' and the 'relations' of production. The term
'superstructure' was used to denote other, non-economic factors
within society, such as the state, religion, art,literature, etc. These
were seen, 'in the last instance', as being determined by the nature
of the substructure, though in turn influencing it to some degree.
Within the Grundrisse and Capital the notion of 'contradiction'
was given a central role in Marx's analysis of the operation of
society. As will become apparent later in the chapter, this notion
has been interpreted in many ways. 2 Common to these interpreta-
tions is the idea that society contains within it elements which
stand in antagonistic relationships one to another, and which gen-
erate conflicts which eventually lead to the breakdown of the mode
of production and its related social configurations. Marx was
primarily interested in the contradictions which exist within the
 Radical Structuralism 329
substructure of society, and he placed considerable emphasis upon
his notion of 'surplus value' as the concept upon which the con-
tradiction between the means and relations of production was
based. 3 His interpreters have also stressed the contradictions
which exist between the substructure and superstructure, and
within the superstructure itself. The notion of contradiction is
central to Marx's explanation of social change and the way in
which one form of society replaces another through crises pro-
duced by these contradictions. Marx saw these crises withinagiven
mode of production as getting progressively worse and eventually
leading to the cataclysmic crisis which would overthrow the soci-
ety as a whole.
As we have noted. the focus of Marx's analysis is upon the
political economy of capitalism. 'Structures·, 'contradictions' and
'crises' take over from the concepts of 'consciousness', 'aliena-
tion' and 'critique' reflected in his earlier work. Whilst this marks a
considerable change in orientation of analysis, which is consonant
with Marx's more materialist view of the social world, a certain
continuity within the Hegelian tradition is also evident.• The
notion of contradiction is ultimately derived from the dialectic, and
the concern for alienation also remains. In Marx's later work,
however, it tends to be imbued with the terminology of political
economy and becomes the 'fetishism of commodities', for within
the capitalist system alienation is seen as intimately linked with the
fact that man is treated as a commodity or resource to be bought
and sold upon the labour market. Marx's overall change in orienta-
tion was aptly expressed by I.assalle, one of his contemporaries,
who described him as ·a Hegel turned economist, a Ricardo turned
socialist'. This description summarises succinctly the two
developments which characterise the thought of his later years, in
which he moved away from a radical idealism towards a radical
interpretation of 'bourgeois', ·positivist' economics. It is this
move which laid the essential foundations of the radical structural-
ist paradigm.
As we have noted, subsequent developments within the context
of the radical structuralist paradigm have been largely based upon
different interpretations placed upon Marx's later work. At least
three distinct lines of development can be identified. One focuses
upon Engels' interpretation of Marx and the subsequent develop-
ment of a 'scientific socialism· in the Russian mould. sIt is this line
of development which is most often equated with 'Marxism' when
evaluated from within a context outside the paradigm. A second
line of development has focused upon an interpretation of the
330 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Grundrisse and Capital as representing the essence of Marx's
work; this has largely arisen as a response to the developments in
critical theory discussed in our chapter on the radical humanist
paradigm. The third line of development can be understood as the
result of a confrontation between the various elements of the work
of Marx and Weber. These three developments largely define the
present structure of the radical structuralist paradigm, and it will
be as well if we review them in general terms prior to more detailed
discussion later in the chapter.
As we have seen, the direction of Marx's thought in his later
years was towards a radical reinterpretation of political economy.
Under the i ntluence of Engels. particularly after Marx·s death. this
general trend was much intensified, leading to an eventual picture
of Marxism as revealing the essential 'laws of motion' underlying
the capitalist system. Under Engels' influence, the work of Marx
was increasingly seen as presenting a total science of man's politi-
cal, economic and social life, which contained within its system the
laws of social evolution. 6 This interpretation , which sought to
stress the links between the work of Darwin and Marx. was the one
which predominated under Engels' influence after Marx's death.
In Engels' hands, the dialectic between subjective and objective
worlds was left further and further behind as a materialist view of
history and of society was forged. As Engels himself notes in a
discussion of dialectical materialism,

dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion,

both of the external world and of human thought - two sorts of laws
which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression insofar
as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature. and
also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert
themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the
midst of an endless series of seeming accidents ... (Engels in Marx and
Engels, 1951, pp. 349-50)

It was precisely this type of rendering of the dialectic within

'dialectic materialism' which impressed the socialists and ·social
democrats' of the late nineteenth century. 7 Within its intellectual
sway, they became the instruments of historical necessity, hand-
maidens of fate who held in their palms the truly superior
philosophy cum science. The Russian, Plekhanov, adopted this
perspective on Marx's work and thereafter set the ground rules for
the study, analysis and interpretation of Marxism under Bolshev-
ism. In many respects the tradition of Russian social theory over
 Radical Structuralism 331
the last hundred or so years has, in large measure, been established
by this Engels-Piekhanov dialogue.
The second line of development within the radical structuralist
paradigm, somewhat paradoxically, originates from the work of
Lenin. As we have seen, Marx's later work retained certain
Hegelian features. This fact was recognised by Lenin who, shortly
before his death, came to the conclusion that Marx, and especially
Capital, could not be understood without a knowledge of Hegel.
As Conquest (1972) reports, since Hegel had been ignored for
some fifty years. Lenin concluded that no Marxist had yet under-
stood Marx.
This line of reasoning was not developed within Russian social
theory, but it was taken up in the 1960s by a group of Marxists who
stood outside both the Hegelian and the Engelsian tradition. They
tended to see Lenin as the Marxist theorist who came closest to
tapping the essence of Marx's work.• Their interpretation of Hegel
is a critical one, and in no sense can they be regarded as belonging
to the Left Hegelian brand of theorising discussed i~ connection
with the radical humanist paradigm. Rather they stand between the
critical theory of radical humanism and the tradition of orthodox
Russian Marxism. Marxist philosophers such as Della Volpe,
Althusser and Colletti grew up in cultures dominated by neither
German idealism nor sociological positivism and, as we shall see,
were able to distance themselves-from existing interpretations of
Marx.
The third line of development focuses upon what may be
described as 'radical Weberianism'. As is well known, Weber
was, in certain aspects of his work, engaged in a dialogue with the
•ghost of Marx', and certain of his key concepts have been used as
a means of exploring the interface between Marx and Weber. As
we have sought to show in earlier chapters, Max Weber's influence
has been felt in all of the four paradigms. Whether one points to his
discussion of scientific rationality which pervades much of radical
humanism, or his development of the notion of verstehen in the
interpretive paradigm, or his work on bureaucracy which, though
often misunderstood, dominates functionalist organisation theory,
Weber cannot be ignored. Within radical structuralism, certain
strands of his work which are consistent with the orientation of a
sociology of radical change have been developed by a small group
of European social scientists. In order to distinguish their reading
of Weber from those more typical of functionalism, for example,
we wish to use the term •radical Weberianism'.
Weber's writings contain political and sociological elements
332 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
welded together, sometimes under great strain and tension, within
the context of one overall framework. 9 For Weber, the central
political question in a unified Germany was the issue of leadership.
How was the newly created State to be governed? He accepted
unquestioningly the 'rightness' of its existence and sought its
continuing growth through a concern for the form of development
of industrial capitalism and its emergent bourgeoisie. Weber was a
sociologist of economic order interested in the social conse-
quences of capitalism, with regard to which his views were some-
what ambivalent. His orientation to capitalism demarcates him
quite clearly from the Marxists and the German romantic con-
servatives of his time. The former opposed the capitalist mode of
production for its deleterious effects on the newly created working
population; the latter, for its effects upon the established Junkers'
aristocracy. Between these perspectives Weber advocated a
capitalism containing a strong, intellectually refined bourgeoisie
which would remain true to the superior German culture.
What is important for radical Weberianism, however, is not that
Weber was primarily a sociologist of order and regulation, but that
his ambivalent attitude to capitalism, and particularly to the place
of bureaucracy within it, left open avenues for exploration which
lead to a sociology of radical change. Weber saw bureaucracy as a
reflection of the process of rationalisation which paralleled the
development of capitalism; a process which invaded all aspects of
social life, from politics to religion. As we have seen, Marcuse took
this notion of rationality and used it critically as a cornerstone in
his treatment of 'one-dimensional man'. Within radical structural-
ism theorists tend to be most interested in Weber's analysis of
bureaucracy as an instrument of social domination, most forcibly
expressed in the notion of the 'iron cage of bureaucracy'. For
Weber, bureaucracy posed a threat to human freedom, making it
increasingly more difficult for men to exercise control over their
everyday lives. The threat of this 'iron cage' was seen as charac-
terising societies of both a capitalist and a socialist nature. Under
the latter Weber emphasised that the strength of bureaucracy was
increased because in the capitalist mode there was at least an area
for the free play of market forces. Under both systems, however,
the growth of bureaucracy and the mode of purposive rationality
which it reflects was viewed as a force detrimental to the interests
of those subject to its control.
Thus, in the context of radical structuralism, radical Weberian-
ism focuses upon bureaucracy, authority and power as the points
of concentration for theoretical analysis as a means of understand-
 Radical Structuralism 333
ing important aspects of ~ociallife under capitalism. Rarely, how-
ever, does it produce politically radical alternatives; as may be
said of other schools of thought, it seeks to interpret critically
rather than to change. Nevertheless, Weber did joust with the
Marxian heritage and fought the battle on its ground, at least on
occasion, and it is the product of this sort of confrontation which
forms the kernel of contemporary 'radical Weberianism'. In
essence, it seeks to emphasise the role of factors which do not
receive extensive treatment within 'Marxism', and which portray
man's domination and enslavement by the social structures in
which he lives. This radical Weberianism comprises the third
strand in the intellectual development of the radical structuralist
paradigm.

The Structure of the Paradigm

The radical structuralist paradigm is thus a complex body of social
theory which is the result of the fusion of a plurality of philosophi-
cal, political and sociological traditions. Any broad categorisation
of its constituent schools of thought must do violence to this fact
but, bearing this in mind, one can recognise the three very broad
approaches discussed above. We describe them as (a) Russian
social theory; (b) contemporary Mediterranean Marxism; and (c)
conflict theory. Each of these occupies a distinctive position
within the paradigm, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Russian Social Theory stands within the Engelsian tradition,
having been introduced into pre-revolutionary thought by
Plekhanov. It later developed into the historical materialism of
Bukharin, and influenced, to a degree, Kropotkin's version of
anarchistic communism. Although these approaches are politi-
cally divergent, they share a common set of meta-theoretical
assumptions which are unquestionably positivistic and naturalis-
tic. They are located in the most objectivist region of the paradigm.
Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism stands in the tradition
of Marx's mature works, particularly Capital, and Lenin's reading
of it. This set the tone for an approach which is of core importance
at the present time. We recognise within it Althusser's sociology
and Colletti's sociology which, whilst having close parallels with
each other in terms of their rejection of both Hegelianised Marxism
and orthodox Russian Marxism, again differ politically. To this
extent they occupy different positions on the regulation-radical
change dimension of our analytical scheme.
334 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Conflict theory is the sociological expression of radical
Weberianism and involves the utilisation of several Marxian con-
cepts. We distinguish between Rex's conflict theory and Dahren-
dorfs conflict theory, although, here again, striking similarities
appear. given a sufficiently broad perspective.
We will discuss each of these schools of thought in turn.

Russian Social Theory

We use this term in order to emphasise certain commonalities
which exist between apparently distinct schools of thought in
Russian intellectual history . 10 We seek to point to connections
between the socio-philosophical approaches of the so-called
'orthodox Marxism' of Bukharin and the 'anarchistic communism •
developed by Kropotkin. These bodies of thought have something
in common in terms of their intellectual backgrounds .and origins,
despite the undisguised hostility between them. The orthodox
Marxism propounded by Bukharin was virulently opposed to
anarchism in all its forms,just as tbe followers ofKropotkin stood
out against the political elitism and administrative centralisation
then nascent in Bolshevism. Indeed, anarchistic communists went
so far as to explode a bomb in a Bolshevik Party Committee
meeting, killing twelve senior members and injuring Bukharin in
the process. Such violent contempt, however, belies a similarity in
meta-theoretical terms between the perspectives of these men.
Both Kropotkin and Bukharin were familiar with the natural sci-
ences, both used 'scientific' conceptualisations as the cornerstone
of their systems in a thoroughly positivistic way, and both were
committed to the revolutionary overthrow of the Tsarist govern-
ment in particular and capitalism in general.
Although easy to overemphasise, their mutual 'objectivism'
derived from Plekhanov and, dependent upon the 'naturalistic'
assumptions of the scientific method, has remained, in some
degree, typical of contemporary Russian social theory, which has
much in common with functionalist social systems theory so far as
the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme is
concerned.lndeed, Gouldner( 1970) has made much ofthe current
Soviet interest in functionalism, with which there are the ties of a
common positivist epistemology , 11 and there has also been inter-
est in the reverse direction. Nisbet ( 1976), for example, has sought
to portray Kropotkin as an ecologist before his time.
 Radical Structuralism 33S
We begin our analysis of Russian social theory with the work fX
Bukharin.

Bukharin' s historical materialism

In the tradition of ·scientific socialism' developed by Engels and
Plekhanov stands the work of Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938), a
one-time 'lieutenant of Lenin' who met his death at the hands of
Stalin. Bukharin sought, in perhaps his best-known work, Histori-
cal Materialism: A System of Sociology, published in 1921, to
provide a textbook in which Marxism was presented as sociology
rather than political economy. The interest at this time in the
sociological challenges to Marx from Weber and Pareto, for
example, required a Marxist response, and Bukharin saw himself
as fulfilling this role.
The son of a Moscow teacher turned bureaucrat, Bukharin
joined the Bolshevik party at the age of 17 as part of its 'intelligent-
sia', though deeply committed to the life of a professional
revolutionary. 12 Arrested for the second time in 1910, he was
exiled to north Russia, from whence he escaped, returning to
Moscow in 1917. Before his exile he had become one of the Party's
leading theorists. interested in developing Marxism through
dialogue with theoretical developments in non-Marxist 'social sci-
ence' .In exile in Europe and briefly in New York, his intellectual
contribution was increasingly acknowledged, to the extent that,
for some Bolsheviks. he outshone Lenin, with whom his relations
were usually strained. After the Revolution, he became editor of
the Party newspapers for ten years, during which time he produced
both ·political' and 'theoretical' writings. Towards the end of the
1920s his differences with Stalin grew over the way forward for the
USSR, particularly with regard to agricultural policy. Stalin's
'revolution from above', in which he took over total control of the
reins of Soviet government. marked the beginning of the end for
the more cautious and gradual policies advocated by Bukharin and
his 'Rightist' colleagues. He was arrested in 1937 and brought
before a court in the infamous Moscow ·show trials' by which he
was convicted and sentenced to death. His reputation in Russia
has, even to this day, never recovered from the effects of the
Stalinist Purge.
In Historical Materialism, Bukharin claims that sociology is ·a
method for history' and, even more controversially, that bourgeois
336 SocioloRical ParadiRms and OrRanisational Analysis
sociology has something to offer Marxism. As he puts it, historical
materialism itself 'is not political economy, nor is it history; it is the
general theory of society and the laws of its evolution. i.e. socio-
logy' (Bukharin, 1965, p. xv). It is, in effect, ·proletaridn socio-
logy.
Bukharin did not have much time for 'dialectics'. Lenin, just
before his death, remarked of Bukharin that 'his theoretical views
can only with very great doubt be regarded as fully Marxist, for
there is something scholastic in them (he has never studied and I
think, never fully understood dialectics)' (Cohen, 1974, p. 152). An
economist by training, Bukharin felt more at home with the new
physics of the twentieth century than with the German idealism in
philosophy of the century before. 'Materialism', for him, stood
against Hegelian metaphysics and for science and technology; as a
consequence his book is based upon the mechanical analogy
·derived specifically and in unmodified form from physics. Rather
than accept the thesis, antithesis and synthesis elements of the
dialectic, Bukharin preferred to equate these with 'the condition of
equilibrium; in the second place, disturbance of this equilibrium; in
the third place, the re-establishment of equilibrium on anew basis'
(Bukharin, 1965, pp. 74-5). His discussion at this point goes on to
consider 'systems theory' from the Marxist perspective, viewing
society as being in a state of unstable equilibrium because of
imbalance with its environment. Balance with the environment is
sought through the development of technology in which the rela-
tionship between the society and nature is regulated. Social change
comes about through alterations in this balance, which leads to
periods of revolutionary disequilibrium at times of crisis and its
ultimate replacement by an equilibrium at a higher stage of
development. In this way Bukharin sought to reject the biological
analogy then prevalent in Western sociology, which saw social
change as somehow pathological, but his Russian critics were
quick to point out, as others were later to say offunctionalism, that
the notion of equilibrium, in whatever form, suggests harmony and
co-operation as the primary modes of social organisation. Indeed,
Bukharin admits such a bias when he maintains that without har-
mony 'society will not grow but decline'.
It is important to note, however, that this disturbance of equilib-
rium implicitly takes the form of a ·catastrophe' or ·cataclysmic
crisis', through which social revolution is brought about. Buk-
harin's concept of a 'new equilibrium· implies a 'totality shift' of
enormous proportions and not the evolutionary or morphogenic
process envisaged by even the most change-orientated of func-
 Radical Structuralism 337
tionalists. The equilibrium models are thus comparable only in
name. In essence, Bukharin's model has more in common with the
catastrophe than the mechanical analogy for the study of social
change.
Clearly, then, Bukharin is a Marxist committed to the revolu-
tionary overthrow of capitalism through violent conflict, but is
convinced that in the end social harmony will prevail. A systems
model of a crude but early type is seen as the best theoretical
perspective through which to understand both this new socialist
society and the laws of motion of pre-socialist societies. In a sense,
then, Bukharin developed a kind offunctionalism before it became
established in the West, with a concomitant focus upon under-
standing social life in terms of long periods of relative stability. In
his case, however, it was first necessary to transform existing
Western societies through violent and sometimes bloody revolu-
tion. In this way the location of Bukharin's sociology within our
analytical scheme parallels that of functionalism, but within the
context of a sociology of radical change. Ontologically, Bukharin
is firmly realist. In talking of idealism, Bukharin describes solips-
ism as 'this insane philosophy' which 'is contradicted by human
experience at every step'. For 'when we eat, conduct the class
struggle, put on our shoes, pluck flowers, write books, take a wife
or husband, none of us ever thinks of doubting the existence of the
external world i.e. the existence ~ let us say - ofthe food we eat,
the shoes we wear, the women we marry' (Bukharin, 1965, p. 56).
Here the reality of the world is accepted on a common-sense level.
There is a total acceptance of the unproblematic nature of real
objects like 'books' and 'class struggles', which are seen to have
material, concrete existence outside human consciousness.
Indeed, human consciousness is seen as wholly dependent upon
economic production, for material production, and its means, the
material productive forces, are the foundation of the existence of
human society. Without it there cannot be a ·social conscious-
ness'.
Epistemologically, Bulkarin adopts the positivism of the
natural sciences as his model. Historical materialism is a ·scientific
sociology' which explains the general laws of human evolution; it
serves as a method for history. What Bukharin seeks, then, primar-
ily through the notion of equilibrium, is to explain in a generalis-
able way the story of human development. The historical material-
ism of Marx and Engels provides a means whereby such general
laws are attainable. Furthermore, these laws provide causal
explanations. As he puts it, 'Both in nature and in society there
338 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
exists objectively (i.e. regardless of whether we wish it or not,
whether we are conscious of it or not) a law of nature that is
causal in character' (Bukharin, 1965, p. 30). In this way Bukharin
adopts a naturalistic positivism for his epistemological stance and
the nomothetic methodology that it implies in the attainment and
analysis of what he believes to be the constantly observable con-
nection between phenomena.
Bukharin also devotes some time to a discussion of the free
wil~determinism debate. He discusses a number of examples
drawn from everyday life, and goes on to suggest that
A consideration of these examples has shown that under all conditions,
both usual and unusual, both normal and abnormal, the will, the feel-
ing, the actions of the individual man always have a definite cause: they
are always conditioned ('determined'), defined. The doctrine of free-
dom of the will (indeterminism) is at bottom an alternated form of a
semi-religious view which explains nothing at all, contradicts all the
facts of life, and constitutes an obstacle to scientific development. The
only correct point of view is that of determinism. (Bukharin. 1965,
p. 37)

In his own words, therefore, Bukharin clearly places himself

upon our analytical schema. He is a determinist, rejecting the
notion of a creative free will and its role in social life. Adding to this
his positivism and realism, in toto Bukharin occupies a position of
extreme objectivism within the sociology of radical change. He
delimits the objectivist wing of the radical structuralist paradigm, a
position which many in the West now describe as 'vulgar Marx-
ism'. It is a variety of Marxism, however, which owes more to
Engels than to Marx; indeed, it takes Engels' reformulation ofthe
work of Marx to its logical extreme. It is the variety of Marxism on
which systems theorists have seized in their attempt to equate
dialectical materialism and functionalism and pronounce that the
order-conflict debate is now dead. 13

Anarchistic communism
Anarchistic communism is most closely associated with Peter
Kropotkin (1842-1921), a Russian prince at whose funeral in
Moscow the Bolsheviks mourned.•~ After a time as a page in the
Tsar's court, Kropotkin journeyed as a geographer and naturalist
into Siberia, where he came into contact with several nomadic
 Radical Stru£"1uralism 339
groups which were to influence his later theoretical work. After
adopting the revolutionary cause and being forced into exile for
forty years, he returned to Russia in 1917, only to become disil-
lusioned with the Bolshevik Revolution before his death in 1921.
Kropotkin continually sought to put anarchistic communism on
a firm philosophical and theoretical footing, which demarcates him
from many of the more activist nihilists of the anarchist movement,
who were anti-intellectuals almost to a man. At university,
Kropotkin had studied mathematics and geography. The
methodology and epistemology of the natural sciences were to
form, throughout his life, the basis of his social philosophy. He
described his own work in these terms in an early entry in the
EncyclopiPdia Britannica:
As one of the anarchist-communist direction Peter Kropotkin for many
years endeavoured to develop the following ideas: to show the inti-
mate, logical connection which exists between the modern philosophy
of the natural sciences and anarchism; to put anarchism on a scientific
basis by the study of the tendencies that are apparent now in society
and may indicate its further evolution; and to work out the basis of
anarchist ethics. As regards the substance of anarchism itself, it was
Kropotkir.'s aim to prove that communism - at least partial - has
more chances of being established than collectivism, especially in
communes taking the lead, and that free or anarchist-communism is the
only form of communism that has any chance of being accepted in
civilised societies; communism and anarchy are therefore two terms of
evoiution which complete each other. the one rendering the other
possible and acceptable. (Quoted in Bose, 1967, p. 262)
As a naturalist, the evolutionary theories of Darwin had a profound
effect upon him, but he argued vehemently against the notions of
Herbert Spencer, whose concepts of the survival of the fittest
Kropotkin saw as implying that competition and conflict were
endemic to all animal species, including man. Rather, he pointed to
the widespread existence of 'mutual aid' in human societies not
characterised by the capitalist mode of production. For, as Avrich
notes,
His own observations indicated that, in the process of natural selec-
tion, spontaneous co-operation among animals was far more important
than ferocious competition, and that 'those animals which acquire
habits of mutual aid are undoubtedly the fittest' to survive. By no
means did Kropotkin deny the existence of struggle within the animal
kingdom, but he was confident that mutual dependence played a much
larger role - indeed, mutual aid was 'the chief factor of progressive
evolution'. (Avrich, 1967, p. 30)
340 Sociological Paradil(ms and Or!fanisational Analysis
His belief in ·mutual aid' had been inspired by his experiences in
Siberia, where small-scale tribal groups of nomads lived according
to 'anarchist' principles. Kropotkin's experiences in these years
convinced him that the natural attitude of man was one of co-
operation and solidarity, and that the principle of hierarchy was a
recent •pathological' development in man's history. The centralis-
ing tendencies of the Russian State, which was undergoing a late
transition to capitalism, were the first objects of his attention, but
his forty years in exile in Western Europe convinced him that
capitalism, wherever it was found, represented an aberration in
man's evolution. Anarchistic communism stood, for Kropotkin, in
direct opposition to the wage system of capitalism, the superces-
sion of which depended upon violent mass revolution. Once the
wage system had been overthrown. a new society would be set up,
based upon communes which would be self-governing, decentral-
ised, almost self-sufficient units. He did not see this vision as
Utopian but as the only possible solution to the problems-of capi-
talism, the State and bureaucracy. The overthrow of capitalism
brought about through economic crisis would be a bloody affair
and, although less disposed towards violence and terrorism than
many others, Kropotkin did believe in ·propaganda of the deed'
and thought it quite legitimate to engage in political assassination.
After 1917 he came to see the Bolshevik's version of Marxism as a
new form of human enslavement, one form of centralisation having
been replaced by another, thereby preventing the return which he
sought to a form of society based upon mutual aid in which conflict
was minimised.
In Kropotkin's publications, 15 one is able to see quite plainly the
objectivist stance which he derived from the wholesale incorpora-
tion of natural science methods and assumptions. He describes his
orientation as follows:
I gradually began to realise that anarchism represents more than a mere
mode of action and a mere conception of a free society; that it is part of
a philosophy, natural and social, which must be developed in a quite
different way from the meta-physical or dialectical methods which
have been employed in sciences dealing with men. I saw it must be
treated by the same methods as natural sciences ... on the solid basis of
induction applied to human institutions. (Kropotkin, in Woodcock,
1975, P. 184)

Kropotkin is representative of that stream of Russian social theory

which sees no distinction between the natural and social sciences
and believes that the •Jaws of nature' serve as models for the study
 Radical Structuralism 341
of society. Also typical of Russian sociological thought at this
time is his firm commitment to radical change, though his vision of
this differs quite substantially from that of his contemporaries.
The social theory of the USSR before 1925, therefore, was
rooted in an equation of the social sciences with the natural sci-
ences. The influence of Darwinism, and the intimate relationship
which was seen to exist between man and nature, created variants
of an evolutionary theory in which capitalism was regarded as a
•genetic' monstrosity, the dispatch of which would herald a new
era of social life in which harmony and understanding would
prevail: The perspective of theorists such as Bukharin and
Kropotkin differs from that of positivist social theorists located in
the functionalist paradigm, in that the analogy which they use to
characterise the· process by which this will be brought about is that
of catastrophe and revolution. It is this crucial feature of their work
which locates it within the bounds of the sociology of radical
change as opposed to the sociology of regulation.

Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism

Within this brand of theorising we recognise two separate schools,
which, although distinctive in their approaches to many substan-
tive issues, are based upon a set of common meta-theoretical
assumptions. These are the sociologies of Althusser and Colletti.
Whilst both theoreticians stand in the mainstream of contempor-
ary Western Marxist thought, they adopt perspectives consciously
distinct from the Hegelianised Marxism of Lukacs, Gramsci and
the Frankfurt School on one hand, and the orthodox Marxism of
Plekhanov and Bukharin on the other . 16 They seek to temper what
they see as the extreme objectivism of ·vulgar' Marxism and the
subjectivism of critical theory by adopting an intermediate posi-
tion.
Althusser and Colletti, in spite of their intellectual proximity, or
perhaps because of it, have conducted a rather fierce academic
battle in which both participants have had their noses bloodied. 17
This internal conflict notwithstanding, there is a close interrela-
tionship in their work in terms of their theoretical stance, although
there are many who believe that Althusser is far and away the more
creative thinker. He has built a system; Colletti seeks to destroy
those of other people.' 8 Whilst we do not wish to denigrate the role
of essayist and critic, we believe that Althusser's conceptualisa-
tions have more scope for development than those of Colletti.
342 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
We have chosen the epithet 'Mediterranean Marxism• to
emphasise not merely the origins of both men, but the fact that
their theoretical stance is located outside the north European
idealist tradition and is, at most, peripheral to the Anglo-French
positivist tradition. It is a hallmark of Althusser's and Colletti's
perspective that the extremes of both these broad currents of
thought are rejected in favour of an 'intermediate' position which,
although unmistakably objectivist, is familiar with, and not totally
unsympathetic to, German idealism. We begin our analysis with
the recognition that we cannot do justice to the quite marked
differences in detail between the perspectives of Althusser and
Colletti, but this is a task which they themselves are not slow to
address. For us, their broad similarities are of more interest at this
point, although some attention will be paid to differences between
them in terms of the regulation-radical change dimension of our
analytical scheme. We begin our analysis with a consideration of
the work of Louis Althusser.

Althusserian sociology
Louis Althusser is one of the world's most influential contempor-
ary Marxist philosophers, and he has attracted a great deal of
attention from not only radical sociologists, but writers in many
disciplines. An Algerian by birth, Althusser fought in World
War II and was taken prisoner by the Germans in 1940. He
returned to Paris in 1945, studied under the philosopher Bachelard
and has remained there to teach ever since. He is a member of the
Communist Party and has explicit political views which are often
described as Stalinist. 19 Whilst his work is extremely complicated,
sometimes contradictory and, indeed, still in the process of being
developed, it is possible to identify certain conceptualisations
which have been the subject of much discussion and critical
assessment. Althusser uses the notion of a circle to describe parts
of his work, and in any analysis it is often very difficult to know
where to begin. However, Althusser's work can be interpreted as a
reaction against the Hegelianised Marxism of Lukacs, Gramsci
and the Frankfurt School, and represents an attempt to develop a
more sophisticated riposte to it in the tradition of 'orthodox'
materialism. Crucial here is Althusser's notion of the ·epistem-
ological break' in Marx's work, which delimits the early 'philo-
sophical' work from the more mature ·scientific' analyses ofCapital
 Radical Structuralism 343
and the later writings. 20 The early work is seen as completely dis-
tinct from the texts upon which Althusser wishes to focus, for he
rejects the notion of Marx as a 'theoretical humanist'. Althusser
maintains that for the mature Marx, humanism represented nothing
more than an ideology, since it assumed both a fixed human nature
and a crucial role for subjective factors in the historical process.
Neither is a correct assumption, according to Althusser, whose
reading of Marx's Capital supposedly demonstrates that the notion
of "dialectic' therein, represents a 'process without a subject' .11
Marx was seen as transforming the Hegelian 'dialectic • by removing
the limitations within it created by both an emphasis on man's con-
sciousness and a dependence upon a belief in the historical neces-
sity of man's progress through ever-developing stages. Put
crudely, for Althusser and his Marx, men do not make history; it is
made by particular configurations of structures which arise at
given points in time. Althusser, then, stands against and between
the ·subjective humanism' of the Hegelian Marxists and the thesis
of historical inevitability proposed by Engels and Bukharin. For
him, the dialectic leads neither to subjectivism nor to historicism.
Althusser's ·structuralism'21 depends upon an understanding of
the 'totality', not just as an assembly of pans to be only understood
as a whole, but as something shaping and present within each part.
The parts reflect the totality; not the totality the pans. Of these
pans, Althusser recognises four 'practices' - the economic, the
political, the ideological and the theoretical (scientific). Although,
in the final analysis, the economic 'practice' is seen as the most
important, at given historical'conjunctures' each of the ·practices'
has relative independence, despite the possible domination of one
'practice' (though not neces~drily the economic) over the others.
Althusser calls such a concept a 'structure in dominance' . 23 Any
particular historical event, therefore, represents the complex
interrelationship between 'practices', which are linked through the
idea of 'overdetermination •, defined rather obscurely by
Callinicos as 'the idea of a structure whose complexity, the mutual
distinctness and interdependence of its elements, is expressed
through the way in which the economy displaces the dominant role
within the structure to a particular instance, organising the other
instances in terms of this structure in dominance' (Callinicos,
1976, p. 51). 24 In Althusser's view, then, superstructural elements
can be as important as, if not more important than, those of the
economic substructure. At the most basic level this implies a
multi-causal theory of history, since economic factors are not seen
as determinate in all instances. As social development consists of a
344 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
series of historical events, the configurations of particular •over-
determinations' create in given societies quite different social
forms. This is the famous •Jaw of uneven development', which
rejects, of course, any concept of historical necessity or prede-
termination in the social process (Aithusser, 1969, p. 249).
Social change, for Althusser, depends upon the type and extent
of ·contradictions' in the social formation. Some contradictions
are antagonistic and their ·explosive' interrelationships will pro-
duce, in the long run, sweeping societal transformations at times of
great crisis. Other contradictions are non-antagonistic and play a
less important role in social change. The motor force of history,
then, is found in the interrelationship of particular contradictions
at a given point in time which surface as perceptible socio-
economic crises. 25
The logic of this position, politically, has not been obscured as
far as Althusser's critics are concerned. If revolution is to be
achieved in this perspective, it depends upon particular conjunc-
tions of contradictions and overdetermination. The. role of the
political activist is thereby de-emphasised. 26 For what can the
revolutionary hope to do to bring about radical social change, if
this is determined ultimately by 4 deep, hidden structures?
Althusser's philosophy, then, is open to the charge of his non-
structuralist critics of 'quietism' and to the accusation that it
implies a rejection of 'praxis'. Regis Debray, a one-time student of
Althusser's, thus commented on his mentor·s separation of
'thought' from ·reality' and '"the operation of society" from "the
operation of knowledge". In other words, all we had to do to
become good theoreticians was to be lazy bastards' (Callinicos,
1976, p. 60). Althusser's claim that philosophy is 'the class struggle
in theory· certainly permits armchair theorising, and it is relatively
easy for cynics to point to the popularity of Althusserianism
amongst the academic Marxists of Europe as an indication of this.
Ontologically, Althusser assumes a real, concrete world exter-
nal to the individual and his consciousness of it. This real world, in
Althusser's theory, may be thought to consist of 'structures' which
together, in the 'totality', represent given 'social formations'.
These conceptualisations, however, according to Althusser's epis-
temology, are not necessarily based upon any correspondence
with the real world. Indeed, as Callinicos has suggested, Althusser
argues that 'there exists the sharpest possible separation between
the real object, that is, the reality which the theory seeks to
explain, and the thought-object, the theoretical system which
makes up a science' (Callinicos, 1976, p. 32). The idea that a theory
 Radical Structuralism 345
should mirror or fit exactly the reality it purports to explain
Althusser terms 'empiricism', and he is fundamentally opposed to
it. The separation of the real from the theoretical which this implies
leads inexorably to the tendency of armchair theorising, which
requires no empirical work, whether 'research' or political activ-
ism, since theory needs no anchors in the real external world.
Althusser·s version of anti-empiricism, however, does not pre-
clude positivism in the sense of the search for universal causal
laws. It does, in fact, explicitly seek to provide a causal analysis,
but one which, in recognising the variety of overdeterminations
and the 'law' of uneven development, does not pursue the pro-
duction of uni-causal explanations of, say, social change. The
social reality, which we as men can only perceive as surface
bubbles upon a deep, hidden and mysterious pool, is seen as con-
tingent upon a variety of structural interrelationships and must be
analysed in terms of conjunctures - specific historical events. The
logic of Althusser's position, in effect, calls for a case-study
method of analysing particular 'conjunctures', each. of which is
unique, for only in this way can our knowledge of history be
developed.
Althusser rejects the perspective of economic determinism
found, for example, in Plekhanov and Bukharin, and its more
extreme form, economic predeterminism - the unfolding of the
inexorable laws of capitalist development which inevitably leads
to its overthrow. He still maintains a determinist position, how-
ever, in that humanism, which for him emphasises subjective and
voluntarist notions, is ruled completely out of court. Man's actions
and historical events are determined fundamentally by the social
formations in which they are located.I ndividuals, according to this
view, are not ·subjects' but agents within the mode of production,
and are correspondingly moulded by the forces acting upon the
economic 'practice'.
As for Althusser's position on our subjective-objective dimen-
sion, his philosophical sophistication makes for an interesting
configuration upon the four analytical strands. Ontologically, he is
a realist, but the real world can only be understood through theory,
which need not be located or rooted in reality at all. Epistemologi-
cally, in seeking ·scientific' knowledge outside ideology, he is a
positivist, though not of an extreme kind, since he totally rejects
empiricism. Methodologically, Althusser's position emphasises
the case-study method of analysis for any given historical ·con-
juncture', whilst his view of human nature is fundamentally deter-
minist. His overall position within the radical structuralist para-
346 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
digm is that of a 'mild' or tempered objectivist. He has sought, and
in large measure achieved, a compromise between the orthodox
Marxism of the Russian State and the Hegelianised Marxism of the
West.

Colletti's sociology
The work of Lucio Colletti reflects a development in Italian Marx-
ism which is more notable for its wide-ranging and trenchant
criticism than its development of any socio-philosophical system.
A student of Della Volpe, 27 Colletti joined the Italian Communist
Party in 1950 and has been concerned both with the role of the
Italian working class in revolutionary activity in a 'post-Fascist'
society, and with sketching the outlines for a 'scientific' Marxism.
Unlike Althusser, he became disaffected with developments in the
internal politics of Russia and her satellites. and in 1956 he left the
Party. Colletti's work, which he calls 'sociology' ,21 consists
primarily of detailed attacks upon variants of Hegelianised Marx-
ism, particularly that of the Frankfurt School, and upon orthodox
Marxism represented in the main by Engels and Plekhanov (Col-
letti, 1972). On the face of it, he seeks not to reconcile these
perspectives within an overall synthesis, but to recognise that
Marx's work reflects two faces, that of the philosopher and that of
the scientist. The unifying link between these is found in the notion
of 'opposition', which in Marx is seen to have two distinct mean-
ings. First, there is the meaning of the real opposition of 'things •,
which have no synthesis and hence no dialectic relationship. As
Marx put it, 'Real extremes cannot be mediated, precisely because
they are real extremes. Nor do they have any need for mediation,
for their natures are totally opposed. They have nothing in com-
mon with each other, they have no need for one another, they do
not complement one another' (Colletti, 1975, p. 6). For
Colletti, this view of ·opposition', which is found pre-
dominantly in science, must be contrasted with that of dialectical
opposition, which, of course, derives from Hegel and refers to the
opposition of abstractions, concepts or ideas which can be syn-
thesised in a 'higher· reconciliation. This is the philosophical view
of opposition. 'Opposition' in the 'science' of Marxism is equated
with the notion of ·contradiction'. which is regarded as inade-
quately emphasised by the Hegelianised brands of thought. On the
other hand, 'alienation' represents 'opposition' in the philosophi-
 Radical Structuralism 347
cal conceptualisations of Marxism, and this is underemphasised by
orthodox Marxism. So in Colletti's words, 'The theory of aliena-
tion and the theory of contradiction are now seen as a single
theory', different elements of which tend to be ignored by compet-
ing versions of Marxist thought (Colletti, 1975, p. 27). Signifi-
cantly, Colletti makes no attempt at the periodisation of Marx's
work. He specifi<:ally maintains that the notion of "alienation'
represents a theme running throughout the writings of Marx, even
in the pieces dealing with abstract political economy. Thus, for
Colletti, there are two parallel strands in Marx, not two distinct
phases of intellectual activity. His criticism ofMarcuse, for exam-
ple, and ofPiekhanov is rooted in this basic assertion. He polarises
Marxism on the basis of the relative emphasis put upon either the
philosophical strand of 'alienation' or the scientific strand of 'con-
tradiction'. His 'solution' to such polarisation is found in the
recognition of its existence, and he is content to
confine myself for the moment to registering this fact. I do not attribute
any conclusive significance to it. The social sciences ·have not yet
found a true foundation of their own. Hence I do not know whether the
existence of these two aspects is fatal or advantageous. What is not at
issue is the fact that our task now is to find out whether and how they
can be reconciled. It is one we must take seriously .It is not to be solved
by verbal subterfuge. (Colletti, 1975, p. 29)

Whilst a skilled and knowledgeable critic, Colletti has added

little to .the conceptual armoury of Marxism, but his position is one
which has attracted many followers. Without developing a 'sys-
tem' in any coherent or rigorous way, Colletti provides a refuge in
the interstices provided by, or left between, the dominant Marxist
traditions. It is a refuge characterised by the following set of
meta-theoretical assumptions. Ontologically, Colletti assumes the
real existence of the external world. As he puts it, 'Progress, then,
consists in restoring and re-establishing these 'facts', these real
processes, eluded and transcended by metaphysics and opposing
the hypostatis that conceals them. Their objective existence, is in
short, the indispensable premiss for any kind of scientific
enquiry' (Colletti, 1972, p. 5). Whilst he rejects an extreme real-
ism, and asserts that ·materialism', the philosophical position he
subscribes to, necessarily involves a consideration of man as a
'knowing subject', Colletti nevertheless sees the nature of the
social world in what is fundamentally a realist way .19 Epistemolog-
ically, Colletti is a positivist in the tradition of Della Volpe. He sees
Marxism as a ·science' which, though not overcommitted to empir-
348 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
icism, is based upon the method of hypothesis testing in the search
for underlying causal laws. When it comes to a choice of orienta-
tion over epistemology, Colletti comes down firmly on the positiv-
ist side. In talking of Husserl and Sartre (inter alia) Colletti pro-
claims, for example, that 'Against the dangers of this spiritualist
idealism, I personally would prefer to incur the opposite risks of
neo-positivism' (Colletti, 1974, p. 20). Methodologically, how-
ever, Colletti tends to be anti-historicist and does not seek a
method of providing laws valid for all societies at all points in time.
He believes that Marx was concerned primarily with capitalism,
and that Marxian theory is aimed in this direction and nowhere
else. With regard to human nature, Colletti assumes a tempered
determinism, for whilst he accepts that someone of Gramsci's
stature could contribute to change in a capitalist society ('his
research on Italian society was a real preparation for transforming
it'), Colletti nevertheless stresses the objective facti city of capital-
ism's structure and the great problems involved in its superces-
sion.
All in all, Colletti stands within the radical structuralist paradigm
in a fairly objectivist position. Faced with the self-imposed choice
of a Hegelian Marxism or an orthodox Marxism, Colletti seems to
reject the former while certainly not fully embracing the latter. For
Colletti, it seems that Lenin is the Marxist thinker who is least
incorrect.
In terms of the regulation-radical change dimension of our
analytical scheme, Colletti occupies an interesting position, and
one which is differentiated from that of Althusser. By continuing to
adhere to the 'philosophical' concept of 'alienation', Colletti
emphasises the importance of potentiality in man's development
and the way in which this is constrained by capitalism. The over-
throw of this form of social organisation is not seen as depending
solely upon violence. The Stalinist tradition, against which Colletti
particularly reacts, believed that 'it was only violence that was the
real hallmark of a revolution: everything else- the transformation
of the nature of power, the establishment of socialist democracy -
was of no importance' (Colletti, 1974, p. 22). In place of this
Colletti seeks to emphasise that revolution and violence are by no
means interchangeable concepts and that in the last resort there
could even be non-violent revolution. Nevertheless, revolutionary
activity by the working class is seen as the main solution to the
social problems posed by capitalism. For Colletti, it is not suffi-
cient for academics to develop good theory, for, as he puts it,
'Marxism is not a phenomenon comparable to existentialism,
 Radical Structuralism 349
phenomenology or nco-positivism. Once it becomes so, it is
finished.' Marxism, for Colletti, involves revolutionary political
practice - a strategy for radical social change which has an
intimate connection with the 'life of the workers' movement.
There are thus clear differences between Colletti and Althusser.
Colletti has attempted to link the philosophy in Marx's work to
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and his politics to those of
Rousseau. For Althusser, Spinoza is the intellectual antecedent of
Marx. Furthermore, as Perry Anderson has observed, 'their two
accounts of the development of Marxism since the 1920s are
incompatible, since Althusser's categories explicitly include Col-
letti in the Hegelian tradition he repudiated, while Colletti's logic
assigns Althusser to the Hegelian heritage he denounced'
(Anderson, 1976, p. 70). Nevertheless, as we have sought to show,
both writers retain elements of Hegelianism within an objectivist
framework. Colletti seeks, through the lifeline of 'alienation', to
maintain links with the Hegelianised Marxism which he wishes to
distance himself from, whilst for Althusser the association with
Hegelianism is supported by the notions of 'totality' and 'dialec-
tic'. The similarity of their intermediate stance in terms of the
subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme pro-
vides the rationale for their consideration here as distinct but
related exponents of what we have called contemporary Medit-
erranean Marxism.

Conflict Theory
As we have noted, conflict theory is a product of ·radical
Weberianism'. Weber's conceptualisations, although not
necessarily specifically intended as rejoinders to those of Marx,
have been used in precisely such a way. For whereas Marx talks of
'class', Weber speaks of 'class, status' and ·party'; Marx of 'the
means of production', Weber of 'the means of administration';
Marx of the 'dialectic', Weber of 'explanation at the level of cause
and meaning', and so on. Such distinctions, although obviously
very important, in fact delineate different approaches to the same
intellectual terrain, namely, the problems of social relations within
a capitalist society. 30 Both Marx and Weber saw that capitalism
represented a new mode of societal organisation, certainly differ-
ent from feudalism (in many ways superior to it), but nevertheless
beset by its own forms of repression, oppression and human
350 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
bondage. However, Weber did not see capitalism as the social
mode in which such tendencies reached their apogee. His concern
for the forms of domination characteristic of a whole range of
societies emphasised the role of power in social life throughout
history, not just within capitalism. The rich conceptualisations of
·status' and •party' sought to encompass the plurality offorms of
social stratification throughout historical development, and not
just the glaring inequalities of the class structure under pre-World
War I capitalism. Weber's emphasis on bureaucratisation within
capitalism was, again, rooted in history. Although he saw the
hierarchical principle, when wedded to purposive rationality. as
the basis for the workers • exploitation and alienation under capital-
ism, he found elements of the bureaucratic mode of domination in
many places and at many points in time.
The radical Weberians of today make much of Weber's concep-
tual armoury for the analysis of contemporary society. For in
Weber's notion of the •iron cage ofbureaucracy'. in his elaboration
of the complexity of modern social stratification, in his emphasis
upon power and authority, they find rich and productive insight. In
line with Marxists, they conceive of capitalism, or its latter-day
transmutations, as beset by gross economic inequalities and by
vast discrepancies in power, both of which mean that social life
must inevitably rest upon domination and conflict. For them, the
interests of the power holders are so clearly distinct from the
interests of the relatively powerless that deep-seated, irreconcil-
able conflict is viewed as the natural and the only permanent
feature of social life. Radical Weberians share Weber's pessimism;
they see no end to such inequalities. Marxism is seen as Utopian if
it expects an end to the principle of hierarchy and imbalance of
power. Social revolution, for these writers as it was for Weber, is
often more dangerous than the retention of the status quo. Thus,
the essence of the radical Weberians' position consists of a tren-
chant criticism of capitalism but without any associated commit-
ment to its transcendence by another form of social organisation.lt
is the strength and nature of their critique and arguments in the first
half of this configuration, at its interface with contemporary Marx-
ism, that identifies their work as part of the sociology of radical
change.ln the following pages we will consider the conflict theory
ofRalf Dahrendorf and John Rex as representative ofthis school of
social thought.
We have already given a certain amount of attention to Dahren-
dorf's work in Chapter 2, where we argued that his distinction
between the integration and coercion theories of society parallels
 Radical Structuralism 35 I
that drawn here between the sociology of regulation and the
sociology of radical change. Dahrendorf's coercion or conflict
theory is developed in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Soci-
ety (1959) as a part of a critique of Marx's work, 'in the light of
historical changes and sociological insights'. Dahrendorf argues
that Marx's basic analysis is faulty, in that his historical predic-
tions have not borne fruit, 31 and seeks to revamp his conceptual
schema with sociological insights drawn primarily from Weber.
Dahrendorf's conflict theory aims at explaining the relative
absence of order within industrial society and reflects one of the
central theses of his study: that 'the differential distribution of
authority' within society 'invariably becomes the determining fac-
tor of systemic social conflicts of a type that is germane to class
conflicts in the traditional (Marxian) sense' (Dahrendorf, 1959, p.
165). His analysis focuses upon the way in which conflict groups
are generated by the authority relations in what he describes as
'imperatively co-ordinated associations'. These are defined as
those forms of organisation, institution or aggregate in which
authority plays the key role in the day-to-day running.of affairs. It
is Dahrendorf's thesis that within such imperatively co-ordinated
associations there exists an authority relationship in which a clear
line, at least in theory, can be drawn between those who partici-
pate in the exercise of authority in given associations and those
who are subject to the authoritative commands of others. Dahren-
dorf thus sets up a two-'class' model of contemporary social
structures, based upon Weber's notion of hierarchical authority
but dichotomised in a manner reminiscent of Marx's thesis of
polarisation. He sees the basic conflict groups of society as rooted
in this differentiation of authority, for different positions involve,
or at least imply, the different interests of the respective role
incumbents. Such interests may be perceived, recognised and
acted upon by an aggregate of persons in a common position in the
authority structure, in which case interests become manifest and
the aggregate becomes a 'group for itself'. If these interests remain
latent, however, then one is dealing merely with a 'quasi-group'. It
is the 'group for itself', the 'interest group' which, for Dahrendorf,
is the true conflict group, having a structure, a form of organisa-
tion, a programme or goal and a personnel of members. Such
interest groups become the motive force behind societal change,
creating transformations of the social structure with varying
degrees of effect, ranging from revolution to small-scale political
reform. Violent class struggle is thus presented as but one extreme
point on a more general scale of social conflict.
3S2 Sociological Paradigm.t and Organisational Analysis
As a summary of his position, Dahrendorf presents a 'theory of
social classes and class conflict', of which the following is an
edited version.ll

I. The heuristic purpose of the approach proposed in the study is

the explanation of structure changes in terms of group conflict.
This purpose is, therefore, neither purely descriptive nor related
to problems of integration and coherence in or of society.
2. In order to do justice to this heuristic purpose. it is necessary to
visualise society in terms of the coercion theory of social
structure, i.e., change and conflict have to be assumed as
ubiquitous, all elements of social structure have to be related to
instability and change, and unity and coherence have to be
understood as resulting from coercion and constraint.
3. The formation of connict groups of the class type follows a
pattern that can be described in terms of a model involving the
following panly analytical, partly hypothetical steps:
4. In any imperatively co-ordinated association two, and only two,
aggregates of positions may be distinguished: positions of
domination and positions of subjection.
S. Each of these aggregates is characterised by common latent
interests; the collectivities of individuals corresponding to them
constitute quasi-groups.
6. Latent interests are articulated into manifest interests; and the
quasi-groups become the recruiting fields of organised interest
groups of the class type.
7. Once the formation of connict groups of the class type is com-
plete, they stand, within given associations. in a relation of group
connict (class connict).
8. Group connict of the class type effects structure changes in the
associations in which it occurs.
9. The radicalness of structure change co-varies with the intensity
of class conflict.
10. The suddenness of structure change co-varies with the violence
of class conflict.

Dahrendorf's analysis is thus firmly rooted in Weberian con-

ceptualisations. Rather than seeing class conflict as a product of
capitalism, he sees it almost as ubiquitous in any hierarchically
organised society. His focus upon power, and particularly author-
ity, borrows from Weber rather than from Marx. However, by
concentrating upon social change, radical conflict and the role of
coercion in social life, and by attacking what he sees as the basic
·one-sided' assumptions of functionalism, Dahrendorf adopts a
stance consonant with the sociology of radical change.
 Radical Structuralism 353
Dahrendorf's conflict theory has many points of similarity with
that developed by John Rex in his book Key Problems in Sociolog·
ical Theory (1961), though Rex is also more committed to revamp-
ing sociological theory in terms of its assumptions in relation to the
subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme.
Whereas Dahrendorf is content to wed his conflict analysis to an
approach which is firmly committed to the sociological positivist
tradition, Rex starts from the assertion that both positivism and
empiricism are inadequate. In their place he advocates a model
based upon the Weberian action frame of reference which, as will
be clear from our discussion in previous chapters, stands at an
intermediate position between positivism and idealism. Rex's con-
flict theory thus follows Weber on two counts rather than just one:
in terms ofboth·conceptsand methods. Rex's action theory speci-
fically recognises that the ends which actors pursue may be
·random ends' from the point of view of the social system within
which they are located and, indeed, in conflict with it. As a result,
he argues that, •if there is an actual conflict of ends, the behaviour
of actors towards one another may not be determined by shared
norms but by the success which each has in compelling the other to
act in accordance with his interests. Power then becomes a crucial
variable in the study of social systems' (Rex, 1961, p. 112).
In Rex's scheme we have a conflict theory characteristic of the
sociology of radical change. based upon the action frame of refer-
ence. He summarises the main characteristics of his model in the
following terms:

I. Instead of being organised around a consensus of values, social

systems may be thought of as involving conflict situations at
central points. Such conflict situations may lie anywhere be-
tween the extremes of peaceful bargaining in the market place and
open violence.
2. The existence of such a situation tends to produce not a unitary
but aplurnl.wciety, in which there are two or more classes, each
of which provides a relatively self-contained social system for its
members. The activities of the members take on sociological
meaning and must be explained by reference to the group's
interests in the conflict situation. Relations between groups are
defined at first solely in terms of the conflict situation.
3. In most cases the conflict situation will be marked by an unequal
balance of power so that one of the classes emerges as the ruling
class. Such a class will continually seek to gain recognition of the
legitimacy of its position among the members of the subject class
and the leaders of the subject class will seek to deny this claim
354 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
and to organise activities which demonstrate that it is denied
(e.g. passive resistance).
4. The power situation as between the ruling and subject classes
may change as a result of changes in a number of variable factors
which increase the possibility of successful resistance or actual
revolution by the subject class. Amongst these variable factors
are leadership, the strength of the members' aspirations, their
capacity for organisation, their possession of the means of viol-
ence, their numbers and their role in the social system proposed
by the ruling class .
.S. In the case of a dramatic change in the balance of power the
subject class may suddenly find itself in a situation in which it
cannot merely impose its will on the former ruling class, but can
actually destroy the basis of that class's existence. New divi-
sions within the revolutionary class may open up, but these may
be of an entirely different kind to those which existed in the
previous conflict situation.
6. The social institutions and culture of the subject class are geared
to, and explicable in terms of, the class's interest in the conflict
situation. So far as its long-term aims are concerned, these tend
to be expressed in vague and Utopian forms. When the subject
class comes to power its ~tual practices will still have to be
worked out. But it is likely that they will be justified and even
affected by the morality of conflict and by pre-revolutionary
charters and utopias.
7. A change in the balance of power might lead not to complete
revolution, but to compromise and reform. In this case new
institutions might arise which are not related simply to the pro-
secution of the conflict, but are recognised as legitimate by both
sides. Such a truce situation might in favourable circumstances
give rise to a newunitarysocial orderoveralongperiod, in which
limited property rights and limited political power are regarded
as legitimately held by particular individuals. But such situations
are inherently unstable because any weakening of the counter-
vailing power of the formerly subject class would lead the former
ruling class to resume its old ways and the maintenance of this
power could easilyencouragethesubject class to push right on to
the revolutionary alternative. (Rex, 1961, pp. 129-30)
The conflict theories of both Dahrendorfand Rex, whilst differ-
ing in terms of the subjectivo-objective dimension of our analyti-
cal scheme, both emphasise that central attention must be devoted
to the structure of power and authority in any analysis of contem-
porary society. They both draw upon the concept of class as an
analytical tool and recognise the conflict between interest groups
as the motor force of social change. Their theories radicalise the
strains and tensions which, as will be apparent from our discussion
 Radical Structuralism 355
in Chapter 4, characterise functionalist theory. In particular, they
start from the premise that society is characterised by divergent
interests rather than the functional unity presumed in the
organismic model. They adopt a model which stresses that society
is 'factional' rather than organismic in nature, and in this respect
can be seen as developing a line of enquiry which logically emerges
from Merton's concept of 'dysfunction'. As we suggested in our
discussion on conflict functionalism in Chapter 4, this notion lays
the basis for a truly radical critique of society. since, as noted by
Gouldner ( 1959), it opens the door to 'functional autonomy' and
hence 'contradiction' as a basic system characteristic. Dahrendorf
and Rex stop some way short of developing the full implications of
this possibility, which would lead them much closer to various
forms of Marxist analysis and a greater and more specific emphasis
upon the notions of 'contradiction' and ·catastrophe'.
Interestingly enough, the spirit of this critique of the conflict
theory of Dahrendorf and Rex has been captured by Loekwood,
who approaches their work from a slightly different perspective. In
his well-known article 'Social Integration and System Integration'
(1964), he takes Dahrendorf and Rex to task for focusing their
attention upon 'social integration' rather than 'system integra-
tion'. Linking this basic distinction with Marxist theory, he con-
tends that the propensity to class antagonism is a reflection of the
degree of 'social integration' and can be affected by superstruc-
tural factors which influence the degree of 'identification', 'com-
munication', etc., whereas the dynamics of class antagonisms are
fundamentally related to contradictions within the economic sys-
tem. In Marxist theory emphasis is explicitly placed upon these
·contradictions' or problems of 'system integration', whereas in
the work of the conflict theorists emphasis is placed upon the
analysis and problems of 'social integration'. Lockwood believes
that whilst these two features are interrelated they are both analyt-
ically separate and distinguishable, and that at any point in time
different combinations of 'social integration' and 'system integra-
tion' may prevail (Lockwood, 1964, pp. 249-50). In essence,
Lockwood seeks to explain the possibility of social order within a
system characterised by fundamental contradictions in its basic
structure. In this and other ways his position is quite similar to that
of Althusser.
The interface between the work of Marx and of Weber appears
as an intellectual terrain calling for a great deal more attention than
it has received up to now. It seems possible, for example, to clarify
many of the points at issue between radical Weberians or conflict
356 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
theorists and their Marxist critics by recognising that the
intellectual traditions upon which they draw approach the study ot
contemporary social formations from different perspectives. using
different analytical constructs and, as a result, they stress in the
course of their analysis the importance of different elements of the
totality which characterises a particular social formation. Let us
examine these points in a little more detail. The radical Weberians,
following Weber, approach the study of contemporary society
from a perspective concerned with explaining the degree and
nature of 'social integration'. The Marxist theorists approach the
study from a perspective concerned to explain why the social
system is in the process of change and disintegration. This is the
distinction which Lockwood (1964) has drawn between the con-
cern for 'social integration' as opposed to ·system integration', or
perhaps more appropriately, 'disintegration'. These different
perspectives favour different analytical constructs. Thus, the radi-
cal Weberians favour ·power', whereas the Marxist theorists
favour ·contradiction'. A focus upon power allows the radical
Weberian to explain how society is integrated through coercion or
the domination of particular interest groups. A focus upon contra-
diction allows the Marxist theorist to explain social change in terms
of the antagonistic relationship between system elements striving
to achieve autonomy from the dominating forces which weld them
together. As a result, the radical Weberians and Marxists tend to
stress the importance of different elements of the social formation.
The radical Weberians within the radical structuralist paradigm
tend to focus upon the 'superstructure', where the conflict of
interests between different power groups are most evident. Thus
there is often a primary concern for the role of the State and the
political, legal, administrative and ideological apparatus through
which the dominant interest groups secure their position within
society. The Marxist theorist focuses his interest, first and fore-
most, upon the forces operating within the ·substructure' or
economic base ofsociety.n Although many Marxist theorists have
concerned themselves with the nature of the relationship between
substructure and superstructure and the relative autonomy of the
latter (Aithusser and Balibar, 1970; Cutler et al. 1977), they are at
one in recognising an analysis of the economic substructure as
central to an understanding of the contradictions which act as the
generators of social change and disintegration.
Stated in this somewhat bald and oversimplified way. some of
the distinctions and similarities between the views of the radical
Weberian and the various types of Marxist thought become easier
 Radical Structuralism 357
to see. For the most part their respective problematics have been
quite distinct. The radical Weberians have tended to focus upon
the relationships between social integration and power as mani-
fested in the superstructure of the social formation. Marxist theor-
ists, have tended to focus upon the relationships between system
disintegration, contradiction, and substructure /superstructure
relationships.
The increasing attention which has recently been devoted to the
nature of the relationships between substructure and superstruc-
ture could usefully be extended to embrace the interrelationships
between the other elements which distinguish radical Weberian
and Marxist thought. The relationships between the concepts of
contradiction and power, and social integration and system disin-
tegration, also seem worthy of attention. It seems clear, for exam-
ple, that the concepts of contradiction and power are connected in
some form of dialectical relationship in which the form of one
presupposes the form of the other. Power can be seen, for exam-
ple, as the manifestation of •contradictory' relationships between
elements within the social formation as a whole. Similarly, as
Lockwood has argued, there is a balance and a relationship be-
tween ·social integration' and the state of •system disintegration'.
Further developments in sociological theory within the radical
structuralist paradigm thus might welt focus upon the complex
network of relationships and concepts which characterise theories
seeking to explore the relationship between the contributions of
Marx and Weber.
This discussion perhaps serves to illustrate the similarities and
distinctions between the perspective of the radical Weberian con-
flict theorists and Marxists such as Althusser, and their respective
locations within the bounds of the radical structuralist paradigm.
As will be clear from Figure 3.3, conflict theory, in its attempt to
explore the interface between Marx and Weber (albeit in a very
limited way), can be regarded as characteristic of a sociology of
radical change located on the boundary of the radical structuralist
paradigm.

The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm

Theories within the radical structuralist paradigm are thus based
upon relatively objectivist assumptions with regard to the nature of
social science, and are geared to providing a radical critique of
358 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
contemporary society. They do so by focusing upon the in-built
forces which they see as creating basic and deep-seated pressures
for social change. With the possible exception of conflict theory,
they present theories of social change in which revolution, often
bloody, plays a central part. The paradigm reflects a sociology of
radical change in which the idyllic vision of non-violent revolution
through consciousness, such as that envisaged by many radical
humanists, is left far behind. From the standpoint of radical struc-
turalism, change in society almost inevitably involves a transfor-
mation of structures which, even given favourable circumstances,
do not fall or change of their own accord. Structures are seen as
being changed, first and foremost, through economic or political
crises, which generate conflicts of such intensity that the status
quo is necessarily disrupted or torn apart and replaced by radically
different social forms.
All schools of thought within the paradigm are predicated, in
varying degrees, upon four central notions. First. there is a general
acceptance of the notion of totality. All theories within the radical
structuralist paradigm, like those of the radical humanist para-
digm, address themselves to the understanding of total social
formations. Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus, in
contrast to that of the radical humanist paradigm, is upon the
configurations of social relationships which characterise different
totalities and which exist independently of men's consciousness of
them. Structures are treated as hard and concrete facticities,
which are relatively persistent and enduring. Social reality for the
radical structuralist is not necessarily created and recreated in
everyday interaction, as, for example, many interpretive theorists
would claim. Reality exists independently of any reaffirmation
which takes place in everyday life.
The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, whilst seen
as persistent and relatively enduring, are also seen as posed in
contradictory and antagonistic relationships one to another. The
notion of contradiction, like that of alienation within the radical
humanist paradigm, has both a symbolic and a substantive aspect.
It is symbolic in the sense that it stands for the radical structural-
ists' hope and belief that capitalist social formations contain within
them the seeds of their own decay.ln substantive terms, the notion
of contradiction varies in definition and use within the context of
this overall symbolic umbrella. Some of the fundamental contra-
dictions which have been recognised are those between the rela-
tions of production and the means of production; between
exchange value and surplus value; between the increasing social-
 Radical Structuralism 359
isation of the forces of production and the narrowing basis of their
ownership; between capital and labour; between the increasing
anarchy of market and centralisation of production. Different
theorists tend to select and emphasise different contradictions,
and with varying degrees of explicitness. Where Bukharin 's histor-
ical materialism is concerned, for example, the notion of contra-
diction pervades his work in implicit fashion, in terms of a basic
incompatibility between any given technology and the basis of
man's relationship to nature. In Althusser's sociology the notion of
contradiction is more explicit, and also more varied. He identifies
many forms of contradiction which, in certain configurations, act
as the motor force behind revolutionary social change. Within the
context of conflict theory, the treatment of contradiction is more
implicit and, indeed, more superficial. For example, attention is
devoted principally to the analysis of class conflict as the surface
manifestation of a more deep-seated structural imbalance
embedded in the nature of contemporary industrial society.
The fourth notion central to schools of thought belonging to the
radical structuralist paradigm is that of crisis. All theories within
the paradigm view change as a process involving structural dis-
location of an extreme form. The typical pattern is that in which
contradictions within a given totality reach a point at which they
can no longer be contained. The ensuing crisis, political,
economic, and the like, is viewed as the point of transformation
from one totality to another, in which one set of structures is
replaced by another of a fundamentally different kind.
The underlying unity and distinctive nature of the paradigm
becomes clearly evident when compared with its functionalist
neighbour. Despite sharing an approach to the study of social
reality, which emphasises how society is ontologically prior to
man and can be understood through positivist epistemology, the
orientation of radical structuralism is towards fundamentally
different ends. As we have seen, the emphasis in radical structural-
ism is upon contradiction and crisis. These factors receive no
attention within the functionalist paradigm; they are essentially
alien to this perspective, since its fundamental aim is to account
for the persistence and survival of existing social forms. Func-
tionalism is concerned with evolutionary as opposed to catas-
trophic change. Even the most change-orientated schools of
thought within the context of the functionalist paradigm are
markedly different from, and conservative in orientation when
compared with, their immediate neighbours within radical
structuralism.
360 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

Notes and References

1. In the Grundrisse, Marx provides the ·outlines' or founda-
tions of the critique of political economy which was to
occupy the remainder of his life's work. These 'outlines'
were primarily in note form and probably never intended for
publication. Though written in the late 1850s, they were not
published until1939, and they have only recently been trans-
lated from the original German and published in English for
the first time.
The three volumes of Capital - Marx's major work -
elaborate but a small part of the schema put forward in the
Grundrisse. Marx died with the vast proportion of his work
incomplete.
2. See, for example, Godelier ( 1972). He maintains that in Capi-
tal there are two central notions of 'contradiction', and a
variety of contexts in which they are used. As he puts it,
First of all there is the contradiction between workers and
capitalists. Then there are the economic 'crises' in which con-
tradictions appear between production and consumption. be-
tween the conditions of production of value and surplus value
and the conditions of their realisation, and basically between
production forces and relations of production. Finally there are
the contradictions between capitalism and small peasant or
artisan property, capitalism and socialism, etc. This simple list
. reveals differences of nature and importance among these con-
tradictions, of which some are internal to the system. and others
exist between the system and other systems. They must there-
fore be analysed theoretically. (Godelier, 1972, p. 350).

In this 'theoretical analysis' Godelierposits that Marx sees

some contradictions as 'specific' to capitalism, created by it
and reproduced continually within it. Within such a structure
these are internal contradictions 'antagonistic' to social
stability and likely therefore to be central to the violent
overthrow of the capitalist mode of production. Such an
antagonistic contradiction is evident to sociologists, etc .• in
the class struggle. More important, however, says Godelier,
there is a contradiction between structures recognised within
Capital. This is the contradiction between the increasing
socialisation of the forces of production (that is, their widen-
ing societal impact) and the narrowing basis of ownership.
Thus in the long term there are more and more producers:
 Radical Structuralism 361
fewer and fewer of the bourgeoisie. However, this contradic-
tion is not originally present within capitalism; it only comes
about at a certain stage in the development of the capitalist
productive mode, when its 'positive' liberating element has
dried up and large-scale industry replaces the small-scale
production typical of early capitalism.
3. The concept of 'surplus value' and its link with the economic
structure of capitalism is by no means an easy one to grasp
and it has been the subject of much debate within economics.
Whilst surplus value is clearly defined as the extra value a
capitalist has control of after he has paid wages to the worker
- that is, the terrain upon which industrial relations and
particularly wage bargaining is fought - it is unclear how
'surplus value' relates to the tendency within capitalism for
'the rate of profits to fall'. In other words, there is an opacity
about the status of the concepts and nature of the relationship
between ·surplus value', the 'fundamental contradictions'
within capitalism and the 'economic crises' to which these
inevitably lead. Contemporary Marxist political economy is
replete with new identifications of the fundamental contra-
diction and discussions of the empirical evidence or lack of
it, for the falling rate of profit. The arguments are beyond the
scope of this exposition, but what is important is that one
recognises that, for Marx, ·surplus value' and the 'exploita-
tion' which it reflects lies at the heart of the contradictions
which blight capitalism. The central empirical reflection of
these contradictions (between the relations of production
and means of production, between exchange value and sur-
plus value, between capital and labour, between the measure
oflabour time and the use oflabour time, etc.) is the tendency
for the rate of profits to fall. As this happens, and the deeply
rooted antagonistic contradictions work to the surface, the
final, cataclysmic economic crisis occurs. Surplus value,
then, represents the economic conceptualisation central to
Marxian analysis which provides the link between deep-
seated structural contradictions and their reflection in
economic cataclysms for which revolution becomes the only
possible solution.
4. For the view that the move from an emphasis on 'alienation•
to ·surplus value' indicates a continuity within Marx in the
study of the 'dialectics of labour', see From Alienation to
Surplus Value (Walton and Gamble, 1972).
S. McLellan describes this movement succinctly as follows:
362 Sociological Paradigms and Or~:anisational Analysis
Towards the end of his life Mar" moved nearer to the positivism
then so fashionable in intellectual circles. This tendency, begun
in Anti-Duhrinl( and continued by Engels in his Ludwil( Feuer-
bach and Dialectics of Nature, reached its apogee in Soviet
te"tbooks on dialectical materialism. It was this trend which
presented Marxism as a philosophical world-view or Weltan-
schauunl( consisting of objective laws and particularly laws d
the dialectical movement of matter taken in a metaphysical sense
as the basic constituent of reality. This was obviously very
different from the ·unity of theory and practice' as exemplified
in, for instance, the Theses on Feuerbach. This preference for
the model of the natural sciences had always been with Engels,
though not with Marx, who had, for example, a much more
reserved attitude to Darwinism. (McLellan, 1976, p. 423)

6. In Anti-Diihring, a personal attack upon a German socialist

(for which, incidentally, Engels had received Marx's
approval for publication) Engels set the scene for the move-
ment towards positivistic ·scientific socialism'. He painted a
picture of Marx's ideas as representative of a totally com-
prehensive frame of reference which provided the laws of
motion for a causally determined process in which socialism
would inevitably replace capitalism. Furthermore, such a
view replaced philosophy itself.
At Marx's graveside, Engels explicitly compared the work
of Darwin in the natural sciences with that of Marx in the
social sciences.
7. It is important to emphasise that Marx himself did not use the
terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism',
and that there has been much debate about what exactly they
mean.
8. See, for example, Colletti (1972) and Althusser (1971).
9. For a discussion of the relationship between Weber's politi-
cal and sociological views, see Giddens ( 1972b).
10. Plekhanov stands as the founding father of contemporary
Russian social theory. For a selection of his work, see
Plekhanov (1974) in which his stance within the Engelsian
tradition is described thus:
Plekhanov was an ardent defender of materialist dialectics,
which he skilfully applied to social life, correctly considering it as
an achievement of Marxist philosophic thought. He saw in it the
great and the new which, combined with the masterly discovery
of the materialist conception of history, distinguishes Marx's
materialism from the teachings of materialists before him.
 Radical Structuralism 363
Plekhanov brings out the various aspects of materialist dialectics
and brilliantly expounds the theory of development, the correla-
tion between evolution and revolution,leaps, etc. In this connec-
tion he shows the opposition between Marx's dialectical method
and Hegel's, and considers the role of Hegel's idealist philoso-
phy as one of the theoretical sources of Marxism. (Piekhanov,
1974, p. 49)

The work of both Bukharin and Kropotkin discussed here

owes a great deal to Plekhanov.
11. See, for example, Gouldner (1970), 'Functionalism goes
East', in Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology,
op. cit., pp. 455-58.
12. For a detailed study of Bukharin's biography, see Cohen
(1974).
13. See, for example, van den Berghe (1969) and the discussion
in Chapter 2 of this book.
14. There are several very readable biographical accounts of
Kropotkin and his work. See, for example, Woodcock
(1975), pp. 171-206; Avrich (1967), pp. 26-32; Bose (1967),
pp. 257-98.
IS. For a comprehensive list of Kropotkin's publications, see
Bose (1967), pp. 261-2.
16. Perry Anderson in Considerations on Western Marxism
(1976) tends to view Althusser and Colletti in the same light
as Lukacs, Gramsci, Marcuse, etc., as part of 'Western
Marxism'. In using the term 'contemporary Mediterranean
Marxism' we seek obviously to differentiate this type of
theorising from other varieties of Marxism in Western
Europe which stand, for us, in a different paradigm. Interest-
ingly, 'Mediterranean Marxism• is relatively popular in Bri-
tain.
17. See, for example, Colletti (1974).
18. See, for example, Anderson (1976), p. 46.
19. For a further discussion of Althusser's background and
approach to Marxism, see Callinicos (1976).
20. For a discussion of the 'epistemological break', see
Althusser (1969). This notion is taken from Bachelard.
21. In addition to Althusser (1969), see also Althusser and
Balibar (1970).
22. For a comparison of Althusser's structuralism with that of
Levi-Strauss, see Glucksmann ( 1974).
23. For a useful glossary of Althusser's terminology, see
Althusser (1969), pp. 248-S7.
364 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
24. The obscurity is also present in Althusser. The concept of
·overdetermination' is taken in modified form from Freud.
25. For a further discussion of this, see Althusser (1969), pp.
88-116.
26. For a discussion, see, for example, Shaw (1975).
27. Della Volpe (1897-1968) was a Marxist philosopher who
sought to provide a much more positive interpretation of
Marxism than those of Lbkacs and Gramsci.
28. See, for example, the essay 'Marxism as a Sociology' in
Colletti (1972).
29. See, for example, Colletti (1974), p. 12.
30. For a discussion of the commonality of interest between
Marx, Weber and Durkheim, see Giddens (1971).
31. In particular, Dahrendorfargues that the crisis of capitalism,
based upon increasing immiseration of the proletariat,
increasing polarisation between proletariat and bourgeoisie
and increasing homogeneity within the two classes has been
'proved' empirically untenable at every turn (Dahrendorf,
1959, pp. 36-71).
32. This is taken from Dahrendorf( 1959), pp. 237-40. The list of
thirty-nine assumptions presented by Dahrendorf has been
reduced here, largely by removing those which are purely
definitional.
It is interesting to note that in his conceptualisation
Dahrendorf draws upon Merton's distinction between
'manifest' and 'latent' functions, developing the radical
implications which these suggest.
33. 'Marxist' is used here as a shorthand for Marxist theorists
located within the radical structuralist paradigm. The focus
of interests of 'Marxists' within the radical humanist para-
digm is, of course, quite different.
11. Radical Organisation
Theory

In recent years a number of social theorists have sought to

approach the study of organisations from a perspective charac-
teristic of the radical structuralist paradigm. For the most part they
have attempted to do this by providing a critique of the problems
inherent in the functionalist approach. As in the case of the
interpretive and radical humanist paradigms, the radical struc-
turalist approach to the study of organisations has developed in a
reactive mould. The critique which has evolved has been wide-
ranging, far from coherent and, at times, highly polemical. Func-
tionalist theorists in general. and organisation theorists in particu-
lar, have been accused of being the mere servants of the capitalist
system; of being mindlessly empiricist; of neglecting the historical
dimensions of their subject; of ignoring the whole body of social
thought reflected in the works of Marx; of underplaying the impor-
tance of class relationships in contemporary society; of ignoring
the importance of the State; and of adopting analytical models
which are generally orientated towards the preservation of the
status quo. as opposed to accounting for the phenomena of ongo-
ing social change. Not all theorists who have attempted to provide
a critique of functionalism in this way are located within the radical
structuralist paradigm. Indeed, as will be apparent from our dis-
cussion of functionalist sociology, many functionalists have criti-
cised their colleagues on some of these grounds, in order to forge a
more radical perspective within the context of the functionalist
paradigm. Again, radical structuralists have not always provided a
critique upon all the above grounds. Typically, one or more has
been given the focus of attention. The critique of functionalism has
been launched from a variety of perspectives and with a variety of
objectives in mind.
We wish to argue here that behind the radical structuralist criti-
que of functionalism lies a latent and only partially developed
approach to the study of organisations. Whilst not altogether co-
herent, it is united on certain themes. As an attempt at the articula-
366 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
tion ofsomeofthese, Table 11.1 presents a sample of twelve points
on which functionalist theory has been criticised and counterposes
these with the assumptions which implicitly underlie the radical
structuralist critique. In criticising functionalism, the radical struc-
turalists imply that they hold an alternative point of view. Whilst
this is not always systematically developed or clearly articulated,
it does underwrite their criticism, and it is as well that it be spell
out. The twelve points thus go some way towards presenting the
overall flavour of the wide-ranging nature of the radical structural-
ist critique.
Table 11.1
The unity ~the radical structuralist attack upon organisation theory
Points of criticism dir~ct~d By implication this would SU/lfl~St tit~
tlllainst orflanisation th~ory followinfl flUidt!lin~s for a rt~dical
orRanisation th~ory

1. Organisation theory is locked Instead of 'having their eyes turned downward

into an acceptance of and their palms upward', orpni$ation theorists
manqerially defined should 'study the structure of social
problems. oppression and bring this knowledge and the
power that it conveys to the powerless and
exploited social rruUority' •1

2. Organisation theorists Organi~ation theorists should seek to carry out

consciously or unconsciously 'action-research' which has discontinuous
play an active and concrete revolutionary change as its objective. Theory
role ifl man's degradation and practice should be unified into a seamless,
within the work place. intellectual activity of which the theorist is
well aware. 3

3. It ignores the contribution of Detailed and extensive knowledge of the work

Marx. of the mature Marx is a sin~ qua non for any
radical orpnisation theory.

4. It neglects tbe analysis of class The concept of class should form an integral
relations. part of any coherent radical orpnisation
theory.

'· It is based upon a very Weber should be read in more depth and with
narrow and misleading greater understanding. Most functionalist
interpretation of Weber. organisation theorists completely misrepresent
bis views on bureaucracy, and misuse his
concept of the 'ideal type'.

6. It neglects tbe role of the Organisational analysis depends upon a theory

State. of tbe state which is still in need of detailed
articulation.
 Radical Organisation Theory 367
Table 11.1 (continued)
Points of criticism dir~ct~d By implication this would SUilll~St th~
t.rllt.rinst or~tt.rnisation th~ory followinR RUid~lin~s for a radi('a/
orRanisation th~ory

7. It is ahistorical. Radical organisation theory should have a

historical dimension. In order to understand
organisations today, there is a need to
comprehend them as they have been in the
past, and indeed, to understand how and why
they developed in the first place.

8. It is 'static:', i.e., it assumes Organisation theory should be dynamic: - it

a tendency to equilibrium, a should conceive of society as a process which
societal consens.us and develops throuah the interplay of contradictory
organic: unity. forces, which can result in m;Uor upheavals
and irregular patterns of change.

9. It is basically empiricist. i.e. Instead of beginning with an emphasis _upon the

concerned with methodology rigour of observation and 'experimental'
above all. technique, radical organisation theory should
seek to assert the primacy of a coherent
theoretical perspective which is not necessarily
subject to the tyranny of data.

10. It is anti-theoretical. Suspicion of 'theory' in conventional analysis

should be inverted, so that radical organisation
theory must celebrate the development of
large-scale, politically relevant theoretical
perspectives.

11. It is basically unaware of the Radical organisation theory must start from the
crucial importance of macro- basic assumption that organisations cannot be
societal factors 'external' to understood without a prior analysis of the
the organisation. social processes and structures in which
organisations are thought to exist.

12. Its recurrent attempts to Conventional organisation theory and its

provide a general theory radical counterpart are mutually exclusive. No
suggest the possibility and synthesis is possible because their
desirability of a synthesis 'problematics' are incompatible. Radical
when in fact, this is organisation theory cannot, nor should it, seek
unattainable. to incorporate its functionalist adversary.

The significance of this critique, however, can only be fully

understood, developed and refined against the background of the
intellectual tradition of radical structuralism as a whole. Elements
of the critique are usually based upon elements of this perspective.
As will be apparent from our discussion in the previous chapter,
368 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
radical structuralism presents a diverse and complex body of
thought. However, there does appear to be a measure of coherence
among its constituent elements, and these provide useful
guidelines by which to chart the general direction in which the
overall thrust of radical structuralism takes us as far as the study of
organisations is concerned.
We concluded our previous chapter by suggesting that the core
concepts of 'totality', 'structure', 'contradiction' and 'crisis' were
in large measure unifying themes. Transferred to the realm of the
study of organisations, they assume significance in the following
ways. The notion of totality implies that it is crucial to study total
social formations as a means of understanding the elements of a
social system. It implies that an understanding ofthe nature of the
whole must precede any understanding of constituent parts.
'Totality' thus implies that organisations can only be understood in
terms of their place within a total context, in terms of the wider
social formation within which they exist and which they· reflect.
The significance of the nature and form of organisations only
becomes fully apparent when viewed from this all-embracing point
of view.
From the radical structuralist standpoint, the totality can be
characterised in terms of its basic structural formation. Structures
are treated as hard and concrete facticities which are relatively
persistent and enduring, and which exist independently of men's
consciousness of them. From this point of view, organisations are
structural facticities, but they represent only part of the wider
structural facti city which constitutes the totality. Organisations
are thus structural elements of a wider structure which they reflect
and from which they derive their existence and true significance.
The organisation is, in this sense, a partial reflection of totality.
The notion of contradiction is of relevance to the study of
organisations since, from the radical structuralist view, it is at the
point of production that many of the contradictions within society
come to the fore. Organisations, particularly economic organisa-
tions, are viewed as the stage upon which the deep-seated cleav-
ages within the social formation as a whole are most visible. It is in
the workshop and factory, for example, that the contradictions
between the relations and the means of production, capital and
labour, the measure of and use oflabourtime, and the fundamental
problem of overproduction, are seen as working themselves out. It
is in the empirical facets of this organisational life that contradic-
tions are seen as taking their most visible form. Not all radical
structuralists address themselves to the study of these contradic-
 Radical Organisation Theory 369
lions in a direct and specific fashion. As we noted in the previous
chapter, there is a division between the so-called radical
Weberians and the Marxian structuralists on this score. The former
are most concerned with the ways in which contradictions surface
at the level of empirical reality through the interplay of power
relationships and the conflicts which ensue. Their interest in con-
tradictions is thus of an indirect as opposed to a direct nature,
and the concepts which they use and the approach which they
adopt reflect this very clearly.
The radical structuralist notion of crisis, involving the view that
macro-social change is characterised by structural contradiction
and dislocation of an extreme form, has significance for organisa-
tions, in that as structures they are necessarily involved in this
process of dislocation. If there is a change in totality, there is of
necessity a change in organisational forms. The significance of
changes in the structure of organisations can thus be seen in terms
of the changes occurring in the totality as a whole. Organisations
monitor and reflect the movement of totality from one crisis to
another. The study of organisations in crisis, therefore, is of par-
ticular interest to the radical structuralist, as reflecting the proces-
ses which contribute to and characterise totality shifts. Crises of
ownership and control, factory occupations, Wall Street crashes
and large-scale redundancies are of particular significance from
the radical structuralist point of view, not as problems to be sol-
ved, but as episodes yielding considerable insights insofar as the
understanding of the nature of the social formation is concerned.
The notions of'totality', 'structure', 'contradiction' and 'crisis'
thus provide core concepts from which a radical organisation
theory characteristic of the radical structuralist paradigm can be
forged. Taken together, these core concepts, along with the impli-
cations which underlie the radical structuralist critique of func-
tionalism, provide clear indications of the form such a radical
theory of organisations might take. Up to now it has remained
largely embryonic, its various elements scattered around a truly
diverse body ofliterature. As a means of establishing the basis for a
fuller understanding and further development of the perspective as
a whole, it seems necessary to move towards a much more sys-
tematic statement. This is our aim in this chapter. In the following
sections we intend to explore some of the relevant literature in this
area, and we will attempt to specify some of the key issues of
debate.
As will become clear, it is not possible to say that there is but one
approach to the study of organisations from a radical structuralist
370 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
perspective. As in the case ofthe functionalist paradigm, different
views can be put forward according to the nature of the assump-
tions made in relation to each of the two dimensions of our analyti-
cal scheme. In our previous chapter we demonstrated the exist-
ence of a number of distinct schools of thought within the radical
structuralist paradigm. Of these, the two described as conflict
theory and contemporary Mediterranean Marxism appear to
underwrite and be most closely connected with radical organisa-
tion theory at the present time. There may also be literature
addressed to the study of organisations from the standpoint of
what we have called Russian social theory, though of this we are
unaware.
Before discussing the radical organisation theories akin to con-
flict theory and contemporary Mediterranean Marxism, some
further remarks are in order. First, the organisation theorists who
adopt the conflict theory perspective may shun association with
the sociological school of thought which we have described under
that name. Although linked with that perspective, they have
developed their ideas somewhat independently and within the
context of different disciplines. What they have in common, how-
ever, is a commitment to the radical Weberianism which we have
described as characterising conflict theory at a sociological level.
For this reason, and in order to avoid unnecessary confusion, we
shall discuss their contribution to a radical theory of organisations
under the heading radical Weberianism. Second, the contribution
to a radical theory of organisations from the Marxist viewpoint,
whilst sharing many points in common with Althusserian structur-
alism, is not necessarily derived from it, and would not always
claim an allegiance to that perspective as a whole. The work of
Baran and Sweezy (1968) (which we shall consider later), for
example, was developed in parallel with that of Althusser. We
shall thus use the term 'Marxian structuralist' to characterise this
brand of radical organisation theory. Third, as we have argued
earlier, and as all radical theorists would accept, it is not possible
to develop a theory of organisations independent of a theory of the
totality of which they are part. The literature which is relevant to
the development of radical organisation theory is diverse and
contains many works which approach the problem of totality
rather than organisations as such. At first sight, therefore, their
relevance to the study of organisations may seem somewhat
remote.
 Radical Organisation Theory 371
Radical Weberian Approaches to a Radical
Organisation Theory
The general flavour of the radical Weberian approach to the study
of organisations is perhaps best captured in the notion of •corporat-
ism', a term which has come to stand for the development of the
seamless web of bureaucratic institutions which exist in modern
society as appendages of(and subservient to) the State. 3 The State
is regarded as being at the centre of an octopus-like structure,
whose bureaucratic tentacles stretch out and invade all areas of
social activity. The radical Weberians tend to be interested in the
relationship between the State and this general process of bureau-
cratisation, and they are particularly concerned to understand the
ways in which the State apparatus dominates the wider social
structure within which it exists. The radical Weberians are
interested in ·power' relationships and draw many of their ideas
and conceptualisations from the realm of political science.
The radical Weberian contribution to a radical theory of organ-
isations, therefore, can be elicited from literature which focuses
upon a theory of the totality, in which the State is accorded a
central role. Its implications for organisations as such, whether
State-related or not, have to be culled from this wider background.
Although considerable emphasis is placed upon the analysis of
bureaucracy, it only represents one part of a wider analysis geared
to obtaining an understanding of the social formation as a whole. A
radical theory of organisations from this point of view, therefore.
only has significance when developed and interpreted against this
wider background.
We will commence our review of relevant literature with Ralph
Miliband's book The State in Capitalist Society (1973). At first
sight the assertion that Miliband, a leading intellectual of the New
Left and co-editor of the Socialist Register, has an affiliation with
radical Weberianism might seem to be stretching the imagination
too far. However, it will be remembered that we maintained in the
previous <;hapter that radical Weberianism explores that
intellectual terrain in which the interests of Marx and Weber may
be thought to coincide. Just as Rex and Dahrendorf attempt to
infuse Marxian notions with a potent draught of Weberianism, so
too does Miliband in his consideration of the role of the State
within the advanced capitalist societies. Since Marx himself never
managed to complete a systematic study of the State, Miliband sets
himself the task of providing a Marxist political analysis which can
372 SocioloKica/ ParadiKms and OrJ!ani.wtional Analysis
confront democratic pluralism on its own ground. Whilst pluralism
assumes a competitive. fragmented and diffuse power structure.
Miliband seeks to demonstrate that this view 'is in all essentials
wrong' and 'constitutes a profound obfuscation' of social reality
(Miliband, 1973, p. 6).
Whilst Miliband believes that today we still live within authenti-
cally capitalist societies, there have been many changes since
Marx himself wrote of capitalism. Miliband regards advanced
capitalism as all but synonymous with the giant form of enterprise
found throughout the industrialised West. The ·economic base' of
advanced capitalism is seen as constituted in large measure by
these ubiquitous corporations, and the political arrangements of
the industrialised nations as taking on a fundamentally similar
form. Within these societies, social stratification presents a dif-
ferentiated appearance but, says Miliband, although there is a
plurality of competing elites within such social structures, taken
together these form a 'dominant economic class, possessed of a
high degree of cohesion and solidarity' (Miliband, 1973, p. 45). The
State's relationship with such a dominant class is the focus of the
book, but for Miliband the notion of the State is a complex and
problematic one. In fact, it turns out that the State consists of the
bureaucracies (the 'institutions') whose interrelationships shape
the form of the State system; these are 'the government, the
administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch.
sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies' (Miliband,
1973, p. 50). Miliband goes on to argue that the governments of the
advanced capitalist societies act positively and with good will
towards business and propertied interests (that is, the corpora-
tions) and, furthermore, that the other bureaucracies which
together form the State can normally be counted upon to support
the dominant economic interests. Of course, says Miliband. per-
turbations within this integraterl structure occur, primarily
through competition between organised interest groups, but these
are superficial and incidental to the underlying structure of domi-
nation. This domination also occurs ·at the level of meaning' and
Miliband considers the process of legitimation of the existing
power structure through, for example, political propaganda, the
media of mass communications and the universities, each acting as
a source of political socialisation. In his final chapter Miliband
considers the future, in terms of both the dangers of conservative
authoritarianism and the immense obstacles to the creation of a
truly ·socialist' society. He concludes, following Marx, that only
within the latter will the State be converted 'from an organ
 Radical Organisation Theory 373
superimposed upon society into one completely subordinated to
if.
It should be clear from this brief exposition of Miliband's book
that he adopts a position much closer to radical Weberianism than
to Althusserian structuralism, a fact revealed quite clearly by
Poulantzas (1969) in his famous critique of The State in Capitalist
Society. 4 Whilst one cannot maintain that Miliband's ideas are at
one with those of Dahrendorf and Rex, there are at this level more
similarities between them than differences. For example, like
these conflict theorists, Miliband recognises the existence of a
lacuna in Marxist thought; he discusses the notion of power as his
central unifying concept; he admits a complicated form of social
stratification within capitalism; his position permits a concern for
explanation 'at the level of meaning' and, last but not least, the
notion of bureaucracy underpins much of his analysis. Of course,
Miliband's references to Weber are few and then mostly hostile,
but this does not and should not mask the essential fact .that his
underlying theoretical position is akin to that of radical Weberian-
ism.
As far as the development of a radical theory of organisation is
concerned, Miliband's analysis emphasises the importance of
obtaining an understanding ofthe theory of the State as a precursor
to a theory of organisations. From this point of view, the latter
cannot be adequately developed before the former. To understand
the operations of the police force, the judiciary and local govern-
ment, as well as industrial organisations, it is imperative to see
them as parts of the State apparatus and to attempt to understand
the processes of mutual interrelationship which link them
together. The radical Weberian perspective emphasises that
organisations cannot be understood as isolated enterprises; their
meaning and significance derive from their location within the
context of the wider social framework, and their activities only
become fully intelligible with this reference point in mind.
Other ideas with a radical Weberian flavour emerge from a close
reading of Eldridge and Crombie's book A Sociology of Organisa-
tions (1974). In essence, the book can be seen as comprising three
parts. 5 The first deals with the literature on organisation theory
and is underpinned by a concern to elucidate a range of sociologi-
cal approaches and interests. This concern follows from Eldridge
and Crombie's attack upon organisation theory for its 'ad hoc'
nature and its attempts to create a ·general theory' when there is no
hope of such a unifying conceptual framework. Thus, rather than
imply conceptual homogeneity, they draw upon organisational
374 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
analysis from both the functionalist and radical structuralist tradi-
tions in an effort to demonstrate the heterogeneity of approaches
to the sociology of organisations. In the second part of the book
Eldridge and Crombie consider the contributions of Spencer, Durk-
heim, Weber and Marx through their respective treatments of the
·organisational phenomenon'. It is important to note, however,
that the incorporation of Spencer and Marx at this point is
achieved through a conceptual leap of imagination, since the
authors make no clear-cut distinction between organisations as
empirical facticities and the ·mode of social organisation'. 6 This
allows an important link to be made between the levels of analysis
of society and organisation, but, at the cost of a certain amount of
confusion. 7 It is only in the third part of Eldridge and Crombie's
work that radical Weberianism becomes evident, as they become
involved in a discussion of the links between organisation and
society provided by the notion of power. Their analysis draws
heavily upon the literature and concepts of political science. They
discuss in some detail totalitarianism, with particular reference to
Nazi Germany; Michels's •iron law of oligarchy' is also con-
sidered, and a final section oftheir work is devoted to a ·critique of
pluralism', in which Miliband's analysis plays a central part. Their
attitude to Miliband, however, is somewhat ambivalent, for they
seem to sympathise with the analysis contained within The State in
Capitalist Society but are doubtful about the ·solutions' and
prophecies which it advocates. Eldridge and Crombie's book thus
reflects various elements of the radical Weberian perspective,
though they must be sifted from the contents of their work as a
whole.
A third example of a nascent radical Weberianism is to be found
in Nicos Mouzelis's introduction to the 1975 edition of Organisa-
tion and Bureaucracy. Whilst the original edition of this book
focuses primarily upon the tradition of functionalist organisation
theory and presents a well articulated account of the development
of organisational analysis within this paradigm, the new introduc-
tion to the 1975 edition reflects a considerable change in theoretical
orientation. Here Mouzelis seeks to point to some of the ways in
which organisation theory might fruitfully develop, and in so doing
adopts a position in many ways characteristic of radical Weberian-
ism. After discussing various aspects of the problem of reification
in social analysis, Mouzelis turns to the work of Althusser as a
means of providing a critique of what he sees as the excessive
empiricism and atheoretical nature of much contemporary organ-
isation theory. Whilst suggesting that Althusser's perspective has
 Radical Organisation Theory 375
much to offer organisation theory, he does not develop its i mplica-
tions to any marked degree. Instead, he turns to emphasising the
need for a more historically based approach to the study of organ-
isations, which Althusser does not provide, and proceeds to illus-
trate what he has in mind through a discussion of the development
of State bureaucracies. This discussion draws heavily upon the
work of Weber, and elaborates upon the class relations and power
struggles which have characterised the emergence and develop-
ment of the process of bureau~ratisation in Western Europe.
Mouzelis demonstrates very clearly the way in which bureau-
cracies have developed their power base and have achieved a high
degree of autonomy within society, to the extent that they now
stand not so much as ·a neutral tool at the service of the people and
its legitimate leaders', but as 'the real master' (Mouzelis, 1975,
p. xxxiv). His analysis reflects many of the concerns of radical
Weberianism. The concern for the power structure within society,
the place of the State bureaucracy within it, and the possibility of
bureaucracy's domination of its intended masters, are central to
his perspective. Mouzelis thus points the way towards a radical
organisation theory based upon an historical analysis which pays
central attention to the nature of organisations within the context
of the power structure of society as a whole. Within this
framework, the nature and role of the State apparatus would
qualify for special attention.
In their paper 'Organisation and Protection' ( 1977) McCullough
and Shannon address a number of the issues referred to above, and
place particular emphasis upon relationships between organisa-
tions and the State. They maintain that within organisation theory
the predominant conceptualisation of the relationship between
organisations and the State is one of dissociation, in which organ-
isations and the State are viewed as ·separable, rational, self-
conscious and self-determining entities' (McCullough and Shan-
non, 1977, p. 72). In practice, they argue, the relationship is quite
different from this, with the State extending 'protection' to organ-
isations which lie within the scope ofintluence -and that, histori-
cally, this is the role which the State has always performed. In line
with this argument, they see the multi-national corporations of
today not so much as phenomena which stand in opposition to the
sovereignty of nation states, but as phenomena which are to be
understood as part and parcel of the development which has led to
the nation state in its present form; as components of the same
repressive system of world division of labour based upon exploita-
tion. McCullough and Shannon adopt a historical perspective for
376 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
much of their analysis, and they present evidence concerning the
role of the State in the growth of the East India Company. for
example, and other State--organisation relationships, as a means
of illustrating the 'hegemonic' nature (as against the liberal,
pluralistic or countervailing nature) of governmental and indus-
trial organisations. In their view the State and organisations have,
internationally and historically, formed an integrated bureaucratic
framework which represents a structure of domination in which
power rests with a small fraction of the population. However, the
integration of this institutional framework is not immutable, nor
does it carry a life-long guarantee, and they point to the contem-
porary situation in Northern Ireland as an illustration. The inabil-
ity of the State there to offer protection to organisations and its
lack of a monopoly of force have, it is argued, entirely disrupted
the normal pattern of organisational life, since the present adminis-
trative, military and legal apparatuses are in a ~ondition of disin-
tegration (McCullough and Shannon, 1977, p. 83). Such.a crisis
offers an opportunity, they suggest, to examine the relationships
between organisations and the State which protects them, in a way
unknown to contemporary organisation theory.
The essence of the radical Weberian perspective which emerges
from this brief review of relevant literature is that organisations
must be studied as elements within the political structure of society
as a whole. This necessarily involves an analysis of power rela-
tionships, particularly in relation to the role of the State, which
stands as the dominant institutional structure offering itself for
analysis. Organisations cannot be understood in isolation. Their
significance arises from their location within the network of power
relations which influence societal processes. From the radical
Weberian standpoint it is this issue of power which stands at the
centre of the analytical stage. The theory of power which under-
writes this perspective is in stark contrast to the pluralist theory
discussed in earlier chapters. It is a theory of power which stresses
the integral as opposed to the intercursive nature of this
phenomenon. The central role accorded to power as a variable of
analysis redirects the organisation theorist's attention towards
issues such as the process of bureaucratisation itself, the increas-
ing concentration of the means of administration in the hands of
bureaucrats, and the rapid development of State intervention in
almost every area of social activity. The macro-orientation of
radical Weberianism points the way towards the development of
macro-theories of organisational process which stand in stark con-
trast to the middle-range theorising reflected in the work of the
 Radical OrRanisation Theory 377
majority of organisation theorists located within the functionalist
paradigm. We shall return to some of these issues later in the
chapter. ·

Marxian Structuralist Approaches to a

Radical Organisation Theory
Those theorists who approach the study of organisations from this
perspective tend to place the problems inherent in monopoly capi-
talism at their centre of analysis. Whereas the radical Weberians
are most concerned with the role of the State within an essentially
political network of bureaucratic power relationships. the Marxian
structuralists focus upon the economic structure of society, which
they see as the key determinant ofthe powerrelationships to which
the radical Weberians address their attention. For the Marxian
structuralists, therefore, political economy provides the most use-
ful intellectual reference point and source of conceptualisations.
They are primarily concerned with the analysis of the economic
structures of capitalist society, and they draw upon Marx's Capital
and the notion of 'contradiction' as central elements in their per-
spective. The modern corporation is of interest as an empirical
reflection of the underlying structure of monopoly capitalism; it is
studied as a means of throwing light upon the nature of this under-
lying structure rather than as an entity in its own right. As in the
case of the radical Weberian perspective, organisations only have
significance in relation to the totality in which they are located.
This concern for totality is clearly apparent in the first work
which we consider in our review of literature in this area: Baran
and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital. They begin by quoting Hegel's
dictum 'the truth is the whole', and stress the need to understand
the social order as a totality rather than ·as a collection of small
truths about various parts and aspects of society' (Baran and
Sweezy, 1968, p. 16). Although Marxism is seen to provide the
starting point, Capital itself is seen as a limited document because
of its failure to appreciate the contemporary importance of mono-
poly rather than competition within the capitalist market place.
The authors give Lenin full recognition for his understanding of the
importance of monopolies to the growth of capitalistic imperial-
ism, and it is to the analysis of the large-scale monopoly corpora-
tion that Baran and Sweezy direct their attention. They suggest that
'the typical economic unit in the capitalist world is not the small
378 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
firm producing a negligible fraction of a homogenous output for an
anonymous market but a large-scale enterprise producing a signif-
icant share of the output of an industry, or even several industries,
and able to control its prices, the volume of its production and the
types and amounts of its investments' (Baran and Sweezy, 1968, p.
19). They argue that any model of the economy within advanced
capitalist societies cannot afford to ignore this central point. The
book is seen as a •scientific' sketch on the American economic and
political order, in which 'the generation and absorption of the
surplus • produced under monopoly capitalism is given primary
consideration, since it is seen as the link between the economic
substructure and the political, cultural and ideological superstruc-
ture of society. The economic base is regarded as consisting
largely of giant corporations which act as engines for the accumu-
lation of capital and the maximisation of profits. Such is their
monopoly position that corporations, by controlling price and cost
policies, creat a tendency for the amount of surplus to rise. This
surplus is seen as being consumed, wasted or invested in an effort
to ensure that it is absorbed by the capitalist system without being
distributed among the populace. Thus imperialism, militarism,
the sales effort, government spending and research and develop-
ment are all seen as ways of consuming the surplus and postponing
the inevitable crisis of overproduction. Baran and Sweezy then go
on to ask how this consumption of surplus has affected the quality
of life within a monopoly capitalist society. Using measures of
divorce rates, housing conditions,juvenile delinquency and so on,
they conclude that it represents an 'irrational system'. Monopoly
capitalism is seen as irrational, because it has at its heart a funda-
mental contradiction; whilst the actual processes of production are
becoming more thoroughly rationalised, more controlled and bet-
ter understood, the system as a whole retains an undiminished
elementality - that is, men may seek to understand it but, like the
wind or tides, it remains beyond their control. Baran and Sweezy,
in essence, argue that the deep structures of monopoly capitalism
are not amenable to empirical knowledge if one uses an 'ideology'
of bourgeois economics. They argue that only with a 'scientific'
recognition that it is these economic structures and their interrela-
tionships which are the key to social injustice, and that no altera-
tions to their superstructural manifestation can fundamentally
affect them, will social revolution be possible in America. • Baran
and Sweezy argue that the crisis produced by the profound
economic contradictions inherent in monopoly capital have
already produced, and will continue to produce, revolutionary
 Radical Organisation Theory 379
wars which have as their goal decolonisation from 'this intolerable
social order'.
We have here an analysis which draws upon the tradition of
Marxist political economy in order to arrive at an understanding of
the essential structure of capitalist society. The monopolist
corporation is given central attention, and the authors demonstrate
that in terms of wealth and control of economic resources, it is
often more powerful than the state within which it is located. Baran
and Sweezy have stimulated much interest in the analysis of
multi-national corporations, and it is at this level that their work is
perhaps of most relevance to the development of a radical organ-
isation theory. Their use of the concept of economic surplus as a
basic analytical tool presents organisations in a light which is quite
different from that which arises from the notion of the purposive,
goal-orientated rationality which dominates functionalist organ-
isation theory. From Baran and Sweezy's standpoint the signifi-
cance of the monopolistic corporation is ultimately related to the
position which it occupies within the fundamental economic base
of society; its activities - research and development, production,
marketing, etc. - are to be understood in terms of the role which
they play in the generation and use of the economic surplus
necessary to sustain the structure of the capitalist system. Baran
and Sweezy demonstrate the relevance of the concept of surplus to
an analysis of organisations. It provides an important concept
linking organisations to the totality and offers the radical organisa-
tion theorist a powerful tool with which to forge a view of organisa-
tions in fundamental opposition to that evident in the functionalist
perspective.
The relevance of Baran and Sweezy's perspective for the study
of organisations has been taken up by Harry Braverman in a book
entitled Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974). In essence Brav-
erman attempts to 'fill in the gaps' left by Monopoly Capital by
applying Baran and Sweezy's approach to a study of the labour
process, and, in particular, he is concerned with the de-skilling of
work, which he sees as an integral part of organisational reality in
the Western world. The book presents a study of the development
of the capitalist mode of production during the past hundred years
or so, and uses as its starting point the first volume of Marx's
Capital, the obvious core of any Marxist analysis of the labour
process. Braverman rejects any assertion that Marx was a
'technological determinist' and points out that, for Marx, it was
technology itself which was determined by the social form in which
it was placed. Thus Braverman focuses upon the labour process as
380 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
it reflects the relations of production in terms of the class system;
he is interested not so much in 'consciousness' or working-class
activities as in how the labour process is dominated and shaped by
the accumulation of capital. Following an historical analysis of the
development of both labour and management, Braverman turns to
a consideration of various schools of management theory and their
role as reflected in the development of the capitalist mode of
production.
First, he turns his attention to 'scientific management'. Taylor-
ism for him is not a 'science of work', nor is it the 'best way' to do
work 'in general'; it is, on the contrary, ·a science of the manage-
ment of others' work' and represents an answer to the problem of
how best to control 'alienated' labour. The followers of Mayo, in a
continuation of this line of argument, are presented as the 'main-
tenance crew' for the human machinery created by Taylor's
·scientific management'. Today Taylor's successors inhabit work
design and work study departments, while the Mayoites are to be
found upstairs in the personnel office. These tendencies, initiated
by Taylor, have ensured that ·as craft declined, the worker would
sink to the level of general and undifferentiated labour power,
adaptable to a large range of simple tasks, while as science grew, it
would be concentrated in the hands of management' (Braverman,
1974, p. 121). Braverman elaborates on these processes in some
detail, giving historical examples drawn from throughout the
capitalist world. He attaches particular importance to the
scientific-technical revolution and the development of machinery
which otTers to management the opportunity to do by wholly
mechanical means that which it had previously attempted to do by
organisational and disciplinary means. Machinery, then, can only
be seen as part ofthe control system of the organisation and hence
as a reflection of the capitalist mode of production. Under capital-
ism the socio-technical system, of whatever kind, represents for
Braverman a 'modern', 'scientific', 'dehumanised prison of labour'.
Having looked at what stands as contemporary management
theory in this highly critical way, Braverman addresses himself to
the question of the form which monopoly capitalism takes. Follow-
ing Baran and Sweezy, he maintains that monopoly capitalism
consists primarily of monopolistic organisations. However, for
him, these are more consumers of surplus labour than producers of
surplus value. The existence of the modern giant corporation is
seen as having three consequences of key importance for the
occupational structure of the advanced capitalist societies: 'the
first is to do with marketing, the second with the structure of
 Radical Organisation Theory 381
management and the third with the function of social co-ordination
now exercised by the Corporation' (Braverman, 1974, p. 26.5). All
of these are seen as ser\ling to consume surplus labour. Since the
market is the prime area of organisational uncertainty, marketing
is necessary in order to control this threat to profitability. Simi-
larly, the growth of an army of clerical workers aids the control and
administration of the corporation, while reducing the level of
surplus labour. Finally, and most important, the development of
the internal co-ordination of the organisation is seen as necessary
because of the lack of overall social co-ordination. The complexity
of the division of labour under capitalism is regarded as requiring
an immense amount of social control, which lies beyond the
capabilities of the public functions of the total society. The internal
planning of such corporations becomes, in effect, social planning
to fill in the existing large gaps in social control left by the State.
Despite these three primary ways of consuming surplus labour,
Braverman argues that all surplus labour cannot be absorbed by
capitalism, so that one inevitably finds, as Marx described, a
reserve army of the working class. It is among this reserve army
that poverty and degradation are at their highest levels. In addi-
tion, Braverman argues, even among the ranks of the employed,
poverty and degradation are essential features of labour under
monopoly capitalism.
Braverman's work can be regarded primarily as a critique of the
ways in which labour develops under monopoly capitalism. His
analysis, in effect, attempts to fill in the interstices of Baran and
Sweezy's work, and he accepts their basic theoretical position
almost without cavil. What is interesting for our present purposes
is the form taken by Braverman's attack upon many of the con-
temporary schools within management theory, an attack which is
predicated upon an analysis of advanced capitalism in terms of its
basic economic structure, using conceptualisations derived from
Marx's Capital. With the aid of detailed examples, Braverman
carefully links the developments of these schools with changes in
the societal means and relations of production. In essence, he
portrays management theory as a superstructural manifestation of
the workings of the economic base of capitalist societies. He
implies that ·as a branch of management science', it 'views all
things through the eyes of the bourgeoisie'. To Braverman, how-
ever, scientific management, human relations, the socio-technical
approach, the quality of working life debate and so on, all r~flect,
in their own ways, the development of the labour process within
monopoly capitalism. Moreover, they become an important
382 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
motive force in this process in their own right. 9 Thus, not only do
theories of organisation and management describe and legitimate
the labour process within advanced capitalism; through their
intervention, they actively and in a concrete way ensure its survi-
val and continued good health.
This is a view with a pedigree which has been. further described
and elaborated by V. L. Allen in his book Social Analysis: A
Marxist Critique and Alternative (197S). Allen begins by giving a
biographical account of his own intellectual development up to the
point where he could see nQ alternative to the complete rejection of
conventional sociological theory. This rejection is seen as the only
possible reaction to a sociology which assumes that social reality is
basically a 'static' phenomenon characterised by consensus, a
tendency to equilibrium and an organic unity. Allen argues that it is
in the attempts of sociological theorists to analyse organisations
that this •static' sociology is most readily visible. His first attack is
upon the "dogma of empiricism' which characterises much of
organisational analysis. The organisational empiricists are seen as
being anti-theory, in that they rely almost exclusively upon a
number of seemingly disparate, data-packed, problem-centred
studies, which seek description rather than causal analysis. If this
trend continues, Allen maintains, the studies of the empiricists will
end up as wholly irrelevant exercises in mathematical methods.
Allen's second target is the theoreticians who have addressed
themselves to the study of organisations. His criticism here is that
they employ static models which view organisations primarily as
self-equilibrating mechanisms. Theories of classical management,
human relations, Weber, March and Simon (1958), and Etzioni
(1961), are all found wanting in this respect, though Allen recog-
nises that some attempt has been made by the latter to modify
equilibrium analysis by introducing some consideration of 'move-
ment' and conflict.
In opposition to these views, Allen offers a 'dynamic' sociology
which is directly concerned with ·movement' and underpinned by
the assumptions and methodology of dialectical materialism. Such
a sociology, he suggests, would concern itself with the ongoing
dynamic processes which affect social situations and would em-
ploy dialectical materialism in the analysis of their causes. A socio-
logy of movement implies that organisations are causally related to
their past states as well as to the hidden and observable features of
their environments, with which there is a perpetual process of
interaction and absorption. In line with such a view, Allen suggests
that we should be concerned with the following questions:
 Radical Organisation Theory 383
First, what properties do organisations have in common with their
environments? Second, in what way are organisations distinguished
from both their environments in general and other arrangements of
social relationships in particular? Third, what is the meaning of organ-
isational autonomy in this context? And, lastly, what is the source of
movement in organisations and the mechanism through which it
passes? (Allen, 1975, p. 184)
Allen suggests that the answers to these questions present a
theoretical perspective and approach to the study of organisations
which is both distinct from, and preferable to, that presented by
more statically orientated systems analysis.
Allen maintains that his perspective does not seek to provide a
middle-range theory of organisations, but rather a dynamic gen-
eral theory capable of analysing middle-range situations. In this
task he uses as a building block the concept of structure. He asserts
that economic factors are the 'primary' determinants of social
behaviour but non-economic factors have a degree of ank>nomy.
After giving some consideration to recent writings on structural-
ism, particularly those of Piaget, Boudon and the Marxist struc-
turalists, he concludes that ·every situation possesses a structure
and superstructure', the former ultimately determining the latter in
an historical context. Allen then proceeds to equate the notions of
structure and superstructure with the respective notions of
·environmental variables' and organisation, in a way which is
arguably the source of much confusion. 10
In considering the components of the superstructure, Allen
posits that analytically it consists of three elements: skills, power
and ideology (Allen, 1975, pp. 213-47). Organisational environ-
ments are seen as consisting of these same elements, which are
entangled empirically but occupy distinct 'causal positions'. He
later examines trade unions as organisations in terms of their
interface and interrelationships with these three elements, particu-
larly the dominant ideology of capitalist society.
In his final chapter Allen moves towards a form of dialectical
materialism, treating the concept of dialectic as representative of a
'process between variables in real social situations', in which the
totality is crucial. For Allen, the totality of capitalism is shot
through with contradictions, some of which are 'primary', some
'internal' and some 'secondary'. Business organisations, for
example, ar~ seen as subject to crises of overproduction, which are
a superstructural manifestation of the prime contradiction within
the capitalist mode of production - the fact that production capac-
ity often exceeds the proletariat's capacity for consumption
384 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
because of its condition of poverty. The effect of the surfacing of a
primary contradiction within the superstructure, says Allen, is
akin to that of a pebble dropped into a pond. Waves of movement
spread out from the source, producing a variety of effects within
the totality. For Allen, the extent of a totality can be gauged by the
spread of the repercussions (Allen, 1975, pp. 268-71). It is this
form of analysis which Allen views as offering the potential for his
·dynamic' approach to social analysis. It is a perspective which
emphasises the importance of looking at actual empirical situa-
tions, identifying structures and superstructures, and identifying
the contradictions and their repercussions. Allen sees it as an
approach which throws light on the process of change, 'but with-
out ever allowing the process to be timed, the climax to be antici-
pated, and its parts named' (Allen, 1975, p. 292).
In this way Allen seeks to develop the rudiments of a radical
organisation theory based upon a Marxian structuralist analysis.
However, much of Allen's discussion is cast in a reactive mould,
and great emphasis is placed upon providing a critique of func-
tionalist theory. In certain respects Allen can be regarded as hav-
ing been trapped by this preoccupation with functionalism, to the
extent that he seeks to incorporate the-distinction between organ-
isation and environment in a way which is arguably counter-
productive with respect to the development of a fully developed
and self-sustaining Marxist theory of organisations. Despite these
limitations, however, Allen's work stands as one of the most
significant and systematic attempts at the construction of a radical
organisation theory.
Allen's concerns have a relatively well developed pedigree as
far as the literature on industrial relations is concerned. Allen has
long been an advocate of a ·radical' or Marxist view of industrial
relations in opposition to the functionalist perspective which
dominates this area of study. Other writers, such as Goldthorpe
(1974), Hyman (1975), Hyman and Fryer (1975), Hyman and
Brough (1975) and Wood (1976), have also been concerned to
provide a Marxist critique of functionalist industrial relations
theory, in terms which stress the importance of developing a
theory of the totality of capitalism before one can begin to under-
stand contemporary industrial relations. In varying degrees these
writers address themselves to the political economy of capitalism,
directing attention to inequalities inside and outside the work
place,the problems of trade union organisation within such a mode
of production and the possibilities for sweeping social change. As
yet, however, these authors, collectively and individually, have
 Radical rJrganisation Theory 385
not yet produced a well developed radical industrial relations
theory which stands on its own. For the most part they have
contented themselves with providing a critique of the functionalist
orthodoxy and consequently have been locked into a reactive
stance.

Towards the Further Development of Radical

Organisation Theory
Our review ofliterature in the two previous sections of this chapter
has suggested that it is possible at the present time to identify two
relatively distinct approaches to the study of organisations from
within the radical structuralist paradigm. The radical Weberian
and Marxian structuralist perspectives tend to draw upon rela-
tively distinct intellectual traditions and focus upon different areas
of interest. In defining the relationship between. these two
approaches it is convenient to recognise at least five points of
difference, as illustrated in Table 11.2.1n the rest of the chapter we
seek to discuss the significance of these differences, as a means of
clarifying the foundations upon which further developments in
radical organisation theory might be based.

Table 11.2
Some differences in emphasis between Marxian structuralist and
radical Weberian approaches to radical organisation theory

The Marxian structuralist approaches The radical Weberian approaches

to a radical organisation theory tend to a radical organisation theory tend
to stress: to stress:

I. Political economy I. Political science

2. Economic structures 2. Political administrative structures
3. Monopoly capitalism 3. Corporatism
4. Contradiction 4. Power
S. The catastrophe analogy S. The factional analogy

The Marxian structuralist approaches to a radical organisation

theory, in looking to the work of the mature Marx as a source of
inspiration, found their analytical framework upon the tenets of
Marxian political economy. They focus upon the economic sub-
386 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
structure of society as the centrepiece of analysis, particularly as it
is reflected in the structure of monopoly capitalism. The notion of
contradiction is emphasised as providing the principal means of
explaining the process of ongoing structural change, generating
periodic crises which will eventually lead to the complete trans-
formation of the totality of capitalism. Insofar as an emphasis is
placed upon crisis and social change upon a macro-scale, these
theorists implicitly draw upon the catastrophe analogy as a means
of modelling the socio-economic system, though the use of the
factional analogy is often consistent with this point of view.
The radical Weberian approaches to a radical organisation
theory, in looking to Weber as the primary source of inspiration,
base their analytical framework upon conceptualisations drawn
from political science. They tend to focus upon political and
administrative structures rather than the economic substructures
of society, and are principally concerned with ·corporatism' as
opposed to monopoly capitalism. They address themselves par-
ticularly to the structure and development of the State apparatus
within the power structure of society as a whole, and to the way in
which the 'means of administration' come to fall under the control
of fewer and fewer hands. Specific attention is devoted not so
much to the direct analysis of contradictions as to the analysis of
power relationships within the superstructure of society. Conse-
quently, the factional as opposed to the catastrophic analogy is
favoured as a basis for analysing basic social processes. Society is
generally seen as dichotomised in terms ofthe factional interests of
a relatively cohesive dominant class which controls the basic
operation of society on the one hand, and the groups which tend to
be subject to that control on the other; society is characterised by
conflicts of interest and power struggles, which provide the motor
force for major social change.
The Marxian structuralist and radical Weberian approaches to a
radical organisation theory stand at the present time as relatively
distinct approaches sharing a commitment to the meta-theoretical
assumptions which characterise the radical structuralist paradigm.
Whether they will follow separate lines of development in the
future remains to be seen. They doubtless contribute their own
special brand of insight to an understanding of organisations within
contemporary society, though, as we argue below, it also seems
that some measure of synthesis is possible. Insofar as they develop
along separate lines, they may be expected to adopt the key con-
ceptualisations and modes of analysis characteristic of the respec-
tive schools of thought from which they derive. as discussed in
 Radical Organisation Theory 387
Chapter 10. A great number of issues relevant to the development
of Marxian structuralist and radical Weberian approaches to a
radical organisation theory have already been thoroughly
explored, and there is scope for adapting and welding them to a
specific concern for the study of organisations.
As far as Marxian radical organisation theory is concerned, the
field is wide open. since Marx himself did not specifically address
the problem of organisations. and Marxist theorists up to now have
largely disregarded this middle-range level of analysis.' 1 Yet it
would seem that a theory of organisations built around the notion
of contradiction and specifically modelled upon some variation of
the factional or catastrophic systems models would have a great
deal to contribute to an understanding of the processes of organis-
ational change, and to its significance within the context of the
totality which characterises the contemporary social formation of
advanced capitalism. Such a perspective would carry Gouldner's
( 1959) analysis of the notion of •functional autonomy' to illi logical
conclusion, with a focus upon the contradictory relationships
which exist within organisational contexts. It could also usefully
draw upon work outside the Marxist tradition which has interested
itself in the catastrophic or schismatic tendencies of various types
of system. Rene Thorn's recent work on catastrophe theory in the
context of mathematical modelling, for example, may have much
to contribute in terms of insight, if not formal technique (Thorn,
1975). 12 Within the field of anthropology the outstanding work of
Gregory Bateson (1973) and Marshall Sahlins (1974) constitute
other sources of inspiration and analytical method. Bateson's
notion of 'schismogenesis'. and the analyses of both these theorists
of the factional tendencies which exist within primitive societies,
open the way to similar forms of analysis of the social formations
within the considerably more complex structure of contemporary
society.
As far as a radical Weberian organisation theory is concerned, it
would seem that there is much scope for the development of
models based upon the factional analogy. with a key focus upon
the nature of power relationships within the structure of society as
a whole. As will be evident from our discussion of the work of
theorists already located in this tradition, the view of power which
emerges stands in stark contrast to the unitary and pluralist per-
spectives characteristic of the functionalist paradigm. Indeed, the
radical Weberian approach to the study of societies diverges from
the unitary and pluralist views in terms of its assumptions with
regard to interests, conflict and power, and the key features of this
388 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
essentially "radical' view can usefully be counterposed with those
presented in Table S.l in the following terms:

Table 11.3
The radical Weberian view of interests, conflict and power

The radical view:

lru,e:st:s Places emphasis upon the dichotomous nature and
mutual opposition of interests in terms of broad socio-
economic divisions of the 'class' type within social
formations as a whole. which are also reflected in
organisations in the middle range of analysis.

Conflict Regards conflict as an ubiquitous and disruptive motor

force propelling changes in society in general and
organisations in particular. It is recognised that conflict
may be a suppressed feature of a social systein, not
always evident at the level of empirical 'reality'.

Power Regards power as an integral. unequally distributed.

zero-sum phenomenon, associated with a general pro-
cess of social control. Society in general and organisa-
tions in particular are seen as being under the control of
ruling interest groups which uercise their power
through various forms of ideological manipulation. as
well as the more visible forms of authority relations.

The radical Weberian approach to a radical organisation theory

thus otTers a mode of analysis which, in focusing upon the totality
of contemporary social formations, allows one to transcend the
insights which emerge from an exclusive pre-occupation with the
middle-range level ofanalysis characteristic of functionalist organ-
isation theory. It is a perspective which emphasises the integral
rather than the intercursive nature of power, interests and conflict
within the context of society as a whole. Whether the radical
Weberian view of power which, as suggested in the previous
chapter, is largely confined to the superstructural aspects of cap-
italism, is adequate as an all-embracing perspective is open to
question. It begs many questions in relation to the role and relative
importance of the economic substructure and superstructure of
society. It is important to emphasise the deep structural elements
in the analysis of social power(what Lukes (1974) has described as
 Radical Organisation Theory 389
the •third dimension'). in addition to the view of power which
emerges from the analysis of superstructural factors on their own
account. The radical Weberian view clearly has a special contribu-
tion to make towards a radical organisation theory which attempts
to locate and evaluate the significance of organisations, both
public and private. within the context of the power structure of
contemporary society as a whole.
The question of the relationship between substructural and
superstructural factors within contemporary society conveniently
leads to the issue of whether or not radical organisation theory
might also develop through a further synthesis of the Marxian
structuralist and radieal Weberian perspectives. As we concluded
in our discussion of conflict theory in Chapter 10, such a develop-
ment seems quite a logical and attractive one, since the radical
Weberians and Marxian structuralists tend to approach the study
of social formations from different perspectives, which lead to the
use of different analytical constructs with emphasis upon differ-
ent elements of the total social formation. As we have suggested,
each ofthese three factors can be regarded as being in a dialectical
relationship both internally and in relation to one another. The
respective concerns for social integration and system disintegra-
tion, power and contradiction, superstructure and substructure,
presuppose an attitude to, and a definition of, the others. Radical
organisation theorists might thus usefully focus upon organisa-
tions as elements within a totality which express a certain relation-
ship between power and contradiction, and between substructural
and superstructural factors, and which throw light upon the bal-
ance between social integration and system disintegration within
the totality as a whole.
A systematically developed radical organisation theory charac-
teristic of the radical structuralist paradigm, which follows any of
the three lines presented above, is likely to offer many new insights
with regard to our understanding of organisations in society. It is
likely that it will offer new perspectives on processes of organisa-
tional control; the dynamics of organisational change; the relation-
ship between substructural and superstructural elements of organ-
isation; new typologies for understanding the role and significance
of different organisations within the wider social formation; and
other insights which emerge from the radical structuralist perspec-
tive as a whole. All three lines of development will seek to build
upon the core concepts of totality, structure, contradiction, power
and crisis, and will recognise that a theory of organisations con-
sonant with radical structuralism would involve not so much the
390 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
development of a radical theory of organisations as such, as a
radical theory of society in which organisations are accorded a
central role.

Notes and References

1. These quotes from M. Nicholaus are quoted in Horowitz
( 1971). They appear in a paper advocating a radical sociology
but would also seem germane to a radical organisation
theory.
2. For a discussion of this, see Willener (1971).
3. For a discussion of corporatism, see Pahl and Winkler( 1974),
Winkler (1975 and 1976).
4. The substance of Poulantzas' criticism is that (I) Miliband
accepts the 'bourgeois problematic' and confrolfts their
analysis at the level of concrete empirical reality (that is, he
adopts an empiricist approach, according to Althusser's
definition of that term); (2) his analysis is couched in inter-
personal 'subjective' terms and not in terms of structures
(that is, Miliband seeks explanation at the level of meaning as
well as that of cause); (3) Miliband does not provide a politi-
cal alternative; he is 'too discrete'. This form of criticism is
precisely what one would expect, given the different assump-
tions and paradigmatic location of Althusserian sociology
and conflict theory, as discussed in the previous chapter.
See, however, Miliband's reply to this critique; both are
reprinted in Urry and Wakeford (1973), pp. 291-314.
5. The book is published in a series of textbooks which stress
exposition rather than the advocacy of a particular tradition.
The radical Weberianism within the book is thus buried
beneath the exposition of a variety of different perspectives.
The three parts which we identify here are not specifically
recognised in the text. The first part consists of pp. 1-124;
the second, pp. 125-49, the third, pp. 150-204.
6. This conflation of two distinct meanings of 'organisation'
follows from their definition of the term derived from Weber.
They expand on this point as follows:
We note in anticipation that the concept of organisation is cer-
tainly not a synonym for bureaucracy. Whereas we have seen
that Caplow, Parsons and Etzioni define organisation as a kind of
 Radical Organisation Theory 391
social system and Maciver and Page as a kind of social group, for
Weber it is treated as a kind of social relationship. This is the
term employed to denote the existence of a probability that
between two or more persons there is a meaningful course of
social action. By pointing to the significance of an individual's
social behaviour, Weber is wanting to avoid the reification of a
collective concept like organisation, state, church and so on.
(Eldridge and Crombie, 1974, p. 27)
7. Eldridge and Crombie's notion of the 'organisational
phenomenon' only serves to mask two distinctive problema-
tics. The first focuses upon organisations as middle-range,
empirical facticities, which are seen as networks of social
relationships forming, through their interdependencies, con-
crete structures. The second problematic lies not with organ-
isations but with principles of organisation. Thus Sper,cer
asked what rules or types of organising principle under-
pinned a whole range of social formations from the mi_litary to
the industrial. Marx, on the other hand, was concerned to ask
what forms of organising principle the proletariat should
adopt in its revolutionary struggle.
Clearly, these two problematics may have in common the
term 'organisation' but little else. Whilst it would be myopic
to assert that these two aspects were completely independent
(particularly when one looks at bureaucracy both as a mode
of organisation and as a concrete structural form), they are
not the same by any means. Any theoretical perspective
which takes 'organisation' to mean only a principle of interre-
latedness and ignores organisations in their empirical concre-
teness cannot claim, with any justification, to be an organisa-
tion theory true to the traditional concerns for 'real'
structures which are at the core of radical structuralism.
Looking further afield, John Eldridge's radical Weberianism
is more evident in some of his other work. See, for example,
his 'Industrial Relations and Industrial Capitalism' in Esland
eta/. (1975) pp. 306-24, 'Industrial Conflict: Some Problems
of Theory and Method' in Child (1973) and 'Sociological
Imagination and Industrial Life' in Warner (1973). In all of
these, the last few pages are particularly important for their
radical Weberian flavour.
8. Baran and Sweezy elaborate on their notion of 'scientific
understanding' in the following terms:
Scientific understanding proceeds by way of constructing and
analysing ·models' of the segments or aspects of reality under
392 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
study. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image
of reality, nor to include all its elements in their exact sizes and
proportions, but rather to single out and make available for
intensive investigation those elements which are decisive. We
abstract from non-essentials, we blot out the unimportant, we
magnify in order to improve the range and accuracy of our
observation. A model is, and must be, unrealistic in the sense in
which the word is most commonly used. Nevertheless, and in a
sense paradoxically, if it is a good model it provides the key to
understanding reality. (Baran and Sweezy, 1968, p. 27)

This approach has much in common with the perspective

advocated by Althusser. However, their approach has been
subjected to criticism. Gamble and Walton ( 1976), for exam-
ple, have suggested that in focusing primarily upon the change
in markets of monopoly capitalism, 'Baran and Sweezy focus
attention on the level of appearances only', and therefore,
by implication, ignore 'the real laws of motion of capitalism'
rooted in production (1976, p. 108). Gamble and Walton also
debate Baran and Sweezy's analysis of the rise in 'surplus'
(1976, pp. 108-10). On a separate point, it is interesting to
note that Baran and Sweezy spend some time discussing the
role of the State, but in classic Marxist fashion they see it as
but a superstructural feature of monopoly capitalism.
9. For example, it seems that, for Braverman, Taylorism
represents the 'bringing to life', the concretisation of Marx's
concept of abstract labour. Taylorism, in this way, becomes
simultaneously an inevitable part of capitalism's develop-
ment and a stimulus to it (Braverman, 1974, pp. 181, 315).
10. For example, it is possible to consider certain types of organ-
isation as being located within the substructure as opposed to
the superstructure of society. Allen appears to wish to retain
the distinction between organisation and environment within
the context of a Marxist analysis, though at the cost of a
significant degree of theoretical clarity and consistency, as
far as Marxist analysis is concerned.
II. Marx did not address himself to the study of organisations
because, apart from the State, large-scale organisations
comprised but a small element of the social formation of his
day. Marxist analysts since then have expressed more inter-
est in modes of organisation than in organisations as middle-
range phenomena.
12. For a very useful and readable discussion of catastrophe
theory, see Zeeman (1976).
Par t III
Conclusions
12. Future Directions: Theory
and Research

In the previous chapters we have sought to provide an overview of

our four paradigms in relation to the literature on social theory and
the study of organisations. Each of the paradigms draws upon a
long, complex and conceptually rich intellectual tradition, which
generates its own particular brand of insight. Each of the para-
digms has been treated on its own terms. We have sought to
explore from within and to draw out the full implications of each
for the study of organisations. Using our analytical scheme, de-
structive critique would have been a simple task. By assuming a
posture in a rival paradigm, it would have been possible to demol-
ish the contribution of any individual text or theoretical perspec-
tive, by providing a comprehensive critique in terms ofits underly-
ing assumptions. Using the dimensions of our analytical scheme,
we could have attacked work located il\ any given paradigm from
each of the three other paradigms simply by locating ourselves in
turn within their respective problematics. We could then have
moved inside the given paradigm and provided a critique from
within, evaluating it in terms of the consistency of its assumptions
from the point of view of its own problematic. Many ofthe critical
treatises in our general area of study attempt to do precisely these
things. They evaluate in detail from within, or in terms of funda-
mentals from a given point outside which reflects their own para-
digmatic location. Whilst there may be much to recommend the
all-embracing style of critique which our analytical scheme
suggests, particularly where the intention is to investigate a single
work in depth, or in student essay writing, seminar sessions, and
academic papers, it has little to offer here. The task of academic
demolition is simply all too easy. We have consciously sought to
adopt a constructive stance, to build rather than to demolish. We
have sought to show what each of the paradigms has to offer, given
an opportunity to speak for itself.
Treatment of the paradigms in these terms emphasises both their
coherence and their distinctive natures. Viewing social theory and
396 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
the literature on organisational analysis from the perspective of the
functionalist paradigm, one has the impression that there is a
dominant orthodoxy which is surrounded by critical perspectives,
each of which seeks to adopt some form of 'radical' stance. Such a
view is unduly narrow; it assumes that the perspectives are
satellites which take their principal point of reference from the
orthodoxy itself. It assumes that their aim and function is critique
and the exposure of the limitations reflected in the orthodoxy.
They tend to be regarded as ·points of view', which need to be
considered and, if possible, rebuffed or incorporated within the
context of the dominant orthodoxy. Such a view favours fusion
and incorporation as the natural line of intellectual development.
We have illustrated, in relation to the historical development ofthe
functionalist paradigm, how various elements of idealism and
Marxist theory have been incorporated in this way. Whilst
strengthening the functionalist perspective, the fusion has not by
any means done full justice to the respective problematics from
which these elements derive. Indeed, it has been at the cost of their
complete emasculation and a misunderstanding of their very
nature.
Stepping outside the functionalist paradigm, we have had an
opportunity to become more aware of the nature of the broad
intellectual traditions at work. We have seen how at the level of
social theory each of the paradigms, drawing upon a separate
intellectual source, is in essence distinct, internally coherent and
self-sustaining. At the level of organisation studies this distinc-
tiveness tends to be less clear-cut, partly because theorists operat-
ing here have adopted a reactive stance with regard to the func-
tionalist orthodoxy. Whilst deriving inspiration from alternative
problematics, they have often been drawn into critique on the
functionalists' ground, thus giving an impression of their satellite-
like status. Our analysis of these approaches to the study of organ-
isations has indicated that, in essence, they are linked with a
completely different intellectual tradition. As we have argued,
they seek to move towards alternative theories of organisations.
Consequently, they should be seen as embryonic rather than
fully-fledged theoretical perspectives. They represent partial and
sometimes confused attempts to grasp an alternative point of view.
Their reactive stance has often prevented them from realising the
full potential which their paradigmatic location offers.
In our analysis of these theories of organisation outside the
functionalist paradigm we have consciously and systematically
attempted to relate them to their wider problematic. In so doing it
 Future Directions: Theory and Research 397
has been possible to anticipate certain lines of development. The
paradigm in which they are located defines the nature of the issues
in which they are interested and the lines of enquiry which they
may fruitfully pursue. We have been able to suggest, for example,
that the radical humanist paradigm offers a nascent anti-
organisation theory and to sketch out the form it might be expected
to take. We have shown that the radical structuralist paradigm
generates at least two strains of a radical organisation theory and,
again, have attempted to identify some of the key issues relevant to
future developments in this area. Our analysis of the interpretive
paradigm has confronted the basic ontological problems which
organisations as phenomena present. We have sought to show that
from certain perspectives within this paradigm organisations are
not permitted an existence on their own account, and that no
theory of organisations as such is possible. From another stand-
point within the interpretive paradigm we have sought to show that
there is room for theorising and research in relation to the concept
of organisation and the part it plays in the accounting practices
within the context of everyday life.
Looking to the future from locations outside the functionalist
paradigm, therefore, at least three broad lines of development
offer themselves for exploration. The radical humanist, the radical
structuralist and the interpretive paradigms all offer themselves
virtually as virgin territory insofar as studies of organisations are
concerned. Whilst each already contains an element of creative
and insightful work in this area, the work is very fragmentary and
not altogether coherent. Accordingly, it does not provide the ideal
starting point nor offer an altogether firm foundation for subsequent
work. Theorists who wish to develop ideas in these areas cannot
afford to take a short cut. There is a real need for them to ground
their perspective in the philosophical traditions from which it
derives; to start from first principles; to have the philosophical and
sociological concerns by which the paradigm is defined at the
forefront of their analysis; to develop a systematic and coherent
perspective within the guidelines which each paradigm offers,
rather than taking the tenets of a competing paradigm as critical
points of reference. Each paradigm needs to be developed in its
own terms.
In essence, what we are advocating in relation to developments
within these paradigms amounts to a form of isolationism. We
firmly believe that each of the paradigms can only establish itself at
the level of organisational analysis if it is true to itself. Contrary to
the widely held belief that synthesis and mediation between para-
398 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
digms is what is required, we argue that the real need is for
paradigmatic closure. In order to avoid emasculation and incorpo-
ration within the functionalist problematic, the paradigms need to
provide a basis for their self-preservation by developing on their
own account. Insofar as they take functionalism as their reference
point, it is unlikely that they will develop far beyond their present
embryonic state - they will not develop coherent alternatives to
the functionalist point of view. This conclusion is firmly in line
with the perspective we have adopted throughout this work in sug-
gesting that the paradigms reflect four alternative realities. They
stand as four mutually exclusive ways of seeing the world. One of
the major conclusions prompted by our journey through the realms
of social theory, therefore, is that organisation theorists face a wide
range of choices with regard to the nature of the assumptions which
underwrite their point of view. For those who wish to leave the
functionalist onhodoxy behind, many avenues offer themselves
for exploration.
For those who feel inclined to remain within the functionalist
paradigm, our analysis raises a number of imponant issues. The
first of these relates to the ontological status of their subject of
investigation, and the second, to the nature of the models which
are used as bases of analysis. These two issues derive directly from
the nature of the two dimensions which we have used to define our
analytical scheme.
The ontological status of organisations is a question wonhy of
investigation. Organisation theorists frequently treat the existence
of organisations in a hard, concrete sense as taken for granted.
They assume there are real phenomena which can be measured
through the nomothetic methods which dominate empirical
research in this area. From their point of view, our journey into
phenomenology and solipsism may seen;t a journey into the absurd
and extreme. However, having made that journey, the position
adopted by highly objectivist social scientists appears equally
absurd and extreme. The notion that one can measure an organisa-
tion as an empirical facticity is as extreme as the notion that
organisations do not exist. It is awareness of these extremes that
underwrites the imponance of examining the ontological status of
our subject of study. Many intermediate perspectives offer them-
selves for consideration. As our discussion of the action frame of
reference has demonstrated, there is room for a questioning of
assumptions with regard to ontology within the bounds of the
functionalist paradigm.
The implications of this issue can perhaps be most forcefully
 Future Directions: Theory and Research 399
expressed by suggesting that there is a need for organisation theor-
ists to adopt methods of study which are true to the nature of the
phenomena which they are attempting to investigate. Our review
of the dominant orthodoxy within organisation theory has shown
that a large proportion of empirical research is based upon highly
objectivist assumptions. The tendency in much empirical research
has been for methodologies to dominate other assumptions in
relation to the ontological, epistemological and human nature
strands of our analytical scheme. The wholesale incorporation of
methods and techniques taken directly from the natural sciences
needs to be severely questioned. The problem of developing
methods appropriate to the nature of the phenomena to be studied
remains one of the most pressing issues within the whole realm of
social science research.
Putting aside the problems of ontology. methodology and other
issues related to social science debate, what model of society
should organisation theorists use to underwrite their analysis? As
we have argued, this is the second crucial issue facing theorists
who wish to understand the nature of the social world. In the past
organisation theorists have almost automatically based their work
upon analogies which treat organisations either as mechanical or
as organismic systems. Since the emergence of open systems
theory as the dominant framework for organisational analysis, the
choice of an organismic analogy has been almost automatic. As we
have sought to show, the choice of this model is often implicit
rather than explicit, since organisation theorists. like many other
social scientists, have mistakenly equated open systems theory
with the use of the organismic analogy. Whilst the organismic
analogy provides an illustration of an open system, the two are by
no means synonymous. Our discussion in Chapter 4, for example,
identified three other types of open systems models - the
morphogenic, the factional and the catastrophic. These three
models reflect quite different assumptions about the nature of the
social world. The morphogenic model emphasises •structure elab-
oration' as a basic feature of social process. The factional model
emphasises that system parts strive for autonomy rather than
functional unity, and that the system has a tendency to split up and
divide. The catastrophic model emphasises the possibility of small
incremental changes in system inputs, leading to dramatic changes
in the state of the system as a whole. In extreme cases the change
produced replaces one state of affairs with a completely new one.
The choice facing the organisation theorist and other social sci-
entists lies essentially in the question of which of these models
400 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
seem to present the most 'accurate' view of the social reality which
he is attempting to study. Do groups and organisations have a set of
needs and a functional unity binding constituent parts together in
the interests of survival, as the organismic analogy would have us
believe? Do groups and organisations have an inherent tendency to
split up and divide as constituent parties attempt to preserve their
autonomy, as the factional analogy would have us believe? The
former places emphasis upon system integration as a key group
and organisational attribute. The latter places emphasis upon
system division as a key characteristic; it emphasises decentralisa-
tion and dispersion as opposed to centralisation and unity. Clearly,
the simple polarisation of just these two models underlies the range
and importance of the choices open to the social scientist in his
decision concerning the analytical tools which he is to employ in
his studies. The upshot of our argument is that social scientists
need to be more conscious of the problem ofbeing 'true'- even in
their own terms - to the very nature of the phenomena under
investigation.
The question relating to choice of analogy brings us back to the
issue of paradigms. As we have argued in earlier chapters, the
factional and catastrophic models emphasise and reflect an under-
lying view of society characteristic of the radical structuralist as
opposed to the functionalist paradigm. Whilst functionalists may
be able to incorporate and use these models within the framework
of their analysis, taken to their logical conclusion the two models
belong to a quite different reality. They stress how social forma-
tions have inbuilt tendencies towards radical change rather than
the maintenance of a regulated order. Social analyses which
attempt to be true to this perspective as a guiding principle find
themselves confronted by the analysis of totalities in these terms.
They are thus deflected from the problematic of organisations and
groups towards an understanding of the organising principles
which underlie the totality within which these organisations and
groups may be located. The analysis of particular elements of
society, in terms of their particular factional or catastrophic tenden-
cies, is replaced by a concern for the study of these tendencies
within the whole social formation, the basic characteristics of
which elements such as organisations and groups merely reflect.ln
the hands of the radical structuralist, the use of factional and
catastrophic analogies is located within quite a different analytical
enterprise.
Our attempt to explore social theory in terms offour paradigms
and their constituent schools of thought raises at least one further
 Future Directions: Theory and Research 401
issue of some importance which we wish to address here. This
concerns the question of the level ofanalysis adopted for the study
of organisations. For the most part this is a concern of relevance to
the functionalist paradigm, where the work of psychologists,
organisation theorists, sociologists and industrial relations theor-
ists are all offered as different ways of studying the same organisa-
tional reality. The differences between their respective
approaches produces an impression of a wide range and diversity
of point of view. It is our contention that this diversity is more
apparent than real, since the different theorists often adopt identi-
cal postures in relation to their view of the social world. Not only
are they usually located within the same paradigm, but they
occupy similar perspectives within it. The emphasis upon the
differences between theories relating to the individual, the group,
the organisation and society has tended to mask much more impor-
tant points of commonality. Multi-disciplinary teams, therefore,
do not always give an all-round view, as is sometimes thought.
Theories which seek to incorporate different levels of analysis do
not always give the all-round view which is sometimes sought.
They may merely serve to strengthen and reinforce an approach
which is, in essence, very narrowly founded. This is an issue which
has considerable relevance for the organisation of research
activities within social science as a whole. Multi-disciplinary
research teams, panels of advisers, grant-awarding bodies and
university departments are growing in both numbers and impor-
tance, a development which is helping to broaden what are seen as
the limited perspectives which have characterised the past. The
nature of our four paradigms, however, clearly illustrates that the
problem of obtaining an all-round perspective is much more far-
reaching than this.
The path to the future is wide open. It is clear that the choices
available to organisational analysts are extremely wide. Our jour-
ney through social theory has given a glimpse of its complexity and
diversity, and has revealed the relatively narrow piece of ground
which organisation theorists, along with many other groups of
social scientists, have thus far tilled. It has become clear that the
foundations of the subject are extremely narrow, and that for the
most part organisation theorists are not always entirely aware of
the traditions to which they belong. The subject is frequently
viewed as having a short history. This appears to be a mistaken
view. The ideas which it has utilised can be traced back to the
broader intellectual traditions which have underwritten social sci-
ence in the widest of terms. It is time that organisation theory
402 Stldologit:lll Pt~..l'tfdigms •nd CHg•nisa.tiomll Analy•is
became fully aware of its pedigree. It is time for it to lhi;nk more
consciously about the social phil·osophy upon which it is based. In
short, it is time that it became more fuUy aware ofits relation.ship to
the 'big issues'. Onl.y by grounding itself firmly in. a knowlalae of
its p.ast and of the alternative avenues for development can it
realise its fuD pot.ential in the years ahead.
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 Sub ject Inde x

KCGUntina practices, 247-8, 250, 260, classical management theory, 123,

269 126-30, 142, 165, 166
action frame « reference, 8, 11, 122, communicative distonion, 269, 295,
296, 321, 323
137. 195-202, 209-10, 218, 353
Adnrillistrariv~ Sci~nc~ Qututerly, 162, conflict, 13, 72, 95, 203, 204, 205, D,
163 280,326
atienation ,32,270,2 82,286,29 8,307, conflict theory, 34, 334, 349-57, 370,
311,312,323,324,329,~7.348, 389
349 conflict functionalism, 93-9,202, 213
in Simmel, 72 conaruency between strands on objec-
as bad faith, 304-5 tive-subjc ctivt dimension, 8, 103,
«
as fetishism commodities, 329 246
between orpnisatio nal subsystems,
as one-dimensionality, 292, 293-4,
317, 332 176-9
transc::ended by identic:al subject-o b- consciousness, 279-81;28 5, 286, 291,
ject, 286, 287 292, 294, 291,307, 310, 311, 337,
alternative realities, 312-9 358
anarchism, 301, 339 class, 284, 286, 288
anarchistic communism, 301, 333, false, 32
334,338-4 1 patholoty fA, 306
anarchist ic individua lism, 283, continaency theory, 126, 164-81, 182
299-302 .contradictions, 34, 98, 307, 328-9, 344,
anonde,4 5,91,92, 139 346, 347, 3SS, 356, 357, 358, 368,
anti-orpn isation theory, 33, 31G-25 377. 383, 386
anti-positivism, 5, 28, 32, 200,228, 253, conviviality, 314, 318283-99, 310, 312,
291, 318, 320 critic:al theory, 282,
Aston studies, 162-3, 166 316,320
Frankfurt School, 284, 290-99, 302,
behaviourism, 49, 73-4, 76, 80, 84, 341,346
102-4, lSI morganisations. 321-2
behavioural symbolic interac:tionism, culture, SO, 100,101,1 93,315,31 8,320
77,79,81 ,189-93,2 51 cybernetics, 100, 101
biolqpc:al anaiOIY (organismic anai-
QIY),42, 43,44,49 -S0,52-3 ,S6, determinism,6, 25, 34, 103,289,338,345
61,63,64 ,65,68,73 ,81, 100,140, dialectic,2 80, 287,336,3 43,346,34 9,
153, 154, 159, 164, 167. 184, 187. 357,383
220,355,3 99,400 dialcctic:al materialism, 94, 285, 330,
llureaucrac:y, 92-3, 162, 175, 315, 332. 383-4
dysfunctions, 98-9, 184, 186, 355
~tltism,286,287,327,330,332,337,
340, 341, 349-SO, 372, 373, 377, empiricism, 76, 90, 218, 345, 353, 365,
378, 380, 383, 386 374
crises fA, 326,337,3 44,359,36 8,369, abstracted ,49,S7,82 ,92,104-6 ,180,
378,383 190
carastrophic analoay, 66, 336-7. 387, empiric:al studies fA orpnisatio nal
399 characteristics, 126, 160-64
causal analysis, 44, 231, 337-8 environment, 156-60, 164-6, 168, 171,
Chic:ap socioiOI)', 77-8,82, 100, 190, 181, 336, 384
194-S cpistemoloay. llii, I, 5, 57, 71, 75, BS,
428 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
130, 164, 192, 227. 228, 231, 232, ideological hegemony, 289
2SO, 21S, 276, 278, 291, 306, 337, industrial psychology, 123. 128-30,
34S, 348, 399 Ill, 13S, 142, 143, 14S-6
epistemological break, 22, 25,34, 282, industrial relations, x, 28, S1, 212,
284, 328. 342-3 384-S, 401
cpodb~.233,242,244-S industrial sociology, x. 28, 131.401
equilibrium, 47, S9, 60-62, 101. 136, sociology of Of'8anisations, 118, 192
139-40, 142, 147, 336 integration hypothesis, 179-80
theories or organisation, 12S, 148-S2 integrative theory, 48, 87-102
elhnomethodology, 8, II, 21, 86, 201, intentionality, 241-2
23S, 247-S3, 254, 2SS, 261, 312 interactionism, 48, 68-87, 101, 191
linguistic, 248, 249, 2S2 symbolic interactionism, 78-82, 8S,
situational. 248, 249, 2S3 189, 190, 193, 209
ethnomethodological approaches to intermediaries, 297, 307
organisational activities, 261-70, interpretive paradigm, 22, 23, 28-32,
271,272 227-78, 306, 397
exchange, 88-90
existcntialism,33, 282.299,302-6,310, job satisfaction, 134-8, 143-6
312,348
language, so. 198, 238, 267, 269-70,
factional analogy, 66,3SS,l81 ,399,400 295-6, 297. 323
functional analysis, 44, 50-S3, 91-2, life-world, 243, 249
94, 188
functional co-ordination. 14-IS. 107 Marxism, xiii, 22, 27, 33, 99, 108,
functional imperatives, S4-S, 6S, 94, 283-99,301,306,327-33
IS4, 158-9, 168, 182-3 contemporary Mediterranean, 333,
functionalist sociology, 41-117 341-9,370
structural functionalism, 43, 48, Russian, 333, 334-8, 340, 341
49-57,64,81, 12S, IS2-4 structuralist approaches to organisa-
functions,42,S0,97 tion theory, 377-8S
manifest and latent, 93-4, 9S mechanical analogy, 47, 61, 68, 100,
or social conflict, 10, 49, 72, 96 130, 132, 140, IS3, 220, 336, 399
methodology, 2, 6, S7, 71, 1S, lOS, 164,
Gristeswrsseucllqft'"· 228, 229, 236, 190,2S0,27S,276,278,288,399
28S mode or organisation, 311, 374
German idealism, 7-8, 27, 31, 46, 69, murual aid, 339-40
74, 107. 197' 227. 230, 279, 282,
324, 331,336 nominalism, 4, 28, 32, 199, 2S3
neoidcalism,69, 73,83,282 Nomothetic approach, 6, 2S, 34, 82,
objective idealism, 236, 279, 280-81, 103, lOS, 277, 338
28S, 290, 319, 327 nothinancss, 303-4
subjec:tive idealism, 238, 279, 281,
282,302 objectivism, 49, 102-6, 121-2, 160-84
objectivist approaches, 8, 21-3, 76,
Harvard School, 46, 61-2, 138, 148 103, 106, 130, 144, 160-64, 334,
Hawthorne Studies, 123, 130-43, 20S 338,341, 342,348
Hqclianism, 280, 282, 28S, 288, 291, ontology, xii, I, 4, S7, 71, 1S, 130, 164,
296-7,300,303,327,329,331,336, 190, 191, 199, 227, 232, 239, 2SO,
341, 342, 346, 348 2S3, 266, 272, 273, 274, 21S, 276,
hermeneutic circle, 237-8 287, 306, 310, 326, 337, 34S, 347,
hermcncutics,232,23S-8,2S4,210,294 398,399
bOIDCOstasis, S9,61,62, 101,140 ontological oscillation, 266, 270
bumannarurc,2,6, 71, 7S,I64,27S,276 order-conflict debate, xii-xiii, IG-16,
human relations, Ill, 119, Ill, 143-6, 28
16S-6, 381 organisational psychology, x, 28, 401
organisations, 127-8, ISO, 152-4, 219,
ideal type, 231, 2S2, 266 260, 273, 310, 311, 365, 368, 369,
or burcauaac:y, 86, 163,366 373, 376, 379, 380, 384, 317, 319,
idcopapbic approach, 6, 28, 32, 2S3 395,391
 Subject Index 429
as open systems, 154-60. 167-71 reificalion, S3, 160, 196, 201, 218, 287,
as structures, 161-1, 166, 186, 189, 312, 324, 374
265. 267. 269, 274
organisation theory, x, 28, 118, 261, science, 41, 44, 69, 103, 107,230,315,
273-5. 321. 324, 373, 3W, 401-2 326,347
functionalist, 118-26,275,331,374, scientific management, 126-7, 132,
375, 388 13S, 380, 381
critique of, 311-13,321-1,365-7 social action theory, 68-9, 82-7, 218
social facts, 44, 138, IW
paradigm, x-xi, xiii, 23, 24-5 social system theory,48,49-68,121-2,
phenomenology, 8, II. 21, 76. 201. 123-60, 205-7, 218-20
232-1, 240-17. 254, 255, 267. morphogenic systems theory,
273-8,279,285,292,349,391 99-102
existential, 200, 235, 243-7, 254, 302 socio-technical systems theory, 125,
transcendental, 234, 235, 240-13, 246 136, 146-8, ISS, 183, 381
phenomenological reduction, 242 systems theory, 48, 57-68, 125
phenomenological sociology, 193, 235, solipsism, 23S, 238-10, 282-3, 302,
247-53, 266, 272, 275-8 310,337
phenomenological ·symbolic interac- reef of, 239, 240, 242, 283
tionism, 77, 79, 81, 86, 235, 247, state,300,340,366,371-7
249,250-53,261,270-73 structure, 42, Sl, 54, S7, 6S, 206, 260,
pluralist theory, 122, 141, 187, 188, 263,264,265,276,307,328,343-S,
202-17 356, 3S7. 358, 368, 369, 377. 383,
positivism 388,389
epistemological, 5, 25, 34, 82, 197, subjectivist approaches. 8, II, 21-3,
277,288,326,333,334,337,347 80, 189, 191, 233, 239
sociological, 7-8,26-7,41-8,69,73, surplus labour, 381-2
83, 107,227,228,294,331,353
post-industrialism. 126, 157. 182-1 Tavistock Institute, 146-8, ISS, 159
power, 89, 105, 203-1, 208, 209, technology, 119-20, 146-7, 161, 173,
212-17. 351-2. 353, 354, 356-7, 180, 293, 313-1, 316. 336
372, 376, 388 theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions,
122, 184-9, 207-9
quality of working life movement, 126, total institutions, 191-2, 209, 210
181-1, 381 totality, 286-7, 288, 291, 306, 307, 320,
323, 343, 344, 349, 358, 368, 369,
radical change, sociology of, 16-19, 370, 3n. 384, 400
21-3,32,33,326,338.351,358 typifications,24S,2S2,266,273
radical organisation theory, 35, 365-92
radical Weberianism, 331-3, 349-57, union of egoists, 300
369, 371-7, 385, 387
rationality, 151, IS4, 206, 231-2, 294, v,strhrn. 82-3, 197, 201, 229-30,
295, 323, 332 232, 23S, 236, 238. 244, 2S3, 331
realism, 4, 25, 34, 103, 191, 337, 345 voluntarism. 6, 28. 32, as. 218, 2S3, 276,
reference groups, 91-2 288,289
reflexivity, 193-1, 244, 248
regulation, sociology of, 16-9, 21-3, work, 29S-6, 317,318,320,324
25,28,45,76, 103,231-2.254,278,
3Sl
 Name Index

Adorno, T. W., 291-2 Dahl, R., 214

Aiken, M., 163 Dahrendorf, R., 10-19, 34,87, 3SO-SS,
Allen, V. L., 383-4 371-3
Aldlusser, L., 22, 34, 331, 341-9, Dalton, M., 206
3SS-9, 374-S Davis, L. E., 182-3
Anual, A., S7-8 Dawe, A., 10
Anthony, P. D., 312. 316 Della Volpe, 347
Af'IYI'is, C., 147-8, 174, 206 Dcnzin, N. K., 2SI-2
Aron, R., 41 Dickson, D., 312-16
Avridl, P., 339 Dickson, W.J.,61,131-6,138-9,142,
144
Bamforth, K. W.,6S,I46,JSS,I61,206 Dill, W. R., 171
~.P.,310,377-81 Dildley, W., 31, 197,228-38, 27S, 28S
Barnard, C., 61-2, 12S, 148-SS, 20S Douglas, J. D., 248, 2SJ-2
Bateson, G., 387 Dubin, R., 17S, 206
Bennis, W., 183 Dunlop, D. T., S7
Berpr, P. L., 21, 193, 199 Durkheim, E., 17,26-7, 44-S, 47. 49,
Berason. G., 76, 244 SS, 84-S, 90, 108, 138-9, 141, 191
Bedeley, G., 239, 279
Beynon, H., 320-21 EldridJe, J. E. T., 87, 119, 192, 19S,
Bittner, E., 261-7, 274 202,209,373-4
Blake, R. R., 176 Emerson, J., 271-2
Blau,P. M.,49,88-90,120,162,184-S, Emerson, R. M., 214
188-9, 207, 21G-ll Emery, F. E., IS7, 166, 171
Blauner, R., 120 Engels, F., 34, 94, 282, 285, 329-31,
Blumer, H., 78-82, 100, 190 33S-8, 343, 346
Bookchin, M., 301 Esland, G., 320
Braverman, H., 379-81 EIZ.ioni, A., 120, 211
Buckley, W., 43. S6-7, 60-1. 6S
Bukharin, N., 34,99-101,333-8, 341, Faris, R. E. L., 78
343, 34S, 3S9 Fayol, H., 127
Buraess, E. W., 100 Feuerbach, L., 281
Bums, T., 161, 166, 171, 172, 17S Fichte, J. F., 279-83, 302
Filmer, P., 267
Callinicos, A., 343-4 Follett, M. P., 127
Carey, A., 130 Fox, A., 202, 211
Castaneda, C., 33, 312, 315-16 French, J. R. P .• 216
Cherns, A. B., 182-3 Freud, S., 228, 292
Child, J .• 171 Fromm, E., 291-2
Cicourel, A. V ., 249
Oeg, S., 320-21 Gadamer, H. G .• 23S, 237, 238, 294
Cohen, P. S., 10-11, 16, 84, 336 Garfinkel, H., 21, 247-9, 250, 274
Colletti, L., 34,331,341-2,346-9 Giddens, A.. 8S, 214, 232, 237-8,
Comte, A., 26, 41-3, 49, SS, 108 249-SO
Cooper, R•• 180 Goffman, E., 190-92, 209-10
Coser, L. A., 10, 13, 69, 10-72, 93, Gold, R. L., 194
95-9 Goldmann, L., 284
Crombie, A. D., 119, 192, 202, 209, Goldlhorpe, J. H., 87, 9S, 17S, 190,
373-4 194-S, 206, 209, 384
 Name Index 431
Gouldner, A. W., IS, 94, 'Tl-9, 184-9, Luckmann, T., 21, 193, 199
2(11, 208,284,313,316,334,387 LukAcs, G., 33, 282, 284-91, 303,
Gramsc:i, A., 33, 283-4, 288-91, 341-2, 344-S, 388
341-2, 348 Lukes, s., 44, 45, 388
Guest, R. H., 144, 161 Lupton, T., 128, 129, 190, 191, 206
Habennas, J., 33, 238, 254, 269-70, Malinowski, 8., SO, 51, 53, 54, SS, 64
2n, 291-6,313,316,320,321 Manis, J. G., 82
Hage, J., 163 Mardi, J. G., lSI, 152, 206
Hall, R. H., 65, 163, 166, 175 Marcuse, H., 33, 86, 291-S, 313, 317,
Hegel, G., 33,227, 2n. 280-82,285-7, 320, 331, 347
300,303,331,346,3n Marshall, A., 46, 84, 85
Heideger, M.• 237, 240, 243, 269 Marx, K., II, 25, 33, 34,87, 90, 93-6,
Henderson, L. J., 61, 62, 148 98, 99, JOB. 211. 269. 2n. m,
Herzberg, F., 144, 145, 174 282-7, 290-91, 2'T1-9, 300, 303,
Hickson, D. J., 65, 119, 162, 166, 173, 305,307,319,327-31,334,337-8,
211,216 342-3,346-S2,3SS,3S7,36S,371,
Hindess, B., 356 372,374,377,379,381,385,387
Hirst, P., 356 Maslow, A., 145, 174
Romans, G. C., 57, 61, 62, 88, 89, 100, Mayo, E., 61, 129, 131, 139, 142, 148,
103, 190 380
Hoppock, R., 143 McCullough, A., 375, 376
Horkheimer, M.• 290-91 Mc:Grqor. D., 176
Hughes, E., 194, 228. 230 McHugh, P., 249
Hussain, A., 356 McNall, S. G., 249
Husserl, E., 31, 33, 228. 232-S, Mead, G. H., 27, 46, 69, 73-81, 86-7,
240-46,279-80,283,285,302-03, 90,92, 100,101,189,190,235,247,
348 251, 304
Hyman, R., 384 Meakin, D., 312, 317
Merleau-Ponty, M., 240, 243
Dlicll, I., 33, 312, 314, 316 Meltzer, 8., 82
Merton, R. K., IS, 49, 56, 69, 88,
Jaques, E., 173 90-100, 106-7, 122, 152. 184-90,
James. W., 46,76 2(17-8, 3SS
Jarvie, I. E., SO Mezaros, I., 284
Johnson, J. E. M., 249 Michels, R., 186, 374
Jones, J., 267-70, 320-21 Miliband, R., 35, 371, 372-4
Miller, E. J., 63, 157
Kant, 1., 31, 33, 227-8, 279. 284, 349 Mills, C. Wright, 14, lOS
Kahn,R.I.,S7,63.6S, 120,157-60,206 Morris, C., 14-S
Katz, D., 57, 63, 65, 120, 157-60, 206 Mouton, J. S., 176
Keat, R .• 25 Mouzelis, N., 374-S
Kierkegaard, S., 303
Kropotkin, P .. 333-4, 338-41 Natanson, M., 76, 232-3
Kuhn, T. S., 24, 2SS Nisbet, R. A., 71, 72, 334
Laing, R. D., 33, 306 Pareto, V., 11. 26,47-8, 61-2. 84-S,
Landsberger. H. A., 130 108, 132, 138-9, 141, 153, 33.5
Lawrence, P.R., 164-7, 171, 173, 179, Park, R. L., 78, 100
206 Parsons, T., 14, 43, 54-7, 61-S, 84-S,
Lenin, V. I., 34, 331, 333, 334, 336, 348, 90-91, 96-7, 100-01, ISS, 198,
3n 200-01,214,228,249
Lewin, K., 144 Perrow, C., 148, 153, 172
Uchtheim, G., 285 Pettigrew, A. M., 213
Ukert, R., 144 Phillipson, M., 267
Locke, E. A .• 145 Piaget, J., 383
Lockwood, D., 10, II, 55, 355-7 Pirsig, R. M., 312, 314
Lorscll,J. w.. 164-7,71,79,206 Plekhanov, G., 34,330-35,341,345-6
Lowenthal, L., 291 Poulantzas, N .• 34, 373
432 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
PUp, D. S., 6S, 119, 162, 166, 173, 211. Sudnow, D.• 267. 271, 272
216 Sweezy, P., 370, 377-81
PUIIbci'J, S .• 21, 193, 199
Tannenbaum, A. S .• 207
Radcliff~ Brown, A., 50-57. 63-S, ISS Taylor, F. W.• 126-30, 132, 144, 146,
Raven, B., 216 174, 380
Reich, C. A., 312, 314-16 Terrebcrry, S., 171
Rex, J.,lS, 87, 3SO, 353-S, 371. 373 Thevenaz,P .• 241-2
Rice, A. K., 6S, ISS, IS6, IS7, 172 Thom, R •• 387
Rickman, H. P., 237 Thomas. W. I., 78
Rocher, G .• S4 Thompson, J. D .• 120, 166, 171
Rocthlisberger,F.J.,61, 131-6,138-9, Thompson, K .• 118
142, 144 Trist, E. L.,6S, 146,15S,IS7,161, 166,
Rose, A., 79, 80, 82, 194 171, 206
Roszak, T., 312, llS-16 Turner, A. N., 173
Roy, D., 190, 191 Turner, B. A., 190. 192-4, 209
Runciman, W. G., 230
Udy, S., 166
Sacks, H .• 249 Urry, J., 2S
Sahlins, M.• l87 Urwick, 127
Salaman. G.. 118
Sanre, J. P.,ll, 239,240,243,254,277, Veblen, T .• 96
283,302-0S.310,348 Van Den Berghe, P. L., 10
Sayles, L. R., 161 Vickers, G., 120
Schcglotr, E. A., 249 Von Bertalantry, L .• SS, S9, 60, 62,68
Schein, E., Ill Vroom, V. H .• 144
Schroyer, Trent, 296
Schutz.A.,31,86,190,193-4,197, 200, Walker, J .• 144. 161
230-32,23S,240,243-9,255,265, Walsh. D., 267
266,302 Weber, M., II. 27, 31,46, 69,82-7,90,
Scott, J. F., 120 96. 118-19, 122. 148, 1.50, ISl,
Sclznick, P .• 12S, ISO, 152-4, 184-9, 161-3. 17S, 184-5, 187-90, 193,
207-8. 262 19S, 197, 201,217,228-35,244-7,
Shannon, M .• 37S-6 252. 2S3, 262, 266, 27S, 292,
Silverman, D., 10. 87, 122, 190, 330-34, 349-52, 355-7, 366, 371,
195-201, 209-10, 266-70, 275, 373, 374, 38S
277. 320, 321 Whitehead, A. N .• 76, 132
Simmel, G., 27, 46, 69-73, 76-8, Whyte, W. F .• 119, 144, 206
86-90, 93, 9S, 100, 189, 191, 211 Wieder, D. L.. 2SI, 2S2. 264, 26S
Simon, H. A., 125, 150-54, 206, 213 Wingenstein, L., 2Soi-S
Skinner, B. F., 102-S Wood, S., 384
Small. A., 78, 100 Woodcock, G., 301
Spencer, H .• 26, 41, 43, 44,47, 49, 5S, Woodward, J .• 120, 161-2, 166, 17.5,
68, 108,374 192
Spiegelberg, H., 234 Wrong, D. H .• 216
Spinoza. B.• 349
Stalker, G. M .• 161. 166, 171, 172, 17S Zald, M. N .• 213
Stirncr, M.• 28l, 299,300,301,305 Zimmerman, D. H., 251-2, 264-7