In Re Local TV Advertising Antitrust Litigation
In Re Local TV Advertising Antitrust Litigation
In Re Local TV Advertising Antitrust Litigation
Table of Contents
A. Defendants Agreed to Fix Prices for Broadcast Television Spot Advertising Sales
and That Agreement Was Facilitated by An Information Exchange ........................... 9
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C. Defendants’ Opportunities and Invitations to Collude are Plus Factors Supporting the
Existence of a Price Fixing Cartel that is Per Se Unlawful ....................................... 32
E. High Barriers to Entry in the Broadcast Television Spot Advertising Market is a Plus
Factor Supporting the Existence of a Price Fixing Cartel That is Per Se Unlawful .. 39
COUNT ONE Price Fixing in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act .................................. 47
COUNT TWO Information Exchange in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act ................. 47
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SOURCE HEATING & COOLING, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated direct purchasers of broadcast television spot advertising (the
“Class,” more fully defined infra), bring this action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for
treble damages, injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to the federal antitrust laws,
demanding a trial by jury of all issues so triable. Plaintiffs allege as follows based upon personal
knowledge as to the facts pertaining to themselves, and upon information and belief and the
1. This antitrust class action arises from a price fixing cartel facilitated by an
anticompetitive information exchange between and among certain major television station
owners and operators to artificially inflate the prices of broadcast television spot advertisements1
Griffin Communications, LLC, Meredith Corporation, Nexstar Media Group, Inc., Gray
Television, Inc. (through its acquisition of Raycom Media, Inc.), Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.,
impact the price levels of broadcast television spot advertisements by agreeing to fix prices and
exchange competitively sensitive historic, current, and forward-looking sales data, including
1
The television advertisements are purchased directly from broadcast television stations (as
opposed to cable operators) and are referred to herein as “broadcast television spot advertising.”
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pacing data. Pacing information is used to compare a broadcast station’s revenues booked for a
certain time period to the revenues booked for the same point in time in the previous year (the
3. The information exchanged covered both local and national broadcast television
spot advertising and was disseminated to individuals within Defendants’ organizations with
authority over pricing, with Defendants’ knowledge and at their direction. By allowing
Defendants to better understand, in real time, the availability of their would-be competitors’
inventory through the exchange of pacing data—with inventory being a, if not the, key factor
affecting pricing negotiations—the scheme derailed the competitive process and allowed
Defendants to avoid price competition, harming direct purchasers of broadcast television spot
advertising. The exchange also served as a means to monitor the members of the price fixing
cartel, as any deviation from the scheme (i.e., what is referred to in the literature as “cheating” on
the cartel) could be easily detected and punished. This information exchange not only facilitated
the Defendants’ price fixing cartel, but also itself is separately unlawful under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
rates, but this unlawful sharing of information lessened that competition and thereby harmed the
between horizontal competitors in the broadcast television spot advertising market,” filing a
series of Proposed Judgments and Stipulations and Orders with Defendants Dreamcatcher
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Broadcasting, LLC, Griffin Communications, LLC, Meredith Corporation, Nexstar Media Group
Inc., Raycom Media, Inc.,2 Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., and Tribune Media Company on
Defendants’ illegal conduct, prevent recurrence of the same or similar conduct, and ensure that
7. The DOJ noted in the Statement that these remedial efforts were “necessary in
light of the extensive history of communications among rival stations that facilitated
Defendants’ agreements” in restraint of trade, and in its Complaint, the DOJ action
8. As Justice Sotomayor held before her ascension to the United States Supreme
Court, “[i]nformation exchange is an example of a facilitating practice that can help support an
inference of a price-fixing agreement.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001)
(Sotomayor, J.) (noting that information exchanges can both be evidence of a per se unlawful
9. Plaintiffs bring this antitrust class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all
2
As mentioned below, while Gray Television, Inc. was not named as a defendant in any of the
suits brought by the DOJ, in January of 2019, it finalized the acquisition of Raycom Media, Inc.,
and thereby assumed liability for the acts of the acquired entity.
3
All emphases to quoted material in the complaint have been added.
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uncompensated for the anticompetitive harm they suffered as a result of the Defendants’
10. Plaintiffs bring this antitrust class action lawsuit pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26), to recover damages suffered by the Class and the
conduct; and for such other relief as is afforded under the laws of the United States for
11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,
and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26).
12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Sections 4, 12, and 16 of the Clayton
Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, and 26), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d), because, at
all times relevant to the Complaint, one or more of the Defendants resided, transacted business,
entered into each year in interstate commerce in the United States and the payments for those
transactions flowed in interstate commerce. Each Defendant sells broadcast television spot
advertising to advertisers throughout the United States or owns and operates broadcast television
stations in multiple states or in Designated Market Areas (“DMAs,” defined infra) that often
cross state lines. Additionally, Sales Rep Firms (defined infra) represent Defendants throughout
the United States in the sale of broadcast television spot advertising to advertisers.
14. Defendants’ manipulation of the market for the sale of broadcast television spot
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advertising thus was in the flow of, and had a direct, substantial, and foreseeable impact on,
interstate commerce.
advertising company headquartered in Minnesota and organized under the laws of Minnesota.
television advertisement development and research, and purchasing broadcast television spot
advertising time. In order to provide those services, Thoughtworx purchased broadcast television
spot advertising during the Class Period (defined infra) directly from Defendants Sinclair
Broadcast Group, Inc. and Tribune Media Company at prices that were supracompetitively
impacted as a result of the conduct alleged herein and has thereby suffered antitrust injury.
16. Plaintiff One Source Heating & Cooling, LLC (“One Source”) is a heating,
cooling, and HVAC services provider headquartered in Alabama and organized under the laws of
Alabama. One Source purchased broadcast television spot advertising during the Class Period
directly from Defendants Raycom Media, Inc. and Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. at prices that
were supracompetitively impacted as a result of the conduct alleged herein and has thereby
purportedly compete (as of 2017) and in which Thoughtworx and One Source purchased
broadcast television spot advertising from one or more Defendants in is set forth in Appendix A.
18. Each of the Defendants named herein entered into consent decrees with the DOJ,
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except Gray Television, Inc., which purchased an entity (Raycom Media, Inc.) that did so.
corporation, headquartered at 2016 Broadway, Santa Monica, California 90404, that owned three
full-power television stations in two television markets and had over $50 million in revenues in
2017.
headquartered at 4370 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30319, that owns and
operates television stations and digital assets in the United States. As of February 23, 2018, Gray
200 program streams, including approximately 100 channels affiliated with the CBS Network,
the NBC Network, the ABC Network, and the FOX Network.
headquartered at 7401 North Kelley Avenue Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111, that owned four
full-power television stations in two television markets and had over $60 million in revenues in
2017.
headquartered at 1716 Locust Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50309, that owned or operated 16
television stations in twelve television markets and had over $1.7 billion in revenues in 2017.
headquartered at 545 East John Carpenter Freeway, Suite 700, Irving, Texas 75062, that operates
as a television broadcasting and digital media company in the United States. As of December 31,
4
Plaintiffs do not allege, at this time, that Gray TV participated in the alleged conduct directly;
merely that Gray TV is liable for the acts of Raycom Media, Inc., which it acquired.
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2017, the company owned, operated, programmed, or provided sales and other services to 170
headquartered at 201 Monroe Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, that owned or operated 65
television stations in 45 television markets and had over $670 million in revenues in 2017.
Raycom was purchased by Gray TV in 2018 for $3.65 billion in a deal that was finalized in
January of 2019.
headquartered at 10706 Beaver Dam Road, Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030, that operates as a
television broadcast company in the United States. As of December 31, 2017, it owned, operated,
and/or provided services to 191 stations in 89 television markets, which broadcast 601 channels.
Delaware limited liability company headquartered at 515 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois
60654, and operates as a media and entertainment company in the United States. It offers news,
entertainment, and sports programming through Tribune Broadcasting local television stations,
including FOX television affiliates, CW Network television affiliates, CBS television affiliates,
ABC television affiliates, MY television affiliates, NBC television affiliates, and independent
television stations; and television series and movies on WGN America, a national general
27. Defendant Tribune Media Company (“Tribune Media,” and collectively with
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Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611, and operates, through its subsidiaries, as a media and
entertainment company in the United States. It offers news, entertainment, and sports
programming through Tribune Broadcasting local television stations, including FOX television
affiliates, CW Network television affiliates, CBS television affiliates, ABC television affiliates,
MY television affiliates, NBC television affiliates, and independent television stations; and
television series and movies on WGN America, a national general entertainment cable network.
28. Various persons and/or firms not named as Defendants herein may have
participated as co-conspirators in the violations alleged herein and may have performed acts and
made statements in furtherance thereof. Such additional co-conspirators include the two major
national Sales Rep Firms in the United States, which operate throughout the nation. These Sales
Rep Firms “function as extensions of a station’s sales staff and are familiar with various rate
cards (prices) and program research demographics.” And as the DOJ noted, these two Sales Rep
Firms facilitated the “exchange[ of] real-time pacing information” between Defendants.
29. One of the Sales Rep Firms is CoxReps, a division of the Cox Media Group. As
of March 2019, CoxReps represented 30 of Tribune’s owned and operated full-power television
30. The second Sales Rep Firm is Katz Television Group (“Katz”), a division of the
Katz Media Group. As of March 2019, Katz represented 86 Nexstar owned and operated full-
power television stations, two Meredith full-power stations, 8 Tribune full-power stations, and
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31. Katz and CoxReps are collectively referred to as the “Sales Rep Firms.”
32. Beginning no later than January 1, 2014, the Defendants have participated in an
unlawful price fixing cartel to supracompetitively impact the price levels of broadcast television
competitors.
33. Defendants price fixing cartel was facilitated in large part through a reciprocal
information among competitors can cause anticompetitive effects and violate the Sherman Act.
35. As revealed in the DOJ’s investigation and related court filings, this exchange of
36. First, Defendants regularly exchanged pacing information through the Sales Rep
Firms, including real-time pacing information regarding each station’s revenues, and reported the
5
The DOJ defined “Competitively Sensitive Information” as “Non-Public Information relating
to pricing or pricing strategies, pacing, holding capacity, revenues, or market shares” as well as
“reports” that are “customized or confidential to a particular Station or broadcast television
station group.”
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37. Pacing information is used to compare a broadcast station’s revenues booked for a
certain time period to the revenues booked for the same point in time in the previous year. Pacing
indicates how each station is performing compared to the rest of the market and provides insight
into each station’s remaining broadcast television spot advertising inventory for the period.
Simply put, the exchange of pacing information reveals the Defendants’ remaining supply, with
supply being a, if not the, key factor informing negotiations over price.
38. Those exchanges included data on individual stations’ booked sales for current
and future months as well as a comparison to past periods. The exchanges covered not just
well.
39. Once the Sales Rep Firms shared the information with the Defendants, their
competitors’ pacing information was then disseminated to individuals with authority over pricing
and sales.
40. The exchanges by Sales Rep Firms were widespread, occurring in DMAs across
the United States, and they occurred with the knowledge of and frequently at the instruction of
DMAs where more than one Defendant was present and in 36 of those DMAs (identified in
Appendix A) CoxReps or Katz counted more than one Defendant as their client.
information directly with one another, without using the Sales Rep Firms as a conduit.
42. These direct inter-seller exchanges included both “local sales” pacing data as well
43. Further, the DOJ’s proposed final consent decrees list several types of
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competitively sensitive information that Defendants are prohibited from exchanging for seven
years: “pricing, pricing strategies, pacing, holding capacity, revenues, or market shares.”
exchanges through the Sales Rep Firms) was not made available to Plaintiffs and the members of
46. Specifically, the DOJ stated that “[t]he exchanges were systematic and typically
included non-public pacing data on national revenues, local revenues, or both, depending on the
DMA. The Complaint further alleges that certain Defendants engaged in the exchange of other
47. In its 2017 Annual Report, Sinclair stated that “fluctuations in advertising rates
and availability of inventory” was an “Industry Risk,” so clearly knowing its rival’s inventory
48. These exchanges, whether direct or through the Sales Rep Firms as conduits, also
violate the information exchange safe harbors enumerated by the Federal Trade Commission
a. First, those safe harbors dictate that the exchange consist of information
that is relatively old, while here, the exchanges were of real-time and
forward-looking information.
operated by a neutral third party, while here, the exchanges were made
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directly between competitors and through interested Sales Rep Firms that
49. A 2010 report prepared by the DOJ and submitted to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development notes that: “In addition to serving as evidence of an
unlawful agreement, information exchanges likely to affect prices may, under certain
50. 2010 Guidance from the DOJ also notes that information exchanges can “serv[e]
as evidence of an unlawful agreement” to fix prices, and also “be illegal in and of themselves,”
51. 2014 Guidance from the FTC confirms that when “competing companies seek
market intelligence by exchanging price or other commercially sensitive information, that may
52. Likewise, 2016 guidance from the DOJ confirms that “[e]ven if an individual
does not agree explicitly to fix [prices] or other terms [of sale], exchanging competitively
53. One academic notes that “[w]ith regard to firm-specific production information,
levels, or production costs will increase expected returns in any competitive bidding process.”
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54. In 2006, the Swedish Competition Authority commissioned several papers on the
large number of scholarly publications. The introductory essay states: “information sharing is
most naturally defined as the sharing of such information that is normally regarded as
confidential: production costs, detailed information about quantities sold, actual transactions
prices (i.e., including individual discounts), planned future pricing, et cetera.” The introduction
also states that “if competitors secretively share information on intended future pricing and
output, this comes very close to actually making anti-competitive agreements.” Another article in
the same volume states: “[i]ndeed, in some circumstances it may be that the mere exchange of
information will in itself be sufficient to eliminate normal competitive activity. The overriding
55. Another article by Baltzer Overgaard and H. Peter Mollgaard states that “it is
(whether tacit or explicit) is made difficult—if not impossible—if firms compete under a veil of
ignorance concerning the actions of rivals. . . . Speedy access to accurate information about the
individual past transactions and future intentions of rivals will generally have a strong
coordinating potential.” The summary characterization of the research that is reviewed in this
article is as follows. “Pulling the two sides of the market together, we may (tentatively) conclude
that improved information flow on the firm side will likely enhance the scope for coordinated
firm behavior, while improved information on the consumer side may enhance competition. . . .
Ideally, antitrust practice should attempt to [promote a regime where] actual competitors are
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information is a valuable tool that allow us to understand and manage our markets, products, and
services so we can better meet our customers’ needs. However, we must gather and use that
information properly. It is important that we comply with the law in acquiring information. . . .
58. Implicit, as well as express, agreements are per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act because “[s]ophisticated conspirators often reach their agreements as much by the
wink and the nod as by explicit agreement, and the implicit agreement may be far more potent,
and sinister, just by virtue of being implicit.” Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 825
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Kleen Prod. LLC v. Georgia-Pac. LLC, 910 F.3d 927, 936 (7th Cir.
2018) (“The task before any plaintiff is thus to find and produce evidence that reveals
coordination or agreement (even a wink and a nod—formal agreements have never been required
58. Much of the conduct in the foregoing section was investigated by the DOJ in a
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59. On November 13, 2018 and December 13, 2018, the DOJ filed complaints, which
stated that “Defendants’ agreements are restraints of trade that are unlawful under Section 1 of
60. The DOJ also filed the Judgments and the Statement as to all Defendants except
for Gray TV (after these dates, Gray TV finalized its acquisition of Raycom, which was
implicated in the DOJ filings), for violating Section 1 through “concerted action between
horizontal competitors in the broadcast television spot advertising market,” describing the
offense as having had anticompetitive effects by “disrupting the normal mechanisms for
negotiating and setting prices and harming the competitive process,” and that the “offense [was]
likely to continue and recur unless the requested relief [was] granted.”
61. The Judgments mandate Defendants’ (and Gray TV, by virtue of its acquisition of
i. pricing;
iii. pacing;
v. revenues; or
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62. The injunctive relief required by the DOJ extends to all DMAs in the United
63. Both the November and December complaints refer to the conduct at issue as
64. The Statement referred to the injunctive relief requested in the Final Judgments as
conduct, and ensur[ing] that Defendants establish an antitrust compliance program,” thereby
“putting a stop to the anticompetitive information sharing.” The DOJ concluded in the Statement
that this injunctive relief was “necessary in light of the extensive history of communications
65. The Chief of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General Makan
these television broadcast companies to disrupt the normal competitive process of spot
66. The DOJ has been unequivocal, then, that the millions of pages of documents it
67. For several reasons, the fact that the DOJ declined to prosecute criminally does
nothing to undermine the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ price fixing claims under the per se standard.
68. First, both the 2016 DOJ and 2014 FTC guidance concludes that information
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exchanges are facilitating practices that can evidence a price fixing cartel. Likewise, the United
States delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development’s Competition
evidence of an unlawful price fixing or market allocation agreement among competitors, and in
69. Second, the priorities of the DOJ vary annually and across administrations. The
DOJ’s own statistics show that it allocates its resources differently from year to year. In 2018
and 2019, the DOJ has only filed a combined 17 criminal antitrust complaints (6 of which relate
to legacy investigations initiated by the prior administration). In 2017, the DOJ filed only 17
70. Comparatively, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ filed aproximately: 50 criminal
71. No inference can be drawn as to the seriousness of the legal violation at issue here
from the lack of a parallel criminal prosecution; and this is particularly true in light of an
72. Moreover, the “fact that Defendants did not plead guilty to wide-ranging conduct
does not limit the civil action. Relatively few defendants plead guilty to all of the charges against
them, and limitations on government resources may play as much a role in the agreement as the
conduct involved.” In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02311, 2014 WL 4272784, at
*8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2014); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
664–665 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to infer lack of a civil conspiracy from the government’s
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decision not to move against certain defendants, acknowledging that the DOJ may decide to limit
the scope of an investigation for numerous reasons, including differing standards of proof in a
criminal case and the knowledge that the private bar “had both the desire and the resources to
73. Third, the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ per se price fixing claim is bolstered by the
additional allegations in this action concerning economic evidence of cartel behavior (infra) and
74. The sale of broadcast television spot advertising on respective television stations
Defendants.6 The objective of the television station owner is to meet the needs of their
Defendants to compete for audience share and advertising revenue with other stations in their
respective DMAs by competing on price. This is particularly true in a market facing disruption
and decreased demand. The broadcast television spot advertising market is such a market.
76. The broadcast television spot advertising market has been faced with rapid
change, as consumers’ media time continues to shift away from traditional sources and towards
digital and online mediums, such as Instagram, Netflix, Hulu, YouTube, and Facebook.
Broadcast television spot advertising has been grappling with ratings erosion and viewers
6
Nexstar and Sinclair’s advertising revenues made up almost 50 percent of their total revenue in
2018. Tribune’s “television and entertainment” advertising revenue made up roughly 65 percent
of its total revenue in 2018.
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canceling television subscriptions in favor of, inter alia, streaming services, which, in a
77. In a McKinsey 2015 Global Report, this was made clear: “Spending on media
continues to shift from traditional to digital products and services at a rapid pace. By 2019, we
believe digital spending will account for more than 50 percent of overall media spend. Within
this, the digital video spending will overtake physical spending by 2018, two years earlier than
we had previously forecast. Digital, consisting of Internet and mobile advertising, will become
the largest advertising category by 2017, surpassing TV one year earlier than forecast, and
mobile will more than double its share of the digital ad market.”
78. The number of persons who actually view television advertising has also been
dwindling. The McKinsey report also states that “[a]s digital media gains ground, advertisers are
increasingly accepting the validity and persuasiveness of advertising on these media, moving
away from the typically high cost-per-thousand (CPM) traditional media to less expensive, low-
CPM Internet and mobile advertising—further accelerating the shift of analog dollars to digital.”
Those who consume television advertising are also declining: the rise of “cord cutters” and “cord
nevers” continues to grow. In fact, eMarketer estimates that traditional television viewers will
drop 2.4 percent (or by roughly 5 million people) by the end of 2018, while the cord-cutter and
cord-never populations will grow by a total of 15 percent (or by almost 7 million people) this
year. This impacts where advertisers spend their dollars, and a decreased demand for television
advertising. Television’s command over the United States advertising revenues has given way to
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79. In light of these challenges, the broadcast television spot advertising market has
not responded to declining demand in the way one would expect a competitive market to
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80. As depicted in Figure 1, from 2008 to 2016, viewership for morning news, early
local evening news, and local late-night news has fallen 13 percent, 18 percent, and 29 percent,
respectively, while total Defendant revenue has increased in the face of this declining demand by
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81. As depicted in Figure 2, the Defendants’ 65 percent gains in over the air (“OTA”)
revenue have outpaced the market as a whole, which lost 2 percent in revenue over that same
time period.
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82. Figures 3.a, 3.b., and 3.c show that beginning in the first quarter of 2014 (the
beginning of the conduct period identified by the DOJ and the Class Period here), broadcast
television spot advertising price levels rose dramatically from their immediately preceding
years.7
7
Broadcast television spot advertising is priced on a cost per thousand (“CPM”) basis, which is
the cost for an advertisement per 1,000 viewers, or a cost per point (“CPP”) basis, which is the
cost to reach one percent of television households in a specified area.
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83. Finally, Figure 4 shows a commensurate jump in Defendants’ revenues at the start
of the Class Period in 2014. This is not how a competitive market responds to declining
viewership and declining demand; these effects would only be expected in a cartelized market
84. Defendants’ price fixing agreement is unlawful under the per se standard, while
the information exchange that facilitated the cartel is either unlawful per se, or alternatively is
8
“Quick look” is an abbreviated version of the rule of reason analysis, where the Court does not
need to conduct analysis of the market and anticompetitive effects, but rather must only show a
form of market injury to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class.
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85. Under the per se standard, and additionally where, as here, there are demonstrable
anticompetitive effects, a relevant product and geographic market need not be defined.
86. Should a relevant product market need to be defined in this action, it is the sale of
87. Should a geographic market need to be defined in this action, it is the specific
88. The broadcast television spot advertising landscape in the United States is
comprised of parent companies like Defendants that own and operate dozens of television
stations. These stations carry programming distributed through their broadcast platforms,
provided by third-party networks and syndicators, news stations, their own networks, and other
original programming.
89. Industry analysts have recognized, inter alia, that broadcast television spot
advertising reaches more people than radio, e-mails, social media, and the Internet. Other forms
broadcast television spot advertising to constrain broadcast television spot advertising prices to
90. Broadcast television spot advertisements typically penetrate about ninety percent
of the households in a DMA, while cable television spot advertisements penetrate far fewer
homes. A significant and growing number of television households do not even subscribe to a
traditional cable provider, instead receiving broadcast television signals over the air for free.
9
In a 2011 review of top traditional and online advertising agencies, 24 of the top 25 online
agencies did not offer television advertising services in-house and, similarly, 24 of the 25 top
traditional advertising agencies did not offer search advertising in-house. This implies that
clients for these two advertising verticals do not see the other as interchangeable.
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Even in households that do subscribe to cable television, the package they receive almost always
includes all broadcast channels but often excludes many cable channels. As a result, some cable
than cable television spot advertising, because most advertisers are looking to capture a wide
audience and broadcast programming has broader appeal to viewers. A broadcast spot reaches
more viewers with more ratings points than a single spot on a cable channel. Cable audiences are
fragmented across numerous stations that cater to niche populations, and thus advertisers looking
92. Finally, broadcast stations have a larger advertising inventory than cable stations.
Due to the limited inventory and lower ratings associated with cable spot advertising, cable
providers cannot offer the same volume of ratings points or broad enough household penetration
93. Because of these factors, advertisers are not likely to respond to a small but
significant increase in the prices charged for broadcast television spot advertising in a given
DMA by switching to cable television spot advertising in large enough numbers to make that
price increase unprofitable. Accordingly, cable spot advertising is not a substitute for broadcast
94. On average, Defendant station owners held between 24 percent and 100 percent
market share in the multi-defendant DMAs listed in Appendix A (measured as of 2017 data, and
95. Defendants’ conduct alleged herein has caused injury to Plaintiffs and the Class
members in the form of having paid overcharges (i.e., artificially inflated prices) for broadcast
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television spot advertising. This is injury of the type that the antitrust laws were meant to deter,
punish, and prevent. As shown in Figures 1 through 4, at the onset of the conduct period
identified by the DOJ (the start of the Class Period here), Defendants’ prices and revenues
exceed those of the non-colluding firms and spiked in the face of declining demand.
96. Moreover, the economic literature (discussed supra, in Section V.A.2) is clear
that the conduct and market outcomes observed here evince cartel behavior, lead to
97. Prominent legal and economic antitrust scholars studying collusive behavior have
developed the concept of “plus factors,” which are “economic actions and outcomes, above and
beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral
conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action.” They refer to the plus factors
that provide the most probative value and “those that lead to a strong inference of explicit
98. Here, plus factors plausibly inferring the existence of a per se illegal cartel
include: high market shares, high market concentration, opportunities and invitations to collude
99. One of the “super plus factors” academics enumerate addresses the reciprocal
sharing of firm-specific competitively sensitive information that would normally remain private
to each firm, or where: “A firm or subset of firms has knowledge of the details of another firm’s
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transactions, production, sales, and/or inventories where the latter firm would be competitively
100. A super plus factor plausibly inferring the existence of a per se illegal cartel
101. As discussed above, overall viewership and revenue have been falling for
broadcast television spot advertising. While the Defendants’ revenues have gone up
tremendously (as a result of their unlawful conduct), industry revenues overall are down, the
102. Television viewership has declined in recent years. According to the Pew
Research Center, “[s]ince 2007, the average audience for late night newscasts has declined 31
percent, while morning audience declined 12 percent and early evening audience fell 19
percent.” In 2018, the Pew Research Center found that “the gap between the share of Americans
who get news online and those who do so on television is narrowing,” with only 50 percent of
United States adults regularly getting news from television in 2017, down from 57 percent in
2016. Typically, local news is the largest source of revenue for local broadcast affiliates,
comprising roughly 50 percent of total revenue. In 2016, advertising revenue for local “news-
producing stations” made up 84 percent of total advertising revenue for the industry overall.
103. Broadcast television spot advertising sales have begun to decline in the last
decade. In real terms, broadcast television spot advertising industry-wide revenue reached its
non-election year peak in 2011 at $16.2 billion (in 2008 dollars). It has declined every two years
since then to $14.9 billion in 2017 (again, expressed in 2008 dollars), a decline of 8.25 percent.
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The same pattern has held for election-years: in real terms, presidential election-year real local
television advertising spending fell from $20.0 billion in 2008 to $18.1 billion in 2012 to $17.6
billion in 2016, a total decline of 12.1 percent. And, for mid-term election years, real spending
fell by $1.9 billion dollars (4.9 percent) from $18. billion in 2010 to $17.4 billion in 2014.
104. BIA Advisory Services forecasts that local television station OTA advertising
revenues will grow slower than overall local advertising, predicting a 0.6 percent compound
annual growth rate (“CAGR”) from 2019 to 2023, outpaced by a forecasted CAGR of over 10
percent for local mobile video and over 15 percent for local online video. BIA Advisory Services
predicts that “by 2023, local online/interactive/digital advertising revenue will be $78.2 billion,
growing to nearly 48 percent of total local media advertising revenue from roughly a 37 percent
share in 2018.
105. “In a healthy economy, we’re looking at no growth in advertising from traditional
media companies,” said Michael Nathanson, an analyst with research firm MoffettNathanson.
“That’s a worrying trend.” The decline in television viewership is accelerating as online rivals
have increased their investments in the online video advertising market, capturing almost every
new advertising dollar entering the marketplace. Almost half of the growth in local video ad
spending during the next five years will go to digital platforms, including local mobile video,
local online video and out-of-home video, according to a 2017 study on advanced television
advertising published by BIA/Kelsey industry analysts. “Television ad sales have fallen even as
global advertising grows, leading research firms and analysts to predict that the business may
never recover.”
broadcast television spot advertising time, should lead to lower prices and the lack of
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profitability that that entails. These factors provide a strong motivation for horizontal
competitors to form and maintain a cartel, particularly in this industry, where broadcast
107. For example, according to Sinclair’s most recent Form 10-K filed with the SEC, a
primary source of revenue for local television stations is “the sale of commercial inventory on . .
“advertising revenue can vary substantially from period to period based on many factors beyond
[its] control.” Furthermore, “[t]his volatility affects [its] operating results and may reduce [its]
ability to repay indebtedness or reduce the market value of [its] securities.” Sinclair specifically
admits that its “operating results depend on the amount of advertising revenue [it] generate[s].”
The key revenue function underscores the strong incentive to collude rather than compete,
108. Further supporting the plausibility of the cartel were Defendants’ frequent
opportunities to, and apparent invitations to one another to, collude rather than compete.
companies, including Nexstar, Sinclair, and Tribune, announced the launch of the TV Interface
Practices or “TIP” Initiative, described as “an industry work group dedicated to developing
broadcasters and their media agency partners.” The TIP Initiative is intended to be national in
scope. It will provide for standardized automated transactions with customers for broadcast
television spot advertising that will enable Defendants to share competitively sensitive
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information. Nexstar’s President and CEO made a public statement regarding TIP indicating that
Defendants “must work together as an industry.” The President and CEO of Sinclair echoed this
sentiment stating that “[t]he TIP Initiative demonstrates the industry’s shared commitment to
working together” to grow their advertising sales. Tribune’s President and CEO also indicated
that through the TIP Initiative, Defendants could “actively work[] together.”
110. Through the TIP Initiative, Defendants thus signaled their invitation to the
industry to come together and collude rather than compete, and continue to disseminate
declining demand.
111. In addition, Defendants had numerous opportunities to meet and conspire with
each other under the guise of legitimate business contacts and to perform acts necessary for the
112. In particular, almost 300 full-power local television stations changed hands in
2013 and many of these deals resulted in stations in the same market being separately owned on
paper but operated jointly, a practice that has grown exponentially in recent years. As of 2014,
joint service agreements of one kind or another existed in at least 94 markets (almost half of the
210 local television DMAs throughout the country), and up from 55 in 2011. As of March 2019,
113. Specifically, Sinclair admits that “[c]ertain of [its] stations have entered into
agreements with other stations in the same market, through which [it] provide[s] programming
and operating services[,] . . . sales services[,] and other non-programming operating services.”
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conspire through industry associations such as the Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc.
(“TVB”), the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”), and the Media Rating Council
(“MRC”), conferences and meetings held by those associations, and merger negotiations.
115. Nexstar, Sinclair, and Tribune are members of the TVB. Nexstar’s President and
CEO serves as the Chairman of TVB. TVB is a “not-for-profit trade association representing
America’s $21 billion local broadcast television industry.” The TVB is designed to bring
116. Sinclair, Tribune, Meredith, and Nexstar are also members of the NAB, which
117. Nexstar’s Chairman, President and CEO, Sinclair’s President and CEO, Tribune’s
COO, Meredith’s President, and Cox Media Group’s Executive Vice President of Television, all
118. The President of Cox Media Group, owner of CoxReps, also serves on the NAB’s
Executive Committee. NAB hosts numerous meetings and other events for industry members
119. Nexstar, Sinclair, Tribune, and several other local television station owners are
120. The MRC boasts that one of the “[b]enefits of MRC [m]embership” is that
“[m]embers are exposed to other members’ ideas and thoughts” and that “[m]embers can attend
121. These invitations and opportunities to collude served to bolster and facilitate the
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122. As shown in Appendix A and alleged above, in the DMAs in which Defendants
purportedly compete they consistently hold dominant shares of the market, averaging 53 percent,
as high as 100 percent, and never any lower than 24 percent. Sinclair is the largest broadcast
company in the nation, while Nexstar and Tribune are among the top five.
123. As of 2017, Defendants in total owned 332 full-power stations, up 125 percent
from 147 stations in 2008. Defendants in total own 504 revenue generating stations, up over 200
percent from 158 stations in 2008. As discussed in more detail infra, a wave of consolidation and
station purchases has made some broadcast media owners considerably larger.
125. In response to decreased advertisement spending, the local television industry has
been consolidating in recent years. This consolidation of the industry continues “as station
owners look to increase their leverage with broadcast networks, which supply much of their
programming, and pay-TV distributors, which carry their channels.” In 2013, “big owners of
local TV stations got substantially bigger, thanks to a wave of station purchases.” That wave is
reflected in the following chart taken from a 2013 report by the Pew Research Center:
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127. Consolidation in the industry was also fueled by the proposed acquisition of
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Tribune by Sinclair, announced on May 8, 2017, which would have created the largest station
owner. Wary of Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) rejection of the deal, Sinclair
and Tribune submitted a revised version of the merger plan to antitrust regulators, whereby
Sinclair would acquire Tribune for $3.9 billion, forming a company that would own 215
broadcast television stations in 102 cities, reaching close to 60 percent of all United States
television households. Sinclair and Tribune jointly have extreme market penetration, with
Tribune currently reaching 43 percent of the nation’s households and Sinclair reaching 38
128. Indeed, analysts called the proposed merger between Sinclair and Tribune “a very
transformative acquisition” that would create “a broadcaster with as close to a national footprint
as you can get.” Sinclair’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Chris Ripley, echoed this belief,
stating the combined company would reach “72 percent of United States homes across 108
markets including 39 of the top 50” and “[t]his combination creates the largest TV broadcasting
129. The revised merger plan could only be accomplished by selling certain television
stations to reduce the number of households jointly reached by Tribune and Sinclair (which
currently is over 80 percent). However, Sinclair’s revised plan called for selling certain stations
to friends and other parties with whom it has a business relationship, for significantly less than
fair value, raising questions about whether Sinclair would actually continue to control these
stations.
130. The FCC expressed concerns that Sinclair did not intend to actually relinquish
control over television stations that it proposed to divest in order to comply with the National TV
Ownership rule, and that Sinclair had been less than candid with the FCC. Indeed, the FCC
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suspected that certain “‘sidecar agreements’ [ ] would allow Sinclair to retain control of stations
without owning them.” According to FCC Commissioner Michael O’Reilly, the vote to send the
merger to an administrative law judge was a “de facto merger death sentence.”
131. The failure of the Sinclair-Tribune merger led Nexstar to announce its intention to
acquire Tribune for over $4 billion in December of 2018. As one article noted:
****
132. Similarly, on June 25, 2018, as noted above, Gray TV agreed to buy Raycom in a
$3.65 billion deal that would create a company that reaches nearly a quarter of United States
television households. The combined company owns 142 television stations in 92 United States
markets, reaching 24 percent of television households and owning the third-largest number
stations.
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concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market
and then summing the resulting numbers. Here, the average HHI across the DMAs in which two
or more Defendants compete is 2,543 when considering ownership of stations and 2,713 when
134. The DOJ considers an HHI measure above 2,500 to be a highly concentrated
marketplace.
135. A collusive arrangement that raises product prices above competitive levels,
under basic economic principles, would normally tend to attract new entrants seeking to benefit
from the supracompetitive pricing, which in turn could erode prices. But there are significant,
even prohibitive, barriers to entry in the spot television broadcasting market that prevent entry
from eroding collusively increased profits. Thus, barriers to entry help facilitate the formation
136. New entrants planning to enter into broadcasting markets typically face six
critical barriers: (1) governmental policy; (2) the presence of dominant broadcasters; (3) access
to content; (4) audience behavior; (5) consumer costs; and (6) capital requirements.
restrict market access. The FCC issues licenses for television stations, and an entrant would be
required to petition the Commission to assign a new channel to a community. Moreover, the
FCC is not accepting any applications for new full power or television or LPTV stations until the
current spectrum repacking process is complete, which is not expected to happen until July 2020.
138. Responsible authorities take into account economic, as well as cultural and social,
factors when issuing broadcasting licenses that may lead to distortions of competition.
with their viewers and (most likely) also with advertisers. New entrants in the market would have
to offer a better deal than the existing broadcasters in order to usurp any market share.
Additionally, bigger companies have more clout to negotiate programming deals with networks
or syndicators. “If you wanted a decent seat at the table talking to those guys, you had to have
scale,” said Barry Lucas, Senior Vice-President of Research at the investment firm Gabelli & Co.
“Otherwise you were irrelevant and got pushed around.” A newer entrant to the market would
have to invest significant capital and time in establishing itself before it could work with
networks.
140. Additionally, successful entry into television broadcasting markets requires access
third parties. Acquisition of this content, which is critical to attract viewers, is likely to constitute
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advertising fees, must establish within a short period an audience base that will also attract a
new entrants must provide offers attractive enough to convince viewers to alter their already
existing patterns of viewing and channel choice—a task that proves to be difficult.
142. Finally, it would require considerable funding, time, and technical sophistication
for a potential market entrant to gain the economies of scale and audience base achieved by
Defendants necessary to compete in the market for broadcast television spot advertising. Where
the level of capital required is prohibitively high, it constitutes a significant barrier to entry.
143. For these reasons, there has not been meaningful recent entry into the industry.
Of the major local broadcast station owners, Nexstar and Raycom (recently acquired by Gray
TV), are the most recent to enter the industry, both in 1996. Many of the large station owners
have been in the industry since the 1940s and 1950s, including Tribune, Meredith, and Griffin.
144. Any applicable statute of limitations has been tolled by Defendants’ knowing and
active concealment of their unlawful conduct. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants
145. Plaintiffs and the Class members did not discover, nor could they have discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the existence of the conduct alleged herein prior to
146. Further, the very nature of Defendants’ conduct was secret and self-concealing.
Defendants engaged in secret market manipulation that could not be detected by Plaintiffs and
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the Class.
147. Throughout the Class Period, each of the publicly-traded Defendants made
various representations in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that
describe a competitive landscape in which they purport to vie for advertising revenue not only
with other spot television broadcast companies, but also with numerous other entities.
148. For example, in its Form 10-K Annual Report filed with the SEC in June 2015,
Meredith stated that its “television stations compete directly for advertising dollars and
programming in their respective markets with other local television stations, radio stations, cable
149. Sinclair consistently claimed in its Form 10-K Annual Reports that its “television
stations are located in highly competitive DMAs,” while Tribune consistently listed among its
main competitors the major networks and the “major broadcast television station owners,”
including Nexstar and Sinclair.” Nexstar made similar statements in its Form 10-K Annual
151. Additionally, Defendants had corporate codes of conduct that members of the
Class reasonably relied on to assume that they were complying with federal antitrust laws.
152. For example, Sinclair has a publicly-posted “Code of Business Conduct and
Ethics” that states that “Officers, directors and employees must comply with all laws, rules and
laws[.]”
153. Nexstar likewise has a public “Code of Business Conduct” that states:
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All employees must comply fully with the laws and regulations that
apply to the Company. When the application of such laws or
regulations is uncertain, employees are urged to seek the guidance
and advice of the General Manager or Chief Financial Officer.
Employees are expected to recognize this duty to society above and
beyond their obligations to the Company and their personal financial
interests. While the Company must compete vigorously to maximize
profits, Nexstar will at the same time do so in strict compliance with
all laws and regulations applicable to our activities. No employee
should at any time take any action on behalf of the Company, which
is known or should be known to violate any applicable law or
regulation.
154. Tribune has an extensive “Code of Ethics and Business Conduct” that spells out
****
155. Nexstar maintains a “Code of Ethics,” which was originally filed with the SEC on
March 31, 2004 by Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc. and incorporated as an exhibit to Nexstar’s
Annual Report for the year ending December 31, 2003 on Form 10-K. The “Code of Ethics”
states, “Each Relevant Officer owes a duty to the Company to act with integrity. . . . Specifically,
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each Relevant Officer must: . . . . Adhere to a high standard of business ethics and not seek
156. And Meredith has a “Code of Business Conduct and Ethics” that states:
We do not condone any act that violates the law, even when such
action appears to be in the Company's best interest.
157. These statements have now been demonstrated to be materially misleading; they
suggest that Defendants were law-abiding companies that recognized their antitrust obligations
and that Defendants and the broadcast television spot advertising market were functioning
competitively.
limitations affecting the Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ claims have been tolled.
159. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action under
Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following
Class:
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“Class Period”).10
160. While Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of members of the Class, Plaintiffs
believe the class size is numerous, and likely includes hundreds if not thousands of members.
161. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. This is
particularly true given the nature of Defendants’ unlawful anticompetitive conduct, which
focuses on the conduct of Defendants, not of any particular class member, and was generally
applicable to all the members of the Class, thereby making appropriate relief with respect to the
Class as a whole. Such questions of law and fact common to the Class include, but are not
limited to:
per se illegal;
▪ The duration of the alleged cartel, and the acts carried out by
10
Excluded from the Class are Defendants and Sales Rep Firms, their parent companies,
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, assigns, successors, agents, or co-
conspirators; the court, court staff, defense counsel, all respective immediate family members of
these excluded entities, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal
government, and states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
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overcharge damages.
162. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, and
Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs and all members
of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ unlawful conduct in that they paid artificially
inflated prices for broadcast television spot advertising time provided by Defendants.
163. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same common course of conduct giving rise to
the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiffs’ interests are coincident with and typical
of, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Class.
164. Plaintiffs have retained counsel with substantial experience litigating complex
antitrust class actions in myriad industries and courts throughout the nation.
165. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, including issues relating to liability and
damages.
166. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy, in that, among other things, such treatment will permit a large number of
similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously,
efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and expense that
numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class
mechanism, including providing injured persons or entities with a method for obtaining redress
for claims that it might not be practicable to pursue individually, substantially outweigh any
difficulties that may arise in management of this class action. Moreover, the prosecution of
separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or
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COUNT ONE
Price Fixing in Violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)
168. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.
169. During the Class Period, Defendants entered into and engaged in a contract,
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).
Defendants to fix, raise, stabilize or maintain at artificially high levels the prices they charged for
171. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured and will continue to be
injured in the form of overcharge damages paid for broadcast television spot advertising time
173. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages, their attorneys’
fee and costs, and an injunction against Defendants restraining the violations alleged herein.
COUNT TWO
Information Exchange in Violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)
174. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.
175. During the Class Period, Defendants entered into and engaged in a contract,
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restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).
sensitive information between and among Defendants, causing anticompetitive effects without
177. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured and will continue to be
injured in the form of overcharge damages paid for broadcast television spot advertising time
178. This conduct is unlawful under the per se standard or alternatively under a quick
179. As described above, the relevant product market affected adversely by the
challenged conduct is the market for broadcast television spot advertising and the relevant
geographic market is those DMAs where two or more Defendants compete, markets where
180. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages, their attorneys’
fee and costs, and an injunction against Defendants restraining the violations alleged herein.
A. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class action
under Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
B. The Court adjudge and decree that the acts of the Defendants are illegal and
unlawful, including the agreement, contract, combination, or conspiracy, and acts done in
furtherance thereof by Defendants and their co-conspirators be adjudged to have been a per se
violation (or alternatively illegal under a quick look or full-fledged rule of reason violation) of
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C. The Court permanently enjoin and restrain Defendants, their affiliates, successors,
transferees, assignees, and other officers, directors, agents, and employees thereof, and all other
persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf, from in any manner continuing, maintaining, or
renewing the conduct, contract, conspiracy, or combination alleged herein, or from entering into
any other contract, conspiracy, or combination having a similar purpose or effect, and from
adopting or following any practice, plan, program, or device having a similar purpose or effect;
Plaintiffs and members of the Class for treble the amount of damages sustained by Plaintiffs and
the Class as allowed by law, together with costs of the action, including reasonable attorneys’
fees, pre- and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate from and after the date of service
E. The Court award Plaintiffs and members of the Class such other and further relief
as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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rwozniak@fklmlaw.com
Megan E. Jones*
HAUSFELD LLP
600 Montgomery St. #3200
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 633-1908
Fax: (415) 358-4980
mjones@hausfeld.com
Michael D. Hausfeld**
Hilary K. Scherrer*
Melinda R. Coolidge*
HAUSFELD LLP
1700 K Street NW #650
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 540-7200
Fax: (202) 540-7201
mhausfeld@hausfeld.com
hscherrer@hausfeld.com
Hollis Salzman*
Meegan Hollywood**
Nathaniel Ament-Stone**
ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
399 Park Avenue, Suite 3600
New York, NY 10022
Tel: (212) 980-740
Fax: (212) 980-7499
hsalzman@robinskaplan.com
mhollywood@robinskaplan.com
nament-stone@robinskaplan.com
Kimberly A. Justice*
Geoffrey C. Jarvis*
Jonathan F. Neumann*
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KESSLER TOPAZ
MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
Tel: (610) 667-7706
Fax: (610) 667-7056
kjustice@ktmc.com
gjarvis@ktmc.com
jneumann@ktmc.com
Stephanie A. Scharf
SCHARF BANKS MARMOR LLC
333 West Wacker Drive, Suite 450
Chicago, IL 60606
Tel: (312) 726-6000
sscharf@scharfbanks.com
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Appendix A
DMAs with Multiple Defendants Present
No. DMA Defendants Present Plaintiffs Owned Operated Owned Operated
Purchased in Stations Stations Stations Stations
the DMA Market Market HHI HHI
During Class Share (%) Share (%)
Period
1. Abilene-Sweetwater, -Nexstar 79 94 3,392 4,602
TX*** -Sinclair Broadcast Group
-Tribune**
-Sinclair
55. Odessa-Midland, TX -Nexstar 50 50 2,563 2,563
-Gray (formerly Raycom)
56. Oklahoma City, OK -Griffin X 75 75 2,470 2,470
*** -Sinclair (from Sinclair
-Tribune and Tribune)
57. Paducah-Cape -Gray (formerly Raycom) X 46 46 2,932 2,932
Girardeau-Harrisburg, -Sinclair (from Sinclair)
MO
58. Panama City, FL -Gray (formerly Raycom) 45 45 3,070 4,220
-Nexstar
59. Peoria-Bloomington, -Nexstar X 38 44 3,944 4,301
IL*** -Sinclair (from Sinclair)
60. Phoenix-Prescott, AZ -Meredith 33 33 1,798 1,798
-Nexstar
61. Portland, OR -Meredith X 74 74 2,121 2,121
Vancouver, WA*** -Nexstar (from Sinclair)
-Tribune
-Sinclair
62. Providence-New -Nexstar X 71 85 2,853 3,713
Bedford, RI -Sinclair (from Sinclair)
63. Raleigh-Durham*** -Nexstar X 24 24 3,117 3,117
-Sinclair (from Sinclair)
64. Richmond-Petersburg, -Gray (formerly Raycom) X 95 95 2,386 2,402
VA*** -Nexstar (from Sinclair)
-Sinclair
-Tribune
65. Roanoke-Lynchburg, -Nexstar X 43 43 2,562 2,562
VA*** -Sinclair (from Sinclair)
66. Rochester, NY*** -Nexstar X 41 73 2633 3,571
-Sinclair (from Sinclair)
67. Salt Lake City-St. -Nexstar X 71 71 2,317 2,317
George, UT*** -Sinclair (from Sinclair)
-Tribune
68. San Angelo, TX*** -Nexstar 64 90 3,986 6,974
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-Sinclair
69. Savannah, GA -Gray (formerly Raycom) X 87 87 3,033 3,033
-Nexstar (from Sinclair)
-Sinclair
70. Seattle-Tacoma, WA -Sinclair X 42 42 2,058 2,058
-Tribune (from Sinclair)
71. Shreveport, LA -Gray (formerly Raycom) 45 45 2,764 2,764
-Nexstar
72. Sioux City, IA -Nexstar X 35 51 3,377 3,718
-Sinclair (from Sinclair)
73. Springfield-Holyoke, -Meredith 97 97 4,689 4,689
MA -Nexstar
74. St. Louis, MO*** -Meredith X 70 70 2,902 2,902
-Sinclair (from Sinclair
-Tribune and Tribune)
75. Syracuse, NY -Nexstar X 66 80 2,544 3,630
-Sinclair (from Sinclair)
Notes:
1
Revenue share and HHI figures are calculated based on 2017 spot advertising revenue. Station ownership status is also reflected as of
year-end 2017. Station operator status is only available as of the present day and present-day station operators are assumed to have
also operated the station in 2017, with the exception of the following: Tribune stations pending purchase by Nexstar are counted as
Tribune stations above. Raycom stations bought by Gray in January 2019 are counted as Raycom stations above. Sales representative
status is also only available as of the present day and present-day sales representatives are assumed to have also represented the station
in 2017.
* Defendant owned but did not operate at least one station in DMA.
** Defendant operated but did not own at least one station in DMA. Unless otherwise noted, Defendant-associated stations in the
DMA were both owned and operated by Defendants.
*** Cox or Katz worked with multiple Defendants in DMA.