Un contained Engine Failure

Description
Most gas turbine engine failures are “contained” which means that although
the components might separate inside the engine, they either remain within
the engine case or exit it via the tail pipe. This is a standard design feature
of all turbine engines and generally means that the failure of a single
engine on a multi engine aircraft will not present an immediate risk to the
safety of the ight. Sizable pieces of ejected debris may, though, present a
hazard to persons on the ground.
However, an “un contained” engine failure is likely to be a violent one, and
can be much more serious because engine debris exits it at high speeds in
other directions, posing potential danger to the pressurised aircraft
structure, adjacent engines, the integrity of the ight control system and,
possibly, directly to the aircraft occupants.
Defenses
Aircraft/engine design features to mitigate against the risks associated with
un contained engine failure include:
• Fan blade containment ring - to provide a measure of protection in the
event of fan blade separation,
• Aircraft systems "routing segregation" - covering both rotor burst and
rapid depressurization scenarios,
• Fuel tank "dry bays" located in the most likely disk trajectories.
Design and Certi cation Requirements
Un contained engine failures can affect both the fan and the turbine
sections; certi cation requirements and tests as well as related engine and
airframe designs account for both scenarios.
Certi cation requirements are "multi-layered" as they include the following
4 layers:
1. Systems safety assessment (e.g. FAR 25.1309),
2. Common cause analysis,
3. Particular risks analysis (e.g. engine "rotor burst"),
4. Zonal analysis (also involved in the un contained engine failure
assessment).
EASA
• CS-25 (Certi cation Speci cation Large Aeroplanes): The European
equivalent of FAR-25.
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fl
 The effects and rate of failure of an engine case rupture, un contained
engine rotor failure, engine case burn-through, and propeller debris release
are minimized by compliance with CS-E, Engines; CS-P, Propellers; CS
25.903(d)(1), CS 25.905(d), and CS 25.1193.
CS 25.903 (d) (1) reads as follows:
"(d) Turbine engine installations. For turbine engine installations - (1)
Design precautions must be taken to minimize the hazards to the
aeroplane in the event of an engine rotor failure or of a re originating
within the engine which burns through the engine case. (See AMC
25.903(d)(1) and AMC 20-128A.)"
AMC (Acceptable means of compliance) 25.903 (d) (1) is relative to
torching ames while AMC 20-128A sets forth a method of compliance with
the requirements of CS 23.901(f), 23.903(b)(1), 25.903(d)(1) and
25A903(d)(1) of the EASA Certi cation Speci cations (CS) pertaining to
design precautions taken to minimize the hazards to an aeroplane in the
event of un contained engine or auxiliary power unit (APU) rotor failures.
The guidance provided within this AMC is harmonized with that of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
AMC 20-128 A is a signi cant document that provides background
information, de nitions, design considerations, accepted design practices;
engine and APU failure model and considerations for safety analysis.
The paragraph on design considerations addresses location of engine and
APU, location of critical systems and component, external shields and
de ectors.
The paragraph on accepted design practices identi es design practices
that address the risks of uncontrolled re, loss of thrust, loss of aircraft
control, passenger and crew incapacitation, loss of structural integrity.
These design practices currently in use by the aviation industry that have
been shown to reduce the overall risk, by effectively eliminating certain
speci c risks and reducing the remaining speci c risks to a minimum level.
• EASA CS-E.510 (Certi cation Speci cations - Engines - Safety
Analysis) - Aircraft-level Failure classi cations are not directly
applicable to Engine assessments since the aircraft may have
features that could reduce or increase the consequences of an
Engine Failure condition. Additionally, the same type-certi cated
Engine may be used in a variety of installations, each with different
aircraft-level Failure classi cations. CS-E 510 de nes the Engine-
level Failure conditions and presumed severity levels.
fl
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 FAA
• US FAR 33[footnote 1] covers engine certi cation aspects.
• US FAR 25.XXXX[footnote 2] covers engine installation and airframe
design aspects.
Damage Assessment
Each un contained failure will result in a “unique” combination of collateral
damage to the aircraft and there will be little, if any, guidance in the AFM for
dealing with this type of potential failure. The aircrew must, therefore, be
especially vigilant when dealing with an un contained engine failure. The
engine failure itself should be dealt with IAW the manufacturer’s prescribed
shutdown procedures. However, it is the collateral damage that carries the
greater potential risk and that will require creative pilot assessment to
ensure a positive outcome is achieved.
Structural Integrity
Loss of pressurisation, if a factor, would have to be dealt with in the usual
fashion; however, the pilots must be cognizant of the fact that the structural
integrity of the aircraft may have been compromised and control the aircraft
speed and drag devices accordingly.
False Indications and Warnings
Severed wire bundles may result in false indications and warnings,
potentially for other engines or aircraft systems. The pilots must use all
means at their disposal to con rm the validity of those indications before
actioning any emergency checklists.
Fuel Leaks and Fire Risk
Uncontrollable fuel leakage due to ruptured fuel lines or tanks may be
present. Fuel system isolation measures to ensure that fuel from unaffected
tanks is not lost would have to be taken. The additional re risk, both in
ight and post landing, would need to be considered and normal
procedures such as use of reverse thrust modi ed accordingly.
Loss of Hydraulic Fluid
Loss of hydraulic uid due to severed pipes can lead to degradation in ight
controls, loss of the ability to extend lift devices such as aps or slats and
the ability to raise or lower the landing gear in the normal fashion. These
factors can have a great impact on approach speed, landing distance and
go around performance and must be considered in the diversion decision.
Aircraft Handling
Flight control response and aircraft handling characteristics, especially as
the aircraft con guration is changed, may have been compromised by the
fl
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
fl
 damage caused by the engine failure. Note that “ y by wire” aircraft may
mask some of the degraded handling symptoms and make them more
dif cult to assess.
Passenger and Crew Management
Throughout all of this process, the crew and passengers must be reassured
and kept apprised of the time to landing and, if warranted, directed to
prepare for any potential post landing evacuation.
Time
As in the case of all engine failures, getting the aircraft safely on the ground
is a priority. However, in the case of an un contained failure the complexity
of the problem is signi cantly greater and both the pilots and controllers
should recognize that additional airborne time may be required to achieve a
positive outcome to the event.
Investigation
All un contained engine failures involving transport category aircraft are
likely to be investigated under ICAO Annex 13 procedures at least in the
principal aviation jurisdictions.
Un contained Engine Failure Events
• A388, en-route Batam Island Indonesia, 2010: On 4 November 2010,
an Airbus A380-800 being operated by Qantas on a ight in day VMC
from Changi Airport, Singapore to Sydney, Australia was passing
7,000 ft in the climb when the No 2 engine suddenly suffered an un
contained failure and a return to Singapore followed.
• B762, Los Angeles USA, 2006: On June 2, 2006, an American
Airlines Boeing 767-200ER tted GE CF6-80A engines experienced
an un contained failure of the high pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1
disc in the No. 1 engine during a high-power ground run carried out in
designated run up area at Los Angeles for maintenance purposes
during daylight normal visibility conditions. The three maintenance
personnel on board the aircraft as well as two observers on the
ground were not injured but both engines and the aircraft sustained
substantial damage from the fuel-fed re which occurred as an
indirect result of the failure.
• A320, Toronto Canada, 2000: On 13 September, an Airbus A320-200
being operated by Canadian airline Sky service on a domestic
passenger charter ight from Toronto to Edmonton was departing in
day VMC when, after a “loud bang and shudder” during rotation,
evidence of left engine malfunction occurred during initial climb and
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fl
fl
 the ight crew declared an emergency and returned for an immediate
overweight landing on the departure runway which necessitated
navigation around several pieces of debris, later con rmed as the fan
cowlings of the left engine. There were no injuries to the occupants.
• DC10, Sioux City USA, 1989: On 19 July 1989, a United Airlines
DC-10 (Flight 232), after earlier improper inspection, suffered an un
contained engine failure which led to loss of hydraulic systems and
Loss of Control during an attempted emergency landing, which was
followed by a post crash re.
• B732, Manchester UK, 1985: On 22nd August 1985, a B737-200
operated by British Air-tours, a wholly-owned subsidiary of British
Airways, suffered an un contained engine failure, with re spreading
to the fuselage during the rejected take off, causing rapid destruction
of the aircraft before many of the occupants had evacuated.
• B752, Las Vegas NV USA, 2008: On 22 December 2008, a Boeing
757-200 departing Las Vegas for New York JFK experienced sudden
failure of the right engine as take off thrust was set and the aircraft
was stopped on the runway for re services inspection. Fire service
personnel observed a hole in the bottom of the right engine nacelle
and saw a glow inside so they discharged a re bottle into the nacelle
through the open pressure relief doors. The failed engine was found
to have experienced an un contained release of high pressure turbine
material.
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi