D.P.Chadha v.

Triyugi Narain
Mishra
[Professional misconduct: Misuse of forged documents, concluding a
compromise decree]

2001 2 SCC 221

Vinitha Johnson [419]

Vishruti Vijay [420]
Abhimanyu Redhu [421]
FACTUAL MATRIX
 Factual Matrix
 Upasana Construction filed a suit for ejectment against Sri Triyugi
Narain Mishra (hereinafter, complainant).
 Shri D.P. Chadha was engaged by the complainant for defending him
in the suit.
 While the proceedings in the ejectment suit were going Triyugi
Narain Mishra was contesting an election in the State of U.P.
 Forgery and Misuse of Documents
 Shri D.P. Chadha was in possession of blank vakalatnama and blank
paper(both signed by Sri. Triyugi Narain Mishra) with Shri D.P.
Chadha
 The blank paper was used for fabricating a compromise petition which
resulted in the complainant having to suffer the decree for eviction.
 Blank vakalatnama was used to appoint Shri. Anil Sharma, an
advocate who got the compromise verified.
 Court Procedure
 On 23.7.1994, the Trial Judge, left with no other option, passed
a decree in terms of compromise in the presence of Shri Rajesh
Jain & Shri Anil Sharma, advocates.
 The decree directed the suit premises to be vacated by 30.11.1993
(the date stated in the compromise petition).
 Appeal to Apex Court under Section 38 of the Bar Council Act,
1961.
ISSUES
1. Term of Suspension
2. Compromise Deed
1. Professional Proving a compromise
petition to the satisfaction of the court.
2. Trial court requiring personal
presence of defendant
3. Misconduct in concluding a
compromise petition
4. Challenging the record of
proceedings of the court.
COMPROMISE PETITION:
CONTENT
 Forgery and Misuse of Documents
 Signed by both concerned advocates
 Rajesh Jain, advocate on behalf of the plaintiff
 Shri Anil Sharma, advocate on behalf of the
defendant.

i. Accompanied by receipt executed by the

complainant acknowledging receipt of an
amount of Rs.5 lakhs by way of damages for the
loss of school building standing on the premises.
i. Not mentioned in the compromise petition
ii. The compromise petition was typed but the date
20.11.1993 is written in hand.
iii. A revenue stamp of 20 p. was fixed in a wrong
place.
COMPROMISE DECREE:
POWERS OF TRIAL COURT
 Owing to the suspicious nature of the contents present,
the learned Additional Civil judge directed the parties to
remain personally present to verify the compromise.
 The advocate for the plaintiffs filed a miscellaneous civil
appeal raising the plea the trial court was not justified in
directing personal appearance of the parties.
 Shri D.P. Chadha, advocate appeared on behalf of the
defendant and argued that personal presence of Shri Triyugi
Narain Mishra was not required for verification of
compromise and the presence of the advocate was enough
for the court to verify the compromise and take the same on
record.
 The court was requested to recall its earlier order directing
personal appearance of the parties.
 The trial court suspected the conduct of the counsel and
passed a detailed order directing personal presence of the
defendant to be secured before the court.
 The trial court also directed a notice to be issued to the
defendant for his personal appearance on the next date of
hearing before passing any order on the compromise
petition.
COMPROMISE DEED:
PRINCIPLES
 “There is nothing certain about a law-suit
except the expense of it”
 If a vakalatnama authorises a pleader to
effect a compromise he is authorised to do
so and if he enters into the compromise, it
cannot be said that was bad as he did not
obtain his client’s consent to the
compromise. AIR 1951 A. 459
 An advocate by virtue of his position holds
the power to effect a compromise and as
such any specific authority to hold it is not
necessary to be called for. AIR 1947 A. 382.
ALLEGATIONS OF
“PROFESSIONAL
 Shri Triyugi Narain Mishra, the
MISCONDUCT”
complainant following the decree
dated 23.7.1994, moved the State
Bar Council complaining of the
professional misconduct of the three
advocates who had colluded to bring
the false compromise in existence
without his knowledge and also
made all effort to prevent the
complainant gathering knowledge of
the alleged compromise.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF
OF THE APPELLANT
 Shri D.P. Chadha, advocate took the
plea that he was not aware of the
compromise petition.
 He never obtained blank paper or blank
vakalatnama.
 He also submitted that on 8.4.1994 his
presence has been wrongly recorded in
the proceedings.
 He had not appeared before the court to
argue that the personal presence of the
parties was not required for verification of
compromise petition.
PART I: COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
 1976 Amendment in Order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C.
requires an agreement or compromise between the
parties to be in writing and signed by the parties.
 There is still an implied authority of counsel to
compromise or agree on matters relating to the
parties.
 The trial court can still stipulate the need to check
the genuineness of the compromise decree.
•  The crucial issue in the case was not the
authority of a counsel to enter into a
compromise, settlement or adjustment on
behalf of the client. The real issue was of the
satisfaction of the court whether the defendant
had really,and as a matter of fact, entered into
settlement.
• [Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union of India AIR
1991 SC 2234]
CPC PROVISIONS-
SATISFACTION OF COURT
 Order 23, Rule 3 of the C.P.C reads as under-
ON COMPROMISE
Compromise DECREE
of suit. __ Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or
compromise, in writing and signed by the parties, or
where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect
of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the
suit, the Court shall order such agreement,
compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall
pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it
relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the
subject matter of the agreement, compromise or
satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the
suit.
 CPC (Amendment Act) 1976 [Order III, R. 1. CPC]
 Any appearance... or by a pleader appearing applying or
acting as the case may be on his behalf.
 Provided that any such appearance shall if the court so
desires be made by the party in person.
RECORD OF COURT
PROCEEDINGS
 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS MADE BY THE COURT IS
SACROSANCT
 State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak AIR 1982 SC
1249
 “... The Judges’ record was conclusive. Neither lawyer nor
litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge
himself, but nowhere else. The Court did not launch into inquiry
as to what transpired in the High Court. The Court is bound to
accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment,
as to what transpired in the Court. It cannot allow the statement
of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by
affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment
that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has
to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled
that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing
recorded in the judgment of the Court are conclusive of the
facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by
affidavit or other evidence.
PROCEDURE FOR
RECTIFICATION
Somasundaran
 v. Subramanian
reiterated by the Apex Court in the
case of D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi
Narain Mishra
◦ “It is settled law that the statement of
facts recorded by a Court or Quasi-Judicial
Tribunal in its proceedings as regards the
matters which transpired during the
hearing before it would not be permitted
to be assailed as incorrect unless steps are
taken before the same forum."
PART II: PRINCIPLES OF MISCONDUCT

 Definition of Misconduct
 Tenuous Definition of Misconduct
 Obligations of a Lawyer
 Deception and “Misleading the Court”
 Record of the Proceedings made
by the court is sacrosanct.
 Counsel’s Duty to Assist Court
 Responsibility of counsel in divorce
litigations.
 Duty to inform the court of the
correct position of law
MISCONDUCT:
DEFINITION
Law is no trade, briefs no merchandise.
 The term 'misconduct' has not been defined in the Act.
 It is an expression with a sufficiently wide meaning.
 In view of the prime position which the advocates occupy in the
process of administration of justice and justice delivery system, the
courts justifiably expect from the lawyers a high standard of
professional and moral obligation in the discharge of their duties.
 Any act or omission on the part of a lawyer which interrupts or
misdirects the sacred flow of justice or which renders a professional
unworthy of right to exercise the privilege of the profession would
amount to misconduct attracting the wrath of disciplinary jurisdiction.
 In the Bar Council of Iyer, J. said that the vital role of the lawyer
depends upon his probity and professional lifestyle. [Bar Council of
Maharashtra v. MV Dabholkar]
 The central function of the legal profession is to promote the
administration of justice. As monopoly to legal profession has been
statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe
scrupulously those norms which make him worthy of confidence of
community in him as a vehicle of justice - social justice.
 The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to
thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be crystalised
into rigid rules but felt by the collective conscience of the
practitioners as right.
Misconduct: Burden of Proof
and Term of Suspension
The burden of proof for alleging
misconduct is very high….
“proved it to the hilt”.
Professional Misconduct:
The Contours
 In George Frier Grahame v. Attorney General,
Fiji AIR 1936 PC 224, the Privy Council
approved the following definition of
“professional misconduct” given by Darling J.
In Re A Solicitor ex parte Law Society, (1912)
1 KB 302-
 “If it is shown that an Advocate in the pursuit
of his profession has done something with
regard to it which would be reasonably
regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by
his professional brethren of good repute and
competency, then it is open to say that he is
guilty of professional misconduct.”
Deception and “Misleading
the Court”
No controversy must not be dragged into doubt solely with a view
to confuse or mislead the Judge and thereby gaining an undue
advantage to the client to which he may not be entitled. Such
conduct of an advocate becomes worse when a view of the law
canvassed by him is not only unsupportable in law but if
accepted would damage the interest of the client and confer an
illegitimate advantage on the opponent. In such a situation the
wrong of the intention and impropriety of the conduct is more
than apparent.

Professional misconduct is grave when it consists of betraying the

confidence of a client and is gravest when it is a deliberate
attempt at misleading the court or an attempt at practising
deception or fraud on the court. The client places his faith and
fortune in the hands of the Counsel for the purpose of that case;
the court places its confidence in the Counsel in case after case
and day after day. A client dissatisfied with his Counsel may
change him but the same is not with the court. And so the bondage
of trust between the court and the Counsel admits of no breaking.
MISCONDUCT:
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
 Obligations of a Lawyer
“A lawyer in discharging his professional assignment
has a duty to his client, a duty to his opponent, a duty
to the court, a duty to the society at large and a duty
to himself. It needs a high degree of probity and
poise to strike a balance and arrive at the place of
righteous stand more so when there are conflicting
claims.”
“While discharging duty to the court, a lawyer should
never knowingly be a party to any deception, design
or fraud. While placing the law before the court a
lawyer is at liberty to put forth a proposition and
canvass the same to the best of his wits and ability so
as to persuade an exposition which would serve the
interest of his client so long as the issue is capable of
that resolution by adopting a process of reasoning.”
Part III: Section 37 of the
Advocates Act, 1961
 Section 37 : Appeal to the bar council
of India
It has a proviso which states that no
order of the disciplinary committee of
the state bar council shall be varied by
the disciplinary committee of the bar
council of india so as to prejudicially
effect the person aggrieved without
giving him reasonable opportunity of
being heard.
Contd.
Wide powers of the bar council under
Section 37.

An order enhancing the punishment ,

being an order prejudicially affecting
the advocate , the proviso mandates
the exercise of such power to be
embodied in the rules of fair hearing.
The advocate was not heard in the
above instance hence , punishment
cannot be enhanced.
PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT:
PRINCIPLES

APPLIED IN
Tenuous Definition of Misconduct
“For the practice of Law with expanding activist horizons,

FUTURE JUDGMENTS
professional ethics cannot be contained in a Bar Council rule
nor in traditional cant in the books but in new canons of
conscience which will command the members of the calling
of justice to obey rules of morality and utility, clear in the
crystallized case-law and concrete when tested on the
qualms of high norms simple enough in given situations,
though involved when expressed in a single sentence.”
 Duty to inform the court of the correct position of law
 The Supreme Court held that a lawyer must not hesitate in telling the court
the correct position of law when it is undisputed and admits of no exception.
 The obligation of a counsel flows from the confidence reposed by the court in
the counsel. The counsel, being an officer of court, ought to apprise the Judge
with the correct position of law whether for or against either party.
 [Anil Chuttani v. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation [MANU/DE/1263/2010]]
 Relations between Bar and Bench
“...Mutual confidence in the discharge of duties and cordial relations between
Bench and Bar smoothen the movement of the chariot. As responsible officers
of the Court, as they are called ---- and rightly, the counsel have an overall
obligation of assisting the Courts in a just and proper manner in the just and
proper administration of justice.”
 [Smt. Poonam v. Sumit Talwar AIR 2010 SC 1384]