Asmis - Cicero Respublica As Partnership

THE STATE AS A PARTNERSHIP: CICERO’S DEFINITION
OF RES PUBLICA IN HIS WORK ON THE STATE
Elizabeth Asmis1
Abstract: This paper argues that Cicero develops a new view of the state as a part-
nership in his work De republica. Like any other partnership, the Roman state is
upheld by the agreement of its members and an allocation of rewards that is propor-
tionate to the contributions. Cicero sketches an outline of this view in his definition of
this state. By focusing on how Cicero uses the definition in the construction of his
argument, the paper attempts to uncover a detailed view of the state as a partnership.
The ancestral Roman constitution, Cicero argues, surpasses all other constitutions in
offering the best division of contributions and rewards. Although the state is held
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
together by the agreement of the whole people, there is an enormous disparity in the
assessment of contributions and rewards among different social groups.
Copyright (c) Imprint Academic
Cicero’s definition of the state in his book On the State (De re publica, usually
translated as On the Republic) is one of the most highly discussed definitions
to have come down to us from Greco-Roman antiquity. For classical scholars,
the main focus of attention has been the question: how original is the defini-
tion? In particular, how much is it indebted to Greek political thought and how
much does it owe to the Roman context? In the past fifty years, Aristotle has
won out over the Stoics as the main Greek influence. At the same time, there
has been an increasing focus on the Roman or Ciceronian features. There is
now a consensus that Cicero develops an original point of view with the help
of Greek sources.2
1 Department of Classics, The University of Chicago, 1010 East 59th Street,

Chicago, IL 60637, USA. Email: e-asmis@uchicago.edu. Unless otherwise noted, all
translations are by the author.
2 The current emphasis on the originality of Cicero’s definition may be traced to
V. Pöschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero (Berlin, 1936).
Pöschl concluded on the basis of a detailed overview of Greek sources that Cicero
fused Platonic thought with Roman political reality in an original way (p. 173).
H. Drexler turned the study of Cicero’s definition in a new direction by a detailed study
of the meaning of res and res publica; see H. Drexler, ‘Respublica’, Maia, 9 (1957), pp.
247–81, and 10 (1958), pp. 3–37. Drexler concludes (Vol. 10, pp. 35–7) that it is a dis-
tinctively Roman concept, referring to a reality shaped by leaders rather than an arrange-
ment. K. Büchner emphasizes that Cicero views the state as a common enterprise
(‘Gemeinwesen’) that confers self-fulfilment and dignity on each individual citizen. See
K. Büchner, ‘Die beste Verfassung’, in Studien zur Römischen Literatur, Vol. 2
(Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 25–115, esp. pp. 81 and 92–3; and K. Büchner, M. Tullius
Cicero, De re publica (Heidelberg, 1984), p. 124. H.P. Kohns likewise considers the
definition to be fundamentally Roman; see H.P. Kohns, ‘Consensus iuris — communio
utilitatis (zu Cic. rep. I 39)’, Gymnasium, 81 (1974), pp. 485–98, and H.P. Kohns, ‘Prima
causa coeundi. Zu Cic. rep. I 39’, Gymnasium, 83 (1976), pp. 209–14. M. Schofield,
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXV. No. 4. Winter 2004
570 E. ASMIS
This paper is an attempt to probe Cicero’s originality further. I will suggest

that Cicero develops a new view of the state as a partnership. This view is
based on a distinctively Roman conception of partnership. Like all partner-
ships, the state is upheld by the common agreement of its members and an
allocation of rewards that is proportionate to the contributions. As a partner-
ship of the whole people, it sets a standard of cooperation for all associations
within the state.
In order to track down this conception, it is necessary to pay attention to the
way Cicero constructs his argument. In the past, scholars have been inclined to
decode the meaning of the definition by gathering elements that occur any-
where in the text. This aggregative procedure ignores the purpose of the defini-
tion in Cicero’s argument. This purpose is twofold: one is logical; the other is
practical; and the latter enfolds the former. The logical purpose is to offer an
undisputed starting-point for discussion; the practical purpose is to lead to a

solution to the current, urgent problem of disunity in the state. Cicero uses the
definition as a basis for working out both a theoretical and a practical solution.
As such, the definition must be distinguished from the conclusions that follow.
As a logical starting-point of discussion, the definition serves as a fixed
standard for answering the question: what is the best ‘condition’, or ‘constitu-
tion’, of a state?3 The definition is agreed upon by all on the basis of their
experience. It is a prerequisite of philosophical argument, not a result. Philo-
sophical argument is used subsequently as a means of determining what type
of government is best. The best type of government, it turns out, is the Roman
mixed constitution. This constitution offers not only a fair division of contri-
butions and rewards, but also the best division.
The practical purpose extends throughout the text. Cicero proposes to answer
the question ‘what is the best constitution’ as the first step towards the task of
restoring unity to the state. Once the best form of government has been
revealed, a policy must be developed in order to put it in place. The definition
together with the argument that follows is embedded in the larger purpose of
healing the civic partnership.
In this paper, I will first sketch the practical background to the theoretical
investigation. The central part of the paper consists of two parts: a study of
focusing on the expression res populi, argues that Cicero uses the concept of property to
offer the first criterion of legitimacy for a regime in Greco-Roman antiquity; see
M. Schofield, ‘Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica’, in Cicero the Philosopher, ed.
J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 1995), pp. 63–84. I add detailed discussion below. On the Greek
influences, see note 60 below.
3 I use the term ‘constitution’ throughout as signifying the organization of a state or,
as Cicero calls it, ‘condition of the state’ (status civitatis, 1.33–34, rei publicae status
1.42, M. Tullius Cicero, de re publica, ed. K. Ziegler (7th edn., Leipzig, 1969)). In other
works, Cicero uses the expression status civitatis (rei publicae status) more widely to
signify simply the condition (‘state’) of the state (e.g. In Catilinam, 1.3, De lege agraria,
2.8).
CICERO’S DEFINITION OF RES PUBLICA 571
Cicero’s definition as a starting-point of investigation; and a study of the

argument that is based on the definition. I will follow up with a brief compari-
son of Cicero’s definition and procedure with Greek antecedents. Last, I shall
offer some conclusions on what is new about Cicero’s conception of the state.
The Practical Problem

Cicero wrote the State in the years 54 to 51 BCE. It consists of six books,
depicting a fictional conversation at the rural estate of Scipio Aemilianus, the
greatest Roman military commander of his time and a leading statesman, in
the year 129 BCE. Each pair of books is prefaced by a prologue written by
Cicero in his own voice. Only about a third or fourth of the text is preserved;
most of the preserved part belongs to the first three books, which are most rel-
evant to this study.

The practical problem dominates the dialogue from the very beginning.
Cicero begins with a casual prelude that turns abruptly to a consideration of
the political turmoil that is raging at Rome. As Scipio’s friends — four senior
statesman and four junior associates — arrive at Scipio’s country home, their
talk focuses on an astronomical curiosity: the reported sighting of two suns.
While they linger on questions of astronomy, one member of the group,
Scipio’s closest friend Laelius, cannot contain himself any longer: why dis-
cuss those two suns in the sky when, before our very eyes, ‘in one state (in una
republica), there are now virtually two senates and two peoples’ (1.31). The
tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, together with his death, has divided ‘a single
people into two parts (populum unum in duas partes)’. One side contains lead-
ers who are ‘highly seditious’; the ‘good’ (boni) are in a state of disarray.
Amid this great danger, Scipio alone can help; but he is hindered by his oppo-
nents in the senate. Even though it is a difficult task, Laelius concludes, it is
possible to bring it about that ‘we have the senate and people as one’ (senatum
. . . et populum ut unum habeamus, 1.32) ; and we will live ‘better and more
happily’ (melius . . . et beatius) if this is brought about.
The two suns, it turns out, serve as a symbol for the division of the state into
two parts. This is a vertical division, so to speak, splitting the senate together
with the people into a part that aims to preserve the state and a part that would
destroy it. Cicero’s Laelius is convinced that help is possible, even though dif-
ficult. Citing the Aristotelian ideal of happiness and the good life, Laelius
seeks a practical solution to a present problem.
Laelius’ vehemence has the effect of turning the group into a quasi-political
assembly. One of the junior members rises to the challenge. He asks: ‘What
should we learn in order to bring this about?’ Laelius replies pointedly: learn-
ing skills that are useful to the state. Then he puts a proposal to Scipio, the
highest-ranking member of the group: ‘Let us ask (rogemus) Scipio to explain
what he thinks is the best constitution (statum civitatis)’ (1.33). Laelius
expresses the hope that Scipio’s answer, followed by other inquiries, will lead
572 E. ASMIS
to an explanation of the present situation. The other senior members approve

Laelius’ proposal. Laelius then cites Scipio’s credentials: it is right ‘for the
pre-eminent leader of the state to speak about the state’ (de republica
potissimum principem reipublicae dicere); further, Scipio used to have fre-
quent discussions with two Greeks, Polybius and Panaetius, both very experi-
enced in politics, in which he argued that the Roman constitution was by far
the best (1.34).4 Laelius sums up his proposal by asking Scipio to explain his
thoughts ‘about the state’, de re publica.
Laelius’ use of the term rogare signals the change to a political assembly.
Traditionally in Roman politics, the presiding officer of the senate initiates
debate by stating the issue, then asking the opinion (rogare sententiam) of the
members of the senate, beginning with the leader of the senate, princeps
senatus. In Cicero’s discussion, Laelius takes over the function of presiding
officer by proposing a subject and asking Scipio for his opinion. As princeps
rei publicae, Scipio acts like a princepts sentatus as the head of a deliberative
body that has taken temporary refuge at his estate.

The question ‘what is the best constitution?’ is the basic topic of ancient
political theory, beginning with Plato. Laelius in effect invites Scipio to
crown an illustrious Greek tradition on the basis of his Roman political
achievements, together with his experience in debating with two Greeks,
Polybius and Panaetius. Despite the continuity with Greek tradition, the
emphasis on political experience, together with the political trappings of the
debate and the immediate practical aim, mark the discussion as a distinctively
Roman endeavour. The aim is not simply to determine what the best constitu-
tion is, but rather to determine how the Roman state can be prevented from
collapsing under the present strain of disunity.
Laelius gives special urgency to the discussion by asking Scipio to speak de
republica. Traditionally, the Roman senate debated de republica, or de summa
republica, at times when the very survival of the state was at stake.5 In this con-
text, the underlying meaning of res publica as ‘public interest’ comes to pre-
dominate.6 This sense creates a strong presumption of unity: just as the public
interest is necessarily one, so the political structure does not admit of division.
Scipio consents to Laelius’ proposal with appropriate modesty. Stressing
his Roman experience, he says he doesn’t dare prefer what he says to what the
4 Both Greeks owed much of their political experience to their association with
Scipio. Polybius joined the household of Scipio as a political prisoner, Panaetius joined
Scipio as philosophical mentor.
5 See T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht (Leipzig, 1887), Vol. 3.2, p. 956, n. 3. For
example, Cicero (In Catilinam, 3.13) consulted the senate de summa re publica (‘the
supreme public interest’) when the Catilinarian conspiracy was exposed. As Mommsen
explains, the senate probably also debated de re publica at the beginning of each year
with special reference to the annual mobilization of troops.
6 Similarly, the familiar expression contra rem publicam means ‘against the public
interest’.
Greeks say, even though he is not satisfied with their writings. His consent is
seconded by Philus, another senior statesman, who adds further praise: allud-
ing to Scipio’s military successes, he says that Scipio has outdone all Romans
in ‘the greatest affairs of state’ (in re publica rerum maximarum, 1.37). Con-
tinuing the exchange of courtesies, Scipio responds by accepting the ‘very
heavy burden’ of speaking about ‘great affairs’ (magnis . . . rebus). Talking
about ‘great affairs’, like achieving the greatest deeds, is to engage in affairs
of state. Just as Scipio previously promoted the public interest by military
action, so now he is to rescue the public interest by political policy. Philus
responds by reassuring Scipio that his discussion de re publica will be ‘much
richer’ than any Greek discussion. Scipio is clearly a mask adopted by Cicero
to present his own, rich contributions to political philosophy.7
The debate as a whole, then, is a constitutional debate which will consider
the general question ‘what is the best state?’ as a means of solving the im-
mediate problem of restoring unity to the Roman state. Sequestered in
Scipio’s rural estate, the group as a whole serves as a kind of shadow senate,
working out a policy for saving the state.
The Definition
The first question that needs to be answered is: ‘What is the state’? Scipio
asserts the answer without proof or discussion; and his friends immediately
accept it. Showing a familiarity with Greek philosophy, he not only defines
the topic of the discussion, but also prefaces the definition with an explanation
of the need for it (1.38). In all discussions, he explains, the topic must be
agreed upon at the outset in order that error may be avoided. First, the name is
agreed upon. After this, ‘what’ (quid) is meant by the name must be ‘unfolded’
(explicetur). Only if this explication is agreed upon, can the discussion begin;
for ‘what’ a thing is must be understood before it can be understood ‘what sort
of thing’ (quale) it is. Since the topic of discussion is res publica, he will first
state what it is.
As Cicero illustrates repeatedly in his philosophical writings, it became
standard procedure in the Hellenistic period to begin a philosophical discus-
sion with a definition. This is an adaptation of a procedure recommended by
Plato. As Cicero points out in De finibus (2.3–5), Plato demanded in the
Phaedrus that, in order to avoid error, all participants in a discussion must
agree on the topic before discussing it. In the case of terms that are in dispute,
7 This does not prevent there being some difference of opinion between Cicero and
his character. Throughout his depiction of Scipio, Cicero, as narrator, preserves a certain
ironic distance from Scipio through the comments he puts in the mouth of other charac-
ters. Most conspicuously, he hints at some excess in Scipio’s enthusiasm for Roman his-
tory (2.22, cf. 3.42). What Cicero and Scipio share is a commitment to the ancestral,
mixed constitution.
574 E. ASMIS
a definition must be agreed upon.8 The aim of the definition is to provide an

unambiguous, fixed standard by reference to which the issue is judged.
Cicero’s Scipio adapts the Platonic precept by drawing a distinction between
‘what’ and ‘what sort’. The definition shows ‘what’ the state is; subsequent
argument based on the definition will show ‘what sort’ of thing the state is. It
is assumed that when we know what qualities a state has, we will know what
sort of state is best.
Although the text is not explicit on this point, Scipio expects that his defini-
tion will command the assent not only of everyone who is present, but also of
anyone at all. In the Hellenistic period, a definition that was agreed upon by
human beings in general was considered true. The reason is that it corre-
sponds to a common, naturally formed conception.9 The advantage of a defi-
nition based on universal agreement is that it provides true premises for
arguments leading to true conclusions. Unlike Plato, who is willing to aban-

don an initial definition, Scipio treats his initial definition as a bedrock of
truth upon which all his conclusions depend. Apart from philosophical argu-
ment, initial definitions that all could agree upon were used in legal pleading.
Cicero describes them as ‘brief’ statements that unfold an ordinary concep-
tion.10
A definition that corresponds to a common conception differs from a defi-
nition that has been obtained by philosophical argument. In Aristotelian ter-
minology, the initial definition is a nominal definition, as opposed to a causal
definition. A nominal definition shows what the word means; a causal defini-
tion reveals the basic nature of a thing by showing what makes it what it is.11
Scipio, we shall see, draws a distinction between his definition of the state and
the cause of a state.
Immediately after announcing his procedure, Scipio puts a limit to follow-
ing the Greeks. He won’t outline the elements of the state by tracing its origin
to the first couple; nor will he offer frequent definitions. For ‘the topic is so
clear and so well known’ that there is no need to do so. Making a pointed
8 Plato, Phaedrus, 237b–d, 263a–d, and 265d; see also Cicero, On Duties, 1.7.
9 Both the Epicureans and the Stoics distinguished between an initial conception
(provlhyiÀ), which is formed naturally in humans and is true, and a technically elabo-
rated conception, which is obtained by argument on the basis of initial conceptions. On
the Epicureans, see E. Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 39–47.
According to Augustine, the Stoics held that it is the job of a definition to ‘unfold’
(explicare) the common conception (called provlhyiÀ, ‘preconception’) that all humans
have by nature (Augustine, City of God, 8.7, = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (hereafter,
SVF), ed. Hans von Arnim (Leipzig, 1903–24), 2.106); cf. SVF, 2.83.
10 Cicero, De inventione, 2.53; De oratore, 1.189–90; cf. Ad Herennium, 2.17 and
4.35. In De partitione oratoria, Cicero distinguishes the kinds of cases for which defini-
tions must be used (33) and recommends that the definitions should ‘unfold’ the ordinary
sense of the term (123–6).
11 See esp. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.10.
contrast between the learned (docti) and those who have practical wisdom
(prudentes), Scipio says that he won’t allow that the reality should be clearer
to his hearers, who have achieved the greatest glory ‘in the greatest state’ (in
maxima republica), than his discourse (1.38). What Scipio excludes are
genetic accounts of the state, such as found in Plato’s State, or an analysis of
the state into households and villages, as found in the first book of Aristotle’s
Politics, or the intricate taxonomies of the Stoics with their definitions.12 He
will later offer a historical account of the Roman state; but this is a story of
Roman experience, not a theoretical analysis.
Scipio’s reliance on practical experience might raise the objection: if his
hearers understand political reality so clearly, why does he go to the trouble of
providing a definition of res publica at all? In the Phaedrus, Plato restricted
the use of definitions to terms about which there was disagreement, such as
‘love’;13 terms whose meaning was obvious, such as ‘iron’ or ‘silver’, were to
be used without definition. Subsequently, philosophers debated among them-
selves whether things that were obvious needed to be defined at all. Some phi-
losophers, Cicero tells us, rejected the use of definitions in obvious cases;
most did not.14 Scipio’s use of a definition can be justified by two reasons.
First, the term is not without ambiguity, as we will see. Second, it is important
to state the meaning explicitly in order to have explicit premises for the argu-
ments that follow.
The definition is famous. It was known ever since Cicero published his
State in 51 BCE. Although the surrounding text was lost from the time of the
early Middle Ages until Mai’s discovery of the palimpsest of the State in
1819, the definition itself was known through Augustine’s citation of it in
City of God.15 Here, then, is Scipio’s definition (1.39), as it appears in the
manuscript:
Est igitur . . . res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum
coetus quoque modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et
utilitatis communione sociatus.
Res publica, then, is the concern (res) of a people (populi). A people, fur-
ther, is not just any gathering of humans that has come together in any way
at all; but it is a gathering of a multitude formed into a partnership by a com-
mon agreement on law (iuris consensu) and a sharing of benefits (utilitatis
communione).
The first thing that stands out is the definiendum: res publica. The previous
discussion, which led up to it, showed that res publica has a range of meanings
12 On Stoic taxonomies and definitions, see Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.9. In
agreement with Scipio, Philus later (3.12) singles out the Stoic Chrysippus for consider-
ing everything on the basis of meaning, not facts.
13 Plato, Phaedrus, 263a–c.
14 Cicero, Academica, 2.17–18.
15 Augustine, City of God, 2.21.
576 E. ASMIS
that includes ‘state’, ‘public interest’, ‘public affairs’. The term also has a
strongly patriotic connotation as the term used by the Romans to designate
their own state. Scipio does not use the more general term civitas, which cor-
responds more closely to Greek politeia (polis) and was used initially by
Laelius to frame his request. It was appropriate for Laelius to use the term
civitas because his question concerned not just the Roman state, but all states.
The general topic, as we saw, arose out of a special concern about the Roman
state. The choice of res publica as the definiendum reflects this concern. It
also reflects Cicero’s own understanding of what a state is. Res publica leads
directly to a definition in terms of a unified people (populus).
As though to correct the implicit focus on Rome, Scipio makes clear shortly
afterwards that he is considering all states. Proceeding very systematically, he
follows the definition by a brief explanation of the cause that first brought
about states. After this explanation, Scipio recapitulates his definition of res
publica by fitting it within a series of definitions. First, he defines a town or
city (oppidum, urbs) as a ‘conglomeration of dwellings’ (coniunctionem

tectorum). Next, he sums up his definition of ‘people’, then offers a brief defi-
nition of civitas, then ends with an abbreviated definition of res publica
(1.41):
omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis qualem exposui, omnis
civitas, quae est constitutio populi, omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi
res est, consilio quodam regenda est.
Every people (populus), then, which is the sort of gathering of a multitude
that I put forward, every state (civitas), which is an organization of a people
(constitutio populi), every res publica, which, as I said, is the concern of a
people, must be ruled by some deliberative body (consilio).
By reintroducing the general term civitas, Scipio reorients the discussion in
the direction in which it was always intended, that is, a consideration of all
states. Civitas and res publica are viewed as synonyms. Although the two
terms have the same extension, each is defined by a different aspect. Just as
the definiendum civitas reflects Greek polis or politeia, so the defining term
constitutio is a translation of Greek suvsthma or suvstasiÀ. The Stoics, for
example, defined both povliÀ (‘city’ in the sense of ‘city-state’) and politeiva
(‘city-state’ or ‘constitution’) as ‘an organization of human beings’
(suvsthma ajnqrwvpwn).16 Polybius regularly refers to the city-state as a
suvsthma.17 By contrast, the definition of res publica views the state as a col-
lective entity rather than an organization.
By prefixing a definition of town (city), Scipio clears up a possible ambi-
guity: the state is a politically structured entity, not just a communal dwelling-
16 SVF, 3.328; cf. 2.528; see further below.

17 Polybius, Historiae, Vol. 2, ed. Theodor Buettner-Wobst (Leipzig, 1889), 6.4.5,
6. 5.10, 6.10.14.
place. Unlike Latin civitas or res publica, which already suggest a political
entity, Greek polis is ambiguous between city as a dwelling-place and city as a
city-state. Even though Roman terminology is not beset by the same ambigu-
ity, Scipio confronts the ambiguity by adding a definition of ‘city’ (oppidum,
urbs) as a dwelling-place. Just like the discussion as a whole, this detail
reflects a Greek source, together with a thrust to put Roman political experi-
ence in the foreground.
Formally, the definition of res publica is a double definition, consisting of
an etymological unpacking, res populi, followed by a definition of the second
word of this brief account, populus, ‘people’.18 Without a definition of
populus, Scipio would not achieve his purpose of providing a clear standard
for inquiry. For even if the term res publica is quite clear in meaning, the word
populus is treacherously ambiguous. Laelius has just distinguished the people
(populus) from the senate (1.31). Throughout the remainder of the dialogue,
Cicero will use populus both in a wide sense to designate the whole Roman
citizenry and in the narrower sense of a grouping of people that differs from
the senatorial aristocracy.19 Scipio later uses the adjective popularis to refer to
rule by the people in place of a monarchy or an aristocracy.20 Popular rule, he
says, degenerates into a bad type when the ‘power of the people’ (populi
potestas) turns into the fury of a mob (1.44). Scipio needs to make clear from
the beginning that he does not take res populi to mean the same as popular
rule, let alone its deviant form, mob rule.
Scipio’s definition of populus is a philosophically rigorous definition, con-
sisting of a genus — ‘a gathering of humans’ (hominum coetus), or more pre-
cisely ‘a gathering of a multitude’ (coetus multitudinis) — together with a
differentia — an association formed by a common agreement on law and a
sharing of benefits. The term sociatus shows that the gathering (coetus . . .
congregatus) is not just any aggregate, but a certain kind of organization.
Along with the logical progression, the definition increasingly emphasizes
the unity of the state. This progression begins with a combination of singular
18 The identification of res publica as res populi appears to be traditional, as shown

by Plautus’ reference to res populi at Poenulus, 524. Another example of a double defini-
tion in Cicero’s writings is his definition of locus, a rhetorical ‘topic’, at Topica, 8 as:
‘argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem’ (‘the place
of an argument, an argument being reasoning that proves something in doubt’). Sedes is
left undefined, like res; and argumentum is defined in terms of genus and differentia.
19 As J.-L. Ferrary points out, the phrase populus senatusque Romanus originally
implied the relation of the whole to a part, but later came to designate two distinct ele-
ments; see J.-L. Ferrary, ‘Le idee politiche a Roma nell’epoca repubblicana’, in Storia
delle idee politiche economiche e sociali, ed. L. Firpo (Turin, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 723–804,
p. 748. On the notion of populus as the collective citizenry, see Mommsen, Römisches
Staatsrecht, Vol. 3.1, p. 6, and C. Nicolet, Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen
264–27 avant J.-C. (Paris, 1977), p. 332.
20 See 1.42 and 3.48.
578 E. ASMIS
terms, res populi, then continues with a sequence of terms compounded by

con- (coetus, congregatus, consensu, communio), which is then rounded off
by the final word sociatus.
The objection has sometimes been made that Cicero’s definition is any-
thing but clear. We need to draw a distinction, however, between the initial
clarity of terms and the clarity that ensues as a result of philosophical investi-
gation. Cicero can justifiably claim that each term in the definition is clear as a
starting-point of investigation. For we all attach the same general meaning to
the word; and although each term has a wide range of meanings, the general
sense is clearly demarcated against an opposite. Thus, ‘gathering’ (coetus)
signifies a throng, as opposed to individuals that are scattered; and all the
terms used to spell out the differentia have clear opposites.
It is very difficult to capture the initial clarity of the terms in English trans-
lation, while leaving open the range of meanings for each term. Ius is espe-
cially difficult to translate; it signifies right, or law, or a policy of justice. It
corresponds more closely to Greek divkh, or German Recht, or French droit

than to any English counterpart. Cicero regularly opposes ius in his writings
to vis, ‘violence’, in such a way as to reinforce the semantic contrast with the
linguistic form.21 He uses this contrast later in the State (3.41). Ius accommo-
dates many subdivisions of meaning, including a contrast between natural and
conventional justice. Cicero previously alerted the reader to this contrast by
having Scipio distinguish between ‘the right/law (ius) of citizens’ and ‘the
right/law (ius) of the wise’, and between a civic bond and the universal law of
nature.22 While the definition requires some type of legal arrangement, it is
important to note that it does not contain a requirement for justice, iustitia,
simply. Whether ius is to be understood as requiring moral justice is some-
thing that needs to be worked out by further argument.
Consensus signifies ‘common agreement’, whether it consists of mere
compliance or strong commitment. Its opposite is dissension.23 The usual
translation ‘consent’ is, therefore, misleading. What is required is not simply
assent, but a shared position. A sharing (communio) of benefits is, obviously,
the opposite of taking benefits for oneself alone; what is not specified is
whether all share equally or not. Utilitas covers any type of benefit, including
material wealth, security, freedom, power, fame, virtue, happiness.
Along with single words, two composite expressions invite special atten-
tion. One is the combination of res with populi. By itself, the word res is
‘thing’, ‘affair’, ‘concern’. In Roman law, ‘things’ (res) were divided into
21 See Cicero, Pro Sestio, 92.

22 1.27 (non Quiritium, sed sapientium iure . . . nec civili nexo, sed communi lege
naturae). See also Cicero, De partitione oratoria, 129.
23 It is to be distinguished, therefore, from the Greek opposition between willing
acceptance and compulsion, as proposed by Plato at Politicus, 291e–92a and Laws, 684c,
690c.
corporeal and incorporeal things, the latter including obligations.24 In both

ordinary usage and the legal texts, the plural expression res publicae desig-
nates public affairs as opposed to res privatae, private affairs.25 The singular
term res publica includes everything that has to do with the political commu-
nity as a whole, including the public interest, public affairs and public
wealth.26 Formulated as res populi, it designates something that belongs to the
people, whether as a sphere of activity or as a possession. Although the geni-
tive case suggests ownership, this connotation is not so strong as to imply a
division between the thing owned (the state) and its owners (the people).
Defined as res populi, the state appears clearly as the kind of thing in which
the whole people has an interest. What sort of relationship the people have to
this thing remains to be investigated.
The other phrase is iuris consensus. It occurs only here in the entire corpus
of Latin literature, together with a repetition at 3.45.27 The awkward use of the
genitive case gives it special prominence. The whole expression is com-
pressed, apparently out of a desire for grammatical parallelism with utilitatis

communione. Still, the general meaning is clear enough: just as the members
of the association share in benefits, so they agree on some sort of legal system.
The most obvious way to understand the genitive is to take it as standing for
de iure, ‘on law’. At the same time, there is no reason to exclude a so-called
subjective use of the genitive: the agreement on law may be viewed as an
agreement that is itself lawful.28 The phrase suggests both an agreement on the
kinds of rules and an agreement to abide by them. Cicero subsequently gets
around the grammatical awkwardness by omitting the reference to agreement
24 Gaius, Institutes, 2.12–14.
25 Ibid., 2.10–11.
26 See Drexler, ‘Respublica’, Vol. 9, pp. 264–79, and Vol. 10, pp. 7–20. Schofield,
‘Cicero’s Definition’, pp. 68–70, points out that there is no precise Greek counterpart; he
also cites Polybius’ expression ta; koina; tou¤ plhvqouÀ (Histories 6.8.3) as coming
close to Cicero’s res populi. C. Ando illustrates the difficulty by citing four different
translations of res publica in the Greek version of Augustus’ Res gestae: ta; koina;
pravgmata, ta; dhmovsia pravgmata, pavtriÀ, pavnta ta; pravgmata. See C.
Ando, ‘Was Rome a polis?’, Classical Antiquity, 18 (1999), pp. 5–34, p. 15. The plural
counterparts all miss the idea of a unified enterprise.
27 This is pointed out by Büchner, ‘Die beste Verfassung’, p. 78, n. 53. See, however,
note 29 below.
28 Büchner, M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica, p. 123, takes consensus iuris as consen-
sus de iure. F. Cancelli has argued that the ‘consent’ is not to be construed as a type of
volition, but as a condition of harmony or ‘consonanza’ (‘la distribuzione armonica del
diritto ai singoli e alle classi componenti lo stato’); on his view, the genitive is a subjec-
tive genitive. See F. Cancelli, ‘ “Iuris consensu” nella definizione ciceroniana di “Res-
publica” ’, Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale, 14 (1972), pp. 247–67, p. 256. In
my view, Cancelli’s interpretation is too dependent on Cicero’s later explanation of con-
sent as a musical harmony (2.69); still, the awkwardness of the genitive in the definition
accommodates a wide range of explanations, including Cancelli’s.
580 E. ASMIS
(1.49): quid enim civitas nisi iuris societas (‘For what is a state other than a
partnership in law’?).29 At the same time, the fact that Cicero crams the idea of
common agreement into his definition suggests that he regards it as a crucial
element.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the entire combination of words in the
definition. The full sense of the definition, as understood by the ordinary
Roman, becomes clear only if all the terms are understood in relation to each
other; and here, I think, something very interesting appears. Using the terms
res publica, iuris consensu, utilitatis communione and sociatus, Cicero builds
up a conception of the state as a certain kind of partnership, societas. This
partnership differs from other kinds in that it encompasses the whole civic
community; what it shares with the others is the principle of a fair division of
contributions and rewards.
Partnerships were an important feature of Roman life from the earliest

times. As defined by de Zulueta, ‘societas was an agreement to contribute
property or work or both to the prosecution of a common aim’.30 Partnerships

were of two main types: partners could share all their assets, or they could
pool just some resources for the purpose of a single transaction or type of
transaction. The first type was prevalent at an early period. It was typically a
partnership of heirs who left their inheritance undivided; this type of arrange-
ment was particularly suitable to close relatives working a farm together.31
Examples of the second type are partnerships of tax collectors or cloak-
makers or persons keeping a shop. The common assets were called res
communis.32 In the period of the Empire, the jurist Gaius drew an analogy
between the state and partnerships proper; both have common assets, a com-
mon treasury, and an agent who determines what must be done in common.33
29 Similarly, in the Dream at the end of the State the elder Scipio defines states
(civitates) as ‘councils and gatherings of humans, joined in partnership by law’ (concilia
coetusque hominum iure sociati, 6.13). The expression societas iuris, ‘partnership in
law’, occurs also at Cicero’s Laws, 1.35, cf. Cicero, On Duties, 3.28 and On the Nature of
the Gods, 2.148). The use of societas with a genitive is frequent; thus Cicero speaks of a
‘partnership in crime’ (societate sceleris) at Pro Sulla, 52. Combining the terms consen-
sus and societas, Cicero defines the bond that holds together friendship as consensus et
societas consiliorum et voluntatum (‘a consensual partnership of plans and intentions’)
at Pro Plancio, 5. Cicero also refers to the state as a ‘partnership’, societas, at Laws, 1.62
and 2.16.
30 The Institutes of Gaius, Part 2 (Commentary), ed. Francis de Zulueta (Oxford,
1953), p. 179.
31 See Gaius, Institutes, 3.154a–b; and A. Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens,
GA, 1995), p. 28, cf. pp. 136–7.
32 Gaius, Institutes, 17.2.45, 47, etc.
33 Justinian, Digest, 3.4.1 (Gaius): Quibus autem permissum est corpus habere
collegii societatis siue cuiusque alterius eorum nomine, proprium est ad exemplum rei
publicae habere res communes, arcam communem et actorem siue syndicum, per quem
In Roman law, partnerships are classified as a type of obligation based on

contract (ex contractu). All partnerships rely on ‘consent’ or ‘common agree-
ment’ (consensu); but some rely only on consent (nudo consensu), whereas
others reinforce common agreement with formal elements, such as special
wording, written records, or a transfer of an object.34 All partnerships are
governed by laws (iura),35 which constitute ‘the law of partnership’, ius
societatis.36 In partnerships that rely only on consent, a person is legally
responsible for acting ‘according to the law of nations (ius gentium)’ or ‘the
natural reason of humans’.37 In general, there can be no partnership in a dis-
honest endeavour: a partnership in crime (malificii societas) is null and void.38
In any partnership it was understood that partners would receive a share of
the profits in proportion to their contribution, whether in money, skill or
labour. There is much controversy in the legal literature about the proportion
of contributions to profit. The basic principle is that the proportion must be

fair. Fraud renders a partnership invalid, whether it is perpetrated by one part-
ner on the others or by the whole partnership. There is no partnership (called

‘leonine’) when one partner gets all the profit and another gets only losses. At
the same time, a person may receive more of the profits if he contributes more
work or runs a greater danger than another who contributes equal wealth.39 All
partners have an obligation to deal ex bono et aequo, ‘fairly’, with one
another.40 Fraud or negligence makes a partner liable to prosecution.41 The
type of action brought by one partner against another is an action on good
tamquam in re publica, quod communiter agi fierique oporteat, agatur fiat. (‘Those per-
mitted to form a corporate body consisting of a collegium or partnership or specifically
one or the other of these have the right on the pattern of the state to have common prop-
erty, a common treasury, and an attorney or syndic through whom, as in a state, what
should be transacted and done is transacted and done’; see The Digest of Justinian, Latin
text ed. T. Mommsen and P. Krueger, English translation ed. A. Watson, Vol. 1 (Phila-
delphia, 1985), p. 96.) The ‘actor’ in the case of the state is presumably the emperor.
34 Gaius, Institutes, 3.135–8 and 148–54b. See Institutes, ed. de Zulueta, Part 2,
pp. 174–81; D. Daube, ‘Societas as Consensual Contract’, in Collected Studies in Roman
Law, ed. David Cohen and Dieter Simon (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 37–59, esp. pp. 54–5; and
Watson, Spirit of Roman Law, pp. 125–46.
35 See Cicero, Pro Quinctio, 11; and Pro Roscio Comoedo, 24.
36 See Justinian, Digest, 17.2.17.1, 17.2.64 and 17.2.82.
37 Gaius, Institutes, 3.154.
38 Justinian, Digest, 17.2.57 pr 1, cf. 17.2.3.3 and 18.1.35.2.
39 Ibid., 17.2.29. A. Watson suggests that the ‘juristic feeling that there should be
some equivalence between prestation and return’ is characteristic of partnerships in
Roman law; other bilateral contracts, he points out, need not be fair (pp. 242–50). What
accounts for this feeling, he proposes, is the original conception of a partnership of all
assets. See A. Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (London, 1991).
40 Gaius, Institutes, 3.137.
41 Justinian, Digest, 17.2.52.2.
582 E. ASMIS
faith (bona fide).42 Cicero’s own writings attest the prevalence of trials con-
cerning good faith or bad faith. These trials use the formula ‘good conduct
among good men’ (inter bonos bene agier) or ‘the better, the more fairly’
(melius aequius).43 A partner who deceives another is not ‘a good man’.44
Like later lawyers, Cicero associates good faith with the law of nations.45
In Cicero’s definition of the state, the entire description ‘formed into a part-
nership by a common agreement on law and a sharing of benefits’ is applicable
to any partnership whatsoever. In particular, the terms consensu and sociatus
stand out as defining characteristics of a partnership. Like any partnership, the
state is a consensual enterprise in which benefits are shared. But what are these
benefits and how are they shared? If the whole state is to be truly a partnership,
the whole people must unite in an agreement on how contributions and benefits
are to be distributed. This distribution, moreover, must be fair.
The definition, then, raises a number of questions. A key problem is: what
does the agreement of the people consist of? More precisely, does ius entail
justice? Is the state indeed a partnership of citizens collaborating with one

another for a fair distribution of benefits? Is this the sort of thing (qualis) a
state is? Finally, what is the best kind of state? In order to answer these ques-
tions, the meaning of the terms used in the definition must be investigated fur-
ther. It is not the job of the initial definition to provide this illumination. It is
beside the point, therefore, to narrow the meaning of the terms as they occur in
the definition, as many scholars have done.46 Cicero will uncover new depths
of meaning as he proceeds in his argument; he does not rely on the definition
as already having this philosophical precision. The result will be a philosophi-
cally refined conception of the state.
42 Gaius, Institutes, 4.62; and Institutes, ed. de Zulueta, Part 2, p. 180.

43 Cicero, Topics, 1.66; and Cicero, On Duties, 3.61–71.
44 Cicero, Pro Roscio Amerino, 116–17.
45 Cicero, On Duties, 3.69.
46 Büchner (‘Die beste Verfassung’, p. 78), for example, translates consensus iuris as
‘Einverständniss im Recht’, then adds that this means ‘gegenseitige Anerkennung von
Recht und Gerechtigkeit’ (p. 79, cf. p. 88). Büchner claims that Cicero already uses terms
in their full meaning from the very beginning (p. 78, n. 53). Büchner’s unpacking of the
phrase seems to me correct; but it already anticipates the argument that follows. Against
Büchner, Kohns (‘Consensus iuris’, pp. 488–93) argues, correctly in my view, that ius, as
used in the definition, covers both justice and ‘Rechtsordnung’. L. Perelli takes iuris con-
sensus to mean ‘accordo circa i diritti’ (that is, an agreement on civic rights), as opposed
to an agreement on ‘diritto’ (understood as natural law), with the explanation that it is ‘un
accordo tra parti contraenti che accettano una limitazione dei loro diritti al fine
dell’utilità collettiva’. See L. Perelli, Il pensiero politico di Cicerone (Florence, 1990),
pp. 18–19.
The Argument
Cicero’s argument consists of Scipio’s exposition together with the discus-
sion that follows. Scipio’s speech is divided into two parts, one analysing the
types of constitutions, the other illustrating the very best constitution with a
history of Rome. The discussion consists of dialogue and a central debate on
the nature of justice. The entire argument will throw new light on four main
concepts: unity, consensus, justice, and the sharing of benefits. The key con-
cept is that of justice; it determines how benefits are shared, and it is what
holds the state together in a common agreement.
Immediately after stating the definition, Scipio makes a second assertion.
This is an explanation of the cause that first brought people together into
states (1.39):
eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis
quaedam hominum quasi congregatio.
The first reason for this gathering, moreover, is not so much weakness as a
certain natural association of humans.
Scipio adds that even if humans had everything in abundance, they would still
prefer to join with each other. The text then breaks down. It resumes about a
paragraph later on the same theme. Scipio now refers to ‘seeds’ of virtue, as
well as of the state. Scipio then recapitulates the definition, as just discussed.
In his explanation, Scipio balances two possible reasons against each other
and opts for natural sociability in preference to weakness. In Greek terminol-
ogy, he holds that the human being is naturally koinwnikovÀ. Although a cru-
cial part of the text is lost, it is clear that he backs up his choice by argument;
for he cites as evidence that we would not want to live alone even if we had
ample resources. He also indicates that our natural communal impulse is a
‘seed’ that grows into a virtue. In the first prologue, Cicero described this nat-
ural impulse as a ‘love for defending the common welfare’.47
In opting for sociability, Scipio endorses one side of a debate that divided
Greek political thought. Some Greek thinkers argued that political communi-
ties are the result of a compact that aims to make the weak stronger through
collective action. This position makes a spectacular entrance in political
thought in Plato’s Gorgias (483b–c), where Callicles proclaims that laws
were instituted by the weaker for their protection against the powerful.
Against this view, a long line of thinkers that includes Plato, Aristotle and the
Stoics maintained that humans are naturally inclined to live justly with others.
When perfected, this inclination becomes the virtue of justice. In Stoic termi-
nology, it is a ‘seed’ of virtue. The two views will be debated in detail in
Book 3 of Cicero’s State. The first view is described here as holding that ‘the
47 1.1: amorem ad communem salutem defendendam.

584 E. ASMIS
mother of justice is weakness, not nature or will’.48 On this view, justice is a

man-made arrangement, consisting in whatever rules are believed to over-
come weakness. The second view makes use of the Stoic claim that justice
exists by nature.
As soon as he turns to the topic of cause, Scipio can no longer appeal to the
agreement of everyone. He launches his argument by making a claim that is
highly controversial. The discussion has moved from an initial definition, to
which all agree immediately, to a causal claim that needs to be backed by
argument.49 While the definition serves as a criterion for delimiting the
topic — states — the causal claim, as Scipio goes on to explain, serves as a cri-
terion for judging the types of states, or constitutions. It is also the first step in
telling us what sort of a thing a state is: it fits human nature, or more specifi-
cally, a natural impulse for justice.
The analysis of constitutions revolves around the criterion of justice. Scipio

begins the analysis with the assertion that constitutions differ according to the
type of council (consilium). Each type of council, he adds, must be judged by

reference to the initial cause of states (1.41). In his subsequent evaluation,
Scipio repeatedly draws attention to the need for justice. Three simple consti-
tutions — monarchy, aristocracy and popular rule — are found to be accept-
able for the reason that each type of council is just (1.42–3). Yet all three types
are deficient as measured by the criterion of providing a share in the govern-
ment: in particular, the people lack liberty in a monarchy and an aristocracy;
and the wisdom of a single individual or merit of an aristocracy count for
nothing in popular rule. Each type, moreover, easily turns into a bad form,
specifically, tyranny, oligarchy and mob-rule (1.44). What makes them bad is
that they are unjust: they are beset by iniquity and passions (iniquitatibus,
cupiditatibus, 1.42).
The best type of constitution, it turns out, is the mixed constitution, consist-
ing of three parts: a monarchic, an aristocratic and a popular element (1.45,
1.69). It stands out above the rest by having great stability as well as ‘a certain
great equity’ (aequabilitas, 1.69). This equity is based on a combination of
two kinds of equality: numerical equality, which bestows freedom on each
individual, and equality of merit, which arranges persons in a hierarchy of
merit. As a result, there is an equitable distribution of power among the three
parts of the constitution.50
48 3.23: iustitiae non natura nec voluntas, sed imbecillitas mater est.
49 Scholars have not always distinguished between the definition and the cause;
so D. Frede, ‘Constitution and Citizenship: Peripatetic Influence on Cicero’s Politi-
cal Conception in the De re publica’, in Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos, ed.
W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), p. 84; and Büchner, ‘Die
beste Verfassung’, p. 77.
50 See Elizabeth Asmis, ‘A New Type of Model: Cicero’s Roman Constitution’,
American Journal of Philology (forthcoming).
The entire discussion of constitutions is clearly indebted to Aristotle and

his school, as well as Plato. The argument turns on how well the various types
of constitution satisfy the reason for which people assembled in states.
Although the discussion reveals aspects of justice and injustice in the state, no
attempt is made to assess the definition as a whole; it remains in the back-
ground. The second part of Scipio’s exposition is much more original. Here
Cicero vies with Plato as he draws on Roman sources to show how the
Romans gradually developed a policy of cooperation that culminated in a
mixed constitution. At the same time, Cicero shows how the Roman state
grew in size, power and wealth. The state appears as a partnership that attains
the pinnacle of success by a policy of pooling contributions and sharing
rewards.
The first two kings lay the foundation of both concord and wealth. Romulus
lays out the rudiments of a political structure by appointing a senate to advise

him (2.15). As military leader, Romulus acquires booty and lands for the peo-
ple; and the people lend him their enthusiastic support. For his service to the
state, he is rewarded by being worshipped as a god upon his death (2.17). The
second king, Numa, turns the Romans toward peaceful endeavours by distrib-
uting the conquered lands to the citizens to be farmed. By doing so, he pro-
motes ‘justice and trust’ (iustitia et fides, 2.26). The two sources of income,
conquest and farming, form the economic basis of the state’s success as a part-
nership. From the beginning, the Roman state functions as a partnership in
which all work hard and cooperatively for the ever greater benefit of all.
Along with an increase in wealth, there comes an increase in the sharing of
political power. The most important innovation after Romulus is the creation
of the centuriate assembly by the sixth king, Servius Tullius (2.39–40).
Describing Servius as ‘the most far-seeing of all kings in matters of state’
(2.37), Cicero gives him credit for recognizing that votes must be ‘in the
power of the rich’ (in locupletium potestate) and, in general, that ‘the greatest
number must not have the greatest power’ (ne plurimum valeant plurimi).
According to Cicero, the assembly consisted of 193 groups (‘centuries’)
arranged in such a way that the wealthy (distributed in 18 groups of knights
and 70 groups of the first class, and joined by a group of carpenters) had enor-
mously greater voting power than the poor (distributed in 104 groups). Each
of these 104 groups contained almost as many persons as the entirety of the 70
groups of the first class. The carpenters were grouped with the wealthy
because of their ‘outstanding usefulness’ to the state. The very poorest
obtained a tiny fraction of voting power on the ground that they contributed
offspring.
Scipio justifies this arrangement as follows (2.40):
Ita nec prohibebatur quisquam iure suffragii, et is valebat in suffragio
plurimum, cuius plurimum intererat esse in optimo statu civitatem.
586 E. ASMIS
In this way, both (a) no one was deprived of the right to vote, and (b) the
greatest voting power belonged to the person who had the greatest interest
that the state should be governed in the best way.
This distribution combines a democratic and an oligarchic principle: every-
one has a vote, but the rich have a vote that is proportionate to their wealth.
This is an adaptation of an Aristotelian formula for a mixed constitution.51 It is
surprising, however, that Cicero should endorse the oligarchic principle that
wealth should be rewarded with power; for he rejects oligarchy as a bad form
of government. On the other hand, it should be noted that Cicero rejects oli-
garchy not so much because it privileges the wealthy, but because it gives
power to wealthy people who are greedy and arrogant, accumulating wealth
for their own benefit. Oligarchs misuse their wealth; but the contribution of
wealth by the wealthy is crucial to the flourishing of the state.
Cicero, moreover, softens the oligarchic principle by saying that voting

power depends on how highly a person values the well-being of the state; he
does not crassly equate voting power with the amount of payment to the state.
The wealthy are rewarded for securing the well-being of the state by means of
their resources. The greater voting power of the wealthy rests ultimately on
the view of the state as a partnership in which privileges are based on contri-
butions. Wealth is a basic type of contribution, though not the only one. The
wealthy contribute patriotic service along with their wealth; and this contribu-
tion includes habits of leadership, both at home and in military campaigns,
and deliberation. Military service is valued in itself; but it is valued the more
highly the more it is joined by wealth. Those who do not have the money to
equip themselves as soldiers count the least; they count only in respect to their
children.
When the monarchy falls, the people gain some measure of liberty. The
aristocrats assume power and the rest of the people gradually obtain more
rights. These rights culminate in the acquisition of political power by the mass
of people through their own representatives, the tribunes, together with an
assembly that has independent legislative power. The constitutional develop-
ment ends with an ‘equitable balance of right, duty and function’ among three
elements: the regal power of the consuls, the authority of the senate, and the
liberty of the people.52 With the exception of two traumatic ruptures — the
tyranny of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, and the oligarchy of the board
of ten — Roman history was characterized by concord, just rule, the growth of
justice in society as a whole, an ever wider sharing of political power, and a
sharing of ever increasing wealth.
The discussion that follows Scipio’s speech provides an in-depth look at
the part of the definition that most requires elucidation: ‘common agreement
51 See Aristotle, Politics, 4, 1294a36–b1. On the oligarchic principle, see Aristotle,
Politics, 3, 1280a25–31.
52 2.57: aequabilis . . . compensatio . . . et iuris et officii et muneris.
on law’ (iuris consensus). The extant text offers just a paragraph on consen-
sus. This paragraph in turn links consensus with justice, which is then debated
at length. Consensus is explained, with the help of Plato, as a harmony among
different social classes (2.69). Plato used the musical analogy in his State to
explain how self-restraint pervades the ideal state. Just like a musical har-
mony, the lowest part, the workers, the middle part, the soldiers, and the high-
est part, the philosopher kings, are of one opinion as to who should rule and
who should be ruled. Cicero adapts this analogy to his own purpose. Just as
concord (concentus) is produced by a blending of high, middle and low notes,
which are very dissimilar to one another, so concord is produced in the state
by the common agreement (consensus) of the lowest, middle and highest
classes, although they are very different.
Importantly, Cicero’s three classes (ordines) do not correspond to the three
parts of his mixed constitution. Unlike Plato’s three divisions, they are not
political units, agreeing on who should rule and who should be ruled. Instead,
they are social classes, working co-operatively with one another. As Cicero
makes clear in his other writings, the highest classes at Rome are, first, the
senate, and, next, the knights (equites). This is followed by other classes, with
freedmen at the bottom. Traditionally, freedmen are bound by legally en-
forceable obligations to the person who freed them; others along the social
scale have looser obligations (in return for rewards) to those above them. Pre-
viously in his State (2.16), Cicero signalled the importance of patron–client
relationships, which bind all of Roman society. Amid extreme social differ-
ences, Cicero founds political unity on a policy of co-operation among the
social classes.
Scipio ends his musical image with the claim that civic concord cannot
exist without justice (iustitia). Indeed, he claims, a state must be administered
with the ‘greatest justice’ (2.70). What, then, is justice? The answer is elicited
by a debate, in which one side (represented by one of the members of Scipio’s
group) argues that justice is nothing but an artifice introduced by humans to
compensate for a condition of weakness. The other side (represented by
Laelius) argues that justice exists by nature. Laelius’ speech includes a Stoic
definition of law as the will of god, applying to humans and states every-
where. Justice is now analysed as an other-regarding virtue. Instead of urging
us to ‘increase resources, enlarge wealth, extend boundaries . . . command as
many as possible, enjoy pleasures, have power, reign, dominate’, it instructs
us to ‘spare all, look out for the interests of the human race, give everyone his
due, not touch things that are sacred or public or belong to others’.53 This con-
trast has special reference to Roman imperialism; but it also applies to the
53 3.24: sapientia iubet augere opes, amplificare divitias, proferre finis . . . imperare
quam plurimis, frui voluptatibus, pollere, regnare, dominari; iustitia autem praecipit
parcere omnibus, consulere generi hominum, suum cuique reddere, sacra publica aliena
non tangere.
588 E. ASMIS
internal affairs of the Roman state. Justice will not permit anyone to subjugate
others for one’s own benefit or take away what is theirs.
The result is a new look at the initial definition. Reminding his listeners
how useful a ‘brief definition’ is, Scipio asserts that the ‘argument now
forces’ (ratio nunc cogit, 3.43) him to contradict what he said earlier about the
types of constitution. The brief definition, as cited by Augustine, is the initial
definition of res publica.54 Using the same definition, Scipio now concludes
that the three unjust types of state are not states at all. Previously, Scipio had
admitted the bad types of constitution as types of ‘state’. Tyranny is now
excluded for the reason that there is no res populi, ‘concern of a people’, when
‘all are oppressed by the cruelty of a single person and there is not a single
bond of justice (unum vinculum iuris) nor common agreement (consensus)
and a partnership (societas) of those who are gathered, which is a people’.55
The reference to a ‘single bond’ points to natural law, which is the same for
all.56 Consensus and ‘partnership’ are treated as equivalent. Just as there is no
people, as previously defined, there is no res populi. In the tyranny of

Dionysius, for example, ‘nothing belonged to the people and the people itself
belonged to a single person’ (nihil . . . populi et unius erat populus ipse).
Instead of the people being in control of the state, a tyrant takes control of the
people.57 The same transfer of control happens in an oligarchy and mob-rule:
for they, too, are a kind of tyranny. Scipio keeps repeating as a kind of slogan:
there is no res populi. There is no state when one group uses the rest for their
own advantage.
What has changed since the initial discussion? The difference, I suggest,
lies in the philosophical dissection of the concept of justice. Common
54 Augustine, De civitate dei, 2.21. In his summary, Augustine not only refers to the
‘brief definition’ (in the singular), but also says that Scipio’s argument rests on ‘defini-
tions’ (in the plural, twice). The ‘definitions’ are possibly the two parts of the ‘brief defi-
nition’, but they may also include the definitions of the types of constitution at 1.42. On
the use of the term ‘brief’ to describe an initial definition, see above, note 10.
55 3.43: . . . cum crudelitate unius oppressi essent universi, neque esset unum
vinculum iuris nec consensus ac societas coetus, quod est populus.
56 Cf. Cicero’s Laws, 1.42.
57 Schofield, ‘Cicero’s Definition’, pp. 75–6, has argued that in Book 3, Cicero con-
strues res populi as ‘property of the people’, and that, as property-owners, the people
have rights which require ‘a degree of liberty’. The people, he proposes, have sover-
eignty, while entrusting the management of the state to others. Although I agree with
Schofield’s main point, that Cicero assigns sovereignty to the people, I disagree that the
argument in Book 3 rests on a (metaphorical) use of res as ‘property’; the sense seems to
me to remain that of ‘object of concern’, ‘realm’, ‘enterprise’. In my view, moreover, the
people does not simply entrust the management of the state to others. Rather, there is a
mutual relationship of trust: the king, or aristocracy, or people, or a combination of all
three elements entrusts approval of their policy to the whole people, just as the whole
people entrusts administrative powers to these bodies. This reciprocity of trust character-
izes the state as a partnership.
agreement, it turns out, entails justice; and justice entails an other-concern

that does not permit one person to abuse or rob another. Scipio originally
relied on an intuitive, ordinary conception of justice in order to draw a distinc-
tion between three acceptable and three bad types of constitution. The ordi-
nary conception allows us to judge the three bad types of constitution as
unjust, yet does not provide a reason for rejecting them as ways of governing a
state. Though we regard the bad forms as unjust, it is not clear that they are not
types of state; in fact, we see such states all around us. By contrast, the debate
on justice shows that governments must be just. Without justice, states fall
into discord, which leads to the takeover of the state by an individual or fac-
tion; and this is the destruction of the state. Along with a rejection of the ear-
lier claim about constitutions, the initial definition needs to be revised by a
new understanding of ius, ‘law’, as ‘just law’.
The Romans had much experience forcing the destruction of states on oth-
ers: they destroyed states by taking over the people and what belonged to
them. Even though they might claim (and Cicero’s spokesmen do claim) that
this policy was just, such an act cannot be just when it is perpetrated by a part
of the state against the people as a whole. Cicero turns the external situation
into a warning for the domestic affairs of the Romans: don’t submit to the
injustice of letting yourselves be taken over by one or more of yourselves; that
would destroy the state as surely as an external take-over.
The new conception of ius also adds new meaning to the expression res
populi. The state, we learn, belongs to the people in such a way that the people
are sovereign. This sovereignty is entirely compatible with the administration
of the state by a monarchy, or aristocracy, or popular regime. Although these
governing bodies make and enforce policy, they do not exercise dominion
over the people. The people remains in charge through the common agree-
ment of all. A clear distinction, therefore, needs to be made between govern-
ing power and sovereignty.
The new understanding of the definition reinforces the conception of the
state as a partnership. All are agreed on acting fairly with one another. As in
any partnership, the basic bond is one of natural justice. Like business part-
ners, the members of the state must act as good men, boni, in good faith, bona
fide, with one another. They must not dissolve into factions, held together by
the bad faith of a partnership in crime, as Cicero describes the former alliance
of Pompey and Caesar in a letter dating from 49 BCE.58 In the state, some of the
partners contribute administrative work and skill; others contribute military
service; some contribute wealth. These contributions are pooled; and none
confers autocratic control to one group over the rest. Just like any partnership,
the state is null and void when one member or group alienates the common
possession from the rest.
58 Cicero, Letter to Atticus, 10.4.1 (societatis et sceleratae consensionis fides, ‘the
faith of a partnership consisting in a criminal agreement’).
590 E. ASMIS
Unfortunately, the text breaks off before there is any mention of the mixed
constitution. Scipio promised initially that, by agreeing on ‘what’ the state is,
we would learn ‘what sort it is’. We have learned that a state must be operated in
a just way. What, then, are the special benefits of a mixed constitution? In a
political partnership, like any other partnership, common agreement confers
rights. But how are these rights to be enforced? One can leave the enforcement
to a part of the state — a monarchy or aristocracy or a popular regime. Yet, as
Cicero warns us, it is easy for such a part to become bad. In any other partner-
ship, if one of the partners turns out to be bad, one can resort to judges. What
about the state? The best guarantee for its continued existence is to reinforce the
rights of all with power for all. The distribution of power throughout the part-
nership not only reflects the value of the contributions that are made, but also
provides a continual monitoring of the partnership within itself.
Finally, Cicero offers a revised answer to the question of the origin of

states. Later in the text (4.3), he explains that the ‘first reason for coming
together’ is ‘a partnership of citizens for living happily and well’ (civium

beate et honeste vivendi societatem). This explanation bears the imprint of
Aristotle, who defined the polis as ‘a community for living well’ (touß
eußj¤j¤ zh¤n koinwniva).59 It should be noted right away that Cicero is not
offering a new definition; rather, he is offering a new explanation for the ori-
gin of states. His initial definition remains in place. At a later point again
(5.8), Cicero shows how his conception of citizen happiness differs from
Aristotle’s:
. . . . huic moderatori rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus
firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit; huius enim operis
maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo.
. . . this director of the state has as his aim the happy life of the citizens, in
such a way that it may be strong in resources, rich in wealth, ample in glory,
and honourable in virtue. I assign to him the accomplishment of this task,
which is greatest and best among humans.
The term moderator probably refers to the director of a mixed constitution;
but it might be any ruler of a state. His goal is to make the citizens happy by
bestowing on them resources, wealth, glory and virtue. Aristotle set a limit to
civic prosperity by viewing it as a means to a virtuous life and as a supplement
to virtue in a happy life. Cicero lists the four aims as though they are equally
important; nor does he assign any limit to any of them. The adjectives
describe the collective life of the citizens rather than the individual lives of the
citizens. As such, they also describe the state: it should be powerful, wealthy,
covered with glory, and honourable.
Cicero now shows, with some precision, in what the sharing of benefits
consists. We previously saw these benefits growing in Scipio’s history of
59 Aristotle, Politics, 1280b33–35; cf. 1275b20–21.
Rome. Indeed, the emphasis on benefits goes back to Cicero’s very first pro-
logue (1.2–3). Here Cicero assigns to the statesman two main jobs: one is to
inculcate virtue; the other is to ‘increase the resources of the human race
(generis humani)’ and ‘make the life of humans (hominum) safer and richer’.
Cicero also says that he prefers an imperial state to a village. As we read on, it
becomes increasingly clear that the best constitution, the Roman mixed con-
stitution, is distinguished not only by a strong commitment to genuine justice
but also by a sharing of enormous power, wealth and glory. In the first pro-
logue, Cicero anticipates the requirement for genuine justice by identifying
‘the human race’ and ‘humans’ rather than fellow citizens as beneficiaries of
the statesman’s efforts. No state is to usurp what rightly belongs to other
states, in the same way as no group or individual within the state is to usurp
what belongs to others.
592 E. ASMIS
Greek Definitions
There are good reasons for thinking that Cicero’s definition of the state is
indebted to Aristotle more than to any other Greek political thinker.60 The first
sentence of Aristotle’s Politics states that the city-state (povliÀ) is a certain kind
of community, koinwniva tiÀ.61 Subsequently, Aristotle identifies the good of
the political community with justice; this is the same, he says, as the common
advantage.62 He argues that the aim of the political community is the good life.63
Despite obvious similarities, however, there are basic differences. Very
conspicuously, Cicero does not use the formal definition of a state offered by
Aristotle at the beginning of the third book of his Politics. In response to the
question ‘what is the city-state (povliÀ)?’, Aristotle identifies the state as ‘a
60 As mentioned above, scholars have turned away from Stoicism to Aristotelianism

as a major influence. M. Pohlenz, following A. Schmekel, is the chief spokesman on
behalf of the Stoics. See A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa (Berlin, 1892),
pp. 61–74; and M. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 5, 32–3 and 46–7;
and M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (2 vols., Göttingen, 1948), Vol. 1, pp. 202–7. Pohlenz is fol-
lowed, among others, by E. Pahnke, Studien über Ciceros Kenntnis und Benutzung des
Aristoteles und die Herkunft der Staatsdefinition Rep. I 39 (Wiesbaden, 1964/5), p. 126.
According to Pohlenz, Cicero followed the Stoic Panaetius in augmenting a traditional
Stoic definition by a demand for a sharing of benefits. Against Pohlenz, E. de Saint-
Denis claims that there is no evidence of any influence by Panaetius, though much evi-
dence pointing to Plato, Aristotle and others; see E. de Saint-Denis, ‘La théorie
cicéronienne de la participation aux affaires publiques’, Revue de Philologie, 3rd ser.,
12 (1938), pp. 193–215, p. 204. R. Stark’s study of Cicero’s definition marks a turning-
point; see R. Stark, ‘Ciceros Staatsdefinition’, La Nouvelle Clio, 6 (1954), pp. 56–69.
Although Stark concedes that Cicero derived his definition from Panaetius, he believes
that Panaetius owed it to the Peripatetics (see pp. 57 and 66–9). Citing numerous parallels
from Aristotle, Stark denies that there is any specifically Stoic element in the definition at
all (p. 66). J.-L. Ferrary agrees with Stark that the definition is Peripatetic; see
J.-L. Ferrary, ‘Le Discours de Laelius dans le troisième livre du De Republica de
Cicéron’, in Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome, Antiquité, 86 (1974), pp. 745–71,
p. 746. While acknowledging that some Stoic doctrine has been amalgamated into the
discussion, Ferrary proposes (pp. 757–60) that Cicero regarded this material as
Platonic-Peripatetic. R. Werner holds that the definition is Academic-Peripatetic, aug-
mented by Roman elements; see R. Werner, ‘Über Herkunft und Bedeutung von Ciceros
Staatsdefinition’, Chiron, 3 (1973), pp. 163–78.
61 This is also the definition of politeiva (‘state’, ‘constitution’) (Aristotle, Politics,
2, 1260b40). Aristotle also differentiates politeiva as an ‘arrangement (tavxiÀ) of the
inhabitants of a city’ (Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1274b38) and as an arrangement of offices
(ibid., 1278b8–10). The terms povliÀ (‘city’, ‘city-state’), politeiva (‘state’, ‘constitu-
tion’) and polivteuma (‘government’) constitute a spectrum of meanings that slide into
each other. Aristotle identifies politeiva and polivteuma at Politics, 3, 1278b11 and
1279a25–26.
62 Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1282b17–18.
63 Ibid., 1, 1252b27–30.
certain multitude of citizens’ (politw¤n ti plh¤qoÀ),64 then goes on to define

‘citizen’ as someone who ‘has the power to share in deliberative and juridical
office’.65 The definition of citizen is opposed to the commonplace conception
of citizenship as a status acquired by birth. Aristotle acknowledges that his
definition of citizen is especially suitable to a democratic regime.66 In fact, it
does not suit a monarchy at all; and it suits an aristocratic regime only if citi-
zenship is restricted to members of the aristocracy.
Aristotle’s definition is a double definition, just like Cicero’s. It differs,
however, in two crucial respects. In the first place, Cicero defines the state as a
public entity (res) rather than a collection of human beings. Second, Cicero
puts forward a people in place of a plurality of citizens. Accordingly, Cicero
defines the state not by the participation of individuals in the political process
but by a common commitment to a collective endeavour. Although Cicero
echoes Aristotle’s claim that the members of a state are ‘not just any multi-
tude’,67 he defines this membership very differently as an association bound
by a common policy rather than as a community of individuals aiming at goals

that are the same for the state as for individuals.
What makes the differences all the more striking is that Cicero follows the
general sequence of argument used by Aristotle in his third book. Both begin
with a definition of the state, then propose the reason why people came
together, then go on to judge the different types of constitution with reference
to this reason.68 Right away, the formal parallelism between Aristotle’s and
Cicero’s definitions underscores the difference between them: each begins
with a statement of the constituency of a state, followed by a definition of the
constituency. Cicero could have followed Aristotle much more closely by
using civitas as his definiendum. This term, which means ‘citizenship’ as well
as ‘state’, would be expected to be defined in terms of citizens. The choice of
res publica immediately announces a difference.
Cicero agrees with Aristotle on the basic reason for political gatherings —
that humans are naturally sociable. When Cicero goes on to discuss the types
of constitution, however, further differences appear. Cicero demands a delib-
erative body, consilium (1.41); Aristotle looks for an authoritative body,
kurion.69 On the surface, this difference seems insignificant, for Cicero goes
on to assign full power to the deliberative body: it has ‘supremacy’ (omnium
64 Ibid., 3, 1274b41; cf. 1276b1–2.

65 Ibid., 3, 1275a23 (twß/ metevcein krivsewÀ kai; ajrch¤À) and 1275b b18–19:
wßJ/. . . ejxousiva koinwnei¤n ajrch¤À bouleutikh¤À kai; kritikh¤À.
66 Ibid., 3, 1275b5–6.
67 Ibid., 3, 1303a26; and 7, 1328b16.
68 Ibid., 3, 1278b15–17 and 1279a22–25. It is unlikely that Cicero himself read Aris-
totle’s Politics, since he never cites the work. His sources, however, clearly did have a
knowledge of the text, whether at first hand or at some remove.
69 Ibid., 3, 1279a26–27.
594 E. ASMIS
summa rerum, 1.42), a term that may be taken to correspond to Aristotle’s

kurion. Still, the choice of term consilium suggests an attempt to distinguish
between who is in charge — the people — and a governing power. Having
defined the state as ‘a concern of the people’, Cicero avoids transferring this
concern to a governing body. Instead, he demands a directing body that leaves
the state intact as an enterprise of the people.70 From the beginning, Cicero
sees the government as an advisory body that makes policy on behalf of the
people as a whole.
Cicero follows Aristotle in recognizing three appropriate and three deviant
types of constitution. Both authors judge them by the general standard of jus-
tice.71 However, Cicero makes no reference here to Aristotle’s distinction
between ruling for the common good and pursuing only one’s own interest.72
This criterion may be taken as understood. There is nonetheless a difference:
Cicero immediately brands the deviant types of constitution as bad, and he has
them arise from excessive passions. In particular, he associates cruelty with
the tyrant and crazed fury with the mob.73 The psychological explanation may
be traced to Plato, but it also reflects Cicero’s understanding of Roman history
as well as his own attitude towards his political opponents. Cicero regularly
divides his fellow citizens into the ‘good’ (boni) and the ‘wicked’ (improbi).
The same division pervades his State: the upholders of the public concern are
the ‘good’; the rest are scoundrels.74
Last, a definition that Aristotle rejects provides an especially illuminating
parallel. If we look for a Greek model for Cicero’s definition, the most obvi-
ous candidate, it seems to me, is a formulation that Aristotle finds wanting. He
denies that a city is a ‘community of place, for the sake of refraining from
injustice to one another and sharing’. Instead, he claims, it is a ‘community of
living a good life . . . for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life’. The
aim, in short, is ‘fine actions’.75 Aristotle explains that the first formulation
70 Aristotle, one might note, achieves a similar goal by defining the citizens as shar-
ing in deliberation.
71 Cicero, State, 1.43, and Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1279a19.
72 Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1279a17–20. Frede, ‘Constitution and Citizenship’, p. 86,
points out that Cicero does not use Aristotle’s criterion for bad constitutions. Cicero
acknowledges the criterion of the common good, or the good of the people, at 1.7–8,
1.54, 2.47.
73 The passions of an individual are described in detail at 1.60. With respect to consti-
tutions, cruelty is associated with the tyrant (1.44, 3.43) and madness with the mob (1.9,
1.44); cf. 1.65–6.
74 See esp. 1.7, 1.31, 6.12.
75 Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1280b30–31 (povliÀ oujk e[sti koinwniva tovpou, kai;
tou¤ mh; ajdikei¤n sfa¤À aujtou;À kai; th¤À metadovsewÀ cavrin); 1280b33–35
(hJ tou¤¤ eujß zh¤n koinwniva . . . zwh¤À teleivaÀ cavrin kai; aujtavrkouÀ); and
1281a2–3 (tw¤n kalw¤n . . . pravxewn cavrin).
lists elements that are necessary but insufficient; mere abstinence from injus-
tice is insufficient because this alone will not make the citizens just.76
Cicero also finds the first formulation wanting; but he uses it in such a way
as to correct it. Cicero agrees with Aristotle that the state is not simply a com-
munity of place. Adapting the rejected definition, he takes from it two criteria
that distinguish the state, one having to do with justice, the other with sharing.
To correct the definition, Cicero replaces mere abstinence from injustice with
a common agreement on law, consensus iuris. As Cicero makes clear in the
argument that follows, this turns out to be a robust commitment to treating one
another with justice. While preserving the framework of the rejected defini-
tion, Cicero builds into it a demand that Aristotle made. At the same time,
Cicero’s formulation is far removed from Aristotle’s own definitions. Cicero
does not define the state either in terms of its citizens or in terms of its goal.
Rather, he defines the state in terms of its operation as a public enterprise.

Although he believes that service to the state is the greatest, most virtuous of
all activities,77 he does not see the state so much as a school for virtue as an
area in which virtue is applied in the pursuit of a common endeavour.
In sum, Cicero uses an Aristotelian framework to work out solutions of
his own. Plato helps him with these solutions. Cicero shares Plato’s concern
for both unity and justice. In his State, Plato defines the first city as ‘a com-
mon dwelling-place’ in which many come together to ‘associate with
(koinwnouvÀ) and help’ one another out of ‘need’, creiva.78 This descrip-
tion lacks any mention of justice; indeed, Socrates raises the question where
justice (dikaiosuvnh) or injustice is to be found in this city.79 The fully
developed city is a paradigm of justice. Cicero demands a system of justice
(ius) right away in his definition; but his definition, too, leaves it unclear
whether there is true justice (iustitia) or not. Like Plato, Cicero proceeds to
unpack the notion of justice, though he does it very differently. In place of a
common agreement on who rules and is ruled, as we have seen, Cicero
demands a consensus that recognizes everyone’s contribution to the state,
conceived as a common enterprise, whether it consists of ruling or not.
Stoic philosophy also had an impact on Cicero’s definition. A basic Stoic
definition of ‘city’ (povliÀ) is: ‘a multitude of human beings living in the
same place, governed by law’ (plh¤qoÀ ajnqrwvpwn ejn taujtw/
katoikouvntwn uJpo; novmou dioikouvmenon).80 Likewise, a ‘people’
(dh¤moÀ) is defined as ‘a multitude of human beings governed by law’.81
The Stoics also offered a series of three definitions for ‘city’: (a) a
76 See esp. Aristotle, Politics, 3, 1280a38–b12.
77 See Cicero, State, 1.2.
78 Plato, State, 369c.
79 Ibid., 371e.
80 SVF, 3.329.
81 SVF, 3.327.
596 E. ASMIS
dwelling-place; (b) ‘an organization of human beings (suvsthma tw¤n

ajnqrwvpwn)’, or (more fully) ‘an organization of inhabitants together with
citizens (to; ejk tw¤n ejnoikouvntwn sun toi¤À poliv taiÀ suvsthma); and
(c) both.82 In addition, the Stoics defined the whole world (cosmos) as a city
composed of humans and gods.83
Like Cicero, the Stoics did not define a city in terms of its citizens;
rather, it is a community of human beings, or a ‘people’. As the fuller ver-
sion of (b) makes clear, the Stoics admitted non-citizens along with citizens.
The requirement ‘governed by law’ fits this broad membership; for it is appli-
cable to all who are under the sway of law, whether citizens or not. In place of
a double requirement for both law and a sharing of benefits, the Stoics
demanded only the rule of law. According to the Stoics, this is the only real
benefit.
Like Cicero’s definition, moreover, the Stoic definitions of a state admit of

both a commonplace interpretation and a philosophically refined interpreta-
tion. When all the terms are taken in an ordinary sense, the definitions agree
with a commonplace conception of the state; that is, they express an initial
conception (provlhyiÀ) that all have by nature. Everyone can agree that a state
is a multitude of people governed by law. A dramatic reversal occurs when the
term ‘law’ (novmoÀ) is revealed in its strict, philosophical sense as: ‘the rea-
son of nature, commanding what must be done and prohibiting what must not
be done’.84 Cicero uses this very definition in his debate on justice (3.33). His
expanded version tells us that this law applies to all humans everywhere and
that its founder is god. In a strict sense, therefore, the Stoics conceived of a
city as governed by the law of god. It follows that a city is morally good; like-
wise a ‘people’ is a morally good organization.85 The only city in a strict
sense, moreover, is the cosmic city, as governed by god, or a city governed by
wise humans in union with god. Existing states, as normally understood, do
not qualify as states.86
82 SVF, 3.328 and 2.528 (which lists only the first two types).
83 SVF, 3.333; cf. 3.327 and 334.
84 SVF, 3.323 (Philo): lovgoÀ . . . fuvsewÀ prostaktiko;À me;n wJßn
praktevon, ajpagoreutiko;À de; wJßn ouj poihtevon.
85 SVF, 3.327; cf. the definition of the state (politeiva) at 3.332 as ‘a good rearing of
humans in a community’.
86 SVF, 3.327. There is much controversy whether the whole world, or the entire
human community, qualifies as a city in the strict sense, or whether a city can consist only
of wise individuals. The distinction between inhabitants and citizens seems to me to
point to a solution. Since a city is defined as a community of inhabitants, not citizens,
nothing prevents a city that contains foolish individuals from being a city in the strict
sense. All humans, it follows, are members of the cosmic city, for all are governed by
law, whether willingly or not; but only wise persons are citizens in a strict sense (see SVF,
1.222). There is no need to impute one view to the early Stoics (that only the wise belong
Like the Stoics, Cicero concludes, on the basis of a philosophically correct

understanding of a key term, that there is no state except one that is governed
justly. Cicero makes use of the Stoic concept of natural law to develop his
own, pragmatic conception of justice. States can be just, he believes, if their
laws conform to natural law; and the ancestral Roman state is an outstanding
example of precisely such a state. Cicero’s more realistic conception thus
admits existing states. The problem Cicero faces is how positive law can
reflect natural law without any loss of justice. Cicero tackles this problem in
his Laws. What makes Cicero’s confidence easier to understand is that he con-
ceives of the state as a partnership that is based, like all partnerships, on com-
mon principles of justice — the kind that he and the Roman lawyers associate
with the law of nations.
Cicero’s definition of the state differs fundamentally from the basic Stoic
definition in that it replaces submission (as expressed by the passive participle

(dioikouvmenon) with common agreement,87 and that it adds ‘sharing of
benefits’. For the Stoics, it would be redundant to add a mention of benefits.

Cicero is pragmatic from the beginning. The differences agree with the idea of
the state as a partnership: partners actively practise lawful behaviour for the
sake of a benefit, which is other than simply the justice of the activity.
Cicero’s conception of the state combines self-direction with a reaping of
material benefits.
Conclusion
The most immediate antecedent for Cicero’s definition occurs in his own
endeavours. Early in 56 BCE, some two years before he began working on his
State, Cicero included a brief definition of res publica in his speech Pro
Sestio, 91. Res publicae, he says, are ‘things for the common benefit’ (res ad
communem utilitatem). To this definition, Cicero added two others: civitates
are ‘assemblies of humans’; and urbes (‘cities’) are ‘conjoined dwelling-
places’. These definitions are part of a discussion in which Cicero draws a con-
trast between two stages of human existence: a solitary life, full of violence
(vis), where there was ‘neither natural nor civil ius’; and the collective life of
humans in states. The discovery of ‘divine and human ius’, he says, led to the
foundation of states.
The same trio of terms is found in Cicero’s State. The brief unpacking of
the term res publica in Pro Sestio conspicuously lacks any mention of ius; but
the surrounding discussion centres on the change from vis to ius. In the State,
Cicero gathers the two requirements, ius and benefits, into a single definition;
and he ends up requiring both natural law and political legislation.
to the cosmic city), and another, more generous view to later Stoics (that all humans
belong to the cosmic city).
87 This has often been noted; see esp. Stark, ‘Ciceros Staatsdefinition’, pp. 61–2.
598 E. ASMIS
In the same speech, Cicero highlighted the current consensus among the
Romans. There are dangerous dissenters to be sure, notably Clodius and his
followers; but the Roman people as a whole is united, Cicero claims, in a con-
sensus of the good, from its leaders to the freedmen.88 In his State, Cicero puts
the requirement for common agreement into his definition. Consensus was a
key element in Cicero’s own political policy. From the time of his consulship,
Cicero prided himself on forging a consensus between senators and knights.
He claimed, moreover, that this agreement extended to the whole people,
including freedmen; it was a consensus of all the ‘good’ (boni).89 The expla-
nation of consensus in his State reflects this personal endeavour. Just as
Cicero aimed for a union of senators and knights in his political career, so he
posits a union of senate and knights in the highest division of his musical
analogy; the rest of the people are joined in agreement with this group. The
union of aristocrats and financiers is the fulcrum on which the success of the
state rests as a common enterprise.
Although Cicero modifies his view of the Roman constitution between Pro
Sestio and his State, his conception of the Roman state as a partnership
remains constant. A partnership is, in sum, a res ad communem utilitatem. In
richer detail, it is a res in which individuals are conjoined iuris consensu and
utilitatis communitate. Partners are ‘good’ people, boni, bound by a fair
agreement to share the profits in proportion to their contributions. If this
agreement is broken, the partnership is dissolved. In a state, all members are
bound by a fair agreement to make contributions and receive benefits in pro-
portion to their contributions. If the common agreement is broken, the state no
longer exists.
In his State, Cicero portrays a division, placed in the year 129 BCE, of the
state into the ‘good’, who attempt to preserve the state, and the seditious, who
would destroy it. What is needed is a victory of the good over the seditious; if
the seditious are victorious, the state will come to ruin. By hinting at the death
of Scipio Aemilianus in the dialogue (6.12), Cicero foreshadows the dire situ-
ation of his own time. In the prologue to the fifth book, Cicero laments the
current destruction of the state. Nonetheless, Cicero constructs a message of
hope in his State: if the old partnership — the traditional partnership of the
good in a mixed constitution — can be renewed, the state can come to life
again.
What is a fair standard for measuring contributions and rewards in this part-
nership? Cicero’s standard was as controversial in antiquity as it is considered
unfair now. He ranks contributions along a scale in which citizen status or
military service is much less important than wealth, and a selfless,
88 Cicero, Pro Sestio, 96–108 (esp. 106).
89 Cicero, In Catilinam 1.32 and 4.14–18; cf. De lege agraria, 1.26. On Cicero’s policy
of consensus, see H. Strasburger, Concordia Ordinum: Eine Untersuchung zur Politik
Ciceros (Borna-Leipzig, 1931), pp. 59–74.
courageous, wise devotion of all one’s capacities to the common enterprise is

most important of all. The reward is correspondingly large; and it consists not
just of material rewards or political power, but above all of honour and
esteem. Cicero lists his rewards in the first prologue: his cares and troubles on
behalf of the state, he says, were more than compensated by the honour and
glory he achieved and the joy he derived from the affection of the ‘good’
(1.7).
Cicero was attacked in his own time for advocating an oligarchic, repres-
sive regime; and the charge has stuck. Given his deep conservatism, it is per-
haps ironic that he views any kind of state — any legitimate state, that is — as
a kind of democracy, as the term res populi suggests. As a partnership of the
people, any legitimate state is an enterprise operated by the people. Depend-
ing on how the contributions are assessed and rewards are distributed, this
rule of the people may be highly undemocratic. The term res populi, one
might object, may be nothing but a camouflage for the alienation of the state
from the people. Cicero’s idea of the state as a partnership, in which all mem-
bers of the community act in good faith with one another according to com-
mon principles of justice, remains nonetheless a fruitful one.90
Elizabeth Asmis THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
90 I am very grateful to the anonymous referees of History of Political Thought for

their very helpful suggestions.

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THE STATE AS A PARTNERSHIP: CICERO’S DEFINITION

OF RES PUBLICA IN HIS WORK ON THE STATE

1 Department of Classics, The University of Chicago, 1010 East 59th Street,

This paper is an attempt to probe Cicero’s originality further. I will suggest

undisputed starting-point for discussion; the practical purpose is to lead to a

Cicero’s definition as a starting-point of investigation; and a study of the

The Practical Problem

evant to this study.

to an explanation of the present situation. The other senior members approve

body that has taken temporary refuge at his estate.

a definition must be agreed upon.8 The aim of the definition is to provide an

arguments leading to true conclusions. Unlike Plato, who is willing to aban-

city (oppidum, urbs) as a ‘conglomeration of dwellings’ (coniunctionem

16 SVF, 3.328; cf. 2.528; see further below.

18 The identification of res publica as res populi appears to be traditional, as shown

terms, res populi, then continues with a sequence of terms compounded by

corresponds more closely to Greek divkh, or German Recht, or French droit

21 See Cicero, Pro Sestio, 92.

corporeal and incorporeal things, the latter including obligations.24 In both

pressed, apparently out of a desire for grammatical parallelism with utilitatis

Partnerships were an important feature of Roman life from the earliest

property or work or both to the prosecution of a common aim’.30 Partnerships

In Roman law, partnerships are classified as a type of obligation based on

of contributions to profit. The basic principle is that the proportion must be

ner on the others or by the whole partnership. There is no partnership (called

justice? Is the state indeed a partnership of citizens collaborating with one

42 Gaius, Institutes, 4.62; and Institutes, ed. de Zulueta, Part 2, p. 180.

47 1.1: amorem ad communem salutem defendendam.

mother of justice is weakness, not nature or will’.48 On this view, justice is a

The analysis of constitutions revolves around the criterion of justice. Scipio

type of council (consilium). Each type of council, he adds, must be judged by

The entire discussion of constitutions is clearly indebted to Aristotle and

lays out the rudiments of a political structure by appointing a senate to advise

Cicero, moreover, softens the oligarchic principle by saying that voting

people, as previously defined, there is no res populi. In the tyranny of

agreement, it turns out, entails justice; and justice entails an other-concern

Finally, Cicero offers a revised answer to the question of the origin of

together’ is ‘a partnership of citizens for living happily and well’ (civium

60 As mentioned above, scholars have turned away from Stoicism to Aristotelianism

certain multitude of citizens’ (politw¤n ti plh¤qoÀ),64 then goes on to define

by a common policy rather than as a community of individuals aiming at goals

64 Ibid., 3, 1274b41; cf. 1276b1–2.

summa rerum, 1.42), a term that may be taken to correspond to Aristotle’s

Rather, he defines the state in terms of its operation as a public enterprise.

dwelling-place; (b) ‘an organization of human beings (suvsthma tw¤n

Like Cicero’s definition, moreover, the Stoic definitions of a state admit of

Like the Stoics, Cicero concludes, on the basis of a philosophically correct

definition in that it replaces submission (as expressed by the passive participle

benefits’. For the Stoics, it would be redundant to add a mention of benefits.

courageous, wise devotion of all one’s capacities to the common enterprise is

Elizabeth Asmis THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

90 I am very grateful to the anonymous referees of History of Political Thought for

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