01. RAJIV DUTTA VS.

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Introduction:
The case of Sarita Devi, the Indian boxer who represented India at the 17th Asian Games, who
was suspended by the Amateur International Boxing Association (AIBA) for a period of one year
from all competitions conducted by AIBA.

Facts:
a. The present petition was filed raising the issue relating to the alleged illegal suspension
of Sarita Devi (Respondent No. 5) from participation in the competitions of Amateur
International Boxing Association (AIBA) and the alleged failure of the Respondents 1-3
i.e., Union of India (Department of Sports), the Indian Olympic Association and Boxing
India to challenge the said decision of AIBA.
b. Sarita Devi is a Boxer who represented India in the 17th Asian Games conducted by
AIBA at Incheon, Korea. Alleging discrepancies in the manner of operation of the semi-
final match in which she’d participated and non-compliance of Olympic Charter and its
Statute, Devi along with her coaches was provisionally suspended by AIBA on
21.10.2014.
c. The present petition came to be filed on 05.12.2014 alleging that no guidelines are in
place for settlement of disputes with International Sports Bodies and contending that it is
necessary to ensure that clear guidelines are formulated for dispute settlement within the
sports bodies that come under the jurisdiction of the UoI.
d. A final order came to be passed by the Disciplinary Committee of AIBA placing Devi
under suspension for a period of one year.

Prayer:
The petitioner seeks a direction to the Respondent No. 1/Union of India to take due cognizance
of the Rules and Regulations framed by the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) situated at
Switzerland and to direct the respective Federations and Associations in India to incorporate the
CAS Arbitration clause within their respective rules/regulations/bye-laws.

Arguments for the Petitioner:

a. It was submitted by Shri Rajiv Dutta that the National Sports Code of 2011 which
primarily deals with administering the affairs of the various National Sport Federations
within India contains a provision of appeal to CAS.
b. It was further submitted that Article 63.3 of AIBA Statute provides that recourse to the
courts of law of a country is permitted where the law of the country mandates such
recourse.
c. The petitioner therefore submitted that if a provision is incorporated in the National
Sports Development Code of India, 2011 providing a remedy of appeal to CAS, it would
empower sports persons in India to appeal against the unjust and unlawful decisions of
AIBA and other such International sports bodies.

Observation of the Court

 a. It is apparent from the material placed on record that no remedy is available as of today
to appeal to CAS against the decision of the International Sports Bodies like AIBA.
b. The fact that CAS is the final authority for settlement of disputes arising out of the
decisions of International Sports Bodies has not been disputed by the Respondent No.
1.
c. It also appears that the National Sports Code of 2011 contains a provision of appeal to
CAS against any decision of Sports Federations in India.

Judgement of the Court

The Court stated that though no mandamus could be issued to the UoI to incorporate such a
provision for the remedy of appeal to CAS against the decisions of the International Sports
Bodies, it directed the Respondent No. 1 to consider the contents of this petition as a
representation and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Court gave 3 months’
time to do the needful.
02. AJAY JADEJA VS. UNION OF INDIA
Facts:
a. Ajay Jadeja was a well-known cricketer in India who played for the Indian cricket team in
the 1990s. In 2000, he was accused of involvement in match-fixing and was
subsequently banned for five years by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI).
Jadeja challenged the ban in the Delhi High Court, which set aside the ban on the
grounds that the BCCI did not follow the proper procedures for imposing the ban.
However, the Union of India (the central government) appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court of India.

Issues:
a. Whether BCCI is amenable to writ jurisdiction under article 32 of Constitution?
b. Whether the BCCI had the authority to impose the ban on Jadeja, whether the BCCI had
followed the proper procedures for imposing the ban, and whether the ban was
proportionate to Jadeja's alleged conduct.

Argument of the Petitioner:

The Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that:
a. Encouragement of games and sports is a State function falling within the functions of the
Ministry of Sports & Youth Affairs, and the BCCI is considered by the Ministry of Youth
Affairs & Sports to be the regulatory authority of cricket in India.
b. The name of the BCCI itself suggests that it is controlling the game of Cricket in India
and it enjoys a monopoly status because nobody can play competitive cricket in India
without the permission of the BCCI.
c. Functions of BCCI are of public importance on account of the State Governments giving
assistance in the form of State largesse to the Members of the Board, i.e., State
Associations in the form of lease of large grounds at prime urban locations at a nominal
rent.
d. The game of cricket affects a high degree of public interest in the country.
e. The BCCI performs sovereign functions by selecting and sending cricket teams to
represent India and similarly inviting teams of other foreign countries to play with the
India team. This is evident from the fact that whether or not to play a foreign country
such as Pakistan is governed by a political decision of the Government. This clearly
indicates that the function of selection of a team to represent India is sovereign in
character.
f. The team selected by the BCCI represents India bearing the Logo 'India' and flies the
Indian Flag and Ashok Chakra is worn on the team dress and the team is clearly not
representing the BCCI but the nation. For all international tournaments such as the
World Cup or the Commonwealth Games where only countries participate, the teams
are selected by the BCCI.
g. The Government allows large sums of foreign exchange known as minimum bank
guarantee amount to the paid to the foreign teams and also releases foreign exchange
towards expenses for boarding and lodging.
h. Cricket laws are framed by the BCCI in India.
 i. The Arjuna Award is granted by the Government on the recommendation of the BCCI.
j. In International Matches played in India, a large amount of Government infrastructure
such as live coverage and security, at considerable public expense is provided by the
Government machinery. Large sums of money are earned by the BCCI affiliates by
utilising the prima locations available at normal or concessional rates for earning huge
profits by way of gate money, sponsorship and advertising revenue.
k. International Cricket Matches whether one day or a Test Matches receive the widest
media coverage much larger than the media coverage even for an event as important to
the nation as the Republic Day Parade.

Arguments of the Respondent:

Mr. Sibal, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that the BCCI is not
amenable to the writ jurisdiction because:
a. It is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act.
b. It is affiliated to the International Cricket Council whose Member can only be a
corporation; individual nominated by a Cricket playing country and Government
representation on ICC is not recognised.
c. BCCI is not an 'authority or instrumentality of the State' within Article 12 of the
Constitution because it does not perform any public duty and has no monopoly status
and does not execute any sovereign function.
d. The Government of India has taken a stand that the BCCI is an autonomous body not
funded by the Government of India and the Government has no control over BCCI's
affairs and tax relief is available to all sports events and stadia at concessional rates and
is given to the respective State Associations of BCCI by the State Government in order
to promote sports and the stadia are not owned or leased by BCCI.
e. BCCI has its own constitution and functions within its own rules and regulations.
f. In view of the judgement of Mohinder Amarnath's Case holding that the BCCI is not a
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution no writ would lie against it. The
said judgement of the Division Bench of this Court is binding on the Single Judge.
g. The petitioner's counsel has submitted that the petitioner is not claiming any contractual
right and that the petitioner has no legal right enforceable in a writ proceeding and the
petitioner not having any contractual right, there could be no direction or a decree of a
Court compelling the BCCI to select any player in the team and the concept of a 'zone of
consideration' as in service jurisprudence does not apply in the present case.

Judgement:
a. After having established that the BCCI’s actions come under the ambit of judicial scrutiny
due to the monopoly status of the BCCI in Indian sports, the Supreme Court set aside
the Delhi High Court's decision and upheld Jadeja's ban. The court found that the BCCI
had the authority to impose the ban and had followed the proper procedures in doing so.
b. The Court concluded that BCCI was the sole representative of India as a country at all
levels of cricket in the international arena and selects teams for all representative levels
of cricket at the International level and has been recognized by the Government of India
 as the Regulatory Authority for the game of Cricket in India; and when the Government
stands by and lets a body like BCCI assume the prerogative of being a sole
representative of India for cricket by permitting BCCI to choose the team for India for
appearance in events like the World Cup, then it necessarily imbues BCCI with the
public functions at least in or far as the selection of the team to represent India and
India's representation in International Cricket fora and regulation of Cricket in India is
concerned.
c. The Supreme Court reasoned that the BCCI had the authority to impose the ban on
Jadeja because the BCCI was a private body with the power to regulate the game of
cricket in India. The court also found that the BCCI had followed the proper procedures
for imposing the ban, including providing Jadeja with a fair hearing and an opportunity to
respond to the allegations against him.

Conclusion:
a. Overall, the Supreme Court's decision in Ajay Jadeja vs. Union of India reaffirmed the
BCCI's authority to regulate cricket in India and emphasised the importance of protecting
the integrity of the sport, while holding the preliminary writ maintainable.
03. INDIAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, WEST BENGAL AND ORS. VS. MOHUN BAGAN
ATHLETIC CLUB AND ORS.
Facts:
a. The plaintiff is an affiliated Association of the pro forma defendant, All India Football
Federation. The plaintiff conducted football League for the year 1986 and Mohun Bagan
Athletic Club (Def1) and other Clubs participated in it.
b. On 15th July, 1986 Mohun Bagan AC played a league match with Rajasthan Club at its
home ground. In the same match one Mastan Ahmed participated and played for the
Mohun Bagan AC. During the said match the said Mastan Ahmed for committing an
offence was shown "Yellow Card'' by the Referee conducting the said match.
c. The concerned Referee duly submitted a report of the said match to the Indian Football
Association. By the letter dated 16th July, 1986 the Indian Football Association duly
communicated to the Mohun Bagan AC as to the said caution given to its said player by
the Referee.
d. Mohun Bagan Athletic Club played another league match against Port Trust at its home
ground. During the said match the said Mastan Ahmed due to commission of an offence
was also shown 'Yellow Card' by the Referee conducting the said match. The said
match, however, could not be concluded due to heavy downpour and was abandoned
after 65 minutes of play.
e. Mohun Bagan A. C. played its next match against Police AC. The said match was played
by the football players of the Mohun Bagan A.C. including the said Mastan Ahmad and
Mohun Bagan won the said match by two nil.
f. After the play was over the Police A .C. lodged a protest in writing to the Calcutta
Football Sub-Committee of the I.F.A., inter alia, contending that Mohan Bagan A.C.
illegally fielded and/or allowed Mastan Ahmed to play the match between Mohun Bagan
A.C. and Police A.C... It was further contended that Mastan Ahmed was not entitled to
participate in the said Match in view of the 'Yellow Card' shown to him twice in the
matches.

Issue:
Whether the abandoned match should be taken to be a valid match and 'Yellow Card' shown in
that abandoned match should be and/or could be taken into account for the purpose of
suspending the player in question in the subsequent match?

Argument for IFA:

The Counsel appearing on behalf of the Indian Football Association and East Bengal Club'
submitted that the effect of showing yellow card in such abandoned match remains valid and is
to be taken into account for the purpose of disciplinary action.

Argument for Mohun Bagan

I.F.A. produced the Caution register and it transpires from the Caution Register that there is no
entry of showing 'Yellow Card' during the second match. It was contended that the I. F. A.
considered the second match, which was an abandoned match as non est and that is why in the
Caution Register there is no entry of the second match and for all practical purposes, the
second match was an abandoned match and was non est and as such, the 'Yellow Card' shown
to Mastan Ahmed during the second match is also non est for all purposes.

Observation of the Court:

04. K. BHASKARAN AND OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, AIR 1999 DEL 150
Facts
a. The genesis of this case is in a dispute between two factions of the fourth respondent
Amateur Kabaddi Federation of India. While one faction is led by Shri Kuldeep Vats, the
other faction is led by Shri J. S. Gehlot. Both S/Shri Vats and Gehlot were claiming to
have been elected to the post of the President of the said association.
b. The faction led by Shri Vats under the supervision of an observer of the Sports Authority
of India selected the Kabaddi team comprising of the petitioners to represent India at the
13th Asian Games to be held at Bangkok. According to the petitioners, various Kabaddi
coaching camps were organized for them at different places.
c. It is significant to point out that in September `1998, a single Judge of the Rajasthan
High Court passed an order directing the concerned authority to appoint an arbitrator for
the resolution of disputes between the two factions in accordance with the decision of
the Supreme Court in M.P. Triathlon Association through its Secretary v. Indian
Triathlon Federation.
d. Pursuant to the direction of the Rajasthan High Court and in accordance with Rule XIX
of the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Olympic Association, the Indian Olympic
Association appointed Shri B. S. Ojha, Vice President of the Indian Olympic Association,
an arbitrator for resolving the disputes between the above said two factions.
e. While the arbitration proceedings were in progress, the Indian Olympic Association on
November 23, 1998 constituted a Selection Committee to select the Kabaddi team for
13th Asian Games. At the same time it directed the ten best players each from the
coaching camps being held at Jaipur (by the Gehlot faction) and Patiala (by the Vats
faction) respectively to participate at the trials which were to be held at the National
Stadium, New Delhi. The Committee selected twelve players including two stand byes
and notified the team to the Indian Olympic Association on November 26, 1998. Six of
the petitioners have found their place in the team.

Issue
Whether any illegality attaches to the team selected by the Selection Committee constituted by
the Indian Olympic Association?

Argument of Petitioner
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
a. the petitioners having undergone extensive training under the auspices of the Sports
Authority of India should be sent to the Asian Games at Bangkok to represent India in
the discipline of Kabadi.
b. as per the direction of the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court the
authority should have cleared their names to enable them to travel to Bangkok for
participating in the Asian Games.
c. the decision of the Indian Olympic Association in nominating the Selection Committee at
the eleventh hour is mala fide and is based on extraneous grounds.
Observation of Court
a. The Court commented that the sporting interest of the country was being jeopardised
because of their inter se rivalry. It is because of this controversy that selection of the
team by the Indian Olympic Association was delayed.
b. As per para 10.3 of the Guidelines for Assistance to National Sports Federations issued
in July, 1997 by the Government of India the Selection Committee is to be constituted by
the concerned federation comprising the President, the National Coach and eminent ex-
sport persons. The Government of India is required to appoint an observer for each
discipline who is to be associated with all the activities of the National Federation.
c. Since there was a dispute between the two factions of the fourth respondent which is
affiliated to the Indian Olympic Association, the matter was required to be resolved in
accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Olympic Association. Rule XIX
(iii) of the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Olympic Association provides for
resolution of the disputes arising within the National Sports
Federations/Associations/State Olympic Associations affiliated to the IOA through
arbitration.
d. According to the said Rule, the dispute is required to be placed by the
Federations/Associations before the IOA for appointment of an arbitrator. On October
19, 1998, in consonance with the said Rule; the IOA appointed Shri B. S. Ojha as the
arbitrator for resolving the disputes between the two factions of the fourth respondent.
e. Since there was a dispute as to whether Vats or Gehlot was the President of the fourth
respondent it was not possible to associate the President of the Federation in the
deliberations of the Selection Committee in accordance with para 10.3 of the Guidelines
for Assistance to National Sports Federations. Therefore, the IOA constituted the
Selection Committee in pursuance of para XlX(iii) of the Indian Olympic Association
Rules without nominating either Gehlot or Vats thereto.
f. The Selection Committee constituted on November 23, 1998 by the Indian Olympic
Association selected the Indian contingent to participate in the 13th Asian Games from
both the factions after judging their performance at the trial. The coach who was
imparting training to the petitioners was also a member of the Selection Committee.
There is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the Selection Committee in selecting the
best sportsmen for the Indian team.
g. The arbitrator after the selection of the team on December 2, 1998 informed the
President of the IOA that he had reached the conclusion that Shri J. S. Gehlot was
legally elected as the President of the fourth respondent in the meeting held at Sawai
Madhopur on September 19, 1997. A copy of the communication was presented in Court
by the learned senior counsel for the IOA. Thus, the team sponsored by Shri Vats
cannot claim to be the team selected according to the Rules.

Judgement
The court held that the selection done by the selection committee is according to the rules of
IOA. There is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the Selection Committee in selecting the best
sportsmen for the Indian team.
05. JOACHIM CARVALHO V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, 2012 INDLAW DEL 4256

Facts:
The Petition was filed in the public interest by the petitioner, who was a former member of the
Indian Hockey team and an olympian, and has a genuine interest in the future of Indian Hockey.
The petition was filed on the ground that hockey players of eminence are being subjected to
threat, and are being prevented from participating in a world class hockey tournament organised
in the country.
The Respondents are:
1. R1: The Union of India through the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport
2. R2: Hockey India
3. R3: Indian Olympic Association
4. R4: Indian Hockey Confedration

Timeline:
1. In 2008, due to misgovernance, R3 suspended R4 from its position as a NSF, and
intimate to R4 and al of its state units that R4 was suspended and R3 would form an ad-
hoc committee to manage and administer affairs of R4 till the issues are resolved. In the
same year, R4 filed a WP against the suspension order.
2. In 2009, R2 was registered as a new society, and R1 and R3 both recognized R2. The
ad hoc committee managing R4 was dissolved.
3. In 2010, the Court quashed the suspension of R4 by R1 and R3. R1 issued a letter
clarifying the court’s decision, and stated that though there are two recognized NSFs,
only R2 enjoys the support of FIH.
4. In 2010, R1, in view of this decision, derecognized R2 as NSF.
5. In the interim measures, seeing as how only R2 was recognized by FIH, the SC
permitted R2 and the IOA to finalize women’s hockey team, and take necessary steps to
field them in competitions, and the same was repeated for Men’s and Women’s teams
later on. In the Asian Games held in this period, R2 was given the power to select
teams.
6. In the same year, 2010, R4 launched ‘World Series Hockey” (the relevant event), which
would be the first financially sustaining hockey event in India, and signed contracts with
many Indian players. The agreement provided that players are required to exclusively
perform in that event during its period.
R4 sanctioned the relevant event to be organized with a promotions and event management
company known as Nimbus Communications Ltd. Hockey players (both domestic and
international) entered into contracts with the company for 3 years. In response to this, R2 put
some restrictions on the players to participate in the aforesaid event. Although R2 is
derecognized by R1, FIH still recognizes R2 as a national sports federation. FIH has introduced
new by laws for its own functioning as well as of its member national associations, which were
introduced by R2 as well. R2 hence enacted a code of conduct and provided for disciplinary
actions that can be taken against Indian players who participate in domestic events not
recognized by R2, and R2 has refused to grant authorization to the relevant event. Hence,
players who have signed the contract are faced with the threat of disciplinary action and denial
of opportunity. The petitioner is challenging this conduct.

Contentions by R2:
1. R2 contended that its Code of Conduct is a by product of the Code of Conduct
prescribed by the FIH, and that it has no option but to adhere to them, as otherwise FIH
can bar India from entering international events.
2. Though R1 has derecognized R2, it is still recognized by the FIH, and FIH is the
controlling body of international events, and participating countries have to conform to
the rules made by FIH. Further, having regard to the interim orders passed by the SC,
R2 is to play a dominant and exclusive role as far as international events are concerned.
3. R2 is supposed to ensure that all rules and regulations of FIH are followed, and
therefore it is difficult for players to participate in the concerned events as there is a risk
of being debarred from international competitions.
4. The dates of the concerned events are also clashing with when players are needed for
national representative duty, which included participation in international events and
training and preparation for those events.

Contention by Petitioners/R4:
1. The Laudable object of organising World Series Hockey by R4 and Nimbus
Communications cannot be undermined. Hockey players would make respectful
earnings which has eluded them till now, and this may attract more young talent to the
game. Through this, the event may serve a public purpose.
Order of the Court:

The Court observed that R2 has organized preparatory camps for Olympic Qualifier number 1,
with the first fitness camp to be held from 16th December to 6th Jan. The Second camp, a skill
camp, starts from 16th january. The Court observed that the problem can be resolved if it is
ensured that the event sought to be conducted does not clash with the training schedule of the
players. The Court observed that the series can give a boos to the players as well as the public,
and can serve a public purpose, hence the event should be held. The Court also held that as
the FIH has not been made a party, and the Court does not have any jurisdiction over it, the
matter must be put before it so that calrificaiton can be sought from them. The Court opined that
both training/preparatory camps, as well as the event are very important, and no clash of
schedules should happen.
06. ABRAR QAZI V. STATE OF KARNATAKA
Facts:
a. The petition was filed for quashing of proceedings under charge sheet filed against the
accused. The case was such that K. Prakasha, the Police Inspector, City Crime Branch
(Special Investigating), Bengaluru, while interrogating the cricket players, coaches and
owners of franchises in connection with an ongoing crime came to know about match
fixing of the KPL cricket matches held in between 15th and 31st August of the year 2019
and gave a report of it to the Cubbon Park Police Station.
b. This resulted in FIR being registered and ultimately charge sheet being filed against the
petitioners and some other accused. The contents of charge sheet were that:
i. On 22.8.2019 a match was played between Bengaluru Blasters and Bellary
Tuskers at Chinnaswamy Stadium, Bengaluru. In connection with this match,
accused No. 3, the owner of a team called Belagavi Panthers conspired with
accused No. 1 and 2 and pursuant to the same accused No. 2 conceded 10 runs
in over No. 7. For conceding the runs, accused No. 2 received an advance of
INR. 2.50 lakhs and then after the match was over, he again received INR 5
Lakhs.
ii. During KPL season of the year 2018, accused No. 5 asked accused No. 2 to
come to his residence on 1.9.2018 and told him that his team should lose the
match to be played on 3.9.2018 against Shivamogga team. It is also alleged that
accused No. 5 asked accused No. 1 that his team should lose the match to
Shivamogga Lions in the said match.
iii. On 26.8.2019, match No. 19 was played at Mysuru between Mysuru and Bellary
teams. Accused No. 5 met accused No. 1 in a hotel called 'Southern Star Hotel'
and asked him to play slowly.
iv. Accused No. 4 is a bookie. After the schedule of the matches of the year 2019
was announced, accused No. 4 met accused No. 2 through a witness by name
Nitesh at Bengaluru Airport and entered into conspiracy for match fixing.
Accordingly, on 23.8.2019, when a match was played between Bellary Tuskers
and Shivamogga Lions, accused No. 4 made a whatsapp call to accused No. 2
and instructed him to stop the bowling in the middle itself and offered Rs.
10,00,000/- for doing so.
v. Accused No. 6 is a secretary of Social Club and KSCA member. He, at the
instance of accused No. 3 bore all the expenses of the players of other teams.
c. tldr: Various instances of match-fixing were drawn out)

Issue:
Whether match fixing is a criminal offence under IPC?

Arguments for the Petitioner:

a. That match fixing is not an offence, nor has it been defined to be an offence in any law.
An offence under section 420 of IPC cannot be imputed against the petitioners for, the
 essential ingredients for the said offence to constitute are not forthcoming in the charge
sheet.
b. Even if it is assumed for argument's sake that the petitioners did involve in match fixing,
it will not constitute an offence and at best it is breach of the Code of Conduct prescribed
to the players by the BCCI.
c. Action may be taken by the BCCI and in this case the Cricket Board has not taken any
action against some of the petitioners who are players. In this view, chargesheet for the
offence under section 420 IPC is not sustainable and for the same reason the offence of
conspiracy punishable under section 120B is also not sustainable.

Arguments by the Respondents:

a. The Anti-Corruption Code prescribed by BCCI is not a bar for initiating criminal
proceedings and that in the case on hand, all the essential ingredients for the offence
under section 420 IPC are present.
b. People buy tickets to watch a match. They carry an impression in their mind that they
are going to watch a fair play which will yield a just result. If match fixing takes place, the
result is predetermined and there is no fair game. Thus people are cheated. The
property involved in a case of this type to invoke the offence under section 420 IPC is
the money that the people pay for buying tickets. They are induced to buy tickets for the
fair play assured and in case there is match fixing, certainly an element of deception can
be made out and thus section 420 is attracted.
c. It was also argued that section 120B IPC is an independent offence, there are materials
in the charge sheet indicating conspiracy among the accused for fixing the game. Even
assuming that section 420 is not attracted, the petitioners can be tried for the offence
under section 120B IPC.

Observation of the Court:

a. It is true that if a player indulges in match fixing, a general feeling will arise that he has
cheated the lovers of the game. But, this general feeling does not give rise to an offence.
Match fixing may indicate dishonesty, indiscipline and mental corruption of a player and
for this purpose the BCCI is the authority to initiate disciplinary action.
b. If the bye-laws of the BCCI provide for initiation of disciplinary action against a player,
such an action is permitted but registration of an FIR on the ground that a crime
punishable under section 420 IPC has been committed, is not permitted.
c. Even if the entire charge sheet averments are taken to be true on their face value, they
do not constitute an offence. The allegations found in the charge sheet do not constitute
an offence under section 420 IPC and therefore offence under section 120B cannot be
invoked in the facts and circumstances.

JudgementJUDGEMENT OF THE COURT

Match fixing was held to not be a criminal offence of cheating under Section- 420 of IPC, and
the proceedings against the petitioners was quashed.
07. K. MURUGAN VS. FENCING ASSOCIATION OF INDIA, JABALPUR AND OTHERS,
(1991) 2 SCC 412
Introduction:
This is one of the landmark cases concerning the Indian Olympic Association. Due to a dispute
on the term & composition of executive council, the court adjudicated on various aspects
pertaining to the functioning of Indian Olympic Association, stating that fresh elections must be
conducted for the governing body, & a fresh executive council must be formulated.

Facts:
a. In 1984, Mr. V.C. Shukla was the President of the IOA and Mr. K. Murugan was one of
the 6 joint secretaries. After 4 years (the complete term for a president of IOA), Mr. B.S.
Adityan was elected as president. After his term, in 1990, there was a requisition of 17
members for a special meeting to move a no-confidence motion against Mr. Adityan and
his executive council. This requisition was overruled as invalid by the executive council
and Mr. Adityan called for a general assembly meeting in Madras on 15th June. The 17
members who had moved the requisition summoned a meeting on the same day at New
Delhi.
b. The delhi HC restrained the meeting from happening and appointed a retired Del HC
judge to be an observer for the meeting to be held in Madras. Mr. V.C. Shukla claims to
have been elected at the meeting which was held in Madras. In light of the in-fighting, a
single judge bench of the Madras HC had appointed retired Justice Natarajan as the
interim president of the IOA. This order was challenged in this particular case by Mr. V.C
Shukla and Mr. K. Murugan. The fencing association of India had filed a civil suit and this
is the appeal from there.

Issue:
The issue under consideration was regarding election of members to the executive council of
the Indian Olympic Association.

Arguments:
a. The Fencing Association contended that under the rules the terms of the President and
the Executive Council is four years and in the absence of a clear provision for a vote of
no. confidence, which would curtail the period, there could be no reduction of the period
of office.
b. It was also contended that the entire Executive Council could not be voted out of office
by a motion of no confidence and, therefore, Shri Adityan had rightly overruled the
requisition.

Judgement
Appeals disposed.

Reasoning:
a. The court disposed of these appeals and reiterated the paramount importance that the
functions of the Indian Olympic Association held in the international sphere. Justice
 Natarajan who was serving as the interim president of the Executive Council was
advised to remain in such a position until proper elections are held and the matter is
properly resolved.
b. The court expressed disappointment regarding the disagreements regarding leaderships
that had arisen within the association leading to litigation and elaborated that such petty
grievances must not foreshadow the important functions that they undertake.
c. They directed for fresh elections to be held at the earliest possible time and consequent
restoration of healthy working conditions. Hence, the court refrained from applying
provisions of the law to matters pertaining to office-bearers

Analysis:
a. While on the outset this may seem like a neutral and balanced approach taken by the
court, it can also be interpreted as one that is distant and lacking in distinct regulations.
b. Matters relating to in-fighting and personal politics must not adversely affect the process
of recruitment and coaching as the importance of sports must be understood by those
undertaking its proper regulation.
08. MESSRS ZEE TELEFILMS LIMITED AND ANOTHER V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS,
AIR 2005 SC 2677
Introduction:
The Judgment brings out various judicial interpretations given to the term “other authorities”
under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution which defines the term “State”. In this case, the
question before the Hon’ble SC was whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI)
was State within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution.

Facts:
a. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is a Society registered under the Tamil
Nadu Societies Registration Act which is said to be recognized by the Union of India,
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.
b. On 07.08.2004 the Board floated a notice inviting tender for grant of exclusive television
rights for a period of four years. Pursuant to the notice several entertaining groups
including Zee Telefilms Ltd. and ESPN Star Sports gave their offers.
c. The Board accepted the offer of Zee Telefilms after holding several negotiations.
However, this was challenged by ESPN Star Sports before the Bombay High Court
under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.
d. Later on 21.9.2004, the Board stated that it purported to have cancelled the entire tender
process on the premise that no concluded contract was reached between the parties as
no letter of intent had therefore been issued.
e. Owing to the cancellation of the tender, ESPN Star Sports withdrew its petition from the
Bombay HC. However, Zee Telefilms filed a writ of mandamus under Art.32 of the Indian
Constitution to direct the Board to act as per the terms and conditions of the tender.
They also stated that such a withdrawal of the tender notice by the Board was an
arbitrary act and stands against the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) was State within the ambit of Article 12
of the Constitution.

Arguments:
a. BCCI
i. BCCI is not a statutory body but is only registered under the Societies
Registration Act,1860 and hence the Board has the autonomy to handle its
administrative affairs.
ii. Neither does BCCI take any financial assistance form the government nor is it
subjected to any financial control by the Government or its accounts are subject
to the scrutiny of the Government.
iii. It is an accepted fact that, BCCI enjoys monopoly status in the field of Cricket but
the same is not conferred on it by any statute or any order of the Government. It
enjoys that monopoly status only by virtue of its first mover advantage and its
continuance as the solitary player in the field of cricket control. Also, there is no
law which prohibits the coming into existence of any other parallel organisation.
 iv. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government.
v. The Board is not under a deep and pervasive State control.
vi. All functions of the Board are not public functions nor are they closely related to
governmental functions.
vii. The Board is not created by transfer of a Government owned corporation. It is an
autonomous body.
viii. Placing reliance on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical
Biology & Ors [2002 5 SCC 111] and Ajay Hasia & Ors v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi & Ors [1981 1 SCC 722] the respondents contended that, a body
will be considered as State under Article 12 only if the Government of India has
deep and pervasive control over its administrative affairs, but the minimal amount
of control that the Government has over the Board is just regulatory in nature and
not pervasive.

b. Zee Telefilms
i. As per the Memorandum, Articles of Association, rules and regulations of the
Board the BCCI has extensive powers in selecting the “members to the Indian
national Cricket team”.
ii. The Board is the sole authority for organising major cricketing events in India and
has the disciplinary power over the players/umpires and other officials involved in
the game and sports which being a subject under the control of the States under
Entry 33 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, in
substance the Board exercises governmental functions in the area of Cricket.
And this monopoly status is conferred on it by the Government of India.
iii. The Board has the authority to determine whether a player would represent the
country or not. Further, since playing cricket is a profession the Board controls
the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.
iv. Prior approval from the Government of India is a mandate which the Board has to
obtain before sending the players to represent India internationally and also to
host international matches in India.
v. The players wear uniforms that carry the national flag and are treated as sports
ambassadors of India.
vi. The petitioners also pointed out an occasion where the team selected by the
Board was rejected permission to represent India for a match in Pakistan. Hence,
the Government of India has pervasive control over the Board.
vii. The petitioner placed reliance in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information
& Broadcasting, Government of India Others etc. v. Cricket Association of
Bengal and Others etc [(1995) 2 SCC 161] where the court held that, “a person
desiring to telecast sports events when he is not himself a participant in the
game, does not seek to exercise his right of self-expression. However, the right
to freedom of speech and expression also includes the right to educate, to inform
and to entertain and also the right to be educated, informed and entertained. The
former is the right of the telecaster and the latter that of the viewers. The right to
telecast sporting events will therefore also include the right to educate and inform
 the present and the prospective sportsmen interested in the particular game and
also to inform and entertain the lovers of the game. Hence, when a telecaster
desires to telecast a sporting event, it is incorrect to say that the free-speech
element is absent from his right”.

Judgement
BCCI is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

Reasoning
a. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) ,a society registered under the
provisions of Tamil Nadu Registration of Societies Act,1975 is not a State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India but it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction
of Article 226 of the Constitution in view of duties and functions performed by BCCI of
public nature. The activities to be performed by the Board are as under:
i. It formulates rules, regulations, norms and standards covering all aspects of the
game.
ii. It has the power to disqualify the players which may at times put an end to the
sporting career of the person.
iii. It spends crores of rupees on building and maintaining infrastructure like the
stadium, running of cricket academics and supporting the State Association.
iv. It frames pension schemes and incurs expenditure on coaches and trainers etc.
v. Collection of admission fees and the telecast and broadcast rights of the matches
are sold by the Board.
b. To these activities, there is tacit approval of the State Government and Government of
India. The State has not made or taken any steps to dilute the autonomy of the Board.
c. The court observed that BCCI, though it enjoyed the monopoly status over the Cricket
control, the state does not give this monopoly, nor does the state protect such monopoly
through any statute. The court also finds that BCCI is financially independent of the
state, nor does the state hold any share in the board. With all these observations, the
court finds no point in dealing with the contention that the respondents violated the
petitioner’s fundamental rights.
d. The majority view held that Board cannot be held to be a State for the purpose of Article
12 . Thus, the Writ filed under article 32 of Constitution is not maintainable. Hence, the
petition is dismissed.
e. The dissenting judgment of Sinha, J. in Zee Telefilms seeks to answer this question from
various perspectives. Whether the said private body could be ‘State’ or not can be
verified by one test as “if allowed to perform the regulatory and controlling functions, or
to discharge positive obligation of public nature or to discharge public duties, which were
otherwise the job of the government.” That being the case, the nature of the function
performed by a private body simpliciter could elevate it to the status of ‘State’, regardless
of the financial, functional and/or administrative control by the Government.
09. ALL INDIA WOMEN'S HOCKEY FEDERATION VS. INDIAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION
AND OTHERS,1994 INDLAW DEL 5
TLDR: Factionalism – plaintiff claimed to be head – originally went for arbitration, who favoured
defendant – plaintiff wants injunction on the arbitral award, tries to argue there is no arbitration
clause – for a federation to be registered with the IOC, it needs to have an arbitration clause –
injunction not granted.

Facts:
a. The plaintiff, claiming to be the All India Women’s Hockey Federation, is affiliated with
the Indian Olympic Association. The Constitution of the IOC (its Memorandum of
Association and the Rules and Regulations formed under it) provides that for the
settlement of disputes, all National Sports Federations/Associations/ State Olympic
Associations affiliated to the IOC shall have their disputes resolved by the IOC with their
Members voluntarily surrendering the right of seeking redress in any Court.
b. For the purpose of resolving a dispute referred to the IOC by a Federation, the IOA
Executive Council, on the recommendation of the President of the IOA, shall recommend
nine names to the disputing parties, to select one name that is acceptable to all parties
to act as the Arbitrator, and the proceedings will be completed within a time period given
by the IOA Executive Council.
c. In February 1994, elections for the post of office bearers were held, and there were
some issues with regard to the right to vote of certain members. After the elections were
held, both parties produced different sets of minutes of the meeting, both of which
showed different sets of office bearers as elected.
d. In April, an agreement was entered into between Mrs. Arnavaz Damania and Mrs. Vidya
Stokes, who were representing the two groups, whereby they agreed to resolve their
disputes as per the constitution of the IWHF and/or the IOA by reference to arbitration.
Mrs. Damania did not appear before the appointed arbitrator (defendant 2), and the
arbitrator, perusing the material placed, gave an award in favour of Mrs. Stokes and
found her the duly elected president of IWHF.
e. In June, the instant petition was filed by the plaintiff, challenging the existence and
validity of the arbitration agreement and the award, and praying for an ad interim
injunction to restrain the operation of the award.

Issues Involved:
a. Whether the arbitral award can stand, or whether the injunction order prayed for can be
granted?

Judgement:
a. The plaintiff argued the clause in the IOC Constitution that deals with arbitration of
disputes shall not apply unless there is an arbitration clause in the constitution of the
Federation, and in the absence of such a clause, the dispute could not have been
referred for arbitration. They also argued that the agreement was entered into by Mrs.
Damania alone, and hence does not bind the other contestants of the election, including
the present plaintiff. (argument not answered by court)
 b. The Court, examining the first contention, observed that the plaintiff did not bring the
constitution of the federation on record, and further that the provisions of the IOC
Constitution mandatorily obliges the plaintiff Federation to include an arbitration clause in
its constitution, without which the Federation would never have been granted affiliation.
c. Hence, the Court held that since the constitution of the Federation has not been brought
on record, the existence of the arbitration clause in the Constitution of the Federation
can be presumed.
d. The Court further held that even if the plaintiff contends that the award is invalid or
incapable of being enforced, the remedy would be a valid reference to arbitration, and
not disputing the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the award.
e. The Court concluded with reference to Batokristo Nandy v Ranadeb Chowdhury,
which had held that election of officials of an association is an internal matter, and the
courts will normally have no jurisdiction to interfere in such matters. Individual members
or a group of members of such an association cannot bring an action in the name of the
association challenging a mere irregular act of a manager when such an act can be
ratified by a majority of the members and the majority is willing to do so. The Court can
only interfere when the impugned act is tainted by fraud and the evil doers themselves
are in majority, or when a breach of a rule is not a mere irregularity but is substantial, or
other such serious wrong has been committed.
f. The Court observed that granting injunction is up to the discretion of the Court, and it
may not be granted merely because it is lawful to do so.

Conclusion:
The Court refused to grant the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff, and rejected the plaint.
10. MAHARASHTRA ARCHERY ASSOCIATION V RAHUL MEHRA AND OTHERS, 2019
INDLAW SC 492
TLDR: Administrator appointed to conduct elections made amendments to the Constitution over
and above what was ordered by the Court – these changes led to certain representatives
ineligible to stand for elections – amendments challenged – Court held amendments over and
above the ones mentioned in the Court order are invalid.

Facts:
a. Respondent 1 had filed a writ before the Delhi HC regarding issues of functioning in the
Archery Association of India (AAI). The HC had passed an order appointing an
Administrator to supervise the affairs of the AAI, till its Constitution was amended and
elections were held as per the terms of an order passed by the HC.
b. The order of the HC appointing the Administrator was challenged through separate
petitions filed by the Maharashtra Archery Association, AAI, and the Kerala State
Archery Association.
c. During the hearing of these petitions, the appellant submitted that the Constitution of the
AAI had been amended in accordance with the National Sports Development Code of
India, 2011. In response to this, the Union of India filed an affidavit which pointed out
certain deviations in the Constitution of the AAI, and said that it was not yet in
consonance with the Sports Code 2011.
d. The Court then directed that the amendments required be incorporated, and that after
the Constitution comes into force, elections should be held under the Administrator
appointed by the HC.
e. The Court further ordered that the Constitution so amended had to be filed before the
Court, and that the Administrator was at liberty to move the Court in case he had any
reservations with regard to the Constitution.
f. Later, the Administrator filed before the Court a new Constitution (“Administrator’s
Constitution”) which contained several new amendments that were not mentioned within
the order of the Court. The Administrator also had not filed any formal application before
the Court seeking any liberty to introduce any such new amendments.
g. The appellants also put forth that the Administrator’s Constitution was not even
circulated to the constituent members until it came to be filed in the Court, and that it
was notified through an email to the members-State Associations along with a notice for
elections for office bearers of the AAI.
h. The AAI moved the Supreme Court asking for a direction that elections be conducted as
per the Court approved Constitution instead of the Administrator’s Constitution. The
Court however did not restrict the conduct of the elections during the hearing of the
petition filed by the AAI, and the same was conducted as per the Administrator’s
Constitution.
i. Due to this, the representatives of the Appellant Association could not contest the
elections as there were certain restrictions in the Administrator’s Constitution.
j. Objections against the Administrator’s Constitution were also filed by the Union of India
and the Indian Olympic Association, claiming that the same was in violation of the Sports
Code.
Issues Involved:
Whether the election held as per the Administrator’s Constitution was valid?

Reasoning of the Court:

a. The Court observed that the mandate given to the Administrator was limited to ensure
that the amendments mentioned in the order of the Court were incorporated, and
elections conducted as per that Constitution. The Administrator had the liberty to the
Administrator to seek clarification or directions if necessary. However, he did not have
the liberty to carry out amendments other than the ones mentioned within the order of
the Court, much less doing so without giving due notice to the stakeholders and having
due deliberations with them.
b. The Administrators argument that the relevant order of the Court gave him the liberty to
ensure that the Constitution was strictly in accordance with the Sports Code was
rejected by the Court, as the mandate given to the Administrator was to ensure that
elections were held as per the Constitution as amended through the recommendations
of the Court.
c. The Court also agreed with the argument of the appellant that the additional
amendments introduced by the Administrator resulted in denial of the right to represent
in and contest in the elections of the AAI for the existing members.
d. The Court observed that even the order of the HC appointing the Administrator did not
give him the authority to amend the Constitution, and even there his mandate was
limited to the conduct of elections, and it would be the newly elected body which would
have the duty to amend the Constitution for it to be in line with the Sports Code, 2011.
The Court held that the steps taken by the Administrator beyond the scope of the
authority given to him in terms of the concerned order, and the elections conducted by
him on the basis of the Administrator’s Constitution would treated as non est in law.

Conclusion: The Court held that the Constitution of the AAI would be amended only to the
extent mentioned within the relevant order, and the other amendments introduced in the
Administrator’s Constitution would be null and void. The Court allowed the elected body to
continue as a Committee of Administrators until a new elected body takes over, with elections to
be conducted by the Committee of Administrators within a fixed time period after this order.
11. OMKAR NATH PAJNU AND OTHERS V J&K CRICKET ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS,
2017 INDLAW JK 809

TLDR: JKCA held elections for positions of office bearers of the Association after the judgement
of the Supreme Court regarding eligibility of individuals to be elected to such positions was
released – the elected members included 4 individuals who were disqualified by virtue of them
failing the eligibility criteria mentioned in the judgement – this Association then appointed an
Ombudsman to resolve disputes between constituent members of the Association – this
appointment was challenged – Court held that this Association, comprised of ineligible
members, could not validly appoint this Ombudsman.

Facts:
a. Jammu and Kashmir Cricket Association (JKCA) was entangled in multiple litigations,
when the Supreme Court decision in the case of BCCI vs. Cricket Association of
Bihar & Ors. constituted the Justice Lodha Committee to recommend reforms. The
recommendations of the Committee were accepted by the SC by judgement dated
18.07.2016, and these also provided for disqualification of office bearers of BCCI and
affiliated associations who did not meet the norms set by the Committee. The SC also
gave 4 to 6 months for transition from the old system to the new system.
b. The JKCA is governed by the Rules of the Jammu and Kashmir Cricket Association
formulated in 1957. It envisages that the Association will consist of Representative
Members from affiliated clubs, along with other categories of Members, and that the
management of the Association will be done by a Working Committee that shall be
selected from the members of the Association. The Working Committee shall then elect
President, Chairman and other office bearers from within its members.
c. After the Lodha Committee recommendations were accepted by the SC in order dated
18.07.2016, elections for the office bearers of JKCA were held on 19.07.2016 even
though this should not have been done. As a result of these elections, 4 persons, i.e. the
Chairman, President, General Secretary and Treasurer were elected who had incurred
disqualification under the recommendations of the Lodha Committee accepted by the
SC.
d. Following this, this Association, with these office bearers, appointed an Ombudsman to
resolve disputes of the clubs affiliated with the Association. The appointment of the
Ombudsman was challenged in this instant case. The Single Judge bench hearing the
case had held that the appointment was invalid, and against that decision, the instant
appeal had been filed.

Issue Involved:
Whether the Ombudsman was validly appointed by the members of the Association?

Reasoning of the Court:

a. The Court observed that the term of the previously elected body of officers ended on
19.07.2016 and elections for the new body were held on that day, but the decision of the
SC accepting the Lodha Committee Reforms had come before that date.
 b. The appellant contended that the appointed Ombdusman had resolved all the disputes
between the clubs, but this was contested by the respondents.
c. The Court also opined that if there was no legal sanctity to the appointment of the
Ombudsman, then the decisions taken by the Ombudsman also would become
insignificant.
d. The appellant also contended that the elected body excluding the 4 disqualified
members had a right to continue for the term they were elected for, and based this
argument on the cooling off period that the SC had given for the transition from the old
system to the new system. The Court observed that the cooling off period is not
applicable to office bearers who have incurred disqualification as the judgement uses the
term “disqualified is automatic '' wrt such persons.
e. The petitioners further contended that as per the order of the SC, the existing office
bearers shall function subject to the supervision of the Committee of Administrators
appointed by the Court, and hence, all the office bearers of the JKCA elected on
19.07.2016 being the existing office bearers shall run JKCA under the supervision of
Committee of Administrators. The Court answered this contention by pointing out that
the Association could not have held elections on 19.07.2016, as the order of the SC had
come out before that date, and the basic structure of the office bearers remains under a
cloud.
f. The Court further observed that the Rules of the JKCA provide that the Working
Committee must elect office bearers from its members annually, but does not say that
the term of the elected officials would come to an end automatically after the end of a
year after the elections.

Conclusion:
The Court issued directions for the appointment of Committee of Administrators, Ombudsman
for resolving disputes, and other critical office bearers, and dismissed the appeal.
12. DEPARTMENT OF SPORTS, MINISTRY OF YOUTH AFFAIRS AND SPORTS, NEW
DELHI VS. ATHLETICS FEDERATION OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, 2018 INDLAW CCI 43

TLDR: Question is whether AFI is abusing dominant position – DG report and Commission
agreed that AFI has dominant position – relevant market is the “provision of services relating to
organisation of athletics/athletic activities in India” – demand and supply side substitutability
absent – DG report said abuse is there, as minutes of AGM in April, 2015 showed abuse –
Commission said that decision was never implemented, the decision was later modified in
subsequent AGM, restriction and payment required only when name/services of AFI is used,
which is reasonable, so no abuse.

Facts of the Case:

a. The instant case is based on a reference filed by the Department of Sports, MYAS, Govt
of India (Informant), u/s 19(1)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 against the Athletics
Federation of India (AFI).
b. The AFI is the apex body for running and managing athletics in India and affiliated to the
Indian Olympic Association (IOA), International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF), and the Asian Athletics Association (AAA).
c. The Informant is aggrieved by the decision taken by the AFI on 11.4.2015 to take action
against its state unit officials and athletes who encourage marathons not authorised by
AFI and become part of such marathons. They contend that the decision by the AFI is
restrictive and not conducive for the development of sport of Athletics in India at the
grass root level, and that it would have an adverse impact on promotion of sports and
interests of sport persons, and prohibit healthy competition in organising athletic events
in India.
d. After forming a prima facie opinion the commission ordered for investigation by the DG
u/S 26(3) of the Competition Act.

Issue:
Whether the AFI has abused its dominant position in contravention of the provisions of Section
4 of the Competition Act?

Reasoning of the Court:

a. Relevant Market
i. Commission was of the view that in order to determine the relevant product
market it is to be ascertained whether provision of services relating to
organisation of athletics is substitutable.
ii. The Commission observed that the DG report stated that the services of the AFI
do not have supply side substitutability as it is the apex body governing athletics
in India, and is recognized by the IAAF and the Informant. Only the AFI has the
authority to select athletes from India for participation in National and
International Events.
iii. With regard to demand side substitutability, the DG stated that an athlete cannot
shift to a body governing any other sport in response to a change in supply
 conditions of the provisions of services for conducting and governing athletics
activities. The services provided by a sport governing body are not substitutable
with the services provided by any other sport governing body. An athlete cannot
avail the services of a Football Association, as the services relating to the
organisation of athletics is distinct from the services relating to organisation of
other sport activities.
iv. The Commission observed that athletics as a sport is not substitutable with any
other sport like TT, badminton, etc. because of the difference in their features
and characteristics such as number of players, playing time, type of sport, etc.
v. The Commission also observed that the Rules and Regulations of the
international bodies such as the IAAF and the AAA as well as that of the AFI are
applied uniformly in India, the geographic region of India exhibits a homogenous
and distinct market condition.
vi. Further, the AFI has neither suggested any alternative relevant product market
nor given any acceptable reason for delineating the relevant product market
differently. In view of this, the Commission delineated the relevant market for this
case as “provision of services relating to organisation of athletics/athletic
activities in India”.

b. Assessment of Dominance of AFI

i. The Commission observed that dominant position refers to a position of strength
enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market to:
1. Operate independently of competitive forces
2. Affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour
ii. The Commission observed that in order to see if an enterprise is in a dominant
position or not, all the relevant factors under Sec. 19(4) of the Act have to be
considered, such as market share, its size and resources, the size and
importance of its competitors, etc.
iii. While assessing the dominance of AFI, the DG has observed that the AFI is the
apex body which controls and manages athletics in India and trains and selects
athletes for various National and International Events. The AFI is the only
recognized National Association which is affiliated to the IAAF, AAA and IOA.
Due to these factors, the DG found that the AFI is in a dominant position in the
relevant market.
iv. AFI tried to contend that the DG only investigated a small part of the relevant
market to conclude that the AFI had a dominant position in the market, as the DG
had taken the services relating to the organisation of athletics as the relevant
market which consists of multiple disciplines, but while assessing the dominance
of AFI the DG only examined the organisation of marathon/road races, which is
only one of the athletic events.
v. The AFI also pointed out that a large number of marathons/road races are
conducted annually in the country, and the AFI only recognizes a small minority
of these events. The Commission rejected these contentions, pointing out that
the dominance of the AFI has been seen in the ‘market for provision of services
 for organisation of athletics/athletic events in India’ and not for ‘organisation of
marathon/road races in India’, and hence the data on the number of marathons
conducted a year is irrelevant.
vi. Further the conclusion of the DG that the AFI is dominant is based on the
activities of the AFI related to athletics, including marathon/road races and its
power to regulate athletics in India vis-à-vis other such organisers. The AFI sits
on the top of the pyramid of administration of athletics in India. Hence, the
Commission concluded that the AFI has a dominant position in the relevant
market.

c. Alleged Abuse of Dominant Position by the AFI

i. The DG in its report stated that in the minutes of the AGM of AFI held in April,
2015 a decision was taken to take action against state units/officials/players who
encouraged participation in unauthorised events.
ii. The DG noted that even though the AFI later amended this decision, it was done
as an afterthought. The DG also said that the AFI did not grant the approval for
conduct of marathons to private organisations in 2011, and in another instance,
the AFI was paid Rs. 1 Lac by the CRA as a royalty for grant of approval, after
the AFI threatened that no national level athlete would participate in it without
such approval.
iii. The DG reported that other NSFs such as the AIFF, AKFI and the WFI are not as
restrictive, and hence concluded that the conduct of the AFI amounts to denial of
market access to the organisers, sponsors, and athletes. AFI contended that it
has not abused its dominant position as restrictions it imposes are reasonable.
No permission is needed from the AFI to conduct a marathon/road race in India,
and affiliation is only required when the services of AFI are required, or to use its
name. Further, no decision was taken in the AGM held in April 2015, and the
minutes only recorded the opinion of the members, and was only approved with
modifications after a subsequent AGM was held.
d. The Commission observed that the contents of the minutes of the AGM of April., 2015
were modified and they were not abusive of the dominant position, as it stated that “the
State Association and Federation should restrict and educate athletes.. as they may be
cheated and there is a risk to their health”. The modified minutes do not contain anything
that can be considered abusive. The alleged abusive decisions taken in the AGM held in
April, 2015 were never implemented, and AFI has categorically stated that they have
never disallowed anybody from organising a marathon or race. The Commission
observed when the services of AFI is required and the organiser wants to use the name
of AFI, only then the approval and permission of the AFI is required along with a fee that
must be paid to the AFI. The Commission held that these requirements are not
unreasonable.

Conclusion: The Commission held that even though AFI has a dominant position in the
relevant market, the alleged conduct of AFI is not abusive, as no case of contravention of
provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act have been made out against them.
13. HEMANT SHARMA AND OTHERS VS. ALL INDIA CHESS FEDERATION, THROUGH
ITS SECRETARY, CHENNAI, 2018 INDLAW CCI 45

TLDR: Is AICF abusing dominance was the question – it made chess players sign undertaking
that they would not play with unauthorised tournaments, even though they do not have
guidelines for authorising tournaments, the punishments for players are very harsh (monetary +
loss in FIDE rankings + ban) – relevant market shown to be the “market for organisation of
professional chess events in India’ and ‘the market for services of chess players in India’ – has
dominant position as it is NSF and regulates chess in India while players have no bargaining
power – abuses this position as it imposes unreasonable restriction with no connection to
protect the integrity of the sport

Facts of the Case:

a. The instant judgement came after information was filed by multiple informants, who are
chess players registered with the All India Chess Federation (AICF), against the AICF,
which is a society registered under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 as the
NSF for chess. It is also affiliated to FIDE, the apex international body governing chess.
b. The informants contend that
i. registration with the AICF, which is mandatory in order to be selected for national
or international events, requires players to declare that they will not participate in
any tournament or championship not authorised by the AICF.
ii. any player doing so will be banned from participating in chess events for 1 year,
will have to surrender 50% of the prize money, tender an unconditional apology,
undertake not to participate in any such unauthorised events in the future, and
that their ELO rating (given to them by FIDE as per their playing strengths) are
removed without giving any prior notice.
c. The Commission formed a prima facie view that there was a contravention of the
Competition Act, 2002 and directed for a Director General investigation to be conducted.

DG Investigation:
a. The DG investigation concluded that the AICF was an enterprise under Section 2(h) of
the Act, as it provides a service to chess players and those interested in conducting
chess tournaments.
b. Relevant Market: Looking at the relevant market, the DG investigation found that on the
demand side, chess players cannot shift to any other sport body conducting any other
sport in response to a change in supply side conditions, and on the supply side,
conducting and governing chess events in India constituted a unique and separate
service that is not substitutable or interchangeable with other sports. Hence the relevant
market was seen as “the market for conducting and governing domestic and
international chess events for men and women and the underlying economic activities in
India”.
c. Abuse of Market Dominance: Examining the dominance of AICF, the report found that
the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport (MYAS) has recognized AICF as a NSF, and it is
the only national level chess federation affiliated to FIDE, which makes AICF the sole
 authority to govern chess in India, allowing it to enjoy a position of strength and act
independently of market forces. The DG Investigation also found that AICF abused this
dominant position as it was
i. restricting participation in unauthorised as well as authorised events (as players
have to declare that they will not play unauthorised tournaments), making
organisation of events commercially unviable for competing organisers such as
Chess Association of India (CAI),
ii. removing ELO rankings of players for participating in unauthorised events,
iii. not implementing the Long Term Development Plan prepared by NSFs as per
Code created by the MYAS in 2011 and
iv. allowing entries other than merit, under special/donor entries and collecting
higher amount of fees from them,
v. misusing the discretion given to the Secretary in nominating players and
vi. not maintaining proper records.
d. The DG concluded that practices and various clauses in the Constitution and By Laws of
the AICF have caused harm to the competition as per the provisions of 19(3) of the Act
such as creating entry barriers, driving out the competition and foreclosure of
competition, and as such, this conduct violates Section 3 of the Act.

Issues:
Whether AICF has abused its dominant position?

Reasoning:
a. Is AICF an Enterprise?
i. The Commission examined the report of the DG as well as the contentions put
forth by AICF.
ii. AICF contended that it is not an enterprise as they do not earn income from sale
of tickets, television rights, or advertisements, and that mere collection of
registration fees is not an economic activity and does not generate income for
AICF, as that fee is utilized for maintenance of the database and preparation of
the rank list, etc.
iii. However, the Commission concluded that organisation of chess events itself is
an economic activity, and falls within the ambit of services covered under Section
2(h) of the Act, and the very fact that AICF has a mandate to undertake the
economic activity of organising chess events under its Constitution makes it an
enterprises. The Commission also held that a person would be an enterprise
even if the activities mentioned are carried out directly or indirectly through units,
divisions or subsidiaries.

b. Relevant Market
i. While trying to delineate the relevant market, the Commission observed that the
unique characteristics of chess as a sport ensure that other sports or forms of
entertainment do not constrain chess in any manner. The AICF requires the
services of the chess players for organising chess events, making it a consumer
 of chess players. Further, the market for assessment of restrictions on chess
players and organisations like CAI, and actions taken such as debarment and
removal of ELO would be the market for organisation of professional chess
tournaments and the market for services of chess players. Wrt the geographic
market, since the AICF is the NSF, it governs chess through rules and
regulations throughout India. The conditions of competition are homogenous
throughout the nation.
ii. Hence, the relevant market to assess the restrictions on chess players will be the
“market for organisation of professional chess events in India’ and ‘the market for
services of chess players in India’.

c. Dominant Position
i. AICF contended that it is governed by the National Sports Code that has a policy
of ‘One Sport One Body’ and its activities cannot be subjected to Section 4 of the
Act as it performs only regulatory functions.
ii. The Commission however, observed that AICF is the only national chess
federation in India affiliated to FIDE, and has the authority to select and field
Indian chess teams for international tournaments and conduct national and
international chess events in India. The regulatory powers enjoyed by AICF
include sanctioning/disapproving proposals for organising chess events and
subjecting players to disciplinary action in case of participation in unauthorised
events. The rules contained in AICF Constitution and Bye-Laws also see that
AICF has control over professional chess players in India, who have no
bargaining power.
iii. Based on these, the Commission concluded that AICF has a dominant position in
both the relevant markets.

d. Alleged Abuse of Dominant Position

i. The Commission began with the view that a system of approval under the
pyramid structure of sport governance is a normal phenomenon of sports
administration, and the rules governing the players and organisation of events
may create a restrictive environment for the economic activities that are
incidental to sport. These may be justified if it can be shown that the restraint is
necessary to develop the sport or preserve its integrity, but if such restrictions are
without justification, they would violate competition law.
ii. In the instant case, the Commission found that there is an absolute restriction on
players from participating in an unauthorised tournament, with very harsh
consequences for any violation of this rule, and facts showing that AICF has
implemented this rule against players for a long time.
iii. The Commission observed that AICF has gone to great lengths to prevent
players from participating in tournaments organised by its rivals in order to oust
them from the relevant markets. AICF tried to justify the restrictions by stating
that as the regulator of chess, these restrictions are required to instil discipline
among players. They also stated that there is no restriction on organisation of
 any chess tournament, and that only if an organiser intends to update the
outcomes in ELO rankings of players is there a requirement for the tournament to
be recognized.
iv. The Commission observed that the restrictions prevent players from participating
in unauthorised tournaments, while neither the bye laws nor the constitution of
AICF defines what an unauthorised tournament is. Since there exist no
guidelines that govern the authorisation of tournaments, AICF has an absolute
discretion in treating any tournament as unauthorised.
v. The Commission observed that while participation in unauthorised events may
not be considered for ELO ratings, there is no rational reason for a complete
prohibition in participating in such tournaments, especially as chess tournaments
do not entail risks in terms of health and safety that may exist for other sports.
vi. Any restrictions that AICF places to preserve the interest of the game have to be
proportionate and inherent to preserving the integrity of the sport, and there
needs to be a balance between the extent of regulation and its implication on the
competition in the economic activities incidental to the sport.
vii. The Commission concluded there that these restrictions contravened provisions
of Sec. 4(2)(b)(i) and Sec. 4(2)(c) of the Act.
viii. The Commission also found that there existed a vertical relationship between
AICF and chess players, as AICF is the consumer of services of chess players
for the organisation of any chess event, and AICF and chess players are at
different stages of the supply chain. Here, the Commission noted that the
undertaking prescribed by the AICF regarding non-participation in unauthorised
events amounts to restraints in the nature of exclusive distribution and refusal to
deal as shown under Sec. 3(4)(c) and Sec. 3(4)(d) of the Act read with Sec. 3(1).

Conclusion:
The Commission found that AICF was abusing its dominant position in the relevant market, and
gave orders to cease such conduct, lay down process and parameters governing authorisation
of chess tournaments, and a monetary penalty amounting to 2% of the relevant turnover
(revenue of AICF from the market for organisation of professional chess tournaments, as
reported under Tournament and Fees Receipts in the audited financial statements of AICF) for
the preceding 3 years.
LEGAL STATUS OF BCCI AS INSTRUMENTALITY OF STATE UNDER ARTICLE 12 OF THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION – Dr. M. Suresh Benjamin and Sanu Rani Paul

Introduction
a. Globalisation of sports has shifted the focus of legal regulation increasingly onto certain
international and national sports federations which controls and governs international
sport. They have their own rulebooks and constitutions, often catered to their own
convenience. They take decisions that can have profound effects on the careers of
players and that have important economic consequences. They are autonomous
organisations and are independent of national governments.

BCCI
a. “BCCI is an unruly horse wielding enormous power economically as well as politically
and enjoys monopoly status in every sense.”
b. The major breakthrough in cricket in India was the opening up of market and
liberalisation policies of the Narasimha Rao government in 1991. It eventually put an end
to the monopoly of state-run Doordarshan in broadcasting the game.

Need for Judicial Supervision

a. Economic globalisation coupled with political globalisation has made BCCI enormous
power wielding machinery both nationally and internationally, enjoying an economic
scale that could be equal to a small nation.
b. BCCI has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and accountability in its
operations.
c. Existing situation within BCCI demands transparency in administration and integrity on
the part of officials and furthermore a legislation to regulate its affairs.
d. Equally important is ensuring ‘fairness‘ and ‘good faith‘ in the activities of BCCIby
subjecting it to the process of judicial review under Article 32 and 226 of the Indian
Constitution and also to make it an instrumentality of the State under Article 12.

Legal Status of BCCI

a. Mohinder Amarnath & others. vs. BCCI: BCCI was held not to be an instrumentality of
State
b. Ajay Jadeja v Union of India & others: writ petition against BCCI was held to be
maintainable by Delhi High Court.
c. Rahul Mehra and Anr. vs. Union Of India: decision in Ajay Jadeja‘s case was held as not
a precedent and it was affirmatively held that writ against BCCI is maintainable although
Court declined to express any opinion regarding status of BCCI as an instrumentality of
the State or not.
d. BCCI vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors: Supreme Court upheld the monopoly status of
BCCI and further held that having regard to the enormity of power exercised by it the
Board is bound to follow the doctrine of ‘fairness‘ and ‘good faith‘ in all its activities and
that its actions are required to be judged and viewed by higher standards.
 e. Zee. Telefilms Ltd &Anr v. Union India & Ors: elaborately discussed about the position of
BCCI as an instrumentality of State under Article 12. Applied test in Pradeep Kumar
Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and held that since BCCI is not
financially, functionally and administratively controlled by government cumulatively and
so it cannot be held as a State and thus writ petition under Article 12 is not maintainable.
f. A.C. Muthiah vs. BCCI & Anr: Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision in Zee Telefilms
Case and it was held categorically that BCCI is a private autonomous body and its
actions have to be judged only like any other similar authority exercising public functions.
It was held that the functions of the Board do not amount to public functions.

Public Functions Test

a. Propounded by Mathew J. in his concurring opinion in Sukhdev Singh’s case, as a
criterion to find out instrumentalities of state under the expression ‘other authorities’
within Article 12.
b. Public Functions Test lays down that when the functions performed by private bodies
could be identified with state functions, they would become State Actors in relation to the
public functions performed by them.
c. Regarding BCCI, starting from Mohinder Amarnaths‘ Case the public functions
performed by BCCI were put into limelight.
i. In Ajay Jadejas‘ Case Delhi High Court held that the function like selecting a
team is a public function and the same has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Rahul Mehra's Case.
ii. Later in Netaji's Case the Apex Court reaffirmed this view and imposed upon the
BCCI the duty to act fairly and reasonably in the manner of conducting elections.
iii. Subsequently in Zee Telefilms Case there had been a detailed discussion on the
public functions performed by BCCI and it was observed by the Minority Bench
that a body discharging public functions and exercising monopoly power would
be an authority under Article 12.
d. BCCI exercises functions like controlling and regulating the game of cricket. It has final
say in the matters of selection and disqualification of players, umpires and others
connected with the game touching their right to freedom of speech and occupation. It
makes law on the subject which is essentially a state function in terms of Entry 33 of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; it thus acquires status of monopoly.
e. It is the sole body which regulates television and broadcasting rights which also involves
the rights of the viewers to witness the match on television and other visual media.60 It
has powers relating to awarding of franchises, endorsements, distribution of prize
money, selection of players, their disqualification etc. BCCI thus enjoys unbridled
monopoly power. But it is not bound by any effective provisions of law or regulations or
control by the government also it is not bound to act fairly and reasonably within the
meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion
a. The classification of BCCI as a state has various potential implications of this
classification, including increased transparency and accountability in the BCCI's
operations and the possibility of legal challenges to its policies and decisions.
b. Further, the BCCI could benefit from greater government oversight and regulation;
subjecting the private actors to constitutional limits by expanding the definition of State
under Article 12.
c. Finally, the authors call for further research and analysis on the issue of sports
governance in India.
WHAT IS SPORTS LAW by Timothy Davis
“Sports Law” or “Sports and the Law”:
There exist three different positions taken by those engaged in the debate concerning whether
sports law constitutes a substantive area or law:
a. The Traditional View: “Sports Law” as a separately identifiable body of law does not exist
and the possibility of such existence is extremely remote.
i. sports law represents nothing more than an amalgamation of various substantive
areas of the law that are relevant in the sports context; alt. “Law as applied to the
sports industry”
ii. Sports law simply entails the application of basic legal precepts arising from
various laws such as contract law, admin law, ip law etc to situations that sports,
as a form of entertainment, warrants.

b. The Moderate Position: “Sports Law” may develop into a field of law; although sports law
does not presently represent a separately identifiable substantive area of law, recent
developments suggest that in the near future it will warrant such recognition
i. Among other critics, Prof Kenneth Shropshire acknowledges that developments,
such as state and federal legislation impacting sports (for example, state statutes
regulating sports agents) suggest a "growing sports-only corpus" of law.
However, this is yet to reach a point of maturation enough to be recognised as a
unique substantive organ of the law.
ii. In a (groundbreaking) treatise authored by John Weistart and Cym Lowell – The
Law of Sports – the authors identify many areas in which sports-related problems
require specially focused analysis. Additionally, they noted that there exist factual
peculiarities in sports that require the unique application of generally applicable
legal doctrine and thus produce results that would not occur in other contexts; for
eg: the general law on sex-based discrimination does not cover the significant
differences in the revenue generating potentials of traditional men’s and women’s
sports, thereby necessitating separate and unconventional judicial reasoning.

c. “Sports Law”: a body of law presently exists that can appropriately be designated as
sports law.
i. Supporters, such as Prof Simon Gardiner rely on the growing body of cases and
laws specific to the sports industry, to embrace the emergence of a new body of
law known as sports law.
ii. According to Professor Carter, "the field of sports law has moved beyond the
traditional antitrust and labour law boundaries into sports representation and
legal ethics, sports and corporate structure, sports and disability, sports and race,
sports and gender, sports and taxation, international issues in sports law and
numerous other permutations."'

Factors for Evaluating what Constitutes a Field of Law

a. Several academic and practical factors may provide evidence that an area has matured
to the point of common acceptance. These include the following:
 i. Unique application by courts of law from other disciplines to a specific context;
ii. factual peculiarities within a specific context that produce problems requiring
specialized analysis;
iii. "issues involving the proposed discipline's subject matter must arise in multiple,
existing, common law or statutory areas;
iv. "within the proposed discipline, [the] elements of its subject matter must connect,
interact, or interrelate;"'
v. decisions within the proposed discipline conflict with decisions in other areas of
the law and decisions regarding a matter within the proposed discipline impact
another matter within the discipline;"
vi. "the proposed discipline must significantly affect the nation's (or the world's)
business, economy, culture, or society;"'
vii. the development of interventionist legislation to regulate specific relationships;
viii. publication of legal casebooks that focus on the proposed discipline;
ix. development of law journals and other publications specifically devoted to
publishing writings that fall within the parameters of the proposed field;
x. acceptance of the proposed field by law schools; and,
xi. recognition by legal associations, such as bar associations, of the proposed field
as a separately identifiable substantive area of the law.

b. Prof Gardiner: There is no official recognition procedure. It is a process of legal

practitioners and academics recognizing the growing application of the law to a new area
of social life
SPORTS TODAY: TOWARDS A ‘LEX SPORTIVA’? by Prof. Dr. Ian Blackshaw
Introduction:
a. The Council of Europe has defined sport as: “Sport means all forms of physical activity
which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical
fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in
competition at all levels.”
b. Furthermore, acc. to the CoE, sport makes diverse contributions to personal and social
development through creative activities, recreational pursuits and the continuous search
for improving sporting performance and . that physical exercise helps promote both the
physical and the mental well-being of individuals
c. According to J. Mukul Mudgal, CJ HC P&H: Sports have also played a key role in nation-
building and fostering unity and friendship between warring nations and hostile
communities. For instance, during the 1955 India-Pakistan Test cricket series, an
estimated 20,000 Indians were given permission to attend the Third Test in Lahore
creating what one newspaper described as 'the biggest mass migration across the
frontier since Partition.

Sport as an Industry
a. Financial stats:
i. worth more than 3% of world trade and 3.7% of the combined GNP of the current
28 Member States of the European Union (EU), which comprises 508 million
people
ii. 5.4% of the EU labour force, that is, some 15 million people, are now engaged in
sport.
iii. EFA PL sold their rights to their live matches for the three seasons beginning in
2016 for a record sum of £5.136. The sale of additional rights, including other
platforms, has increased this sum to £8.3 billion!
iv. On 9 June 2016, the German Bundesliga set a new record for the sale of TV
rights in a deal worth E4.64bn over four seasons: 2017/18 - 2020/21.
b. Stats that prove that sports, as an industry, is experiencing tremendous growth:
i. the world-record fee of almost f200 million paid during the 2017 'Summer
Transfer Window' for the transfer of the Brazilian forward Neymar Jr from FC
Barcelona to Paris Saint-Germain FC.
c. One of the pernicious effects of so much money circulating in sport has been the need,
on the part of a number of athletes, to win at all costs. This obsession has given rise to
an increasing use of banned performance-enhancing drugs - an ever-present scourge of
sport - and other forms of cheating.
d. The author states that as a consequence of all of the aforementioned, there now exists a
need for legal regulation of the sport, to benefit its various stakeholders - and this body
of law is called ‘Lex Sportiva.’

Lex Sportiva
a. Prof. Steve Cornelius: For a while, there was a significant debate around the question
whether one should speak of sports law, or whether it should rather be sport and the
 law. The argument was that sports law was no more than various other fields of law
applied in the context of sport
b. It has long since it become clear that sport poses various unique questions to the law
and that various aspects of sport are regulated in ways that have no equivalent in other
spheres of business and governance. For instance, safeguarding the integrity of sport
against practices, such as doping and match-fixing, hardly have any clear parallels
outside the world of sport. In addition, the International Olympic Committee enjoys a
special legal status, similar to that enjoyed by international organisations in public
international law. As a result, it is now generally accepted that sports law is a distinct
subject worthy of recognition, study and research in its own right.
c. At the EU level, the term ‘specificity of sport’ (also referred to as ‘sporting exception’) has
been coined and is considered in various Commission rulings and Court decisions.
d. Court of Arbitration
i. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has also been contributing to a discrete
body of sports law during its 33 years of operations, as a result of the substantial
number of cases, covering a wide range of sports-related legal issues that the
CAS has handled to date. It currently registers some 600 cases a year.
ii. Since the end of 2002, all Olympic International Federations and several non-
Olympic Federations have recognised the jurisdiction of the CAS.
iii. Although CAS arbitrators are not generally obliged to follow earlier decisions and
obey the sacred Common Law principle of 'stare decisis' (binding legal
precedent), in the interests of comity and legal certainty, they usually do so. 19
As a result of this practice, a very useful body of sports law is steadily being built
up.

Challenges faced by CAS

a. One of the difficulties faced by the CAS in its desire to develop a 'Lex Sportiva' and
provide some degree of legal certainty and consistency stems from the fact that,
generally speaking, CAS proceedings and decisions are a matter of private law and
confidential to the parties.
b. There lies a paradox in CAS being a private arbitral body: the need of the sporting
community 'not to wash its dirty sports linen in public'; and the need of the wider public to
know how cases are being decided, for future guidance and reference.
REFORMS IN THE INDIAN SPORTS ADMINISTRATION

1. Include ‘Sport’ as a Subject in the Concurrent List

Introduction
a. Sports is included under Entry 33 in the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Indian
Constitution. Entry 33 reads: Theatre and dramatic performances; cinemas subject to
the provisions of entry 60 of List 1; sports, entertainment and amusements.
b. As is evident from the above, sports in India has historically been clubbed with
entertainment and amusement.
c. The Union Govt.