SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 250846. January 05, 2022 ]

SPS. RONICO LOPEZ* AND MARCELINA LOPEZ, AND SPS. GLORIA LOPEZ ADORZA AND
NICOMEDES ADORZA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. ADOLFO AND SUSANA POTOY, SPS.
VICTOR AND BERLINA LUMAPAT, SPS. JUANITO AND LUZ POTOY, SPS. TEOFISTO AND
SOTERA POTOY, SPS. ALLAN AND CARMELITA POTOY, SPS. HERBERTO** AND ROSARIO
POTOY, SPS. SONNY AND ELENITA POTOY, SPS. MANITO AND SHIRLEY PALLER, SPS.
REYNALDO AND MARILOU DOLLOSO, SPS. RICARDO AND ISIDRA SIBAYAN, AND SPS.
VICTOR AND LOLITA BONJOC, RESPONDENT

INTING, J.

The Antecedents

Spouses Ronico Lopez (Ronico) and Marcelina Lopez and Spouses Gloria Lopez Adorza (Gloria) and Nicomedes
Adorza (collectively, petitioners) filed a Complaint [5] for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents [6] that
sought to quiet title over a parcel of land registered in the name of petitioners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 28487,[7] measured at 80,000 square meters (sq. m.), described as Lot No. 9194-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd
277952, and situated in Barrio Nueva Vista, Ormoc City (subject property). [8 The subject property was originally part
of Lot No. 9194 registered in the name of Ronico and Gloria's parents, Severino Lopez (Severino) and Esperanza
Lopez (Esperanza), under TCT No. 2556[9] and measured at 261,425 sq. m. [10 Petitioners denied having executed
any deed of conveyance covering the subject property and averred that respondents' allegation that they acquired a
two-hectare portion of Lot No. 9194 was baseless.[11

The Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision[17] dated July 20, 2012, the RTC found, by preponderance of evidence, that the claim of respondents
was without merit; and it ordered them to respect the ownership of petitioners over the subject property. It also
adjudged attorney's fees and costs of litigation in favor of petitioners.[18]
The RTC ruled that: (1) respondents did not present any evidence to prove their relationship to the deceased Agustin;
[19]
(2) they failed to establish which portion of the property was sold to Agustin considering that Lot No. 9194 is
261,425 sq. m.; and (3) it was Torrevillas who caused the cancellation of Agustin's adverse claim and not petitioners.
[20]
It was not convinced of the validity of the sale in favor of Agustin in view of the Notary Public's doubt as to the
identity and capacities of the parties to the instrument.[21]

In the assailed Decision[23] dated January 24, 2019, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 20, 2012, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, Ormoc City in Civil Case No. 4677-0 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Complaint
dated October 18, 2006 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[24]

The CA expressed a different appreciation of facts and reversed and set aside the RTC Decision: (1) it upheld the
validity of the sale as its being duly notarized converted it into a public document which enjoyed the presumption of
regularity and that petitioners failed to overturn this presumption by clear and convincing evidence; [25] (2) it lent no
credence to petitioners' denial of having signed the duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale as no other evidence was
presented to show that it was not validly executed;[26] (3) it disagreed with the RTC's conclusion that the Notary
Public's testimony could not be given too much weight and should be received with caution considering the passage
of time and the natural tendency of notaries public to validate documents they allegedly notarized for fear of
administrative liabilities;[27] and (4) it held that it was sufficient that the Notary Public testified that at the time the Deed
of Absolute Sale was signed before him, he personally knew the parties, and that each party signed the document in
his presence.[28]

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The Issue
The lone issue brought forth in the petition is whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint
for Quieting of Title anchored on the presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit. The Court is not convinced.

A notarized instrument has in its favor the presumption of regularity. In the case, there is evidence that the sale
between Esperanza Lopez and her children namely: Ronico, Catalina, and Gloria, as sellers; and Agustin, married to
Crescenciana, as buyer was executed and notarized before Notary Public Demosthenes Tugonon (Tugonon). [31] The
respondents presented the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of Agustin which Tugonon duly
identified in his testimony in court.[32] Being a public document, the subject notarized Deed of Absolute Sale enjoys
the presumption of regularity. To overcome this presumption, there must be clear and convincing evidence. Absent
such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.[33] The testimony of a notary public, who is an officer of the court,
enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary witness, especially if the latter's testimony consists of nothing more
than mere denials.[37] Petitioners vehemently denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of Agustin. [38] But
aside from Gloria's bare denial, petitioners failed to present any other evidence to prove their claim that they never
executed a deed of sale in favor of Agustin involving the subject property.

One who denies the due execution of a deed where his or her signature appears has the burden of proving that
contrary to the recital in the acknowledgment, one neither appeared before the notary public nor acknowledged the
deed to be a voluntary act.[39] Although Gloria alleged minority at the time of the execution and notarization of the
Deed of Absolute Sale to support her denial,[40] she failed to present competent evidence to prove such defense. Her
testimony paled in comparison with that of Tugonon, who stated in no uncertain terms that petitioners, including
Gloria, signed the Deed of Absolute Sale in his presence.Respondents' undisputed possession of the subject
property since 1969[41] is also convincing evidence that demonstrates the existence of the sale. Otherwise, petitioners
would have earlier asserted and exercised their right to take over the property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 24, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 5,
2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04771 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur

*
Petitioner Ronico Lopez died on May 2, 2009 and was substituted by his heirs Marcelina Lopez, Johnny Lopez,
Rosemary L. Villacorta and Ronico Lopez, Jr., per Order dated February 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, rollo, p.
97.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 250311. January 05, 2022 ]
CONQUEROR INDUSTRIAL PEACE MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE, PETITIONER, VS.
JOEY BALINGBING, ERNESTO QUING, ARIEL VELASQUEZ, ELVIN JOHN FERNANDEZ,
AND LEAN DENNIS OSENA, FOR THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF BRANDO
G. BINAS, LORENCE R. TESALONA, REYMAR VILLAPANDO, JOEL LORENCE DELA CRUZ,
EUGENIO V. ILAO, HERMINIO V. RUBING, JR., RANIEL A. CRUZAT, JAYSON ADORNADO,
JESUS MATEO, FLORY JANE BLESRUBIO, JERRY MENDOZA, NILO MILLAR, JENELIL
NAKANAR, MARK ANTHONY MENDOZA, RENWEL A. REGALADO, JOHN ROMMEL
PARDUCHO, SHIELA MARIE FACTOR, RENATO SANTOS, WINSTON OSTIA, AGRIPINO B.
PERNICE, JR., ARNOLD G. HERVERA, RUBEN OREZA, VINCENT MANALO, JERWIN JOHN
PANGAN, ERICKSON GOMEZ, KEEMPEE TAJALA, ANTONIO PRECIOSO, ALEJANDRO
ANINION, RONALD JOSEPH GUEVARRA, JERRY VALLESTEROS, BENEDICT ARBOLEDA,
JANNLOWEL MAGPANTAY, MELVIN MENDOZA, LESTER BALOTO, RAMIL ACLIZAS,
MARK JOHN ANTHONY LAPELLAN, RALP V. MARPA, EVAN CHRISTOPER C. PAMPLONA,
DIELMAR MONTALBO, RUEL MATA, EDMON DAVID, REDEN CELACIO, MARK MOTIL,
RODEL RODRIGO, JERWIN GARCIA, REYMARK SANTANDER, MA. JENALYN C.
CABUYAO, RODEL COMPANERO, JONATHAN DE GUZMAN, ROWENA F. TALANAY, SIGIN
D. NALING, JESUS A. PEREZ, JOEY D. CARIAGE, CRIS A. MERDIDO, MARVIN
BARRAMEDA, DANIEL ANASTACIO, ERIC SILVA, RONALD APGITI, REYMAR VALENCIA,
MARK ANTHONY H. LADIP, ROMNICK PUERTON, MILDRED BERNARDO, JAY BAUTISTA,
ROMEL LAZO, ANTHONY HELERA, WALTER T. ASIDERA, JOHN DAVID CORPUZ,
FELICIDAD M. MENDOZA, ERWIN DIMAANO, LESTER GARCIA, RYAN BOOC, JEREMIAH
OCAMPO, EDWARD EBARULA, ELBERT CARANGALAN, WILSON GAMUIN, GHALLOYD R.
ESPENDE, JENNIFER FANG, JUANITO RODRIGUEZ, JESSIE ALLAN ODVINA, ARIEL
VICTORIA, JHON MARON BANAS, ROLDAN DEL MUNDO AND RODOLFO LIZA,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 250501]

SAGARA METRO PLASTICS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. JOEY

BALINGBING, ERNESTO QUING, ARIEL VELASQUEZ, ELVIN JOHN FERNANDEZ, AND
LEAN DENNIS OSENA, FOR THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF BRANDO G.
BINAS, LORENCE R. TESALONA, REYMAR VILLAPANDO, JOEL LORENCE DELA CRUZ,
EUGENIO V. ILAO, HERMINIO V. RUBING, JR., RANIEL A. CRUZAT, JAYSON ADORNADO,
JESUS MATEO, FLORY JANE BLESRUBIO, JERRY MENDOZA, NILO MILLAR, JENELIL
NAKANAR, MARK ANTHONY MENDOZA, RENWEL A. REGALADO, JOHN ROMMEL
PARDUCHO, SHIELA MARIE FACTOR, RENATO SANTOS, WINSTON OSTIA, AGRIPINO B.
PERNICE, JR., ARNOLD G. HERVERA, RUBEN OREZA, VINCENT MANALO, JERWIN JOHN
PANGAN, ERICKSON GOMEZ, KEEMPEE TAJALA, ANTONIO PRECIOSO, ALEJANDRO
ANINION, RONALD JOSEPH GUEVARRA, JERRY VALLESTEROS, BENEDICT ARBOLEDA,
JANNLOWEL MAGPANTAY, MELVIN MENDOZA, LESTER BALOTO, RAMIL ACLIZAS,
MARK JOHN ANTHONY LAPELLAN, RALP V. MARPA, EVAN CHRISTOPER C. PAMPLONA,
DIELMAR MONTALBO, RUEL MATA, EDMON DAVID, REDEN CELACIO, MARK MOTIL,
RODEL RODRIGO, JERWIN GARCIA, REYMARK SANTANDER, MA. JENALYN C.
CABUYAO, RODEL COMPANERO, JONATHAN DE GUZMAN, ROWENA F. TALANAY, SIGIN
D. NALING, JESUS A. PEREZ, JOEY D. CARIAGE, CRIS A. MERDIDO, MARVIN
BARRAMEDA, DANIEL ANASTACIO, ERIC SILVA, RONALD APGITI, REYMAR VALENCIA,
MARK ANTHONY H. LADIP, ROMNICK PUERTON, MILDRED BERNARDO, JAY BAUTISTA,
ROMEL LAZO, ANTHONY HELERA, WALTER T. ASIDERA, JOHN DAVID CORPUZ,
FELICIDAD M. MENDOZA, ERWIN DIMAANO, LESTER GARCIA, RYAN BOOC, JEREMIAH
OCAMPO, EDWARD EBARULA, ELBERT CARANGALAN, WILSON GAMUIN, GHALLOYD R.
ESPENDE, JENNIFER FANG, JUANITO RODRIGUEZ, JESSIE ALLAN ODVINA, ARIEL
VICTORIA, JHON MARON BANAS, ROLDAN DEL MUNDO AND RODOLFO LIZA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
INTING, J.:

The Antecedents

Sagara is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of various plastic parts and tubes for automotive wiring
harness, non-automative applications, and fabrication of molding dies.[7] Conqueror, on the other hand, is a service
cooperative engaged in performing specific jobs which require special services to different clientele.[8]

On June 8, 2015, respondents Joey Balingbing, Ernesto Quing, Ariel Velasquez, Elvin John Fernandez, and Lean
Dennis Osena, for themselves and on behalf of 149 other employees including respondents, filed a Sama Samang
Sinumpaang Reklamong Salaysay para sa Complaint for Inspection[9] (Complaint for Inspection) against Sagara and
Conqueror for alleged violation of labor laws, particularly DOLE Department Order No. (DO) 18-A, Series of 2011 (18-
A-11).[10] According to respondents, Conqueror was a mere labor-only contractor and that Sagara was their true
employer for the following reasons: (1) Conqueror was not registered with the DOLE; (2) it had no substantial capital
or investment in the form of tools or equipment; and (3) it was Sagara which exercised control and supervision over
them.[11]

Respondents prayed that they be declared as regular employees of Sagara and be entitled to the benefits enjoyed by
its regular employees according to their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.[12]

Aggrieved by the observations of the DOLE Compliance Officers, Sagara filed an Opposition and manifested that the
question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists is evidentiary in nature and cannot be determined by a
mere ocular inspection.[17]

During the mandatory conference on July 13, 2015, Conqueror also filed its Opposition averring that it is a legitimate
job contractor and submitted its current and previous Certificates of Registration issued by the DOLE.[18]

As the parties failed to settle their dispute, the DOLE Regional Director required them to submit their respective
position papers.[19]

In their [Pinagsama-samang] Sinumpaang Salaysay at Position Paper,[20] respondents reiterated their previous
arguments and attached the following documents as evidence that they were regular employees of Sagara:
1. List of employees who did not render overtime work;

2. Company Identification cards;

3. Machine Operator and Reliever Schedule; and

4. Finishing Inspection Production Plan.

Ruling of the DOLE

In the Order[25] dated October 6, 2015, the DOLE Regional Director dismissed the Complaint for Inspection of
respondents and found Sagara and Conqueror compliant with DO 18-A-11.

Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal[26] with the Secretary of DOLE reiterating their stand that Conqueror and
Sagara violated Sections 6[27] and 9[28] of DO 18-A-11.

In the Resolution[29] dated May 16, 2016, the Secretary of DOLE affirmed the ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
holding that Conqueror proved the following: (1) it met the substantial capital to operate as a legitimate labor
contractor; and (2) it exercised control and supervision over the means and methods of respondents' work.[30]

Aggrieved, respondents moved[31] for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Secretary of DOLE, but the latter
denied it on October 24, 2016.[32]

Ruling of the CA

In the Decision[33] dated June 28, 2019, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the Secretary of DOLE and
held that the labor officials committed grave abuse of discretion when they found Conqueror as a legitimate job
contractor. According to the CA, Conqueror is a mere labor-only contractor and Sagara was the actual employer of
respondents.[34]

In holding that respondents were employees of Sagara and that it exercised control over the means and methods of
respondents' work, the CA considered the following evidence: (1) the inspection hourly monitoring report showing that
Sagara monitored the output of respondents; (2) Sagara's list of employees who did not render overtime work; and
(3) certifications showing that 17 of the respondents were former contractual/project-based employees of Sagara.[35]

Aggrieved, Sagara moved[36] for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 28, 2019, but the CA denied it on October
29, 2019.[37]

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

Issues

The issues to be resolved by the Court are as follows:

1. Whether respondents performed activities which were directly necessary to the line of business of
Sagara;

2. Whether Conqueror is a legitimate job contractor; and

3. Whether respondents were employees of Conqueror or Sagara.

Ruling of the Court

While the Court may resolve only questions of law in a petition for review on certiorari, an exception may be made
when the factual findings of the CA and the labor tribunals are contradictory, such as in the case. [38] Here, both the
Regional Director and Secretary of DOLE found that Conqueror is a legitimate job contractor which exercised control
over the means and methods of respondents' work. In contrast, the CA found that Conqueror was a labor-only
contractor and that Sagara was respondents' employer.

While the CA noted in its assailed Decision that Conqueror is a duly registered independent service contractor with a
substantial capital of more than P3,000,000.00, it nonetheless ruled that the functions outsourced to it by Sagara
were necessary and desirable in the latter's line of business.

To be considered as
a labor-only
contractor, the lack of
substantial capital of
the contractor must
concur with the fact
that the employees'
work directly relates
to the main business
of the principal.[39]

Article 106 of the Labor Code defines labor-only contracting, thus:

Art. 106. Contractor or Subcontractor. — x x x

xxxx

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of
such employer. x x x (Italics supplied.)
The above-quoted provision is implemented by Section 5 of DOLE DO 18, Series of 2002 (18-02), thus:
Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. — Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this
purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits,
supplies, or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements [is]
present:

i. The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or
service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii. The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
(Italics supplied.)
Outsourcing of services is not prohibited in all instances.[40] To be considered as labor-only contracting, three
requisites must concur under Article 106 of the Labor Code and Section 5(i) of DO 18-02:
1. the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies, or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal;

2. the contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital of at least P3,000,000.00[41] or
investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed; and

3. the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities
which are directly related to the main business of the principal.

Primarily, Conqueror is presumed to have complied with all the requirements of a legitimate job contractor
considering the Certificates of Registration issued to it by the DOLE.[42]

At any rate, Conqueror has a substantial capital of more than P3,000,000.00 with working premises at Unit 2807
Makati Corporate Office, City Land, Pasong Tamo Tower, Chino Roces Ave., Makati City. [43] Having substantial
capital and work premises of its own, Conqueror cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor by the alleged fact
that respondents performed activities directly related to the main business of Sagara. To be considered a labor-only
contractor, the lack of substantial capital or investment must concur with the fact that the work of the employees is
directly related to the main business of the principal, which is not the case herein. This is shown by the use of the
conjunction "and" in Article 106 of the Labor Code and Section 5(i) of DO 18-02, viz.: "[t]he contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be
performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal."

Furthermore, while it may be argued that Conqueror did not have investment in the form of tools, equipment, and
machineries, it is sufficient that it has a substantial capital of more than P3,000,000.00.[44]

The law does not require a contractor to have both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, etc. This can be gleaned from the use of the conjunction "or" in Article 106 of the Labor Code and
Section 5(i) of DO 18-02, viz.: "[t]he contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment
which relates to the job, work or service to be performed."

If the objective was to oblige the contractor to prove that he has both capital and the requisite investment, then the
conjunction "and" should have been used.[45]

Besides, to require a contractor to have both substantial capitalization and investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, etc. would be to overlook the accustomed system in different industries where contractors are merely
outsourced to provide ancillary or logistic services to the principal. These services range from janitorial services,
security, housekeeping, creatives, and other non-core services similar to those performed by respondents. Notably,
Conqueror deployed them to Sagara to perform the following: (1) manually transport materials from the storage
warehouse to the work station; (2) load finished goods to the delivery trucks; (3) label products; and (4) recycle waste
materials.[46] Given the type of services Conqueror provides Sagara under their Contract of Service, there is no need
for it to invest in any equipment or machineries in the plant of Sagara.

Now, in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the four-fold test can be used. The elements
of the four-fold test are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control, which is the most important element.[47]

Conqueror selected,
engaged, and
deployed
respondents to
Sagara.

In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the totality of the facts and the
surrounding circumstances of the case must be considered.[48] Even if Sagara initially hired 17 of the respondents,
records show that they were merely contractual and project employees of Sagara whose term of employments
eventually expired.[49] The Court does not foreclose the possibility that they eventually applied to Conqueror and were
subsequently hired and deployed to Sagara. At any rate, the circumstances of the 17 respondents were different from
the rest of the respondents who were directly recruited and hired by Conqueror. Respondents themselves stated
under paragraph 5 of their Complaint for Inspection: "Marami din sa amin kinuha (ni-recruit) ng manpower agency na
CONQUEROR at ipinadala (deployed) sa loob ng pagawaan ng SAGARA upang magtrabaho sa iba[']t ibang trabaho
o gawaing aming nabanggit sa itaas sa loob ng pagawaan ng SAGARA[.]"[50]

Payment of wages

As for the payment of wages, the Court notes that the DOLE Compliance Officers, during their inspection, did not
report any transgression relating to the salaries and benefits of respondents. There was neither any finding that
Sagara managed the payroll of respondents. Instead, the following circumstances indicate that Conqueror was the
one who paid the wages of respondents: (a) it faithfully remitted the SSS, Philhealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions of
respondents which are the usual deductions from employees' salaries; and (b) the supervisors of Conqueror were the
ones who monitored respondents' attendance and released their pay slips.[51]

Power of dismissal

Conqueror exercised the power of dismissal including the power to discipline, suspend and reprimand, as shown by
the following: (1) Notice[52] dated November 11, 2014 wherein Conqueror meted out the penalty of three-day
suspension on respondent Evan Christopher Pamplona for his offense "Paglabag sa Kautusan na Itinakda ng
Kompanya" (Insubordination); and (2) "Noticed (sic) to Explain"[53] dated July 8, 2015 wherein it required Dennis
Aragona to explain his being Absent Without Notice to His Superior for the dates July 3, 4, 6, and 7, 2015. As a
matter of fact, respondents Marvin Barrameda, John David Corpuz and Ariel Velasquez expressly recognized
Conqueror as their employer when they tendered their resignation letters [54] with Conqueror between June and July
2015.

Power of control

The ruling of the Court in Orozco v. Court of Appeals[55] is instructive:

Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the
mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control
or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to
promote the result, create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second, which address both the result and
the means used to achieve it.[56]

Likewise, Fos visited and inspected the work stations of respondents, who were assigned as production operators
under the Tube Parts Department, to ensure promptness in the cutting and bundling of the tube products in
conformity with the prescribed length and quantity of Sagara.[61]

As for Cariño, she monitored and directed the work of respondents assigned as warehousemen in maintaining and
updating the movement of the stock inventory to ensure an efficient and systematic manner of warehousing.[62]

Taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances of the case and applying the four-fold test, the Regional
Director and the Secretary of DOLE aptly determined that Conqueror was a legitimate job contractor and,
consequently, the employer of respondents.

The factual findings of the Regional Director and the Secretary of DOLE, who are deemed to have acquired expertise
in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. They bind the
Court when supported by substantial evidence.[63] As a rule, the factual findings of the labor officials are not disturbed
by the Court particularly where, as in the case, both the Regional Director and the Secretary of DOLE are in
agreement.[64]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2019 and the Resolution dated October 29,
2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 148896 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Resolution dated May 16, 2016 of the Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment in OS-LS-0455-0425-
2016/RO4A-LPO-CV-0615-0017 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250311), Vol. I, pp. 10-62; rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 10-49.

Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 52-63; penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas with Associate
[2]

Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.

[3]
Id. at 64-66.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250311), Vol. I, pp. 534-541; signed by Undersecretary Rebecca C. Chato.
[5]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. II, pp. 844-846; signed by Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III.
[6]
The following are the respondents: Joey Balingbing, Ernesto Quing, Ariel Velasquez, Elvin John Fernandez, Lean
Dennis Osena, Brando G. Binas, Lorence R. Tesalona, Reymar Villapando, Joel Lorence Dela Cruz, Eugenio V. Ilao,
Herminio V. Rubing, Jr., Raniel A. Cruzat, Jayson Adornado, Jesus Mateo, Flory Jane Blesrubio, Jerry Mendoza, Nilo
Millar, Jenelil Nakanar, Mark Anthony Mendoza, Renwel A. Regalado, John Rommel Parducho, Shiela Marie Factor,
Renato Santos, Winston Ostia, Agripino B. Pernice, Jr., Arnold G. Hervera, Ruben Oreza, Vincent Manalo, Jerwin
John Pangan, Erickson Gomez, Keempee Tajala, Antonio Precioso, Alejandro Aninion, Ronald Joseph Guevarra,
Jerry Vallesteros, Benedict Arboleda, Jannlowel Magpantay, Melvin Mendoza, Lester Baloto, Ramil Aclizas, Mark
John Anthony Lapellan, Ralp V. Marpa, Evan Christoper C. Pamplona, Dielmar Montalbo, Ruel Mata, Edmon David,
Reden Celacio, Mark Motil, Rodel Rodrigo, Jerwin Garcia, Reymark Santander, Ma. Jenalyn C. Cabuyao, Rodel
Companero, Jonathan De Guzman, Rowena F. Talanay, Sigin D. Naling, Jesus A. Perez, Joey D. Cariage, Cris A.
Merdido, Marvin Barrameda, Daniel Anastacio, Eric Silva, Ronald Apgiti, Reymar Valencia, Mark Anthony H. Ladip,
Romnick Puerton, Mildred Bernardo, Jay Bautista, Romel Lazo, Anthony Helera, Walter T. Asidera, John David
Corpuz, Felicidad M. Mendoza, Erwin Dimaano, Lester Garcia, Ryan Booc, Jeremiah Ocampo, Edward Ebarula,
Elbert Carangalan, Wilson Gamuin, Ghalloyd R. Espende, Jennifer Fang, Juanito Rodriguez, Jessie Allan Odvina,
Ariel Victoria, Jhon Maron Banas, Roldan Del Mundo and Rodolfo Liza, rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 10-11.
[7]
Id. at 13.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250311), Vol. I, p. 14.
[9]
Id. at 167-184.
[10]
Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as Amended, approved on November 14, 2011.
[11]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250311), Vol. I, pp. 175-179.
[12]
Id. at 181-182. See Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 13, 2009, id. at 298-309.
[13]
See Notice of Results dated June 23, 2015, id. at 310.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. II, p. 584.
[16]
Id. at 585.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id. at 586.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 67-92
[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 402-403.
[22]
Id. at 45-48.
[23]
Id. at 230.
[24]
Id. at 264-280.
[25]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. II, pp. 577-621.
[26]
See Appeal Memorandum dated October 17, 2015, id. at 623-669.
[27]
Section 6 of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Department Order No. 18-A. Series of 2011 (DO 18-A-
11) provides:
SECTION 6. Prohibition Against Labor-only Contracting. — Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For
this purpose, labor only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where:
(a) The contractor does not have substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the employees recruited and placed are performing activities which are usually
necessary or desirable to the operation of the company, or directly related to the main business of the principal within
a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed
within or outside the premises of the principal; or
(b) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the employee.
[28]
Section 9 of DO 18-A-11 provides:
SECTION 9. Required Contracts under these Rules. —
(a) Employment contract between the contractor and its employee. Notwithstanding any oral or written stipulations to
the contrary, the contract between the contractor and its employee shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 279
and 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. It shall include the following terms and conditions:
i. The specific description of the job, work or service to be performed by the employee;
ii. The place of work and terms and conditions of employment, including a statement of the wage rate applicable to
the individual employee; and
iii. The term or duration of employment that must be co-extensive with the Service Agreement or with the specific
phase of work for which the employee is engaged.
The contractor shall inform the employee of the foregoing terms and conditions of employment in writing on or before
the first day of his/her employment.

(b) Service Agreement between the principal and the contractor. The Service Agreement shall include the following:
i. The specific description of the job, work or service being subcontracted.
ii. The place of work and terms and conditions governing the contracting arrangement, to include the agreed amount
of the services to be rendered, the standard administrative fee of not less than ten percent (10%) of the total contract
cost.
iii. Provisions ensuring compliance with all the rights and benefits of the employees under the Labor Code and these
Rules on: provision for safe and healthful working conditions; labor standards such as, service incentive leave, rest
days, overtime pay, 13th month pay and separation pay; retirement benefits; contributions and remittance of SSS,
PhilHealth, PagIbig Fund, and other welfare benefits; the right to self-organization, collective bargaining and peaceful
concerted action; and the right to security of tenure.
iv. A provision on the Net Financial Contracting Capacity of the contractor, which must be equal to the total contract
cost.
v. A provision on the issuance of the bond/s as defined in Section 3 (m) renewable every year.
vi. The contractor or subcontractor shall directly remit monthly the employers' share and employees' contribution to
the SSS, ECC, Philhealth and Pag-ibig.
vii. The term or duration of engagement.
The Service Agreement must conform to the DOLE Standard Computation and Standard Service Agreement, which
form part of these Rules as Annexes "A" and "B".
[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 50501), Vol. II, pp. 760-767.
[30]
Id. at 765-766.
[31]
See Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2016. id. at 768-808.
[32]
Id. at 844-846.
[33]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 52-63.
[34]
Id. at 62.
[35]
Id. at 59-62.
[36]
See Motion for Reconsideration dated August 9, 2019, rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. IV, pp. 1806-1832.
[37]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 64-66.
[38]
See Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 184452, February 12, 2020.
[39]
Neri v. National Labor Relations Commission, 296 Phil. 610, 616 (1993).
[40]
Universal Robina Corp. v. Jumao-As, G.R. No. 212580 (Notice), December 2, 2020.
[41]
Section 3(l) of DO 18-A-11, provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used in these Rules, shall mean:
(l) "Substantial capital" refers to paid-up capital stocks/shares of at least Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in the
case of corporations, partnerships and cooperatives; in the case of single proprietorship, a net worth of at least Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).
[42]
See Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 230030, August 29, 2018.
[43]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, p. 281.
[44]
Id. at 274.
[45]
See San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. Rivera, 824 Phil. 961 (2018).
[46]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 299-310.
[47]
Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388, 430 (2014).
[48]
See Loreche-Amit v. Cagayan De Oro Medical Center, Inc., G.R. No. 216635, June 3, 2019.
[49]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 129-147.
[50]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250311), Vol. I, p. 175.
[51]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 345-384.
[52]
Id. at 315.
[53]
Id. at 314.
[54]
Id. at 294-298.
[55]
584 Phil. 35 (2008).
[56]
Id. at 49. Citations omitted.
[57]
See Order dated October 6, 2015 of the DOLE Regional Director, rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. II, pp. 577-621.
See also Resolution dated May 16, 2016 of the Secretary of DOLE, id. at 760-767.
[58]
Rollo (250501), Vol. I, p. 87.
[59]
Id.

[60]
Rollo (G.R. No. 250501), Vol. I, pp. 302-303.
[61]
Id. at 305-306.
[62]
Id. at 309-310.
[63]
PCL Shipping Phil., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 502 Phil. 554, 562 (2005).
[64]
Id.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 243765. January 05, 2022 ]
MALATE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION * AND GIOVANNI OLIVARES,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXTRAORDINARY REALTY AGENTS & BROKERS COOPERATIVE,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Malate
Construction Development Corporation (MCDC) and Giovanni Olivares (Olivares), praying for the reversal of the May
10, 2018 Decision[2] and December 17, 2018 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103092,
which affirmed the October 21, 2013 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47 awarding
broker's fees and attorney's fees in favor of respondent Extraordinary Realty Agents & Brokers Cooperative
(ERABCO).
Antecedents

MCDC is a domestic corporation engaged in developing and selling residential subdivisions, most of which consist of
low-cost housing projects. Olivares is MCDC's President.[5]

Sometime in July 2003, MCDC entered into a Marketing Agreement [6] with ERABCO, a cooperative engaged in the
realty business as a broker. [7] ERABCO undertook to promote and sell the former's properties in Mahogany Villas in
Looc, Calamba, Laguna. Particularly, ERABCO's promotional activities consist of project briefing, presentation to
interested individuals and groups, campaign, site visit, open house, and other similar undertakings. Meanwhile, its
selling activities include conducting orientations on the project and home financing options, buyer screening, sales
counseling, solicitation, review of the required documents, and other like activities. [8] ERABCO was further
commissioned to sell at least ten housing units within two months.[9]

In turn, MCDC agreed to pay ERABCO a sales commissions of nine percent (9%) for the latter's first fifty million sales
within the period of two to five months, and a higher commission of ten percent (10%) if ERABCO's sales reached the
fifty million mark within the said period. All commissions shall be based on the selling price of the housing package,
excluding processing fees, move-in fees, and interest income on in-house financing.[10]

The Marketing Agreement further stated that for Pag-IBIG and Bank Financing accounts, ERABCO shall be entitled
to receive a pro-rated commission based on its fulfillment of the following conditions: (i) twenty percent (20%) of its
total commission under the first tranche upon the buyer's full payment of the reservation fee, and submission of the
reservation agreement, Buyers Information Sheet, Income Tax Return (ITR) or Certificate of Employment and
Compensation (CEC), and one latest pay slip; (ii) ten percent (10%) under the second tranche upon the buyer's
submission of the MCDC loan requirements; [11] (iii) thirty percent (30%) under the third tranche upon the buyer's
remittance of four amortizations of equity payments and the approved Membership Status Verification Slip (MSVS);
and (iv) forty percent (40%) under the fourth tranche upon the release of the take out proceeds to MCDC and the
submission of 24 post-dated checks for Pag-IBIG amortization, as well as the post-dated checks for the remaining
equities. It was clearly indicated that prior to the delivery of the commissions under the third and fourth tranches, all
accounts must be in current status.[12]

However, in 2005 and 2006, MCDC suddenly refused to pay ERABCO's commissions. Thus, ERABCO sent demand
letters to MCDC, which were unfortunately, unheeded. This prompted ERABCO to file a complaint for sum of money
with damages[13] demanding the payment of P4,962,935.77 including interest, with P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.[14] ERABCO impleaded Olivares as a party-defendant.

MCDC and Olivares filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Special Affirmative Defenses, [15] vehemently denying
ERABCO's allegations. They pointed out that the total payment claimed by ERABCO is inconsistent with the amounts
it sought in the body of its complaint and in the Police Report it filed. Furthermore, MCDC and Olivares averred that
ERABCO even received a higher commission than what it was lawfully entitled to.[16]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 21, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision [17] awarding broker's commission and attorney's fees in favor of
ERABCO. The RTC held that ERABCO proved that its agents sold 202 units in Mahogany Villas worth
P140,461,655.56. Thus, since ERABCO's services have been completed and pursuant to the Marketing Agreement,
it is entitled to a nine percent (9%) commission of P12,641,549.00. The RTC observed that ERABCO's claim and
evidence have not been rebutted by contradictory proof. Thus, the RTC concluded that since MCDC had already paid
ERABCO P8,571,629.12 as commission, it should be held liable for the remaining balance of P4,069,919.88.

However, the RTC rejected ERABCO's pleas for the higher commission of ten percent (10%) of its total sales,
considering that it failed to prove that it sold the units worth more than P50,000,000.00 in a period of two to five
months from the inception of the agreement.

Furthermore, the RTC denied MCDC's defense that some of the units sold should have been merely subjected to a
five or seven percent (5 or 7%) commission because they were bought back by MCDC from Pag-IBIG.

Finally, the RTC declared Olivares solidarily liable with MCDC and awarded attorney's fees in favor of ERABCO.

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendants to solidarily pay [ERABCO] the amount of Four Million Sixty Nine Thousand Nine Hundred
Nineteen Pesos and Eighty Eight Centavos (4,069,919.88) plus legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time of the last demand to pay up to the time of payment, and;

2. Ordering [MCDC] to solidarily pay [ERABCO] the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees[;]

3. Dismissing [MCDC's] claims for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees for lack of
sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, MCDC filed an appeal[19] with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision[20] dated May 10, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA held that the provisions of the
Marketing Agreement are clear, unequivocal, and leave no room for interpretation.[21] The CA noted that ERABCO
sold 202 units and complied with what was incumbent upon it under Sections A, B, and F of the Marketing
Agreement. In contrast, MCDC failed to disprove and rebut the fact that ERABCO was able to sell the 202 units. [22]
Thus, according to the CA, ERABCO may not be deprived of its right to its nine percent (9%) commission for all the
units it sold.[23]

Moreover, the CA explained that MCDC's act of buying back from Pag-IBIG the 44 units sold by ERABCO does not
absolve MCDC from its obligation to pay the commission. What matters is that the take-out loan proceeds were
released for said 44 units, and Pag-IBIG paid MCDC in full for the same. The "buy-back" transpired only after the
housing loan of the buyer had been approved and the fund was released to MCDC. The only problem was the
buyer's inability to continue paying his/her obligation.[24] The CA further elucidated that the subsequent cancellation of
the Marketing Agreement does not free MCDC from its obligation to pay ERABCO's commissions. [25] Accordingly, the
CA agreed with the RTC that MCDC is liable to pay ERABCO the balance of P4,069,919.88. However, the CA
modified the interest rates to conform with jurisprudence.[26]

The dispositive portion of the CA's ruling states:

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the appeal is DENIED. The October 21, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
City of Manila, Branch 47, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the rate of interest awarded. [MCDC and
Olivares] are ordered to pay [ERABCO) the amount of Four Million Sixty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Nineteen
Pesos [and Eighty-Eight Centavos] (Php4,069,919.88) with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum to be computed
from the time of the filing of the complaint up to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013
until finality of the Decision. When the judgment of the court becomes final and executory, an interest of 6% per
annum shall be imposed from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Also [MCDC and Olivares] are ordered to pay attorney's fees of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) which shall likewise earn an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the Decision
until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.[27] (Citations omitted)

Aggrieved, on June 13, 2018, MCDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the CA's December 17,
2018 Resolution.[28]

Undeterred, MCDC filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.[29]

Issues

The pivotal issues in the case at bar may be summarized into (i) whether or not MCDC is liable for broker's fees; and
(ii) whether or not Olivares may be held solidarily liable with MCDC.

At the outset, MCDC and Olivares implore the Court to resolve their questions of fact in their Rule 45 Petition, arguing
that the conclusions and findings of the CA are grounded on speculation, surmises, and conjectures. [30] They allege
that the CA merely speculated that ERABCO complied with the conditions required for the payment of commissions
despite the lack of evidence on record proving ERABCO's compliance.[31] Particularly, they state that ERABCO failed
to present in court the documents that would prove its entitlement to the release of the first, second, third, and fourth
tranches of its commissions. Alternatively, MCDC and Olivares urge that even assuming that ERABCO submitted the
necessary documents in evidence, it violated the best evidence rule by merely presenting photocopies.[32]
Furthermore, MCDC and Olivares fault the CA for shifting the burden of proof to them rather than on ERABCO. [33]
They disagree with the CA's statement that they failed to dispute by competent evidence the number of units sold by
ERABCO and that they failed to rebut or negate the accounting report where ERABCO based its claims. [34] They
contend that since it was ERABCO who claimed that it complied with all the conditions to be entitled to the
commissions, then it should prove its claim, not the other way around.[35]

Lastly, Olivares claims that being a mere officer of MCDC, he should not be held personally liable for the latter's
obligations.[36]

On the other hand, ERABCO counters that the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA are entitled to full
weight and great respect.[37] It explains that the original documents were all in MCDC's possession. It relates that
during the pre-trial of the case, it moved for the production of all documents in MCDC's possession, which motion
was granted by the RTC.[38] Then, MCDC's counsel admitted the existence, due execution and genuineness of the
requested documents with the only caveat that "provided that it contained their signatures."[39] Thus, the receipts,
vouchers, slips were marked in bulk by folder to save time. MCDC did not object. Neither did it alter or modify its
admissions, or raise such issue as a matter on appeal before the CA.[40]

Additionally, ERABCO retorts that the best evidence rule was never violated. MCDC and Olivares are bound by the
admission made by their former counsel.[41] Said admission allowed ERABCO to dispense with the presentation of the
originals and offer photocopies.[42] Furthermore, ERABCO points out that MCDC and Olivares never objected to the
submission of photocopies in evidence during ERABCO's formal offer of its documentary exhibits.[43]

Also, ERABCO clarifies that the CA did not shift the burden of proof to MCDC and Olivares, but only the burden of
evidence after it had amply proven its claim.[44] ERABCO explains that the minor inconsistency in the amount it initially
sought as a commission was due to its claim for a ten percent (10%) commission, which, at best, is merely due to a
human error.[45]

Finally, ERABCO argues that Olivares was impleaded in the case because of his solitary role in the transactions
subject of the complaint. It asserts that Olivares was the lone arm behind MCDC. His family owns it, and he directs
and manages all of its affairs by himself. ERABCO likewise claims that Olivares blatantly violated the contract, filed
malicious criminal suits, engaged in harassment tactics against ERABCO's agents, and acted in bad faith in the
performance of MCDC's obligations with it.[46]

Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly granted.

Parameters of
Judicial Review
under Rule 45

It is noted at the outset that the issue pertaining to MCDC's liability for the payment of ERABCO's commission, as
well as Olivares' personal liability are factual issues. As a general rule, factual matters are not the proper subject of
an appeal by certiorari,[47] as it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence which has been
considered in the proceedings below.[48]

Nevertheless, a review of the factual findings is justified under the following circumstances:
(i) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (ii) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (iii) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (iv) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (v) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (vi) when in making its findings[,]
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (vii) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (viii) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (ix) when the facts set forth in the petition[,]
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent; (x) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [or] (xi) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[49]
The findings of the RTC and the CA regarding Olivares' personal liability were based on speculations and bereft of
evidence, thereby warranting a review of the facts.
The Marketing
Agreement is the
Law Between the
Parties

It is settled that a contract is the law between the parties and the courts must enforce the contract as long as it is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Courts cannot stipulate for the parties or amend their
agreement, for to do so would transgress their freedom of contract and alter their real intention.[50]

In line with this, Article 1370 of the Civil Code mandates that "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." [51] Thus, the court
must conduct a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract is indeed ambiguous, or if its provisions are susceptible
of two reasonable alternative interpretations. After all, its ultimate purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the
parties' intent, as objectively manifested by them.[52]

Notably, if the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without
reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The parties' intention must be determined solely from the language of their
contract. The contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason
can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make better or
more equitable agreements than the parties themselves have been satisfied to make; or, rewrite contracts because
they operate harshly or inequitably against one of the parties; or alter them for the benefit of one and to the detriment
of the other; or relieve a party from a term he/she voluntarily consented to; or impose on him/her a condition which
he/she did not agree to.[53]

In the case at bar, the terms of the Marketing Agreement freely and voluntarily entered into by MCDC and ERABCO
are clear and leave no room for interpretation.

Particularly, the broker's scope of work and responsibilities are plainly and distinctly enumerated as follows, (i) to
promote the units in Mahogany Villas by performing project briefings, presentations, campaigns, site visits, open
house activities, and other related promotional activities; (ii) to sell the units in Mahogany Villas by conducting buyer
orientations on the sale and home financing, screening buyers, counseling and following up on sales, soliciting
buyers, reviewing the required documents and other similar tasks; (iii) to sell at least ten housing units within two
months; (iv) to underwrite the marketing of the Mahogany Villas within one year by using its technical expertise and
material capability; (v) to participate in company-initiated marketing activities; (vi) to exercise due prudence in
screening and endorsing buyers; (vii) to collect the documentary requirements from the buyers on or before the due
date; (viii) to compile and examine the documentary requirements for acceptability and validity; (ix) to schedule
agents' visits and provide the necessary logistical support; (x) to inform MCDC of the status of its sales; and (xi) to
assist the buyer in the fulfillment of the requirements of the sale until the buyer finally moves in to the unit.[54]

In exchange for ERABCO's services, MCDC undertook to pay the former's commissions upon its compliance with the
requisites in Section F of the Marketing Agreement, which states:
SECTION F. Compensation

1. For the services completed herein the Broker shall be entitled to a sales commission of NINE PERCENT (9%) for
the FIRST FIFTY MILLION SALES (P50,000,000.00) within the period of 2-5 months and TEN PERCENT (10%) if
the Broker has reached the FIFTY MILLION SALES (P50,000,000.00) within the specified period of time, otherwise,
the NINE PERCENT (9%) commission will still be applicable. All Commissions shall be based on the selling price of
the housing package excluding processing fees and move-in fees and interests income on in House financing.[55]
Furthermore, for Pag-IBIG and Bank financing accounts, ERABCO's commission will be released in the following
manner:
(i) 20% as the first tranche upon the buyer's full payment of the reservation fee, and the submission of the
reservation agreement, buyers information sheet, ITR or CEC, and 1 latest pay slip;
(ii) 10% as the second tranche upon the submission of the MCDC loan requirements;[56]

(iii) 30% as the third tranche upon the payment of four amortizations of equity payments and the approved
MSVS; and

(iv) 40% as the fourth and last tranche upon the release of take out proceeds to MCDC and the submission of
24 post-dated checks for Pag-IBIG amortization, and the post-dated checks for the remaining equities.[57]

As correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, ERABCO performed its obligations under the Marketing Agreement. It
complied with what was incumbent upon it under Sections A, B, and F of the Marketing Agreement, and fulfilled the
pre-requisites for the release of its commission in tranches. It promoted and sold 202 housing units and assisted the
buyers in the submission of the requirements until the loan proceeds were released by Pag-IBIG and the buyer finally
moved in to the housing unit. All in all, it obtained total sales worth P140,461,655.56.

MCDC cannot forget that under the Marketing Agreement, it bound itself to "pay all commissions when due upon
satisfaction of the requirements pertinent to such payment."[58] It cannot renege on its covenant. Thus, pursuant to
Section F of the Marketing Agreement, MCDC must pay ERABCO the balance of its nine percent (9%) commission,
which is P4,069,919.88.

ERABCO was able to prove its claim by a preponderance of evidence. Its evidence consisted of receipts and
vouchers issued by MCDC,[59] voluminous records containing lists of the balance or deficiency in the total
commissions payable by MCDC,[60] accountant's collation, check and balance, analysis and computation of MCDC's
obligations,[61] coupled with the testimonies of its witnesses.[62]

In contrast, MCDC and Olivares failed to rebut the evidence presented by ERABCO. They only presented one
witness who testified on the commission paid to ERABCO which amounted to P8,571,629.12, based on checks and
vouchers. In fact, ERABCO did not contest said amount.[63] Hence, ERABCO is entitled to a balance of
P4,069,919.88, which represents the commission of P12,641,549.00 minus the amount of P8,571,629.12.

It bears noting that the burden of proof was never shifted to MCDC and Olivares. Quite the contrary, ERABCO, as the
plaintiff in the action for sum of money and damages, was tasked to present evidence to prove its entitlement to its
commission. As uniformly held by the RTC and the CA, to which the Court agrees, ERABCO fulfilled its burden. Thus,
the burden of evidence was shifted unto MCDC and Olivares to refute ERABCO's claim, which unfortunately, they
failed to do.

Remarkably, the distinction between the burden of proof and evidence was clarified in Section 1, Rule 131 of the
Rules on Evidence, to wit:
Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Burden of proof never shifts.

Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut a fact in issue to establish
a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from one party to the other in the course of the proceedings,
depending on the exigencies of the case.
MCDC waived its
right to question
ERABCO's
presentation of
photocopies

Trying to renege on its responsibility to pay, MCDC and Olivares raise a novel argument claiming that ERABCO's
evidence consisted of mere photocopies which are inadmissible under the "best evidence rule."[64]
MCDC's and Olivares' contention fails to persuade.

It cannot be gainsaid that the rules on admissibility of documentary evidence require that the original document be
produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. Specifically, under the original document rule, when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, [65]
except in the following instances:
RULE 130
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

xxxx

2. Secondary Evidence

Section 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. – If the document is in the custody
or under the control of the adverse party, he or she must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he or she fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss.

Section 7. Summaries. – When the contents of documents, records, photographs, or numerous accounts are
voluminous and cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established is only
the general result of the whole, the contents of such evidence may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation. The originals shall be available for examination or copying, or both, by the adverse party at a reasonable
time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

Section 8. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued
by the public officer in custody thereof.
Equally important, a timely objection must be made against the introduction of photocopies. Otherwise, evidence not
objected to shall be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts
are not precluded from accepting in evidence a mere photocopy of a document if no objection is raised during its
formal offer.[66]

Consequently, to exclude photocopies as evidence, the objection to their admissibility must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds thereof must be specified. In case of documentary evidence, the offer must be made after the
witness of the party making the offer has testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is
only at this time, and not at any other, that the objection to the documentary evidence may be made. If a party fails to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered, such objection shall be considered as waived.
This holds true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have been rejected had it been
challenged at the proper time. To reiterate, grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be
considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Hence, even on appeal, the
appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were properly and timely
raised.[67]

Interestingly, in Sps. Tapayan v. Martinez,[68] the Court noted that the opposing parties' failure to object to a plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the RTC is equivalent to a waiver of
the right to object, and is a bar to assail the probative value of the copy.[69]

In this case, ERABCO presented photocopies of the documents, vouchers, and receipts considering that said
evidence were voluminous, and the original documents were in MCDC's possession. It related that by practice,
MCDC furnished it with photocopies of the documents, and kept the originals.[70]

Strangely, MCDC and Olivares never objected to the presentation of the photocopies. In their Comment (to the
plaintiff's formal offer of exhibits),[71] MCDC's and Olivares' counsel never objected to the admissibility of the
documents for being mere photocopies in violation of the original document rule. On the contrary, the only objections
they raised were that the documents (Exhibits A to V) were self-serving and misleading; that no one appeared before
the trial court to testify thereon; and the witness presented by ERABCO did not identify them as the basis for the
claim for an alleged unpaid commission.[72] Although their objections were varied, not one of them was due to an
alleged violation of the original document rule.

Additionally, the Court notes that the argument regarding the submission of photocopies in lieu of the originals was
raised belatedly in MCDC's and Olivares' petition for review. It must be remembered that points of law, theories,
arguments, and issues not adequately brought to the trial court's attention need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court. Such matters cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow this would
transgress the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[73]

Moreover, it is odd that MCDC in its petition for review blames ERABCO for allegedly failing to move for the
production of the originals.[74] On the contrary, the records clearly reveal that ERABCO actually filed a Motion for the
Production of Evidence,[75] particularly of the documents vouchers, and slips that were in MCDC's possession. The
trial court even granted the motion. However, instead of complying and producing the documents, MCDC's and
Olivares' counsel admitted the existence, due execution, and genuineness of the requested documents, with
the only caveat "provided it contained their signatures." Interestingly, the documents indeed contained Olivares'
signature, thereby resulting to an admission of their existence, genuineness, and due execution.[76]

In addition, the trial court's ratiocination in its Decision is telling:

[P]re-trial was conducted during which [ERABCO] and [MCDC and Olivares] submitted their briefs; marked their
respective documentary exhibits (Exhibits "A" to "BB" and "1" to "645"); and stipulated on the facts of demands of
payment of commission and that the vouchers and receipts attached to the complaint and/or marked and
submitted for preliminary conference were issued by [MCDC and Olivares] as long as these bore the
signature of [MCDC and Olivares] x x x[77] (Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, from the pre-trial stage to the rendition of the trial court's judgment, reconsideration before the trial court, and
appeal with the CA, MCDC and Olivares never assailed or tried to alter or modify their admissions. [78] It was only
when they filed the instant petition before the Court that they suddenly and belatedly raised said issue. [79]
Significantly, an admission, oral or written, made by the party in the court of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made.[80]

Furthermore, ERABCO's evidence, which consisted of receipts, vouchers, slips, and other documents, were
voluminous. They were kept in several large boxes put inside at least nine (9) sacks. Hence, they were marked in
bulk by folder to conserve time. MCDC and Olivares did not interpose any objections thereto. [81] Actually, their
counsel even made an admission as to the genuineness of the bulk of receipts.[82]

The subsequent
"buy-back" of the
units does not
release MCDC from
its obligation to pay
ERABCO's
commission

MCDC claims that ERABCO should not be entitled to receive the commissions considering that some buyers reneged
on their subsequent payments, and thus, they had to buy back the properties from Pag-IBIG.

The Court disagrees.

A scrutiny of the Marketing Agreement painstakingly enumerates the conditions for ERABCO to receive its
commissions. As exhaustively discussed earlier, ERABCO fulfilled all of these conditions. Hence, the fact that MCDC
subsequently bought back 44 units from Pag-IBIG does not change the fact that there had been completed services
for the promotion and sale of the units. The take-out loan proceeds were released for the said 44 units, and Pag-IBIG
paid MCDC in full for the same. The "buy-back" only happened after the housing loan of the buyer had been
approved and the fund was released to MCDC, when the buyer could not continue paying his/her obligation. There
could have been no buy-back of the units unless and until take-out loan proceeds were released by Pag-IBIG that
completed the sale transactions.[83] Besides, if the "buy-back" was a valid justification for non-payment of the
commission, then this should have been clearly stated in the Marketing Agreement. No such proviso exists in said
Marketing Agreement. Pursuant to the rule strengthening the freedom to contract, the Court may not add provisions
or conditions that run counter to the parties' original intent.

Additionally, MCDC's and Olivares' sole witness Rosemarie DC Faustino (Faustino) testified during her cross-
examination that the extent of ERABCO's obligation regarding the sale of the units was until the buyer moves in to
the unit. She likewise claimed that it was ERABCO's duty to ensure that the buyer continously pays his/her
amortization after the loan take out or release of the loan within twenty-four months, and that ERABCO needed to
monitor the payment because it is the pay back period or conversion of title of the buyer, "even if this was not stated
in the marketing agreement."[84] Faustino's admission that said obligations are not specified in the Marketing
Agreement certainly affirms that MCDC's excuses for refusing to pay were clearly unjustified. To stress, all that said
Agreement mandates for the release of the final tranche of ERABCO's commission is the release of take out
proceeds to MCDC and the submission of 24 post-dated checks for Pag-IBIG amortization, and the post-dated
checks for the remaining equities,[85] which the former fulfilled.

Olivares is not
personally liable for
MCDC's obligation

Although the Court agrees that MCDC is liable for ERABCO's unpaid commission of P4,069,919.88, Olivares should
not be held personally liable for the same.

As a general rule, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
comprising it, or from any other legal entity that it may be related to. The corporation's obligations are its sole
liabilities. Accordingly, the corporate directors, officers, or employees are generally not personally liable for the
corporation's obligations.[86]

Nonetheless, Section 30 of the Corporation Code enumerates particular instances that render corporate officers
solidarily liable with the corporation:
Section 30. Liability of Directors, Trustees or Officers. - Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or
trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.

A director, trustee or officer shall not attempt to acquire, or any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any
matter which has been reposed in them in confidence, and upon which, equity imposes a disability upon themselves
to deal in their own behalf; otherwise, the said director, trustee or officer shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation
and must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the corporation."[87]
In Heirs of Fe Tan Uy v. International Exchange Bank,[88] the Court enumerated the requisites for holding a corporate
officer and/or employee personally liable:
Solidary liability will then attach to the directors, officers or employees of the corporation in certain circumstances,
such as:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation: (a) vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs; and (c)
are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons;

2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did
not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;

3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily
liable with the corporation; or

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.
Before a director or officer of a corporation can be held personally liable for corporate obligations, however, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the complaint that the director or officer assented
to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the
complainant must clearly and convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.
While it is true that the determination of the existence of any of the circumstances that would warrant the piercing of
the veil of corporate fiction is a question of fact which cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, this Court can take cognizance of factual issues if the findings of the lower court are not supported by the
evidence on record or are based on a misapprehension of facts.[89] (Citations omitted)
This ruling was echoed in Bank of Commerce v. Nite,[90] where the Court warned that before holding a director
personally liable for debts of the corporation, and thus piercing the veil of corporate fiction and disregarding the
corporation's separate juridical personality, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must first be established clearly
and convincingly.[91] Such wrongdoing cannot be simply presumed.[92]

Olivares' purported bad faith and intentional wrongdoing were not proven during the trial of the case. Rather, Olivares'
liability was vaguely premised on the allegations that he acted in bad faith and maliciously evaded his obligations. [93]
However, no proof was adduced to establish said accusations. Lest it be forgotten, good faith is always presumed,
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. [94] Neither did the RTC and the CA discuss their bases
for holding Olivares solidarily liable with MCDC.

Hence, absent clear proof of bad faith and intentional wrongdoing, the general rule that the corporation's liabilities
may not be shifted on to its officers, applies. Accordingly, Olivares may not be held personally liable for MCDC's
liability.

All told, the Marketing Agreement serves as the law between the parties. ERABCO dutifully complied with its
responsibilities. In turn, MCDC must fulfill its covenant and fully pay ERABCO's commission. The unpaid balance of
P4,069,919.88 shall be subject to a legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from the filing of the
complaint until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 10, 2018 Decision and December 17, 2018 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 103092 are MODIFIED by DELETING Giovanni Olivares' personal liability. Malate
Construction Development Corporation is hereby ORDERED TO PAY Extraordinary Realty Agents & Brokers
Cooperative the amount of P4,069,919.88, with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from the
filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction.
The total amount due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until
full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

*
Also referred to as Malate Construction and Development Corporation.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-39.
[2]
Id. at 45-61. Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Jane Aurora C. Lantion concurring.
[3]
Id. at 62-63.
[4]
Id. at 195-219. Penned by Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos.
[5]
Id. at 22.
[6]
Id. at 71-75.
[7]
Id. at 64.
[8]
Id. at 71.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id. at 72.
[11]
The loan requirements consisted the following:
1. MCDC Contract to Sell
2. HLA, MSVS, Claim Stub (For Pag-IBIG Members)
2.3 copies of 1x1 picture
3. Proof of billing address
4. Residence certificate
5. Marriage contract/birth certificate
6. Photocopy of company and Tin ID...

For self-employed:
1. Business License/Permit
2. Latest ITR
3. Audited Financial Statement with Balance Sheet
4. BIR Letter of Confirmation

For OCW:
1. Contract of Employment
2. Non-Residence Certificate/W2
3. Passbook (if POP member) Photocopy
4. Passport Photocopy back to back
[12]
Id. at 74.
[13]
Id. at 64-69.
[14]
Id. at 47.
[15]
Id. at 110-118.
[16]
Id. at 47.
[17]
Id. at 195-219.
[18]
Id. at 219.
[19]
Id. at 220.
[20]
Id. at 45-61.
[21]
Id. at 54.
[22]
Id. at 58.

[52]
Norton Resources and Dev't. Corp. v. All Asia Bank Corp., supra note 50 at 388, citing Benguet Corp., et al. v.
Cabildo, 585 Phil. 23 (2008).
[53]
Id. at 388-389.

1. Contract of Employment
2. Non-Residence Certificate/W2
3. Passbook (if POP member) Photocopy
4. Passport Photocopy back to back
[57]
Id. at 74.
[58]
Id. at 72.
[59]
Id. at 120.
[
**
Referred to as Hereberto in some parts of the rollo.
[2]
Id. at 96-104; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino with Associate Justices Louis P. Acosta and
Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga, concurring.

Id. at 126-128; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-
[3]

Yap and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga, concurring.

[6]
The following are respondents: Spouses Adolfo and Susana Potoy, Spouses Victor and Berlina Lumapat, Spouses
Juanito and Luz Potoy, Spouses Teofisto and Sotera Potoy, Spouses Allan and Carmelita Potoy, Spouses Herberto
and Rosario Potoy, Spouses Sonny and Elenita Potoy, Spouses Manito and Shirley Paller, Spouses Reynaldo and
Marilou Dolloso, Spouses Ricardo and Isidra Sibayan, and Spouses Victor and Lolita Bonjoc.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 11439. January 04, 2022 ]
BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY INC., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
ANTHONY JAY B. CONSUNJI, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint[1] filed by Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company Inc.
(BASECO), through its Board of Directors, against Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji (Atty. Consunji) for receiving
excessive cash advances and professional fees from BASECO and failing to render an accounting and liquidation of
the said moneys in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Facts of the Case

BASECO is a stock corporation engaged in the leasing of real properties for pier and port operations, ship docking,
provisioning and cargo handling. Meanwhile, Atty. Consunji was the legal counsel of BASECO from 2005-2011.

According to the complaint, Atty. Consunji received several cash advances purportedly as payment for professional
fees and taxes due to the government from BASECO in the total amount of P20,593,781.42, which consist of:

Date Description Amount Payee

 09-04-07 SEC Registration of Joint Venture Corporation and otherP1,150,000.00 Law Firm of
SEC registration expenses[2] Ramos

04-27-10 Payment of Transfer taxes to Province of Bataan, CGT, P4,350,000.00 Anthony Jay
DST and registration fee[3] Consunji

06-23-10 Payment of DST, CGT and other BIR expenses[4] P7,962,781.42 Anthony Jay
Consunji

03-07-10 Preparation and filing expenses for Articles of P51,000.00 Law Firm of
Incorporation and By-laws of Bataan-Baseco Joint Ramos
Venture Inc.[5]

03-28-11 Advances for professional fees for re-issuance ofP110,000.00 Law Firm of
Engineering Island titles[6] Ramos

04-13-11 Representation regarding issuance of new titles atP500,000.00 Anthony Jay

Engineering Island[7] Consunji

04-26-11 Professional fee for reconstitution of Engineering IslandP1,020,000.00 Anthony Jay

title[8] Consunji

04-26-11 Professional fee for titling of four parcels of land inP850,000.00 Anthony Jay
Engineering Island[9] Consunji

04-26-11 Representation re: reconstitution of Engineering IslandP1,600,000.00 Anthony Jay

titles[10] Consunji

04-26-11 Representation re: titling of four parcels of land inP3,000,000.00 Anthony Jay
Engineering Island[11] Consunji

TOTAL:P20,593,781.42

Out of the P20,593,781.42 cash advances paid by BASECO, Atty. Consunji received P4,350,000.00, as
representation fees for the titling of the four parcels of unregistered land and P2,730,000.00, as professional fees for
the reconstitution of the lost titles of BASECO, both in Engineering Island. Moreover, Atty. Consunji received the
amount of P12,312,781.42, as payments for the taxes due to the government on certain transactions of BASECO.
These payments were evidenced by the payment vouchers submitted by BASECO.

BASECO avers that Atty. Consunji failed to liquidate or account for the advanced professional fees and taxes he
received. Likewise, he failed to render the professional services he was supposed to provide which include the titling
of unregistered lands and reconstitution of lost titles in the Engineering Island. Likewise, Atty. Consunji failed to
submit the Official Receipts of the several taxes he paid to the Province of Bataan and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). Further, he did not issue Official Receipts to BASECO with respect to the professional fees paid to
him.

Moreover, BASECO contends that it was able to successfully secure the re-issuance or reconstitution of the subject
titles with the help of other lawyers, instead of Atty. Consunji, only for the amount of P200,000.00.

On December 14, 2012, BASECO sent a Demand Letter[12] to Atty. Consunji asking him for accounting, liquidation
and refund or reimbursement of the cash advances he received. However, Atty. Consunji failed to heed from its
demand.

Accordingly, BASECO filed charges against Atty. Consunji and its other former directors, officers and employees for
plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
before the Office of the Ombudsman docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0429.

BASECO made another demand[13] from Atty. Consunji but he failed to respond hence, BASECO filed the instant
administrative complaint against him.
In a Resolution[14] dated August 17, 2016, this Court required Atty. Consunji to file his Comment to the Complaint
within 10 days from notice. After requesting for five extensions of time to file his comment, Atty. Consunji filed his
Comment[15] on December 22, 2016.

In his Comment, Atty. Consunji denies the charges against him. He argues that all the cash advances he received
were liquidated and well accounted for. He submitted all the liquidation documents to the Finance Department of
BASECO. Further, he avers that all the funds that were released to him were duly approved by the Board of Directors
and with the knowledge of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Comptroller. To support his
defense, he submitted the affidavits of former BASECO President Proceso L. Maligalig (Maligalig), Treasurer
Agustiniana Avelino (Avelino) and Finance Branch Chief Socorro Santos (Santos).

In a Resolution[16] dated April 5, 2017, this Court required BASECO to file its Reply to the Comment within 10 days
from notice. On March 24, 2017, BASECO filed its Reply.[17]

In its Reply, BASECO contends that it is incumbent upon Atty. Consunji to account for and liquidate the cash
advances he received. It was his duty to document and retain proof of such accounting and liquidation if, indeed,
these were done or made. His failure to produce any objective or documentary proof of accounting and liquidation
suggests that he did not actually account for and liquidate the cash advances.

With respect to his receipt of professional fees on the titling of the lands, Atty. Consunji did not deny that he failed to
complete the reconstitution of the land titles in Engineering Island, to which he was paid for. Thus, for such failure to
render the services required of him, BASECO argues that he must return or refund the professional fees he received
in relation thereto.

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In a Resolution[18] dated August 9, 2017, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of the record.

The IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference Hearing [19]
dated June 8, 2018 notifying the parties of the mandatory conference to be held on July 26, 2018 9:30 am at IBP
Office. The parties were likewise directed to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs 5 days prior to the
scheduled hearing.

On July 23, 2018, Atty. Consunji, through counsel, filed a Motion for Cancellation of Mandatory Conference [20] citing
as reason the prior scheduled hearing of his counsel at the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa on July 25, 2018,
and his counsel's flight back will be on July 26, 2018 at 10:25 am.

In an Order[21] dated July 26, 2018, the IBP-CBD continued with the mandatory conference however, neither of the
parties appeared. However, it noted the Motion for Cancellation filed by Atty. Consunji. Thereafter, it directed the
parties to submit their respective verified position papers within 10 days from notice.

After several extensions, Atty. Consunji filed his verified position paper.[22] He reiterated the arguments set forth in his
Comment to the Complaint. In addition, he cited the Ombudsman Resolution [23] in OMB-C-C-13-0429 acquitting him
of the charge of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for lack of substantial proof to support the charges
against him. Lastly, he argues that he tried to obtain the records from the Finance Department of BASECO however,
all the documents and records were seized by the PCGG on June 23, 2011.

BASECO did not file any position paper. The notices were returned unserved with a notation that the complainant has
moved out. BASECO failed to inform this Court and the IBP of the change of its address, thus the IBP deemed
BASECO to have waived its right to receive notices and other pleadings as well as its right to participate in the
proceedings.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In a Memorandum[24] dated November 23, 2018, the IBP-CBD, through Investigating Commissioner Sherwin C. De
Joya, recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Atty. Consunji for lack of merit.

The Investigating Commissioner found that BASECO failed to establish through substantial evidence that Atty.
Consunji committed the acts complained of. In fact, BASECO did not even participate in the proceedings before the
CBD. All that it submitted were machine copies of the annexes attached to its Complaint, which were not
authenticated. There was no evidence to support the alleged irregularities in the disbursements made to Atty.
Consunji.

On the other hand, Atty. Consunji presented evidence to support his defense, which the Investigating Commissioner
gave more credence than the unsupported surmises and conjectures of BASECO.

In a Resolution[25] dated June 18, 2019, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) approved and adopted the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the administrative complaint against Atty. Consunji.
However, it resolved to impose against him a fine of P5,000.00 for his failure to comply with the mandatory hearing
requirement of the IBP-CBD.

Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Consunji should be administratively disciplined

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds that Atty. Consunji violated Rule 16.01, Canon 16, and Rules 18.01 and 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Hence, the Court reverses the findings and recommendation of the IBP and holds Atty.
Consunji administratively liable.

In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the
complainant. A finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence or that evidence which the reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to establish a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.[26]

The Court holds that the complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence that Atty. Consunji committed acts in
violation of his duties and obligations as a member of the Bar under the CPR.

Violation of Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of

the CPR

Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR provides:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SMALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. (Emphasis
supplied)
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer great fidelity and good
faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. [27] Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used
for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[28]

There is no dispute that Atty. Consunji received cash advances from BASECO for his professional fees and for the
payment of certain taxes due to the government. According to BASECO, Atty. Consunji failed to liquidate and render
an accounting of these cash advances. BASECO sent two demand letters asking Atty. Consunji to account for and
liquidate the funds he received from them but Atty. Consunji failed to comply with the said demand.

On the other hand, Atty. Consunji argues that he was able to render an accounting and liquidation of the fees he
received and all these documents were submitted to the Finance Department of BASECO. However, due to the
seizure of BASECO's documents and files by the security personnel of the PCGG, he can no longer obtain access to
the accounting and liquidation reports he submitted to BASECO. In his Comment and Position Paper, he provided the
following explanation to the cash advances he received, which the Court quotes:
20.1 The amount of P1,150,000.00 was liquidated through original receipts which were turned over to the Finance
Department of complainant BASECO;

20.2 The amount of P4,350,000.00 was liquidated through official receipts which were turned over to the Finance
Department of complainant BASECO;
20.3 The amount of P7,962,781.42 was likewise liquidated through turnover of official receipts to the Finance
Department of complainant BASECO;

20.4 The amount of P51,000.00 was paid to Consunji by way of professional fees for the preparation and filing of the
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Bataan-BASECO Joint Venture Corporation. Surely, an official receipt
therefor was issued;

20.5 The amount of P110,000.00 was paid to respondent Consunji as initial professional fees for the re-issuance of
the titles for the properties of complainant BASECO at the Engineering Island;

20.6 The amount of P500,000.00 was received by respondent Consunji for settlement of representation expenses in
relation to the properties of complainant BASECO at the Engineering Island. This amount was subsequently
liquidated through acknowledgement receipts which were turned over to the Finance Department of BASECO;

20.7 The amount of P1,020,000.00 was received by respondent Consunji as professional fees for the reconstitution of
titles of Engineering Island. An official receipt therefor was issued;

20.8 The amount of P850,000.00 was paid to respondent Consunji as payment of the last tranche of the latter's
professional fees for the reissuance of the titles for the properties of BASECO at the Engineering Island;

20.9 The amount of P1,600,000.00 represented the settlement of representation expenses incurred in relation to the
properties of BASECO at the Engineering Island. This amount was liquidated through presentation of
acknowledgment receipts which were subsequently turned over to the Finance Department of complainant BASECO;

20.10 The amount of P3,000,000.00 represented the settlement of representation expenses incurred in relation to the
properties of BASECO at the Engineering Island. This amount was liquidated through presentation of
acknowledgment receipts which were subsequently turned over to the Finance Department of complainant
BASECO[.][29]
The Court finds Atty. Consunji's contentions bereft of merit. The explanation he provided is general and lacks
substantiation. He merely stated that the receipts were turned over to the Finance Department of BASECO without
specifying the OR Nos. per transaction, the dates that these were turned over and the officers who received the
same. Further, in the receipt of payment for his professional fees, he merely issued acknowledgment receipts instead
of official receipts as required by the law. He did not retain copies of these receipts for his record. All these
circumstances lead the Court to believe that no actual accounting and liquidation was done by Atty. Consunji.

It is incumbent upon a lawyer to keep records of his transactions with clients as a matter of prudence and due
diligence. Ethical and practical considerations require lawyers to issue receipts to their clients, even if it was not
demanded, and to keep copies of the said receipts for his own records. [30] Thus, he cannot simply claim that the
records were already with the Finance Department of BASECO. As a dutiful and prudent lawyer, he should have kept
copies of these receipts and records of transactions he had with BASECO. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a
lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of
ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

In this case, Atty. Consunji failed to provide evidence to show that he has already accounted for and liquidated the
cash advances he received from BASECO. It is his duty to show that all moneys received from his client have been
accounted for, that the money has been utilized for the purpose it was given, and that there are corresponding
receipts issued with respect to these transactions. Atty. Consunji has not submitted any copies of the receipts he
issued to BASECO with respect to the professional fees he received in processing the titling of the unregistered lands
and reconstitution of lost titles in the Engineering Island. Further, he has failed to show copies of Official Receipts
issued by the Province of Bataan and BIR with respect to the payment of transfer taxes, capital gains taxes,
documentary stamp taxes and registration fees made by BASECO.

The taxes payable to the Province of Bataan and BIR were released to Atty. Consunji, as the legal counsel of
BASECO, in order to facilitate and process its payment to the concerned government units. It is incumbent upon him
to show that these moneys he received were properly utilized to its purpose and that there are Official Receipts
issued by the government as evidence of payment of these taxes. The claim that the liquidation records of these cash
advances were already with the Finance Department of BASECO, which were seized by the PCGG, deserves scant
consideration. If the custody of these documents and records were really with BASECO or PCGG, Atty. Consunji
could have easily requested the IBP or the Court to order the former to produce these records pursuant to Rules 21
and 27 of the Rules of Court. The IBP Investigators have the power to issue subpoenas, take depositions and
administer oaths pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. However, Atty. Consunji failed to
avail of these legal remedies. He failed to rebut the allegation of BASECO that no accounting and liquidation has
been made to the cash advances released to him.

The affidavits of former BASECO officers Maligalig, Avelino and Santos are not sufficient to absolve Atty. Consunji of
his administrative liability. Both Avelino and Santos, Treasurer and Finance Branch Chief respectively, testified on the
process of budget approvals and release followed by BASECO. Santos, as the Finance Branch Chief, had no
statement indicating that she received accounting and liquidation reports from Atty. Consunji. It was in the Joint
Affidavit of Maligalig and Avelino where they testified that all the moneys disbursed to Atty. Consunji were liquidated.
However, the Court finds their statement irrelevant and self-serving.

If indeed Atty. Consunji submitted the liquidation reports to the Finance Department, it should have been Santos, the
Finance Branch Chief at that time, who is the most competent witness to testify having received these liquidation and
accounting documents. However, there was no such statement coming from her which leads the Court to believe that
there was no actual accounting and liquidation done for the moneys Atty. Consunji received from BASECO.

Further, under the Rules of Evidence, when the contents of a document are the subject of inquiry in an action, the
original document must be presented, as in this case, the original Official Receipts of the transactions and liquidation
report submitted by Atty. Consunji. It is only in exceptional cases enumerated in Section 3, particularly Section 3(b) of
Rule 130 that secondary evidence may be admitted. Such exception cannot apply in this case because Atty. Consunji
failed to avail of his legal remedy to require BASECO or PCGG to produce the said documents, which were
purportedly in the latter's custody. Hence, the affidavits of his witnesses are not admissible to support his claim that
he actually liquidated the moneys advanced to him by BASECO.

Violation of Rules 18.01 and 18.03 of

Canon 18

Furthermore, the Court finds that Atty. Consunji also violated Rules 18.01 and 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which
state:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.01 – A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel
a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
BASECO contends that despite receipt of his full legal compensation, Atty. Consunji failed to complete his obligation
to process the registration of the untitled lands of BASECO and the reconstitution of the lost titles in Engineering
Island. Atty. Consunji counters that he was not able to do so because the PCGG seized all the documents and files of
BASECO and prevented him from gaining access to the documents in relation thereto. This was corroborated by the
Affidavit of Maligalig stating that Atty. Consunji was able to accomplish substantial preparatory works however, he
was prevented from completing the same because of the lack of relocation surveys and the records, documents, and
papers in relation to the properties in Engineering Island which were also seized by the security personnel of PCGG.

In the Memorandum of Agreement[31] dated March 21, 2011, BASECO and Atty. Consunji entered into a service
contract wherein Atty. Consunji obligated himself to process the registration of the untitled parcels of land of BASECO
in Engineering Island. In consideration thereof, Atty. Consunji shall be entitled to an acceptance fee of
P1,200,000.00. In addition to the acceptance fee, Atty. Consunji shall also be entitled to a success contingent fee,
quoted hereunder:
3. In addition to the aforementioned acceptance fee, the SECOND PARTY shall be entitled to charge and collect from
the FIRST PARTY, a SUCCESS – CONTINGENT – FEE of twenty-five percent (25%) of the fair market value of the
PROPERTIES that were successfully registered and titled in the name of the FIRST PARTY or of the prevailing zonal
valuation in the area or of real properties adjacent in location to the PROPERTIES, whichever is higher.

4. The Success – Contingent – Fee shall become due and collectible by the SECOND PARTY from the FIRST
PARTY, upon his delivery to the latter, of the certificates of title over the PROPERTIES in the name of the
FIRST PARTY as well as the corresponding Tax Declarations thereof, and within thirty (30) days thereafter. [32]
(Emphasis supplied)
According to the records, Atty. Consunji received a compensation of P4,350,000.00 for the issuance of new titles for
the unregistered lands in Engineering Island, which consist of:
 1. Representation regarding issuance of new titles at Engineering Island – P500,000.00 (under Payment
Voucher No. 2011-04-137 dated April 13, 2011)
2. Professional fee for titling of four (4) parcels of land at Engineering Island – P850,000.00 (under
Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-151 dated April 26, 2011)
3. Representation re: for titling of four (4) parcels of land at Engineering Island – P3,000,000.00 (under
Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-153 dated April 26, 2011)

It is not disputed that Atty. Consunji was not able to successfully deliver the certificates of title of the four parcels of
unregistered land of BASECO in Engineering Island. Despite the nonfulfillment of his legal obligation in the MOA,
Atty. Consunji received P4,350,000.00 as his legal compensation. Knowing that this is in excess of the compensation
he was supposed to receive, Atty. Consunji retained such amount and did not bother to return the excess
compensation he collected.

Moreover, Atty. Consunji received P2,730,000.00 for his legal services for the reconstitution of the lost titles, which
breakdown as follows:
1. Advances for professional fees for re-issuance of Engineering Island titles – P110,000.00 (under
Payment Voucher No. 2011- dated March 28, 2011)
2. Professional fee for reconstitution of titles of Engineering Island – P1,020,000.00 (under Payment
Voucher Mo. 2011-04-150 dated April 26, 2011)
3. Representation re: for reconstitution of titles of Engineering Island – P1,600,000.00 (under Payment
Voucher No. 2011-04-152 dated April 26, 2011)

Similar to the previous engagement, Atty. Consunji was not able to process the reconstitution of the lost titles despite
receiving his legal compensation.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Atty. Consunji was remiss in fulfilling his obligation to his client. The affidavit of
Maligalig stating that Atty. Consunji was able to prepare substantial preparatory works is self-serving. If indeed Atty.
Consunji was able to make substantial preparatory works, he should have presented these works/documents to the
IBP or the Court. Had he really done substantial work for the processing of the titles, he could have submitted
documentary or object evidence to support his claim. There was no showing of what substantial preparatory works
were done and what specific actions were taken by Atty. Consunji to fulfill his legal obligation. He does not deny
having received the legal fees in relation to the engagements. Thus, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he has
duly complied with his obligation or that he has substantially performed tasks to fulfill the same but was prevented
from completing it for reasons not attributable to him. However, Atty. Consunji failed to prove that he did his
professional duties properly and meticulously.

The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case and subsequently
failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine
interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and
ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but
also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

Failure to comply with such duty subjects the lawyer to administrative sanction.

Administrative Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. Lawyers should
bear in mind that the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted only
to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for a delinquent lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[33]

In this case, Atty. Consunji received millions of pesos from his client as his legal compensation but he failed to fulfill
his obligation. He likewise received money in trust as payment for his client's taxes but he did not render an
accounting and liquidation of the moneys he received. Neither did he present any Official Receipt or proof of payment
of the said liabilities of the client. These acts are evidently against the provisions of the CPR, the lawyer's oath and
the law. The Court cannot turn a blind eye on these palpable imprudence of Atty. Consunji for these constitute as
blatant disregard and desecration of the fiduciary duty, competence, diligence and loyalty that a lawyer owes to his
client.

Likewise, it is also the Court's mandate to ensure that the lawyer shall impose and charge reasonable and proper
attorney's fees in accordance with the efforts and time spent in the case. A lawyer shall not unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of the client. It must always be remembered that the practice of law is not a business and a lawyer plays
a vital role in the administration of justice. Hence, it is of utmost importance that lawyers maintain an honest and fair
dealings with its clients.

In this case, Atty. Consunji charged exorbitant legal fees to his client despite nonfulfillment of his legal obligation.
BASECO was able to process the reconstitution of the lost titles in Engineering Island with the help of another lawyer
only for the amount of P200,000.00 while Atty. Consunji charged BASECO P2,730,000.00 for the same engagement
but still failed to accomplish the reconstitution. Having failed to complete his engagement, Atty. Consunji should have
returned the excess legal fees he received from his client. Instead, he retained the money and appropriated it unto
himself, to the damage and prejudice of BASECO. Such acts display Atty. Consunji's propensity to take advantage of
his clients in violation of his duties as a member of the Bar.

Based from the foregoing, the Court finds that Atty. Consunji's acts are so reprehensible and disgraceful, and his
violations of the provisions of the CPR are so blatant, demonstrating his moral unfitness and unsuitability to discharge
the duties of a lawyer. His actions besmirch the public perception of the legal profession. As such, Atty. Consunji
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment

In Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III,[34] the Court ordered the disbarment of Atty. Meneses III after he failed to
account for the money received by him from his client. Atty. Meneses III was given P50,000.00 as the consideration
for the out-of-court settlement in the case where his client was involved. However, the settlement did not materialize.
Despite that, Atty. Meneses III continued to keep the money entrusted to him in his professional capacity in violation
of his duty to immediately return the same to his client. The Court ruled that such conduct on his part indicated his
unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. Showing such lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him worthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for disciplinary action extending to
disbarment.[35]

In Sison vs. Atty. Camacho,[36] Atty. Camacho was meted out the penalty of disbarment for violating Rule 1.01 and
16.01 of the CPR. Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the authority of his client and he
failed to account for the money he received from his client in the amount of P1,288,260.00 intended for payment of
additional docket fees. The Court therein ruled that Atty. Camacho's acts are inexcusable and shameful to the legal
profession. His failure to abide by the legal duties and moral obligations of a member of the Bar and the damage and
prejudiced caused to the client because of such acts warranted the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.[37]

In Mariveles v. Atty. Mallari,[38] the Court imposed the penalty of disbarment on Atty. Mallari after he failed to file his
client's appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals despite asking for several extensions of time, in direct violation of
Rule 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. The Court ruled that Atty. Mallari's act demonstrated not only appalling indifference
and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is
unfit for membership in this noble profession.[39]

Lastly, in Enriquez v. Atty. Lavadia,[40] Atty. Lavadia Jr. was disbarred after he failed to file several pleadings which
resulted to an adverse decision against his client. His client paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other
fees relating to the preparation of the pleadings. However, Atty. Lavadia Jr. failed to file the position paper which
resulted to his client being declared to be in default. He filed an appeal, moved for several extensions, but still failed
to file the appeal memorandum which resulted to the dismissal of his client's appeal. These acts revealed Atty.
Lavadia's nonchalant attitude to the cause of his client in violation of his duty under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR.[41]

Further, Atty. Consunji must return the amount of P12,312,781.42 to BASECO, which he received in his professional
capacity, for the purported payment of transfer taxes, capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax and registration fees
to the Province of Bataan and BIR. Likewise, he must return the excess legal fees in the amount of P3,150,000.00
which he received in relation to his engagement to register the untitled parcels of land in Enginering Island in the
name of BASECO. As above-stated, Atty. Consunji failed to successfully deliver the certificates of title of these
parcels of land. In accordance with the MOA dated March 21, 2011, he shall only be paid a success contingent fee of
25% of the FMV of the properties upon delivery of the certificates of title. Failing to accomplish his obligation, Atty.
Consunji can only retain the acceptance fee of P1,200,000.00. Lastly, he must return the amount of P2,530,000.00 as
excess legal compensation he received for the reconstitution of the lost titles. Assuming that he made substantial
preparatory works for the said engagement, the Court deems it proper to let Atty. Consunji retain P200,000.00 as his
legal fees therefor, on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit and in accordance with the customary fees actually
paid for the said transaction.
Payment for transfer taxes, CGT, DST and registration fees
to the Province of Bataan
P4,350,000.00

+
Payment for transfer taxes, CGT, DST and registration fees
to the BIR
P7, 962,781.42

_______________
Total taxes advanced:
P12,312,781.42

Legal fees received for the registration of the untitled

parcels of land in Engineering Island

P4,350,000.00

-
Legal fees indicated in the MOA dated March 21, 2011
P1, 200,000.00

_______________
Total excess fees advanced:
P3,150,000.00

Legal fees received for the reconstitution of the lost titles in

Engineering Island
P2,730,000.00.

-
Actual fees paid for the successful reconstitution of the lost
titles
P200,000.00

_______________
Total excess fees advanced:
P2,530,000.00
The practice of law is a privilege given to few, and it is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar
maintains and aims to uphold a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji is found GUILTY of violation of Rule
16.01, Canon 16, and Rule 18.01 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons
above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll
of Attorneys.

Further, he is ORDERED to Return to Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company Inc. the amount of
P12,312,781.42 intended for the payment of certain taxes to the Province of Bataan and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the amounts of P3,150,000.00 and P2,530,000.00 as excess legal fees he received from the latter for his
failure to complete his engagements which shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
Decision until full payment. He is further DIRECTED to submit proof of payment to the Court within ten (10) days from
his full payment.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED."

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M.
Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-9.
[2]
Id. at 41.
[3]
Id. at 42.
[4]
Id. at 43.
[5]
Id. at 44.
[6]
Id. at 45.
[7]
Id. at 46.
[8]
Id. at 47.
[9]
Id. at 48.
[10]
Id. at 49.
[11]
Id. at 50.
[12]
Id. at 51-52.
[13]
Id. at 53.
[14]
Id. at 56.
[15]
Id. at 95-108.
[16]
Id. at 142.
[17]
Id. at 146-149.
[18]
Id. at 166.
[19]
Id. at 168.
[20]
Id. at 169-170.
[21]
Id. at 177.
[22]
Id. at 188-198.
[23]
Id. at 307-346.
[24]
Id. at 378-382.
[25]
Id. at 376.
[26]
Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing, 743 Phil. 622, 668 (2014).
EN BANC

[ A.M. No. P-12-3091 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3426-P]. January

04, 2022 ]

CLERK OF COURT YVONNE Q. RIVERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. REX J. GEROCHE, CASH

CLERK III, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, KABANKALAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Court personnel who fail to safeguard court funds and collections, either through their willful conduct or negligence,
shall be held accountable.

The Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and that all public officers must be accountable to the
people and must serve them with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The demand for moral uprightness is
more pronounced for members and personnel of the Judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. As
frontliners in the administration of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and
integrity in the public service and, in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Thus, any
conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not be tolerated.[1]
This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint-Affidavit [2] filed before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on June 28, 2010, by Yvonne Q. Rivera (complainant), Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, against Rex J. Geroche (respondent), Cash Clerk III of the same
MTCC, for malversation, falsification of documents, and gross dishonesty committed in the performance of his duties.

In the complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that respondent was appointed to his position on December 15, 2006.
His duties included the issuance of official receipts, deposit of collections, deposit and withdrawal of cash bonds,
maintenance of books of accounts, and preparation and transmittal of monthly reports concerning the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF), Legal Research Fund (LRF), and Fiduciary Fund (FF). According to complainant,
respondent competently performed his duties during the first few years of his service, and the audits conducted found
the transactions in the books of accounts to be in order.

However, in February 2010, respondent stopped reporting for work after being instructed by complainant to submit
the reports for the JDF, Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ), Mediation Fund, LRF, and FF to the State Auditor,
who had requested said reports for verification. Complainant examined respondent's files, and found out that reports
and documents were missing, including those for submission to the Chief Accountant of the Court which she had
already signed.

On March 8, 2010, the State Auditor conducted an audit, but the reconciliation of records proved impossible due to
the missing documents which respondent had custody of. The Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Cyclamen J. Fernandez
(Judge Fernandez), issued two (2) memos consecutively, ordering respondent to report for work and to explain why
he was not able to do so, which respondent both disregarded. Later, respondent presented himself and admitted to
complainant and the Presiding Judge that he had misappropriated office funds.

Sometime thereafter, complainant received a letter from the Court directing her to explain the failure to submit
monthly reports for the JDF, SAJ, FF, and General Fund from August 2009 to June 2010. Complainant was surprised
to receive such letter considering that she had already signed the reports and believed that these had already been
transmitted to Manila, as respondent had even showed her the receipts for their transmittal. When complainant
confronted respondent, the latter explained that the failure to transmit the reports were due to inadvertence. However,
upon further investigation, complainant discovered that the collections covered by the reports were actually not
deposited. After several demands by complainant, respondent turned over the savings account passbook of the
MTCC. An examination of the passbook revealed irregularities in the deposits and withdrawals, which led
complainant to write a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to inform them of the fraudulent transactions.
Complainant also reported the incident to the Philippine National Police. The LBP launched an investigation on the
matter.[3]

The OCA directed respondent to comment on the complaint, but instead of filing his comment, respondent informed
the OCA that he had already resigned effective August 23, 2010, and that he would no longer submit a comment.[4]

On September 3, 2012, the OCA submitted its report recommending respondent's dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits for gross dishonesty.[5]

On February 20, 2013, the Court directed the OCA to conduct a financial audit of the books of accounts of
complainant and to withhold all cash benefits due her, pending financial audit. The Court found both complainant and
respondent remiss in their duty to remit collections within the prescribed period, given that complainant was
responsible for monitoring the MTCC's financial transactions and ensuring that respondent properly performed his
functions.[6]

On June 1, 2016, the Court, acting on the Financial Audit Report [7] by the OCA on the books of accounts of
complainant wherein she was found to have failed to "exercise close supervision" over respondent, directed
complainant to explain why the FF withdrawals amounting to P784,477.00 were not supported by documents and
why there was failure to deposit collections amounting to P76,690.60. Complainant was also directed to submit the
missing supporting documents for the withdrawals and to restitute and deposit the amount of P76,690.60[8] to the
respective depositories to settle undeposited collections. The Court also consolidated the initial audit findings of the
OCA with this administrative matter, and directed Judge Fernandez to issue an order for the withdrawal of the STF
collections and to open a new account for the STF pursuant to OCA Circular No. 99-2014 [9] dated July 31, 2014,
using the withdrawn amount.[10]
After the submission of respective compliances by both complainant and Judge Fernandez, the Court referred the
matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation on September 19, 2016.[11]

Meanwhile, complainant compulsorily retired on November 29, 2016. [12] On August 24, 2020, complainant filed a
motion for the early resolution of the administrative matter, praying that judgment be rendered absolving her of any
liability so she could process the release of her retirement benefits. She also alleged that upon learning of the
remaining undocumented withdrawals of respondent, she immediately made deposits in the total amount of
P263,650.00 for the purpose of having her retirement benefits processed and her administrative liability cleared, and
for not having to admit "any irregularity on her part." Complainant also manifested that she would personally "go after
respondent" for all the payments she made due to respondent's misappropriation and for the immense inconvenience
it had caused her.[13]

On October 16, 2020, the OCA reported to the Court that:[14]

In her letter dated [August 3,] 2016, [complainant] submitted her compliance stating that: (a) the supporting
documents, order authorizing withdrawal, Cash Voucher, Monthly Report and Withdrawal Slips for the Fiduciary
withdrawals amounting to PHP [606,327.00] were already submitted to the Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD), Court
Management Office (CMO), OCA; (b) the FF withdrawals amounting to PHP 178,150.00 have incomplete or no
supporting documents and that some unauthorized withdrawals were made by respondent x x x by forging her
signature and that of then Presiding Judge Fernandez; (c) the amount of the PHP76,690.60 was deposited to the FF,
JDF[,] and GF accounts of the court, however, the PHP6,600.00 for the STF was deposited to the FF account
considering that Acting Presiding Judge Dialinda S. Dominguez did not sign the Application for the Opening of the
STF account because it was Judge Fernandez who was directed by the Court: and (d) she cannot comply with the
directive to open an account for the STF collections and to transfer the STF collections which were deposited in the
FF as this directive was addressed to Judge Fernandez and she therefore prayed for the issuance of an order
directing Acting Presiding Judge Dominguez to comply with the Court's directive.

On the other hand, Judge Fernandez, in her letter dated [July 26,] 2016, informed the Court that she [had] been
appointed to Branch 63, [Regional Trial Court of] La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, and therefore cannot comply
with the [June 1,] 2016 Resolution to issue an Order for the withdrawal of the STF collections deposited with the FF
and to open an account for the STF pursuant to OCA Circular No. 49-2014 dated [July 13,] 2014.
xxxx

A review of the documents shows that respondent x x x, who was in charge of the collections and deposits of the
judiciary funds, incurred the following shortages which were restituted by [complainant]:

Type of Fund Amount Date Deposited

Fiduciary Fund PHP 263,650.00 08/21/2020

Fiduciary Fund 58,043.00 07/29/2016

Sheriffs Trust Fund 6,600.00 08/01/2016

Judiciary Dev. Fund 8,150.60 07/29/2016

General Fund 3,897.00 08/01/2016

Total PHP 340,340.00

============
The OCA reiterated its initial finding that respondent's actions placed his honesty and integrity in serious doubt and
that his resignation did not render the administrative case moot and academic.[15]

As to complainant, the OCA observed that although she had no participation in the unauthorized withdrawals of the
MTCC's funds, she was remiss in the discharge of her functions as Clerk of Court when she failed to closely
supervise the financial transactions of the court and to personally monitor the collection of fees, the safekeeping of
the collections, the proper recording of the transactions in the corresponding book of accounts, and the submission of
the monthly financial reports. The OCA further remarked that had complainant been more assiduous in the discharge
of her duties, the missing funds could have been discovered sooner or altogether prevented. As such, the OCA found
complainant guilty of simple neglect of duty and recommended the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00, in lieu
of suspension, after considering that she had not been charged of any offense in her 30 years of service and, further,
since the shortages had already been restituted.[16]

On the failure to withdraw the STF collections and to open a new account for the same due to Judge Fernandez's
appointment to a different court, the OCA recommended the issuance of a directive to current Presiding Judge Jose
A. Lopez of the MTCC, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, to issue an order to facilitate its processing.[17]

The Court notes that respondent opted not to file a comment to the charges against him. Given that respondent has
waived his right to defend himself, the Court shall resolve the matter on the basis of the facts and circumstances set
forth in the records.[18]

Ruling of the Court

The Court is in accord with the findings and recommendations of the OCA as regards complainant, and also finds
respondent guilty of grave misconduct pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

Both respondent and complainant

are administratively liable for the

missing court funds.

The Court has always reminded clerks of courts, cash clerks, and all court personnel entrusted with the collections of
court funds, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected
because they are not authorized to keep them in their custody. The failure to deposit these judiciary collections on
time deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts were deposited in a bank. The unwarranted
failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of the collection
shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.[19]

In here, both respondent and complainant, in their capacities as cash clerk and clerk of court, respectively, had been
remiss in their duties in handling and securing the funds of the MTCC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.
A. Respondent is guilty of

serious dishonesty and

grave misconduct.

The Court has regarded the misappropriation of judicial funds not only as a form of dishonesty, but also of grave
misconduct.[20] Dishonesty is defined as: the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.[21] It is a malevolent conduct that has no place in the judiciary. [22] On the other hand,
misconduct refers to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it is accompanied by the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.[23]

Based on the preceding legal precepts, respondent's acts constituted serious dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Respondent's dishonest ways were manifested by his failure to deposit the MTCC's collections and to transmit the
monthly reports to the Court [24] and, worse, by misrepresenting that the same had been deposited to the appropriate
accounts. He even prepared the corresponding reports for these transactions to cover up his mishandling of the
funds.

He likewise admitted to have misappropriated the said funds when confronted by complainant and Judge Fernandez,
[25]
and had opted not to file a comment to the complaint in view of his resignation. [26] Such admission notwithstanding,
his mere failure to account for and explain the discrepancies in the reports and the missing funds, already gave rise
to the presumption that he had misappropriated the funds for personal use. Based on his overall conduct, respondent
is liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and malversation.[27]
As a cash clerk, respondent is an accountable officer entrusted with the delicate task of collecting money for the
court. This proprietary function imbues his position with trust and confidence. His acts of misappropriation clearly
betrayed his integrity, and much more evinced his disposition to defraud the court.[28]

B. Complainant is liable

for simple neglect of duty.

Anent the liability of complainant, it must be emphasized that clerks of court are primarily accountable for all funds
that are collected for the court, whether personally received by them or by a duly appointed cashier who is under their
supervision and control.[29] Complainant, therefore, had the primary duty to ensure that respondent performed his
duties and responsibilities in accordance with the circulars on deposits and collections so that all court funds were
properly accounted for.[30] As the custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, she is liable
for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and properties.[31]

A clerk of court found short of money accountabilities may be dismissed from the service on the ground of gross
neglect of duty, among others.[32] As such, the Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty of dismissal for
even the slightest breach of duty by, and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of, officers and employees, if so
warranted.[33] In other instances, the Court had only found the clerk of court liable for simple neglect of duty for failing
to supervise and properly manage the financial transactions of the court.[34] Verily, the Court has the discretion to take
into account the attendant circumstances in determining the extent of the clerk of court's administrative liability in
connection with the duty to handle the court's funds.

In here, respondent may only be liable for simple neglect of duty on account of her failure to give attention to a task,
or in the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. [35] Apparent from the records, complainant had been
remiss in performing her functions when she failed to closely supervise respondent in the management of the
MTCC's funds, thus resulting in the failure to submit the financial reports on time and the misappropriation of the
funds by respondent.[36] As the primary accountable officer of the MTCC, she should have verified with accuracy the
proper recording of the financial transactions and should not have solely relied on respondent's representations.

Proper Penalties

In imposing the appropriate penalties against respondent and complainant, the Court takes into account the recent
amendments to, and the application of, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court regarding disciplinary proceedings of lower
court personnel.

On October 2, 2018, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC creating the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the
Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO). In strengthening the powers and authority of the JIB, the Court
expanded the coverage of Rule 140, to include not only the discipline of judges of regular courts and justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, but also administrative complaints against justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals, as well as the personnel of the lower courts and other offices in the Supreme Court.[37]

Consequently, the Court amended A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC on July 7, 2020, and further enlarged the scope of Rule
140 to include disciplinary proceedings against officials and employees of the Judiciary, [38] among others. In the same
amendment, violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and the offenses under Civil Service Laws and
Rules, were integrated into Sections 22, 23, and 24 and were properly classified as either Serious, Less Serious, or
Light Charges. The incorporation of the offenses under Civil Service Laws and Rules finds significance in the present
case because the offense of simple neglect of duty, which is classified as a less grave offense under Civil Service
rules, is now treated as a less serious charge under Sec. 23 of Rule 140.
The Court made recent amendments again to Rule 140 when, on March 16, 2021, it increased the fines provided
under Sec. 25, commensurate to the prevailing salaries of judges and personnel of the Judiciary.[39] Thus, Sec. 25
now provides for the following penalties:

Sec. 25. Sanctions.

1. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credit;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.
2.

3. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of not less than P35,000.00 but not exceeding P100,000.00.
4.

5. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P35,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning, (emphases in the original)
Prior to increasing the fines under Sec. 25, the Court laid down the rule in Dela Rama v. De Leon[40] that, since the
amended Rule 140 is the prevailing rule, it shall be uniformly applied in administrative cases involving Judiciary
personnel, unless its retroactive application will not be favorable to the employee. This rule was also observed in the
succeeding cases of Flores v. Hipolito,[41] Brasales v. Borja,[42] OCA v. Lazaro,[43] and Rodil v. Posadas,[44] among
others.

A. The penalty to be imposed

against respondent is based

on the URACCS; a claim of

resignation will not prevent

the imposition of appropriate

penalty.

As previously discussed, respondent is guilty of two (2) offenses, namely, serious dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Under the amended Rule 140, both offenses are classified as serious charges, with the following penalties: dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than
P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.[45]
On the other hand, the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),[46] which is the
applicable rule at the time respondent committed the offenses, classifies dishonesty and grave misconduct as grave
offenses punishable by dismissal from the service at the first instance, with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, disqualification for reinstatement or reemployment, disqualification for promotion, and bar from
taking civil service examinations.[47]

At this juncture, reference shall be made to Flores v. Hipolito,[48] wherein the Court explained that in case of multiple
offenses under the amended Rule 140, separate penalties shall be imposed against the errant court personnel
following the ruling in Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez,[49] However, instead of applying Rule 140,
the Court referred to the URACCS in penalizing the errant court employee, because the URACCS only considers the
most serious offense in prescribing the penalty, while the other offenses shall be treated as aggravating
circumstances,[50] viz.:

If the Court applies Rule 140 to the present case, Flores would be charged and penalized with two separate offenses
in line with the ruling in Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, where the Court held that in
administrative cases under Rule 140, separate penalties shall be imposed for every offense. In contrast, only the
penalty for the most serious charge shall be imposed if the URACCS is to be applied, thus:

SECTION 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. – If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or
counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall
be considered as aggravating circumstances.

Considering that the penalty under the URACCS is more favorable to Flores, the Court deems it best to apply the
said rule and hold Flores guilty of grave misconduct, which is the more serious offense, aggravated by
insubordination. Since this is not Flores' first administrative infraction – the first being an administrative complaint
where she was found guilty of serious dishonesty and was suspended instead of being dismissed – the penalty of
dismissal in the present case is more than proper.
Similar with Flores, the application of Rule 140 will be more prejudicial to herein respondent as he will be meted with
separate penalties for the two administrative offenses. Accordingly, for his dishonesty and serious misconduct,
respondent shall suffer the penalty of dismissal with the corresponding accessory penalties under the URACCS.

The Court is aware that respondent submitted his resignation letter to the OCA immediately after the institution of the
complaint against him. The records further show that his resignation remained unacted upon due to the present
administrative matter.[51] Despite submitting his resignation, the Court still deems it proper to impose the penalty of
dismissal against him. It bears emphasis that the precipitate resignation of a government employee shall not render
moot the administrative case against him, and will not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he
shall be answerable.[52] In several cases,[53] the Court still meted the penalty of dismissal from the service against a
court employee when the latter's resignation was filed during a pending administrative complaint, and remained
unacted upon. Verily, resignation "is not a way out for a court personnel who is facing administrative sanction to
evade administrative liability."[54]

Moreover, in the fairly recent case of OCA v. Bravo,[55] the Court agreed with the OCA's observation that the
employee's resignation was made to preserve an opportunity for re-employment in the Judiciary. However, this
scheme, designed to evade the consequences of the offenses he committed, should not be allowed to prosper.
Resignation should not be used as a device to circumvent administrative liability.

In view of the rules discussed above and with the intention of having a uniform imposition of penalties against
judiciary personnel, the Court holds that dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty that should be meted
against respondent. The accessory penalties attached to dismissal, especially that of perpetual disqualification from
government service, fittingly applies to respondent, in order to deny him the opportunity to commit any similar
misbehavior to the prejudice of public service.
In line with this pronouncement, the Court resolves to enjoin the heads of offices to withhold any action on
resignations pending the resolution of administrative complaints against their respective personnel. This includes the
period of investigation, i.e., judicial audits, among other similar administrative proceedings, prior to the filing of the
appropriate complaint. More importantly, the OCA and the JIB, as the case may be, are likewise enjoined to indicate
the fact of the involved personnel's resignation, if there be any, and its status in their reports. This action will facilitate
the standardization of the procedure in disciplining judiciary personnel and the imposition of appropriate penalties.

B. The penalty of fine

against complainant is

based on Rule 140.

Simple neglect of duty under Rule 140 is classified as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of not less
than P35,000.00 but not exceeding P100,000.00. Under the URACCS, it is categorized as a less grave offense,
punishable for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months on the first offense, and dismissal on the
second offense.[56]

In previous cases, the Court imposed fines on erring court employees when the penalty of dismissal can no longer be
imposed due to the latter's retirement or separation from the service.[57] In view of complainant's compulsory
retirement, a fine will be the appropriate penalty.
In fixing the amount of fine that shall be meted against complainant, the Court takes into consideration the recent
case of Quitlong v. Padlan[58] which involved a court employee who was found liable for simple neglect of duty. In
deciding which between Rule 140 and the URACCS will be applied, the Court held that the fine prescribed under
Rule 140 will not prejudice the complainant, thus:

The 1999 URACCS states that: "the penalty of fine shall be in an amount not exceeding six (6) months salary of
respondent and the computation thereof shall be based on the salary rate of the respondent when the decision
becomes final and executory." On the other hand, the amount of fine prescribed under Rule 140, as amended by
A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC for a less grave offense under Civil Service Rules such as simple neglect of duty should not be
less than P35,000.00 but not exceeding P100,000.00.

Notably, respondent occupies the position of Clerk of Court II with Salary Grade 18. For Salary Step 1 alone under
SG 18, the Basic Monthly Salary is already at P43,681.00. Verily, therefore, Rule 140 should apply to respondent as
it would be less prejudicial to him.[59]

Similarly, the Court will impose the fine against complainant based on Rule 140, as amended. Complainant had
occupied the position of Clerk of Court IV with a Salary Grade of 23. At the time of her retirement in 2016, the basic
salary for SG 23 Step 1 was at P51,826.00. Clearly, the fine that may be imposed against complainant based on Rule
140 will be lower than the equivalent monetary value of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension under the
URACCS. However, the Court may still exercise its sound discretion [60] and consider attendant circumstances in fixing
the amount of fine that complainant will be ordered to pay.

In previous cases, the Court imposed a P10,000.00 fine against court personnel found liable for simple neglect of
duty as an alternative penalty to suspension. [61] The Court also takes into consideration the fact that complainant had
immediately filed the present administrative complaint upon discovering respondent's infractions, and had willingly
complied with the Court's directives related to this matter. Thus, a fine of P10,000.00 against complainant, as
recommended by the OCA, will be appropriate and likewise commensurate to the clean record that she had in her 30
years of service.[62]
Indeed, the safeguarding of funds and collections, the submission to this Court of a monthly report of collections for
all funds, and the proper issuance of official receipts for collections are essential to an orderly administration of
justice. We emphasize that all court employees must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court's good
name and standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge
their duties with due care and utmost diligence since they are officers of the court and agents of the law. They must
bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work there.[63]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Rex J. Geroche, former Cash Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, GUILTY of Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. He is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification
from holding public office, and barred from taking civil service examinations. The monetary value of his earned leave
credits, withheld salaries, bonuses and allowances, if any, shall be applied to the total amount of his shortages paid
by Yvonne Q. Rivera, former Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
which is P340,340.00. Let a Hold Departure Order be ISSUED against respondent Geroche.

Yvonne Q. Rivera, former Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is
found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and is hereby FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be paid to the Court
within 30 days from notice. She is cleared from her financial accountabilities considering that all the shortages
incurred in the handling of the judiciary funds as far as the subject court is concerned have been fully restituted,
subject to the condition of the General Auditing Office General Circular No. 52, dated December 23, 1957, that "if
later on an official or employee who had been cleared is later discovered still accountable for cash and/or property,
the clearance thus previously issued shall not relieve him/her of said accountability." In the light of this
pronouncement, she is now ALLOWED to process her retirement papers.

The Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is hereby DIRECTED
to: REFUND complainant Rivera the amount of P263,650.00, representing the amount she paid for the
undocumented withdrawals if the same be later found to have been returned to their claimants/bondsmen; OPEN an
account for the Sheriffs Trust Fund collections of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental in consonance with OCA Circular No. 99-2014 dated July 31, 2014; and WITHDRAW the Sheriffs Trust
Fund collections deposited to the Fiduciary Fund LBP SA No. 1171-0001-53 and TRANSFER them to the account to
be opened for the Sheriffs Trust Fund.
The Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is AUTHORIZED to
withdraw the Sheriffs Trust Fund pursuant to OCA Circular No. 99-2014 dated July 31, 2014, and is further
DIRECTED to MONITOR all financial transactions of the court in strict adherence to the issuances of this Court on
the proper handling of all Judiciary funds.

The Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator, is DIRECTED to: COMPUTE the balance of
earned leave credits of respondent Geroche within thirty (30) days upon receipt of notice; and FORWARD the same
to the Finance Division, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, together with his Certificate
of Leave Credits, Computerized Service Record, Notice of Salary Adjustment, and Notice of Step Increment.

The Finance Division, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is DIRECTED to: COMPUTE
the monetary value of the earned leave credits and unpaid salaries and bonuses, if any, of respondent Geroche
within 30 days upon receipt of all the documents required from the Office of Administrative Services; APPLY the
proceeds to the cash accountabilities incurred by respondent Geroche in the Fiduciary Fund of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, amounting to P321,693.00; FORWARD the check to the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, for transmittal to the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. In the event that the said proceeds are insufficient to cover cash
accountabilities, respondent Geroche is ORDERED to RESTITUTE the remaining balance within 30 days upon
receipt of notice.

The Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to FILE the appropriate criminal and civil
actions against respondent Geroche.

SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M.
Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

Marquez, J., no part. Submitted OCA Report.

[1]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, 799 Phil. 607, 620 (2016); citations omitted.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 1-4.

[3]
Id. at 25-28.

[4]
Id. at 28.
[5]
Id. at 17-22.

[6]
Id. at 28-29.

[7]
Id. at 31-34.

Id. at 33; the undeposited collections are: P58,043.00 for the Fiduciary Fund; P6,600.00 for the Sheriffs Trust Fund;
[8]

P8,150.60 for the Judiciary Development Fund; and P3,897.00 for the General Fund (Old).

[9]
Reduction of Initial/Opening Deposit Balance and Maintaining of Regular Savings Account from P10,000.00 to
P1,000.00 for the Fiduciary and Sheriffs Trust Fund Accounts; Waiver of Certification Fee on Bank Balances; and
Waiver of Fee on Requests for Snapshots and Re-Printing of Bank Statements.

[10]
Id. at 122-124.
[11]
Id. at 136.

[12]
Id. at 140.

[13]
Id. at 140-141.

[14]
Id.

[15]
Id. at 141, citing Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., 560 Phil. 96, 105 2007).

[16]
Id. at 142-143.

[17]
Id. at 143.
[18]
See Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Dureza-Aldevera, 534 Phil. 102, 134 (2006); see Office of the Court
Administrator v. Espineda, 614 Phil. 359, 373 (2009); and Office of the Court Administrator v. Laya, 550 Phil. 432,
444 (2007).

[19]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Buyucan, 813 Phil. 519, 540 (2017).

[20]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, supra note 1, at 616-617 (2016).

[21]
Id. at 615.

[22]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Puno, 587 Phil. 549, 556 (2008).

[23]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, supra note 1, at 617.

[24]
Rollo, p. 141.
[25]
Id. at 27.

[26]
Id. at 12.

[27]
See Office of the Court Administrator v. Villanueva, 630 Phil. 248, 257 (2010).

[28]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, supra note 1, at 615-616.

[29]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Villanueva, supra note 27.

[30]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Dureza-Aldevera, supra note 18, at 132.

[31]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Villanueva, supra note 27.
[32]
Id.

See Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting and Angelita C. Esmerio, 502 Phil. 264, 277
[33]

(2005).

[34]
See Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Buencamino, 725 Phil. 110, 121 (2014) and Report on the Financial
Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Dy and Atty. Cuanico, Jr., RTC Catarman, Northern Samar, 655 Phil.
367, 380 (2011).

[35]
Jomadiao v. Pastor, G.R. No. 230322, February 19, 2020; Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted at the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-17-3746, August 28, 2019, 915 SCRA 241, 252; Office of the
Court Administrator v. Inmenzo, 832 Phil. 143, 150 (2018).

[36]
See Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, supra note 1, at 619.

[37]
A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC (October 2, 2018).
[38]
Section 1, Rule 140.

[39]
A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC (March 16, 2021).

[40]
A.M. No. P-14-3240 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3835-P), March 2, 2021.

[41]
A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3450-P, approved by the Court on May 11, 2021.

[42]
A.M. No. P-21-024 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 18-4815-P), June 16, 2021.

[43]
A.M. No. P-21-020 (Formerly A.M. No. 20-01-09-MeTC), June 21, 2021.

[44]
A.M. No. CA-20-36-P, August 3, 2021.
[45]
Sec. 25(A)(3), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC.

[46]
CSC Resolution No. 991936, September 14, 1999.

[47]
Secs. 52(A) and 57, CSC Resolution No. 991936, September 14, 1999.

[48]
Supra note 41.

[49]
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018, 883 SCRA 17.

[50]
Sec. 55, CSC Resolution No. 991936, September 14, 1999.

[51]
Rollo, p. 21.
[52]
See Judaya v. Balbona, 810 Phil. 375, 380 (2017), citing Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., supra note 15.

[53]
See the cases of Dizon v. Bawalan, 453 Phil. 125 (2003); Faelden v. Lagura, 561 Phil. 368 (2007); and Office of
the Court Administrator v. Bravo, 827 Phil. 673 (2018).

Faelden v. Lagura, supra, at 374-375, citing Re: (1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late Melliza, Former Clerk II,
[54]

MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo; and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Andres, 537 Phil. 634, 646 (2006).

[55]
Supra note 53.

[56]
Sec. 52(B)(1), CSC Resolution No. 991936, September 14, 1999.

[57]
See Office of the Court Administrator v. Salunoy, A.M. No. P-07-2354 [Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-140-MTC],
February 4, 2020; Re: Non-Submission of Monthly Financial Reports of Ms. Erlinda P. Patiag, Clerk of Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. 11-6-60-MTCC, June 18, 2019; and Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Chavez, 815 Phil. 41 48 (2017).

[58]
A.M. No. P-14-3185 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-P), June 16, 2021.
[59]
Id.

[60]
See Dela Rama v. De Leon, supra note 40; see also Re: Non-Submission of Monthly Financial Reports of Ms.
Erlinda P. Patiag, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, supra note 57.

[61]
See Olympia-Geronilla v. Montemayor, Jr., 810 Phil. 1, 11 (2017); Mendoza v. Esguerra, 703 Phil. 435, 440
(2013); and Zamudio v. Auro, 593 Phil. 575, 584 (2008).

[62]
Rollo, p. 143.

Re: Non-Submission of Monthly Financial Reports of Ms. Erlinda P. Patiag, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in
[63]

Cities, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, supra note 57.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10511. January 04, 2022 ]
MILAGROS MELAD-ONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PLACIDO M. SABBAN,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The administrative case stemmed from a complaint filed by Milagros Melad-Ong (complainant) against Atty. Placido
M. Sabban (respondent) for committing unlawful and illicit acts by taking interest in a property subject of a litigation,
acting as counsel for opposing parties, and executing falsities in the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the
complainant and her co-heirs in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Facts of the Case

The controversy began on November 22, 1984, when complainant's father, Jose Melad (Jose), filed a civil suit [1]
against Concepcion Tuyuan (Concepcion) for Reconveyance, Reivindication and Annulment of Instrument with
Damages for the illegal transfer of title of a 272,045-square meter property originally owned by Fe Tuyuan, which was
now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-52533. In the complaint, Jose alleged that he is the sole
legal heir of Fe Tuyuan for being the first cousin by blood of the former, while Concepcion was not related by blood to
the deceased.[2] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3413 before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, Branch 2 (RTC). Jose was represented by Atty. Simeon Agustin (Atty. Agustin), while Concepcion was
represented by Atty. Hilarion L. Aquino (Atty. Aquino).[3]

On May 31, 1985, respondent, on behalf of his clients Rita Maguigad-Baquiran, Teodorico Maguigad, Estelita
Maguigad Dalupang, Alberto Maguigad, Rogelio Maguigad, Edna Maguigad Managelot, and Totoy Maguigad
(collectively, Maguigads), filed a Complaint in Intervention [4] on Civil Case No. 3413. The Maguigads alleged that they
are the true and rightful sole heirs of Fe Tuyuan to the exclusion of Concepcion and Jose. They averred that the
property was the paraphernal property of Pelia Maguigad (Pelia), who was the mother of Fe Tuyuan. They claim that
Severino Maguigad, who was their father, Pelia's brother and the deceased's uncle, is entitled to the property by right
of succession, thereby making them the rightful heirs of Fe Tuyuan. Respondent was assisted by his father, Atty.
Benito Sabban (Atty. Benito), in handling the case.

On January 26, 1995, Jose passed away while the case was still pending. He was substituted by his surviving heirs
(Heirs of Jose) as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3413, which included herein complainant.

On May 1995, Concepcion executed a Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees [5] (Deed) in favor of Atty. Benito and
transferred to him 10 hectares (100,000 square meters [sq. m]) of the 27 hectares (270,000 sq. m.) land owned by
the deceased Fe Tuyuan. The land was received as compensation for the legal services rendered by Atty. Benito
during the lifetime of Fe Tuyuan. The deed was made without the knowledge of the court where the case was
pending nor the consent of the parties involved in the suit.

By virtue of the abovementioned deed, Atty. Benito, for himself and on behalf of his son, respondent, applied for
retention of the 10 hectares of the subject property before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Likewise,
Concepcion filed an application for retention of seven hectares against the subject property before the DAR, despite
the fact that there was an ongoing litigation on the said land and a 'lis pendens' attached to the title. As a
consequence of the application for retention, on November 3, 1995, the DAR granted seven hectares (70,000 sq. m.)
to Concepcion, five hectares (50,000 sq. m.) to Atty. Benito and 2.0507 hectares (20,507 sq. m.) to respondent, Atty.
Benito's son, despite the subject property still being under litigation. The subject land, being under the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27, [6] Concepcion, Atty. Benito, and respondent were ordered to maintain the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the tenants in the farm lots and authorized them to withdraw the amortization payments
made by the tenants which were considered as lease rentals.[7]

On the other hand, the civil suit continued for years until Atty. Agustin, the counsel for plaintiffs Heirs of Jose, initiated
a compromise deal among the parties. However, the deal did not materialize because Atty. Agustin died on
December 2007.

Thereafter, the parties resumed the compromise discussions and on February 2008, the respondent drafted a
Compromise Agreement[8] and filed it before the court with the following partition: 80,000 sq. m. located in the
southeast portion will be allotted to the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose, 80,000 sq. m. located in the middle south portion will
be allotted to the intervenors Maguigads, and the remaining 112,045 sq. m. will be for defendant Concepcion. The
Compromise Agreement was granted by RTC Branch 2 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan on April 1, 2008. [9] Under the
Compromise Agreement, a certain Atty. Luis Donato acted as the counsel for the plaintiffs (Heirs of Jose), while
respondent acted as the counsel for both the intervenors (Maguigads) and the defendant (Concepcion).

On the same date, Concepcion executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale, first, on the sale of 20,000 sq. m. of the subject
property in favor of respondent and second, on the sale of 50,000 sq. m. of the subject property in favor of
respondent, his mother and siblings. The sale consisted of the 7 hectares of the subject property retained by
Concepcion in 1995 as granted by the DAR. By virtue of the deeds of sale, TCT Nos. T-165677 (20,000 sq. m.), T-
165678 (45,687 sq. m.) and T-165679 (4,135 sq. m.) were issued in favor of respondent, his mother and siblings.

In 2009, the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose filed an application for retention of the portion awarded to them by virtue of the
Compromise Agreement before the DAR. However, their application was not immediately acted upon and they re-
submitted their application in 2011. Thereafter, the DAR informed the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose that the portion of the
property awarded to them has already been awarded to various tenants in 1995. When they got hold of the
documents pertaining to the inappropriate retentions to their property, they discovered the illegal retentions made by
Concepcion, Atty. Benito and respondent in 1995.

Complainant reached out to respondent to seek his help with respect to the tenants in their awarded portion of the
property since the respondent and his father were recognized by the tenants as the landowners. However,
respondent did not reply to her despite her numerous emails. Hence, complainant was again constrained to file a
case against the illegal tenants before the DAR in order to get back their share of the subject property.

In an Order[10] dated February 14, 2011, the DAR granted the application for retention filed by the plaintiffs Heirs of
Jose and ordered the retention area of not more than five hectares in the subject property. The DAR also authorized
the cancellation of the emancipation patents issued to the tenants who were awarded the lots in 1995, when
Concepcion transferred it to them via the Operation Land Transfer through Direct Payment Scheme program under
PD 27. DAR ruled that the tenants lost their right over the properties when the Compromise Agreement was judicially
approved and the farm lots were no longer covered by the provisions of PD 27.[11]

Sometime in 2012, respondent negotiated a sale and was able to sell about 130,000 sq. m. of the subject land in
favor of Camella Homes. Respondent sold about 74,000 sq. m. under his name while Concepcion sold 36,184 sq. m.
and two of the farmer-beneficiaries sold 10,000 sq. m. each of the land they acquired through the Operation Land
Transfer under PD 27.[12]

On March 19, 2013, the intervenors Maguigads filed a Motion for Execution [13] of the April 1, 2008 Order granting the
Compromise Agreement. They averred that up to that date, they have not received the portion of the lot allocated to
them. Likewise, they filed a Manifestation[14] informing the lower court that they have rescinded the legal services of
respondent in Civil Case No. 3413 and they are now represented by Evangelista and Maguigad Law Office.

On August 8, 2013, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution of the intervenors Maguigads. [15] On
August 31, 2013, respondent, on behalf of Concepcion, filed a Motion for Reconsideration [16] of the said Order and
prayed for the stay of execution, which was denied by the RTC. On August 27, 2014, a Writ of Execution [17] was
issued and a survey was made over the subject land. Under the Survey Verification Report, [18] it was found that the
area occupied and developed by Camella Homes encroached upon the area being claimed by the intervenors and
plaintiffs, approximately 44,619 sq. m. and 14,417 sq. m., respectively.

Despite obtaining a positive ruling from the DAR and the RTC, the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose and intervenors Maguigads
still failed to get the whole portion of their share in the subject property.

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

On July 17, 2014, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondent before the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) alleging that respondent committed unlawful conduct, together with his father, in acquiring a portion of the
subject property being litigated in Civil Case No. 3413, which case they were handling. In her complaint, she alleges
that respondent allowed his father, Atty. Benito, to apply for retention of a portion of the subject property and
eventually became a beneficiary of such retention, as awarded by the DAR. Likewise, they deceived the DAR by
making it believe that the subject property was free from any liens or encumbrances and hid the fact that the property
was under litigation. Further, respondent disregarded the conflict-of-interest rule when he acted as counsels for both
the intervenors Maguigads and defendant Concepcion in the Compromise Agreement and later on, he became the
counsel of Concepcion and filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Order dated August 8, 2013 of the RTC granting
the Motion for Execution filed by the intervenors, who were his initial clients. Respondent also failed to disclose to the
parties and to the RTC Branch 2 of Tuguegarao that he, Atty. Benito and Concepcion applied for retention of the
subject property before the DAR in 1995. Lastly, he enticed the parties to enter into a Compromise Agreement
despite knowing that the subject property has already been retained and allocated to several people making the
division of the property unfair and disadvantageous on the part of the Heirs of Jose and the Maguigads.[19]
In a Resolution dated February 23, 2015, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision. In an Order dated August 18, 2015, the IBP directed the
respondent to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the order.

On October 12, 2015, the respondent, thru his counsel, filed his Answer.[20] Respondent admits that he filed the
Complaint in Intervention on behalf of the Maguigads, however he claims that it was not him, but his father, who
handled the case until Atty. Benito's death in 2006. It was only then that he resumed his appearance in Civil Case No.
3413. In 2007, Atty. Agustin, counsel of the complainant and Heirs of Jose, approached respondent and requested
that he arrange a conference with Concepcion for early settlement of the case. However, Atty. Agustin died thus,
there was no settlement reached. Respondent avers that the Compromise Agreement was approved with the consent
of all parties and that the Heirs of Jose were assisted by their counsel, a certain Atty. Luis Donato, in signing and
approving the same. Lastly, he argues that the portion designated to the Heirs of Jose in the Compromise Agreement
is the same portion of the land awarded to them by the DAR in a Resolution dated July 14, 2011 when the Heirs of
Jose applied for retention. Respondent did not answer the other allegations in the Complaint.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing[21] dated October 15, 2015 was issued by the IBP setting the hearing on
December 3, 2015 to discuss the admissions, stipulation of facts and definition of issues and directing the parties to
submit their mandatory conference briefs 10 days prior to the hearing. Respondent filed his mandatory conference
brief on October 28, 2015.[22] Respondent reiterated the arguments raised in his Answer. On the other hand,
complainant filed her mandatory conference brief[23] on November 26, 2015. Aside from the averments raised in her
complaint, she alleges that respondent committed delay of justice, deceit, dishonesty, forgery, falsification of public
document and malicious intent for personal gain.

In an Order dated December 3, 2015, the IBP conducted the mandatory conference and directed the IBP-Cagayan
Chapter to assist in the conduct of deposition by oral interrogatories of the witnesses to be presented by the
respondent. He will be presenting Atty. Luis Donato and Concepcion Tuyuan as his witnesses, who are both living in
Cagayan.

On January 25, 2016, the IBP-Cagayan Chapter President Caesar Segundo R. Catral (Atty. Catral) facilitated the
conduct of deposition by written interrogatories of the respondent's witness, Atty. Luis Donato. The complainant's
representatives manifested that they will hire a counsel for the next hearing to conduct their cross-interrogatories. On
February 26, 2016, Atty. Jovencio Evangelista (Atty. Evangelista) appeared for the complainant. He conducted the
cross-examination of the deponent witness. On March 1, 2016, the respondent manifested that he will be dispensing
with the testimony of his witness Concepcion.

In an Order dated April 8, 2016, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner Robles) conducted a
clarificatory hearing and directed the parties to submit their verified position papers, the agreement being that the
complainant has to show that respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the
complainant under the Compromise Agreement and that the respondent has the burden to show that the property
subject of the Compromise Agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered
loss or prejudice in the implementation of the said Compromise Agreement.[24]

The parties submitted their respective position papers. Complainant reiterated the arguments she raised in her
complaint and conference brief. On the other hand, respondent limited his discussion on the issue agreed upon
during the April 8, 2016 clarificatory hearing. He argued in his position paper that the complainant did not suffer any
loss of the property awarded to them under the compromise agreement and it was the complainant's fault that they
failed to enjoy their share in the property.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

After hearing and investigation, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Report and
Recommendation[25] dated December 12, 2016 penned by Investigating Commissioner Robles recommending the
suspension of respondent, to wit:

UPON THE FOREGOING, it is recommended that Respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban be suspended from the legal
profession for one (1) year. There is no doubt at all that he breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Canons 3 and 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, showed ignorance of Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and
defied conflict-of-interest rules.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[26]

In a Resolution dated June 17, 2017, the IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law against the respondent. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[27]

Upon reconsideration, the IBP-BOG reversed its earlier Resolution and issued an Extended Resolution dated
October 4, 2018 granting the respondent's motion for reconsideration and dismissing the case against him, the
dispositive portion thereof reads:

Wherefore, it is resolved that the respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the Notice of
Resolution of the Board of Governors dated June 17, 2017, in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1214, with an attached
Report and Recommendation dated December 12, 2016, by Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles be set aside and the
case against respondent Atty. Placido Sabban be DISMISSED.[28]

The IBP-BOG ruled that according to the Order dated April 8, 2016 of Commissioner Robles, the basic issue agreed
upon was the complainant has to show that respondent is responsible for the alleged loss of a property that was
awarded to the Heirs of Jose by virtue of the Compromise Agreement. Upon review of the records, the IBP-BOG
found that the complainant failed to prove respondent's fault and participation in the loss of the property and thereby
dismissed the complaint against respondent.

Issue

The main issue in the complaint is whether respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations
in the Complaint.

Ruling of the Court

The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG and finds respondent administratively liable for violating Canons 1,
15 and 17, and Rules 1.01, 10.01 and 15.03 of the CPR and Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the complaint, the Court must discuss the procedural issue
raised by the complainant. The IBP-BOG limited its resolution on the issue of whether the complainant was able to
prove that respondent is responsible for the loss of the property awarded to them in the Compromise Agreement. The
IBP-BOG finds basis in the Order dated April 8, 2016 of Investigating Commissioner Robles, which the Court quotes:

After lengthy discussions, it was decided that the parties themselves will submit within a period of thirty (30) days
from today their respective verified position papers, etc. The agreement being that: on the part of the complainant she
has to show that the respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the complainant
under a compromise agreement. On the part of the respondent, it is his burden to show that the property subject of
the compromise agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered loss or
prejudice in the implementation of the said compromise agreement.[29]

However, this Court rules that the IBP-BOG erred in disregarding the other substantive issues raised in the complaint
and pleadings submitted by the complainant.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. The procedural requirements observed in ordinary civil proceedings do not
strictly apply in disbarment cases.[30] Disciplinary proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. In Re Almacen,[31] the Court held:

Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. x x x Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.[32] (Citations omitted)

Thus, unlike in civil proceedings, issues in disbarment cases are not limited by the issues agreed or stipulated by the
parties or ordered by the trial court. Further, a disbarment case is not instituted for the restitution of the complainant
but rather for the determination of the fitness of the lawyer to remain as an officer of the Court. Hence, limiting the
issue to respondent's participation in the loss of the property of the complainant is not proper in a disciplinary
proceeding.

It is worthy to note that complainant has raised repeatedly in her complaint, mandatory conference brief, and position
paper the unlawful and reprehensible acts committed by respondent in violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the
ethical conduct mandated by the legal profession. Hence, the Court shall discuss each of the acts complained of by
the complainant in her pleadings against respondent.

Violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and

Canon 17 in relation to Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the CPR

Complainant raised the several instances that respondent committed violations of the conflict-of-interest rule, to wit:

1. Respondent acted as the counsel of the intervenors Maguigads and of Concepcion (Defendant) in the
Compromise Agreement;
2. Respondent was initially the counsel of the Maguigads and filed the complaint in intervention against
Concepcion but later on, he acted as counsel of Concepcion and filed a motion for reconsideration to
order granting the motion for execution filed by the Maguigads;
3. Respondent notarized the motion for intervention filed by his father, Atty. Benito, in Civil Case No. 3413
on August 22, 1997.

Complainant's allegations are well-taken. Respondent's acts of representing opposing clients violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 and Canon 17 in relation to Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which provide:

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law of and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As culled from the records, respondent was the counsel of the Maguigads when they filed the complaint in
intervention in Civil Case No. 3413. There was no record that respondent withdrew as counsel or terminated his
services with the Maguigads. It was only on March 19, 2013 that the Maguigads manifested before the RTC that they
were terminating the services of respondent. It was admitted by respondent in his answer that he filed the complaint
in Intervention of the Maguigads but he argues that it was not him who was handling the case, but his father, Atty.
Benito. Respondent's defense fails to convince this Court.

A lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause upon acceptance of the case. A relationship imbued with trust and
confidence, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs, especially in representing them in a case before the court. Until
there is termination of services by the client or a withdrawal approved by the court, the lawyer remains counsel of
record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. The attorney-
client relationship does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. Case law provides:

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time
with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client's written consent or from a good cause.[33]

In this case, there was no termination of services made by the Maguigads until they filed their Manifestation dated
March 19, 2013 informing the RTC that they were severing the services of respondent. Thus, respondent remained to
be their counsel of record until his services were severed by the client. Likewise, there is nothing in the records that
shows that respondent applied to withdraw as counsel of the Maguigads.

While remaining to be the counsel of the Maguigads, respondent also acted as counsel of Concepcion in the
Compromise Agreement filed before the RTC, thereby acting as representatives of opposing parties. Respondent did
not provide any explanation as to why he was acting as counsel for both the Maguigads and Concepcion. Neither did
he present a written consent of the parties involved authorizing him to act as counsel for both of them, as required by
the law.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon 17 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR for his lack of commitment to the cause
of his client, the Maguigads, and for betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by representing as well the
opposing party, Concepcion, without the consent of the former.

Further, complainant was able to prove that respondent acted as counsel for Concepcion when he filed the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated August 8, 2013 of the RTC granting the Maguigads' motion for execution of the
Compromise Agreement. This is a definite violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to situations where opposing parties are
represented by the same lawyer in the same, or an unrelated action. It also applies even if a lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired
from one client to the other's disadvantage. The determining factor is whether acceptance of the new relation will
prevent a lawyer from fulfilling his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client, or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[34]

In the case of Aniñon v. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.,[35] the Court identified three tests developed by jurisprudence to
determine the existence of conflict of interest. First, whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue, or claim on
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Second, whether acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client, or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Third, whether the lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.[36]

Based from these tests, there exists a conflict of interest in the representations made by respondent. As the counsel
on record of the Maguigads, respondent is duty-bound to advocate for his client's rights and interests in the subject
property, and at the same time, oppose that claim for Concepcion when he became the latter's counsel, thereby
establishing representation of conflicting interests. Further, respondent's act of representing Concepcion after his
services were terminated by the Maguigads likewise violate the conflict-of-interest rules. Respondent has confidential
information acquired through his previous employment with the Maguigads with respect to the contested property
which he may use in favor of his new client, Concepcion. He cannot simply represent a client especially when that
person was the opposing party in the case he previously handled.

The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of
the professional employment.[37] Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. [38] Nor should
the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.[39]
However, on the issue of notarizing the Motion for Intervention filed by his father, the Court cannot fault respondent
for the same. At the time of notarization in 1998, the prevailing law governing notarization was the Notarial Law. [40]
Under the said law, there is no disqualification among notaries public in notarizing documents executed by their
immediate family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Such disqualification was only
adopted in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice [41] which was promulgated by this Court on July 6, 2004. Hence,
respondent was permitted by law to notarize the document at that time.

Violation of Article 1491 of the Civil

Code
Further, complainant avers that respondent acquired a portion of the subject land in violation of Article 1491 of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:

xxxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." (Emphasis supplied)

For lawyers, the prohibition applies to all properties of their clients which were subject of a litigation that they took part
in. The prohibition, which rests on considerations of public policy and interests, is intended to curtail any undue
influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him.[42]

In this case, respondent acquired by purchase from Concepcion a portion of the contested property as evidenced by
the Deeds of Absolute Sale[43] executed on April 1, 2008, the same day that the Compromise Agreement was
judicially approved. It can be gleaned from this that respondent has had interest over the property even while the
case was pending and immediately grabbed the opportunity to buy it upon approval of the Compromise Agreement
so as to avoid the prohibition under Article 1491. The fact that the property was bought at the same date as the
approval of the Compromise Agreement shows the propensity of respondent to circumvent the mandate of the law
which is that respondent, as a lawyer, is prohibited from acquiring, either by purchase or assignment, the property
and rights of his client that were involved in a litigation in which he took part in.

Further, respondent violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code when he and his father, Atty. Benito, illegally retained
about 7 hectares of the land subject of the litigation while the case was still pending. It is evidenced by the Order [44] of
the DAR dated November 3, 1995, granting Atty. Benito's application for retention of the land for himself and for
respondent. Likewise, it is bolstered by the Motion for Intervention with Consolidated Petition for Intervention and for
Partial Lifting of Lis Pendens [45] filed by Atty. Benito and notarized by respondent in Civil Case No. 3413 before RTC
Branch 2 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In the said Motion, Atty. Benito sought to exclude the 10 hectares of the subject
property ceded and transferred to him by Concepcion by virtue of the Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees. [46]
These pieces of evidence prove that respondent has known and consented to the acts of his father taking interest in
the property in Civil Case No. 3413. Respondent was even granted the retention of two hectares of the subject land in
contravention of the prohibition under Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Public policy prohibits these transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved between the lawyer and his
client. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the
sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice and is a
ground for suspension.[47]

All these acts were done with the knowledge and consent of respondent, despite the clear prohibitions embodied in
the law. Such reprehensible conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Violation of Rule 10.01 of the CPR

Likewise, we rule that respondent violated Rule 10.01 of the CPR which provides:

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent knew that his father, Atty. Benito, applied for illegal retention over the subject land before the DAR. As a
matter of fact, Atty. Benito applied not just for himself but also on behalf of his son, respondent. Thus, respondent
cannot claim that he has no knowledge of the illegal retentions made by his father and Concepcion on the contested
property. As counsel of the intervenors Maguigads and as an officer of the Court, respondent had the duty to disclose
the fact of illegal retention to his clients and the RTC Branch 2 where the subject property was being litigated upon.

Further, respondent, in drafting the Compromise Agreement which was later on approved by the RTC, failed to inform
the parties that they had existing rights over the subject land. Respondent concealed to his clients, the Maguigads,
and to the Heirs of Jose that Atty. Benito and Concepcion had been granted retention over a portion of the contested
land and that they have transferred some of these lots to the current tenants via the Operation Land Transfer under
PD 27. The Compromise Agreement was drafted by respondent and approved by the parties thinking that the subject
land was free from any liens, encumbrances or issues. All these facts affect the partition of the property under the
Compromise Agreement, which complainant would not have accepted had she known of the illegal retentions made
by Atty. Benito, Concepcion and respondent. Thus, respondent's failure to disclose the illegal retentions misled the
Maguigads and the Heirs of Jose into approving the Compromise Agreement, which resulted to the latter's damage
and prejudice.

Imposable Penalty

Parenthetically, it is this Court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. [48] Under the current
rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. [49] The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. [50] Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.[51] The final decision lies with the Supreme Court as
the constitutional institution empowered to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, including
the discipline and disbarment of erring lawyers.

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating the
lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is
a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.[52]

Considering the gravity and multiplicity of the misconducts committed by respondent and in view of the settled
penalties in jurisprudence on the matter, the Court deems it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a
period of two years.

In the cases of Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting,[53] Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,[54] and Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte,[55] the Court
imposed the penalty of six months suspension to the erring lawyers who all violated the prohibition under Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code for acquiring a property subject of a litigation in a case that they handled or were handling.

Meanwhile, in similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Court has
imposed the penalty of suspension ranging from one to three years. In Samson v. Atty. Era,[56] the erring lawyer
violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR by representing the opposing party of his previous client
and the Court suspended him for two years. Similarly in the case of Paces Industrial Corp. v. Atty. Salandanan,[57] the
respondent therein handled cases of Paces Industrial against E.E. Black Ltd. but later on, he was engaged as the
counsel of the latter in cases against Paces Industrial. The Court suspended him for three years and found that he
has acquired knowledge from his previous employment that could be utilized for his own personal interest or for the
advantage of the new client to the detriment of Paces Industrial.[58]

Lastly, in cases where the lawyers committed falsehood in violation of Rule 10.01 of the CPR, the Court has imposed
a penalty of six months to two years suspension depending on the circumstances of each case.
In Heirs of Torrices v. Atty. Galano,[59] the lawyer notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale despite the fact that two of the
parties in the sale were dead at the time of notarization. The Court found that Atty. Galano notarized the document
even without the presence of the executing parties in violation of the CPR and 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Atty.
Galano was suspended from the practice of law for two years due to his misconduct. In Petelo v. Atty. Rivera[60], the
lawyer who committed falsehood and misled the Court by authorizing or delegating to his secretary the signing of the
pleadings filed before the courts was imposed the penalty of suspension for one year.

In view of these Court pronouncements and in consideration of the nature of the acts committed by respondent, the
penalty of two years suspension is warranted. Lawyers as officers of the Court must always conduct themselves in a
proper, honest and decent manner. They must always possess good moral character worthy of the public confidence.
They must endeavor to conduct themselves at all times in such a way as to give credit to the legal profession and to
inspire the confidence, respect and trust of their clients and the community. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's
responsibility in our society that he stands "as a shield" in the defense of rights and to ward off wrong. From the
profession charged with these responsibilities there must be expected those qualities of truth speaking, of a high
sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have throughout the
centuries been compendiously described as "moral character."[61]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Rule 10.01, Rule 15.03, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective from the date of his
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that his commission of similar offenses will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the personal record of
respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban. Copies shall likewise be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the
Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez,
Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Hernando, J., no part.

Rosario, J., Please see separate opinion.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 56-61.
[2]
Id. at 58.

[3]
Id. at 63.

[4]
Rollo, pp. 65-69.

[5]
Id. at 74.

Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, transferring to them the Ownership of the
[6]

Land they till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.

[7]
Rollo, pp. 71-73, 80-82.

[8]
Id. at 86-90.
[9]
Id. at 93-96.

[10]
Id. at 269-275.

[11]
Id. at 140-142.

[12]
Id. at 8-9.

[13]
Id. at 99-101.

[14]
Id. at 97-98.

[15]
Id. at 148.

[16]
Id. at 148-152.

[17]
Id. at 300-301.

[18]
Id. at 302-303.

[19]
Id. at 4-10.

[20]
Id. at 168-172.

[21]
Id. at 181.

[22]
Id. at 177-180.

[23]
Id. at 183-187.

[24]
Id. at 246.

[25]
Id. at 896-900.

[26]
Id. at 899-900.

[27]
Id. at 883.

[28]
Id. at 893.

[29]
Id. at 246.

[30]
Mejares v. Atty. Romana, 469 Phil. 619, 632 (2004).

[31]
142 Phil. 353 (1970).

[32]
Id.

[33]
Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 797-798 (1997).

[34]
Pilar v. Atty. Ballicud, A.C. No. 12792, November 16, 2020.
[35]
685 Phil. 322 (2012).

[36]
Id. at 327.

[37]
Samson v. Atty. Era, 714 Phil. 101, 112 (2013).

[38]
Id.

[39]
Id.

[40]
Sections 231-259, Chapter 11, Revised Administrative Code.

[41]
A.M. No. 02-08-13-SC.

[42]
Zalamea v. De Guzman, Jr., 798 Phil. 1, 7 (2016).

[43]
Rollo, pp. 124-127.

[44]
Id. at 80-82.

[45]
Id. at 117-121.

[46]
Id. at 74.

[47]
Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248, 280 (1940).

[48]
Ramirez v. Atty. Buhayang-Margallo, 752 Phil. 473, 484 (2015).

[49]
Id.

[50]
Id.

[51]
Id.

[52]
Constantino v. Aransazo, Jr., A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021.

[53]
273 Phil. 534 (1991).

[54]
261 Phil. 266 (1990).

[55]
283 Phil. 1064 (1992).

[56]
714 Phil. 101, 112 (2013).

[57]
814 Phil. 93 (2017).

[58]
Id. at 98-102.

[59]
A.C. No. 11870, July 7, 2020.

[60]
A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019.
[61]
Collantes v. Renomeron, 277 Phil. 668, 674 (1991).

SEPARATE OPINION

ROSARIO, J.:

I have no qualms about the ponencia's finding that respondent is guilty of misconduct. There is substantial evidence
to support this conclusion. I also have no problems concurring in the penalty imposed. Taken together, the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years is commensurate.

However, I would like to note some procedural gaps in the investigation and resolution of this case. For future
reference, these issues must be addressed to ensure that due process is diligently observed. Otherwise, we risk
being a party to a gross violation of this very right we are sworn to protect.

THE ANTECEDENTS

In a complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on July 17, 2014, Milagros Melad-Ong (complainant)
accused Atty. Placido M. Sabban (Atty. Sabban or respondent) of illegally acquiring a portion of a property subject of
litigation, of representing conflicting interests, and of deception.

Complainant alleged that she is the daughter of Jose Melad (Jose), who filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan a civil suit against Concepcion Tuyuan (Concepcion) for the reconveyance of a parcel of land
left behind by Fe Tuyuan. Jose claimed to be the sole heir of Fe Tuyuan and thus, he is entitled to the whole property.

Atty. Sabban, together with his father, Atty. Benito Sabban (Atty. Benito), filed a complaint-in-intervention on behalf of
their clients, the Maguigads, who also claimed to be the true heirs of Fe Tuyuan.

On January 26, 1995, Jose passed away and was substituted by his heirs, which include herein complainant.

In May 1995, Concepcion executed a "Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees," which ceded ten hectares out of the
27 hectares of land originally owned by Fe Tuyuan. The land was supposedly Atty. Benito Sabban's compensation for
the legal services he rendered for Fe Tuyuan when she was still alive.

Subsequently, Atty. Benito, for himself and on behalf of his son, herein respondent, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) an application for retention of the ten-hectare portion. Complainant alleged that this was
furtively done without the knowledge of the court and the other parties to the civil case.

Sometime in 2006, Atty. Benito died. Respondent resumed appearance in the civil case. Around February 2008,
respondent convinced the parties to settle the case. He then drafted a compromise agreement, which the RTC
approved on April 1, 2008.

However, complainant lamented that due to the actuations of respondent, they never received the portion assigned to
them under the compromise agreement. Further, she claimed that they would not have agreed to settle the case had
respondent fully disclosed to them the retention he and his father made in 1995.

Complainant additionally accused respondent of representing conflicting interests, which he committed by lawyering
for Concepcion and the Maguigads, his original clients. In particular, when the Maguigads obtained a writ of execution
of the judicially approved compromise agreement, respondent moved for reconsideration thereof on behalf of
Concepcion.
Accordingly, complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

On October 12, 2015, respondent filed his answer[2] by counsel. While he admitted to filing the complaint-in-
intervention of the Maguigads, respondent alleged that it was Atty. Benito who handled the case until the latter's
death in 2006. Respondent also averred that the parties freely consented to the compromise agreement. Finally, he
contended that the portion assigned to the heirs of Jose is the same portion awarded to them by the DAR when they
applied for retention.

The Investigating Commissioner conducted a clarificatory hearing on April 8, 2016. The parties agreed to discuss
only one issue in their position papers: whether respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of the property awarded
to the heirs of Jose under the compromise agreement.[3]

The parties filed their position papers. Complainant reiterated her arguments whereas respondent complied with the
directive to discuss the sole issue agreed upon.

In a Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 12, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. Quite notably, the
Investigating Commissioner based his findings on the other charges leveled by complainant, contrary to his Order
dated April 8, 2016.

In a Resolution[5] dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, [6] arguing that the Investigating Commissioner went beyond
the matters agreed upon, thereby violating his right to due process.

The IBP-BOG agreed with respondent and proceeded to determine his liability vis-à-vis the stipulated issue. Finding
that complainant and her co-heirs received their due share under the compromise agreement, the IBP-BOG ordered
the dismissal of the complaint.[7]

Atty. Sabban, as the respondent in the present disbarment proceedings, is entitled to due process. [8] No less than the
Constitution vouchsafes this right.[9] Thus, no deprivation of life, liberty, and property can take place without due
process of law.[10]

Since lawyers earn a living through the practice of their profession, their license is deemed a property right which may
not be arbitrarily taken away without due process of law. In PSP Development Corp. v. Arma,[11] we said:

Keeping in mind the above-discussed requirement of due process as well as the fact that the power to disbar
(including the power to suspend) must be exercised with great caution, we hold that there is no sufficient basis for a
disciplinary action against respondent. The Court cannot simply deprive respondent of the right to practice his legal
profession without any sufficient factual and legal justifications. After all, such legal practice involves respondent's
rights to work and to make a living, which are his property rights, and "the arbitrary and unwarranted
deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong." (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, before a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law, the rudimentary
requirements of due process must be observed. As Rule 138, Section 30 of the Rules of Court affirms:

SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
As an administrative proceeding, due process requirements in disciplinary cases are less stringent. Indeed, the right
to due process is satisfied when there is notice, and a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend oneself. In addition,
technical rules of procedure are not strictly observed. In Besaga v. Acosta,[12] we elaborated on the concept of
administrative due process as follows:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The
essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in
the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.

Nevertheless, the non-observance of technicalities in administrative cases does not give us the carte blanche to
disregard fundamental considerations of fairness.[13] We are still "bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process."[14]

II

In the proceedings before the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP, the parties agreed that the issues will
be limited to whether complainant lost properties due to the actuations of respondent. In his Order [15] dated April 8,
2016, the Investigating Commissioner directed the parties to submit their respective position papers on this very
issue, to wit:

At today's session, the counsel for the complainant and her representative appeared. The respondent himself and his
counsel also appeared.

After lengthy discussions, it was decided that the parties themselves will submit within a period of thirty (30) days
from today their respective verified position papers, etc. The agreement being that: on the part of the complainant she
has to show that the respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the complainant
under a compromise agreement. On the part of the respondent, it is his burden to show that the property subject of
the compromise agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered loss of
prejudice inn the implementation of the said compromise agreement.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

I agree with the ponencia that the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP-BOG erred in limiting the issues to be
dealt with during the investigation. As the ponencia cogently discussed, disbarment proceedings are sui generis.
Unlike in criminal or civil suits, no rights are prosecuted in disciplinary cases. Rather, they inquire into the fitness of a
lawyer to remain a member of the bar. They are conducted to protect public interest and not to vindicate private
rights. As we explained in Bernal, Jr. v. Prias:[16]

The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court
and as participant in the dispensation of justice. It is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. A
case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts.

The IBP's error, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It has consequences that reverberate throughout the entire
proceedings. If left to fester, their odious effects will certainly taint the resolution of this case with due process
defects.
One such consequence is the way respondent was constrained to address one and only one issue—whether his
conduct resulted in complainant's loss of property. A review of his submissions shows that respondent complied with
this directive.

As the ponencia observed, respondent was silent regarding the other charges raised by complainant. I find
respondent's silence understandable. He merely followed the order of the Investigating Commissioner to limit his
discussion to the stipulated issue. After all, it is his duty to abide by the lawful orders of the IBP, with which non-
compliance is considered a contemptuous act and a misconduct.[17]

Evidently, the opportunity to be heard granted respondent was illusory. Although he was able to file his position
paper, he was prevented from arguing the other issues and presenting evidence that may exculpate him or, at the
very least, mitigate his liability.

To reiterate, due process is not satisfied by the mere perfunctory existence of the opportunity to be heard. Such
opportunity must be fair and reasonable to enable the respondent to mount an intelligent defense. Of course, what is
fair and reasonable depends on the circumstances of each case.

For instance, in Jardeleza v. Sereno,[18] we ruled that physical presence in a meeting without a reasonable chance to
defend oneself does not satisfy due process requirements:

What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before
the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the
opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he
given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting
where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the
allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting.
While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea
that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due
process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a
reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion
becomes an idle and futile exercise. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Fontanilla v. Commission on Audit,[19] we carved an exception from the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration precludes a violation of the right to due process. In particular, we insisted that the root cause of the
due process defect must actually be remedied:

While we have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due
process because the process of reconsideration is itself an opportunity to be heard, this ruling does not embody an
absolute rule that applies in all circumstances. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the
due process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to
due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits remained.

In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the
accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper
pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or she stands charged, then a due process
problem exists. This problem worsens and the denial of his most basic right continues if, in the first place, he is
found liable without having been charged and this finding is confirmed in the appeal or reconsideration process
without allowing him to rebut or explain his side on the finding against him.

Time and again, we have ruled that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In administrative
proceedings, one is heard when he is accorded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his case or is given the
chance to have the ruling complained of reconsidered. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Gradiola v. Deles,[20] we remanded the case to the CBD for further investigation, report, and recommendation upon
a finding that the respondent lawyer suffered a stroke, which may have impaired his cognitive abilities. That an
answer was filed and the respondent lawyer was ably represented by counsel who was retained by his son did not
deter us from ruling that there is a due process defect that must first be addressed.
In Baldomar v. Paras,[21] a disbarment complaint was filed before us against a lawyer, who denied the charges in his
answer. After the complainant filed his reply, we referred the case to the IBP for further investigation. The
investigating commissioner, however, failed to conduct hearings on the case. The report and recommendation
endorsed to us was based on the same documents that we sent to the IBP. Despite the fact that the parties were able
to file pleadings, we still ruled that they were denied the opportunity to be heard. As such, we remanded the case to
the IBP for further proceedings.

In sum, due process is satisfied when there is an "opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or
rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings."[22]

In this case, it is true that respondent was informed that there were other allegations against him. It is equally true
that he was able to file an answer to the complaint. However, for his position paper, the "proper pleading" so to
speak, where he could have fully responded to the accusations against him, he was directed to confine his discussion
and evidence to the issue agreed upon. At the very least, this case should have been remanded to the IBP to give
respondent a full and reasonable opportunity to refute the charges against him.

With that said, this case should also not be dismissed as recommended by the IBP-BOG. I agree with the majority
that respondent's misconduct was substantially proven. The records do show that respondent admitted to
representing conflicting interests, violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, and failed to disclose his interest in the
property subject of the litigation.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result insofar as Atty. Placido M. Sabban is found guilty of misconduct and in the
penalty imposed.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 240337. January 04, 2022 ]
FRANCIS O. MORALES PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
CARANDANG, J.:

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration[1] of this Court's Resolution[2] dated September 21, 2020, which affirmed the
Decision[3] dated March 15, 2018 and the Resolution [4] dated June 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 39341. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, Branch 56 in
Criminal Case No. R-ANG-15-02275-CR (MTCC Case No. 13-8513), which affirmed the judgment of conviction
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch III for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Damage to Property and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor;
2) The award of lost income for one (1) month at P400 per day, or the sum of P12,000.00, to spouses Rico
and Leilani Mendoza is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages
in the amount of P8,000.00;

3) The award of lost income for one (1) week at P400 per day, or sum of P2,800.00 to Myrna Cunanan is
DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of
P2,000.00; and
4) The award of P350,000.00 to Noel G. Garcia representing the cost of the repairs of the jeepney is
DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his authorize[d]
representative temperate damages in the amount of P150,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Facts of the Case

On June 5, 2013, an information was filed against Francis O. Morales (petitioner) for the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property and Multiple Physical Injuries. The accusatory portion of the information
reads:

That on or about 14th day of May, 2013, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of a Mitsubishi Delica Van with Plate No. XKZ-528
owned and driven by Francis O. Morales, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the
said vehicle along Sto. Rosario St. corner San Jose St., Brgy. San Jose, Angeles City, in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner and in utter disregard of traffic laws, rules, and regulations and without taking the necessary
precaution and care to avoid accident, thereby causing such recklessness and imprudence to hit and bump a Isuzu
Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 owned by a certain Noel F. Garcia a resident of 333 Dela Paz Norte, CSFP and
driven by Rico M. Mendoza as a result thereof, the driver of said Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 sustained
serious physical injuries and the three (3) other passengers namely: Lailani Mendoza, Myrna Cunanan and Albert
Vital sustained slight physical injuries, likewise said Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 incurred damages in the
estimated amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00), Philippine Currency to the
prejudice of said complainant.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[6] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three
witnesses, namely Rico Mendoza (Rico), Leilani Mendoza[7] (Leilani), and Myrna Cunanan (Myrna). The defense
presented petitioner as its sole witness.[8]

The witnesses for the prosecution alleged that on May 15, 2013 at around 3:00 a.m., Rico, Leilani, and Myrna,
together with Albert Vital (Albert; collectively, private complainants), were on board a passenger jeepney with Plate
No. CWR-138. Rico was driving the jeepney. They came from Maimpis and were traversing the road of Sto. Rosario
Street, Angeles City on their way to Angeles City Market. They were on the right lane. Meanwhile, the Delica van
driven by petitioner with Plate No. XKZ-528 was on the opposite lane going to San Fernando. Petitioner suddenly
overtook the vehicle in front of him, causing him to occupy the lane of the jeepney. Rico tried to avoid the collision to
no avail as petitioner was driving in a fast speed. Petitioner bumped the jeepney resulting in physical injuries to the
passengers and driver as well as extensive damage to the jeepney amounting to P350,000.00. Rico suffered a deep
laceration in the forehead and a cervical strain. He underwent suturing and hospitalization in the amount of
P14,345.00. Leilani sustained skin and soft tissue avaltion, posterior lateral aspect right forearm and sprain ankle,
costing her hospitalization expenses in the amount of P34,763.50. Myra suffered multiple physical injury and incurred
damages in the amount of P3,045.00. Albert incurred hospitalization expenses in the amount of P2,895.80.[9]

Petitioner countered that after a night of merry making, he and his friends decided to go to a gotohan in Angeles City
at the midnight of May 15, 2013. He rode his Delica van with his 13-year-old son. They stayed at the gotohan until
3:00 a.m. On their way home, they passed Sto. Rosario Street bound for San Fernando City. They occupied the inner
lane of the road going to San Fernando. The right side of the jeepney driven by Rico suddenly hit the Delica van.
Petitioner and his son were injured and brought to the Sacred Heart Medical Center. The Delica van also sustained
extensive damages.[10]

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

In its Decision[11] dated June 30, 2015, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Angeles City convicted petitioner
of the crime charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court finds accused Francisco Morales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to property and he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one month and twenty one days to two months.
Likewise, Francisco Morales is ordered to pay the following indemnifications:

1. To Spouses Rico Mendoza and Leilani Mendoza:

a) Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P49,108.50;

b) Lost Income for one (1) month for P400 per day at a sum of P12,000.00;

c) Moral damages of P10,000.00 each spouse.

2. To Myra Cunanan:

a) Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P3,045.00;

b) Lost income for one (1) week for P400 per day at a sum of P2,800.00;

c) Moral damages of P10,000.00.

3. Albert Vital:

a) Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P2,895.00.

4. To Noel G. Garcia the registered owner of the passenger jeep with plate number CWR-138 or any of his
authorized representative, the amount of three hundred fifty thousand pesos (P350,000.00) representing the
cost of the repair of the damage of the passenger jeep.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The MTCC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the recklessness and negligence of petitioner in
driving his Delica van. Petitioner, in violation of Section 37 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, as amended, hastily
overtook the vehicle in front of him without first determining whether the road was clear. He was also driving his van
at a fast speed, as evidenced by the extent of damage incurred by both vehicles in violation of the speed restriction
stated in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.[13]

The MTCC ruled that it is undisputed that the jeepney driven by Rico was traversing along its rightful lane when the
van coming from the opposite direction suddenly overtook another vehicle and encroached on the passenger jeep.
The accident would not have happened had the accused stayed on his lane and not recklessly try to overtake another
vehicle, especially not at 3:00 a.m. while the road is dark and not well lighted.[14]

The MTCC held petitioner liable for: (1) the lost income of spouses Rico and Leilani as well as Myrna who, as
vendors, were earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day; (2) the medical and hospital expenses of Rico, Lailani, Myrna,
and Albert; and (3) moral damages to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna.[15]

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the MTCC denied in its Order[16] dated August 25, 2015. Petitioner appealed to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[17] dated December 1, 2016, the RTC affirmed the ruling of the MTCC. It agreed with the MTCC that
petitioner's negligence in overtaking the vehicle in front of his without taking the necessary precaution is the
proximate cause of the injury and damage suffered by the private complainants. It noted that the sketch of the
incident showed that the point of impact was at the inner lane occupied by the jeepney. This proves that petitioner
encroached into the rightful lane of the jeep. Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles
immediately after the accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicle's movement prior
to, and at the time of the accident. The RTC also sustained the MTCC's finding that petitioner was speeding at the
time of the accident, which very act is indicative of imprudent behavior.[18]

Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[19] dated March 15, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed and the
damages granted.

Preliminarily, the CA upheld the conviction of petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
physical injuries and damage to property. It agreed with the RTC and the MTCC that it was petitioner's act of
overtaking the vehicle in front of his, without taking the necessary care and precaution to ensure that he can safely do
so, that was the proximate cause of the injury suffered by Rico and his passengers. Petitioner was at fault because
he was driving at the wrong side of the road when the collision happened. As shown in the Traffic Accident Report
(TAR) and the testimonies of the witnesses, before the collision, the jeepney driven by Rico was cruising along its
rightful lane when the Delica van driven by petitioner, suddenly swerved and encroached its lane. The accident would
not have happened had petitioner driven his vehicle on its lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle.
Significantly, petitioner did not deny the fact that he overtook another vehicle.[20]

The CA noted that petitioner is presumed to be negligent at the time of the mishap pursuant to Article 2185 of the
New Civil Code, since he was violating a traffic regulation, that is, he was driving on the wrong side of the road at the
time of the accident. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption.[21]

The CA also rejected petitioner's argument that Rico was at fault because the latter testified that he saw the
approaching van but failed to evade the same. It held that R.A. No. 4136, as amended, provides that the one who is
overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction know his/her presence and not the
other way around as petitioner seems to suggest. Likewise, the CA ruled that the last clear chance doctrine does not
apply in the case because it presupposes that both parties are negligent. Here, it was established that petitioner's
negligence caused the damage and the injury.[22]

With respect to the penalty imposed, the CA explained that the penalty prescribed for reckless imprudence is
dependent on whether the act, if committed with intent, would have resulted in a grave felony, less grave felony, or
light felony. The CA found that the evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by Rico,
Leilani, and Myrna amount only to slight physical injuries, which is a less grave felony. Per the Certificates of
Confinement, Leilani was confined for three to five days only, Rico for two to three days, and none was mentioned for
Myrna. No other proof was shown that they were incapacitated for labor or that they required medical attendance for
a longer period. Pursuant to Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty for reckless imprudence for an act,
which if it had been intentional would have been a less grave felony, is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Since the maximum term of imprisonment in this
case, four (4) months, does not exceed one (1) year, the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no
application. The CA ruled that a straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods should
be imposed. It meted the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.[23]

As to the damages awarded, the CA sustained the grant of moral damages and actual damages representing
hospitalization expenses. However, on the award for lost income, Rico, Leilani, and Myrna failed to present evidence
sufficiently showing their respective income. Hence, the awards for lost income should be deleted. Similarly, Noel G.
Garcia failed to adduce competent proof of the amount spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. The
sum of P350,000.00 is merely a cost estimate from a motor repair shop and not the actual amount expended to repair
the jeep. Due to the lack of documentary proof, the CA awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages since
some pecuniary loss was suffered though its amount cannot be proven with certainty.[24]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution [25] dated June 22, 2018. He elevated the
case before Us via a petition for review on certiorari. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a comment.
Proceedings Before this Court
Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner raised the following: first, the CA erred in giving full faith and credence to the TAR, which stated that
petitioner was at fault when the collision happened because he was driving at the wrong side of the road. Petitioner
insisted that the TAR was prepared without his presence since he and his child were then being treated at the
hospital for the severe injuries they suffered. The TAR was prepared at the instance of the private complainants; thus
it does not provide a truthful account of what transpired during the accident.[26]

Second, the object evidence, particularly the physical depression on the vehicles, showed that Rico instead of
steering the jeepney away from petitioner's approaching van, steered right into the van's direction head on. The point
of impact of the van and the jeepney was within petitioner's lane. Rico admitted that he saw petitioner's approaching
vehicle from the opposite direction, but he did not evade it. Thus, it was Rico who was negligent in driving his vehicle.
It was he who had the last opportunity to reflect and deliberate on the impending danger of an overtaking vehicle from
the opposite direction of the road. More, the prosecution failed to establish the actual speed of petitioner's vehicle and
the circumstances of place and time immediately prior to the collision. Neither did it prove that Rico was driving the
jeepney with due diligence.[27]

Third, the award of temperate damages to the private complainants has no basis because petitioner was not shown
to have been negligent when he drove his vehicle prior to, or during the collision. Private complainants failed to
adduce evidence that they sustained substantial pecuniary losses due to the accident or even establish their earning
capacity.[28]

Fourth, the CA, applying Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, [29] imposed upon the petitioner the straight penalty of two (2)
months imprisonment, an increase from the lower court's-imposed penalty of one (1) month and twenty (20) days to
two (2) months of imprisonment. R.A. No. 10951 was passed in 2017, while the alleged infraction was committed in
2013. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 10951 is not favorable to him, the same should not be applied in the case.[30]

Arguments of respondent

The OSG maintained that the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution established all the elements of the
crime charged. The MTCC's finding of guilt was based on the evidence that petitioner overtook the vehicle without
checking whether the opposite lane was clearly visible from incoming vehicle. It also considered the evidence that it
was 3:00 a.m., the road was not well lighted, and petitioner was driving at a fast speed. The RTC, meanwhile, based
its ruling on a sketch which showed that the impact occurred at the inner lane occupied by the private complainants'
jeepney. The CA anchored its findings on the unrebutted presumption of negligence that arose because petitioner
was violating a traffic regulation during the mishap. Thus, the CA did not rely solely on the contents of the TAR. As for
the award of damages, the OSG argued that that it was in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.[31]

In Our assailed Resolution[32] dated September 21, 2020, We denied the petition for failure to show any reversible
error on the part of the CA as to warrant the exercise of Our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present Motion for Reconsideration,[33] repleading and reiterating the arguments in his
petition for review.

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether We should uphold petitioner's conviction.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm petitioner's conviction but modify the penalty imposed.

Petitioner was charged of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to property. Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence." It defines
reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his/her employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.[34]

The Ivler Doctrine

In Ivler v. Hon. Judge Modesto-San Pedro[35] (Ivler), We emphasized that simple and reckless imprudence are distinct
species of crimes, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws. Reckless imprudence is
not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; (2) the legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would
have been subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty structure for quasi-
crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime but
is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. [36] Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is to state that
their commission resulted in damage, either to person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
or simple imprudence causing damage to property.[37]

In Ivler, the accused was charged of two separate offenses arising from the same vehicular accident, which are
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property. He pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted the penalty of public censure. He was tried for the
second charge, but he moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) denied the quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The RTC dismissed the accused's
petition for certiorari for lack of standing. The accused elevated the case before Us arguing that his constitutional right
against double jeopardy bars his prosecution for the second charge, having been convicted previously in the first
charge for the same imprudent act. He maintained that there is only one offense of reckless imprudence, and the
multiple consequences of such act are material only to determine the penalty. We ruled in favor of the accused.

We recognized in Ivler that there are two approaches in the prosecution of quasi-crimes. The first approach applies
Article 48 of the RPC while the second approach forbids its application. Article 48 deals with complex crimes. It allows
the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories, namely: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. Light felonies are excluded in Article 48 and must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as
grave or less grave offense. In complex crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum penalty for the most serious
crime. It is a procedural tool for the benefit of the accused. In contrast, the second approach sanctions a single
prosecution for all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number and
severity. After exhaustively discussing numerous case law, We declared that Article 48 of the RPC is not applicable
to quasi-crimes. We forbade the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except light felonies) to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
crimes. This way, the splitting of charges under Article 365 which results to rampant occasions of impermissible
second prosecution based on the same act/s or omission/s are avoided. We explained Our ruling in this wise:

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains
us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a
quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an
offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant ...by the Justice of the Peace ...of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved
and diverted to proper use. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)[38]

Accordingly, We laid down the rule that there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365. Only one information
shall be filed regardless of the number or severity of the consequences of the imprudent or negligent act. The judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.[39]

Ivler Cannot Reverse a Prior En Banc

Case Applying Article 48 to Quasi-Offenses

While the 2010 case of Ivler comprehensively discussed the nature of Article 365 and the inapplicability of Article 48
to quasi-offenses, it was decided by the Second Division of the Court and not by the Court sitting En Banc. This finds
significance considering the 2001 En Banc case of People v. De los Santos[40] (De los Santos), where We held that
Article 48 applies to crimes through negligence. De los Santos was among the string of cases stated in Ivler, referring
to the rulings which "complexed" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences, unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges where split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts, and on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with first level courts. Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc[.]" Thus, there is a need for the Court, sitting En Banc, to
clarify whether it subscribes to the view pronounced in Ivler, thereby abandoning De los Santos.

The accused in De los Santos was charged with the complex crime of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder,
and Multiple Attempted Murder in an Information filed in the RTC of Cagayan De Oro City. The RTC convicted the
accused as charged, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. The RTC sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims of frustrated and attempted murder.
On automatic review, We found lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused, hence he cannot be held liable for
intentional felony. We convicted him of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries and 10 counts of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. We ruled that Article 48 applies in this wise:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts
or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). In Reodica v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity
with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of
the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted of the
complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat
to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should
be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity
of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.[41] (Emphasis supplied.; citations omitted.)

Thus, it appears that in De los Santos, reckless imprudence is not treated as a crime itself. Rather, it is regarded as a
way of committing a crime. There, We stated that "[s]ince Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa)."[42] "Crimes through negligence" pertain to the offenses committed
under Article 365.

Subsequently, Our ruling in De Los Santos was cited in Dayap v. Sendiong,[43] where the accused was charged with
the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries, and damage to
property. However, We acquitted the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. We affirmed the Municipal
Trial Court's (MTC) finding that there was no evidence proving that a crime has been committed and that the accused
was the person responsible for it.[44]

A survey of case law reveals that the last case which cited De los Santos is Ivler. However, as previously stated, Ivler
declared that a quasi-offense cannot be "complexed" with its resulting acts or consequences. As opposed to De los
Santos, Ivler sees reckless imprudence as a crime itself and not as a modality or way of committing a crime. De los
Santos' characterization of reckless imprudence as a way of committing a crime traces its roots from the 1939 case of
People v. Faller[45] (Faller), where We categorically ruled that, "[r]eckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability."[46] In Faller, the accused was
charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. After hearing, the CFI found
that damage was caused through reckless imprudence. On appeal, We stated "[n]egligence being a punishable
criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts
charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence."[47]

Conversely, in the 1955 case of Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga [48] (Quizon), We rejected the earlier
concept that reckless imprudence is simply a way of committing a crime. We explained, viz:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal
Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense
is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to
property".

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to
prision correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series, of crimes.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
Quizon is the bedrock of Ivler's dicta that simple or reckless imprudence are distinct species of crime.

Meanwhile, at this juncture, We acknowledge the observation of Associate Justice Benjamin Caguioa about the
concerning volume of inconsistent jurisprudence relating to Article 365.[50] Thus, We shall finally settle in this case the
conflicting rulings of the court on complex crimes and quasi-crimes.

Case Law after Ivler

On its face, Ivler had already settled the nature, proper designation, and treatment of quasi-crimes and their resulting
act/s, but jurisprudence after it appears to be in disarray.

In Dumayag v. People[51] (Dumayag), the accused was charged before the MTC of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and damage to property. The MTC
convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. The RTC affirmed the MTC with
modification in that the accused was found liable for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and damage to property. The CA affirmed
the RTC in toto. On appeal before Us, We acquitted the accused of the crimes charged because his recklessness
was not the proximate cause of the damage. However, We did not take issue on the characterization made by the
RTC and the CA of the crime that the accused was charged and convicted of, which is "complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide."[52]

In Gonzaga v. People[53] (Gonzaga), We affirmed the accused's conviction of the "complex crime" of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide with double serious physical injuries and damage to property under Article 365 of
the RPC in relation to Article 263 of the same Code.[54]

In Dr. Cruz v. Agas, Jr.,[55] We affirmed the ruling of the CA that the Department of Justice did not err in sustaining the
dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Cruz for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and medical
malpractice.[56] Similar to Dumayag, We did not take issue or corrected the proper designation of the offense to be
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

In Senit v. People[57] (Senit), We affirmed the CA, which convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property.[58] The CA imposed the penalty of three (3) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor "since the petitioner has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act which had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article
48 of the RPC."[59]

Conversely, in other cases, We applied Our pronouncement in Ivler, to wit:

In Sevilla v. People,[60] We observed that the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed by the accused as
"falsification of public document through reckless imprudence."[61] We noted that this is an inaccurate designation of
the felony and emphasized that reckless imprudence is not simply a modality of committing a crime but is a crime
itself. Thus, the proper designation of the offense is reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.
[62]

In Esteban v. People[63] (Esteban), the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, serious
physical injuries, and damage to property. We agreed with the CA that: (1) Article 48 of the RPC does not apply to
acts penalized under Article 365 since the former is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes; and (2) prosecutions
under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. [64]
Thus, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC (with modification), which in turn sustained the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court's (MCTC) imposition of three separate penalties for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, serious physical
injuries, and damage to property. The MCTC imposed the following penalties:

(a) for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correcional as
maximum; and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Antonieto Manuel; P35,000.00 as actual
damages for funeral expenses; P602,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and P25,000.00 as moral damages.[65]
(b) for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, a straight penalty of two month imprisonment.

(c) for damage to property, to pay the victim Librado Felix in the amount of P42,996.40 as actual damages and a fine
of P50,000.00.[66]

Penalties under Article 365 of the RPC

Article 365 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951,[67] reads:

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had
it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages
to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000).

A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) and censure shall be imposed upon any person, who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two (2)
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The penalties provided in Article 365 are clear and straightforward except for its third paragraph, in instances where
the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only to damage to property but also to physical injuries. The third
paragraph provides that when an imprudent or negligent act resulted in damage to property only, the offender shall
be punished by a fine. The question that arises is whether the third paragraph still applies when there is also damage
to persons. We answered in the affirmative in the 1954 case of Angeles v. Jose[68] (Angeles). There, We ruled that the
third paragraph applies to the resulting damage to property, and an additional penalty shall be imposed on the
resulting injury to person. The "additional penalty" pertains to the penalty scheme under Article 365.[69]

In Angeles, the accused was charged before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the crime of damage to property in
the sum of P654.22 with less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence. The CFI dismissed the case upon
motion of the defense on the ground that the penalty prescribed by Article 365 is only arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium period, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. However, the prosecution
argued that the CFI has jurisdiction because the fine that may be imposed on account of the damage to property is a
sum equal to the amount of damage to three times such amount, which in no case shall be less than P25.00. We
reversed the CFI and remanded the case for further proceedings. In effect, We held that the CFI has jurisdiction
because the fine for the damage to property should be considered in determining jurisdiction. [70] We also interpreted
the third paragraph of Article 365 in this manner:

The respondent court, however, relies on the wording of the third paragraph of said article, which reads as follows:
"When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos."

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter.
The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property,
for both the injuries and the damage committed were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what
may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this
case is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of first instance. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)[71]

Simply put, if the imprudent or negligent act covered by Article 365 results to both damage to property and persons, a
fine shall be imposed for the former and an additional penalty based on the penalty scheme of Article 365 shall be
meted for the latter. The information cannot also be split into two – one for physical injuries and another for damage
to property.

Nevertheless, in the 1998 case of Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[72] which involved an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, We held that the third paragraph of Article
365 does not apply since the reckless imprudence did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first
paragraph of Article 365 which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for an act committed
through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony.[73]

Significantly, in Ivler, We went back to Our pronouncement in Angeles that the third paragraph of Article 365 applies
even if the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only in damage to property but also in damage to persons, in which
case an additional penalty for the latter shall be imposed aside from a fine.

Interestingly, We did not apply this in Gonzaga where despite a finding that the accused was guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property, no separate fine was
imposed for damage to property. The same goes for Senit where the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property. There was no fine imposed for the resulting
damage to property. In both these cases, the imprudent acts and their consequences were treated as complex
crimes.

Meanwhile, there is a seeming flaw in Angeles that We need to address. Angeles teaches that an "additional penalty"
should be imposed when the negligent or imprudent act resulted not only in damage to property but also to physical
injuries. Only one information shall be filed for both the injuries and the damages. The reasoning stated in Angeles is
because "the injuries and damage committed were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what
may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property."[74] Hence, on its face, Angeles is among
the case law which applied Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-crimes. Ivler, by citing Angeles, seems to affirm a case
which allows the "complexing" of quasi-crimes. We now clarify Our ruling in Angeles.

The crux of the controversy in Angeles is the interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365 in relation to
determining the jurisdiction of courts. We ruled that the fine for damage to property and the additional penalty for
damage to persons should both be considered in ascertaining which court has jurisdiction over the quasi-offense.
While We referred to the "complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property," [75] Our declaration that an
additional penalty should be imposed for the resulting physical injuries defies or disregards the sentencing formula
under Article 48 for complex crimes, which is the imposition of only one penalty – the penalty for the most serious
crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period.[76] Thus, the contradiction in Angeles seems to be more
apparent than real. Angeles, in prescribing an additional penalty for the resulting damage to persons, does not, in
essence, allow the "complexing" of the resulting acts of a single quasi-crime.

In fine, the Angeles and Ivler interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365 conform/dovetail with the second
approach that quasi-crimes should be prosecuted in one charge, regardless of their number and severity, and each
consequence should be penalized separately. We applied this interpretation in the recent case of Esteban.

Jurisdiction of Courts over Quasi-Crimes

In Angeles and the succeeding cases that cited it, both the fine for damage to property and the penalty for damage to
persons were considered in determining which court has jurisdiction. Hence, in People v. Villanueva[77] (Villanueva),
which involved the complex crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in the amount
of P2,636.00,[78] We ruled that the CFI (now the RTC) had jurisdiction, viz.:

Considering that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense
that resulted from appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, it would
be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with
damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace court. The
presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd
results. Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the various trial courts proceeds on the basic
theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more serious than those triable in justice of the
peace or municipal courts.[79] (Emphasis supplied)

Villanueva was followed by People v. Malabanan.[80] However, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
129 by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the amount of fine in criminal negligence resulting to damage to property is
no longer relevant in determining which court has jurisdiction. Section 32(2) of BP 129, as amended, reads:

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Hence, the MeTCs, MTCs, MCTCs, and MTCCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal negligence cases
which results to damage to property, regardless of the imposable fine. Note that prior to the amendment of BP 129,
the first level courts only have jurisdiction when the imposable fine does not exceed P20,000.00.

Similarly, BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases
to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from the crime. Thus, the first
level courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over acts penalized under Article 365 of the RPC. The most serious
imposable penalty under Article 365 is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period or two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years of imprisonment. This is the imposable penalty, "[w]hen, by imprudence
or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused." [81] The only exception
is when the offender in the foregoing offense "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in
his/her hands to give,"[82] in which case the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed. [83] The penalty next higher
in degree to prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods or six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of imprisonment. The jurisdiction for the qualified offense
will now lie in the RTC.

De los Santos is no longer a good law.

We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the "complexing" of the effects of a
single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-offenses and their resultant
acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under the RPC. We
thus declare that De los Santos[84] is abandoned. We agree with Our pronouncements in Ivler. Article 48 does
not apply to quasi-offenses under Article 365 because reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a
mere way of committing a crime. Simple or reckless imprudence does not strictly fall under the term
"felonies" or acts or omissions committed by fault or culpa.
Applying what We had discussed in the present case, We find that the offense charged against petitioner was
properly designated as reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The
Information was also correctly filed before the MTCC.

The elements of the crime of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time, and place.[85]

The prosecution was able to establish the foregoing elements beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner has exhibited, by
his voluntary act, without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution in overtaking the vehicle in front of him. He did not
ensure that the road was clear and free of oncoming traffic. Section 41 of R.A. No. 4136, also known as the "Land
Transportation and Traffic Code," as amended, provides that, "the driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of
the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such
left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for sufficient distance to permit such overtaking or passing to
be made in safety." As stated in the TAR [86] and shown in the Sketch Plan, [87] the point of impact occurred at the inner
lane occupied by the private complainants' jeepney. This proves that petitioner encroached on the rightful lane of the
private complainants. Petitioner was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision as he was driving on the
wrong side of the road.[88] Under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, he is presumed to be negligent at the time of the
accident, which presumption he failed to rebut.[89]

The CA, the RTC, and the MTCC uniformly held that petitioner failed to observe the necessary care and precaution
required of a driver who abandons his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle, which recklessness
resulted in the injuries sustained by the private complainants and the damage to the jeepney. Settled is the rule that
findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court.[90]

Consequently, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. The said doctrine
presupposes that both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably at a later point in time than that
of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose negligence or fault brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the consequences arising therefrom.[91] The documentary and testimonial evidence in this case show that
petitioner was at fault.

Accordingly, the courts a quo did not err in finding that petitioner's reckless act is the proximate cause of the injuries
and damage to property. However, the said courts failed to apply Ivler in determining the imposable penalty.
While they found that petitioner was guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to both physical injuries and damage to
property, they did not impose a separate fine for damage to property, manifesting that they treated the single
imprudent act and its effects as a complex crime. The correct approach is to impose separate penalties for each
consequence of the imprudent act alleged and proven.

More, the CA found that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna from the collision amounted to slight
physical injuries only, yet it erroneously characterized it as a less grave felony in its Decision dated March 15, 2018.
The Certificates of Confinement[92] presented by the prosecution showed that the estimated days of confinement for
Leilani is only 3-5 days; for Rico 2-3 days; and none was mentioned for Myrna. Under Article 266 (1) of the RPC, as
amended, the crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto menor when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) to nine (9) days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period. Arresto menor has a duration of 1-30 days of imprisonment. Hence,
pursuant to Article 9 in relation to Article 25 of the RPC, as amended, slight physical injuries is only a light felony.

The correct penalty for the crime

The reckless driving of petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna. As previously stated,
slight physical injuries is a light felony. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 365, [93] reckless imprudence resulting
in a light felony is punishable by arresto menor in its maximum period, that is, imprisonment of twenty-one (21) to
thirty (30) days. On the contrary, if the reckless act of petitioner was intentional, it would have been penalized under
Article 266[94] of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, as a crime of slight physical injuries punishable by arresto
menor or imprisonment with a duration of one (1) to thirty (30) days.[95] Evidently, the penalty under Article 266, had
the act been intentional, is equal to or lower than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365. In this
connection, the sixth paragraph of Article 365 provides that:

When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed
in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

The underlying reason for this reduction in penalty is to preserve the difference between an act wilfully performed
from one committed through negligence.[96] Otherwise, a reckless or imprudent act would be punished with the same
penalty imposable to an intentional act.

Thus, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the
penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. Since that the reckless act of petitioner resulted in slight physical
injuries to three persons (Rico, Leilani, and Myrna), the penalty of public censure shall be imposed for each of the
slight physical injuries committed.

With respect to the resulting damage to property, We concur with the CA that while it is evident that the jeepney
driven by Rico and owned by Noel G. Garcia (Garcia) was damaged, the prosecution failed to present competent
proof to establish the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. The Vehicle and
Equipment Work Order presented in the trial court only provided for an estimated expense of P350,000.00. No
representative from the Maglanque Motor Shop testified to authenticate the document. Only Rico and Lailani testified
that they brought the jeep for repair to the shop and the cost of repair is P350,000.00. In any case, this will not
prevent Us from imposing temperate damages in favor of owner of the wrecked jeepney. Under Article 2224 of the
New Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty. Here, We rule that the amount of P150,000.00
which the CA awarded as temperate damages to Garcia is fair and reasonable.

As to the amount of fine, petitioner should pay P150,000.00 conformably with the third paragraph of Article 365 which
states that, when the reckless act "resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a
fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no
case be less than Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00)."

Additionally, We agree with the CA that Rico, Leilani, and Myrna suffered some pecuniary loss due to their physical
injuries, which prevented them from working. However, aside from their bare allegations they failed to present proof
that they are earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day. Therefore, the CA's award of temperate damages in the amount of
P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and Leilani, and P2,000.00 to Myrna, are in order. All the monetary awards shall be
subject to a legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Resolution until fully paid.[97]

Lastly, for technical propriety, We shall correct the designation of the offense stated in the dispositive portion of the
Decision dated March 15, 2018 of the CA. It seems that the CA inadvertently indicated that petitioner is guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple serious physical injuries, whereas based on the
evidence presented and the body of the Decision, private complainants only suffered slight physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED. Our Resolution dated September 21, 2020 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that:

(1) petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight
physical injuries and damage to property, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of public censure for each
of the resulting slight physical injuries committed to private complainants Rico Mendoza, Leilani Mendoza,
and Myrna Cunanan, and to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00 as penalty for the resulting damage
to property;

(2) petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and
Leilani Mendoza and P2,000.00 to Myrna Cunanan;
(3) petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his authorized representative temperate damages in the
amount of P150,000.00;
(4) all monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and
Marquez, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Caguioa, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

Lazaro-Javier,* J., no part.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10897. January 04, 2022 ]
TONY PETER PARTSCH, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

Before this Court is complainant Tony Peter Partsch's (Partsch) administrative complaint [1] seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Vitorillo (Atty. Vitorillo).

Partsch's complaint:

In March 2012, Partsch, a Swiss national, desired to purchase a piece of beachfront real property located in Bayabas,
Cagayan de Oro. Upon information of the adjacent land owners, Partsch sought Atty. Vitorillo in the latter's law office
in Cagayan de Oro City.[2]

Atty. Vitorillo claimed ownership over 800 square meters of the said beachfront lot (subject property). He represented
to Partsch that 100 square meters of the subject lot were already titled under his name. The remaining 700 square
meters of the subject lot were still pending registration, but will allegedly be completed in three months' time. [3] Atty.
Vitorillo offered to sell to Partsch the 800 square-meter subject property for the total amount of P2,500,000.00, ten
percent (10%) of which shall constitute down payment and the balance shall be paid upon delivery of the two titles
within three months.[4]

On April 4, 2012, Partsch tendered a check in the amount of P230,000.00 and P20,000.00 in cash to Atty. Vitorillo as
partial payment for the subject property. While Atty. Vitorillo gave Partsch a receipt for the transaction, no deed of
absolute sale was executed. Instead, Atty. Vitorillo promised Partsch to draw the deed of absolute sale along with the
land titles after three months.[5]

After three months, or in July 2012, Partsch followed up the written contract and the land titles. Partsch also inquired
on the title over the 100-square-meter portion that Atty. Vitorillo represented to have been already registered in his
name, and other documentary proof of Atty. Vitorillo's ownership over the other 700-square-meter portion of the
subject property.[6]

Atty. Vitorillo, however, only offered the following excuses: (1) he cannot give the title to the 100-square-meter portion
as it is his only access thereto; and (2) the 700-square-meter portion was given to him by his clients as compensation
for legal services and which was still under litigation before the regional trial courts of Cagayan de Oro City. Atty.
Vitorillo assured Partsch that his client's pending case shall soon be resolved and be granted in their favor, and that
the title over the 700-square-meter portion shall be released in September 2012. Atty. Vitorillo also rescheduled his
undertaking to deliver all the documents for the purchase to September 2012.[7]

In September 2012, Partsch again asked about Atty. Vitorillo's promise. Atty. Vitorillo answered that the case over the
700-square-meter portion of the subject property was not yet done, and thus, the titles could not still be delivered to
Partsch. Atty. Vitorillo further advised Partsch to just possess the subject property and fence it. Partsch did not heed
the advice, believing that he has no right to do so without the titles and the deed of absolute sale, and because there
already existed a wooden structure on the subject property belonging to another person.[8]

On November 24, 2012, Atty. Vitorillo informed Partsch that he is no longer selling the subject property. As
alternative, Atty. Vitorillo proposed for sale another lot located in the highlands. Partsch rejected the offer and
demanded instead the reimbursement of his down payment plus interests. Atty Vitorillo refused, saying he needed to
dispose of the land first and promising anew to prepare a deed of rescission of contract to sell. Partsch also asked for
a promissory note for the return of Partsch's down payment.[9]

Like before, these promises only dried up. On November 26, 2012, Partsch sent Atty. Vitorillo a letter [10] formally
demanding the reimbursement of P250,000.00 plus one percent (1%) monthly interest from receipt of the letter under
pain of legal action.

Atty. Vitorillo responded to the formal demand. In his November 29, 2012 letter [11] to Partsch, Atty. Vitorillo told
Partsch that, while he was vexed by Partsch letter and actions, they could proceed with the original sale transaction
under the condition that Partsch pays in full the balance of P2,250,000.00 as they have initially stipulated.

Partsch declined Atty. Vitorillo's condition. On December 7, 2012, the parties ended up in a mediation proceeding
before the Katarungang Pambarangay of Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City. [12] During the hearing, Atty. Vitorillo scolded
Partsch for sending him the formal demand letter. He further intimidated Partsch with a criminal case for unjust
vexation unless the latter apologizes then and there. Afraid to jeopardize his visiting status in the country, Partsch did
as he was told. He was also compelled to again grace Atty. Vitorillo with more time to reimburse his money without
resorting to any court action.[13]

Two years passed and another formal demand letter to pay [14] was sent to Atty. Vitorillo. The reimbursement,
however, remained unpaid. Thus, on September 1, 2015, Partsch filed this complaint [15] for disbarment against Atty.
Vitorillo.

On December 9, 2015, the Court required Atty. Vitorillo to comment on the complaint.[16]

Atty. Vitorillo's comment:[17]

Atty. Vitorillo admitted that he entered into a written contract to sell [18] the 800-square-meter subject property with
Partsch but denied that he undertook to deliver the land titles within three months. It was Partsch who proposed the
sale and enticed him with the 10% down payment of P250,000.00. Partsch knew of the nature and the status of the
subject property beforehand. Atty. Vitorillo had not been dishonest as Partsch painted him to be and that he acted in
utmost good faith in informing Partsch that the subject property was under litigation. Atty. Vitorillo attributed the delay
in the delivery of the title to the 700-square-meter portion of the subject property to the trial court's eventual dismissal
of the case.[19]

Atty. Vitorillo held himself responsible for the return of Partsch's P250,000.00 but not for the interest claimed. His
reasons were that he was likewise unable to use the subject property since April 2012 when he allowed Partsch to
enter the premises, and that his inability to deliver the title over the 700-square-meter portion was neither deliberate
nor malicious.[20]

On August 1, 2016, the Court ordered Partsch to file a reply to Atty. Vitorillo's comment.[21]

Partsch's reply:[22]

Partsch maintained that Atty. Vitorillo had never furnished him a copy of any written contract to sell, much less had he
signed any such contract. Atty. Vitorillo's omission to provide Partsch the requisite documents for the purchase of the
800-square-meter subject property allegedly meant that Atty. Vitorillo had never intended to be bound by their verbal
agreement to sell the subject property, for which Partsch has already paid the down payment.[23]
It was also Atty. Vitorillo who had enticed Partsch to the transaction. Partsch had completely relied on Atty. Vitorillo's
representations that the latter was the absolute owner of the subject property. The latter even advised Partsch that a
foreigner like him can own a beach lot in the Philippines after he pays its price in full. Only after he paid the down
payment and followed up on Atty. Vitorillo's promises did Partsch discover the fraud. Had he known the falsity of Atty.
Vitorillo's statements, Partsch would never have given Atty. Vitorillo a single cent.[24]

Partsch insisted on Atty. Vitorillo's liability for payment of interest on the reimbursement owing to him, as well as
moral damages and attorney's fees. Atty. Vitorillo acted in bad faith as he knew that he cannot deliver the subject
property to Partsch, cancelled the sale, and now continues to refuse to return his down payment.[25]

On April 24, 2017,[26] the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation of

the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines:[27]

In ignoring the constitutional prohibition against alienation of private lands to foreigners and by continuously refusing
to return the money he received from Partsch, Atty. Vitorillo was deemed to have seriously impaired his status as a
member of the Bar. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) determined that
Atty. Vitorillo's actuations and misrepresentations have ripened into willful and Gross Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct and deemed him guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the imposition of the following penalty:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is recommended that Respondent, ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO be

suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[28] (Citation omitted.)

Per its June 18, 2019 Resolution,[29] the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.

Our Ruling

Atty. Vitorillo is suspended for three years from the practice of law.

The following provisions under the CPR are pertinent:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)
One's admission to the Bar is by no means a license to gloss over the loopholes in legislation, to hijack the legal
processes, or to manipulate the technical decisions of those unlearned in law.[30] Among the sworn obligations of
attorneys upon taking the Lawyer's Oath is to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land at all times, never
to waver even if vices of luxury, convenience, and worldly excesses tempt them so.[31]

Of course, accusations remain mere allegations if unsupported by the requisite quantum of proof. In disciplinary
cases involving members of the Bar, substantial evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalty.[32] Substantial evidence means "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."[33] It is "more in keeping with the primodial purpose of and essential considerations
attending this type of cases."[34]

Records, however, easily establish that Atty. Vitorillo gave in to the indulgent vices of the profession.

The Court finds Atty. Vitorillo guilty of deceitful conduct proscribed by Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR. In the contract
to sell[35] that Atty. Vitorillo himself submitted before the Court, Atty. Vitorillo expressly named himself as the seller and
absolute owner of the subject property.[36] The verity of such contractual status rests upon a single fact – that Atty.
Vitorillo held absolute ownership over the entire 800-square-meter subject property at the time he offered it for sale to
Partsch. The facts at hand reveal that he did not.

Atty. Vitorillo had never denied the grave accusations of his non-ownership in the complaint despite the opportunity to
do so in his comment. His clients may have agreed to compensate Atty. Vitorillo's legal services in kind, but only to
the following extent and subject to the highlighted caveats, per the stipulations in their deed of partition &
assignment[37] executed before the questioned sale:[38]

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Deed, made and executed by and among the Heirs of Eufracio and Pilar Cailo namely Eufracio Cailo, Jr.,
Charito Burlat, Amor Cailo, Eden Cailo, Juana Anislag, Ciolar Mabalacad, Josephine Cailo, Regina Cailo and Efren
Cailo x x x

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, Eufracio Cailo, Jr., Charito Burlat, Amor Cailo, Eden Cailo, Juana Anislag, Ciolar Mabalacad, Josephine
Cailo, Regina Cailo and Efren Cailo are the substituted appellants [in] a civil case entitled, 'Rodrigo T. Caingin vs.
Eufracio Cailo, Jr., Charito Burlat, Amor Cailo, Eden Cailo, Juana Anislag, Ciolar Mabalacad and Efren Cailo'
docketed as CA-G.R. CV NO.72424-MIN decided by the x x x Court of Appeals and affirmed by the x x x Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 193223 dated October 4, 2010;

WHEREAS, subject of the case is the erroneous Free Patent award of Lot 35797, Cad-237 [hereinafter, main lot]
x x x in favor of Rodrigo Caingin and the issuance of O.C.T. No. P-2521; in effect, the possession and ownership
of Lot 35797, Cad-237 by Eufracio Cailo, Jr., Charito Burlat, Amor Cailo, Eden Cailo, Juana Anislag, Ciolar
Mabalacad, Josephine Cailo, Regina Cailo and Efren Cailo as substituted appellants, are recognized;

WHEREAS, in defending the rights of appellants, they have engaged the services of the law office of Atty.
Reynaldo A. Vitorillo for a fee of a portion of the recovered Lot 35797, Cad 237.

WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to partition among themselves Lot 35797, Cad-237 with an area of 2,561 square
meters into fourteen (14) Lots x x x

xxxx

That for and in consideration of the legal services rendered, the parties hereby cede and assign unto Atty. Reynaldo
A. Vitorillo x x x Lot 35797-C and 35797-D more particularly described as follows:

xxxx

Lot 35797-C, PSD-10- _____ Portion of lot 35797, CAD. 237

xxxx
Area: Five Hundred (500) square meters, more or less.

xxxx

Lot 35797-D, PSD-10-_____ Portion of lot 35797, CAD. 237

xxxx

Area: Two Hundred (200) square meters, more or less.

That the Lot herein partitioned is not registered in the name of the heirs of Eufracio Cailo and Pilar L. Cailo ,
the parties have agreed to register the instrument under Act 3344. [39] (Emphasis, underscoring, and items in
brackets supplied.)

Atty. Vitorillo failed to show the factual bases of his absolute ownership, i.e., that the 800-square-meter subject
property has already been transferred to him in any legal manner, indicative of a dishonest intent.

First, deeds of transfer in Atty. Vitorillo's favor, certificates of title in his possession, or at least any affidavit from the
true registered owners constituting him as the new owner of the entire 800-square-meter subject property would have
sufficed as proof. Suspiciously, Atty. Vitorillo was unbothered to provide these despite repeated requests from
Partsch.

Second, the litigated main lot that included the subject property was still unregistered in the names of Atty. Vitorillo's
clients.

Records disclose that the earlier case for quieting of title involving the main lot had been ruled against Roberto T.
Caingin (Caingin), the party adverse to Atty. Vitorillo's clients. Nevertheless, a free patent in Caingin's name still
existed over the main lot. Thus, Atty. Vitorillo's clients filed a petition seeking to cancel the existing free patent. The
petition, however, was ordered dismissed by the trial courts,[40] as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA),[41] since it
was determined to be a case for reversion to the government of lands of the public domain, and Atty. Vitorillo's clients
had no personality to institute it. They had even been advised by the CA in the quieting of title case to "legalize their
claim over the land through the filing of the proper judicial or administrative remedy." [42] Hence, Atty. Vitorillo's clients
cannot automatically declare their possession over and legal entitlement to the main lot.

This is more so with Atty. Vitorillo, as his assertions of ownership is only derivative from the title of his clients. Faced
with the fact that the cancellation of the free patent over the main lot including the subject property was still under
active litigation, Atty. Vitorillo's statements that he is the owner thereof cannot simply be taken as bible truth.

Third, even if Atty. Vitorillo's clients truly had in their names the 800-square-meter subject property, only 700 square
meters were clearly assigned to Atty. Vitorillo in the Deed of Partition and Assignment.

In all, the Court is inclined to view Atty. Vitorillo's claims of ownership over the 800-square-meter subject property as
specious.

In taking the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Vitorillo swore "to do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission." Above
circumstances show that he broke this honored pledge. There is proof that Atty. Vitorillo truly misrepresented himself
as the subject property's owner to Partsch, who fully relied thereon and readily agreed to the transaction. What Atty.
Vitorillo had was at best an inchoate right, anchored on mere hope that the subject property shall someday be
transferred to his name. A person possessing only expectancies of ownership over a piece of property cannot and
should not legally hold oneself out as the absolute owner thereof.[43] This carries heftier relevance if such person is
one well-versed in law like Atty. Vitorillo.[44]

This expectancy was admittedly conditioned on the issuance of a final court ruling cancelling the title over the main lot
in favor of his clients, who were the ones directly claiming ownership over the subject property in their own right.
However, Atty. Vitorillo conveniently forgot that courts decide cases depending on the relevant law and evidence
presented. He fed Partsch false assurances that the trial court would grant his cause. He even openly blamed the trial
court's supposed delay in resolving the pending ownership dispute over the main lot and its eventual dismissal of the
case that prejudiced his expectancy. In so doing, Atty. Vitorillo demeaned the integrity of legal processes and
tarnished the image of impartiality of the courts that he had professionally vowed to espouse, per Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the CPR.
Furthermore, for Atty. Vitorillo to gaslight Partsch, in that the latter should have been more circumspect in transacting
with real property in the Philippines, is irrelevant in negating Atty. Vitorillo's administrative transgressions.

The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a rule for even non-attorneys to be
unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is presumed to know this. Despite being equipped with such knowledge, Atty.
Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale to Partsch, a Swiss national. More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's ethical
obliquity is his questionable instruction to Partsch to just proceed with the fencing of the subject property without any
acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title thereto. Again, Atty. Vitorillo had not refuted this serious allegation. He is
deemed to have acted in contravention of Canon 1, Rule 1.02 - CPR's proscription against counseling activities
aimed at defiance of the law.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit, gross misconduct in such office, or violation of the Lawyer's Oath. [45]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the penalty of suspension for two years, which the IBP-Board of
Governors approved.

In light of recent jurisprudence most akin to the present case, the Court increases Atty. Vitorillo's suspension to three
years.

In Andaya v. Atty. Tumanda,[46] respondent lawyer therein borrowed P500,000.00 from his complainant. To convince
complainant to part with his money, respondent issued a post-dated check, which the bank dishonored on its maturity
date as the account was closed. Complainant demanded payment, to which respondent counter-offered his
Mercedez Benz. While he executed a deed of absolute sale over the car in favor of complainant, respondent failed to
give complainant the certificate of registration. He did not even turn over to complainant physical possession over the
car. Complainant later learned that the Mercedes Benz already belonged to another person. The Court saw
respondent in bad faith when, aside from issuing a bum check, he sold to a third person the Mercedes Benz that he
had previously sold to complainant. In so doing, respondent committed deceitful conduct and gross misconduct;
showed lack of honesty and good moral character; and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
CPR. Respondent lawyer was suspended for three years.

The Court's reminder to the Bar in Nakpil v. Valdes[47] bears reiteration:

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession.[48] (Emphasis supplied.)

As regards the reimbursement of the down payment plus interests and damages claimed by Partsch and disputed by
Atty. Vitorillo, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that raising it in the
present case is misplaced:

x x x [Partsch]'s demand for the refund of the payment of Php250,000.00 which was paid to [Atty. Vitorillo] by virtue of
a defective "Contract to Sell" is beyond and is not within the ambit of the delegated authority of the IBP-CBD. More
importantly is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this regard in A.C. No. 6955, July 22, 2006, entitled "Mar
Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan,"

"This Court will not act as a collection agency from faltering debtors, when the amount of the indebtedness is
indefinite and disputed. x x x"[49]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Vitorillo is found GUILTY of deceitful conduct, gross misconduct,
violation of Canons 1 and 7, Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and violation of
the Lawyer's Oath. Respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Vitorillo is SUSPENDED for three years, effective upon receipt of
this Decision. Atty. Vitorillo is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

Respondent Atty. Vitorillo is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has
started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Vitorillo's
personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and (3) the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all Philippine courts.
SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez,
Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 239878. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), ALFONSO SERVANA CASURRA, LEONARDO LUIB EDERA, JR.,
JOCELYN ELEAZAR MONTEROS, MARIA SEPARA GEOTINA, ARMANDO MAPA ELUMBA,
CARLO REYNALDO FAROLAN LOZADA, JR., AND ROSEMARIE V. PALACIO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for certiorari[1] assails the November 27, 2017 Resolution [2] and April 18, 2018 Resolution[3] of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1669 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Resolutions granted the motion to quash information/dismiss the case [4] and motion
(A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest; and (B) to defer arraignment and other
proceedings[5] filed by respondent Jocelyn Eleazar Monteros (Monteros), and the omnibus motion to quash
information and to defer arraignment[6] filed by respondents Alfonso Servana Casurra (Casurra), Leonardo Luib
Edera, Jr. (Edera), Maria Separa Geotina (Geotina), and Armando Mapa Elumba (Elumba), as adopted by
respondent Carlo Reynaldo F. Lozada, Jr. (Lozada), resulting to the dismissal of the criminal case for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, [7] otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," against
them.
The Factual Antecedents:

This case arose from a complaint [8] filed by Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (Task Force) of the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents local government officials of Surigao City: Casurra is the city mayor,
Edera is the city treasurer, Monteros is the city accountant, Geotina is the city engineer and a member of the Bids
and Awards Committee (BAC), Elumba is the city general services officer and a BAC member, and Lozada is the city
legal officer and a BAC member.[9] Respondent Rosemarie V. Palacio (Palacio) is a private individual who is the
proprietress of Rosa "Mia" Trading.[10]

The task force alleged that in early 2004, the Department of Budget and Management Office issued a special
allotment order amounting to P723,000,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm Implements
Program of the Department of Agriculture.[11] Out of the amount, the City Government of Surigao, Surigao del Norte
received P5,000,000.00.[12]

Thus, the city, through respondents, entered into a contract with Palacio and Rosa "Mia" Trading for the purchase of
3,332 kilograms of Elements 15-15-30+T.E. Foliar Fertilizer for P1,500 per kilogram, or a total amount of
4,998,000.00.[13] This was allegedly done without the requisite public bidding under the procurement law. [14] The city
paid Rosa "Mia" Trading in two tranches.[15]

Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction. It was discovered that there is a
variance between the cost of fertilizers procured and the cost of fertilizers locally canvassed resulting to an
overpricing.[16]

As a result, the COA issued on June 14, 2006 a Notice of Disallowance (NOD), which was subsequently amended on
March 19, 2007.[17]
Thereafter, on July 4, 2011, Task Force Abono filed the Complaint against respondents for violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of RA 3019, Sections 10, 18, and 21 of RA 9184, [18] otherwise known as the "Government Procurement
Reform Act," and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, as well as administrative charges.[19]

The OMB issued a resolution dated October 5, 2016 finding probable cause for the filing of an Information for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.[20] This was approved by the Ombudsman on March 22, 2017.[21]

On September 11, 2017, an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.[22]

Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash information/dismiss the case and a
motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest; and (B) to defer arraignment and other
proceedings. Monteros claimed that her right to speedy disposition of cases was violated because of the length of
time that had passed from the COA investigation in 2006 to the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan in
2017.[23] There was inordinate delay of 11 years and three months on the part of the OMB. [24] This delay, according to
Monteros, divested the OMB of the authority to file the case against her; the instant Information therefore is void, and
the anti-graft court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. [25] Monteros subsequently moved to hold the release
of the warrant of arrest and to defer arraignment and other proceedings as a consequence of the pendency of the
question on the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.[26]

On September 25, 2017, respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, and Elumba filed their omnibus motion to quash
information and to defer arraignment. Respondent Lozada subsequently manifested that he adopts this motion. [27]
Like Monteros, respondents claimed that there was inordinate delay from the fact-finding phase up to the filing of the
Information.[28]

To note, records show that respondent Palacio did not file a similar motion.

On October 19, 2017, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its consolidated comment/opposition [29] to the motions
filed by accused. The prosecution countered that the delay in this case is reasonable. Delay becomes inordinate if
there are arbitrary, vexatious, and oppressive actions or inactions that are attendant to the proceedings within the
context of the particular circumstances attendant thereto.[30] The prosecution stressed that the instant case is part of
the controversial "Fertilizer Fund Scam" that involved high ranking officials of the government and various non-
governmental organizations; investigation the case thus requires diligence, thoroughness, and necessarily, time.[31]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

In its November 27, 2017 Resolution, [32] the Sandiganbayan granted the motions of respondents and dismissed the
criminal case against them. The anti-graft court confirmed that more than 11 years have passed from the COA's
issuance of the NOD until the filing of the Information. [33] It held that the delay is not reasonable. The prosecution's
excuse that the many layers of review and the meticulous scrutiny that the case necessitates time, failed to convince.
[34]
No other plausible reason was provided to explain the delay of more than 11 years. [35] Also, the delay cannot be
attributed to the accused as they have timely filed their affidavits and supporting documents with the OMB. [36] The
anti-graft court added that the delay caused prejudice and anxiety to the accused. [37] Resultantly, respondents are
acquitted.

The prosecution moved for reconsideration. In its April 18, 2018 Resolution, [38] the Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
It added that respondents (being retired from service and dependent on their pensions) suffered from public
humiliation and embarrassment due to this criminal complaint that dragged on for many years. [39] The court likewise
reiterated that the prosecution failed to show that the delay was attributable to respondents.[40]

Further, the Sandiganbayan in its September 7, 2018 Resolution[41] dismissed the criminal case as regards Palacio as
well.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.[42] The prosecution ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in granting respondents' motions and dismissing the criminal case. The prosecution claims that the
Sandiganbayan disregarded the doctrine of Balancing Test (in determining violations of the right to speedy disposition
of cases) when it resorted to a mere mathematical computation of the period for fact-finding and preliminary
investigation.[43] The prosecution then adds that the period for fact-finding investigation should not be added to the
period for preliminary investigation for purposes of computing length of delay.[44]

The prosecution also claims that the delay in this case is reasonable and warranted under the circumstances. [45] The
OMB is deluged with cases filed before it; there is a steady stream of cases reaching the office. [46] The
Sandiganbayan should not have "closed its eyes" to these factors in determining inordinate delay.[47]

Next, the prosecution claims that respondents did not assert their right to speedy disposition of cases at any time
before the filing of the Information; in fact, they maximized the benefits of the OMB processes. [48] The right should be
asserted at the first instance.[49] Respondents, however, sat on their right during the fact-finding and preliminary
investigation; they did not initiate any move at the OMB level to assert their right.[50]

Lastly, the prosecution avers that the prejudice claimed to have been suffered by respondents has no factual support.
[51]
The Sandiganbayan merely relied on bare allegations of prejudice as respondents did not adduce any proof of
actual prejudice resulting from the delay.[52]

Monteros, in her Comment,[53] counters that the prosecution failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motions. Their right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated since it took
the OMB 11 years and three months to file an Information against respondents[54] The prosecution did not provide an
explanation for the delay given that the transaction were not complex and that the OMB should be accustomed to
evaluating such transactions as it was already conducting similar investigations on the "Fertilizer Fund Scam" all over
the country[55] Monteros also reiterated that respondents suffered anxiety, humiliation, and depression by reason of
the length of time the case remained pending.[56] As such, the petition violates the prohibition on double jeopardy.[57]

Respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, Elumba, and Lozada likewise filed their joint comment [58] raising the same
arguments as Monteros,[59] but they cited the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan[60] (Cagang) in arguing that there was
inordinate delay.

Palacio did not file a comment or any pleading before this Court.

The prosecution, in its reply, [61] reiterated its arguments in the petition. Notably, it added that based on Cagang as
well, the fact-finding investigation of the OMB is not yet adversarial in nature, thus, the period for it should not be
counted in determining delay.[62] The prosecution also emphasized that there were cases where this Court ruled that
the right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated despite the lapse of a considerable amount of time during
the investigation of the OMB.[63]

Issue

The issue for resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the motions filed by respondents, which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case
and their acquittal.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal cases.

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the dismissal of the instant criminal case against respondents constitutes
acquittal. Thus, it may only be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, [64] as done
here by the prosecution. Grave abuse of discretion must be alleged in order for the petition to prosper. [65] It must be
shown that respondent court or tribunal "acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack or jurisdiction;" [66] it must be "so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."[67]

In contention here is the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the criminal cases against respondents by reason of
inordinate delay.
The Constitution guarantees every person's right to speedy disposition of cases. Article III, Section 16 states:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

The Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[68] laid down the guidelines for determining if there is a violation of the right
to speedy disposition of cases:

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both
rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition
of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary
investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall
not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time
periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated
by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the
delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the
delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the
delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed
procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity
of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case,
from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice,
such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence.
Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of
further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by
the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the
accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are
deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.[69]
Applying the guidelines in Cagang, the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition
of cases.

Period for fact-finding investigation not

included in the determination of
inordinate delay.

Initially, it is very clear in Cagang that the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be included in the
determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned from the filing of a formal complaint.
[70]
In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with the OMB primarily pertains to the period taken for preliminary
investigation.

In this regard, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the period for fact-finding in its determination of the period
relevant to inordinate delay.

The Sandiganbayan summarized the dates relevant for inordinate delay:

1. July 4, 2011 - Task Force Abono filed a complaint before the OMB;
2. August 10, 2011 - an Order directing respondents (accused) to file their respective counter-affidavits and
supporting documents was issued;
3. September 14, 2011 - respondent Geotina filed her counter-affidavit;
4. September 20, 2011 - respondents Lozada, Monteros, and Casurra filed their counter-affidavits;
5. October 18, 2011 - respondent Edera filed his counter-affidavit;
6. April 17, 2012 - respondents filed their supplemental counter-affidavits;
7. April 20, 2012 - an Order directing the parties to file their verified position papers was issued;
8. June 14, 2012 - respondents Edera, Monteros, Geotina, Elumba, and Lozada filed their position paper;
9. November 4, 2013 - the case was submitted for resolution;
10. October 5, 2016 - the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3016;
11. March 22, 2017 - the Honorable Ombudsman approved the resolution;
12. April 26, 2017 and May 2, 2017 - respondents filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the October 5,
2016 Resolution of the OMB;
13. September 11, 2017 - an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.[71]

In fine, the OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from the filing of the complaint on July 4, 2011 and
ended on the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on September 11, 2017. Again, the period for fact-
finding investigations shall not be included in the determination of inordinate delay. Thus, it took six years, two
months, and seven days for the OMB to conduct its preliminary investigation. The question now is whether this
amount of time constitutes inordinate delay.

Prosecution bears the burden of proof;

it failed to show that the delay was
reasonable.

Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the right was invoked. The
defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the periods prescribed by this Court, the Rules of Court, or
the OMB for the conduct of preliminary investigation; the prosecution bears the burden if the right was invoked
beyond the set periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the factors provided in Cagang.[72]

As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman [73] then in effect do not provide for the period within which
the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the periods provided for in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court shall have
suppletory application.[74] Applying Sections 3(f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, [75] the graft investigation officer
shall have 10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause; then, he has five days from resolution to
forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act upon the resolution within 10 days from receipt.
Here, it is clear that the prescribed periods were not observed. As can be gleaned, the case was submitted for
resolution on November 4, 2013. But looking closely, records show that the last pleading was submitted on June 14,
2012, when respondents submitted their position papers. As there were no further submissions or orders for parties
to submit further pleadings as well as hearings, the case should have been submitted for resolution as early as June
14, 2012.

It was only on October 5, 2016 when the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause, which is almost three
years after the case was submitted for resolution, or more than four years from the date the last pleadings were
submitted—clearly way beyond the 10-day period. Further, the Ombudsman herself approved the resolution only on
March 22, 2017, which is almost six months after the issuance of the resolution—again way beyond the five-day and
10-day period respectively prescribed for the transmittal of the records to her office and for her to act upon the
resolution.

The next step is the determination of when respondents invoked their right to speedy disposition of cases. The timing
of invocation affects which side bears the burden of proof to justify the delay. Records show that the earliest time
respondents invoked the right was when respondent Monteros filed a motion for reconsideration of the OMB October
5, 2016 Resolution.[76] The right was invoked after the lapse of the periods prescribed, resulting to the burden shifting
to the prosecution.

As the prosecution bears the burden, it shall prove that the delay was reasonable. Following the parameters in
Cagang, the prosecution failed to do so. It merely made allegations that the OMB is deluged with cases and that the
instant case is complex. These excuses fail to convince the Court.

While the Court recognizes the reality of institutional delay in government agencies, including the OMB, this solely
does not justify the office's failure to promptly resolve cases before it.[77] The OMB cannot just claim institutional delay
or the "steady stream" of cases reaching its office as an excuse for not resolving cases timely. After all, the
Constitution itself, as enforced and bolstered by The Ombudsman Act of 1989, requires the OMB to promptly act on
complaints filed before it against public officials and government employees. [78] As further stated in jurisprudence, the
allegation of heavy case load of a particular government agency should "still be subject to proof as to its effects on a
particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right." [79]
The OMB should clearly show that delay is inevitable because of the peculiar circumstances of each specific case,
which it failed to do so in this case. The OMB here failed to show that this specific procurement of fertilizer had
peculiar circumstances to make delay inevitable.

The Court understands that the instant case is part of the so called "Fertilizer Fund Scam" cases. However, this does
not mean that the case is highly complex that requires a serious amount of time. Records show that the instant case
involves only one transaction: the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in two tranches. There is also no allegation
that respondents here conspired with other government officials involved in the other Fertilizer Fund Scam cases
elsewhere in the country. Further, there are only seven respondents. To add, the OMB was in effect assisted by the
COA in the latter's issuance of the NOD. In fact, it was the primary basis of the Task Force's filing of the complaint.
Likewise, there was no showing that the records of this case were voluminous that would necessitate a number of
years for the conduct of review.

In the cases of Javier v. Sandiganbayan[80] and Catamco v. Sandiganbayan[81] (Catamco), which also involve the
"Fertilizer Fund Scam," the OMB also posited the same arguments of complexity and voluminous records. The Court,
in ruling that there was inordinate delay, disregarded the OMB's arguments absent proof as regards the assertions.
Similarly in the instant case, the OMB did not show proof of complexity and volume that would make the delay
inevitable and justified.

For the Court, the delay was unreasonable. Six years, two months, and seven days for the preliminary investigation
of a case involving a single transaction and seven respondents is too long a period for this Court to accommodate.

Respondents suffered prejudice.

In addition to the discussion, the prosecution must show that respondents did not suffer prejudice as a result of the
delay. In this regard, the prosecution failed to show that respondents did not suffer prejudice. The Court recognizes
that the inordinate delay places the accused in a protracted period of uncertainty which may cause "anxiety,
suspicion, or even hostility."[82] The Court also recognizes that the lengthy delay would result to the accused's inability
to adequately prepare for the case which would result to the deterioration or loss of evidence, leading to impairment
of the accused's defense.[83]

Thus, it is inevitable that respondents in this case suffer the same predicament. Surely, they suffered anxiety due to
the long period of uncertainty while waiting for the resolution of the case. The delay affected their ability to prepare for
their defense. As found by the Sandiganbayan, respondents suffered public humiliation and embarrassment as a
result of the case dragging on for so long. [84] These circumstances constitute the actual prejudice that respondents
have suffered as a result of the delay.[85]

Right was timely invoked.

Cagang requires that the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. In Catamco[86] and Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan,[87] the Court, applying Cagang, considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the OMB
resolution finding probable cause as a timely invocation of the right.

Here, the Court considers the motion for reconsideration [88] filed by Monteros before the OMB sufficient for purposes
of determining whether the respondents' right to speedy disposition had been violated. Her invocation of the right in
the motion is deemed to cover the other respondents as they are co-respondents in a single case and it assails a
single resolution that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy of great consideration is respondents' immediate
filing of the motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan after the filing of the Information. These circumstances show
that respondents did not in any way sleep or waive their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Considering all the foregoing, respondents' right to speedy disposition of cases was undoubtedly infringed. The
Sandiganbayan therefore did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case against them.

As for respondent Palacio, the Court notes that the instant petition did not assail the Sandiganbayan September 7,
2018 Resolution[89] that dismissed the criminal case as against her. The instant petition assails only the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions that dismissed the criminal case as against the rest of the respondents. Thus, Palacio's
acquittal still stands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The November 27, 2017 Resolution and April 18, 2018 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1669 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218663. February 28, 2022 ]
MUNICIPALITY OF CORELLA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSE NICANOR D. TOCMO,
PETITIONER, VS. PHILKONSTRAK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND VITO RAPAL,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 30, 2015 Decision [2] and
June 9, 2015 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 06516, affirming in toto the October 27,
2011 Decision[4] and November 25, 2011 Order[5] of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) in CIAC
Case No. 19-2011 entitled "Philkonstrak Development Corp. v. Municipality of Corella, represented by Hon. Jose
Nicanor D. Tocmo and Hon. Vito B. Rapal, in his personal capacity." The Municipality of Corella, represented by
Mayor Jose Nicanor D. Tocmo (Tocmo), was ordered to pay Philkonstrak [6] Development Corporation (Philkonstrak)
the amount of P12,844,650.00.

The Antecedents:

Corella is a municipality located in Bohol. It is represented by its municipal mayor, Tocmo. [7] On the other hand,
Philkonstrak is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. It is a private firm engaged in the
business of design/build construction.[8] Vito Rapal (Rapal) was the former mayor of Corella. [9] During the pendency of
the proceedings, Rapal is the Vice-Mayor of Corella.[10]

Sometime in 2009, Corella conducted a public bidding for the rehabilitation and improvement of its municipal
waterworks system project. Philkonstrak emerged as the winning bidder.[11]

Subsequently, Corella, through then Mayor Rapal, entered into a contract agreement [12] (contract) with Philkonstrak
for the rehabilitation and improvement of the municipal waterworks system for a total amount of P15,997,732.63.[13]

Pursuant to the contract, Philkonstrak procured the materials, equipment, and the labor force for the mobilization of
the construction works. During the course of the project, Philkonstrak submitted progress reports to the municipal
engineer of Corella for coordination and supervision.[14]

As of December 2009, Philkonstrak accomplished more than 50% of the work essential for the project for which
Philkonstrak expended the amount of P8,233,000.00.[15] When Corella, through Tocmo, refused to pay and denied
liability, Philkonstrak was forced to suspend its construction works.[16] Consequently, Philkonstrak sent Corella,
through Tocmo, a formal demand letter [17] to pay for the actual expenses incurred by Philkonstrak. Philkonstrak also
sent a demand letter[18] to Rapal.

Tocmo, in his reply,[19] denied liability and questioned the validity of the contract. He averred that Rapal had no
authority to enter into such contract during his term as mayor of Corella.[20]

On April 28, 2011, Philkonstrak filed before the CIAC a complaint [21] for collection of sum of money against Corella
and Rapal, as Rapal was the mayor at the time the contract was signed and whose signature appeared thereon. The
case was docketed as CIAC Case No. 19-2011.

In its complaint, Philkonstrak claimed, among others, that it had already undertaken more than 50% of the
construction work for the completion of the project, which caused it to incur the amount of Php 8,233,000.00,
excluding other materials that were not yet installed as per the completion report.[22]

According to Philkonstrak, Tocmo refused to pay the obligation on behalf of Corella primarily because of his political
differences with Rapal.[23] Philkonstrak averred that it had no knowledge of the underlying issues between the
administrations of Tocmo and Rapal, and that it merely complied faithfully with the terms of the contract.[24]

Philkonstrak prayed for attorney's fees, legal interest, exemplary damages, arbitration fees, and other expenses.[25]

On August 1, 2011, Rapal filed his answer, [26] admitting the material allegations of the complaint and averring that he
was authorized to enter into the contract with Philkonstrak for the rehabilitation/improvement of the waterworks
system of Corella[27] in accordance with Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02 [28] or "An Ordinance Appropriating the
Amount of Twenty-Seven Million Pesos (Php 27,000,000.00) for the Purchase of the Following Heavy Equipment:
One Unit Brand New Road Grader, One Unit Reconditioned Road Roller, and Rehabilitation/Improvement on the
Existing Waterworks System of the [Local Government Unit]."[29]

On August 19, 2011, Corella filed its answer,[30] denying the material allegations of the complaint. It asserted that the
contract is not binding because Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02 was in violation of Article 107(g) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 [31] otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991."

Furthermore, Corella contended that Rapal was in bad faith since he knew that the municipal ordinance was defective
and ineffective; thus, he was not legally authorized to enter into a contract with Philkonstrak for lack of a valid
municipal ordinance.[32]
Ruling of the Construction
Industry Arbitration
Commission:

On October 27, 2011, the CIAC issued a Decision[33] finding the contract between Philkonstrak and Corella to be
valid. Thus, Corella, through its present mayor, Tocmo, breached the contract when he refused to honor the
obligation. The CIAC ordered Corella to pay Philkonstrak the total amount of P12,844,650.00, which includes claims
for unpaid billings, delivered but uninstalled materials, and accrued interest. The CIAC exonerated Rapal from any
liability arising from the repudiation of the contract on the principle of res inter alios acta. The dispositive portion of the
CIAC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby decides and awards in full and final disposition of this arbitration, as follows:

(a) Respondent Municipality of Corella, Bohol is hereby ordered to pay [Philkonstrak] its (i) claim in the amount of Php
8,233,000.00, representing the value of work done and material supplied for the rehabilitation and improvement of the
waterworks system of respondent Municipality and (ii) the claim in the amount of Php 4,000,000.00 representing the
value of materials needed for the rehabilitation and improvement of the waterworks system of Respondent
Municipality which [Philkonstrak] had purchased and delivered but were not installed due to the repudiation of the
Contract by Respondent Municipality of Corella.

(b) Respondent Municipality of Corella is hereby ordered to pay [Philkonstrak] the amount of Php 611,650.00
representing accrued legal interest; provided that if the principal amounts decreed in paragraph (a) above are not fully
paid after the award shall have become final and executory, the said principal amounts shall earn interest at the legal
rate of 12% per annum computed from the date this award shall become final and executory and until whole amount
is fully paid.

(c) [Philkonstrak's] claims for attorney fees and exemplary damages are denied.

(d) [Philkonstrak] shall pay two-third (2/3) and Respondent Municipality of Corella shall pay one-third (1/3) of the cost
of arbitration which shall include the following:
Total Arbitration Fee [Philkonstrak's] Share [Municipality of Corella's]
(75%) Share (25%)

(i) Filing Fee P22,346.79 P16,782.59 P5,564.20

(ii) Administrative Fee 23,666.79 17,750.09 5,916.70

(iii) Arbitrators' Fees 287,118.82 215,339.12 71,779.70

(iv) Arbitration Dev't Fund 17,844.65 13,383.49 4,461.16

P350,977.05 P263,255.29 P87,721.76

(e) All other requests for relief not granted or disposed of here are hereby denied.

Summary of Award
Nature of Claim Amount Claimed Amount Awarded

[Philkonstrak's] claim for unpaid P8,233,000.00 P8,233,000.00

billings for work done and material
supplied

[Philkonstrak's] claim for material P4,000,000.00 P4,000,000.00

purchased and delivered but not
installed
[Philkonstrak's] claim for accrued P611,650.00 P611,650.00
interest

[Philkonstrak's] claim for attorney's P2,500,000.00 none

fees

[Philkonstrak's] claim for exemplary P2,500,000.00 none

damages

Total P17,844,650.00 P12,844,650.00

Further, [Municipality of Corella] shall reimburse the amount advanced by [Philkonstrak] in the amount of eighty-
seven thousand seven hundred twenty-one pesos and 76/100 (P87,721.76) representing one third of the total
arbitration fees.[34]
Aggrieved, Corella filed a motion for correction of final award [35] dated November 21, 2011, claiming that the award of
P4,000,000.00 for the uninstalled materials should be deleted because it is inconsistent and contradictory to the
quantum meruit principle applied by the CIAC.

On November 25, 2011, the CIAC issued an Order [36] which ruled that Corella's motion for correction of final award
actually partook of a motion for reconsideration because it sought to change the CIAC ruling; that such motion for
reconsideration of the substantive merits of the dispute is not allowed under the CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure
Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules); and that the same is denied for lack of merit.[37]

On January 19, 2012, the CIAC issued another Order, [38] granting Philkonstrak's motion for execution of judgment and
issuance of writ of execution[39] dated December 2, 2011. The CIAC held that its October 27, 2011 Decision had
become final and executory.[40]

On December 26, 2011, Corella appealed[41] to the CA through a petition for review [42] under Rule 43 with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for stay of execution [43] the October 27,
2011 CIAC Decision.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its Decision[44] dated January 30, 2015, the CA dismissed Corella's petition for review, finding no cogent reason to
reverse and set aside the October 27, 2011 CIAC Decision ordering Corella to pay Philkonstrak the amount of
P12,844,650.00. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The CIAC's Decision dated October 27, 2011 and its Order dated
November 25, 2011 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[45]
The CA denied Corella's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution [46] dated June 9, 2015, finding no new, valid, and
justifiable ground or reason that would compel it to alter or reverse its ruling.

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.[47]

Issues

Corella seeks relief in its petition for review on certiorari on the following questions of law, to wit:
1. Can a mayor enter into a contract with a corporation without prior authorization from the sangguniang bayan as
required by [RA] 7160 and [RA] 9184?

2. Can a mayor enter into a contract with a corporation without the proper appropriation of public funds as required by
the 1987 Constitution as reflected in Presidential Decree 1445 and Executive Order 292?

3. Will a [Department of Interior and Local Government] Circular prevail over the EN BANC Decision of the Supreme
Court in Quisumbing, et al. v. Garcia, et al. docketed as G.R. No. 175527 dated December 8, 2008?

4. Can a final and executory decision of a quasi-judicial agency (CIAC) still be subject to judicial review?[48]
Summarizing all four questions, the main issue in the case at bar is this: whether or not the CA is correct in affirming
the Decision of the CIAC which found that the contract between Philkonstrak and Corella was valid, and which
ordered Corella to pay Philkonstrak the amount of P12,844,650.00 for breach of the same.

Our Ruling
The petition is granted in part. The contract between Philkonstrak and Corella is not valid and binding. However,
Corella is obliged to pay Philkonstrak on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit.

No separate sangguniang
bayan authorization is
necessary when the
appropriation ordinance is
sufficient in detail.

Corella, through Tocmo, alleged that then Mayor Rapal failed to secure proper authorization from the sangguniang
bayan of Corella before entering into the contract with Philkonstrak,[49] citing the following laws and provisions as
bases:

First, Section 22(c) of the Local Government Code and Article 107(g) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR), to wit:
SECTION 22. Corporate Powers.

xxxx

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of
the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such
contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.

xxxx

ARTICLE 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. - The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and
resolutions:

xxxx

(g) No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purpose
shall be valid unless approved by a majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance or
resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative
vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members for its passage. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, RA 9184[50] or the "Government Procurement Reform Act," specifically the last paragraph of Section 37, to
wit:
SECTION 37. Notice and Execution of Award. - x x x

xxxx

The Procuring Entity shall issue the Notice to Proceed to the winning bidder not later than seven (7) calendar days
from the date of the approval of the contract by the appropriate authority. All notices called for by the terms of
the contract shall be effective only at the time of receipt thereof by the contractor. (Emphasis supplied)
Tocmo asserts that before then Mayor Rapal entered into the contract on behalf of Corella with Philkonstrak, two
requirements were necessary to be met:[51] (1) prior authorization from the sangguniang bayan of Corella, in
accordance with Section 22(c) of the Local Government Code and Section 37 of the Government Procurement Act;
and (2) the appropriation ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating a liability,
[52]
in accordance with Article 107(g) of the IRR of the Local Government Code.

Tocmo posits that the two documents or requirements are separate and distinct from each other. [53] As to the first
requirement of prior authorization from the sangguniang bayan, Tocmo alleged that:
18. The contract merely describes the contracting parties as the "Municipality of Corella" and "Philkonstrak
Development Corporation" and signed by Respondent Vito B. Rapal and Jesse J. Ang. Nowhere is there any showing
that the contract contains the "prior authorization of the sanggunian concerned." No ordinance authorizing
respondent Rapal to enter into a contract was made an integral part of the contract. The contract besides
being 149 pages long does not contain any prior authorization ordinance. Page two of the contract, which
outlines the contract documents, does not include an ordinance authorizing respondent Rapal to enter into a
contract with Philkonstrak.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court disagrees. It must be emphasized that such issue is not novel.

In the landmark case of Quisumbing v. Garcia[55] (Quisumbing) the Court delineated when a sangguniang bayan
authorization is still necessary to accompany the appropriation ordinance and when it is not. Depending on the
circumstances of the case, if the project is provided for in sufficient detail in the appropriation ordinance, meaning the
transactions, bonds, contracts, documents, and other obligations the mayor would enter into in behalf of the
municipality, among others, are enumerated, then no separate authorization is necessary. On the other hand, if the
project is merely couched in general and generic terms, then a separate approval by the sangguniang bayan in
accordance with the law is required.

The recent case of Verceles, Jr. v. Commission on Audit [56] (Verceles) citing Quisumbing, elaborated on this issue,
thus:
Explained simply, the [Local Government Code] requires the local chief executive to secure prior authorization from
the sanggunian before he can enter into contracts on behalf of the LGU. A separate prior authorization is no longer
required if the specific projects are covered by appropriations of the LGU. The appropriation ordinance passed by
the sanggunian is the local chief executive's authority to enter into a contract implementing the project.

As required in Quisumbing, the local chief executive must inquire if the provisions in the appropriation ordinance
specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered into.

If the project or program is identified in the appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then there is no more
need to obtain a separate or additional authority from the sanggunian. In such case, the project and the cost
are already identified and approved by the sanggunian through the appropriation ordinance. To require the
local chief executive to secure another authorization for a project that has been specifically identified and approved
by the sanggunian is antithetical to a responsive local government envisioned in the Constitution and in the [Local
Government Code].[57] (Emphasis supplied)
As the Verceles case explained, "sufficient authority" in an appropriation ordinance simply means specifically and
expressly setting aside an amount of money for a certain project or program.[58]

In the case at bar, the Court finds that there is no need for a separate authorization from the sangguniang bayan as
the appropriation ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02, identified the project or program in sufficient detail,
and not just in general or generic terms. The one-paged appropriation ordinance specifically and expressly set aside
an amount of money, P27,000,000.00, for certain projects, including the purchase of specific heavy equipment and
rehabilitation/improvement of the existing waterworks system of the municipality. Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02,
having sufficiently covered the project and the cost in detail, need not be accompanied by a prior sangguniang bayan
authorization any longer.

An appropriation ordinance
requires the affirmative vote of a
majority of all the sanggunian
members.

Article 107(g) of the IRR of the Local Government Code provides the general rule that no ordinance or resolution
shall be passed by the sanggunian without prior approval of a majority of all the members present. The exception to
the general rule is that for ordinances or resolutions authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating a
liability, what is needed is the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members, whether present or
not. Simply, the quorum in the general rule depends on the number of the sanggunian members present while the
quorum in the exception depends on the total number of sanggunian members voted into office.

In the case at bar, Corella asserts that Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02, the appropriation ordinance in question,
directs and authorizes the payment of money; thus, requires a majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang
bayan, not only of the members present. Thus, since the sangguniang bayan of Corella is composed of a total of 11
members, the majority vote of six is required in order for municipal ordinance no. 2010-02 to be valid and binding.
However, the municipal ordinance only obtained five affirmative votes, based on the quorum on the sanggunian
members present at that time, which was eight members. Thus, Tocmo contends that Municipal Ordinance No.
2010-02 is null and void. Consequently, the contract between Corella and Philkonstrak is null and void too.
The CIAC and the CA ruled otherwise. Both tribunals noted that upon the disapproval [59] of Municipal Ordinance No.
2010-02 by the sangguniang panlalawigan of Bohol for not meeting the required majority number, then Mayor Rapal
elevated the matter to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The Regional Director of the DILG
issued an Opinion,[60] the pertinent portion of which was cited by both the CIAC and CA in their Decisions, to wit:
Hence, for all intents and purposes, the legislative process has been completed, and that the subject
ordinance [Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02] is now accorded with the presumption of validity . Moreover, it
might interest you to know that DILG Central Office had the occasion to opine, under DILG Opinion No. 103 S 2001
dated December 18, 2001, that the Local Government Code of 1991 does not expressly prescribe for a specific
voting requirement for the passage of an appropriation ordinance. Hence, the general rule on the passage of
an ordinance should be made to apply. The pertinent provision on the matter is Article 107 (g) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. 7160 x x x.[61] (Emphasis supplied)
Both the CIAC and the CA applied the opinion of the Regional Director of the DILG to their Decisions, noting that
Tocmo, the present Mayor, did not take any steps to question the validity of the Opinion, thus, it had become final and
binding on the concerned parties.

The Court disagrees with the CIAC and the CA.

The long-standing principle of contemporaneous construction is applicable in the case at bar. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that the principle of contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control. [62] However, the
exception is that the construction may be disregarded by competent authorities or judicial courts when it is clearly
erroneous, when strong reason to the contrary exists, or when the court has previously given the statute a different
interpretation.[63]

In this case, the DILG Opinion was given as a contemporaneous administrative construction of the term
"appropriation ordinance" and "that the Local Government Code does not expressly prescribe for a specific voting
requirement for the passage of the same."[64] However, the Court finds the construction of the DILG clearly erroneous.

The term "appropriation," as defined under Section 306, Title V of the Local Government Code "refers to an
authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from local government funds
under specified conditions or for specific purposes."

Juxtaposing this definition with the exception in Article 107(g) of the IRR of the Local Government Code, that "any
ordinance x x x authorizing or directing the payment of money x x x, shall require the affirmative vote of a
majority of all the sanggunian members," it is express and clear that an "appropriation ordinance" is one such
ordinance contemplated in the exception.

The definition of the term "appropriation" in the Local Government Code is clear: [i]t is an authorization made by an
ordinance that directs the payment of money. The exception to the general rule of the prescribed voting requirement
in the IRR of the Local Government Code is clear: an ordinance that directs or authorizes the payment of money
needs a quorum of all the sanggunian members, not only of those sanggunian members present.

The Court, thus, holds that the DILG Opinion is erroneous, and the CIAC and CA wrongfully applied the same to their
Decisions.

The CIAC Decision is not

anymore subject to judicial
review.

The CIAC and the CA both ruled that the October 27, 2011 CIAC Decision had already become final and executory
on the ground that Corella's motion for correction of final award, which was actually a motion for reconsideration, was
a prohibited pleading under Section 17.2[65] of the CIAC Rules, thus, did not stop the running of the reglementary
period for appeal. The CA ruled that:
Since the motion for correction did not fall under any of the grounds provided by the CIAC's Rules, it is considered a
motion for reconsideration and a prohibited pleading. It did not interrupt the running of the fifteen (15) days period for
petitioner to file its petition to this Court. Consequently, after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days from November 10,
2011 or on November 25, 2011, the CIAC's decision has already become final and executory because petitioner
failed to file its petition for review within the period provided by law. The CIAC was correct to issue on January 19,
2012 an Order, declaring that the Final Award has become final and executory.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. While there are recognized exceptions - e.g., the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable - none of these exceptions apply to the present case.[66] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court agrees. As aptly pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe during the deliberations
of this case, a CIAC Final Award, equivalent to a trial court final decision as opposed to a partial award or decision, is
still susceptible to judicial review. However, when availing of judicial reliefs against a CIAC Final Award, one must still
abide by the procedural framework set therefor, such as the periods of appeal and prohibited motions. If the said
party fails to comply, he or she is equally bound by the finality of judgment principle.

The recent case of Department of Labor and Employment v. Kentex Manufacturing Corporation,[67] citing Mocorro, Jr.
v. Ramirez,[68] explains the primacy of the finality of judgment principle, to wit:
A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the
modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.
And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions
of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all.
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost
respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication.
Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of
prior adjudication is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends
to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.[69]
The CA nor this Court may not anymore step in to modify or correct a quasi-judicial agency's decision that has
already been deemed final and executory. If this were so, then there would be no end to litigation stemming from the
CIAC, which is against the expeditious nature of such proceedings and hence, against the public policy underlying
arbitration.

Here, records show that the CIAC Decision rendered in favor of Philkonstrak had already attained finality since
Corella's Motion for Correction of Final Award did not toll the period to appeal given that it did not raise the accepted
grounds stated in Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules therefor. The Motion for Correction only questioned the final award
based on the quantum meruit principle, and thus, was properly considered by the CIAC as a motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading.

Under the CIAC Rules, a party aggrieved by a final award may contest the same by filing either a motion for
correction or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.[70] However, if a motion for correction is filed and said motion is not based on the exclusive grounds
enumerated under Section 17.1, such filing will not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. [71] Consequently, if
the period to appeal has lapsed, a final arbitral award shall be considered as executory. [72] The pertinent provisions of
the CIAC Rules read:
RULE 17
Post-Award Proceedings

SECTION 17.1 Motion for Correction of Final Award - Any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the Final
Award within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof upon any of the following grounds:
1. an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error;
2. an evident mistake in the description of any party, person, date, amount, thing or property referred to in
the award;
3. where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the
decision upon the matter submitted;
4. where the arbitrators have failed or omitted to resolve certain issue/s formulated by the parties in the
Terms of Reference (TOR) and submitted to them for resolution; and
5. where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.

xxxx
17.1.2 A motion for correction upon grounds other than those mentioned in this section shall not interrupt the running
of the period for appeal.
xxxx
RULE 18
Execution of Final Award

SECTION 18.1 Execution of Award. - A final arbitral award shall become executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof by the parties.

SECTION 18.2 Petition for Review. - A petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

xxxx

SECTION 18.5 Execution/Enforcement of Awards. - As soon as a decision, order or final award has become
executory, the Arbitral Tribunal (or the surviving remaining member/s), shall, motu proprio or on motion of the
prevailing party issue a writ of execution requiring any sheriff or proper officer to execute said decision, order or final
award. If there are no remaining/surviving appointed arbitrator/s, the Commission shall issue the writ prayed for.

xxxx
Since Corella's Motion was not based on any of the enumerated grounds under Section 17.2, the fifteen-(15) day
period to file a petition for review before the CA was not suspended. As Corella received the CIAC Decision on
November 10, 2011,[73] it had until November 25, 2011 to file its petition for review. Thus, when Corella filed its Rule
43 petition before the CA on December 26, 2011, the same was already filed out of time and hence, executory and
immutable.

Notably, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether it be made by
the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. [74] This principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications
is not confined in its operation to the judgments of courts, but extends as well to those of all other tribunals exercising
adjudicatory powers.[75] While this principle recognizes certain exceptions as enumerated in the CA Decision above,
none are present in this case.

Thus, considering that the CIAC Decision had already attained finality, the CIAC Decision, as affirmed by the CA,
should not be disturbed.

The principle of quantum

meruit is applicable in this
case.

Quantum meruit literally means "as much as he deserves." [76] This legal principle, a principle predicated on equity,
states that a person may recover a reasonable value of the thing he delivered or the service he rendered. It is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain a benefit
without paying for it.[77]

The Court has held in the past that recovery on the basis of quantum meruit is allowed despite the invalidity or
absence of a written contract between a contractor and a government agency. The absence or invalidity of
required documents would not necessarily preclude the contractor from receiving payment for the services
he or she has rendered for the government.[78]

Thus, in the case at bar, despite the invalidity of Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02, which in turn rendered the
contract between Corella and Philkonstrak, invalid, the latter is still entitled to receive payment for the services it
rendered for the local government of Corella. Corella cannot be unjustly enriched and allowed to retain the benefits of
the services rendered by Philkonstrak without properly paying for it.

Philkonstrak sufficiently established its right to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. As gleaned from the
records of the case, the Court finds that Philkonstrak entered into the contract in good faith and for the good interest
of Corella, notwithstanding the allegation of Corella that Philkonstrak "conspired, if not, even was the brains behind all
these irregularities"[79] with then Mayor Rapal "in an effort to do away with public policy." [80] However, such allegation
was not proven to be true by either the CIAC or the CA.

To deny Philkonstrak compensation for more than 50% of the services it already rendered, services which clearly
benefited Corella, would be the height of injustice, which cannot be countenanced by this Court. This is especially
true since the use of the road grader, the reconditioned road roller, and the rehabilitation/improvement on the existing
waterworks system benefited the government and people of Corella. It is but just that Philkonstrak be compensated
for the services it rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Contract Agreement between the Municipality of Corella and
Philkonstrak Development Corporation is declared NULL and VOID. The January 30, 2015 Decision and June 9,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 06516 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Based on the
principle of quantum meruit, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

(a) The Municipality of Corella is hereby ordered to pay Philkonstrak Development Corporation:
(i) The amount of P8,233,000.00, representing the value of work done and materials supplied for the
rehabilitation and improvement of the waterworks system of the Municipality of Corella;

(ii) The amount of P4,000,000.00 representing the value of materials needed for the rehabilitation and
improvement of the waterworks system of the Municipality of Corella which Philkonstrak Development
Corporation had purchased and delivered but were not installed due to the repudiation of the Contract
Agreement by the Municipality of Corella.

(b) The Municipality of Corella is hereby ordered to pay Philkonstrak accrued legal interest from the time the CIAC
Decision became final on October 27, 2011, at the rate of 12% per annum, until June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013
until full payment of the amount is made, the accrued legal interest shall be 6% per annum.[81] The total of the
foregoing amount shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until full
payment.

(c) Philkonstrak Development Corporation shall pay two-thirds (2/3), and the Municipality of Corella shall pay one-
third (1/3), of the cost of arbitration, in accordance with the Terms of Reference [82] agreed upon by the parties which
provides that:
[The] cost of arbitration which includes the filing, administrative, arbitrators' fees and charges for Arbitration
Development Fund, including all incidental expenses, shall be on pro rata basis (or other modes of sharing), subject
to the determination of the Arbitral Tribunal which of the parties shall eventually shoulder such cost or the mode of
sharing thereof.[83]
The mode of sharing as determined by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission is affirmed by this Court,
which is as follows:
Total Arbitration Fee Philkonstrak's Share Municipality of Corella's
(75%) Share (25%)

(i) Filing Fee P22,346.79 P16,782.59 P5,564.20

(ii) Administrative Fee 23,666.79 17,750.09 5,916.70

(iii) Arbitrators' Fees 287,118.82 215,339.12 71,779.70

(iv) Arbitration Dev't Fund 17,844.65 13,383.49 4,461.16

P350,977.05 P263,255.29 P87,721.76

Thus, the Municipality of Corella shall reimburse the amount advanced by Philkonstrak Development Corporation in
the amount of P87,721.76, representing one-third of the total arbitration fees.
SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 247522. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZORAIDA MARIANO A.K.A.
NORA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

On appeal[1] is the August 16, 2018 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01746-MIN,
affirming the March 21, 2017 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
Nos. 70,389-11 and 70,390-11 which found accused-appellant Zoraida Mariano a.k.a. Nora (Nora) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale) and 11 (Illegal Possession) of Article II, Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,[4] or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
Version of the Prosecution:

On August 6, 2011, at about 11:30 a.m., a confidential informant (CI) notified Police Officer (PO) 3 Lendro Tutor (PO3
Tutor) about the illegal drug activities of Nora and her co-accused in front of NCCC Supermarket in Magsaysay
Avenue, Davao City.[5] A buy bust team was thus formed with PO3 Tutor as the designated poseur buyer, and PO2
Virgilio Arubio (PO2 Arubio) and PO1 Junila Acierto (PO1 Acierto) as immediate back up. [6] PO3 Tutor was given a
P1,000.00 bill with serial number PS746307, marked with his initials "LBT," as buy-bust money. [7] Prior to dispatch to
the target area, the Certificate of Coordination[8] was prepared.

At around past 12:00 noon, the team proceeded to the area in front of the NCCC Supermarket. [9] As they passed by
the supermarket, the CI identified Nora and her co-accused who were then standing beside an electrical post outside
a Banco de Oro (BDO) bank.[10] Thereafter, PO3 Tutor and the CI alighted from the vehicle and walked towards Nora
and her co-accused, while the backup team positioned themselves outside the supermarket and across the BDO
bank.[11] The CI approached Nora and talked to her while PO3 Tutor stayed three meters away from them. [12] When
the CI signaled PO3 Tutor to walk towards them, the latter was introduced to Nora as the buyer of shabu.[13]

After the introduction, Nora glanced at PO3 Tutor and made an eye gesture towards her co-accused. [14] Afterwards,
the co-accused walked towards PO3 Tutor and asked how much he was going to buy, to which the latter answered
"bulig," which means P1,000.[15] PO3 Tutor gave the marked money to the co-accused, who handed it over to Nora.[16]
Nora took out one elongated transparent plastic sachet from her shoulder bag and discreetly gave it to PO3 Tutor. [17]
After examining the contents of the sachet containing what appeared to be shabu, PO3 Tutor gave the pre-arranged
signal by removing the towel from his shoulder to alert the backup team.[18]

When the backup team arrived, they introduced themselves as police officers and arrested Nora and her co-accused.
[19]
PO3 Tutor also conducted a body search on Nora and recovered one big plastic sachet containing shabu weighing
1.0923 grams; forty (40) pieces of elongated sachets containing shabu weighing 3.5437 grams; and cash in the
amount of P10,150.00.[20] Thereafter, PO3 Tutor placed the seized items in separate evidence pouches and kept
them in his custody.[21] In order not to compromise the security of the police officers and the accused due to the
crowding of people in the area, they immediately brought Nora and her co-accused to the police station.[22]

Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Tutor placed his markings on the seized items and indorsed [23] them, as well as
the accused, to the desk officer, PO2 Adnan Ahadain (PO2 Ahadain). [24] Subsequently, PO2 Ahadain placed his own
markings on the seized items and returned them to PO3 Tutor as the latter was the evidence custodian and
investigating officer.[25] PO3 Tutor labeled the evidence pouches and placed them in his locker for safekeeping. [26]
Thereafter, be prepared the necessary documents for inventory, drug test, and laboratory examination of the seized
items.[27]
Since the buy-bust operation happened on a Saturday, the inventory of the seized items was conducted only on
August 8, 2011 in the presence of Nora, Roger Abella from Brigada News, Barangay Chairman Joel Landero, and
Noel Polito from the Department of Justice (DOJ).[28] The Certificate of Inventory[29] was prepared and photographs of
the accused and the seized items were also taken.[30]

Afterwards, PO3 Tutor delivered the seized items, along with the Letter Request for Laboratory Examination to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.[31] The said items were received by PO1 Jerry A. Marron (PO1 Marron), who placed his initials
"JAM" on the drug specimens, as well as its corresponding weights.[32] Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector
(PSI) April Dela Rosa Fabian (PSI Fabian) conducted a qualitative examination on the drug specimens, which tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, as evidenced by Chemistry Report No. D-128-11. [33]
Then, the drug specimens were turned over to SPO2 Antonio Alcozar (SPO2 Alcozar), the evidence custodian of the
crime laboratory.

On August 11, 2011, two separate Informations were filed against Nora for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II,
RA No. 9165, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 70,390-11 (Violation of Section 5 - Illegal Sale)

That on or about August 6, 2011, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, in conspiracy with each other and helping one another, without being authorized by
law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously sold and delivered one (1) elongated transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as Shabu, weighing 0.1569 gram, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[34]

Criminal Case No. 70,389-11 (Violation of Section 11 - Illegal Possession)

That on or about August 6, 2011, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in her
possession and control one (1) big transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as Shabu, which is a dangerous drug, weighing 1.0923 grams and another forty (40) elongated transparent
[plastic] sachets likewise containing the same kind of substance having a total weight of 3.5437 grams or all with a
total weight of 4.6360 grams.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[35]

During her arraignment, Nora pleaded "not guilty" to both charges.[36] Thereafter, trial ensued.

Nora belied the charges against her. She testified that at around 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 2011, she went shopping
alone at Uyanguren in Davao City before heading back to her residence in Cotabato City that afternoon. [37] After
buying a few things, she decided to go to NCCC Supermarket. [38] While she was standing at the pedestrian lane near
BDO, she and another woman (her co-accused) were approached by men in civilian attire. A man, later identified as
PO2 Arubio, held Nora and said, "Do not move, or else I will shoot you."[39] Then, she was suddenly arrested along
with her co-accused.[40] PO2 Arubio took her shopping bag with the things she bought for her children. [41] Thereafter,
she was instructed to board the vehicle and was brought to the Sta. Ana Police Station.[42]

At the police station, Nora claimed that PO2 Arubio asked her to undress so they could conduct a body search. [43]
Because she adamantly refused and cried, PO2 Arubio called in a female officer to perform the search. [44] After she
was frisked, the female officer said, "This one is clear."[45] She was also asked to sit in the corner while her co-
accused was searched.[46] When her co-accused came out of the room, she saw her carrying a cellophane plastic.[47]
Subsequently, they were taken to the detention cell.[48] After two days, they were subjected to a drug test, which
yielded negative results.[49]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its March 21, 2017 Decision, [50] the RTC found Nora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It held
that all the elements of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were met. In giving credence to PO3
Tutor's testimony, the RTC found that the prosecution sufficiently established an unbroken chain of custody. While
the police officers failed to conduct an inventory immediately after Nora's arrest, the RTC found it justifiable due to the
unavailability of witnesses since the buy-bust operation took place on a Saturday.

The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing discussions, as the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 70,389-11, accused ZORAIDA MARIANO is CONVICTED for violation of Section 11 of RA
9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
MINIMUM to TWENTY (20) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00);

2) In Criminal Case No. 70,390-11, accused ZORAIDA MARIANO is CONVICTED for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);

Accused is entitled to be credited in her favor the preventive imprisonment that she had undergone pursuant to Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 10592.

Pursuant to Section 21(7) of RA No. 9165, the prosecution is hereby given a period of five (5) days from receipt of the
copy of the decision to manifest before this Court whether or not its office will be needing the shabu subject matter of
these cases. Otherwise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to forward the same to the PDEA, upon proper
receipt, for disposition and destruction in accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED.[51]

Aggrieved, Nora filed a notice of appeal.[52]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

On August 16, 2018, the CA rendered its assailed Decision [53] denying the appeal and modifying the RTC ruling as to
the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 70,389-11.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 21 March 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 13, Davao City, in Criminal Cases No. 70,389-11 and No. 70,390-11, finding appellant
Zoraida Mariano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 11 (possession of dangerous drug) and 5
(sale of illegal drugs), respectively, of Article II of R.A. 9165 is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed in Criminal Case No. 70,389-11, such that appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen years and eight (8) months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[54]

Hence, the present appeal.[55]

Nora contends that: 1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration of the alleged sale of
dangerous drugs were not sufficiently established; 2) the prosecution failed to prove that she was in possession of
illegal drugs; and 3) the chain of custody was not clearly established.[56]
Conversely, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution successfully
established all the elements of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs through testimonial and documentary
evidence. Absent any ill motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant, PO3 Tutor's testimony must be respected
and the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers' duties must be upheld. As such, the
prosecution's evidence prevails over Nora's self-serving and uncorroborated denial.

The OSG also argues that the prosecution successfully proved an unbroken chain of custody. While a perfect chain
was not established, it contends that the arresting officers substantially complied with the legal requirements in order
to preserve the identity and integrity of the seized items. It posits that PO3 Tutor's testimony sufficiently established
each link in the chain of custody: (1) that he marked the seized items after arrest and conducted an inventory thereof;
(2) that he personally delivered the same to PO1 Marron of the crime laboratory for examination by PSI Fabian; and
(3) that the illegal drugs were turned over to evidence custodian SPO2 Alcozar for safekeeping. Besides, it points out
that Nora failed to specify which rule in the chain of custody was broken.[57]

Issue

Whether or not Nora is guilty of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

It must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors, whether they are assigned or unassigned, in the appealed
judgment.[58] Generally, findings of fact by the lower court are accorded great respect and even finality when affirmed
by the CA.[59] However, if there are certain facts and circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected
the result of the case that were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, such factual findings may be reversed. [60]
After a careful review of the records of the case, this Court holds that the prosecution failed to establish the very
corpus delicti of the crimes charged and an unbroken chain of custody.

At inception, We find that the elements of illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were met, to wit: (1) identity of the buyer
and seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. [61] In buy-
bust operations, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the simultaneous receipt of the marked money
by the seller consummate the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.[62] In the present case, PO3 Tutor positively identified
Nora as the one who sold him shabu in exchange for the marked money worth P1,000.00. His testimony, coupled
with the other pieces of evidence offered during trial, indubitably show the consummation of the sale of illegal drugs.

Likewise, the elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were sufficiently established, to wit: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. [63] On this note, We also find
that PO3 Tutor's testimony is sufficient to prove that he was able to further recover (1) one big plastic sachet
containing what appears to be shabu weighing 1.0923 grams; and (2) 40 pieces of elongated sachets containing
what appears to be shabu weighing 3.5437 grams. These were later on examined by PSI Fabian and yielded positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.[64]

Corollarily, the integrity and identity of the dangerous drug must be established beyond reasonable doubt considering
that it constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.[65] It is in this aspect that We depart from the findings of both lower
courts.

To establish the identity of the seized drugs from the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the chain of custody must
be proven in order to dispel any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence. [66] The chain of custody
involves the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs from the time of seizure and
confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and to presentation in court for destruction. [67] In
People v. Kamad,[68] this Court enumerated the four links in the chain of custody that the prosecution must establish:
1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and
submission of the seized and marked illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. [69] In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to establish the first, third and fourth links.

A perusal of the records show that one plastic sachet containing what appears to be shabu was the subject of the
sale transaction between Nora and PO3 Tutor and another 40 pieces of elongated plastic sachets, also believed to
contain shabu, were recovered from the possession of Nora. PO3 Tutor admittedly did not immediately mark the said
elongated plastic sachets at the place of the apprehension but only made the marking at the police station. However,
the prosecution failed to provide any detail as to how these sachets were segregated or identified from each other,
aside from the fact that PO3 Tutor placed the seized items in separate evidence pouches and kept them in his
custody. The sachets were mingled with each other and the lack of marking thus made it impossible for the
prosecution to identify which item was subject of the sale, and which sachets were confiscated from Nora's
possession. This is important since the weight of the seized contraband determines the proper penalty in the Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs case. Evidently, this critical lapse on the part of the apprehending officers made the
initial link in the chain of custody unreliable. Consequently, the integrity and evidentiary value of the subsequent links
were also tainted.

Moreover, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Tutor placed his markings on the seized items and indorsed[70] them,
as well as the accused, to the desk officer, PO2 Ahadain.[71]

PO3 Tutor testified that he personally delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory for examination, to wit:

Q: You said that there was a signing of that inventory and picture taking, after that what happened?

A: After we made the inventory and signed by the witnesses, I immediately delivered the seized suspected
shabu items to the PNP Crime Lab for laboratory examination, sir.

Q: When you said you delivered those drug specimens to the PNP Crime Lab for examination, who were
with you?
A: It was me along with the arrested persons.

xxxx

Q: What did you submit to that office for them to examine your drug specimens?

A: The one (1) elongated transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which is the
object of sale. One (1) big transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance believe[d] to
be shabu, sir. And the other forty (40) pieces of elongated transparent plastic sachets containing
suspected shabu, Sir.

Q: What document do you have to show that the PNP Crime Lab received those specimens?

A: There is a letter request for laboratory examination, dated August 8, 2011, Sir.
xxxx

Q: Now there is a manual signature under your printed name as the delivering officer, do you know whose
signature that is?
A: This is my signature, Sir.

Q: What about the signature under the printed name of the receiving officer, POI Marron JA, whose signature
is that?
A: It was POI Marron who affixed his signature, Sir.

Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?

A: Because it was signed in my presence, Sir.[72]

Based on PO3 Tutor's testimony, PO1 Marron received the seized drugs. However, there is no evidence on record
indicating how he handled and preserved the identity of the seized drugs while he was in possession thereof before
handing it over to PSI Fabian. Relatedly, there are also no informative details as to how PSI Fabian handled and
preserved the identity of the seized drugs before and after she conducted the qualitative examination.

In the similar case of People v. Del Rosario,[73] We held:

Third Link

The third link in the chain of custody is the delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and
verify the nature of the substance.

Here, SPO1 Naredo testified that he was with PO1 Cruz when the latter delivered the seized items to SPO1 Agustin
of the crime laboratory. Thus, there was an apparent transfer of the seized items from SPO1 Naredo to PO1 Cruz. As
can be gleaned from SPO1 Naredo's testimony, however, no informative details were provided as to how, and at
what point, the seized items were handed to PO1 Cruz, who was not even a member of the buy-bust team. There
was also lack of information on the condition of the seized items when SPO1 Naredo transmitted the same to
PO1 Cruz and when PO1 Cruz delivered it to SPO1 Agustin. Further, there was no documentary evidence
indicating SPO1 Agustin's actual receipt of the seized items and how the latter handled the same upon his receipt
thereof before transmitting the same to FC Rodrigo for forensic examination.

Fourth Link

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented as
evidence in the criminal case. In this case, there was no testimonial or documentary evidence on how FC
Rodrigo kept the seized items while it was in her custody and in what condition the items were in until it was
presented in court. While the parties stipulated on FC Rodrigo's testimony, the stipulations do not provide
information regarding the condition of the seized item while in her custody or if there was no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession thereof.

In People v. Gutierrez, there were inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist. In that case, no
explanation was given regarding the chemist's custody in the interim — from the time it was turned over to the
investigator to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records also failed to show what happened to the
allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the chemist to the investigator and its presentation in court.
Thus, since no precautions were taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the object and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, the accused therein was acquitted. [74]
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Consequently, there is doubt on whether the supposed shabu seized from accused-appellant were the same ones
submitted to the crime laboratory, and eventually, presented in court. The failure of the prosecution to offer details on
how the seized items were handled during its movement from one person to another gives rise to the possibility of
tampering, alteration, or substitution of the corpus delicti.

Moreover, We find that the procedural safeguards in the seizure, custody, and handling of confiscated illegal drugs
and/or paraphernalia under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 were not complied with by the police operatives.

RA 10640[75] amended Section 21 of RA 9165 on July 15, 2014. Since the alleged crime in the present case took
place in 2011, or prior to its amendment, the old provisions apply. The pertinent portion of Section 21 reads:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.][76] (Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing rule mandates that the marking, photography, and inventory of the seized items be done immediately
after seizure and confiscation of the items, and in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a representative from the media; (3) a
representative from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official. The presence of these insulating witnesses negates
any suspicion of the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence.[77]

This Court notes that while the buy-bust operation took place on August 6, 2011, the inventory of the seized items
was only conducted on August 8, 2011. While strict adherence to the rules is not always required under justifiable
grounds, and as long as the identity of the seized drugs are preserved, We find that the same is wanting in this case.

In People v. Lim,[78] We discussed what may be considered justifiable grounds: (1) their attendance was impossible
because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face
the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations,
which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Furthermore, it was emphasized in People v. Sipin[79] that:

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way
that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be
proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the
apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their
sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items.
Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.[80] (Emphasis Ours; citations Omitted)

While PO3 Tutor testified that they exerted diligent efforts in securing the presence of the witnesses, [81] sheer
statements of unavailability of the witnesses given by the apprehending officers are not justifiable reasons for non-
compliance with the requirement. [82] It bears stressing that the "lack of evidence of serious attempts to secure the
presence of the necessary witnesses result in a substantial gap in the chain of custody of evidence that shall
adversely affect the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented in court."[83]

In sum, the prosecution failed to prove Nora's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the police officers' non-compliance
with the chain of custody and Section 21 of RA 9165. Consequently, it casts serious doubt as to the identity, integrity,
and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Though successful in proving the conduct of a legitimate buy-bust
operation, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the items seized from Nora were the very
same items presented in court. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt and accused-appellant must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed August 16, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01746-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Zoraida Mariano a.k.a. Nora is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Dujali, Davao del
Norte, for immediate implementation. Furthermore, the Superintendent is DIRECTED to report to this Court the action
he/she has taken within five days from receipt of this Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Rollo, pp. 26-27.

[1]
[2]
Id. at 5-25. Penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Perpetua T. Atal-Paño.

[3]
Records (Criminal Case No. 70, 390-11), pp. 335-347. Penned by Presiding Judge Rowena Apao-Adlawan.

Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING
[4]

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: June 7, 2002.

[5]
TSN, October 24, 2013, p. 5.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 219495. February 28, 2022 ]
REYNALDO P. CABATAN, PETITIONER, VS. SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORP./ ATTY.
ROMEO DALUSONG AND/OR MARITIME MANAGEMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to annul and set aside the January 23, 2015 Decision [2] and July 20, 2015
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 126155, which affirmed the April 26, 2012 Decision [4]
and June 18, 2012 Resolution[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. (OFW-M) 10-
000897-11.

The Antecedents:

Petitioner Reynaldo P. Cabatan (Cabatan) was employed as an oiler by Southeast Asia Shipping Corp.
(SEASCORP) on behalf of its principal, Maritime Management Services (Maritime Management) from 2006 to 2010. [6]
Before deployment, he underwent his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was certified to be fit for
sea duty.[7] On January 30, 2010, he boarded M/V BP Pioneer under a three month contract.[8]

On March 29, 2010, while Cabatan was on his 12-hour duty, the spare parts assigned to one of the generators he
was tasked to repair were delivered. He carried the spare parts along with a heavy connecting rod. At that point, the
vessel, which had a restricted alley, suddenly swayed due to the big waves. This caused Cabatan to bend and nearly
fall to his knees. Then, he felt excruciating pain in his scrotal/inguinal area. Despite feeling pain and numbness in his
left leg all the way down, he continued to carry the parts and repaired the generator until he was relieved by another
oiler.[9]

After his duty, Cabatan went to his cabin and took a pain reliever. Shortly after, he went to the ship's clinic to have
himself checked by the doctor on board. In the Report of Illness [10] by the ship's doctor, the latter advised him to rest
until further observation since it may just be due to tiredness. Furthermore, the doctor ruled out hernia and trauma.[11]

On May 19, 2010, Cabatan was re-examined by the doctor. He still felt pain during prolonged standing or while
walking, with numbness of his lower extremity. However, the doctor concluded that this was normal considering his
age and was just advised to take pain relievers.[12]

Upon expiration of his contract on May 25, 2010, Cabatan disembarked the vessel at the port of Takoradi, Ghana and
was repatriated back to the Philippines. Believing that the pain in his scrotal/inguinal area was normal and, as the
doctor had advised, he took a complete rest for about a month.[13]

Eventually, SEASCORP called him for possible deployment. He was sent to Merita Diagnostic Clinic (Merita), the
company-accredited clinic, for his PEME. During his examination, Cabatan informed the doctor about the injury
sustained while on board. Thus, the doctor asked him to get an x-ray of his scrotal/inguinal area and lumbar spine.[14]

On July 2, 2010, Merita reported the following findings/recommendations regarding Cabatan's examination:
NOTED: PERINEAL PAIN (WHILE WALKING)
EXTENDING TO MEDIAL ASPECT OF BOTH THIGH
*LUMBO SACRAL X-RAY RESULT:
RETROLESTHESES L2 OVER L3
OSTEODEGENERATIVE CHANGES LS
SACRALIZATION OF L5
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEON ASSESSMENT:
TO CONSIDER NERVE ROOT COMPRESSION
FOR EMG NCV OF LOWER EXTREMITIES AND MRI OF
LUMBOSACRAL
OTHER REMARKS:
GENITALS (+) PENILE IMPLANT RULE OUT
BULGING MASS – CLEARED BY SURGEON
 HYPERTENSION CONTROLLED WITH
MAINTENANCE: MICARDS PLUS 40 MG
ONCE DAILY[15]
On July 30, 2010, Cabatan also underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of the Lumbo-Sacral Spine. The
findings were as follows:
1. Central canal and bilateral neural foraminal stenosis, L4-L5 and L5-S1, secondary to posterior disc
protrusion, ligamentum flaval thickening and facet arthropathy.
2. Disc bulging, L2-L3 and L3-L4.
3. Lumbar osteophytes with disc desiccations.
4. Posterior annular tears, L4-L5 and L5-S1.
5. Grade I spondylolisthesis, L4/L5.
6. Subcutaneous cyst, left posterior wall of lumbar spine.

x x x x[16]

He also underwent EMG NCV which yielded the following results:

Interpretation:

Today's electrodiagnostic examination revealed findings compatible with a mild chronic lumbar radiculopathy
involving the L4-5 and L5-S1 spinal roots. Kindly correlate clinically.

x x x x [17]
Cabatan further consulted Dr. Detabali of the De los Santos Hospital who advised him to have L4-S1 Laminectomy
and L4-L5 Instrumented Posterolateral Fusion. Due to the costly price of the procedures, Cabatan asked for financial
assistance from SEASCORP through its crewing manager, Mr. Aguinaldo, considering that he sustained his injury
during his employment. Mr. Aguinaldo promised to relay the request to its principal, Maritime Management, but the
request was left unheeded.[18]

On August 26, 2010, Cabatan also consulted Dr. David M. Cabatan, Jr. (Dr. Cabatan), an orthopedic and spine
surgeon, who made the following findings:
DIAGNOSIS: SPINAL STENOSIS L4-L5 AND L5-S1
GRADE 1 SPONDYLOLISTHESIS, L4-L5

Mr. Reynaldo P. Cabatan is a 54 year old male, seaman, who first consulted the undersigned on August 20, 2010. He
complained of greatly diminished standing and walking tolerance secondary to low back pain radiating down the
lower extremities of about 6 months duration. This was left sided worse than right and was aggravated by 15 minutes
of standing or walking. There was accompanying numbness and paresthesias of the lower extremities. Mr. Cabatan
has been on medication and physiotherapy without apparent relief of his symptoms.

On physical examination, Mr. Cabatan walked into the office bent forward and with a limp. There was reproduction of
his pain with low back extension and left lateral flexion. He was able to walk on tiptoe and on heels without any
difficulty. Trendelenburg test was negative. Nerve root tension signs were absent and Patrick's test was negative.
Manual muscle testing revealed no more deficits.

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the lumbosacral spine revealed a grade 1 spondylolisthesis at L4-L5 causing
moderate to severe spinal stenosis. There also were spondylotic changes at L5-S1 and L2-L3 causing mild to
moderate stenosis.

Mr. Cabatan has been advised surgical decompression of this spinal stenosis as symptoms have become quite
disabling. The planned procedure as a laminectomy from L4-S1 and posterolateral instrumented fusion at L4-L5 due
to the spondylisthesis. Risks and benefits of the surgery were discussed. He is to have a medical and cardiac
clearance prior to the surgery.

x x x x[19]
Dr. Cabatan also estimated the total surgery cost amounting to P473,000.00.[20]

On March 1, 2011, Cabatan filed a complaint[21] against the respondents for permanent and total disability benefits.[22]

On the other hand, respondents maintained that during Cabatan's last employment contract, he underwent PEME
and was certified fit for sea duty. [23] Upon completion of his contract on May 25, 2010, Cabatan disembarked the
vessel. When he arrived in Manila, Cabatan did not report to the manning agency for the mandatory post-employment
medical examination, nor request for medical assistance for any injury or illness.[24]

After almost a year following the termination of his contract, Cabatan suddenly filed a complaint against respondents
before the NLRC and claimed for total and permanent disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.[25]

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA):

In its August 31, 2011 Decision,[26] the LA ruled in favor of Cabatan. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondents Southeast Asia Shipping Corp. and Maritime
Management Services, Inc. are hereby directed to pay complainant Reynaldo P. Cabatan, jointly and severally, his
permanent and total disability compensation equivalent to $60,000.00 plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
total judgment award.

All other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[27] (Emphasis in the original)

The LA found that Cabatan suffered an injury while performing his duties as an oiler. Being a work-related injury, it
held that it must be compensable. As to respondents' contention of Cabatan's failure to comply with the mandatory
three-day reporting requirement for a post-employment examination, it found the same untenable. Cabatan was
repatriated not because of a medical condition but due to the expiration of his contract. Thus, the three-day
mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20 (B) (2) and (3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC) did not apply in Cabatan's case.[28]

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission:

Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal[29] before the NLRC. They argued that Cabatan failed to prove that he
suffered a work-related injury during the term of his employment which rendered him permanently and totally
disabled. There was no accident on board as the Report of Illness reveals that Cabatan experienced scrotal/inguinal
discomfort while lifting a heavy object. Moreover, while he complained of scrotal/inguinal discomfort, Cabatan is
claiming for disability compensation for an alleged injury on his back and/or spinal region.

Respondents also pointed out that if Cabatan was really suffering from an illness/injury, he should have sought
medical assistance immediately upon repatriation and that he was not really repatriated due to medical reasons.
Lastly, Cabatan's failure to report to the company-physician within three days from arrival for post-employment
examination bars him from claiming any disability benefits.

In its April 26, 2012 Decision,[30] the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's Decision and dismissed Cabatan's claim
for disability benefits for lack of merit. It found Cabatan's assertion, that he suffered an injury while on board and felt
pain on his left leg to his foot, unsupported by evidence. What was reflected on record is the discomfort on his scrotal
and inguinal area. Moreover, a seafarer who claims to be medically infirm must be examined by the company-
designated physician within three days from repatriation. Thus, Cabatan's failure to report within the mandatory
period without justifiable cause resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim compensation and disability benefits
under the POEA-SEC.

Cabatan filed a motion for reconsideration[31] which was later denied by the NLRC in its June 18, 2012 Resolution.[32]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Aggrieved, Cabatan filed a petition for certiorari[33] before the CA. In his petition, Cabatan averred that Section 20(B)
(3) which requires the three-day mandatory reporting requirement only covers seafarers who are medically
repatriated. Since he was repatriated due to the completion of his contract, he is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits upon the company-accredited clinic's finding that he was unfit for sea duty. The controlling factor in
claiming disability benefits is that the seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.
Thus, his failure to report to the company-designated physician for post-employment examination shall not bar him
from claiming disability benefits.[34]

Cabatan also claimed that he substantially proved the injury in his scrotal and inguinal area through the Report of
Illness by the ship doctor which stated that he experienced pain while lifting a heavy object during the performance of
his duties as an oiler. However, since the ship doctor did not recommend him for medical attention, Cabatan
explained that he no longer went to the company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination.
He only found out about his disability when the company-designated physician eventually declared him to be unfit for
sea duty. Consequently, his disability became permanent and total.

In its January 23, 2015 Decision,[35] the CA denied Cabatan's appeal. It held that Cabatan's failure to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim compensation and benefits for injury or
illness. The fallo of the CA's judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[36]
Discontented, Cabatan filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] but it was later denied by the CA in its July 20, 2015
Resolution.[38]

Issue

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the following errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals blatantly erred when it failed to consider the "REPORT OF ILLNESS" of
the Ship's doctor indicating that petitioner's illness of "Spondylolisthesis" was contracted during the
petitioner's term of employment with respondents.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred when it ruled that the 3-day reporting requirement under
Section 20 (B) paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA-SEC is an absolute rule, contrary to existing
jurisprudence.

3. Petitioner is entitled to disability compensation for the injury/illness suffered during the term of his
employment with respondents pursuant to Section 20 (B) paragraph 6 of the 2000 POEA-SEC, thus, he
is entitled to permanent total disability under the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability
consistently applied by the Honorable Supreme Court to Filipino seamen on-board ocean-going vessels.
Likewise, petitioner is entitled to 10% of the award for and as attorney's fees.[39]

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Generally, a petition for review under Rule 45 is only limited to questions of law since the Court is not a trier of facts
and it is beyond its function to evaluate the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. [40] One of the
recognized exceptions is when the findings of the LA and NLRC on one hand, and the CA, on the other, are
conflicting. Such is the case at bar. Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court is compelled to re-
evaluate the factual issues and re-examine the questioned findings.[41]

It is undisputed that Cabatan's employment contract with SEASCORP executed on January 30, 2010 is governed by
the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-
Board Ocean-Going Ships (2000 POEA-SEC). Paragraph 3, Section 20 (B) thereof regarding disability benefits
provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS. — The liabilities of the employer when the
seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work by the company-designated physician or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall it exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as
compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Thus, in order to claim compensability under the forgoing section, it is required that the seafarer must have: (1)
suffered a work-related illness or injury during the term of his contract; and (2) submitted himself to a mandatory post-
employment medical examination within three (3) working days upon his arrival. As explained in Jebsens Maritime,
Inc. v. Undag,[42] the purpose of the three-day mandatory reporting requirement is to enable the company-designated
physician to ascertain if the seafarer's injury or illness is work-related, viz.:
The rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier
for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not. After that period, there would be difficulty in
ascertaining the real cause of the illness.

To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a
limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would
have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of time. In such a case,
the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.[43]
The same doctrine was applied in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan [44] (Wallem), InterOrient Maritime
Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III[45] (InterOrient), Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. v. De Leon[46] (Scanmar), and Manila
Shipmanagement & Manning, Inc. v. Aninang[47] (Manila).

In Wallem,[48] the seafarer was repatriated due to a foot injury and was examined by the company physician within the
three-day reporting requirement; however he claimed for disability benefits for both foot and eye injuries. Under such
facts, the Court denied his claim for disability benefits due to the eye injury for his failure to report the same to the
company physician within three days from repatriation.

In InterOrient[49] and Scanmar,[50] the mariner also failed to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
within three days from disembarkation. The Court held that non-compliance with the three-day reporting requirement
bars his claim for disability benefits.

In Manila,[51] We also denied the seafarer's claim for disability benefits absent any showing that he presented himself
before the company three days upon disembarkation. This Court further clarified that the fact that a seafarer was not
repatriated for medical reasons will not exempt him from compliance with the mandatory three-day reporting
requirement.

As pointed out by Cabatan, the three-day mandatory reporting requirement is not absolute. In Wallem Maritime
Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,[52] the Court explained that if the seafarer is physically
incapacitated from complying with the requirement for being terminally ill and is in need of immediate medical
attention, the mandatory reporting period may be dispensed with.

However, the three-day reporting requirement is not absolute as correctly pointed out by Cabatan. Paragraph 3,
Section 20 (B) of the POEA-SEC also provides that a seafarer who is physically incapacitated to report for a post-
employment examination may send a written notice to its agency within the same period. In Status Maritime Corp. v.
Spouses Delalamon,[53] We recognized the deteriorating condition of the seafarer who cannot be reasonably expected
to report to his employer's office considering the physical strain caused by his illness. Moreover, the employer was
already notified of the failing health condition of the seafarer upon finding out he was diagnosed with a serious illness
abroad.

Based on the foregoing, Cabatan's claim for disability benefits and other monetary awards prayed for by him must be
denied. It is evident that Cabatan was repatriated due to the expiration of his contract. Regardless of the cause of his
repatriation, he was required to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-
designated physician within three working days upon his return in order to ascertain if he was really suffering from a
work-related injury or illness. Cabatan may only be excused from such requirement if he was physically incapacitated
to do so. However, such is not the case at bar.

Moreover, in the complementary case of Maunlad Trans Inc. v. Isidro,[54] We held:

While the facts, as found by the CA and the NLRC, point to the existence of a knee injury which respondent suffered
in 2009, during the term of his employment contract and while on board the vessel, such knee injury was not the
ailment complained of by respondent upon repatriation to the Philippines. x x x[55]
Here, Cabatan complained of pain in the scrotal/inguinal area while on board which is why the initial diagnosis by the
ship doctor was epididymorchitis. Aside from his bare assertion, there is nothing on record to show that he felt pain or
numbness on his lower extremities while on board or that the ship doctor concluded that he contracted
spondylolisthesis. It was only on July 2010 or after his repatriation that the said findings were made by a doctor,
which is well-beyond the three-day mandatory reporting period.
While this Court commiserates with petitioner's plight, non-compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 20
(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC renders it difficult to ascertain if his injury or illness was work-related.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by Cabatan.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 23, 2015
Decision and July 20, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126155 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 233867. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX, [1] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

On appeal[2] is the March 30, 2017 Decision [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07147 that
affirmed with modifications the November 5, 2014 Joint Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 207,
xxxxxxxxxxx,[5] which found accused-appellant XXX (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
following charges: two counts of Rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code[6] (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,[7] in relation to RA 7610,[8] in Criminal Case Nos. 06-809
and 07-147; and, one count of Rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended, in relation to RA 7610, in Criminal Case No. 07-146.

The Factual Antecedents:

This case arose from three separate Informations charging accused-appellant with two counts of Rape through
sexual assault and one count of Rape through sexual intercourse, thus:
Criminal Case No. 06-809
[For rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC (sexual assault) in relation to RA 7610]

That on or about the 2nd day September 2006 in xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual
assault on the person of the complainant, [AAA],[9] a fourteen (14) year old minor, by inserting his finger inside the
latter's vagina against the will and consent of the said complainant.

With the presence of the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the complainant is a fourteen (14) years [sic] old
minor at the time of the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.[10]

Criminal Case No. 07-146

[For rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC (sexual assault) in relation to RA 7610]

That on or about the 23rd day August 2006 in xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault on the person of the complainant, [AAA], a fourteen (14) year old
minor, by inserting his finger to the vagina of said complainant against the latter's will and consent.

Contrary to law.[11]

Criminal Case No. 07-147

[For rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to RA 7610]

That on or about the 26th day August 2006 in xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant, [AAA], a fourteen (14) year old minor, against the latter's will
and consent.

Contrary to law.[12]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.[13] The RTC resolved to consolidate the three cases, [14] and joint
proceedings ensued.

Version of the Prosecution:

Accused-appellant was employed as a stay-in family driver during the time material to the cases.

The first incident (Criminal Case No. 07-146) transpired at around 2:00 a.m. of August 23, 2006. AAA was 14 years
old at that time. She testified that she was suddenly awakened when accused-appellant entered her room; she
recognized him because of the ambient light coming from the outside.[15] She then asked him what he was doing in
her room, to which he did not respond.[16] Instead, he covered her mouth, then kissed her neck and lips.[17] She tried to
resist and avoid his kisses, but he was aggressive. [18] He proceeded to insert his hand in her shirt and mashed her
breasts.[19] He then inserted his finger in her vagina.[20]

After the act, accused-appellant threatened AAA not to tell anyone about the incident, otherwise, he will kill her and
her family.[21] Thereafter, AAA woke up her younger sister BBB [22] (with whom she shares the room), and asked her to
accompany her (AAA) in the bathroom so she can wash herself. [23] AAA did not tell anybody about the incident as she
was afraid of the threats made by accused-appellant.[24]

The second incident (Criminal Case No. 07-147) happened during the wee hours of the morning of August 26, 2006,
only a few days after the first incident. AAA testified that she was awakened when accused-appellant again entered
her room and covered her mouth.[25] He pulled up her shirt and kissed her breasts, and then removed her jogging
pants and underwear.[26]

Afterwards, accused-appellant inserted his penis into AAA's vagina for about five to 10 minutes. [27] She tried to stop
him, but to no avail as he was much stronger. [28] When accused-appellant finished, he again threatened her not to tell
anyone or else he will kill her and her family. [29] After accused-appellant left the room, AAA again woke BBB up and
asked her to accompany her (AAA) to the bathroom so she can wash herself.[30]

The third incident (Criminal Case No. 06-809) occurred during the early hours of the morning of September 2, 2006.
AAA testified that accused-appellant again entered her room.[31] Accused-appellant locked the door and proceeded to
carry out his plans.[32] AAA was awakened when he kissed her lips and neck.[33] She again pleaded for him to stop, but
to no avail.[34] He mashed her breasts.[35] She tried to wake BBB up who was sleeping on the other bed, but was not
successful.[36] Accused-appellant continued the assault and proceeded to insert his finger in her vagina.[37]

Meanwhile, CCC,[38] a nursemaid in AAA's household, woke up and went to the maid's quarters to change her clothes
as she was peed on by AAA's four year old sister. [39] CCC stated that at that time, she heard a door being locked. [40]
After changing clothes, she noticed that accused-appellant was not in his bed.[41] CCC woke the other maids up and
they checked if accused-appellant went out of the house. [42] As the gates were still locked, they looked for him inside
the house.[43] CCC proceeded to AAA and BBB's room and she noticed that the door was locked. CCC became
anxious because the sisters do not usually lock the door in their room and at the same time, accused-appellant was
missing.[44] CCC knocked on the door and called on to AAA and BBB, but no one answered for a time. [45] CCC kept on
knocking and calling out AAA and BBB until AAA opened the door.[46]

Inside the room, accused-appellant was alarmed when he heard the knocking on the door; thus, he instructed AAA to
pull up her pajama and underwear.[47] Accused-appellant tried to hide under the bed but he was too big to fit. [48] So he
just sat down beside BBB's bed and asked AAA to open the door. [49] AAA opened the door and CCC saw accused-
appellant sitting on the side of BBB's bed.[50]

CCC angrily asked accused-appellant what he was doing inside the room in the middle of the night with the door
locked.[51] Accused-appellant explained that he was just patting BBB to sleep.[52]

Notably, Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Marianne Ebdane (PSI Ebdane) conducted a medical examination on AAA.
PSI Ebdane found deep healed lacerations at the five and seven o'clock positions on AAA's hymen, which show clear
evidence of blunt penetrating trauma to the hymen.[53]

Version of the Defense:

Accused-appellant denied the charges against him.

For the first and second incidents (August 23 and 26, 2006), accused-appellant claimed that he was nowhere near
the room of AAA as he was sleeping inside his quarters located at the first floor of the house.[54]

As to the third incident (September 2, 2006), accused-appellant admitted that he was indeed inside AAA's room. [55]
He, however, claimed that he did not molest the child. [56] He explained that the night before, on September 1, he and
AAA were waiting inside the car for CCC, who was buying medicines in a drugstore, when suddenly, AAA had an
asthma attack.[57] Accused-appellant stated that she told him not to tell anyone about the asthma attack. [58] When they
returned, AAA also told him not to leave her.[59] Thus, he returned to her room (in the morning of the next day,
September 2) to check her condition.[60]

Accused-appellant added that he could not think of any reason why they would file a case against him; except that his
good intention of checking on AAA was taken with malice. [61] He stated that AAA's family treats him well, gives him his
salary, and that they had a good relationship.[62]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its November 5, 2014 Joint Decision,[63] the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt on all
charges. First, the trial court gave more credence on the testimonies of AAA and CCC as against the mere denial of
accused-appellant.[64] Second, accused-appellant did not deny that he was in the residence during the material dates;
he even admitted that he was inside AAA's room on the date of the third incident. [65] The RTC likewise found accused-
appellant's excuse of checking on the complainant for asthma unbelievable. [66] Third, there is no reason for AAA to
concoct a story of sexual molestation.[67] The RTC also held that the acts of locking the door of AAA's room and not
opening it immediately when CCC knocked show that accused-appellant intended to commit sexual acts against
AAA.[68] Lastly, there is no reason for accused-appellant not to tell AAA's parents about the asthma attack. [69]
Accused-appellant does not have any medical background; thus, if he really was concerned about AAA's condition,
he should have just informed her parents about it.[70]

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed the case to the CA.[71] In his brief,[72] he attacked AAA's credibility and pointed
out that her testimony was not corroborated as her sister BBB (with whom she shares the room) and their parents
(whose room was next to hers) were not presented. [73] BBB and their parents could have heard AAA's squeals during
the act even if her mouth was covered. Accused-appellant also claimed that there was a "window of opportunity" for
the complainant to scream and wake BBB up before her mouth was covered. [74] It was expected that a normal 14 year
old girl would have screamed upon seeing a potential rapist.[75]

The prosecution (through the Office of the Solicitor General) filed its appellee's brief. [76] The prosecution countered
that there is no clear-cut behavior that can be expected of a person being sexually abused or has been abused. [77]
Further, the trial court's assessment of the witnesses must be given great respect, especially testimonies of child
victims of sexual abuse.[78] Lastly, the prosecution reiterated that accused-appellant's defense of denial fails in light of
AAA's positive testimony and identification of him in court.[79]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its March 30, 2017 Decision, [80] the CA affirmed the RTC Joint Decision, with modification on the amounts of the
civil indemnities, damages, and fines to be paid by accused-appellant for all convictions. The CA notably added that
the non-presentation of AAA's sister and parents is not fatal to the case; conviction may be based on the sole
testimony of the victim as long as it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing, which is the case here. [81] Further,
the testimony was corroborated by the medico-legal findings showing deep healed lacerations.[82] AAA's failure to
shout for help should not be taken against her as people react differently to highly stressful situations such as the
incidents in this case.[83] There is also no showing of any ill motive on the part of AAA and her family against accused-
appellant; thus, the testimony of AAA should be accorded full weight and credit.[84]

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the 5 November 2014 Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx City, Branch 207 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-809, 07-146 and 07-
147 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 06-809, Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as the maximum and to pay the
victim the amount of PhP30,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP30,000.00 as moral damages, PhP30,000.00
 as exemplary damages and PhP25,000.00 as fine in accordance with Section 31(f) of R.A. 7610;

2. In Criminal Case No. 07-146, Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as the maximum and to pay the
victim the amount of PhP30,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP30,000.00 as moral damages, PhP30,000.00
as exemplary damages and PhP25,000.00 as fine in accordance with Section 31(f) of R.A. 7610;

3. In Criminal Case No. 07-147, Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua
and is ordered to pay the victim PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000.00 as moral damages,
PhP75,000.00 as exemplary damages and PhP50,000.00 as fine in accordance with Section 31(f) of RA
7610.

In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Still aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated his case to this Court.[85] The parties opted to no longer file supplemental
briefs.[86]

Issue

The issue is whether the conviction of accused-appellant on all charges is proper.

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the appeal. The Court affirms accused-appellant's conviction on all charges.

Article 266-A of the RPC provides how rape is committed:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is Committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Based on the provision, there are two modes of committing Rape: (a) Rape through sexual intercourse as provided in
paragraph one; and, (b) Rape through sexual assault as provided in paragraph two.
The elements of rape under paragraph one are as follows: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and,
(2) the act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.[87]

On the other hand, the elements of the second mode of rape are as follows: (1) the accused committed an act of
sexual assault by (a) inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or (b) inserting any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and, (2) the act was accomplished (a) through the use of force
or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under
12 years of age or is demented.[88] Carnal knowledge is the operative act that distinguishes the first mode from the
second mode.

In the instant case, the Court is convinced that all the elements of both offenses as appropriately charged against
accused-appellant were present.

At the outset, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination.[89] The Court is therefore generally bound by the findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, in the absence of any misapprehension of facts that would warrant
the reversal of the lower court's findings.[90]

Here, the RTC is correct in finding AAA a credible witness and in ruling that all the elements of both offenses were
present. AAA was able to identify accused-appellant in open court as the perpetrator in the three incidents. She was
able to narrate in a clear and straightforward manner what had happened during the three incidents that she was
assaulted by accused-appellant.

The relevant portions of her testimony regarding the first incident are as follows:
Direct Examination of AAA

Atty. Arellano (private prosecutor)

xxxx

Q: On August 23, 2006 at around two o'clock in the morning, do you remember anything unusual which
occurred?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you please tell us what happened during that time?

A: Pinasok po ako sa kwarto.

Q: Who entered your room?

A: The family driver, sir.

Q: Is [XXX] here right now?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you please point him out?

Interpreter

The witness pointed to a man wearing yellow shirt and when the said man was asked by the Court
about his name, he identified himself as [XXX].

Q: You mentioned before that the accused entered your room. Can you please tell us what happened next?

A: Parang may tumatabi sa'kin nung time na yun tapos biglang sinabi ko, "anong ginagawa mo
dito?", wala siyang sinabi pero tinakpan lang niya yung mouth ko tapos biglang hinalikan na'ko sa
labi tapos 'yung shirt ko...inano niya 'yung breast ko tapos finingger niya po ako.

Q: After the accused did those things to you, what happened next, if any?

A: Gisining ko po si [BBB] tapos nagpasama ako sa banyo para hugasan ang buong katawan ko.

Q: Did you tell your parents about the said incident?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: You said a while ago that [XXX] entered your room and started kissing your neck and mashing your
breast and touch your genitalia, is there anything else that [XXX] do?

A: Nag-threaten siya sa'kin.

Q: And what did he tell you?

A: 'Wag ko daw sasabihin kundi papatayin kami.

xxxx
Prosecutor Alejo
xxxx

Q: You also said that finingger ka nya, by finingger, exactly, can you tell us explicitly what you mean by
finingger?
A: Finingger niya yung genital ko kase naramdaman ko... (interrupted)

Q- What explicitly do you mean by finingger ang genital? Did he harm your genital? Did he merely
touch, caress it or placed his finger inside your genital?

A: Placed his finger inside my...

Q: Genitals.

A: Yeah.[91]

xxxx

Atty. Arellano
xxxx

Q: [AAA], in your previous testimony, you mentioned that in the early morning of August 23, 2006 you were
at your house located at [xxxxxxxxxxx], is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.[92]

xxxx

Q: Did he pin you down in your bed, [AAA]?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he use in pinning you down, Ms. Witness?

A: His arms and legs, sir.

xxxx

Q: After inserting his finger in your vagina, Ms. Witness, for how many minutes did the accused do that?

A: For about ten minutes, sir.

Q: During such time, [AAA], what were you doing to the accused?

A: I cannot do anything because he was too strong, sir.

Q: After ten minutes, what did the accused do, Ms. Witness?

A: He stood up and he told me something, sir.

Q: What did the accused told [sic] you, Ms. Witness?

A: "Wag kang maingay, 'wag kang magsasabi kahit kanino kung hindi papatayin ko kayo." [93]

AAA was able to clearly narrate that in the early morning of August 23, 2006, accused-appellant entered her room
and assaulted her by inserting his finger in her vagina—thereby satisfying the first element of performing sexual
assault by inserting an object into a person's genital. AAA likewise stated that accused-appellant pinned her down
and employed intimidation by threatening her not to tell anybody about the deed or else, he will kill her and her family
—thereby satisfying the second element by performing the sexual assault through force or intimidation. Thus, this
Court is convinced that the elements were present for the first charge.

For the second charge—this time Rape through sexual intercourse—the trial court again was correct in finding AAA a
credible witness. The relevant portions of her testimony regarding the second incident are as follows:
Atty. Arellano
xxxx

Q: Also, [AAA], on August 26, 2006, where were you at around 2 o'clock in the morning?

A: In my house, sir.

xxxx

Q: While you were sleeping on such date and time, do you remember anything unusual which occurred
during that date and time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you please tell us what that unusual incident was?

A: Someone covered my mouth, sir.

Q: Who is that person who covered your mouth?

A: The accused, sir.

Q: After the accused covered your mouth and after you woke up, what happened next?

A: I recognized his face, sir.

Q: How were you able to recognize his face?

A: Because there was a light coming from our window, sir.

Q: After recognizing the accused, [AAA], what happened next, if any?

A: He kissed my lips and my neck, sir.

Q: Did the accused say anything after he kissed your lips and neck?

xxxx

A: "Wag kang maingay; 'wag kang magsasalita."

Q: After that statement by the accused, Ms. Witness, what happened next, if any?

A: He put up my shirt and kissed my breast, sir.

Q: While the accused kissed your neck and breast, what was he doing during such time?

A: He also covered my mouth, sir.

Q: Did you try to fight back the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you able to repel what the accused do [sic], [AAA]?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why is that, [AAA]?

A: Because he was so strong, sir.

Q: After kissing your breast and your neck, what did the accused do to you?

A: He put on [sic] my panty and jogging pants, sir.

Q: After removing your underwear and your jogging pants, what happened next?

A: He spread my legs and put his penis on, sir.

Q: The accused put his penis into your vagina, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How do you know that, [AAA]?

A: I felt it, sir.

Q: You felt the penis of the accused inside your vagina, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you still remember, [AAA], for how long did the accused insert his penis into your vagina?

A: Five to ten minutes, sir.

Q: And he did that repeatedly, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you consent to what the accused was doing to you?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did you try to stop the accused from what he was doing to you?

A: Yes, sir, but he was too strong.

Q: After five to ten minutes, what did the accused do?

A: He stood up and then threw my jogging pants and my panty to me and said, "Wag kang
magsasabi kahit kanino kundi papatayin ko kayo."

Q: After the incident, what happened next, if any?

A: I woke up my sister again, sir.

Q: After waking up your sister, what happened next, Ms. Witness?

A: I washed my body and I felt something bleeding, sir.

Q: What was that bleeding? Where was the bleeding coming out [sic], Ms. Witness?

A: In my vagina, sir.

xxxx

Q: What was the threat which you are afraid of, [AAA]?

A: "Wag kang magsasabi kahit kanino kung hindi papatayin ko kayo."

Q: And that specific statement came out of the accused, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.[94]

Once again, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and straightforward manner the rape that had transpired. AAA
testified that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina—thereby satisfying the first element of carnal
knowledge. For the second element, it can be gleaned from the testimony that accused-appellant again employed
force and intimidation to perform the rape. AAA stated that accused-appellant covered her mouth and that she tried to
fight back, but to no avail because of his strength. Further, she recalled that accused-appellant again uttered threats
of killing her and her family. And notably, she clearly stated that she did not consent to having sexual intercourse with
accused-appellant. Thus, the Court is convinced that the elements of rape through sexual intercourse are present in
the second charge.

With regard to the third charge, which is again sexual assault, the RTC was once again accurate in finding AAA a
credible witness. The relevant portions of her testimony regarding the third incident are as follows:
Atty. Arellano

xxxx

Q: Also, [AAA], on September [2,] 2006 at around 2 o'clock in the morning, can you please tell us where
were you?
A. In my room, sir.

xxxx

Q: Do you remember anything unusual which happened during such date and time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you please tell us what was that?

A: Someone kissed my lips, sir.

Q: Who was that person who kissed your lips?

A: It was the accused, sir.

Q: How were you able to know that it was the accused who kissed you?

A: There was light coming from the window, sir.

Q: Where was that light coming from?

A: From the tower guard, sir.

Q: After kissing your lips, [AAA], what happened next, if any?

A: He kissed my neck also, sir.

Q: What else happened, Ms. Witness?

A: He also smashed [sic] my breast, sir.

Q: After kissing and touching you in your private parts, [AAA], what happened next, if any?

A: He inserted his finger in my genital, sir.

Q: What specific genital is that, [AAA]?

A: My vagina, sir.

Q: Did you feel the finger of the accused inserted in your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why do you know that the finger was inserted in your vagina?

A: I felt his hands, sir.

Q: After inserting his finger into your vagina, Ms. Witness, what happened next, if any?

A: Someone knocked at the door, sir.[95]

xxxx

Q: And [sic] ibig sabihin ba nun willing ka mag-suffer na ginagawa sa iyo without even revealing or without
even telling them na ganito na pala ang nangyayari sa iyo?

A: Syempre nagpapadala ako sa threat nya.

Q: Sa threat?
A: Opo.

Q: Ano ba iyong threat na sinasabi mo?

A: Na kapag sinabi ko kahit kanino baka patayin kami.

Q: Ibig mo bang sabihin na tuwing mangayayari [sic] ito meron parating threat o meron parating
pananakot na tinatawag?
A: Opo.

Q: Pero ibig sabihin kung ito ay hindi mo plinanong sabihin pansamantala at ito ay gusto mong ireserba ibig
sabihin pagsabi nung pangyayari sa iyo gusto mong gawin some other time nalang kung kelan [sic]
kumpleto kayo, ibig sabihin ba nun na willing kang isakripisyo ang sarili mo?

A: Hindi naman po.

Q: Willing ka na pagdaanan yung pinagdadaanan mo na hindi mo man lang sinasabi sa magulang mo kung
ano na talaga nangyayari sa iyo?
A: Hindi naman.

Q: Hindi naman ganun, eh ano yun?

A: Natatakot lang talaga ako sa threat na binigay nya.[96]

xxxx

The Court:

xxxx

Q: Pag-ginagawa nang [sic] akusado nung unang pangyayari ano yung mga exact words na sinabi nya sa
iyo?
A: Sabi nya kapag magsasalita daw ako o magsasabi nang [sic] nangyari papatayin nya kami.

Q: Okay, and sa second time, anong sabi nya ulit?

A: Ganun din po.

Q: And the third time?

A: Ganun din po.

Q: Bakit ka naglakas ng loob nung third time na nag-report?

A: Nahuli na po kasi sya.

Q: Dahil sa nahuli na sya?

A: Opo.[97]

Here, AAA was again able to narrate that accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina—thereby satisfying
the first element of performing sexual assault through insertion of an object into a person's genital. Notably for the
second element, there was no narration during the direct testimony of the offended party regarding the employment
of force or intimidation. However, it can be gleaned during the cross-examination and questioning by the trial court
that accused-appellant indeed continued to threaten her during the third incident. It was clarified that accused-
appellant employed threats even during the third incident. AAA answered in the affirmative when the counsel for the
accused-appellant asked her during cross-examination if accused-appellant threatened her during each of the
incidents (including the third time). AAA also answered in the affirmative when asked by the RTC regarding the third
incident. Thus, the Court is satisfied that the second element of employing intimidation is present in the third charge.

In sum, the Court affirms the RTC's assessment of the witness, AAA, regarding the narration of the events that
transpired during those three nights. In addition, it must be remembered that a child's testimony on sexual abuse
deserves great respect, thus:
x x x When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Errorless
recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. What is important is that the victim's declarations are consistent on
basic matters constituting the elements of rape and her positive identification of the person who did it to her.[98]
Further, AAA's account was corroborated by the medico-legal report issued by PSI Ebdane. The report stated that
AAA's vagina suffered deep healed lacerations at the five and seven o'clock positions of the hymen, which show clear
evidence of blunt penetrating trauma.[99] It is settled that when the offended party's testimony is corroborated by
physical findings of penetration (which in this case are the fingers and the penis), there is sufficient basis to conclude
that sexual intercourse (and sexual abuse) had occurred.[100]

On accused-appellant's defense of denial, the Court finds it feeble. The defense of denial is inherently weak due to
the ease with which it can be concocted; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim.
[101]
Case law provides that "mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is [a] negative self-
serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who
testified on affirmative matters."[102]

Accused-appellant claimed that as to the first two alleged incidents, he was not in AAA's room because he was
sleeping in his quarters. However, the defense failed to substantiate or corroborate this claim. No one saw him
sleeping in his quarters during those times. Thus, it is not impossible for accused-appellant to not be in AAA's room at
those times.

As for the third incident, accused-appellant admitted that he was inside the room. He claimed, however, that he did
not assault AAA and that he was merely checking in on her asthma. Again, his assertion remains uncorroborated. In
fact, his admission that he was inside the room is altogether inconsistent with his denial. Also, CCC corroborated that
accused-appellant was indeed inside the room. While CCC did not have personal knowledge of the sexual assault
itself, she had personal knowledge of accused-appellant's presence inside the room as she saw that he was sitting
on CCC's bed when the door was opened. More importantly, AAA's positive identification of accused-appellant on all
three incidents defeats the latter's weak defense of denial.
The Court likewise finds that the other contentions raised by accused-appellant do not cast reasonable doubt on his
guilt.

On the issue on the non-presentation as witnesses of AAA's parents and sisters, it is settled that "a conviction for
rape may be upheld based on a complainant's testimony when it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things." [103] As already shown, the Court here finds AAA's testimony sufficient
to be the primary basis of accused-appellant's conviction for all charges.

Accused-appellant also raised the behavior of AAA during and after the incidents. To recall, the offended party failed
to report the incidents to her mother or other housemates until the third incident. Further, accused-appellant claimed
that AAA's squeals, even if her mouth was covered, should have been heard by her parents (whose room is next to
hers) and her sister (with whom she shares the room), and that there was a "window of opportunity" for her to scream
before he covered her mouth. In this regard, there is no standard form of behavior for a rape victim. A victim's
behavior and reaction cannot be predicted accurately; people react differently to a given situation. [104] Not all rape
victims can be expected to act according to the usual expectation of the majority.[105]

Considering all the foregoing, the Court affirms accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all two counts
of Rape through sexual assault and one count of Rape through sexual intercourse.

At this juncture, the Court deems it necessary to correct the nomenclature of the crimes charged and to impose the
proper penalties.

It is undisputed that AAA was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the three offenses. This fact calls for the
application of RA 7610.

In People v. Tulagan[106] (Tulagan), the Court summarized the applicable laws and penalties for the crimes of Acts of
Lasciviousness or Lascivious Conduct and Rape through sexual intercourse or sexual assault, depending on the age
of the victim, in view of the provisions of paragraphs one and two of Article 266-A and Article 336 of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353, and Section 5(b) of RA 7610.[107]

In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child covered by RA 7610, and the act is covered by
sexual assault under paragraph two Article 266-A of the RPC, the offender shall be liable for violation of Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610.[108] Tulagan, citing People v. Caoili,[109] provides for the proper nomenclature of the crime of Rape through
sexual assault and the imposable penalty if the victim is more than 12 years of age but below 18 years of age:
In People v. Caoili, We prescribed the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in
determining the imposable penalty.

xxxx
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18)
years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or
protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special
circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it
should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of the sexual assault is 18
years old and above, and not demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.[110]
If the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, and the acts committed fall under rape through sexual assault
under the RPC, the proper nomenclature is "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610." The imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
As for Rape through sexual intercourse, and the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, Tulagan again
instructs that the proper nomenclature is "Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC," and
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.[111]

To recap, the Court finds that Rape through sexual assault was committed in Criminal Case Nos. 06-809 and 07-146.
Considering that AAA was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the acts, the Court changes the
nomenclature of the two charges to "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610." Resultantly, the Court
modifies the penalty imposed by the appellate court; after all, an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing court can increase the penalty to conform with what is provided by the
violated penal law."[112] For Criminal Case No. 06-809, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[113] The same sentence shall be imposed for Criminal
Case No. 07-146.

As for the Rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Case No. 07-147, the Court revises the nomenclature of the
offense to "Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC" or Simple Rape. The CA did not err in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court also modifies the imposition of civil indemnities, damages, and fines to conform with Tulagan and People
v. Jugueta.[114] For Criminal Case No. 06-809, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. For Criminal Case No.
07-146, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. For Criminal Case No. 07-147, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All amounts are subject to six percent (6%) legal interest that will commence to run from the
finality of this Decision until full payment thereof. The fines imposed by the appellate court for all cases shall be
deleted for lack of legal basis.[115]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 30, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 07147 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds accused-appellant XXX guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 06-809, of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, for
which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. 07-146, of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, for
which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 07-147, of Simple Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the
RPC. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until
full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-15 dated
September 5, 2017 entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites
of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 16-17.

Id. at 2-15. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P.
[3]

Punzalan Castillo and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.

[4]
CA rollo, pp. 57-68. Penned by Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo.
[5]
As provided in the Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the identities of the victim and relatives, records,
and court proceedings are kept confidential by replacing the names and other personal circumstances with fictitious
initials, and by blotting out the specific geographical location that may disclose the identity of the victim.
[6]
Act No. 3815, "AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS [THE REVISED PENAL
CODE] (1930)." Approved: December 8, 1930.

Republic Act No. 8353, "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING
[7]

THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES [THE ANTI-RAPE LAW OF 1997]
(1997)." Approved: September 30, 1997.
[8]
Republic Act No. 7610, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES [SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT] (1992)." Approved: June 17, 1992.

"The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of
[9]

her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing
for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing
Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their
Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
[10]
Records, p. 1.
[11]
Id. at 24.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 232336. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARNEL VINLUAN Y
LICLICAN A.K.A. "URBON," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

On appeal[1] is the August 17, 2016 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07360 that
affirmed the January 8, 2015 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya in
Criminal Case No. 3438, which found accused-appellant Marnel Vinluan y Liclican (Vinluan) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 [4] or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."[5]

The Factual Antecedents:

The Information[6] charging Vinluan with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs alleges:
That on or about December 3, 2013 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in Barangay Banggot, Municipality of
Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and
give away dried marijuana and fruiting tops, a dangerous drug, as contained in one (1) heat-sealed plastic container
weighing 73.99 grams and three (3) pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets weighing 13.984 grams, 13.984
grams, 12.696 grams and 11.939 grams, respectively [sic], to PO1 MARLON BACCAY CAMMAYO, who acted as
poseur buyer during a buy-bust operation, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
During arraignment, Vinluan entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Proceedings ensued.

Version of the Prosecution:

At around 2:00 p.m. of December 3, 2013, a confidential informant (CI) reported to the Bambang City Police Station
that Vinluan[9] is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana leaves and fruit tops.[10] Thus, Police Chief Inspector Rafael
Pagalilauan, in coordination with the Nueva Vizcaya Police Provincial Office-Intelligence Section, organized a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation.[11] The team was composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Erwin Bautista (SPO1
Bautista), Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert Ngaloy (PO2 Ngaloy), PO2 Darwin Damaso (PO2 Damaso), and PO1 Marlon
Cammayo (PO1 Cammayo), who was designated as poseur-buyer.[12] PO1 Cammayo then marked the buy-bust
money consisting of five P100.00 peso bills with his initials "MBC." [13] The operation was coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.[14] Thereafter, the CI called Vinluan and informed him that his (CI) friend was
interested in buying marijuana worth P500.00.[15] Vinluan thus instructed the CI to meet him in his residence in Purok
1, Barangay Banggot, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.[16]

The team proceeded to the target area; the CI and PO1 Cammayo rode the CI's tricycle. [17] They parked adjacent to
the house of Vinluan, while the other team members positioned themselves at a nearby basketball court. [18] Vinluan
then approached the CI, who in turn introduced PO1 Cammayo as his friend who wants to buy marijuana.[19] The sale
took place through the simultaneous exchange of the money and the drugs between Vinluan and PO1 Cammayo —
PO1 Cammayo gave the five P100.00 bills while Vinluan gave four transparent plastic sachets containing dried
leaves.[20]

After the exchange, PO1 Cammayo gave the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap. [21] Vinluan was alarmed so he
attempted to flee inside his house; but SPO1 Bautista and PO2 Ngaloy caught up and was able to apprehend him.[22]

The seized items were marked at the place of the incident in the presence of Vinluan. [23] PO1 Cammayo marked the
four sachets with "MBC1," "MBC2," "MBC3," "MBC4."[24]

Meanwhile, PO2 Damaso called for barangay officials.[25] Upon arrival of barangay kagawads Virgilio Hernandez
(Hernandez) and Norma Laguisma (Laguisma), an inventory of the items was prepared.[26] PO2 Damaso also frisked
Vinluan.[27] Photographs of the seized items, the marked money, and Vinluan were also taken.[28]

Thereafter, they went to the police station. PO2 Damaso prepared a request for laboratory examination.[29] PO1
Cammayo then delivered the seized items to the forensic laboratory. [30] Police Senior Inspector James Bad-e (PSI
Bad-e) conducted the qualitative examination. The seized items tested positive for the presence of marijuana.[31] After
which, PSI Bad-e placed the items in a plastic bag that he sealed with a masking tape, and turned it over to the
evidence custodian.[32]

Version of the Defense:

Vinluan denied the accusation and claimed that the drugs were planted. He averred that at that time, he was just at
home watching television, when he heard someone outside call out "Apo."[33] When he opened the door to check who
was calling him; he saw Jimboy (the CI) accompanied by someone unknown to him wearing a black hat. [34] Vinluan
claimed that the two individuals asked him if he had marijuana, to which he answered in the negative. [35] The duo then
left.

After a while, Jimboy called for Vinluan again. [36] When Vinluan opened the door, he saw Jimboy this time
accompanied by SPO2 Pascual, PO2 Ngaloy, PO2 Damaso, and the unknown person wearing a black hat. [37]
Suddenly, the group barged into his house.[38] Vinluan claimed that the unknown person pointed a gun at him, while
PO2 Ngaloy and SPO2 Pascual grabbed and handcuffed him.[39] He was then dragged toward the back of the house.
[40]

Vinluan asserted that SPO2 Pascual placed a P500.00 bill in his hands; he had no choice but to hold the money as
he was hit with a gun on his right side when he refused to do so. [41] Thereafter, PO2 Damaso frisked him.[42] Vinluan
added that while they were waiting for the barangay officials, PO2 Damaso brought out a bag of marijuana,[43] and
threatened him with "salvage" if he would not admit that the drugs were his.[44]

The defense also presented Florita Vinluan (Florita), Vinluan's stepmother. Florita recalled that at that time, she was
in a hut near Vinluan's house when she saw three (3) men onboard a tricycle alight in front of the house. [45] Upon
seeing Vinluan, one of the men pointed a gun at him and uttered "That's him." [46] The group cornered Vinluan and
dragged him to the back of the house.[47] Florita interfered and asked the police officer to lower his gun as Vinluan
was unarmed.[48]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its January 8, 2015 Decision,[49] the RTC convicted Vinluan of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment along with the payment of a fine. The RTC held that the elements of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs were present.[50] PO1 Cammayo was able to credibly narrate the occurrence of the sale. [51] The
RTC added that the presumption of regularity strengthened PO1 Cammayo's credibility. [52] It likewise ruled that the
rule on chain of custody was substantially complied with.[53] It did not give weight to Vinluan's defenses of denial and
frame-up.[54] The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Marnel Vinluan y Liclican guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II, RA. 9165, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty [of] life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00. The drug subject of the case is confiscated, to be destroyed in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.[55]
Aggrieved, Vinluan appealed[56] to the CA.

In his appellant's brief,[57] Vinluan argued that the RTC erred in not taking into consideration his defenses and in
relying instead on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties. [58] Second, he argued that the police
officers failed to observe the rules on chain of custody.[59] There were no representatives from the media and
Department of Justice (DOJ) during the marking and inventory.[60] Vinluan averred that for the saving clause regarding
noncompliance to apply, the prosecution must have recognized the lapses and provided justifiable grounds, as well
as show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items have been preserved; in this case, however, the
prosecution failed to do so.[61] Vinluan also pointed out the inconsistency in the testimonies as to who conducted the
inventory.[62]

In its appellee's brief,[63] the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), insisted that the elements
of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were convincingly and sufficiently established. [64] As to the chain of custody, the
OSG countered that the links were clearly established; thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved.[65] For the prosecution, integrity is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof of tampering.[66] Also, the inconsistency as to who prepared the inventory was inconsequential.[67]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its August 17, 2016 Decision,[68] the CA affirmed Vinluan's conviction. The CA found that the elements of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs were present.[69] As to the issue of chain of custody, the CA found that the prosecution was
able to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. [70] The items were
identified and every link in the custody has been accounted for. [71] Further, the non-presentation of the evidence
custodian as witness was not fatal for the prosecution.[72] Likewise, the inconsistency in the testimonies as to who
conducted the inventory was inconsequential.[73]

Unrelenting, Vinluan elevated[74] the case to this Court.[75] The parties opted to no longer file supplemental briefs.[76]

Issue

The issue here is whether Vinluan's conviction for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs is proper.

Our Ruling

The appeal has merit. We acquit Vinluan for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

At the outset, We find that there was a violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs are as follows: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and, (b)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [77] In a buy-bust operation, the receipt by the poseur-buyer of
the dangerous drug and the corresponding receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs.[78] What matters is the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.[79]

We affirm the finding of the CA and the RTC in this regard. Evidence show that the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
was consummated. Vinluan indeed delivered marijuana to PO1 Cammayo, who in turn gave the buy-bust money as
payment. The seized items were also presented in court to prove the corpus delicti.

However, the setback lies in the failure of the police officers to observe the rule on chain of custody.

Related to establishing the identity of the object of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs is the observance of the rule on
chain of custody. Section 21 of RA 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (emphasis supplied)
The law requires that the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs must be done in the
presence of three witnesses: a representative from the media, a representative from the DOJ, and any elected public
official. People v. Baluyot[80] (Baluyot) teaches that this requirement seeks to avoid frame ups or wrongful arrests of
persons suspected to be violators of the law.[81] The presence of the three witnesses protects from the planting of
evidence on the person or effects of the accused.[82] The prosecution must therefore allege and prove that at the time
of the inventory of the evidence and the taking of photographs, the three witnesses were present.[83]

This rule is subject to exceptions. Baluyot, citing People v. Lim[84] (Lim), further elaborates on this matter:
Indubitably, this strict requirement is subject to exceptions as well. The case of People v. Lim holds that in the event
of absence of one or more of the witnesses, the prosecution must allege and prove that their presence during the
inventory of the seized items was not obtained due to reasons such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or
any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts
sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an
elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove[d] futile through
no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints
and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers
from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
The prosecution must show that the apprehending officers employed earnest efforts in procuring the attendance of
witnesses for the inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust operation. Mere statements of unavailability of the
witnesses given by the apprehending officers are not justifiable reasons for non-compliance with the requirement.
This is because the apprehending officers usually have sufficient time, from the moment they received information
about the alleged illegal activities until the time of the arrest, to prepare for the buy-bust operation that necessarily
includes the procurement of three (3) witnesses. If one of the individuals invited refuses to participate as witness, the
apprehending officers can still invite another individual to become a witness.[85]
The witness requirement, before the amendment [86] of the law, is quite strict. Lim, however, allows the prosecution to
show that the attendance of one of the witnesses was not procured due to the reasons provided therein. The
prosecution must show that the police officers have exerted earnest efforts in procuring the attendance of the
witnesses.

Also, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 [87] provides for the same requirements regarding
witnesses. It allows, however, for non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody as long as there is a justifiable
reason, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. The relevant portion of the IRR
provision reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphases supplied)
For the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must first have recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter
explain the justifiable ground for noncompliance as well as show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved.[88] The prosecution bears the duty to acknowledge and justify any deviations from the
procedure during the trial.[89]

Here, the three-witness requirement was not observed. Only two witnesses were present, and they were both elected
public officials: barangay kagawads Hernandez and Laguisma. There were no representatives from the media and
the DOJ. First, it is apparent in the inventory report that only the two kagawads signed as witnesses.[90] The document
shows only the signatures of the two officials along with the police officers'; there is no showing of any other signature
to imply that the other required witnesses were present and had signed. Second, the apprehending officers testified
that only the two kagawads were present as witnesses. PO1 Cammayo testified that after Vinluan's arrest, he marked
the evidence while PO2 Damaso called for the barangay kagawads; and that they signed the inventory report upon
their arrival.[91] SPOl Bautista and PO2 Damaso provided the same information.[92]

There was no attempt for the prosecution to justify the absence of the representatives from the media and DOJ as
required by the law. Nowhere in the records does it show that the police officers employed earnest efforts to procure
the attendance of the other required witnesses. With this, the prosecution also cannot just rely on the saving clause.
To recall, the prosecution is required to first recognize the lapse, then provide for the justification as well as show that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved. Here, the law enforcers failed to
acknowledge the lapse on the witness requirement during the trial. This step is necessary for the saving clause to
apply.[93] While the prosecution argued that all of the links in the chain of custody were established, this does not
suffice as there was no recognition of the lapse in the first place.

The Court finds that the police officers failed to comply with the witness-requirement of Section 21, Article II of RA
9165. This unjustified noncompliance produces a gap in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs that adversely affects
their integrity and evidentiary value. The identity of the object of the illegal sale was not established. Thus, the
prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving Vinluan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Vinluan's acquittal is
therefore in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The August 17, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 07360 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marnel Vinluan y Liclican is ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director General, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director General is DIRECTED to report to this Court the action he/she has taken within five
days from receipt of this Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[2]
Id. at pp. 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of this Court), and concurred in
by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Renato C. Francisco.
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 10-16. Penned by Presiding Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui.
[4]
Entitled "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." Approved on June 7, 2002.
 Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO.
[5]

6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved on June 7, 2002.
[6]
Records, p. 1.
[7]
Id.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 207159. February 28, 2022 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF EDUARDO BOOC,
MERCEDES BOOC, AURELIA BOOC, PEDRO BOOC, FLORENTINO BOOC, AND FELICIANA
BOOC,* RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the April 24, 2013 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 03247, which affirmed the November 19, 2008 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27 of
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, in Cadastral Case No. 20 granting the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) of Lot
Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 in favor of Eduardo Booc, Mercedes Booc, Aurelia Booc, Pedro Booc, Florentino Booc,
and Feliciana Booc (collectively, respondents).

The Antecedent Facts

Subject of the controversy are three lots located in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu known as: (a) Lot No. 4749 with a lot area
of 2,813 square meters; (b) Lot No. 4765 with a lot area of 5,507 square meters; and (c) Lot No. 4777 with a lot area
of 6,973 square meters.[4]

On July 9, 1998, respondents filed a petition for reconstitution [5] of OCT of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777 alleging
that sometime in 1930, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered three January 20, 1930 Decisions [6]
declaring the late Eduardo Booc, Mercedes Booc, Aurelia Booc, Pedro Booc and Florentino Booc (collectively, the
Boocs) as the registered owners of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777. As a result thereof, in 1934, Decree Nos. 531394,
531367, and 531382 were separately issued by the CFI-Cebu directing the registration of the subject lots in the name
of the Boocs.[7]

OCTs were thereafter allegedly issued to the Boocs relative to the subject lots. Unfortunately, the OCTs were lost or
destroyed during the World War II as evidenced by the Certification [8] dated June 26, 1998 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Respondents exerted diligent efforts to recover the certificates of title but still failed to find
the same.[9]

Respondents further averred that the certificates of title were still in force at the time they were lost or destroyed.
Also, no co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate certificates of title were issued.[10]

Respondents likewise alleged that the lots adjoining the subject lots are as follows:[11]
Lot No. 4749:

North – Lot 4736 owned by Nemesio Fernandez of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;

East – Lot 4748 owned by Eusebio Pino of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
South – Lot 4750 owned by Hilarion Fernandez of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City; and
West – Lot 4735 owned by Jorge Linao of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City.

xxxx

Lot No. 4765:

Northeast – Lot 4764 owned by Juan Inot of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;

North West – Lot 4757 owned by Juan Booc of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
Southeast – Lot 4766 owned by Miguel Linao of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
South West – Lot 4755 owned by Calixto Inot of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City; and Lot 4769 owned by Lazaro Cabuco of
Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
West – Lot 4756 owned by Santiago Fernandez of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City.

xxxx

Lot No. 4777:

East – Lot 4779 owned by Laureana Talingting of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;

South – Lot 4780 owned by Bonifacio Malingin of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
West – Lot 4776 owned by Joaquin Patalinghug of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City;
North – Lot 4775 owned by Sotera Catagcatag of Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City.[12]
At present, Lot No. 4749 is in the material possession of the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority (MEPZA). [13]
On the other hand, the Mactan International Airport Authority (MIAA) possesses Lot Nos. 4765 and 4777.[14]

In support of their petition for reconstitution, respondents presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certified true copy of the January 20, 1930 Decision of the CFI Cebu awarding to the Boocs Lot No.
4749;[15]
2. Certified true copy of the January 20, 1930 Decision of the CFI Cebu awarding to the Boocs Lot No.
4765;[16]
3. Certified true copy of the January 20, 1930 Decision of the CFI Cebu awarding to the Boocs Lot Nos.
4777 and 4765;[17]
4. Certified true copy of Decree No. 531367 issued by the CFI-Cebu dated June 1, 1934 declaring the
Boocs as the owners of Lot No. 4749;[18]
5. Certified true copy of Decree No. 531382 issued by the CFI-Cebu dated June 2, 1934 declaring the
Boocs as the owners of Lot No. 4765;[19]
6. Certified true copy of Decree No. 531394 issued by the CFI-Cebu dated May 1, 1934 declaring the
Boocs as the owners of Lot No. 4777;[20]
7. Certification by the Registry of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City dated June 26, 1998;
8. Certified true copies of the respective technical description of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777;[21]
9. June 18, 1998 Certification from the Clerk of Court of RTC of Lapu-Lapu City stating that no application
for reconstitution of original certificates of title for the subject lots was filed before the said trial court;[22]
10. Certifications from Branch Clerks of Court of Branch Nos. 27, 53 and 54 of RTC of Lapu-Lapu City which
similarly stated that no application for reconstitution of original certificates of title for the subject lots was
filed before the said trial court;[23] and
11. Sketch plans for the subject lands.[24]

In its Amended Order[25] dated February 18, 2000, the RTC: (a) set the initial hearing of the case; (b) directed the
Branch Clerk of Court to cause the publication of the Notice of Hearing in the three successive issues of the Official
Gazette; and (c) ordered the posting of the copies thereof at the Capitol Building of Cebu City and the place where
the subject lots were located. The RTC further ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), the Register of Deeds-Cebu, the Bureau of Lands, and the Land Registration Authority (LRA), copies
of the RTC Amended Order. Subsequently, the OSG entered its appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of
Lapu-Lapu City to appear for the State.[26]

Pursuant to the aforementioned order, an Amended Notice of Hearing[27] was issued on the same date.

The initial hearing was thereafter conducted wherein respondents established the jurisdictional facts. The RTC
initially entered an order of general default when no opposition to the petition for reconstitution was filed, and
scheduled the initial presentation of respondent's evidence on August 29, 2000. However, it did not push through
when the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) filed its opposition.[28]

In its opposition,[29] MCIAA asserted that the government, through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), owned
the subject lots. The CAA bought the said lots from Julian Cuizon (Julian), Modesta Cuizon (Modesta), and Paulino
Cuizon (Paulino), as evidenced by three Deeds of Absolute Sale dated September 5, 1957, [30] April 4, 1958,[31] and
July 16, 1958.[32] Since then, the government has been in continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the
subject lots which it declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 00357, 00371, and 00086. [33] The
ownership of the subject lots were then transferred to MCIAA pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 6985.[34]
Respondents filed their reply[35] to the opposition, averring that Julian, Modesta, and Paulino, were not the legal heirs
of the Boocs; hence, they cannot sell the subject lots. MCIAA was a possessor in bad faith since it grossly neglected
its duty to determine who were the actual owners of the subject lots before purchasing the same. Respondents also
insisted that since the subject lots are covered by Torrens certificates of title, the action relative thereto is
imprescriptible.[36]

MCIAA then filed its rejoinder asserting that respondents are not real parties-in-interest in the case because they are
not the registered owners of the subject lots. MCIAA also sought the dismissal of the petition for reconstitution on the
ground that it was prematurely filed. MCIAA reasoned that there is still a need to resolve the issue of ownership which
could only be ventilated in an ordinary court action and not before a cadastral court.[37]

In its February 19, 2003 Order,[38] the RTC dismissed MCIAA's opposition on the ground that respondents, being the
heirs of the Boocs, and MCIAA, claiming ownership over the subject lots, are both real parties-in-interest in the
petition for reconstitution under RA 26,[39] which only determines if the re-issuance of a title is proper.[40]

During the trial, respondents presented their sole witness, Ismael Limalima (Ismael), son-in-law of the heirs of
Eduardo Booc, who identified the pieces of documentary evidence. During his cross-examination, Ismael averred that
sometime in 1976, respondents were surprised to find out that another person had occupied the land of Eduardo. [41]
They then searched for the duplicate copy of the OCT but did not find it.[42] Believing it was lost, Ismael claimed that
they went to the municipal hall of Lapu-Lapu City afterwards.[43]

In a Report[44] dated April 17, 2009 submitted to the RTC, the LRA states:
(1) The present petition seeks the reconstitution of Original Certificates of Title Nos. N.A., allegedly lost or destroyed
and supposedly covering Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, situated in the Municipality
of Opon, Province of Cebu, on the basis of Decree Nos. 531394, 531382 and 531367.

(2) From Book No. 8 of the "Record Book of Cadastral Lots" on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it
appears that Decree Nos. 531367, 531382 and 531394 were issued to Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 on June 1,
1934, June 2, 1934 and May 31, 1934, respectively, all of Opon Cadastre, in Cadastral Case No. 20, GLRO Cad.
Record No. 1004. As per copies of said decrees on file at the Vault Section, Docket Division, this Authority, it appears
that it were issed in favor of Eduardo, Mercedes, Aurelio, Pedro, Florentino and Feliciana, all surnained Booc.

(3) The technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, appearing on
Decree Nos. 531367, 531382 and 531394 has been examined and found correct after examination and due
computation. Said technical descriptions when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 7323, do not appear to
overlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.

x x x x[45]
Ruling of the Regional Trial
Court:

In its Decision[46] dated November 19, 2008, the RTC held that respondents sufficiently proved that the OCTs of the
subject lots were issued in the name of the Boocs and that these were lost or destroyed during the war. Thus,
reconstitution of the same is in order.

The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, reconstitution is hereby granted. The
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby directed to reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lots Nos. 4749,
4765, and 4777, of Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the corresponding fees in the name of the decreed owners,
namely: Eduardo Booc, Mercedes Booc, Aurelia Booc, Pedro Booc, Florentino Booc and Feliciana Booc based on
the Index of Decrees, sketch plans, technical descriptions and Report of the Land Registration Authority, subject to
the following conditions:

1. A first lien in favor of the National Government to guarantee the payment of the special taxes assessed pursuant to
Section 18 of Act 2259, as amended; and,

2. A lien in favor of E. Bunagan Surveying Co. to guarantee the payment of the costs of cadastral survey and
monumenting pursuant to Act 3327, as amended, unless the same has previously been cancelled; and provided
further, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds
concerned.
The Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City is hereby directed to deliver the title thereof to the decreed owners or their
successors-in-interest.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines then appealed [47] to the CA arguing that the RTC erred in granting the petition
mainly because the numbers of the purported OCTs of the subject lots were not identified. Hence, respondents failed
to prove that the said certificates exist and were in force at the time they were allegedly lost or destroyed.[48]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its April 24, 2013 Decision,[49] the CA ruled that the failure to mention the numbers of the lost OCTs of Lot Nos.
4749, 4765 and 4777 is not a fatal defect to the reconstitution thereof. The CA held that the existence of the decisions
and decrees awarding the subject lots to the Boocs, and the Register of Deeds' certification stating that the OCT was
lost or destroyed, are sufficient to warrant the reconstitution of the purported lost or destroyed certificates of title.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED without prejudice to the determination of the
issue of ownership of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777 in a separate proceeding. The Decision of Branch 27, Regional
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Lapu-lapu City dated November 19, 2008 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[50]
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.[51]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following grounds:

THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PURPORTED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE COVERING LOT NOS.
4749, 4765 AND 4777 OF OPON CADASTRE HAS NO BASIS AS THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THESE LOTS
WERE REGISTERED UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM. HENCE, THERE ARE NO TITLES THAT MAY BE
VALIDLY RECONSTITUTED.

II

THE DECISIONS AND THE DECREES ALLEGEDLY PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT LOTS, WITHOUT ANY
INDICATION OF THE NUMBERS OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE, CANNOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A
PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION.[52]
Simply put, the sole issue for resolution is whether or not respondents are entitled to the reconstitution of the OCTs of
the subject lots.

Petitioner avers that the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision since there is no proof that the subject lands were
indeed registered under the Torrens System to warrant the reconstitution of the purported lost or destroyed
certificates of title. Further, the numbers of the certificates of titles of the subject lots were not indicated in the decrees
and the CFI-Cebu Decisions which allegedly awarded the same to the Boocs.[53]

Respondents, on other hand, insist that OCTs were issued on the subject lots as proved by the Register of Deeds'
certification. Also, the absence of the numbers of the certificates of title is not a ground to deny or infirm the petition
since Section 13 of RA 26 merely states that the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title shall only be stated
in the notice "if known".[54]

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is settled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [55] The question must therefore not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. [56] The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. [57] If the issue
raised entails a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[58]
As such, as a general rule, the factual findings of the CA will not be reviewed on appeal by this Court as it is not a
trier of facts. It will therefore not entertain questions of fact since the factual findings of the appellate courts are final,
binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence.[59]

Nonetheless, the Court deals with questions of fact in resolving a petition for review on certiorari when there is the
presence of any of the following exceptional circumstances:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both parties;
(7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[60]
The fourth and ninth exceptions are present in the case which warrant a review of the issues presented in the
petition.

The RTC failed to acquire

jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution due to procedural
infirmities.

RA 26, otherwise known as "Special Procedure for Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Torrens Certificate of Title,"
on judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title, governs the restoration of a lost or destroyed certificate of title in its
original form and condition.[61] The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the
same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction.[62]

The trial court can only acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution if the mandatory requirements and
procedures laid down in RA 26 have been strictly complied with. In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
[63]
the Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the requirements and procedures in RA 26 in this wise:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title
lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to
hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode
of procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority
over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The
Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in
the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. x x x[64]
There are two procedures and sets of requirements under RA 26 which must be observed depending on the source
of the petition for reconstitution.[65] Section 10, in relation to Section 9, provides the procedure and requirements for
sources falling under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). [66] On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down the
procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f).[67]

Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, in particular, state:

SECTION 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e)
and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's
or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the
location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if
any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such
buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that
no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same:
Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of
this Act, the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of title covering the same property.

SECTION 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered
mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons
in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location,
area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
The requirements in Section 12, on the contents of a petition, and Section 13, on the publication of the notice of
petition, are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature. [68] Hence, non-observance thereof fatally affects the whole
proceedings in all its aspects and renders the same void.[69]

In the case at bench, the petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements laid down in Section 12 of
RA 26. Although respondents stated in their petition that MEPZA possesses Lot No. 4749 while the MIAA occuppies
Lot Nos. 4765 and 4777, they failed to indicate their present addresses. Despite being aware that the subject lots are
in the material possession of the MIAA and MEPZA, respondents did not stipulate if a building or improvements which
do not belong to the Boocs are erected in the subject lots, and the nature thereof. They also did not state the
encumbrances affecting the property, which are the deeds of absolute sale executed in 1957 and 1958 in favor
MCIAA. Verily, the petition for reconstitution is fatally defective due to the presence of severe infirmities.

Not only did respondents violate Section 12 of RA 26, they likewise did not strictly adhere to the procedures on notice
of hearing laid down in Section 13 of the said law.

The Amended Notice of Hearing[70] dated February 18, 2000 states:

TO: Atty. Froilan Quilano, Don Mariano Cui, St., Fuente Osmena, Cebu City
Hrs. of Eduardo Booc, Rep. by Bartolome Booc, et al., Medellin, Cebu
The City Fiscal, Lapu-Lapu City, Personal Service
The Register of Deeds of Cebu, Prov'l Capitol Bldg., Cebu City
The Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Personal Service Reg/m/rrr
The Director Bureau of Lands, Manila. Reg/m/rrr
The Administrator, LRAZ, Quezon City, Reg/m/rrr
The Director National Printing Office, Quezon City, Reg/m/rrr
The Solicitor General, Makati, Metro Manila, Reg/m/rrr
Lot No. 4749, Eduardo Booc, et al., (Decreed Owners) Onofre Seño, Heirs
of Jorge Linao, Memesio Fernandez, Eusebio Pino and Heirs of Hilarion
Fernandez (Adjoining Owners) Lot No. 4765 Eduardo Booc, et al.,
(Decreed Owners) Lazaro Cobuco, Calixto Inot Santiago Fernandez, Juan
Booc, Juan Inot and Miguel Linao Lot No. 4777 Eduardo Booc, et al.,
(Decreed Owners) Bonifacio Malingin, et al., Joaquin Patalinghug, Sotera
Catagcatag and Laureana Talingting (Adjoining Owners) All residing at
Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City

GREETINGS:

Please take notice that the petition filed with this Court by movant through counsel, seeking an Order for the
reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777, all of Opon Cadastre, is set for
hearing on July 13, 2000 at 8:30 in the morning, before this Branch of the Court, stationed at Lapu-Lapu City,
Philippines.

Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 & 4777 are situated in the Barrio Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City and bounded by the properties of the
last Fifteen (15) aforementioned persons.
WITNESS THE HONORABLE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of this Court, this 18 th day of February
2000 at Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines.

(sgd) ATTY. NANCY C. ARRIESGADO

Branch Clerk of Court
A close scrutiny of the amended notice shows that it did not indicate the number of the lost of destroyed OCTs. It
simply stated "Original Certificate of Title of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777." Consequently, the failure to identify the
exact title number "defeats the purpose of the twin notice and publication requirements since persons who have
interest in the property or who may otherwise be affected by the reconstitution of the supposed title thereto would not
be able to readily identify the said property or could even be misled by the vague or uncertain title reference."[71]

The amended notice also failed to indicate the following in violation of the in rem character of the reconstitution
proceedings and the mandatory nature of the requirements under RA 26: (a) the names of MEPZA and MIAA who
are the occupants and possessors of the subject lots; (b) the area and the boundaries of the subject lots; and (c) the
date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition.

Undoubtedly, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondents' petition due to these fatal defects in gross
violation of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26. As a result thereof, its proceedings, as well as those of the CA, are null and
void.[72]

Remarkably, although petitioner overlooked the jurisdictional infirmities in the petition for reconstitution and failed to
incorporate them as additional issues in its petition, the Court still has sufficient authority to pass upon and resolve
the same since they affect jurisdiction.[73] As held in Castillo v. Republic:[74]
We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to
land registration cases. Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements,
the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of
proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the
proceedings before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of
jurisdiction.[75]
Besides, even if respondents complied with the procedural rules under RA 26, still, the petition for reconstitution
should have been denied.

There is insufficient evidence

showing that OCTs of the subject
lots in the name of the Boocs exist.

Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates in the following order the sources from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original certificates of title may be based:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
has been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis Ours.)
In Republic v. Tuastumban,[76] the Court laid down the requirements for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a)
that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and
proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner
of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.[77]

Respondents anchored their petition for reconstitution on Sections 2(d) and 2(f) of RA 26. To recall, respondents
attached to their petition the following documentary evidence: (a) decisions of the CFI-Cebu awarding the subject lots
to the Boocs; (b) decrees issued by the cadastral court pursuant to which an original certificate of title of the subject
lots was issued in favor of the Boocs; (c) Register of Deeds' certification; (d) technical description of the subject lots;
and (e) certifications from the Branch Clerk of Court, and Branch Clerks of Court of Branch Nos. 27, 53 and 54 of
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City stating that no application for reconstitution of original certificate of title for the subject lots
was filed before the said trial courts; and (f) sketch plans of the subject lots.[78]

Respondents also presented the testimony of Ismael on the authenticity of the documentary evidence, and that the
duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost and/or destroyed.[79]

Unfortunately, however, these pieces of evidence are not adequate proof that certificates of title were in fact issued to
the Boocs, and the same were in force at the time they were lost or destroyed. At best, the CFI-Cebu decisions and
Decree Nos. 531367, 531382 and 531394 only proved that Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 were awarded to the
Boocs and that the lots were to be registered in their names pursuant to Land Registration Act. Neither can the
Register of Deeds' certification be considered as a competent evidence as it simply states that "the Original
Certificate of Title of Lot No./s. 4749, 4765 and 4777 of Opon Cadastre as per records on file has/have been lost or
destroyed during the last Global War,"[80] without even stating the title numbers of the certificates of title, and the
names for which they were issued.

Interestingly, the LRA Report merely corroborated the award of the subject lots to the Boocs pursuant to the decrees.
It did not even state if the certificates of title covering the subject lots were in fact issued to them. Verily, respondents'
failure to present any competent evidence, private or official, indicating the number of the purported OCTs of the
subject lots is a fatal defect which warrants the dismissal of their petition for reconstitution.[81]

Respondents' non-submission of an affidavit of loss further casts doubt if the certificates of title of the subject lots in
the name of the Boocs exist.[82]

Section 109[83] of Presidential Decree No. 1529[84] mandates that the owner must file with the proper Registry of
Deeds a notice of loss executed under oath. Here, as early as 1976, respondents knew that the duplicate certificates
of title were already lost. Yet, they did not execute an affidavit of loss or had submitted the same as evidence if there
is one giving rise to serious doubts if the purported certificates of title indeed existed.

The Court cannot give credence and weight to the testimony of Ismael which pertained only to the authenticity and
existence of the documentary evidence presented, and that the duplicate of the certificates of title were lost in 1976.
He neither testified as to who among the Boocs possessed the certificates of title nor attested that he had seen the
duplicate thereof. Worse, Ismael's testimony is nothing but a mere sweeping general statement that the duplicate
certificates of title were lost and that they tried to look for the same. He did not recount in detail who participated in
the search and how it was conducted.

Respondents did not also submit any tax declarations relative to the subject lots. While a tax declaration does not
prove ownership, payment of realty tax is an exercise of ownership over the said lots and is the payor's unbroken
chain of claim of ownership over it.[85]

Moreover, respondents are guilty of laches. Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [86]
Here, respondents only filed the petition for reconstitution 12 years after they first discovered that the titles were
allegedly lost or destroyed.

All told, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failed to comply with the legal requirements
under RA 26 for the petition for reconstitution to be given due course. Furthermore, respondents did not adduce
competent evidence that the OCTs of the subject lots existed and were indeed issued in the name of the Boocs. To
stress, the purpose of the reconstitution of a certificate of title under RA 26 is to have the same reproduced, after
proper proceedings in the same form it was when the loss or destruction occurred. [87] Thus, before any reconstitution
may be made, there should be sufficient and competent proof that the title sought to be reconstituted had actually
existed.[88]
On a final note, We have emphasized time and again that the trial courts should be circumspect in granting a petition
for reconstitution. It is the duty of said courts to first examine carefully the petition and its supporting documents, and
ensure that the legal provisions on jurisidictional requirements under RA 26 are strictly complied. [89] In Republic v.
Sanchez,[90] the Court emphasized that the strict observance of the rules laid down in the law is necessary to prevent
parties from resorting and exploiting reconstitution proceedings to obtain Torrens title over a parcel of land, to wit:
Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for their purpose the restoration in the original form and condition of a
lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. Thus, reconstitution must be granted only
upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. Strict observance of this rule
is vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens
certificates of titles over parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. The social and
economic costs of such modus operandi cannot be underestimated. As we observed in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals:
The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be protected and preserved to ensure the stability and security
of land titles for otherwise land ownership in the country would be rendered erratic and restless and can certainly be a
potent and veritable cause of social unrest and agrarian agitation. x x x x The real purpose of the Torrens System
which is to quiet title to the land must be upheld and defended, and once a title is registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.[91] (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The April 24, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03247 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution filed by the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu docketed as Cadastral Case No.
20, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

*
Feliciano Booc is also referred as Feliciana Booc and Feleciana Booc in some parts of the records.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 22-39.
[2]
Id. at 8-20. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo
L. Delos Santos (now a retired member of the Court) and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino.
[3]
Id. at 70-76. Penned by Presiding Judge Toribio S. Quiwag.
[4]
Id. at 58.
[5]
Records, pp. 1-5.
[6]
Id. at 12-14.
[7]
Rollo, p. 10.
[8]
Records, p. 15.
[9]
Rollo, p. 10.
[10]
Id. at 71.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 257276. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX [1] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This resolves the appeal[2] filed by accused-appellant XXX (accused-appellant) assailing the November 25, 2020
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 03295. Accused-appellant was charged with
Qualified Rape under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of August 2009 in the xxxxxxxxxxx,[4] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
[AAA],[5] a minor 7 years old (sic) aggravated by relationship, the accused being the uncle of the victim because
accused is the brother of the victim's father.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.[7] The defense admitted the authenticity and due
execution of complainant AAA's temporary medical certificate. The said document, along with AAA's baptismal
certificate and birth certificate, was admitted as documentary evidence. [8] The prosecution presented the testimonies
of AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr. Rufina Leonor Barrot Gler (Dr. Gler). The records of the stenographic notes of the
said witnesses were lost due to the onslaught of Typhoon Yolanda; thus, the retaking of testimonies of the said
witnesses was conducted, except for Dr. Gler's. [9] However, the defense admitted the authenticity and due execution
of the temporary medical report and final medico-legal report.[10]

Version of the prosecution:

AAA recounted that at around 7:00 p.m. of August 8, 2009, she was inside their house when accused-appellant, her
uncle who lived with them, summoned her inside his room. Upon entering accused-appellant's room, accused-
appellant pulled down her shirt, removed her panty, and undressed himself by removing his pants, brief, and t-shirt.
Accused-appellant proceeded to kiss AAA on the lips, then laid her down on the bed. He subsequently mounted AAA
and inserted his penis inside her vagina.[11] The latter felt pain in her vagina and informed accused-appellant about it,
which caused him to stop his actions. Accused-appellant stood up, put on his clothes and directed AAA to do the
same. She put on her clothes and both of them then sat on the bed side by side. At this point, accused-appellant
unzipped his pants and ordered AAA to suck his penis. Due to his threat that he will kill her if she does not comply
with his orders, AAA followed his order. After 30 minutes of satisfying his desires, accused-appellant told her to get
out of his room.[12] AAA was only seven years old at the time of the incident. [13] She further testified that accused-
appellant also raped her prior to the incident.[14]

On the same night, BBB was grilling fish inside their house and called for AAA to help her. However, she did not
reply. BBB went out to look for her daughter. While BBB was passing through accused-appellant's window, she saw
that accused-appellant was kissing her daughter and that her daughter was holding accused-appellant's penis,
running her fingers on it in an up and down motion.[15] BBB rushed to enter her house and saw her daughter coming
out of accused-appellant's room. Upon seeing her mother, AAA informed her that accused-appellant sexually abused
her and threatened to kill her if she does not follow his orders. Upon hearing this, BBB informed her husband, and
they immediately proceeded to the xxxxxxxxxxx Police Community Precinct to report the rape incident against
accused-appellant. After reporting the incident, they brought AAA to the hospital to undergo a medical examination.[16]

Dr. Florence J. Curbilla, the gynecologist who examined AAA, discovered that there was an abrasion on the labia
majora and an old healed incomplete hymenal laceration at the 11:00 o'clock position, but her vaginal discharge did
not contain any spermatozoa. Dr. Curbilla's findings were contained in the medico-legal report.[17]

Version of the Defense:

For his part, accused-appellant denied having raped AAA and claimed that he was sleeping in his house at the time
of the incident. His house was adjacent to the house of AAA. While he was sleeping, two police officers went to his
house, awakened him, and informed him that someone has complained that he committed rape. BBB accompanied
the police officers.[18] He admitted that he was AAA's uncle, since her father is his brother. [19] While he noted that the
only possible motive against him is a land dispute between the siblings, he stated that he was very close to AAA's
parents, who treated him well and had no reason to charge him with sexual abuse.[20]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC):

On February 20, 2019, the RTC, Branch 7 of xxxxxxxxxxx, convicted accused-appellant of Qualified Rape. The RTC
accorded great weight to the victim's straightforward and positive testimony, which was corroborated by BBB's
testimony, over accused-appellant's negative and self-serving account.[21] The RTC also noted that the fact that the
victim was only seven years old at the time of the incident and that the accused-appellant is her uncle was sufficiently
proven.[22] The fallo of the RTC's judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused [XXX] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and to pay the private offended party "AAA" P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with all such amounts to earn interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision until full payment.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[23]
In his appeal, accused-appellant decried the RTC's finding of guilt, and argued that the RTC erred in giving weight
and credence to the testimony of AAA. Accused-appellant argued that there are glaring inconsistencies in AAA's and
BBB's testimonies, noting further that BBB's supposed reaction of not rushing to the aid of her daughter in a dreadful
situation is incredulous. Accused-appellant likewise maintained that his relationship to AAA was not duly proven. [24]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General averred that accused-appellant's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and maintained that the complainant's credible and straightforward testimony must prevail over the
bare denials of the accused-appellant. [25]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its November 25, 2020 Decision, the CA modified the designation of the crime committed from Qualified Rape to
Statutory Rape. The CA agreed that the prosecution sufficiently established AAA's minority at the time of the incident
and the presence of the elements of Statutory Rape, and that AAA's clear and convincing testimony deserves full
weight and credence. However, the CA observed that the allegation of relationship between AAA and accused-
appellant under the Information is insufficient under prevailing jurisprudence.[26] The dispositive portion of the CA's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated 20 February 2019 of the Regional Trial Court of
xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx, Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 2009-08-363 finding accused-appellant [XXX] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. [XXX] is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The award of damages must earn 6% per annum computed from finality of the Court's Decision until satisfied.

SO ORDERED.[27]
Hence, this appeal.[28]

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that the appeal is bereft of merit.

In the review of rape cases, We continue to be guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in
view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the
complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue.[29]

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the courts a quo that the
elements of Statutory Rape were duly established. AAA's straightforward and positive testimony that accused-
appellant raped her was corroborated by BBB's testimony. When considered together with the medico-legal
certificate indicating an abrasion on her labia majora and AAA's birth certificate proving that she was seven years old
at the time of the incident, the prosecution's evidence is sufficient for conviction. It is settled that the crime of rape is
deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters or comes into contact to the labia or lips of the
female organ.[30] Further, the trial court's assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserves great weight, and even
conclusive and binding effect, unless the same is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, since the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the CA sustained said findings, as in
this case.[31]

Moreover, AAA's testimony is clear, candid, consistent in its material points, and unshaken during cross-examination.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability, but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. [32] Thus, accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. A denial, which necessarily constitutes self-serving negative evidence,
cannot prevail over the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[33]

However, contrary to the finding of the CA, We hold that the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was
sufficiently alleged in the Information. Indeed, the minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender
should both be alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to qualify the rape
charge as these circumstances have the effect of altering the nature of the rape and its corresponding penalty. [34] If
the offender is merely a relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the
mother of the victim — it must be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by 'consanguinity or affinity (as the
case may be) within the third civil degree." The allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of AAA, and a brother of
AAA's father, without specifically alleging that such relationship was within the third civil degree, is specific enough to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship.[35] In People v. XXX,[36] the Court considered the qualifying
circumstance of relationship even without the specific allegation that the same was within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, since the information therein already described the offender as the "maternal uncle" of the
victim. In the same manner, the Information in the instant case contained a statement that "the accused being the
uncle of victim because accused is the brother of the victim's father." [37] Hence, accused-appellant can be properly
convicted of Qualified Rape.

In sum, accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape. Thus, he was properly meted out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. [38] The CA's awards of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.00 each to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
[39]
All damages awarded shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 25, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB
CR. HC. No. 03295 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY of
Qualified Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to
pay AAA (i) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii) P100,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the aggregate amount of the
monetary awards computed from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular
[1]

No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017 entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and
Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal
Circumstances."
[2]
Rollo, pp. 5-7. Notice of Appeal dated January 4, 2021.
[3]
Id. at 11-26. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Emily R. Alino-
Geluz and Lorenza Redulla Bordios.
[4]
Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.

"The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of
[5]

her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing
for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing
Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their
Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
[6]
Records, pp. 1-2.
[7]
Id. at 18-19.
[8]
Id. at 99.
[9]
Id. at 30. TSN, June 26, 2015, pp. 1-12.
[10]
Records, p. 31.
[11]
TSN, June 26, 2015, pp. 6-7.
[12]
Id. at 8-9.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 240810. February 28, 2022 ]
GLORIA PAJE, LOLITA GOMEZ, MIRIAM CATACUTAN, ESTRELLA ZAPATA, GLORIA
SUMANG, JUANITA JULIETA DINGAL, MYRA AMANTE, AND FE S. BERNARDO,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPIC N' SPAN SERVICE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

A quitclaim executed in favor of the employer does not operate to discharge the labor-only contractor from liability for
the remaining balance of the workers' money claims.

This resolves the Petition for Review[1] filed by Gloria Paje, Lolita Gomez, Miriam Catacutan, Estrella Zapata, Gloria
Sumang, Juanita Julieta Dingal, Myra Amante, and Fe Bernardo (Paje et al.), seeking to annul the Decision [2] and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the Decision [4] and Order[5] of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The Commission earlier affirmed the Order [6] of the labor arbiter, granting the Motion to Quash the
partial writ of execution filed by Spic N' Span Service Corporation (Spic N' Span).

Paje et al. were merchandisers of products manufactured by Swift Foods, Inc. (Swift) in various supermarkets in
Tarlac and Pampanga. Meanwhile, Spic N' Span is a domestic company engaged in the business of supplying
human resource services to different clients, one of which was Swift. It was Spic N' Span that hired Paje et al. and
assigned them to Swift.[7]

On March 13, 1998, Paje et al., with four others, [8] filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
Swift and Spic N' Span.[9]

In a Decision,[10] the labor arbiter dismissed the Complaint of Paje et al., but held Swift and Spic N' Span "jointly and
severally" liable to pay the claims of the other co-complainants, namely, Edelisa David (David) and Inocencio
Fernandez (Fernandez):
VIEWED FROM THIS LIGHT, judgment is hereby rendered with the following dispositions:
1. Ordering respondents Spic and Span as Agent and Swift Foods Corporations as the employer to jointly and
severally pay the economic benefits of the complainants as follows:

A. Edelisa F. David

Retirement - P114,840.00
pay

SIL - 797.50
 P115,637.50

2.
3. B. Inocencio A. Fernandez
4.

Retirement - P191.400.00
pay

SIL - 797.50

P192,197.50

5.
6.
7. DISMISSING without prejudice the claims made by Julieta C. Dingal, Fe A. Bernardo, Lolita Gomez,
Myra Amante, Miriam M. Catacutan, Gloria O. Sumang, Gloria Paje, Estrella Zapata[,] and Thelma M.
Guardian; and

8. DENYING all other claims for lack of factual basis.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Paje et al., together with David and Fernandez, filed a partial appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission. Swift also filed an appeal.[12]

In a Resolution,[13] the National Labor Relations Commission held that Spic N' Span was the true employer of Paje et
al. and dismissed the Complaint against Swift. It awarded backwages to David and Fernandez, but sustained the
dismissal of the Complaint of Paje et al.[14]

Paje et al. later filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the National Labor Relations Commission.[15]

In a Decision,[16] the Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the NLRC dated
January 11, 2002 and December 23, 2002 are SET ASIDE in so far as the dismissal of the petitioners' case is
concerned and in so far as Swift is found not liable for the payment of the petitioners' money claims.

The present case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the money claims of petitioners,
to wit: 1) Backwages; 2) Separation Pay; and 3) Service Incentive Leave Pay.

The settlement of the claims of David and Fernandez is not affected by this decision.

SO ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis supplied)

Spic N' Span filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.[18]

Accordingly, Spic N' Span filed a Petition for Review with this Court. Swift also filed a Petition for Review, which was
denied by the Court for being defective.[19]
On September 18, 2008, Swift paid Paje et al. the amount of P3,588,785.30. This represented exactly half of
P7,177,570.60, the total amount due Paje et al. as of July 3, 2008 per the fiscal examiner of the National Labor
Relations Commission.[20] A quitclaim was signed by Paje et al. upon receipt of the said amount.

The Quitclaim and Release[21] provides:

COME NOW, the undersigned complainants, by and through their Attorney-in-Fact Jessie P. Albacea in the above-
entitled case, and before this Honorable Office respectfully manifest:

That for and in the total amount of P3,588,785.30 to be divided equally by herein nine (9) complainants, in full and
complete settlement of my/our claims as financial assistance and/or gratuitously given by my/our employer, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged to my/our complete and full satisfaction, I/We release and discharge SWIFT FOODS
CORP./SWIFT FOODS, INC. (SFI) and/or its officers from any and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation
pay, overtime pay, differential pay[,] or otherwise as maybe due me/us incident to my/our past employment with said
establishment.

I/We hereby state further that I/We have no more claims, rights[,] or action of whatsoever nature, whether past,
present or contingent against the respondent(s) and/or its officers.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I/We have hereunto set my/our hands this 18 th day of September 2008 at (sic) the City of
San Fernando, Pampanga.[22]
On August 25, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision [23] on Spic N' Span's Petition. It affirmed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals with an additional award of nominal damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' October 25, 2004 Decision and
August 2, 2006 Resolution in CA-GR SP No. 83215, with the modification that nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 should additionally be paid to each of the respondents, for violation of their procedural due process
rights.[24]
When the Decision became final,[25] Paje et al. filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.[26]

The labor arbiter issued a Partial Writ of Execution, [27] directing the collection of P3,858,785.30 from Spic N' Span,
inclusive of nominal damages of P30,000.00 each for the nine complainants.

Spic N' Span filed a Motion to Quash Partial Writ of Execution with Motion for Re-computation. [28] It contended that
since Swift had already paid P3,588,785.30 by way of settlement, the subsequent execution of the quitclaim in favor
of Swift must necessarily benefit Spic N' Span as a mere agent of Swift.[29]

As explained earlier, the labor arbiter found merit in the Motion and quashed the partial writ of execution.[30]

Paje et al. appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which denied the same. The dispositive portion of
its Decision[31] reads:
All told, finding no serious error in the findings of facts by the Labor Arbiter in rendering [their] Order, denial of the
appeal is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Order of Labor Arbiter Mariano L. Bactin dated 18
April 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[32]
In an Order,[33] the National Labor Relations Commission also denied Paje et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relation Commission.[34] It held that the labor
tribunals were correct when they ruled that the Quitclaim and Release redounded to the benefit of Spic N' Span
pursuant to Article 1217 of the Civil Code. It also upheld the factual findings of the labor tribunals as to the
voluntariness of the execution of the Quitclaim and Release.[35]

The Court of Appeals also denied Paje, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution.[36]

Hence, this Petition was filed.[37]

Petitioners contend that the Quitclaim and Release in Swift's favor redounded to the benefit of respondent, but only to
the extent of Swift's share in the total amount due them. Invoking Article 1222 of the Civil Code, they claim that a
solidary debtor, like Spic N Span, may invoke defenses pertaining to its co-debtor only to the extent of the debt for
which the latter is responsible.[38]
They further argue that the first sentence of Article 1217 of the New Civil Code, which states that "payment made by
one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation," must be read in conjunction with Article 1233, which provides
that "[a] debt shall not be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists
has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be." Petitioners point out that the debt due them had not
been fully collected.[39]

Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals has ruled in their favor as early as October 2004 and the award
was computed by the fiscal examiner in the total amount of P7,177,570.60. Therefore, there was no reason for them
to ask for only half of the said amount if not with the understanding that the balance would be shouldered by
respondent. Considering their stations in life, it would be contrary to human experience for them to accept only half of
the total amount due them.[40]

They add that the Quitclaim and Release was never intended to release respondent. This was clear from the
document itself. Moreover, the Quitclaim and Release is a contract of adhesion and they were not assisted by
counsel during its execution. Finally, their filing of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution shows clearly their
intention to collect from respondent. Thus, they pray that they be allowed to collect what is due them in accordance
with Spic N' Span Services Corporation v. Paje.[41]

In its Comment,[42] respondent counters that petitioners' arguments have already been thoroughly passed upon in the
congruent decisions of the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals. At any rate, Swift and respondent were made
solidarily liable by law for all the rightful claims of petitioners. Thus, when petitioners accepted the payment and
executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of Swift, respondent, as agent, was also released from liability.
Consequently, petitioners are already barred from claiming from respondent.[43] It adds that petitioners' claim that the
settlement pertained only to Swift's share in the liability is misleading because the Quitclaim and Release pertained to
a full and complete settlement of all their claims.[44]

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the Court of Appeals properly sustained the quashal of the partial writ of
execution on the ground that the Quitclaim and Release executed by petitioners Gloria Paje, Lolita Gomez, Miriam
Catacutan, Estrella Zapata, Gloria Sumang, Juanita Julieta Dingal, Myra Amante, and Fe Bernardo redounded to the
benefit of respondent Spic N' Span Service Corporation.

We rule in favor of the petitioners.

The Quitclaim and Release signed by the petitioners pertinently provides:

That for and in the total amount of P3,588,785.30 to be divided equally by herein nine (9) complainants, in full and
complete settlement of my/our claims as financial assistance and/or gratuitously given by my/our employer, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged to my/our complete and full satisfaction, I/We release and discharge SWIFT FOODS
CORP./SWIFT FOODS, INC. (SFI) and/or its officers from any and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation
pay, overtime pay, differential pay[,] or otherwise as maybe due me/us incident to my/our past employment with said
establishment.

I/We hereby state further that I/We have no more claims, rights[,] or action of whatsoever nature, whether past,
present[,] or contingent against the respondent(s) and/or its officers.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners do not deny that they signed the Quitclaim and Release voluntarily. The point of dispute here is the
interpretation of the quitclaim. To the petitioners, the quitclaim was meant to release only Swift. Respondent contends
that the quitclaim also releases it from liability.

The Court sides with petitioners.

The Quitclaim and Release plainly and explicitly reads that petitioners "release and discharge Swift. . . from any and
all claims[.]"[46] Strictly construing these terms, [47] the quitclaim was meant to release Swift only, and not respondent.
"When the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the
agreement."[48] The fact that respondent was omitted is understandable because when the quitclaim was signed, its
Petition for Review before this Court was still pending.

Parenthetically, the quitclaim pertained to Swift's payment of P3,588,785.30, or only half of the total obligation of
P7,177,570.60. To construe the quitclaim as a complete discharge of respondent's obligation as well would not
constitute a fair and reasonable settlement of petitioners' claims. This Court has held that to be valid, the
consideration for the quitclaim must not be unconscionably low.[49]

In Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission,[50] this Court clarified the standards in determining the validity of
a waiver, release, and quitclaim:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction[.] But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking[.][51] (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic Planters Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, [52] the difference between the total claim of
P908,022.65 and the amount of P434,468.52 received by the employee, or almost half of the total claim, was deemed
"considerably big and substantial."[53] Accordingly, the quitclaim was held to encroach upon public policy.

Similarly, the amount of P3,588,785.30 involved in this case is unconscionably low. It cannot be said to constitute a
reasonable and equitable settlement of the judgment award in favor of petitioners.[54]

Respondent contends that because of the solidary nature of its liability, the release and discharge of Swift "from any
and all claims" should redound in its favor.

Swift's solidary liability with respondent finds basis in Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code:
Article 106. Contractor or Subcontractor. — Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees
directly employed by him.

....

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of
such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer
who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

Article 109. Solidary liability. — The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or
indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of
this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as
direct employers.[55] (Emphases supplied)
The law establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employees of the labor-only contractor and the
employer for the purpose of holding both the labor-only contractor and the employer responsible for any valid claims.
[56]
The result is that the "liability must be shouldered by either one or shared by both." [57] This solidary liability of the
employer and labor-only contractor is mandated by the Labor Code to prevent any violation or circumvention of labor
laws,[58] and ultimately to assure workers the payment of their rightful claims.[59]
A similar situation obtains where there is "labor only" contracting. The "labor-only" contractor — i.e. "the person or
intermediary" — is considered "merely as an agent of the employer." The employer is made by the statute
responsible to the employees of the "labor only" contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the
employer. Thus, where "labor only" contracting exists in a given case, the statute itself implies or establishes an
employer-employee relationship between the employer (the owner of the project) and the employees of the "labor
only" contractor, this time for a comprehensive purpose: ". . . to prevent any violation or circumvention of any
provision of this Code." The law in effect holds both the employer and the "labor-only" contractor responsible to the
latter's employees for the more effective safeguarding of the employees' rights under the Labor Code.[60] (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent cannot misuse the solidary nature of its obligation to unjustly escape from its liability to the petitioners.
The Quitclaim and Release did not operate to extinguish the entirety of the award due petitioners.

Petitioners were merchandisers. They cannot be expected to be familiar with the intricacies of the law, especially the
nature of solidary obligations. When they signed the quitclaim, they were unassisted by counsel and uninformed of
their need to reserve their right to collect the other half of the obligation from respondent. [61] There was also no
evidence that the quitclaim's purported effects of releasing respondent from liability had been explained to them.
Thus, we are more convinced with petitioners' argument that they accepted Swift's payment with the understanding
that the balance would be shouldered by respondent.
Furthermore, while it is true that the liabilities of the principal employer and labor-only contractor are solidary, Article
1216 of the Civil Code gives the employees the right to collect from any one of the solidary debtors or both of them
simultaneously. Also, "[t]he demand made against one of them will not be an obstacle to those that may be
subsequently directed against the other, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."[62]

In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,[63] the Court rejected Rodolfo Guerrero's contention that he was released from
liability when the creditor compromised the case with the other solidary debtor:
We fail to see any incompatibility between the two obligations that would sustain the defense of novation. The fact
that in the compromise agreement and subsequently in the execution sale, [Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc.]
chose first to realize its credit from Robles, did not imply waiver of its right to proceed against any of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously, and the demand made against one of them is no obstacle to demands
which may subsequently be directed against the others so long as the debt or any part of it remains outstanding and
unpaid.[64] (Citation omitted)
In this case, the total award of P7,177,570.60 due petitioners had not been fully satisfied. Swift paid only half of the
amount. Pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, Swift's payment and release will not bar petitioners from collecting
this remaining balance of the obligation from respondent.

Moreover, in resolving respondent's Petition for Review, this Court imposed nominal damages of P30,000.00 for each
of the nine petitioners, resulting in the total balance of P3,858,785.30.

In fine, we find that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the quashal of the partial writ of
execution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 128429 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The labor arbiter's Order dated April 18, 2011, which
quashed the partial writ of execution, is NULLIFIED.

Respondent Spic N' Span Service Corporation is directed to pay petitioners Gloria Paje, Lolita Gomez, Miriam
Catacutan, Estrella Zapata, Gloria Sumang, Juanita Julieta Dingal, Myra Amante, and Fe Bernardo the amount of
P3,858,785.30. The total amount is subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum to be computed from the
finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr.,* JJ., concur.

*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2871 dated February 24, 2022.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 12-32.
[2]
Id. at 39-53. The June 15, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 128429 was penned by Associate Justice Marie
Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser
of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3]
Id. at 64, 66. The July 16, 2018 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 128429 was penned by Associate Justice Marie
Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser
of the Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

Id. at 92-105. The June 18, 2012 Decision was penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by
[4]

Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco of the First Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

Id. at 106-114. The October 25, 2012 Order was penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by
[5]

Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco of the First Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

Id. at 186-198. The April 18, 2011 Order was signed by Labor Arbiter Mariano L. Bactin of the Regional Arbitration
[6]

Branch No. III of the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando, Pampanga.
[7]
Id. at 40.
[8]
These included Edelisa David, Inocencio Fernandez, Thelma Guardian, and Irene de Leon.
[9]
Rollo, p. 40.
[10]
Id. at 120-132. The November 16, 1999 Decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Fedriel S. Panganiban of the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando, Pampanga.
[11]
Id. at 131-132.
[12]
Id. at 41.

Id. at 134-142. The January 11, 2002 Resolution was penned by Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo and concurred
[13]

in by President Commissioner Roy V. Señeres and Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso of the First Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.
[14]
Id. at 41.
[15]
Id. at 42.

Id. at 143-153. The October 24, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP. No.83215 was penned by Associate Justice Juan
[16]

Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas of the Eight
Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
[17]
Id. at 152-153.
[18]
Id. at 42.

SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 13131. February 23, 2022 ]
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAMBERTO T. TAGAYUNA,
ATTY. JOSE A. GANGAN, ATTY. ELMAR A. PANOPIO, AND ATTY. RENATO DE PANO, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by complainant Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC) against respondents Atty. Lamberto T. Tagayuna (Atty. Tagayuna), Atty. Jose A. Gangan (Atty. Gangan), Atty.
Elmar A. Panopio (Atty. Panopio), and Atty. Renato De Pano, Jr. (Atty. De Pano) (collectively, respondents) for
violation of Rules 15.01, 15.03, and 15.08 of Canon 15, and Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).[2]

The Factual Antecedents:

On November 5, 2015, HGC filed a complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
alleging that respondents violated the conflict of interest rule as provided in Canon 15, as well as for failure and
refusal to account for the funds and properties of their client HGC when due or upon demand as provided in Canon
16.[3] Respondents are partners of Soliven, Tagayuna, Gangan, Panopio & De Pano Law Firm (Law Firm).[4]

HGC, a government-owned and controlled corporation, claimed that it had a large volume of non-moving, inactive,
and past due receivables.[5] This necessitated the procurement of services of an external collection agency to improve
its collection efficiency.[6] HGC thus engaged E.S.P. Collection Agency (ESP), which was represented by Atty.
Panopio jointly with the Law Firm.[7] In 2003, HGC and ESP jointly with the Law Firm entered into a Collection
Retainership Agreement, where HGC endorsed accounts for judicial and extrajudicial collection. [8] Consequently,
HGC provided ESP and the Law Firm the necessary documents for collection and litigation purposes. [9] HGC claimed
that the Collection Retainership Agreement was renewed annually for several years, until HGC and ESP agreed to
terminate their contractual relationship on October 23, 2013.[10]

HGC claimed that respondents refused to return the documents, specifically 53 owner's duplicate copies of transfer
certificates of title and other various documents, endorsed to the Law Firm in view of the termination of the Collection
Retainership Agreement.[11] HGC sent several demand letters in 2014 and 2015.[12]

On the allegation of conflict of interest, HGC claimed that Atty. Tagayuna (one of the partners of ESP and the Law
Firm) was also the president of Blue Star Construction and Development Corporation (BSCDC). [13] HGC averred that
in 2012, BSCDC through Atty. Tagayuna initiated an arbitration case against it before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission while the Collection Retainership Agreement with ESP was still subsisting.[14]

For their defense, respondents Atty. Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio claimed that the Collection Retainership Agreement
was never extended until 2013; the contract expired on December 31, 2011 and was no longer renewed.[15] Atty.
Tagayuna admitted that he was an officer of BSCDC but not its counsel when the arbitration case was filed. [16] He
likewise insisted that the Collection Retainership Agreement was already expired when BSCDC filed the arbitration
case against HGC[17] on May 16, 2012.[18] Had there been any communication between HGC and ESP and the Law
Firm beyond 2011, it was purely for the winding up of the obligations of the parties.[19]

Respondents added that HGC still owed ESP and the Law Firm the sum of P846,212.39, for which the Law Firm
exercised its retaining lien against the remaining records in custody. [20] They also add that these documents were
already returned to HGC save for a few unaccounted ones. [21] There was no intention of withholding the remaining
records of HGC, except on the ground of exercising retaining lien by reason of non-payment of legal fees.[22]

During the mandatory conference before the IBP, HGC manifested that it will no longer pursue the disciplinary case
as against respondents Atty. De Pano and Atty. Gangan. [23] Atty. De Pano was no longer connected with the Law
Firm long before the filing of the instant complaint, as evidenced by his resignation letter tendered on December 8,
2011.[24] Atty. Gangan, on the other hand, passed away in October 23, 2016 while in Japan.[25]

Report and Recommendation

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines:

In its December 23, 2019 Report and Recommendation,[26] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
recommended that respondents Atty. Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months. It found that they violated the conflict of interest rule when they represented BSCDC in the filing of an
arbitration case against HGC.[27] The CBD stated that even assuming that the contractual relationship was already
terminated at the time of filing of the case, it did not open the floodgates for the lawyers to perform overt acts against
a former client.[28] As to the charge of unlawful retainer of client's properties and documents, the CBD held that the
Law Firm had legal grounds to withhold certain documents of HGC in the exercise of retaining lien.[29]

The CBD further recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Atty. De Pano, in view of his resignation from
the Law Firm on December 8, 2011, and Atty. Gangan, in view of his death.[30]

The dispositive portion of the Report and Recommendation reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondents ATTY. LAMBERTO T.
TAGAYUNA AND ATTY. ELMAR A. PANOPIO, be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law, with a
stern warning that repetition or breach of [L]awyer's [O]ath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) among
others, shall be dealt with severely.

The Complaints against respondents [sic] ATTY. JOSE A. GANGAN, in view of his death be DISMISSED; and the
complaints against respondent ATTY. RENATO DE PANO, JR. be dismissed for lack of merit.

Respectfully submitted.[31]
However, in its September 8, 2020 Extended Resolution, [32] the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to set aside
the Report and Recommendation of the CBD insofar as the suspension of respondents Atty. Tagayuna and Atty.
Panopio. The BOG recommended the dismissal of the complaint as to them, as well as affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint as to respondents Atty. De Pano and Atty. Gangan.
The BOG ruled that respondents are not guilty of violating the conflict of interest rule. Evidence show that the Law
Firm was retained as counsel only until December 31, 2011, while the arbitration case was initiated in May 2012. [33]
Thus, the Law Firm was no longer HGC's counsel when the case was initiated. Further, the Law Firm did not act as
BSCDC's counsel in the arbitration case; Atty. Tagayuna signed as president for purposes of verification of the
initiatory pleading.[34] There is also no evidence that respondents participated as HGC's counsel in the transactions
pertaining to the arbitration case.[35] The BOG likewise cleared respondents of the charge on unlawful withholding of
documents; it found that respondents already returned the demanded documents to HGC.[36]

The dispositive portion of the BOG's Extended Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board RESOLVED to APPROVE and ADOPT, as it hereby APPROVED
and ADOPTED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case to
DISMISS the case against Atty. Jose A. Gangan and Atty. Renato De Pano Jr., after finding the recommendation to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.

RESOLVED FURTHER to REVERSE and SET aside, as it hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case insofar as it held Attys. L[a]mberto T.
Tagayuna and Elmar A. Panopio liable for conflict of interest and, considering that no unethical conduct were
committed by respondents Atty. Lamberto T. Tagayuna and Atty. Elmar Panopio, the case is hereby recommended to
be DISMISSED.[37]
Our Ruling

The Court partially adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP BOG. The administrative complaint against
respondents Atty. Gangan and Atty. De Pano is dismissed. However, the administrative complaint against
respondents Atty. Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio is partly meritorious; the Court thus imposes the penalty of reprimand.

On the violation of the conflict of interest rule, HGC claims that respondents violated the rule as espoused in the
following provisions of the CPR:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Rule 15.01 A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.

xxxx

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
In one case, the Court summarized:
Simply put, in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest under the CPR, it is
essential to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at
the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;" (2) "the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment."[38]
The Court finds that respondents did not violate the conflict of interest rule under the three tests.

Under the first test, there is conflict of interest if the lawyer represents both opposing parties in an issue or claim.
Stated differently, "if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
other client, there is a violation of the rule."[39]

The Court finds that there was no violation under the parameters of this test. Respondents did not represent
conflicting interests—HGC's and BSCDC's interests—here. As found by the IBP, the Law Firm did not represent
BSCDC as counsel in the arbitration case. The arbitration complaint was signed by Atty. Ruben L. Almadro (Atty.
Almadro) as BSCDC's counsel.[40] Atty. Almadro is not part or related to the Law Firm. On the other hand, Atty.
Tagayuna merely signed as president to verify the complaint. [41] Further, evidence show that the Law Firm and ESP
were engaged by HGC for collection purposes only; as determined by the IBP, there is no proof that the Law Firm
handled matters that were related to the arbitration case.[42] Also, it was established that the Law Firm was no longer
retained as counsel at the time of the filing of the arbitration case. The Collection Retainership Agreement expired on
December 31, 2011 and was never renewed, while the arbitration case was filed in May 2012. [43] Considering the
foregoing, respondents did not represent both opposing parties (i.e., HGC and BSCDC) in an issue or claim,
particularly the arbitration case.

For the second test, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of a new relation or engagement will prevent the
lawyer from faithfully performing his duties to a client. The second test is not relevant to the instant case; the factual
circumstances did not include allegations of respondents' acceptance of a new relation while being counsel of HGC
that prevented them from faithfully performing their duties to it. There is no showing that BSCDC is a new client of the
Law Firm.

The third test provides that there is conflict of interest if the lawyer, in a new relation, would be called upon to use
against a former client any confidential information he has acquired through their connection or previous employment.
This test specifically applies to situations where the professional relationship with a former client was already
terminated when the lawyer was engaged by a new client. [44] The Court stated that "for there to be conflicting interests
when a former client is involved, the following circumstances must concur: (a) the lawyer is called upon in his present
engagement to make use against a former client confidential information[,] which was acquired through their
connection or previous employment[;] and (b) the present engagement involves transactions that occurred during the
lawyer's employment with the former client and matters that the lawyer previously handled for the said client." [45]
Related to this, proof must be adduced to show that the former client intended the information to be confidential; mere
relation between attorney and client does not create a presumption of confidentiality.[46]

Indeed, the professional relationship between the Law Firm and HGC expired on December 31, 2011. However, there
is no proof that the Law Firm, in a new matter, used against HGC confidential information acquired from their
previous relation. HGC merely made allegations that respondents represented BSCDC while being engaged as its
counsel. To reiterate, the subject of arbitration are matters not handled by the Law Firm; the Law Firm was engaged
for collection purposes only—this is clear in the Collection Retainership Agreement as adduced in evidence. In any
event, there is no new relation to speak of as BSCDC is not a client of the Law Firm.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and affirms that respondents did not violate the conflict of interest rule.

On the charge of unlawful withholding of documents, HGC claims that respondents failed and refused to return
documents when due and upon demand. The Court finds the charge to be partly meritorious.

In this regard, the CPR provides:

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
It has been consistently held that any money or property collected for the client coming into the lawyer's possession
should be promptly declared and reported to the client. [47] The Court, however, recognizes that a lawyer is entitled to
a lien over funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession for purposes of
satisfying the legal fees and disbursements due to him. [48] Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows this upon prompt notice to
the client. This is also provided in Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [49] The lien covers documents such as
titles and other pertinent papers. In this relation, the Court has long held that a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his client's money, as well as properties and documents, for himself by the mere fact that he is owed
legal fees.[50] It is essential that the client consent to the application of his property or funds to the legal fees, in which
case the lawyer may deduct what is due him and return the excess to the client. [51] Absent the client's consent, the
lawyer must return the funds to the client, without prejudice to the filing of a case to recover the unpaid fees.[52]

Here, HGC claims that respondents failed to return documents related to the collection services, specifically 53
owner's duplicate copies of transfer certificates of title and other various documents, after the termination of their
retainership agreement. Respondents on the other hand argue that the majority of these titles were already returned
to HGC. They state, however, that only a total of four titles are unaccounted for. This is negligible, according to
respondents, considering the voluminous transactions endorsed to the Law Firm and ESP in the performance of the
collection services.
Records show that respondents are no longer in possession of the documents that HGC claims to be unlawfully
withheld. As found by the IBP, the titles were already returned by the Law Firm to HGC as evidenced by turnover
letters as attached to respondents' position paper.[53] Assuming that there are still unaccounted titles as stated by
respondents, it does not mean that respondents are in possession of these absent any contrary proof. Being
unaccounted, it is possible that those titles are with government agencies or third parties that got hold of those during
the course of the collection process.

True, the documents have already been returned to HGC as based on the evidence adduced, save for those
unaccounted ones. The Court, however, takes note that as of the date of filing of the complaint in 2015, respondents
have yet to return the documents. In other words, respondents are still in possession of some of these documents at
the time of filing of the complaint. A careful examination of records show that they were returning documents to HGC
up until 2018.[54] They even admitted this in their position paper.[55]

Respondents then claim that they were merely exercising their right to withhold to exercise retaining lien for unpaid
fees. The Court, however, finds that the requisites to exercise lien were not met. As discussed, it is essential that the
client consent to the application of its property to the unpaid fees because a lawyer cannot unilaterally appropriate his
client's property. Here, there is no proof that HGC consented to the respondents' withholding of the titles to satisfy the
unpaid legal fees. Thus, the Court finds that respondents improperly exercised its right to retain HGC's documents as
lien.

Jurisprudence provides that the penalty for a violation of Canon 16 of the CPR ranges from suspension from practice
for six months to two years, or even disbarment, depending on the circumstances of each case. [56] The Court
acknowledges the fact that the documents were already returned to HGC during the pendency of this case. It
remains, however, that respondents committed a violation of Canon 16 of the CPR at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Considering these circumstances, the Court deems it proper to reprimand respondents, specifically Atty.
Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio, with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offense shall merit a heavier penalty.

As for respondent Atty. Gangan, the Court adopts the recommendation of dismissal of the complaint as against him in
view of his death during the pendency of the case. It is settled that "the death of a respondent in an administrative
case before its final resolution is a cause for its dismissal."[57]

As for respondent Atty. De Pano, the Court likewise adopts the recommendation of dismissal of the complaint against
him in view of his resignation from the Law Firm. Records show that he resigned from the Law Firm on December 8,
2011. He was already separated from the Law Firm when the arbitration case, the origin of the alleged violation of the
conflict of interest rule, was filed in 2012. Also, as a result of his resignation, Atty. De Pano was no longer in
possession of the documents alleged to be unlawfully retained by the Law Firm after the expiration of their
relationship with HGC. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint as against him is likewise proper.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:

1. The administrative complaint as against respondents Atty. Renato De Pano, Jr. and Atty. Jose A.
Gangan is DISMISSED.

2. The Court finds respondents Atty. Lamberto T. Tagayuna and Atty. Elmar A. Panopio GUILTY of
violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. They are
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense shall merit a heavier
penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Lamberto T. Tagayuna's and Atty. Elmar A. Panopio's personal
records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Furnish copies of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, vol. I, pp. 1-13.
[2]
The Code of Professional Responsibility (1988).
[3]
Rollo, vol. II, unpaginated (Extended Resolution, p. 2).
[4]
Id. (Id.).
[5]
Id. (Id. at 3).
[6]
Id. (Id.).
[7]
Id. (Id.).
[8]
Id. (Id.).
[9]
Id. (Id.).
[10]
Id. (Id.).
[11]
Rollo (vol. I), pp. 5-6. Rollo, (vol. II), pp. 81-82.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rollo (vol. II), unpaginated (Extended Resolution, p. 3).
[14]
Id. (Id.). See rollo (vol. I), p. 3.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 247824. February 23, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ORLANDO PADILLA AND
DANILO PADILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

On appeal[1] is the November 13, 2018 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 09380,
affirming the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67, Bauang, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 3988-
BG which found accused-appellants Orlando Padilla (Orlando) and Danilo Padilla (Danilo) (collectively, accused-
appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

An Information[4] dated June 18, 2010 was filed against Danilo [5] and Orlando for the murder of Rhandy Padin
(Rhandy).[6] The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the 29th day of March, 2010 in the Municipality of Naguilian, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one-another, with intent to kill and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one [RHANDY] PADIN with the use of a knife and a big stone, hitting and inflicting
upon the latter fatal injuries, which, caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
[RHANDY] PADIN.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Danilo was apprehended and committed to the Bauang, La Union district, jail on August 16, 2010. He pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged and trial ensued. [8] On November 4, 2013, Orlando was subsequently apprehended. He
also pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. [9] By then, the case against Danilo had already been submitted for resolution
and the RTC opted to finish the hearing of Orlando's case before issuing a Joint Decision.[10]

The testimonies of supposed eye-witness Antonio Villanueva (Antonio),[11] Parole and Probation Officer Nicanor
Taron,[12] Medico Legal Dr. Nerino Daciego (Dr. Daciego),[13] Rhandy's mother, Victoria Padin (Victoria),[14]
Investigating Officer, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Benjamin Costales, Jr., and [15] Rhandy's Father, Jaime Padin[16]
were presented.
On the other hand, the testimonies of Danilo,[17] Orlando[18] and Romeo Bakate were presented by the defense.[19]

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution's eyewitness, tricycle driver Antonio, testified that at 11:00 a.m. of March 29, 2010, he chanced upon
the brothers Danilo and Orlando in Naguilian, La Union, who then hired him to take them to the Municipal Hall of
Agoo, La Union. The trip was in order for Danilo to meet with his probation officer.[20]

At around 5:00 p.m. of that day, they were able to drive back to Naguilian where they proceeded to a videoke bar in
Ermita called Bagulin road videoke bar or inuman.[21] Accused-appellants started their drinking spree while Antonio
proceeded inside to take a bath. He was able to take a bath in the establishment since he was friends with the owner.
On his way to the bathroom, Antonio noticed Rhandy occupying another table and drinking with a companion. After
his bath, Rhandy approached him and asked to bring his companion home. Antonio, Danilo, Rhandy and his
companion all went to Barangay Pantar. After their trip, Antonio, Danilo and Rhandy returned to the inuman. Danilo
and Rhandy proceeded inside while Antonio went elsewhere and waited for the brothers to finish their drinking spree.
When he returned inside the inuman, he saw the brothers and Rhandy drinking together. After a while, Danilo told
him to bring them all to Bagulin. Antonio agreed to do so for an additional fee.[22]

When they reached Upper Bimmotbot, Antonio noticed that his three passengers were fighting inside the tricycle. He
immediately stopped, at which point, the brothers pulled Rhandy out. Danilo boxed Rhandy while Orlando aided by
choking the former. Danilo then returned to the tricycle and took out the knife kept at the backseat which was usually
used by Antonio in cutting rubber. Danilo warned Antonio not to speak of the attack against Rhandy or else he will kill
him next.[23]

Thus, Antonio remained in the tricycle while the brothers gang up on Rhandy. He saw Orlando choking and
restraining Rhandy by putting his right arm around the latter's neck, while his left hand twisted Rhandy's left hand
upwards. Meanwhile, Danilo was in front of Rhandy with a knife. Rhandy struggled against Orlando's choking, and at
the same time he tried to repel Danilo's attacks by embracing the latter with his free hand. Both Rhandy and Danilo
fell on the ground with Danilo on top of Rhandy. Danilo cut and stabbed Rhandy on the waist and the two of them
struggled to gain possession of the knife. All throughout the brawl, Orlando was watching on standby and when
Rhandy was able to get a hold of the knife, he stepped on Rhandy's hand, retrieved it and returned the same to
Danilo. Attempting to fully wound Rhandy, Danilo repeatedly stabbed the latter but was not able to mortally wound
him as the knife was already bent. Danilo thus got a hold of a stone and hit it against Rhandy's head.[24]

At this point, Rhandy was no longer moving. Danilo and Orlando, with the help of Antonio, pitched Rhandy into the
ravine. Danilo got a bigger stone and dropped it into the ravine and hit Rhandy. Danilo also tossed the knife next.
Thereafter, Antonio, Danilo and Orlando all left together.[25]

Five days later, the police officers visited Antonio. He executed his written statement about the incident.[26]

Dr. Daciego of the Philippine National Police examined the cadaver and declared that the cause of death of Rhandy
was by a blunt traumatic head injury. He sustained seven injuries including a crack at the back of the head possibly
caused by a big stone and an open wound in the abdominal cavity possibly caused by a knife.[27]

At the trial, the parents of Rhandy testified how the death of their son caused a deep onslaught on their feelings. [28]
Victoria also testified on the actual expenses they incurred for Rhandy's funeral and burial.[29]

Version of the Defense:

The defense vehemently denied the version of the prosecution.

Danilo testified that on March 29, 2010, he and his brother Orlando hired Antonio to take them to Agoo in order for
him to meet with his probation officer. After their business in Agoo, they all went back to Naguilian and went to an
establishment called "inuman" to drink. There, Danilo noticed Rhandy, whom he encountered for the first time,
singing in the videoke and drinking with a companion. Antonio then transferred from their table to Rhandy's. [30] After a
while, Rhandy approached Antonio and hired him to bring Rhandy's companion to Pantar and as payment, he
promised to buy drinks for later. Antonio agreed and invited Danilo to come along with them. After bringing the
companion to Pantar, they went back to continue their drinking session. Antonio then asked Rhandy to buy the drinks
as promised but the latter refused. Antonio thus became angry and initiated to leave. Rhandy nonetheless joined
them saying that he will visit Antonio's place to which the latter agreed. [31] Thus, they all boarded the tricycle with
Danilo sitting behind Antonio, with Rhandy and Orlando inside the sidecar.[32]
They did not head to Mamat-ing Norte but instead proceeded to go to Bagulin. [33] Suddenly, Antonio stopped the
tricycle, alighted and pulled out Rhandy by the collar. Danilo tried to pacify the two but in the process, he and Rhandy
fell down on the ground with Rhandy on top of him. They ended boxing each other. Antonio then returned to his
tricycle and took out a knife hidden in the backrest, Antonio went behind Rhandy and stabbed him. Danilo thus
pushed Rhandy's body away as the latter was already weak from the stab wound. Antonio then asked Danilo to help
him push Rhandy's body into the ravine but Danilo refused. Thus, Antonio demanded Orlando to help him and the
two finished the deed with Antonio lifting Rhandy's feet while Orlando held on to Rhandy's hands. After doing so,
Antonio noticed that Rhandy was still alive. Hence, Antonio searched for a big stone and dropped the same into the
ravine where Rhandy lay. Antonio also tossed the knife he used into the ravine. Thereafter, they all boarded the
tricycle and drove to Mamat-ing to bring Orlando home. Afterwards, Antonio and Danilo hid the tricycle.[34]

Orlando, on the other hand, denied any participation in the assault and killing of Rhandy. He insisted that he was the
one who initiated to leave the inuman when Antonio and Danilo returned. He boarded the tricycle thinking that they
will return to Mamat-ing Norte and noticed that Antonio was driving towards Bagulin. Along the way, Antonio stopped
the tricycle and when Orlando asked why, Antonio said he will just get something. When they alighted, Antonio
declared that he will kill Rhandy because he always fails to pay whenever he hires him. When Orlando heard of
Antonio's intention, he ran away because he did not want to be implicated in Antonio's actions.[35]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision [36] finding Danilo and Orlando guilty of Murder, with abuse of
superior strength and conspiracy having attended the crime. The RTC disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Orlando Padilla and Danilo Padilla alias
"PANDAN" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility of Parole.

The accused are further ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rhandy Padin: death indemnity of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php 75,000.00), Philippine Currency; moral damages of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php 100,000.00), Philippine Currency; exemplary damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00), Philippine Currency plus the cost of suit.

The accused are also ordered to pay legal rate of interest at six (6) percent per annum until the above monetary
awards are fully paid.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ordered to reinvestigate the extent of the participation of Antonio
Villanueva to the death of RHANDY PADIN, taking into consideration the findings of the Court.

SO ORDERED.[37]
The RTC convicted accused-appellants for the murder of Rhandy but also implicated Antonio as part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. It was the RTC's conclusion that Danilo's narration was more in tune with the medico-
legal's findings that, indeed, Antonio was the one who caused the stab-wound on Rhandy. Although such can be
considered a mortal wound, the same was not the cause of death. It was established that the cause of death was the
head wound caused likely by being hit with a big stone. The RTC however, did not ascertain anymore who delivered
the death blow and deemed such fact immaterial considering the existence of conspiracy among Antonio, Danilo and
Orlando in executing the murder. The RTC likewise noted that since the death penalty was already abolished, the
imposable penalty against Danilo and Orlando was reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole.[38]

Aggrieved, Danilo and Orlando appealed[39] the judgment of conviction to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision, upheld the RTC's judgment of conviction. However, it
modified the grant of damages, by awarding the following to the victim's heirs: P100,000.00 as death indemnity and
P100,000.00 exemplary damages with the prevailing interest rate.[40]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 67 in CR Case No. 3988-BG is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the amount of death
indemnity and exemplary damages is increased to P100,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.[41]
The CA held that all elements of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) were
successfully proven by the prosecution. The CA affirmed the conclusion of the RTC that the collective acts of the
accused-appellants manifested conspiracy between them.[42]
Undeterred, accused-appellants brought the case before Us. [43] They manifested that they would no longer file any
supplemental brief but shall adopt the appellant's brief they filed before the CA.[44] The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing the People of the Philippines, followed suit and adopted its appellee's brief filed before the CA.[45]

Issues
I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS FINDINGS THAT
IT WAS PROSECUTION WITNESS ANTONIO VILLANUEVA WHO STABBED RHANDY PADIN.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS OWN
FINDINGS THAT PROSECUTION WITNESS ANTONIO VILLANUEVA'S TESTIMONY WAS FALSE.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDNG ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE

PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE AND NOT RESOLVING DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THEM. [46]
Accused-Appellants' Arguments:

Accused-appellants assert that the prosecution failed to establish the crime considering the lack of credible testimony
against them. It was proven that the prosecution's witness was the one who stabbed the victim, although the same
was not the death blow. They contend that the allegation on conspiracy was not established by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt as the inferences of the trial court did not establish the common design and purpose
among the accused-appellants and the prosecution's witness. Moreover, ill motive on the part of the accused-
appellants was not established, thus, there was no reason for them to kill the victim. Lastly, they contend that for
them to be convicted, the court must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense but must rely on the
strength of evidence of the prosecution's. Here, considering that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution was
proven to be false, the prosecution's case had no leg to stand on and the guilt of the accused-appellants was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[47]

Plaintiff-Appellee's Arguments:

The OSG interposes that the accused-appellants were duly convicted of Murder. The existence of conspiracy was
correctly appreciated by the RTC considering the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the crime
which indicated their joint purpose. The fact that the accused-appellants ganged up on, stabbed, and smashed the
victim's head and threw the latter into a ravine fully established their common intent to kill the victim. As it is, the
circumstantial evidence, taken together, was more than sufficient to prove the conspiracy. Moreover, the defense of
denial propounded by the accused-appellants was intrinsically weak considering that they admitted to being in the
scene of the crime although pointing at each other as to who dealt the deadly blow. Lastly, their subsequent act of
hiding contradicts their claim of innocence.[48]

Our Ruling

The appeal is dismissed.

Murder; Quantum of proof
required and court's discretion in
weighing all evidence presented.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the RPC as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
attended by circumstances enumerated therein. The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as Murder, to wit:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse. (Emphasis Ours)
In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance alleged to have attended the killing of the victim was abuse of superior
strength. Concomitantly, conspiracy among the accused-appellants was likewise alleged to have attended in the
manner of the killing of the victim, viz.:

To achieve conviction, the prosecution must prove an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2
of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind . (Emphasis Ours and underscoring Ours)
Necessarily so, this quantum of proof imposes upon the prosecution the burden to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused and must abide by the doctrinal stance that it must do so by presenting its
own evidence, without relying on the weakness of the arguments and proof of the defense. Failure to overcome this
burden equates to liberty of the accused.[49]

In the same vein, courts are likewise given wide latitude of discretion to analyze and weigh the evidence presented by
both parties to determine and resolve the criminal charge against the accused. In other words, courts may utilize all
evidence presented, including admissions[50] of the parties, to resolve the judicial controversy presented before it and
not solely rely on the evidence laid by the prosecution. Axiomatic to this, jurisprudence has emphatically maintained
that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.[51]

Guided by the above doctrinal pronouncements, this Court delves upon the crux of the appeal as to whether
accused-appellants are guilty of Murder and whether conspiracy attended the crime.

Conspiracy to determine
culpability' and abuse of superior
strength as qualifying
aggravating circumstance.

Concomitantly, although it is not an element of the crime charged, conspiracy, as a manner of incurring liability,
whenever alleged, must be proved with the same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the
offense, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the existence of the conspiracy renders each
accused only liable for his own specific acts.[52]

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.[53] However, oftentimes, direct proof of conspiracy is elusive. Hence, while it is true that the
elements of conspiracy must be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt — necessary to establish the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, this is not to say that direct proof of such conspiracy is always required. The existence of
conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it necessary to prove prior agreement
between the accused to commit the crime charged. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably
shows community of criminal purpose or design.[54]

This Court's ruling in People v. Evasco[55] (Evasco), is instructive:

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an
actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always
shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.[56]
A careful review of the records of the case reveals that the conduct of the accused-appellants before, during and after
the commission of the crime, together with that of Antonio's, showed conspiracy on their part, and that they all had an
equal hand in the killing of Rhandy.[57]

If at all, their versions of what happened at the time of the incident, though appearing to be conflicting, were actually
consistent and enough to draw light on their joint culpability in the crime that was committed, thus:

1) Accused-appellants, Antonio and the victim, without any animosity, all left together from the inuman;[58] 2) All
boarded Antonio's tricycle;[59] 3) No one protested when they were traversing the route going to Bagulin instead of
heading home to Mamat-ing Norte;[60] 4) All were in the crime scene, i.e., where the tricycle stopped; Antonio and
Danilo admitting their continued presence and Orlando, although interposing that he left the crime scene even before
the attack began, was pointed out by his very own brother Danilo to be actually present; 5) All got involved in a fight
with the victim with Danilo boxing the victim, and Antonio stabbing the deceased, and Orlando remaining on standby;
6) Antonio admitted to having participated with Orlando in disposing the body of the victim into the ravine; 7)
Accused-appellants and Antonio all left together boarding Antonio's tricycle when the killing was finished with nobody
protesting or reporting the incident to the authorities;[61] and, finally, 8) the findings of the medico-legal indicate that
the injuries sustained by the victim were done by several persons.[62]

It is thus inescapable that what transpired was a fight between the victim and the joint forces of the accused-
appellants and Antonio that led to the victim's demise. Analyzing the two versions of the parties, it is readily apparent
that they all ganged up on him; they brought the victim at a detour, fought and mortally wounded him; participated in
the disposing of the body; and went home together after the gruesome incident and not reporting the incident to the
authorities. These circumstances were all geared towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, indicating
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.

We thus quote with approval the summation of the CA, viz.:

In arriving at its conclusion, the RTC, in light of the clashing testimonies of the participants, took what was
common and uadisputed in their respective versions, and from there, inferred accused-appellant's common
design to kill Padin, to wit: (a) that the participants, i.e., Orlando, Danilo, Villanueva and Padin boarded Villanueva's
tricycle; (b) while traversing the road towards Bagulin, Villanueva stopped the tricycle at the would-be murder site; (c)
Padin was pulled out of the tricycle; (d) a fight ensued where Padin sustained a knife wound; and (e) Padin's head
was hit by a stone. The foregoing are supported by the medico-legal findings, i.e., that Padin sustained
injuries consistent with being dragged and attacked by several perso ns, was cut by a knife, and suffered a fatal
crack on his skull.[63] (Emphasis Ours)
Therefore, regardless of which version this Court appreciates, it is conclusive from the admitted individual acts of the
assailants that conspiracy among them existed. It thus becomes inconsequential to prove who delivered the death
blow considering conspiracy was implied from their actions thereby making the act of one, the act of all.[64]

Having established the presence of conspiracy, this Court now resolved the issue of whether or not the killing was
attended by abuse of superior strength to qualify the act as Murder.

In Evasco, this Court held:

The determination of whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
attendant requires the arduous review of the acts of the accused in contrast with the diminished strength of
the victim. There must be a showing of gross disproportionality between each of them. Mere numerical superiority on
the part of the accused does not automatically equate to superior strength. The determination must take into
account all the tools, skills and capabilities available to the accused and to the victim to justify a finding of
disproportionality; otherwise, abuse of superior strength is not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.[65]
Here, this Court fully agrees with the findings of the CA that indeed abuse of superior strength was present in the
commission of the crime. Indeed, to take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force that
is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In the present case, the evidence
gathered shows that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked by accused-appellants, who were not only
superior in number but had access to, and in fact used, a weapon in form of a knife. Moreover, it was established that
when the victim was already defenseless and weak from the stab wound and the mauling, he was unnecessarily hit
with a big stone that ensured his death. Thus, the fact that the victim was outnumbered without means to put up a
defense as he was taken to a place where rescue would be close to impossible and the fact that accused-appellants
and Antonio used weapons out of proportion to the defense available to the victim, i.e. a knife and a big stone, fully
establish the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Crime committed, penalties and

award of damages.

It is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime such as Murder, the following may be recovered:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[66]

This Court has held that where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in crimes such as that of Murder where the
imposable penalty is comprised of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death,[67] but no ordinary
aggravating circumstance attended the crime thus meriting the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua,
the nature and amount of damages that may be awarded are as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others.[68]

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, considering that no other aggravating circumstance was present in the
killing apart from the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the penalty of reclusion perpetua as the
lesser penalty is warranted. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be
reverted to P75,000.00 respectively.[69] Moreover, since the prosecution was able to present evidence of expenses
incurred by the family of the victim, this Court likewise award the amount of P53,800.00 as actual damages since the
same was the aggregate amount supported by receipts.[70]

All damages awarded shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
full payment.

Finally, the phrase "without eligibility for parole" is deleted pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC[71]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 13, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-
HC No. 09380 finding accused-appellants Orlando Padilla and Danilo Padilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the phrase "without eligibility of parole" is DELETED
and accused-appellants are ordered to PAY the heirs of Rhandy Padin the following:

1) Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00;

2) Actual damages in the amount of P 53,800.00;
3) Moral Damages in the amount of P75,000.00; and
4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 11-13.
[2]
Id. at 3-10. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi and concurred in by Associate Justices
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Ramon A. Cruz.
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 46-58. Penned by Presiding Judge Ferdinand A. Fe.
[4]
Records, p. 1.
[5]
Also referred to as Padan.
[6]
Also referred to as "Randy" a.k.a. Padin in the records.
[7]
Records, p. 1.
[8]
Rollo, p. 4.
[9]
Id.
[10]
CA rollo, p. 32.
[11]
TSN, November 15, 2010, October 21, 2014 and November 25, 2014.
[12]
TSN, May 7, 2011.
[13]
TSN, February 10, 2011.
[14]
TSN, June 2, 2011.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218652. February 23, 2022 ]
RODRIGO DERIQUITO VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto.[1]

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[2] filed by Rodrigo Deriquito Villanueva (petitioner) assailing the
February 23, 2015 Decision[3] and June 8, 2015 Resolution [4] of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0381, which found petitioner and his co-accused guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, [5] as
amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

The accusatory portion of the Amended Information by which petitioner was charged reads:
That on or about January 15, 2001, and for some time prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Janiuay
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FRANKIE H.
LOCSIN, CARLOS C. MORENO, JR., RAMON T. TIRADOR, LUZVIMINDA P. FIGUEROA and RICARDO S.
MINURTIO, all public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Accountant, Municipal Budget Officer,
Municipal Treasurer and Representative of the Municipal Mayor in the Committee on Awards, respectively, all of the
Municipality of Janiuay, Iloilo, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to and in discharge of their
official and administrative functions, conniving, confederating together and mutually helping with each other and with
RODRIGO S. VILLANUEVA, President and General Manager of AM-Europharma Corporation, a private individual,
with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith; did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
award the contract for the purchase of medicines and in fact bought such medicines in the amount of THIRTEEN
MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY-ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (P13,191,223.00)
PESOS, from AM-Europharma Corporation, notwithstanding the fact that on said date the accreditation of AM-
Europharma Corporation was still suspended by the Department of Health (DOH), hence should have been
disqualified to participate in the bidding, that AM-Europharma Corporation is owned and controlled by said accused
Rodrigo S. Villanueva, who at the same time is the sole proprietor of Mallix Drug Center, a supplier who was awarded
the contract for the supply of medicines in the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX PESOS (PHP 1,744,926.00) in the same public bidding and that the
public bidding was conducted without the presence of any provincial or municipal auditor or its (sic) duly authorized
representative, thus accused public officers, in the course of the performance of their official/administrative functions,
had given AM-Europharma Corporation/accused Rodrigo S. Villanueva, unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of their official/administrative functions to the detriment and prejudice of the other
companies and public service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.[7]

The Factual Antecedents:

On December 19, 2000, the municipality of Janiuay, Iloilo, through Mayor Franklin A. Locsin (Mayor Locsin),
representing the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP), Iloilo Chapter, [8] entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)[9] with the Department of Health (DOH) Center for Health Development (CHD) for Western
Visayas.[10]

The MOA was executed to implement the Rescue and Emergency Disaster Program of then Senator Vicente S. Sotto
III, for the purchase of necessary and appropriate medicines, equipment, devices, and the likes, for emergency
purposes, for distribution to the different municipalities of the province of Iloilo. Considering that Mayor Locsin was
then the president of LMP-Iloilo Chapter, the execution and implementation of the MOA was coursed through the
municipal government of Janiuay, by virtue of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 318-2000.[11] DOH thus duly
released the amount of P15,000,000.00 to the municipal government of Janiuay to carry out the program.[12]

The Office of the Mayor of Janiuay caused the Invitation to Bid to be published in three local newspapers inviting all
qualified and accredited medical suppliers of various medicines and medical supplies to participate in the bidding to
be conducted on January 12, 2001 at the municipal hall of Janiuay. On January 4, 2001, another Invitation to Bid was
issued by the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Three companies allegedly responded to the invitation, namely: AM
Europharma Corporation (Europharma), Mallix Drug Center (Mallix Drug), and Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.
(Pharmawealth). However, on January 12, 2001, the scheduled bidding was postponed to January 15, 2001 due to
the provincial auditor's absence.[13]

On January 15, 2001, the opening of bids took place. The Committee on Awards (committee) composed of Municipal
Accountant Carlos C. Moreno (Moreno), Municipal Budget Officer Ramon T. Tirador (Tirador), Municipal Treasurer
Luzviminda P. Figueroa (Treasurer Figueroa), and Ricardo S. Minurtio (Minurtio), Mayor Locsin's representative,
proceeded with the opening of the bids despite the absence yet again of the provincial auditor. The committee
recommended the award of the contract to Europharma and Mallix Drug, in the amount of P13,191,223.00, and
P1,744,926.00, respectively.[14]

Mayor Locsin approved[15] the award to Europharma and Mallix Drug. Thereafter, purchase orders [16] and certificates
of acceptance,[17] both dated January 16, 2001 were issued, and the medicines were immediately delivered to and
received by Mayor Locsin on even date. The medicines were inspected by Supply Officer Gabriel M. Billena as to
their quantities and specifications.[18]

On the next day, January 17, 2001, the Municipality of Janiuay issued two checks in favor of Europharma and Mallix
Drug as payment for the medicines, and official receipts were subsequently issued in favor of petitioner's companies.
[19]
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a medical analysis on the delivered medicines by
Europharma and Mallix Drug. The drug cotrimoxazole[20] worth P240,000.00 failed the test as embodied in the Result
of Analysis of BFAD.[21] It was only on October 16, 2001 that Mallix Drug delivered the replacement drugs which were
found compliant under BFAD's standard. The medicines were subsequently distributed to the municipalities that were
beneficiaries-members of the LMP in the province of Iloilo.[22]

On post-audit, a Notice of Suspension and Notice of Disallowance[23] were issued by the provincial auditor, and Mayor
Locsin and Treasurer Figueroa were ordered to submit a justification on the alleged failure of the municipality to: 1)
notify the Office of the Provincial Auditor of the bidding; 2) require the winning bidder to submit a performance bond;
3) explain why Europharma and Mallix Drug were allowed to bid despite the fact that both companies were owned by
petitioner; and 4) submit the list of the recipient municipalities with Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIV). It was
uncovered during the annual audit of the provincial auditor for the calendar year 2001 that both Europharma and
Mallix Drug were owned by petitioner, and that Europharma had a suspended accreditation at the time of the bidding.
[24]

On June 28, 2002, Mayor Locsin and Treasurer Figueroa, through the committee, submitted their Reply-Letter [25] and
interposed that the Office of the Provincial Auditor was duly notified of the January 15, 2001 bidding but the latter did
not send any of its representatives on the scheduled date. As to the required performance bond, it was dispensed
with since the supplies were already delivered within the 10-day period. Finally, it did not see any reason to disqualify
Europharma and Mallix Drug since Europharma is a corporation with a distinct personality, while Mallix Drug is a sole
proprietorship owned by petitioner.[26]

Meanwhile, on May 29, 2002, the president of Pharmawealth, Dr. Ferjenel O. Biron (Dr. Biron), issued a press
statement "So the Public May Know" disowning Pharmawealth's participation in the January 15, 2001 bidding. Dr.
Biron likewise sent a letter [27] to Commission on Audit, Iloilo, confirming the disclaimer which led to the latter
discovering that Europharma was 99% owned by petitioner.[28]

Due to the irregularities that plagued the bidding, the matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas for
investigation. After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman ultimately found probable cause to indict
the municipal officers who conducted the bidding, including petitioner, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.[29]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision dated February 23, 2015,[30] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused FRANKIE H. LOCSIN, CARLOS C. MORENO, JR.,
RAMON T. TIRADOR, LUZVIMINDA P. FIGUEROA, RICARDO S. MINURTIO and RODRIGO S. VILLANUEVA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the Information and sentencing each of them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and to suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office, and to proportionately pay the cost.

For failure of the prosecution to present evidence to establish damage or injury and/or the amount thereof suffered by
the government as a result of the said procurement of medicines, no civil liability is assessed against the herein
accused.

SO ORDERED.[31]
The Sandiganbayan found that all the accused conspired with each other and were guilty of violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 for awarding the contracts for the purchase of medicines to the business entities of petitioner,
Europharma, and Mallix Drug, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith, thereby giving petitioner
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. The signatures of the committee members' in the Minutes of Meeting,
the undue haste in the delivery of the medical supplies, and the speed by which the payments were made, even
without the required 10% performance bond, and the irregularities found in the qualification and accreditation of
Europharma and Mallix Drug, reveal the manifest partiality and evident bad faith of the public officials charged and
that of the petitioner.[32] As regards petitioner, the Sandiganbayan found him to have conspired with the accused
public officials in the perpetuation of the crime charged based on his conduct prior, during, and after the bidding that
took place.[33]

All the accused moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's ruling but the same was denied in its June 8,
2015 Resolution.[34] Thus, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari[35] raising the following -

Issues
I.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR SUPPOSED
VIOLATIONS NOT STATED UNDER THE FATALLY AMENDED INFORMATION DATED 7 JANUARY 2009.

II.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED UNDER COA
CIRCULAR NO. 92-386, WHEN IT IS NOT A PENAL LAW.

III.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON AWARDS RAILROADED THE PROCUREMENT OF THE SUBJECT MEDICINES, WHEN SAID
ACCUSED ACTED ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS NATURE AS AN EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT.

IV.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SECTION 368 OF R.A. 7160
WHICH ALLOWS EMERGENCY PURCHASES WITHOUT PUBLIC BIDDING.

V.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE STATUTORY
PERSONALITY OF THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PROVINCE OF ILOILO WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE ACCUSED PUBLIC OFFICERS ACTED IN DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES AS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS.

VI.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ACCEPTING PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH'S FLIMSY
DENIAL OF PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJECT BIDDING WHEN AT LEAST THREE DOCUMENTS--- ONE,
WHICH COULD ONLY HAVE ORIGINATED FROM PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, ITS DOH BFAD LICENSE TO
OPERATE - BELIED SUCH DENIAL.

VII.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAULTED ACCUSED PUBLIC OFFICERS
FOR CONSIDERING AM EUROPHARMA AS A QUALIFIED BIDDER, WHEN AM EUROPHARMA'S RENEWAL OF
LTO WAS UNDER PROCESS AND IT HAD NOT LOST ANY OF THE QUALIFICATIONS AS A DRUG
MANUFACTURER.

VIII.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT INSISTED ON DOH ACCREDITATION AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENTS FOR MEDICINES WHEN NO LEGAL BASIS
SUPPORTS SUCH REQUIREMENT.

IX.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT PIERCED THE VEIL OR CORPORATE FICTION IN
RULING THAT AM-EUROPHARMA CORPORATION AND MALLIX DRUG CENTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED JUST ONE BIDDER.

X.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND CONSPIRACY BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. THAT ARE CAPABLE OF EXCULPATORY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE
EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE.[36]
Our Ruling

The petition is denied.

It is a settled rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the
evidence all over again. In petitions for review under Rule 45, the discretionary appellate jurisdiction of the Court is
limited only to questions of law.[37]

The Sandiganbayan, the special anti-graft appellate collegial court, has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those
in government-owned or government-controlled corporations.[38] Considering that the anti-graft court has already
evaluated the evidence presented in light of the charges posed, its factual findings in the disposition of graft cases
are conclusive upon this Court.

The general rule nonetheless is not set in stone as to not admit chiseled exceptions. Indeed, jurisprudence instructs
on the exceptions to the general rule, viz.: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) where the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.[39] Conversely,
the well-entrenched doctrine, constantly strengthened and invigorated by judicial pronouncements, is that exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the
case.[40]

The various issues presented by the petitioner indirectly and unjustifiably require this Court to review once again the
factual matters of the case, a function which is outside the province of this Court. [41] Hence, this Court will only
address issues involving questions of law that will ultimately answer the crux of the case, i.e., whether or not the
petitioner was correctly found .guilty under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Charge under Sec, 3 (e) of RA
3019 may be hinged from acts
also penalized under other
provisions of law, and when the
acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense are
alleged in the Information,
conviction is proper.

Sec. 6 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute: the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is, committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
(6a) (Emphasis Ours)
Meanwhile, Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
x x x (Emphasis Ours)[42]
The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he/she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his/her action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[43]

The allegations[44] mentioned in the Amended Information consist of averments of "evident bad faith" and "manifest
partiality" in giving "unwarranted benefit" to the petitioner in conspiracy with the public officers, to wit:
[n]otwithstanding the fact that on said date the accreditation of AM-Europharma Corporation was still suspended by
the Department of Health (DOH), hence should have been disqualified to participate in the bidding, that AM-
Europharma Corporation is owned and controlled by said accused Rodrigo S. Villanueva, who at the same time is the
sole proprietor of Mallix Drug Center, a supplier who was awarded the contract for the supply of medicines x x x.[45]
Thus, the parameters set by the rules were fulfilled. The assailed Decision is clear that petitioner was found to have
violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019, specifying the instances of his connivance in order to obtain unwarranted benefits,
and was consequently unduly awarded the contracts for the purchase of medicines.[46]

Thus, this Court fully agrees with the Sandiganbayan as to its finding that the petitioner, when he allowed himself to
be arraigned and proceeded to trial after entering his plea under the Amended Information, is now estopped from
claiming, after his conviction, that the Amended Information is "vague," and that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. [47] The fact that petitioner was able to
mount a defense belie his allegations.

The assailed Decision also cited the provisions of the then prevailing Circular No. 92-386 [48] of the Commission on
Audit on the instances when public bidding is a failure,[49] viz.:
Section 95- When Public Bidding Deemed a Failure - For purposes of these rules and regulations, public bidding(s) is
deemed to have failed under any of the following circumstances:

a. When no or only one qualified bid is received on or before the schedule date of the opening of bids; or

b. When all the bids submitted are defective and/or non-complying bids or not responsive to the terms, conditions and
specifications of the tender documents.[50]
The citation is a direct reference to how petitioner and his co-accused public officers violated Section 3(e) of RA
3019. The accused public officers' noncompliance with the COA Circular, and their willful omission to declare that the
bidding that took place was a "failed bidding" were badges of "manifest partiality" and "giving of unwarranted benefits"
to the petitioner, whose acquiescence to the award constituted the offense charged.

The prosecution satisfactorily established that there was a failure of bidding, since at the time of the public bidding on
January 15, 2001, the accreditation of Europharma and Pharmawealth were still suspended by the DOH as shown by
the November 23, 2000 letter[51] and September 29, 2000 Memorandum[52] of DOH Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M.
Galon.[53] Consequently, only Mallix Drug is supposedly qualified. Although, petitioner averred that such accreditation
was not relevant to the bidding, he recognized that Europharma's accreditation was non-existent at the time of the
bidding since the accreditation was issued only on January 17, 2001.[54]

Petitioner cannot take refuge on the claim that the transactions were under "Emergency Purchase" and thus a
competitive bidding may be dispensed with.[55] Clearly the transaction could not be characterized as under an
"emergency purchase" since the requisites of Section 368 of the Local Government Code of 1991 were not present.
[56]
Otherwise, the public officers would have dispensed altogether the steps for a competitive bidding and would not
have issued Invitations to Bid.

The third element of RA 3019

refers to two separate acts - either
act qualifies as a violation.

In his desperate attempt to escape conviction, petitioner manifests that there was no damage or actual injury on the
part of the Government or any of its instrumentalities, and as such he was not liable under RA 3019.[57]

We disagree.

The third element of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 consists of when the accused's action caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions.

In Cabrera v. People,[58] this Court elucidated on the two separate acts under the third element of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, thus:
The third element refers to two (2) separate acts that qualify as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. An
accused may be charged with the commission of either or both. The use of the disjunctive term " or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The first punishable act is that the accused is said to have caused undue injury to the government or any party when
the latter sustains actual loss or damage, which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on speculations or
conjectures. The loss or damage need not be proven with actual certainty. However, there must be "some reasonable
basis by which the court can measure it." Aside from this, the loss or damage must be substantial. It must be "more
than necessary, excessive, improper or illegal."

The second punishable act is that the accused is said to have given unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference to a private party. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential. It is sufficient
that the accused has given "unjustified favor or benefit to another." (Emphasis Ours; citations omitted)
Following the above, We quote with approval the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Likewise, in Pacifico C. Velasco vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court explained that there are two (2) ways by
which a public official violates Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either way or under both. The term "unwarranted"
has been defined lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third New
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrase, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A
1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19). "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher
evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. And in Alvarez v. People, the Supreme Court
held that the use of disjunctive word "or" connotes that either act or (a) "causing any undue injury to any
party, including the government," and (b) "giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference," qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. The use of the disjunctive " or"
connotes that the modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction.
The presence of the first element is not disputed. Admittedly, on the date alleged in the information, the herein
accused Frankie H. Locsin, Carlos C. Moreno, Jr., Ramon T. Tirador, Luzviminda P. Figueroa, and Ricardo S. Minutio
are public officials by virtue of their respective positions as Municipal Mayor, Municipal Accountant, Municipal Budget
Officer, Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Officer and Representatives of the
Municipal Mayor in the Committee on Awards of the municipality of Janiuay, Iloilo. Accused Rodrigo D. Villanueva,
although a private person, is charged as a conspirator of the aforesaid public officials.

In this regard, the herein accused public officials are charged with evident bad faith and manifest partiality
when they, in conspiracy with accused private person Rodrigo D. Villanueva, President and General Manager
of AM Europharma and also the sole proprietor of Mallix Drug, awarded the contract for the purchase of
medicines to, and in fact bought such medicines from, AM Europharma in the total amount of
Php13,191,223.00 and Mallix Drug in the amount of PhP1,744,926.00, notwithstanding that, on the date of
public bidding on January 15, 2001, the accreditation of AM Europharma was still suspended by the DOH,
and hence, should have been disqualified to participate in the bidding, and despite the fact that said
companies/bidders were owned and controlled by accused Rodrigo D. Villanueva, thereby giving unto AM
Europharma/accused Rodrigo D. Villanueva unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of
their official administrative functions.

xxxx

After going over the records of the case, the Court finds, and so holds that herein accused members of the
municipal Committee on Awards of Janiuay, Iloilo, acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when
they awarded the contract for the purchase of medicines to, and in fact bought said medicines in the amount
of PhP13,191,223.00, from AM Europharma, a corporation owned and controlled by accused Rodrigo
Villanueva, who is the sole proprietor of the other winning bidder Mallix Drug, notwithstanding the fact that
AM Europharma should have been disqualified to participate in the bidding because its supplier's
accreditation was still suspended by the DOH, and thereby giving to AM Europharma/accused Rodrigo
Villanueva unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official/administrative
functions to the detriment of the government.[59] (Emphasis Ours; citations omitted)
Indubitably, the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding petitioner liable under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 notwithstanding the
absence of actual damage or injury to the government or its instrumentalities.

Private individuals can be liable

together with public officials if
conspiracy is proven; piercing of
fiction of corporate veil is allowed
if juridical entities are used by
private individuals as vehicles to
commit illegal acts.

Petitioner is misguided on his stand that he cannot be convicted under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 since he is a doctor
and a businessman by profession, and not a public official. [60] The issue on liability of private individuals under Section
3(e) of RA 3019 has long been settled.

In People v. Go,[61] this Court has reiterated a private person's liability on graft and corrupt practices, to wit:
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine
as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent. [62]
(Emphasis Ours; citations omitted)
It is rare, if not impossible, to find direct evidence of conspiracy. As such, guides to determine its existence are in
place. Here, petitioner's participation in the bidding and his acceptance of the bid award, despite the overwhelming
deficiencies in the bidding process, which he must be familiar with considering his record as a supplier of medicines,
demonstrated his conspiracy with his co-accused public officers. Additionally, the following acts evidently bolster his
connivance with them, thus: 1) failure of petitioner's business entities to submit their Declaration of Business
Interests, thereby concealing the composition of the companies; 2) authorizing the spouses Antonio H. Gasapos and
Luz M. Sarmiento-Gasapos to act as representatives of his company in clear disregard of arms-length dealing in bids;
3) failure to post the required performance bond and the immediate delivery of medicines, just a day after the award,
suggest a pre-arranged and predetermined outcome of the bid; and, lastly 4) immediate processing and acceptance
of payment.[63]
Petitioner's actuations revealed his joint purpose, conceited action, and concurrence of sentiments with his co-
accused public officials in-charge of conducting a flawed bidding to unjustifiably favor his business entities.

The relevant findings of the Sandiganbayan in the matter is hereto quoted, to wit:
It is true that there is no law that prohibits his companies/corporations from participating in one and the same bidding
under the principle that they are clothed with personalities separate from the person/s composing them, however,
since accused Rodrigo Villanueva used the said companies as means or vehicles for the circumvention of
statutes governing procurement of government supplies through competitive bidding by combining his
companies in the bidding, not only to get the desired price but also in order to assure that one or both of
them can get the award, such act should not be countenanced as the very purpose of a public and
competitive bidding (which is to give the public/government the best possible advantage/bargain or secure
the lowest possible price and curtail favoritism in the award of government contract) would be defeated.
Undoubtedly, this objective of competitive bidding cannot be obtained if the only two (2) competing bidders are
owned and controlled by one and the same person.

xxxx

It is settled that there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it Conspiracy need not to be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative or a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Conspiracy is present when one occurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt
act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
committed.

xxxx

With respect to the accused private person, namely accused Rodrigo Villanueva the owner of the AM
Europharma and Mallix Drug, the Court also finds that he conspired with accused public officials Frankie H.
Locsin, Carlos C. Moreno, Ramon T. Tirador, Luzviminda P. Figueroa and Ricardo Minurtio in the
consummation of the subject procurement because of the fact that his companies accepted and encashed
the checks as payments for the procured medicines which readily shows that he concurred in the criminal
designs of the said accused public officials. While it may be true that there is no direct evidence linking him
to conspiracy with the said accused public officials, the Court considers the conduct of accused Rodrigo
Villanueva in authorizing the spouses Antonio H. Gasapos and Luz M. Sarmiento-Gazapos as his companies'
representatives in the subject public bidding, and immediately on the following day after the award or on
January 16, 2001, he caused his companies to deliver the procured medicines, and thereafter, on January 17,
2001, caused the encashment of the checks in payment thereof, indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments. Undeniably, by permitting his two (2) companies to participate in the
subject public bidding, and immediately thereafter, became the recipient of the proceeds of the said procured
medicines, clearly indicate [accused] Rodrigo Villanueva's concurrence to the conspiracy and thereby giving him
unwarranted benefit, advantage, and preference.[64] (Emphasis Ours; citations omitted)
Notably, petitioner was not only the general manager and the owner of the 99% capital stock of Europharma [65] but
also the sole proprietor of Mallix Drug.[66] The corporate documents[67] of the entities reveal petitioner's ownership and
almost absolute control over Europharma. Meanwhile, Mallix Drug has no juridical personality separate and distinct
from petitioner, it being a sole proprietorship, and its business activities bind him. [68] The foregoing thus display that
the two "companies" owned by petitioner which participated in the defective bidding were "alter egos" of each other
and of petitioner's. The relevant portion of the petitioner's testimony is enlightening, to wit:
PROS. SANTOS:

Q. And you mentioned, sir, that your Provincial Agent or Sales Agent in this case is Ms. Luz Gazapos?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: She is also the one that represented AM Europharma during that bidding?

A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And Mrs. Gazapos is the married name, am I correct?

A: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON:

Let us clarify, Mrs. Gazapos was representing both Europharma and Mallix?

Witness: To my knowledge, your Honor, I think there is another individual that should represent Europharma
and Mallix Drug.

CHAIRPERSON:

Should represent. But who was actually representing during that time?

WITNESS: Well, I am not sure who is at this moment, your Honor.

CHAIRPERSON:

I thought you were the proprietor of Mallix and now you are not sure?

WITNESS: But I was just informed that bidding will be held in a certain province and I told them okay you
prepare the necessary documents for the bidding and that's what they did. I just signed the documents for
submission to the bidding areas, your Honor, after we read from the newspapers. Most probably they knew
about it because it's supposed to be published in the newspapers and a lot of bidders will be joining the
bidding. So, we opted probably to join the two companies.

CHAIRPERSON:

Did you not mention that you allowed Mallix and AM Europharma to have greater chance of winning?

WITNESS:

Most probably, your Honor.

CHAIIRPERSON:

You mentioned that earlier.

WITNESS:

Most probably, your Honor, it would be better.

CHAIRPERSON:

And both entities were represented by a single agent?

WITNESS:

I am not very sure. Most probably your Honor

xxxx

PROS. SANTOS

Q: Sir, do you know a certain Antonio Gazapos, Jr.?

A: Antonio Gazapos is the husband of Luz Gazapos.

xxxx

Q: By the way, sir, how long have you known Antonio Gazapos?

A: Well, as the husband of Luz, we usually meet sometimes but he is not a regular employee of Mallix.

Q: And for clarification, sir, you mentioned a while ago that Mrs. Luz Gazapos is the representative of AM
Europharma, Did I hear you correct, sir?
A: Right. That's right, ma'am.

Q: And did you see the Bidder's Tender, sir, that were submitted in connection with this bidding?

A: No.

Q: But you are sure, sir, that Mrs. Luz Gazapos is your representative in AM Europharma not Mallix Drug
Center?
A: That's right.

Q: Sir, of course, sir you have authorized Mrs. Luz Gazapos to enter in your behalf? You have authorized
her, sir?
A: I think so, ma'am.

Q: How did you authorize her, sir, is it in writing?

A: Actually, she is an employee of Europharma.

Q: Employee of Europharma. And you will agree with me sir that both AM Europharma and Mallix Drug
Center were awarded the purchase of these medicines in these cases, you will agree with me?

A: I think so, ma'am.[69]

Clearly, petitioner's attempt to use the corporate fiction of Europharma as a shield from liability is not proper.
Remarkably, when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetuating fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for
the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of monopoly, or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, such as in this case, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the
corporation will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals.[70]

Hence, this Court concurs in the disposition of the Sandiganbayan in piercing the veil of Europharma's corporate
fiction. In any case, even if this Court disallows the piercing of the corporate veil of Europharma, petitioner would still
be held liable because his defense of denial was self-serving and cannot be taken in his favor. Moreover, considering
too that petitioner is the sole proprietor of Mallix Drug, its liabilities are his and the participation of Mallix Drug in the
flawed bidding is evidence against him.

All told, the question of whether petitioner acted in conspiracy with his co-accused public officials is a factual question
which is beyond the purview of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, we reviewed the records again and find that indeed, the
Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioner acted in connivance with his co-accused public officials by participating
in the flawed bidding resulting to unwarranted benefits and advantages to his favor, in stark violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019.[71]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari, is hereby DENIED. The February 23, 2015 Decision and June 8,
2015 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. SB-08-CRM-0381, which found petitioner Rodrigo
Deriquito Villanueva GUILTY of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 1. Emphasis supplied.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 3-76.

ECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 240224. February 23, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILLRUSS ORTEGA, *
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the November 9, 2017 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-HC
No. 08591, which affirmed in toto the August 19, 2016 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13,
Laoag City, in Criminal Case Nos. 15891 and 15892, finding accused-appellant Willruss Ortega (Ortega) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, [4] otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Factual Antecedents:

On March 18, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag filed two cases against Ortega after preliminary
investigation.[5] The Information in Criminal Case No. 15891 charged Ortega with violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, viz.:
That on or about the 20th day of February, 2014, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell and deliver to a police
poseur buyer, One (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, weighing 0.1083 grams (sic), including plastic sachet, without any
license or authority to sell the same, in violation of the aforecited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
On the other hand, the Information in Criminal Case No. 15892 charged Ortega with violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165, which alleges:
That on or about the 20 th day of February 2014, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, weighing 0.69
grams (sic), including plastic sachets, without any permit, license, or authority to do so.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon his arraignment on April 2, 2014, Ortega pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. [8] After the preliminary and pre-
trial conferences were concluded, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution:

On February 20, 2014, at around 8:30 p.m., Police Officer (PO) 2 Lawrence Ganir (PO2 Ganir) was on duty at the
Laoag City Police Station when he received information from an asset that Ortega was looking for prospective buyers
of shabu.[9]

Consequently, a team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against Ortega. PO2 Ramon Christopher Diego
(PO2 Diego) was designated as poseur buyer, while PO2 Ganir, PO2 Engelbert Ventura (PO2 Ventura), and PO3
Melecio Antonio, Jr. (PO3 Antonio), were tasked to act as back-up operatives. [10] The buy-bust money consisting of a
P1,000.00-bill was then prepared, and the coordination form and pre-operation report were submitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.[11]

After the briefing, the buy-bust team went to the target area located at Barangay 19, Basa Street corner Rizal Street,
Laoag City.[12] PO2 Diego and the asset positioned themselves strategically within five meters from the Addessa
Building, where the back-up police officers were staying.[13]

A few minutes later, Ortega arrived at the target area. The asset introduced PO2 Diego to Ortega as his friend who
was interested in buying shabu.[14] Subsequently, Ortega gave PO2 Diego a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. After receiving the plastic sachet, PO2 Diego placed the same in his pocket and gave Ortega
the P1,000.00-bill marked money as consideration therefor. [15] Once the transaction was completed, PO2 Diego then
shouted the pre-arranged signal, "Pulis! Arestado ka!”[16]

Upon hearing the pre-arranged signal, the back-up operatives immediately rushed to the scene. When they arrived,
PO2 Diego was holding Ortega, who was trying to resist arrest. [17] PO2 Ventura then handcuffed Ortega and informed
him of his rights and the reason for his arrest. [18] Thereafter, PO2 Ventura conducted a body search upon Ortega and
recovered from him one leather coin purse containing six plastic sachets of white crystalline substance, among other
items.[19]

As onlookers were starting to gather around them, the buy-bust team transferred to the police station. There, the
police officers photographed, marked, and inventoried the confiscated items in the presence of Ortega and Barangay
Captain Andres (Andres).[20] They likewise prepared the Confiscation Receipt and Request for Laboratory
Examination.[21] Afterwards, PO2 Diego and PO2 Ventura brought the seized drugs to the crime laboratory for
examination.[22] The forensic chemist, Police Inspector (PI) Amiely Ann Luis Navarro (PI Navarro), conducted the
examination and found that the items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[23]

Version of the Defense:

For his part, Ortega vehemently denied the accusations against him. He testified that on the night of the incident, he
was at home taking care of his two children, when his live-in partner, May Ann Colobong (Colobong), texted him to go
to St. Joseph Pharmacy at Rizal Street, Laoag City. [24] She asked him to bring P7,000.00 because she did not have
enough money to buy medicine for their child. Ortega acceded to her request and left the children with his sister-in-
law and brother.[25]

Thereafter, Ortega boarded a tricycle and noticed a white Tamaraw FX following him. He then alighted from, the
tricycle at the corner of Basa Street and walked towards the south. Suddenly, a vehicle stopped in front of him and
three individuals got off, whom he later on identified as PO2 Ganir, PO2 Ventura, and PO2 Diego. [26] PO2 Ganir
handcuffed him and pushed him to the pavement. [27] Ortega was then made to board the Tamaraw FX. He asked
them what his fault was, but no one answered.[28] Ortega was brought to the Laoag City Police Station, where the
police searched him and confiscated from him his cellphone, key chain, and money.[29]

Colobong also testified and corroborated the testimony of Ortega. She claimed that while she was waiting for Ortega
at the pharmacy, she heard noises at the back of Adessa Bldg. along Basa Street and saw Ortega being forcibly
taken and boarded on a vehicle by persons in civilian clothes. She immediately went home and was advised to blotter
the incident. At around 11:00 p.m., she went to the Laoag City Police Station, where she discovered that Ortega was
being implicated for the Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs.[30]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

On August 19, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Ortega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies than Ortega's defense of denial.[31] Moreover, the RTC held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drugs had been preserved as "there was compliance with the procedural requirements under Section 21
of RA 9165, and more importantly a perfect chain of custody of the seized drugs." [32] The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Willruss Ortega GUILTY on both counts beyond
reasonable doubt and is accordingly sentenced to suffer as follows:

1. for illegal sale of shabu as charged in Criminal Case No. 15891, the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php500,000.00); and

2. for illegal possession of shabu weighing 0.69 gram as charged in Criminal Case No. 15892, the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 300,000.00).

The shabu subject hereof is confiscated for proper disposition as the law prescribes.

SO ORDERED.[33]
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, Ortega elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its November 9, 2017 Decision,[34] the CA affirmed Ortega's conviction. It found that the testimonies of the police
officers were "straightforward, categorical, consistent on material points, unwavering, clear, and credible." [35] Similar to
the RTC, the CA likewise ruled that the integrity of the seized drugs was "intact and never compromised," [36] despite
the presence of some flaws in the police officers' compliance with the procedures provided in Section 21 of RA 9165.
[37]
According to the CA, such procedural lapses did not affect the admissibility of the seized items since the court is
not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements.[38] The CA thus ruled:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 19, 2016 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Laoag City in Crim. Case Nos. 15891-13 and 15892-13 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[39]
Hence, the present appeal.[40]

Issue
The sole issue for resolution in the instant case is whether Ortega is guilty of violating Section 5 and Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.

Our Ruling

There is merit in the appeal.

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [41]
Meanwhile, in instances where an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, three elements
ought to be proved by the prosecution, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[42]

However, jurisprudence dictates that the presentation of evidence establishing the elements of the offenses of Illegal
Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction under RA 9165.[43] In illegal
drugs cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is
essential to sustain a guilty verdict. Thus, aside from proving the elements of the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Possession, it is equally important for the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the integrity and identity
of the dangerous drug. It must be proven with moral certainty that the substance obtained from the accused during
the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court.[44]

In this regard, and in order to prevent any unnecessary doubt as to its identity and integrity, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drug and account for each link in the chain of custody from
the moment it is seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the crime.[45]

In the instant case, this Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and CA that the elements of Illegal Sale and
Possession of Dangerous Drugs are present. The evidence offered by the prosecution shows that Ortega committed
the said crimes following the buy-bust operation conducted against him. The records indicate that he had sold shabu
to PO2 Diego who acted as the poseur buyer. His receipt of the buy-bust money consummated the sale of the illegal
drug. Moreover, he was also caught to have in his possession six other plastic sachets of shabu after being arrested
and frisked by PO2 Ventura.

This Court likewise concurs with the CA's conclusion that the buy-bust team was not impelled by any ill motive to
impute such serious offenses against Ortega. As correctly found by the CA, "accused-appellant admitted that the first
time he met the police officers was during his arrest and there was no previous misunderstanding among them.
Neither was there any indication that the police officers were in bad faith nor had digressed from their ordinary tour of
duty."[46] Hence, on this score, there is no basis to suspect the veracity of the testimonies of the police officers.[47]

This notwithstanding, this Court finds that Ortega's acquittal is proper because the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the integrity of the seized drugs, given that the police officers did not strictly comply with
requirements laid down under Section 21 of RA 9165.

Section 21 provides the procedural safeguards that the apprehending team must observe in the custody and handling
of seized illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity as evidence. "While it is true that a buy-bust
operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights
are safeguarded."[48] The said provision states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x
Further, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 elaborates on the proper procedure to be
followed, to wit:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items; x x x
It bears to note at this juncture that RA 10640, [49] which took effect on July 23, 2014, had amended Section 21 of RA
9165 by requiring only two witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized items, namely: (a) an elected public official; and, (b) either a representative from the
National Prosecution Service or the media. Prior to its amendment, three witnesses were required, namely: (a) a
representative from the media; (b) a representative from the Department of Justice; and (c) any elected public official.
As the crime in this case was committed on February 20, 2014, Section 21, prior to its amendments, is applicable.

A perusal of the records of the case would show that only the barangay official, Andres, was present during the time
the police officers conducted the inventory of the seized drugs.[50] Further, the Inventory /Confiscation Receipt[51] was
not signed by Ortega or by his counsel or representative, as required by Section 21. [52] It only contained the
signatures of Andres, PO2 Diego, and PO2 Ventura. [53] Moreover, it was also admitted by the prosecutor handling the
case that there was no proof that Ortega and the required witness/es were furnished a copy of the said document.[54]

Given the fact that a buy-bust operation is, by its very nature, a planned activity, it strains credulity why the buy-bust
team could not have ensured the presence of all the required witnesses. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has ample
time to gather and bring with it the said witnesses. [55] The law requires their presence in order to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and to guard against the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence.[56]

While this Court has ruled that the absence of the required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses must first be adduced by the prosecution.[57] Any discrepancy should be reasonably explained and
accounted for, otherwise, the regularity of the entire seizure procedure would be put into question.[58]

In the case at bar, the prosecution did not adduce any explanation as to why the police officers deviated from the
procedure under Section 21, or whether they exerted earnest, efforts in securing the presence of the required
witnesses. The multiple breaches and the lack of justification therefor effectively tainted the integrity of the seized
drugs presented in court; thus, the very identity of the seized drugs became highly questionable.

Additionally, this Court notes that the parties' stipulation to dispense with the testimony of forensic chemist PI
Navarro[59] did not fully cover the necessary pieces of information as required by jurisprudence, namely: (1) that the
forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after
examination of the content; and (3) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be
tampered with pending trial.[60] Consequently, a huge gap in the chain of custody of the seized drugs is created. [61]
This gives rise to the probability that the evidence seized from Ortega may have been compromised while under
police custody, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Claudel,[62] this
Court held that:
Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism has been
provided to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of
custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the application of this
saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain
them. Such justification or explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the
Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or explanation for them. The
failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence of the
corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused deserves acquittal.[63]
Strict compliance with Section 21 is especially important in instances where only a miniscule amount of dangerous
drugs is involved, such as in this case. As enunciated in People v. Holgado,[64]
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores
the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of
tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."

xxxx

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act
No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be
scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily
planted and tampered. x x x[65] (Emphasis supplied)
All told, this Court finds that the prosecution failed to show that the chain of custody was properly preserved. Since
proof beyond reasonable doubt was not established, the acquittal of Ortega must follow as a matter of course.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The November 9, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 08591 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Willruss Ortega is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged against him and is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for some
other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director General is DIRECTED to inform this Court the action he/she has taken
within five days from receipt of this Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe,(Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 217097. February 23, 2022 ]

ROLANDO UY Y SAYAN ALIAS "NONOY," PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the August 8, 2014 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00911-MIN, and its February 9, 2015 Resolution, [3] which affirmed with
modifications the November 17, 2010 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Malaybalay, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 14300-04, finding petitioner Rolando Uy y Sayan alias
"Nonoy" (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[5] or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2022."
On May 28, 2004, an Information[6] was filed charging petitioner with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. It alleges as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 2004, in the afternoon, at Sitio Pasok, Barangay Mabuhay, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally have in his possession and under his exclusive control and custody 248 grams of marijuana flowering tops, classified as a
dangerous drug, without permit or authority from the government to possess the same.
That the aforesaid crime is aggravated or qualified by the fact that said accused was found positive for use of marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 11, in relation to Section 25, Article II or R.A. 9165.[7]
Version of the Prosecution:
On April 6, 2004, at about 5:45 p.m., members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of San Fernando, Bukidnon, set up a mobile check point at Purok 4, Sitio Paso, Barangay Mabuhay, San Fernando,
Bukidnon, pursuant to the implementation of COMELEC[8] Resolution No. 6446,[9] imposing the COMELEC gun ban.[10]
While conducting the routine inspection in the check point, the police officers flagged down petitioner. They asked petitioner for the Certificate of Registration (CR) and Official Receipt (OR) of his
motorcycle. Petitioner, however, failed to produce these documents. The law enforcers then became suspicious and, thus, asked petitioner to open the tools compartment of his motor vehicle. From the

tools compartment, the police officers found five bundles of marijuana placed and wrapped in a cellophane. The police officers further asked petitioner to open the compartment under the driver's seat.
Petitioner initially refused but he eventually relented. The search of the compartment under the driver's seat further yielded several bundles of marijuana.[11]
Petitioner was brought to the police station. Upon arrival at the police station, petitioner was interviewed by the police officers and the confiscated dried marijuana leaves were marked. The specimen was
then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Malaybalay City. The result of the examination conducted by Police Chief Inspector (PCI) April Madroño yielded positive for the presence of marijuana.
Petitioner's urine examination also yielded positive for use of prohibited drugs.[12]
Version of the Defense:
Petitioner presented a different version. As the lone witness for the defense, petitioner denied the allegations of the prosecution's witnesses. [13] He testified that in the afternoon of April 6, 2004, he went
to Mabuhay, San Fernando, Bukidnon to deliver medicines which he peddles to some small stores. On his way to Mabuhay, the motorcycle he was driving had a flat tire. While changing tire somewhere in
Barrio Paso, San Fernando, Bukidnon, armed persons in civilian attire arrived and told petitioner that they will be inspecting his bag. Notwithstanding his opposition, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 [14]
Ricardo Llorin (SPO2 Llorin) conducted a search of his bag but found nothing illegal. The armed individuals then asked for his driver's license and the CR of his motorcycle. Petitioner was not able to
produce the documents at that time, explaining that he left the documents in his house. The police officers then arrested and brought him to the police station of San Fernando. [15]

The police then took pictures of him with the motorcycle and forced petitioner answer their queries by striking him with the butt of a rifle every now and then. After that, the police took something from the
tools compartment of the motorcycle which appeared to be wrapped in plastic. At around midnight of April 7, 2004, the police called him out of the cell and demanded him to produce the amount of
P10,000.00, otherwise he would be locked up in jail. Thereafter, he was brought to Cagayan de Oro City for drug testing.[16]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
The RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC emphasized that unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the law enforcers were inspired by any
improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, the testimonies of the apprehending team with respect to the check point operation deserve full faith and credit. Further, the RTC stressed that
in drug cases, mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se, and the burden of proof is upon the accused to show that he or she has a license or permit under the law to possess the
prohibited drug. In this case, petitioner failed to prove that he has a license to possess the marijuana.[17]
The RTC also did not give credence and much weight to petitioner's defense of denial, and to his argument that there was an absence of a search warrant, hence his constitutional right was violated.
According to the RTC, this case falls under the case of a lawful arrest, thus the subsequent warrantless search was justified.[18] The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Rolando Uy y Sayan alias Nonoy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in violation of Sec. 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and imposes upon him the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of life to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.00. The accused shall serve his penalty in the National
Penitentiary of Davao Penal Colony.
The 248 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops are ordered immediately turned over to the PDEA for destruction.[19]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[20] to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Petitioner's arguments before the CA hinged on the validity of the warrantless arrest and search made by the police officers, and consequently, the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the search.
However, the CA pointed out that petitioner is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest because he never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. His active participation
in the trial of the case amounts to a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest.[21]
Moreover, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the RTC since Section 36(f) of RA 9165, which was the basis of the sentence imposed by the RTC, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the
Court in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board[22] Thus, the urine sample taken from the petitioner, which was the only evidence against petitioner for his alleged use of marijuana,
cannot be used as evidence against him.[23]
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 08, Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 14300-04, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Rolando UY y SAYAN is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years and nine (9) months, as maximum, and a fine of PhP 300,000.00

SO ORDERED.[24]
Undeterred, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari arguing that his right to privacy has been violated, since a close scrutiny of the records would reveal that the case against him does not fall
under any of the circumstances mentioned under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The police officers did not have any reason to believe that he had a gun to validate his arrest based on the
implementation of the COMELEC gun ban. Petitioner was not doing anything illegal, there was no prior positive identification of petitioner, nor was anything in plain view for the police officers to engender
a well-founded belief that petitioner was guilty of any crime.
Issue
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug as defined under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.

Constitutional Mandate on
Search and Seizures.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that search and seizures must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause. [25]
Otherwise, searches and seizures done without a valid warrant are considered intrusive and unreasonable within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. The Constitution provides further
safeguards such that the evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of unreasonable searches and seizures are considered tainted, and consequently, inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.[26]

However, there is a recognized exception to the need of securing a warrant before a search may be effected, that is, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. In such instances, the law requires
that there be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. The process cannot be reversed.[27]
Moreover, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for instances when a lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant:
SEC. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.

Briefly, there are three instances when warrantless arrests may be effected. These are: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which has just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[28]
Among the circumstances where a warrantless arrest is allowed, the arrest of the suspect in flagrante delicto imposes a rigid, if not strict, compliance with its elements. An in flagrante delicto arrest
requires the concurrence of two elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[29]
Jurisprudence has also carved out an additional exception to the necessity of securing a search warrant prior to the conduct of a search. In Caballes v. People,[30] this Court discussed the validity of
warrantless searches on moving vehicles, to wit:
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a

requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
"constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[31]
Checkpoints are not illegal per se.
This case presents us with a situation wherein an individual was arrested during a checkpoint search. Setups of the military or police checkpoints are considered a variant of searching moving vehicles
which are not illegal per se, for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. [32] Inspections at checkpoints are not violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable searches if limited to the following: (a) the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; ( b) simply looks into a
vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[33]

Checkpoint searches are considered valid as long as it is limited to a mere routine inspection. However, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search instead of a mere routine
inspection, such search remains valid as long as the officers who conducted the search have a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.[34]
Warrantless arrest and the
concomitant search in this case is
valid.

This Court has ruled in several instances[35] that although as a general rule, motorists as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may also
be stopped to allow authorized personnel to conduct an extensive search when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that either the motorist is a law
offender, or that the contents of the vehicle are, or have been, instruments of some offense.[36]
As may be gleaned from the records of this case, petitioner, who was driving a red motorcycle, passed by the mobile check point at Purok 4, Sitio Paso, Barangay Mabuhay, San Fernando, Bukidnon,
where SPO2 Llorin was stationed. The motorcycle was then flagged down, and SPO2 Llorin asked petitioner for his OR/CR. However, he failed to produce the documents. [37] The police authorities then
became suspicious that the motorcycle might have been stolen considering petitioner's failure to produce the OR/CR. Moreover, upon inspection of the motor vehicle, the police officers chanced upon a
plastic cellophane protruding from the tools compartment. [38] When petitioner opened the tools compartment, the police officers found a small bundle of dried marijuana placed inside a transparent
cellophane.[39]

The police officers then scrutinized the motorcycle and further found the same transparent cellophane in the driver seat. Upon opening the driver's seat, [40] the police officers discovered five more bundles
of marijuana wrapped in a cellophane. Immediately after, the police officers brought petitioner to the police station where he was further interviewed and eventually detained. [41] The marijuana specimen

were brought to the laboratory for examination.[42]

Based on the foregoing, while it is true that the root of the encounter of the police officers and the petitioner was due to the mobile check point in implementation of the COMELEC gun ban, the arrest was
not made by reason of the COMELEC gun ban or any traffic violation. Instead, it was in light of petitioner's failure to present his OR/CR, which raised suspicions on the part of the police officers, prompting
them to inquire further and look into the motor vehicle, on the theory that petitioner might be committing a crime or the motor vehicle itself is the subject of the crime already committed. The consequent
search conducted by the police officers led to the confiscation of marijuana from petitioner.
Rule on Chain of Custody was
not complied with.
In particular, the records show that there was noncompliance by the police officers at the rule on chain of custody. The chain of custody refers to the duly recorded, authorized movements, and custody of

the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation, to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination, until it is presented to the court.[43] Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public

official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing
within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,

a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be
submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the
said offender or accused refuses or tails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the
evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;
(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of
the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the

same; and
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of
court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA,
the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 further expounded on this provision:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any

elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending officers to immediately conduct the marking, physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. Moreover, the physical inventory and taking of
photographs shall be conducted in the presence of: (a) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) a representative from

the media; (c) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) an elected public official, after seizure and confiscation.[44]
The procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is considered substantive law and not merely a procedural technicality. [45] The law requires that the police authorities implementing RA 9165
strictly comply with the chain of custody procedure, although failure to strictly do so does not, ipso facto, render the seizure and custody over the illegal drugs as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable
ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence were preserved.
In this case however, there was total lack of compliance. A review of the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties show that an inventory report was not accomplished by any of the police officers. In
fact, an inventory report was never mentioned in all the transmittal documents accomplished by the concerned authorities. Absent the inventory report, the required presence of the insulating witnesses
cannot be considered to have been complied with. Consequently, rendering a judgment of conviction without being able to establish that petitioner, along with the required witnesses under Section 21 of
RA 9165, were able to personally see the movement of the seized drugs amounts to a violation of substantive law.

In view of the foregoing lapses in the chain of custody and ultimately, lack of compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, petitioner's acquittal is warranted. Serious uncertainty hangs over the identity
and integrity of the corpus delicti introduced into evidence by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 8, 2014 Decision and February 9, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00911-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner Rolando Uy y Sayan alias "Nonoy." He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is ORDERED to implement this Decision and to inform this Court of the action he has taken within five days from receipt of this
Decision.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 12-66, filed on March 10, 2015.

[2] The August 8, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 00911-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Edward B.
Contreras of the Twenty-Third Division of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Edward B. Contreras.
[4] The November 17, 2010 Decision in Criminal Case No. 14300-04 was penned by Presiding Judge Pelagio B. Estopia, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 in the City of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 231042. February 23, 2022 ]

ARTURO O. MIÑAO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO), RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse and set aside the August 23, 2016 Decision [2] and March 30, 2017 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05743-MIN which
affirmed the March 8, 2013 Decision[4] and May 30, 2013 Order[5] of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (OMB-Mindanao) in OMB-M-A-09-124-C, finding petitioner Arturo O. Miñao
(petitioner) together with Manolito G. Abapo (Abapo), and Clemente A. Tabiliran (Tabiliran), administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, and imposing on them the penalty of dismissal from government service. The March 30, 2017 Resolution[6] denied their motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents:
The instant case stemmed from a letter-complaint[7] dated October 14, 2005 from Aurelio Cadavedo (Cadavedo) pertaining to the alleged anomalous purchase of guardrails and guardrail posts worth
P5,500,000.00 sometime in 2004 made by the 1st Engineering District of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City. [8] The audit team of the Commission on Audit
Regional Office No. IX (COA-IX), which was duly constituted to investigate the letter-complaint of Cadavedo, submitted an audit investigation report (AIR) dated October 5, 2006.[9]
The AIR provided that the 1st Engineering District of the DPWH in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City committed splitting of contracts in procuring guardrails and guardrail posts amounting to P5,500,000.00 under
the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) No. ROIX-2003-353,[10] issued by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for the Dipolog-Oroquieta and Dipolog-Sindangan national roads

(National Roads).[11]
In particular, the AIR alleged that the 1st Engineering of DPWH in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City: (1) resorted to splitting of contracts by awarding 11 purchase orders worth P500,000.00 each to AUF
Enterprises without public bidding; (2) purchased overpriced guardrails and guardrail posts from AUF Enterprises; and (3) left guardrails and guardrail posts at the project site resulting in wastage of
government resources in the amount of P40,110.00.[12]
In their joint-counter affidavit,[13] petitioner, who was then OIC District Engineer of the DPWH Zamboanga del Norte 1st District Engineering Office, Dipolog City, and his co-respondents, [14] denied the
aforesaid allegations. They claimed that under the SARO, the main project was split into 11 projects, and that said projects, with an aggregate amount of P5,500,000.00, were already divided in the
amount of P500,000.00 per project under the SARO.[15] They further maintained that they could not have violated Republic Act No. (RA) 9184[16] or the Government Procurement Reform Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) in the procurement of the materials for the project, considering that RA 9184 took effect on October 8, 2003, whereas the SARO was issued only on December
16, 2003. Since RA 9184 took effect shortly before the issuance of the SARO, they insisted that the procurement of materials for the projects should be governed not by RA 9184 but by the old
procurement law.[17]

Ruling of the Office of the

Ombudsman – Mindanao:
After evaluation of the allegations and defenses of Cadavedo, and petitioner and his co-respondents in the case before the OMB-Mindanao, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Samuel P.
Naungayan, in his March 8, 2013 Decision in OMB-M-A-09-124-C, found petitioner, together with Abapo and Tabiliran, administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, and meted the penalty of dismissal from government service. The dispositive portion of the said Decision states:
Wherefore, this Office finds substantial evidence to hold respondents Arturo O. Miñao, Manolito G. Abapo, and Clemente A. Tabiliran liable for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious

Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. On the other hand, this Office finds substantial evidence to hold respondent Marilyn S. Luna liable for Simple Misconduct.
The administrative charges against Reseller R. Morallo, Sr. are DISMISSED because he was not able to answer them by reason of his death. In conformity with the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman vs.
Uldarico P. Andutan Jr., that resignation prior to the filing of an administrative case divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint, the administrative charges against Jovencio
A. Hibaya and Dannie D. Carreon are DISMISSED because this case was filed on 10 March 2009 after they retired from office in September 2007 and 08 February 2009, respectively.
On the other hand, the administrative charges against Blandina A. Pajaren, Ray S. Cadavedo and Wilfredo B. Senarillos are DISMISSED, for insufficiency of evidence.
Pursuant to Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, dated 10 April 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17, dated 07 September 2003, Arturo O. Miñao, Manolito G. Abapo, and Clemente A. Tabiliran are hereby DISMISSED from government service which shall carry with it the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service.

On the other hand, Marilyn S. Luna is hereby SUSPENDED from service for three (3) months without pay.
xxxx

SO DECIDED.[18]
The OMB-Mindanao observed that while the specific kind of project was not indicated in the SARO, the 11 abstracts of bids; 11 cost estimates; and 11 purchase orders indicate that there is only one kind
of project for the National Roads. The OMB-Mindanao also observed that the abstracts of bids and purchase orders further show that the guardrails and accessories were all procured from one supplier,
AUF Enterprises. In this regard, the OMB-Mindanao found it absurd for petitioner and his co-respondents to purchase in 11 installments the same materials from the same supplier when the budget for the
procurement of the materials for the whole project was readily made available under the SARO.[19]
Since the materials to be procured for the 11 projects are identical and can be supplied by a single supplier, the OMB-Mindanao concluded that there could only be one procurement contract/project.
Consequently, it held that petitioner, together with Abapo and Tabiliran, resorted to the prohibited act of splitting government contracts as defined in RA 9184.[20]
The OMB-Mindanao also found that there was also failure to conduct public bidding under both the old and new procurement law. [21] Findings of the COA-IX also show that the Concrete Posts and

Machine Bolts delivered for the National Roads were substandard and overpriced since the materials used were substandard compared to the specifications in the purchase orders and approved plans.
[22]

Petitioner, together with Abapo and Tabiliran, filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the OMB-Mindanao in its May 30, 2013 Order. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review [23]
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order before the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
On August 23, 2016, the CA rendered its Decision[24], the dispositive portion of which reads:

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 8 March 2013 and Order dated 30 May 2013 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
In ruling against petitioner, the CA heavily relied on the findings of the OMB-Mindanao in its March 8, 2013 Decision and May 30, 2013 Order. The CA similarly observed that the intent behind the
execution of 11 identical contracts involving the National Roads was to avoid the requirement of the law, particularly on public bidding as defined under Section 54.1 of the IRR of RA 9184. In this regard,
the CA held:
In the present case, the procurement in question was the purchase of Concrete Posts, Guardrails, machine bolts and nuts were intended to be used for the entire project. Even if the project was composed
of eleven sub-sections, still it is evident that all eleven sub-sections involve the procurement of the same materials of the same specifications. And so only one procurement contract is really needed for all
subsections of the project, and it would be ridiculous and nonsensical for petitioner and his allies to enter into eleven identical contracts with one supplier – AUF Enterprises. [26]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[27] but the same was denied by the CA in its March 30, 2017 Resolution.[28]
Hence the instant petition.

Issues
Petitioner raised the following assignment of errors in his petition:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in disregarding the actions taken by Petitioner's Office in the interpretation and implementation of SARO No. RO-IX 2003-353
from the Department of Budget & Management (DBM).
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in finding Petitioner administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for not applying the provisions of R.A. 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations in the implementation of SARO No. RO-IX 2003-353.[29]
In compliance with this Court's Resolution[30] dated June 28, 2017, the OMB-Mindanao filed its comment[31] on the petition, to which petitioner filed a reply.[32] In a Resolution[33] dated October 5, 2020,
this Court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In his memorandum,[34] petitioner denied splitting or dividing a single procurement contract into 11 identical contracts to circumvent the requirements of public bidding under RA 9184. Petitioner
maintained that his office was primarily and merely tasked to implement the said projects indicated in the SARO, which supposedly already identified the 11 projects for the National Roads, including the
allocated budget per project. As the OIC District Engineer of the DPWH Zamboanga del Norte 1st District Engineering Office, Dipolog City, petitioner insisted that he implemented the SARO in good faith

consistent with the basic guidelines stated therein,[35] and resorted to the use of the simplified bidding process under the Old Procurement Law.[36]
For its part, the OMB-Mindanao maintains that the CA did not err in issuing its August 23, 2016 Decision and March 30, 2017 Resolution finding petitioner guilty of disregarding the provisions of RA 9184
on public bidding involving procurement activities.[37] The OMB-Mindanao further countered that petitioner's defense of good faith, i.e., that he only acted in accordance with the guidelines stated in the
SARO, is untenable since petitioner was duty-bound to ensure that the amounts provided therein shall be spent in accordance with the provisions of RA 9184.[38] Moreover, petitioner's reason that he was
unfamiliar with the bidding process under RA 9184 does not excuse him from complying with the provisions of the law.[39]
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Well-settled is the rule that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to questions of law. As the Court is not a trier of facts, it is not within its functions to analyze and weigh all
over again evidence already passed upon in the proceedings below.[40] While there are recognized exceptions to this rule,[41] the Court observes that none of them are present in the instant case.
This notwithstanding, the Court shall discuss the issues raised by the petitioner in the instant petition.

Petitioner is accused of violating RA 9184 when he resorted to splitting of government contracts, failed to conduct public bidding as required by law, and according to the COA, procured substandard and
overpriced materials from AUF Enterprises.
At the outset, petitioner does not question in his petition and memorandum the factual findings of the OMB-Mindanao and the COA as to his alleged procurement of substandard and overpriced materials
from AUF Enterprises for the rehabilitation and improvement of the National Roads. Hence, the Court affirms these findings following the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative bodies are
accorded great respect by this Court.[42]
Notably, the alleged acts of petitioner – splitting of government contracts and failure to conduct public bidding as required by law – were committed pursuant to the SARO for the National Roads, which

was issued by the DBM on December 16, 2003. Moreover, procurements by petitioner's office for the rehabilitation and improvement of the National Roads were initiated on July 12, 2004. As such, RA
9184, the governing law at that time, is controlling.
Having settled the issue of the governing law in the implementation of the SARO, we next determine whether the acts of petitioner constitute violations of current state of laws, particularly, RA 9184 and its
IRR,[43] which would warrant the administrative penalties meted against him by the OMB-Mindanao.
Splitting of Government
Contracts:
On the matter of splitting of contracts, petitioner essentially claims that his office was not responsible in splitting the procurement project as indicated in the SARO and that it implemented the same in good
faith. In this regard, petitioner relies on Annex "A" attached to the SARO, which supposedly specifies the names of projects and their location, and the amounts respectively allotted to each project, as

follows:
Name of Project/Location Amount

Zamboanga del Norte 2nd District

Roads, Highways and Bridges P5,500,000.00

1 Rehab./Impv't of Dipolog-Oroquieta National Road 1,500,000.00

a Km 1829 + 427 – Km 1832 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

b Km 1832+ 100 – Km 1835 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

c Km 1835 + 427 – Km 1837 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

2 Rehab./Impv't of Dipolog-Singan National Road P3,500,000.00

a Km 1840 + 000 – Km 1844 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

b Km 1844 + 000 – Km 1848 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

c Km 1848 + 000 – Km 1851 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

d Km 1851 + 000 – Km 1857 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

e Km 1857 + 000 – Km 1862 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

f Km 1862 + 000 – Km 1867 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

g Kin 1867 + 000 – Km 1872 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

3 Rehab./Impv't of Dipolog-Sindagan National Road 500,000.00

a Km 1837 + 000 – Km 1872 + 000, Dipolog City 500,000.00

*** nothing follows ***

Total Amount Released 5,500,000.00[44]

From the foregoing recitals, petitioner claims that it was DBM who did the first form of "splitting of contracts" by dividing or breaking up the project or projects into smaller quantities and amounts as

contained in the SARO pursuant to Annex "A," which is an integral part of the SARO. Specifically, petitioner argues that it was DBM which identified the projects to be implemented supposedly consisting
of 11 stations of the two national roads and allocated P500,000.00 per station for a total cost of P5,500,000.00 for all the 11 identified stations. As the project was specified as "Urgent Infrastructure
Including Local Projects," the 11 projects needed to be implemented with dispatch. "Splitting" the project would then mean that petitioner's office would have jurisdiction to approve purchase requests and
other related matters to implement the projects pursuant to Department Order No. 319, series of 2002 (DO 319) dated November 20, 2002 of the DPWH, which limits the authority of District Engineers to
sign purchase requests not exceeding the amount of P750,000.00. As it was DBM which supposedly made the "splitting" of the projects, petitioner insists that his office merely implemented the same, and
that it had no discretion to consolidate the total amount released by the DBM pursuant to the SARO.
Section 54.1 of the IRR of RA 9184 expressly prohibits the splitting of government contracts. It provides that "[s]plitting of Government Contracts means the division or breaking up of [Government of the
Philippines] contracts into smaller quantities and amounts, or dividing contract implementation into artificial phases or sub-contracts for the purpose of evading or circumventing the requirements of law

and [the IRR], especially the necessity of competitive bidding and the requirements for the alternative methods of procurement."[45]
The Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), through GPPB Non-Policy Matter Opinion No. 136-2014 issued on December 6, 2014, clarified the meaning of splitting of contract in this wise:

[I]t does not follow that once a contract is divided into smaller quantities or phases, there is splitting of contract. In order to determine whether the division of the procurement project into two (2) packages
amounts to splitting of contract, it must be clearly shown that the act must have been done for the purpose of circumventing or evading legal and procedural requirements, i.e., there should be a
determination that, despite resorting to public bidding for both packages, the division into two (2) packages was done to circumvent or evade the legal and procedural requirements under RA 9184 and its
IRR.[46]

Along the same lines, the COA states that there is deemed a splitting of contracts when a project is "funded under a single obligating authority and implemented in several phases whether by the same or
different contractors x x x x."[47] COA Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, while considered an old administrative issuance, is instructive on the matter of splitting of contracts. In fact, it even went a
step further by stating that proof of loss or damage sustained by, or caused to the government, is immaterial before a government official can be considered guilty of splitting of contracts, thus:
But in whatever form splitting has been resorted to, the idea is to do away with and circumvent control measures promulgated by the government. It is immaterial whether or not loss or damage
has been sustained by, or caused to, the government. In a celebrated administrative case wherein a ranking official was charged with and found guilty of splitting of purchases, the Office of the
President of the Philippines was quite emphatic when it ruled that "his liability is not contingent on proof of loss to the Government because of said violations of rules on procurement.xxx”[48]
Notably, the foregoing recitals are consistent with Article 5 of the Civil Code, which states that "[a]cts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity."
To be clear, RA 9184, including its IRR, does not prohibit or penalize the splitting of projects into sub-sections. What the law penalizes is the splitting of contracts. [49] Hence, the government may enter
into contracts with private individuals or entities for the implementation of several projects. The current state of laws, however, prohibit the splitting of contracts in order that the requirements of the law may

not be evaded or circumvent to suit personal interests in government procurements.

In this case, the OMB-Mindanao, as affirmed by the CA, held that the implementation of the SARO necessitated only one procurement contract, thus:
The project has to be implemented in eleven (11) sections along the stretch of the National Roads specified in Annex "A": Dipolog-Oroquieta has three (3) sections; Dipolog-Singan has seven (7) sections;
and Dipolog-Sindangan has only one (1) section.
The specific kind of project was not indicated in the SARO as well as in Annex "A", but the eleven (11) Abstracts of Bids, eleven (11) Cost Estimates; and eleven (11) Purchase Orders on record indicate
that there was only one kind of project for all the National Roads specified in Annex "A", i.e. Construction of Guardrails along sections of the National Roads specified in Annex "A".
xxxx
Inasmuch as the materials to be procured for the Project are identical and the materials can be supplied by a single supplier – it is clear that there could be only one Procurement
Contract/Project. It is not difficult to comprehend that the eleven (11) sections of the National Roads enumerated in Annex "A" refer to the specific SECTIONS or LOCATIONS x x x specified
in Annex "A". However, the respondents who acted as members of the BAC and the respondent who approved their recommendations, divided the project worth P5,500,000.00 into eleven (11) contracts
worth P500,000.00 each, as shown by eleven (11) Purchase Orders; and conducted eleven separate canvassing of prices, involving the same materials and suppliers.[50]
We agree with the findings of the OMB-Mindanao. It was highly erroneous for petitioner to conclude that the implementation of the SARO necessitated the execution of 11 government contracts. While

petitioner's office needed to purchase concrete posts and guardrails, including its accessories (machine bolts and nuts) for the 11 subsections indicated in Annex "A," it should be understood, however,
that there could only be one procurement contract for all sub-sections of the project. As correctly observed by the OMB-Mindanao, the project was merely divided or "split" into sub-sections or phases in
Annex "A" of the SARO for the convenience of DPWH that was tasked to implement the project. In fact, whether or not the project was split into 11 sub-sections, the same materials of the same
specifications should still be procured for the eleven (11) sub-sections.
Petitioner's interpretation of the SARO – that the same requires the execution of 11 contracts – becomes even more implausible since 11 separate purchase requests, abstracts of bids, and purchase
orders involve identical materials and one supplier of said materials. It is thus apparent in this case that petitioner is aware, or at least should have known, that the SARO necessitated the execution of only
one procurement contract.
In other words, since the same materials and same specifications were procured for the National Roads' rehabilitation and improvement, common sense dictates that there could only be ONE procurement
contract for all sub-sections of the project. This conclusion holds true regardless of whether or not the project was split into 11 other projects. On the contrary, it was absurd for petitioner and his office to
have entered into 11 identical procurement contracts involving the use of the same materials coming from only one supplier.

The foregoing brings to fore the next issue of whether petitioner, in splitting the procurement of guardrails component of the project into 11 P500,000.00 contracts, was made to circumvent the
requirements of applicable laws, particularly, DO 319, series of 2002, dated November 20, 2002 of DPWH entitled "Increasing the Limits of Authority in the Approval of Purchase Requests and Other
Related Matters," including the necessity of public bidding under RA 9184.
On the matter of DO 319, the same provides that district engineers, such as herein petitioner, has the authority to approve purchase requests orders involving infra-related supplies and equipment in the
amount not exceeding P750,000.00. Petitioner contends that when DBM issued the SARO, it was cognizant of his limited authority as OIC District Engineer to approve purchase requests in the amount
not more than P750,000.00 pursuant to DO 319. As such, the manner in which DBM divided or "split" the project into eleven sub-sections in Annex "A" of the SARO with each sub-section having an

allocation of P500,000.00 meant that DBM empowered petitioner's office to approve purchase requests under the SARO as provided in DO 319. For this reason, petitioner argues that he merely
discharged the functions of his office when he followed the directives of the DBM in implementing the SARO.
Petitioner's contention is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Nothing in the SARO states that the rehabilitation or improvement of the National Roads should be implemented
through 11 separate projects, which would thereby necessitate the execution of eleven 11 separate contracts. Nor does it appear that DBM had this supposed directive in mind to petitioner when it issued
the SARO. In fact, it is not within the mandate of DBM to dictate the manner by which DPWH should implement the rehabilitation or improvement of the national roads.
In contrast, we agree with the findings of the OMB-Mindanao that the 11 sections enumerated in Annex "A" of the SARO merely refer to locations along the national roads, and the amount of P500,000.00
indicated opposite the 11 sections pertain to the budget allocation for each of the locations along said national roads, thus:
Inasmuch as the materials to be procured for the Project are identical and the materials can be supplied by a single supplier – it is clear that there could only be one Procurement Contract/Project. It is not

difficult to comprehend that the eleven (11) sections of the National Roads enumerated in Annex "A" refer to specific SECTIONS or LOCATIONS along the National Roads where the guardrails shall be
installed, NOT to the number of Procurement Projects; and that the amount of P500,000.00 indicated opposite the eleven (11) sections obviously refers to the budget allocations for each of the eleven (11)

SECTIONS or LOCATIONS specified in Annex "A".[51]

We are also inclined to believe the conclusion of the OMB-Mindanao that it was not the DBM which identified and listed the 11 projects supposedly contained in the SARO. The project in the SARO, which
involves the rehabilitation or improvement of the National Roads, were split into 11 sub sections along the National Roads, which appears to have been done for the convenience of the DPWH in
implementing the project in terms of allocating the budget to the different sections along the National Roads, and not because the DBM intended DPWH to implement 11 separate and distinct projects for
the rehabilitation and improvement of the National Roads.[52]
Even on the premise that it was the DBM which identified and listed the 11 projects in the SARO, it was incumbent upon petitioner, as a public official, to ensure that the SARO is strictly earned out in
accordance with relevant rules and regulations. A SARO is defined as follows:
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) is a specific authority issued to one or more identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose

indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or are subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority. [53]
Thus, a SARO, as issued by the DBM, is an authority, much like a "green light," given to government agencies to enter into contracts with private individuals or entities pursuant to the purpose or purposes

indicated in the SARO. Accordingly, the release of the funds which will cover the implementation of the project should not exceed the amount stated in the SARO and utilized only for the purpose or
purposes indicated therein. Notably, the funds released pursuant to the SARO is subject to compliance with specific rules or regulations, particularly DO 319, RA 9184, and its IRR.
From the foregoing recitals, petitioner cannot escape liability by claiming that he merely relied on DBM's directive supposedly embodied in the SARO. Petitioner's acts should not have been guided by any
such directive, if such was even the case, but by the relevant provision of law. Petitioner was duty-bound to take the necessary steps, which would ensure that the SARO was properly carried out by the

proper office or agency and in compliance with applicable laws or regulations.

Moreover, if this Court accepts petitioner's arguments, this will set a precedence for future cases where the implementation and administration of SAROs made in accordance to a public official's own
interpretation, albeit erroneous, shall be considered valid despite the mandatory nature of RA 9184, and that the stand alone defense of "good faith" will exculpate him or her from liability. This we cannot
countenance as it would lead to confusion and seriously hamper the proper enforcement of RA 9184, and other related laws, rules and regulations.
Failure to conduct public
bidding:
We now address the next issue – whether the splitting of contracts as discussed above was done to circumvent or evade the legal and procedural requirements under RA 9184 and its IRR.
Petitioner maintains that he did not commit splitting of contracts since he did not circumvent or avoid the requirements of public bidding under RA 9184 or its IRR. Moreover, he merely resorted to the use
of the simplified bidding process under the old procurement law.
There is no question at this point that the DBM issued the SARO on December 16, 2003, while procurements were initiated by petitioner's office on July 12, 2004 – all of which were done after the

effectivity date of RA 9184 and its IRR on January 26, 2003[54] and October 8, 2003,[55] respectively.
Interestingly, petitioner admits in his petition that while he is aware of the existence of RA 9184 and its IRJR during the implementation of the "projects" in the SARO, he resorted, in good faith, to the
simplified bidding process under the old procurement law due to the difficulty of complying with the bidding process requirements under RA 9184 and its IRR. On this point, we emphasize that petitioner
cannot simply disregard prevailing statutory requirements on bidding and procurement processes on the basis of his personal sentiment that they are difficult to carry out. This argument is unacceptable if
not absurd. Petitioner, and this Court for that matter, is duty-bound to uphold and apply the law to the letter, more so under these circumstances where public funds are involved, and where the system of
accountability in the implementation of procurement contracts must all the more remain transparent. At the very least, petitioner acted in gross negligence when he resorted to the public bidding process
under the old procurement law which clearly negates the presumption of good faith on his part.
Petitioner also argues that while RA 9184 and its IRR took effect even before he implemented the projects in the SARO, the requirements of bidding under the law was not required pursuant to GPPB
Resolution No. 010-2004,[56] which states, in part:
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE PREMISES, all branches, agencies, departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations
(GOCCs), government financial institutions (GFIs), state universities and colleges (SUCs), and local government units (LGUs), are hereby encouraged to use the Philippine Bidding Documents as the
standard forms in the preparation of their bidding documents for all of their procurement activities, provided that the use of these Philippine Bidding Documents shall be mandatory effective March 1, 2005.

Petitioner's argument is misleading. To be clear, GPPB Resolution No. 010-2004 standardized the bidding forms to be used for all procurement activities, the use of which is required by all procuring
entities starting March 1, 2005. Nowhere in the said resolution states that the requirements of bidding under RA 9184 and its IRR were not required prior to such date.
In any case, the OMB-Mindanao, as affirmed by the CA, made clear in its findings that petitioner failed to conduct public bidding or any other method of procurement under the old procurement law or RA
9184 and its IRR, thus:
The respondents who acted as members of the BAC and the respondents who approved their recommendations did not only resort to splitting of government contracts, they also failed to conduct public
bidding as required by law. While these respondents allegedly conducted public bidding under the old law, there is nothing on record that indicates that public bidding or any other method of procurement
under the old or new law was observed in the Procurement of Guardrails component of the Project. The only documents on record relevant to their claim that they conducted public bidding are the eleven
(11) Abstracts of Bids, showing that AUF Enterprises was the lowest bidder in all eleven (11) biddings for the supply of guardrails. However, the Abstracts of Bids could not be considered as evidence of
public bidding, because they appear to have been manufactured by respondents whose signatures appear therein, inasmuch as the abstracts were not substantiated with the individual bid offers of the
suppliers indicated therein. Also, while respondents alleged that they published the invitation to bid in the local newspapers, in accordance with the old procurement law, they failed to present any

evidence to that effect. Thus, respondents' claim that they conducted public bidding under the old law is not believable.
Even granting that eleven (11) Abstracts of Bids can be considered as evidence of public bidding under the old law, they cannot be considered as evidence of public bidding for the eleven (11)
procurements in this case, because the procurements in question should have been made under the new law, inasmuch as the procurements were initiated on 12 July 2004, almost a year after the
effectivity of the IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 on 8 October 2003.[57]
We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the OMB-Mindanao and the CA.
Taken all the matters discussed above, it is apparent that petitioner's intent in entering into 11 identical contracts with AUF Enterprises was all too obvious – to avoid the requirements of public bidding as

required under RA 9184 and its IRR.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the findings of the OMB are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality, by the courts considering its specialized knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction.[58] Along the same lines, findings of fact by the OMB are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence – or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not
be overwhelming."[59] Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the OMB-Mindanao's conclusions, more so in this case when such findings and conclusions are affirmed by
the CA.[60]
Other matters:
Dismissal of the criminal case has

no bearing on the administrative

aspect of the instant case.

Petitioner also invites attention to the January 11, 2015 Joint Resolution [61] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Dipolog City in Criminal Case Nos. 18879 and 18880 acquitting petitioner and
his co-defendants for violating Section 65 (A) (4), Article XXI of RA 9184 in relation to Section 56.1.4. IRR of RA 9184 for -
taking advantage of their respective official positions by conspiring together and helping one another in splitting a single procurement contract amounting to P5,500,000.00 for guardrails and accessories
into eleven (11) P500,00.00 contracts to avoid competitive public bidding and to circumvent Department Order No. 319 series of 2002 limiting the authority of District/sub-District Engineers to approve
purchase request to P750,000.00 less for infra-related supplies and equipment.[62]
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of the criminal aspect of this case by the RTC in its January 11, 2015 Joint Resolution should absolve him from any administrative liability.
We disagree. The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 18879 and 18880 of the RTC does not have any bearing on the administrative case against petitioner as different degrees of evidence are required in
these actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas only substantial evidence will suffice in administrative proceedings. [63] Accordingly, petitioner's acquittal in the criminal

aspect of this case does not affect the decision reached in the instant administrative case nor carry with it relief from administrative liability.[64]
Finally, it should be noted that the OMB-Mindanao and the CA invariably found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best

Interest of the Service. The Court affirms these findings following the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative bodies, and as affirmed by the CA, are accorded great respect by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the August 23, 2016 Decision and March 30, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05743-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEXANDER OLPINDO Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

The rule on automatic review of death penalty cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court was rendered ineffective by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[1] which prohibited the imposition of
death penalty. While R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, no criminal case may be elevated motu proprio by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) for automatic review.
This is an Appeal[2] from the November 22, 2019 Decision[3] of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08984 which affirmed the December 1, 2016 Decision [4] of the RTC of San Jose City, Branch 38 in Criminal
Case No. 1307-08-SJC, finding Alexander Olpindo y Reyes (accused-appellant) guilty of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
Antecedents
On October 6, 2008, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610, in an information which reads:
That on or about February 27, 2008, in the City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with [AAA], [5] a 14 year-old minor, without her consent and against the will of the latter, which act
debases, degrades and demeans the dignity of [AAA] and impairs her normal growth and development, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
After evading arrest, accused-appellant was eventually apprehended on December 4, 2012. During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[7] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 2008, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, and her sister, BBB, were on their way home from the city public market, when a tricycle driven by accused-appellant stopped in front
of them. Accused-appellant and his sister Mary Ann Olpindo (Mary Ann), who was on board the tricycle, asked AAA to send BBB home as they allegedly had something important to tell her. AAA refused
but BBB got scared so she ran away and went home to ask for help. [8] Thereafter, accused-appellant and Mary Ann forced AAA aboard the tricycle. Accused-appellant drove to Barangay X with Mary Ann
sitting beside AAA to prevent her from escaping. Mary Ann allegedly got off the tricycle before reaching Barangay X, but AAA was unable to ask for help since the tricycle was moving fast.[9]
Upon arrival at Barangay X, accused-appellant forcibly took AAA to an uninhabited place. He tied her hands with rope, slammed her to the floor, then removed her short pants and underwear. He took off
his clothes and thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina and made up and down movements. AAA felt pain and cried.[10]
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant withdrew his penis, untied AAA, and got dressed. He told her not to tell anyone about the incident. AAA, however, reported the incident to her aunt the following

day.[11]
The prosecution offered for stipulation the proposed testimony of Dr. Janine Duran (Dr. Duran), who examined AAA and consequently prepared a medico-legal report. In its May 10, 2016 Order, [12] the
RTC admitted the following as Dr. Duran's testimony:
1.) That she is a Licensed Physician connected with PJGMRMC, Cabanatuan City during the time [AAA] underwent medical examination;

2.) That she is an expert to perform the necessary medical examination she conducted on the subject minor victim;

3.) That she reduced her findings into writing as shown by the Medico-Legal Report marked as Exhibit "B"; and

4.) That she can identify the said Medico-Legal Report which she prepared.[13]

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant testified that on February 27, 2008, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at the city public market waiting for his girlfriend, AAA. After AAA boarded his tricycle, Mary Ann, accused-appellant's
sister who also worked at the public market, boarded the tricycle. He dropped them off near their respective houses. AAA's grandmother saw him dropping them off. Afterwards, he plied his tricycle for

passengers the whole night.[14]

On that same night, accused-appellant narrated that after parking his tricycle in front of the church, police officers arrived and asked around for the driver of a tricycle with body number 626. When
accused-appellant admitted being the owner of the said tricycle, the police officers invited him to the police station. At the police station, accused-appellant saw AAA's mother and grandmother waiting for
him. Upon seeing him, AAA's grandmother approached and slapped him several times. Initially, he did not know the nature of the complaint against him. When he was informed about the alleged rape, he
denied the same. He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with AAA multiple times, but with her consent because they were in a relationship for about five months already. Prior to that, they had already
known each other for a long time because they were neighbors.[15]
During cross-examination, accused-appellant added that he and AAA were already cohabiting in his place and that AAA's grandmother, who strongly opposed their relationship, was the one who forced
AAA to charge him with rape.[16]
The defense offered for stipulation the proposed testimony of one Fedelita Colorena, which states:
1.) That she knows that [AAA] and the accused [have] a relationship and that they are neighbors;

2.) That she was also working in the public market and on 27 February 2008, [AAA], together with the [accused's] sister, Mary Ann Olpindo, was fetched by the accused;

3.) That the accused did not force [AAA] to board in his tricycle; and
4.) That when they went away on 27 February 2008, they were all happy.[17]

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of rape considering that the prosecution had sufficiently proven all the elements of the said crime. It also ruled that accused-appellant's flight for
more than four years from the filing of the information before his arrest, indicates his guilt. Further, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by accused-appellant had no sufficient basis, and was deemed to be
self-serving and uncorroborated. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused ALEXANDER OLPINDO y REYES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and hereby sentenced

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[18]
CA Ruling
In its decision, the CA first noted that accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal and that, in its December 15, 2016 Order,[19] the RTC, citing People v. Mateo[20] (Mateo), forwarded the records of
the case to the CA for automatic review. The CA opined that the RTC decision, which imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death, was not subject to automatic review and, thus, had already
become final and executory after accused- appellant did not file a notice of appeal. However, the CA proceeded to review the records of the case as if a notice of appeal was timely filed. It explained that
the gravity of the crime committed, as well as the fact that the life and liberty of the accused are at stake, necessitated a review of the factual issues in order to minimize the possibility of errors of
judgment.
Nonetheless, the CA still affirmed the ruling of the RTC and gave credence to the testimony of AAA. It held that the straightforward testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings on her physical

condition, was sufficient to convict accused-appellant of rape. Moreover, the positive identification of AAA prevailed over accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi. The CA observed that the
damages awarded must be increased according to People v. Jugueta,[21] but it did not modify the damages, reiterating that the RTC decision had already attained finality. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by accused-appellant ALEXANDER OLPINDO y REYES is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[22]

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the Court.

Issues

Accused-appellant submits the following errors on the part of the CA:

I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S QUESTIONABLE
BEHAVIOR AND THE PALPABLE [INCONSISTENCIES], AND INCREDIBILITY OF HER TESTIMONY WHICH PUT GRAVE AND SERIOUS DOUBTS ON HER CREDIBILITY.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THERE IS NO CONCLUSIVE FINDING OF RAPE.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND FOR SOLELY RELYING ON THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION.[23]

In its September 21, 2020 Resolution,[24] the Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In its December 23, 2020 Manifestation and Motion, [25] the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that it had thoroughly discussed the assigned errors in its appellee's brief. In his January 4, 2021

Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,[26] accused-appellant averred that he would no longer file a supplemental brief to avoid repetition of the arguments raised in his appellant's brief.
In his Appellant's Brief[27] before the CA, accused-appellant questions the credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA's testimony is too incredible to be given any credence and is full of inconsistencies. He
also claims that there was no conclusive finding of rape. Accused-appellant likewise ascribes ill motive to AAA's grandmother, who disapproves of their alleged relationship, and denies resisting
authorities.
On the other hand, the OSG argues in its Appellee's Brief[28] that the prosecution had duly established all the elements of rape and that AAA's failure to call for help when accused-appellant sexually
abused her is not enough to discredit her testimony. The records show that AAA testified in a forthright manner and remained steadfast even under cross-examination.
Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of rape?
The Court's Ruling

The Court dismisses the appeal.

The present case is not subject
to automatic review.
At the outset, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the procedural milieu of this appeal which involves the application of automatic review and intermediate review of criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In its December 15, 2016 Order,[29] the RTC motu proprio elevated the case to the CA, citing Mateo as basis:

Pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in People vs. Mateo allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[30]
This was an erroneous application of the Mateo ruling.
Prior to its amendment on September 28, 2004, Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides for a direct appeal to this Court for criminal cases where the RTC imposed the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, to wit:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of
this Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
On July 7, 2004, the Court En Banc promulgated Mateo and, pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec. 5, Rule VIII of the Constitution, introduced an intermediate review by the CA of criminal cases

where the RTC imposed the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The Court emphasized in Mateo the need to provide an additional avenue to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused where his life and liberty are at stake, to wit:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must
be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of
an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.[31]
Consequently, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases) dated September 28, 2004, which resolved to
amend, among others, Secs. 3 and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of

appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this
Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review
and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter, (underscoring supplied)
As correctly explained by the CA, the Court, in People v. Rocha,[32] clarified the confusion that might have arisen because of the pronouncement in Mateo:

We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were
grouped together with death penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode

of review, however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on
automatic review.
xxxx
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 July 2004, this Court promptly caused the amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases.[33]
It is clear that despite adding an intermediate review by the CA, the new rule as introduced in Mateo, retained the modes of appeal prescribed in the old rule. As the rule now stands, in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC. On the other hand, in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed by the RTC is death, the CA shall automatically review the same without need of a notice of appeal.

The difference in the procedural treatment of death penalty cases was explained in the 1910 case of The United States v. Laguna,[34] whereby the Court emphasized the need to protect the accused,
thus:

The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of
the accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded
placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined . Such procedure is merciful. It gives the accused a second chance
for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions.[35] (emphasis supplied)

This is similar to the Court's declaration in Mateo that "[w]here life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused."[36]
However, on June 24, 2006, R.A. No. 9346 was signed into law, prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The pertinent provisions of the said law states:
SEC. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. x x x.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.[37]
As a result, trial courts are precluded from imposing the penalty of death and, instead, shall mete out either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, depending on the nomenclature of penalties used by
the law violated. Corollary to this, Secs. 3(d) and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which prescribe an automatic review by the CA of cases where death penalty is imposed, became ineffective without,

however, the Court simultaneously resolving to suspend the aforesaid rule. At present and during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, an automatic review of criminal cases is no longer available and
in no instance should the RTC elevate motu proprio the case records to the CA.
Notwithstanding the clarification of the Mateo ruling and despite initially recognizing that the case may be dismissed outright, the CA proceeded to review the records of the case as if a notice of appeal
was timely filed, thus:
In this case, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 has become final and executory after accused-appellant Olpindo, who was represented at the trial by his counsel de parte, Atty. June Elva G.
Dumangeng, did not file a notice of appeal. This appeal should thus be dismissed outright as provided under Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by these Rules;
xxxx
In view however of the gravity of the crime committed by accused-appellant and the penalty imposed on him by the RTC. and in view of the ruling in Mateo, supra, that "[w]here life and liberty are at stake,
all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be undone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,

particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment" , We have assiduously reviewed the records of this case as if an appeal has timely been made by accused-appellant .
We find no reversible error in the conviction of the accused-appellant, except in the award of civil liability.[38] (underscoring supplied)
The CA, however, after reviewing the merits of the case, still concluded that the RTC decision had already become final and executory because accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal within the
period allowed by the Rules:
However, as discussed, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 has already attained finality and thus has become immutable and may no longer be amended. Olpindo did not file a notice of appeal within
the fifteen (15) day period allowed under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.[39]
As a result, the CA dismissed the appeal without modifying the award of damages.
The Court, however, finds it proper to exercise its prerogative to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interests of justice, particularly the right of the accused to life and liberty.
Strict adherence to the procedural rules facilitates the adjudication of cases and avoids unnecessary delay in the administration of justice, but when such would defeat the ends of justice, the Court may
allow exceptions to the Rules:

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.[40]
In a fairly recent case, the Court exercised its equity jurisdiction and relaxed a rigid application of procedural rules where it would tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice:
It has been held that if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where
strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. [41]

In the instant case, accused-appellant's non-filing of a notice of appeal may be excused because the RTC, on its own, elevated the records of the case to the CA based on its erroneous assumption that
the verdict of conviction is subject to an automatic intermediate review. To be clear, the RTC order forwarding the records of the case pursuant to the Mateo ruling was issued on December 15, 2016,
which was 14 days after the RTC promulgated its ruling on December 1, 2016, or within the 15-day reglementary period under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court [42] for the accused to file a notice of
appeal. As initially discussed, the CA could have just treated the automatic review as if a notice of appeal was timely filed by herein accused-appellant considering "the gravity of the crime committed by
accused-appellant and the penalty imposed on him by the RTC."[43] This would better serve the interests of justice as it provides an additional layer of protection against a possible erroneous judgment. In
Latogan v. People,[44] the Court liberally construed the rules in the interests of justice:
However, procedural rules were precisely conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter. Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court enjoins the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote its objective to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[45]

In the absence of a rule on how to treat criminal cases elevated motu proprio for automatic review when it is no longer applicable, it is fair to consider the same as if a notice of appeal had been timely

filed. In such manner, the accused will be provided with another opportunity to defend his case and convince the courts of his innocence of the accusations against him.
In the instant case, accused-appellant cannot be faulted for not filing a notice of appeal considering that the adverse RTC decision erroneously ordered the records forwarded to the CA for automatic
review. The RTC order to elevate the records had initiated the appellate procedure in which accused- appellant had actively participated on the presumption that the motu proprio elevation of the records
of the case was valid. Consequently, it is premature to say that the appeal was dismissible under Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court on the ground of failure to file a notice of appeal within the
prescribed period. It is also hasty to conclude that the RTC judgment of conviction had become immutable when the period to appeal had not lapsed or accused-appellant has not waived in writing his right
to appeal. To reiterate, the RTC order forwarding the records of the case to the CA was made within the 15-day reglementary period.
Even assuming that the judgment of conviction had become final and executory because accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal before the RTC, the Court has relaxed the rule on immutability of
judgments to serve the ends of justice, such as where life and liberty are at stake and the party favored by the relaxation of rules is not at fault. Again, Latogan v. People[46] discussed:

Withal, as in the liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, the Court has enumerated the factors that justify the relaxation of the rule on immutability of final judgments to serve the ends of
justice, including: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or

negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.[47]
As a matter of equity, considering that the case was elevated motu proprio within the reglementary period to file an appeal and accused-appellant had shown his intent to appeal his conviction by actively
participating in the CA proceedings and by timely filing a notice of appeal before the CA, the Court takes cognizance of the instant appeal. This throws the whole case open for review by the Court,

including modifying the amount of damages.

Appeal by certiorari in cases
involving reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
As the remedies regarding criminal cases where the penalty imposed by the courts are either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are the subject matter in the case at bench, the Court deems it proper
to address the remedy of appeal by certiorari.
Sec. 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that appeal by certiorari is a mode of appeal. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[48] On the other hand, Sec. 1 of Rule 45 provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari."[49] Accordingly, appeal by certiorari is the mode of appeal; while a petition for review on certiorari is the pleading where the said mode of appeal is effectuated.

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already
been considered in the lower courts.[50] A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. In contrast, what is involved is a question of fact when
the resolution of the same demands the calibration of evidence, the determination of the credibility of witnesses, the existence and the relevance of the attendant circumstances, and the probability of
specific situations.[51]
With respect to criminal cases, Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. —
xxxx
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules 45. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.
xxxx

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
There are other related provisions found under Rules 45 and 56 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 9, Rule 45 states:
Sec. 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In connection therewith, Sec. 3, Rule 56 provides:
Sec. 3. Mode of appeal. — An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court states that except as provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. On the other hand, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 states that "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment

imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals." [52] Conspicuously, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 used the word "may" in stating
how appeal from the decision of the CA can be taken to the Supreme Court. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.[53] In addition, the said provision does not contain the word "only," which would have imposed the essential and exclusive means by which an appeal to the Court may be perfected. [54]
Further, a deeper analysis of Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 13(c), Rule 124, would demonstrate that a petition for review on certiorari is simply not allowed in cases of
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment when the purpose of the appeal is to open the case for review, including questions of fact.
Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court contemplates an appeal of a judgment involving reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by notice of appeal. Thus, the mode of appeal undertaken is an ordinary

appeal. As early as the case of United States v. Clemente,[55] the Court stated that an appeal taken by the accused from a criminal conviction throws the whole case open for reconsideration by the
appellate tribunal. Indeed, when the mode of appeal is through a notice of appeal, it is an appeal in a criminal case that throws the whole case wide open for review; and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[56]
When ordinary appeal is chosen as the mode of appeal, the Court can review the entire records of the criminal case, including those where the penalty involves reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Thus, an examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion. [57] Since the appeal throws the whole case open for review, there were instances
of cases on appeal that the Court even imposed a graver penalty than that provided in the assailed judgment.[58]
Accordingly, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court mandates the remedy by filing a notice of appeal, when the purpose of the accused, who is convicted of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, is
to throw the case open for review, which includes questions of fact. This interpretation is consistent with Sec. 9, Rule 45, which states that Rule 45 shall not apply to appeals in criminal cases where the

penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, because those appeals contemplate opening the whole case for review, including questions of fact. Likewise, it is coherent with Sec. 3, Rule 56,
because it proscribes a petition for review on certiorari except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, because appeals in these cases include questions of

fact.
Notably, Sec. 3(e), Rule 122; Sec. 13(c), Rule 124; Sec. 9, Rule 45; and Sec. 3, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court do not categorically prevent the accused, who was convicted, from filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 based purely on questions of law. Instead, these provisions proscribed the said petition for review on certiorari if it raises a question of fact. In such situation, the proper mode of
appeal is an ordinary appeal which will throw the whole case open for review by the Court, including questions of fact.
Based on the foregoing, if an accused wants to file a petition for review on certiorari to purely raise a question of law before the Supreme Court without absolutely raising any question of fact, when the CA
has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, there is no ostensible legal roadblock to such remedy. Indeed, the Supreme Court has the inherent authority and ultimate prerogative,
based on its sole discretion, to entertain purely questions of law and to determine whether the applicable laws were properly applied in any pending case.
However, a review of relevant jurisprudence shows that if the accused, who is convicted of a crime penalized by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, files a petition for review on certiorari raising

questions of fact, it may still be entertained by the Court if there is compelling reason to evaluate the findings of fact of the courts a quo.
In Dungo v. People,[59] a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the accused even though the CA had imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court stated that "[a]n accused, nevertheless, is

not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Moreover,
such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons." [60] However, in that case, the questions of fact raised by the
petition were still entertained because, "due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review."[61]
Similarly, in People v. Del Rosario,[62] the CA imposed a penalty of life imprisonment against the accused. However, the accused filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. In that case, the

Court still examined the records of the case because the appeal was meritorious.
Recently, in Bartolome v. People,[63] petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari even though the penalty imposed by the CA was reclusion perpetua. The Court recognized that a petition for review
on certiorari may only raise pure questions of law. However, the Court was constrained to review the evidence presented as the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In contrast, in Alicando v. People,[64] the petitioner therein was convicted by the CA of the crime of rape with homicide and which imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari before this Court. However, the Court did not grant the petition because it raised questions of fact and the factual findings of the courts a quo were neither arbitrary nor
unfounded.
In the same manner, in Macad v. People,[65] even though the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court after the CA imposed the penalty of life imprisonment, it was underscored that
only questions of fact may be raised in such an appeal. The Court also highlighted that even if the questions of fact raised by the petitioner are considered by the Court, the petition was still bereft of merit.
[66]
There are other cases when a petition for review on certiorari is filed against the decision of the CA, which imposes reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, that the Court has treated as an ordinary

appeal in the interests of substantial justice.

In Arambulo v. People,[67] the petitioner therein filed a petition for review on certiorari even though the CA had imposed a penalty of life imprisonment. It was underscored that, in the interests of
substantial justice, the Court would treat the instant petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the substantive issue at hand with finality. Likewise, it was stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and that the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.[68]
Similarly, in Matabilas v. People,[69] the petition for review on certiorari assailing a judgment of the CA imposing life imprisonment was not outrightly dismissed. Instead, it was held that in the interests of
substantial justice, the Court would treat the petition as an ordinary appeal in order to finally resolve the substantive issues at hand.
After thorough analysis of the relevant rules and jurisprudence, the Court finds that a petition for review on certiorari may be filed by an accused where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, provided that purely a question of law is raised. However, if a petition for review on certiorari raises a question of fact, it can be treated as an ordinary appeal based on the interests of
substantial justice, which would throw the whole case open for review, including the factual findings of the courts a quo.
The prosecution duly proved the
elements of rape.

Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be convicted of rape on the
basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering
that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. Indeed, it is more consistent with human experience to hold that a rape victim of
tender age will truthfully testify as to all matters necessary to show that she was raped.[70]
In the instant case, accused-appellant hinges his present appeal on the issue of credibility of AAA as prosecution witness. It is well-settled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight particularly when affirmed by the CA. In People v. Descartin, Jr.,[71] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that:
The rule is settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are accorded
finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,

hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" – all of which, are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges,
therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings
are sustained by the CA.[72]
Accused-appellant attempts to discredit AAA's testimony for being incredible because she did not even ask for help or at least offer any resistance in defense of herself. The Court has invariably ruled that
rape victims react differently.[73] There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. Some may shout, some may faint, some may choose to
keep their ordeal, and some may be shocked into insensibility. None of these, however, impair the credibility of a rape victim, let alone negate the commission of rape. [74]

It is also well-settled that the accused in a rape case may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[75]
Here, both the RTC and the CA found that AAA's testimony was straightforward and candid. Thus, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule, since accused-appellant failed to
demonstrate that the RTC and the CA overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of weight and substance that would alter the assailed decision.
Art. 266-A of the RPC provides that rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Whereas, Art. 266-B of the RPC provides the penalties for the crime of rape:
ART. 266-B. Penalty. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
For a charge of rape by sexual intercourse under Art. 266-A(1), as amended by R.A. No. 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that; (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he
accomplished this act under the circumstances mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.[76]
In the instant case, this Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of rape by sexual intercourse. First, accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim. AAA was unwavering in her assertion that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, making an up and down movement. Her testimony was strongly corroborated by
the medico-legal findings. Second, accused-appellant employed threat, force, and intimidation to satisfy his lust. In this case, AAA testified that accused-appellant forcibly took her into an uninhabited
place, tied her hands with rope, slammed her to the floor, and then removed her short pants and underwear. As a minor, AAA could not reasonably be expected to resist in the same manner that an adult
would under the same or similar circumstances. Thus, the crime of rape was established.

In addition, the physical examination conducted on March 1, 2008, or only two days after the incident, showed that AAA sustained multiple abrasions which indicate the application of force and violence on
her person, and hymen laceration on her private part which proves sexual assault. The CA correctly held that accused-appellant cannot find exculpation simply because the attending physician did not
identify the medico-legal report confirming that AAA suffered sexual assault. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape or acts of lasciviousness. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential for the conviction of perpetrators of such crimes.[77]
The defenses of denial and alibi
of accused-appellant were weak.
Accused-appellant's defense of denial deserves scant consideration. He mainly invokes the "sweetheart theory," claiming that he was in a romantic relationship with AAA for about five months as of the
date of the incident and that they had previously copulated for at least six times. However, bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be
substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos, and the like. [78] Here, aside from accused-appellant's bare testimony, no other evidence
was presented to support his claim.
Also, as pointed out by the CA, accused-appellant's claim that he was maliciously charged with rape has no leg to stand on. His defense of denial and alibi cannot take precedence over the rape victim's

categorical and positive narration of facts.

Interestingly, the fact that accused-appellant's whereabouts could not be determined for four years since the information was filed shows that he has evaded arrest and is highly indicative of his guilt. He
has not even presented a reasonable explanation for his prolonged absence from the authorities.
In People v. Lopez, Jr.,[79] the Court held:
Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may
be established "for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence."[80]
Penalty and Damages
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC under Art. 266-B of the RPC. However, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amount of damages. Pursuant to People v.
Jugueta,[81] if the penalty imposed for simple rape is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages shall be P75,000.00 each, all subject to six percent (6%)
interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

Summary
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court pronounces that since the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, in 2006, prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the procedure on automatic review of
death penalty cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has been rendered ineffective and is, thus, suspended. The suspension of the procedure on automatic review of death penalty cases shall not,
however, impact the manner of imposing penalties in view of R.A. No. 9346, and shall remain only during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect.
Considering further that criminal cases imposed with the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment have still been elevated motu proprio to the appellate courts for automatic review, the Court
adopts the following guidelines:

1. In cases where the prescribed penalty is death, but where reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment was imposed by reason of R.A. No. 9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of
appeal either before the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

2. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed not by reason of R.A. No. 9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal either before the
Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

3. When the case records of a criminal case imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, whether due to R.A. No. 9346 or not, are elevated motu proprio for
automatic review, the following rules shall apply:

1. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued beyond fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order and
the accused did not file a notice of appeal within the same period, the automatic review shall not be given due course. The Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

2. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued within fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order, the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall issue an order requiring the accused within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to manifest whether they are
adopting the order to elevate the records as their notice of appeal. If the accused shall refuse to adopt or fail to timely manifest despite due notice, they shall be

deemed to have waived their right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

4. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and the accused files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only

questions of law may be raised. However, based on the interests of substantial justice, a petition for review on certiorari that raises questions of fact may be treated as an ordinary
appeal in order to throw the whole case open for review.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals in its November 22, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08984. Accused-
appellant Alexander Olpindo y Reyes is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer

the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Further, he is ORDERED to PAY AAA civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00, with interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 254622. February 16, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARKO PULGADO Y MAGNO A.K.A. "MAKO," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated June 16, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11074, which affirmed with modification the Decision [3] dated
October 25, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 2016-996 and 2016-997, finding accused-appellant Marko Pulgado y Magno a.k.a. "Mako"
(Pulgado) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The present case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations [5] filed before the RTC charging accused-appellant with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively

defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 2016-996
(Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs)
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of June 2016, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously deliver and sell to PO3 Sherwin G. Tan P300.00 (SN-DE994536, WA251104 and KN886910) worth of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug weighing One Hundred Six Thousandths (0.106) of a gram placed in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with marking "Exh A
ST BCS."
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 2016-997
(Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs)

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of June 2016, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his effective possession and control four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, with following markings and weight:
B1 (Exh B ROJ BCS) = 0.108 gram
B2 (Exh B-1 ROJ BCS) = 0.175 gram
B3 (Exh B-2 ROJ BCS) = 0.143 gram

B4 (Exh B-3 ROJ BCS) = 0.093 gram

Total = 0.519 gram
said accused not having the corresponding license or prescription to possess said dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around 2:30 in the morning of June 14, 2016, officers of the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operations Team (CAIDSOT) successfully conducted a buy-bust operation
against Pulgado at the Caltex Station in front of a 7/11 Convenience Store along Arthur Street, West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, during which, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.108 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered from him by Police Officer 3 Sherwin Tan (PO3 Tan). After Pulgado's arrest, Police Officer 2 Rexyboy Jugatan (PO2 Jugatan) frisked him and
recovered four (4) more heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a combined weight of 0.519 gram of the same substance from his possession. The police officers then brought Pulgado to the

police station in Brgy. Barretto, Olongapo City, and thereat, PO3 Tan and PO2 Jugatan placed their initials on the seized items and turned them over to Police Officer 2 Benedick C. Sarmiento (PO2
Sarmiento) for marking, inventory, and photography in the presence of Pulgado, members of the CAIDSOT, Barangay Kagawad Dave Antonio (Brgy. Kgd. Antonio), and media representative Jeffrey B.

Valdez of Brigada Siete. Thereafter, the seized items were taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory where, after examination by Police Senior Inspector Maria Cecilia G. Tang (PSI Tang),
their contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.[8] Thereafter, PSI Tang turned over the specimens to the prosecution office for safekeeping until their
presentation during trial.[9]
In defense, Pulgado denied the charges against him, as well as the ownership of the items purportedly seized from him. He claimed that on the day of the alleged incident, at around 7:00 in the evening,
he was on his way home from the public market when he was arrested for allegedly stealing at the Caltex Station.[10]
In a Decision[11] dated October 25, 2017, the RTC found Pulgado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the following penalties: ( a) in Criminal
Case No. 2016-996, for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 plus costs without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 2016-997, for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,

as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00 plus costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [12] Giving
credence to the testimony of PO3 Tan, the RTC held that the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crimes charged, and that the apprehending team adequately preserved the chain of

custody over the dangerous drugs from the moment of seizure up to their presentation in court as evidence. [13] Meanwhile, the RTC found Pulgado's defense of denial untenable for lack of clear and
convincing evidence showing that the CAIDSOT did not regularly perform their duties.[14]
Aggrieved, Pulgado appealed[15] to the CA, arguing, among others, that he should be acquitted on account of the apprehending team's failure to comply with the chain of custody rule considering that the
police officers failed to immediately mark the drug evidence at the place of arrest. [16] However, in a Decision[17] dated Jun 16, 2020, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification, sentencing

Pulgado to suffer the following penalties: (a) for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00;
and (b) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.[18] Echoing the trial court's findings, it ruled that the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crimes charged. [19] Moreover, it
held that the chain of custody rule was duly complied with, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been properly preserved.[20]
Hence, this appeal seeking that Pulgado's conviction be overturned.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Pulgado is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,[21] it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the

dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.[22] Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.[23]
To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.[24] As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.
In People v. Beran,[25] the Court clarified when the physical inventory and photography shall be conducted. In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photography must be
conducted at the place where the search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the same may be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.[26] Notably, however, RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), are silent as to the
procedure of marking.
Marking is the first and most crucial step in the chain of custody rule as it initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. This is when the apprehending officer or poseur-buyer places his or her initials and signature on the item/s seized. [27]
Thus, in People v. Sanchez,[28] the Court ruled that marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items that

enter the chain of custody. This is considering that marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link and is vital to be immediately undertaken because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. Marking serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.[29]
On this note, it must be emphasized that compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law."[30] This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment."[31] Thus, in the case of People v. Lim[32] (Lim), the Court En Banc definitively held that the prosecution has the positive duty to demonstrate observance with the chain of custody rule
under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, in such a way that it must acknowledge and justify any perceived deviations therefrom. This is especially true in cases where the quantity of the seized drugs is
miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration of evidence,[33] as in this case.[34]
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. [35] As such, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: ( a) there is a justifiable

ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. [36] The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21 (a), [37] Article II of
the IRR of RA 9165, which was adopted into the text of RA 10640. [38] It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses,[39] and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[40]
Thus, when it comes to the marking requirement, the standard rule is that it should be done immediately after confiscation of the seized item from the accused. Nonetheless, marking said item/s at any
other point in time may be allowed, but only if there are justifiable reasons therefor.
In this case, there appears to be a deviation from the chain of custody rule as records show that the marking of the items purportedly seized from Pulgado was performed only at the police station.

Notably, while the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the immediate marking requirement would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon the prosecution to account for such deviation by presenting a justifiable reason therefor. Here, the prosecution did not duly explain such deviation, and merely insisted that the
apprehending team complied with the marking requirement by conducting the same at the police station. This may gleaned from the testimony of PO3 Tan, to wit:
[Prosecutor Melani Fay V. Tadili]: After you gave the money to the accused, what happened next?
[PO3 Tan]: I executed the pre-arranged signal by removing my bull (sic) cap, ma'm (sic).
Q: What happened next?
A: And when I felt that somebody from our team was approaching and I saw PO2 Jugatan frisking Alias "Maco", we introduced ourselves as police officers, ma'm (sic).
Q: Who frisked the accused?

A: PO2 Jugatan, ma'm (sic).

xxxx

Q: And what happened next?

A: We introduced ourselves as police officers after PO2 Jugatan informed him of the Miranda doctrine, we brought him to the Police Station, ma'm (sic).

Q: Where is the police station?

A: At our Office at Police Station 1, ma'm (sic).
Q: Who was in possession of the sachets of shabu sold to you by the accused from the place of your operation to the Station?
A: I was holding it, ma'm (sic).
Q: How about the other sachets of shabu recovered by Police Officer Jugatan, who was in possession of the same?
A: In his possession, ma'm (sic).[41]
xxxx

Q: Do you know what PO2 Sarmiento do (sic) with the sachets of shabu during your inventory?
A: Yes, ma'm (sic).
Q: What?
A: We put markings, ma'm (sic).
Q: After the inventory?
A: Before he prepared the inventory we put our initials, ma'm (sic).

Q: How were you able to put your initials on the sachets of shabu sold to you when you said that the sachets of shabu were already in the possession of PO2 Sarmiento?
A: Before I turn[ed] over to him, I already put my initials, ma'm (sic).
Q: What initials did you place?
A: ST, ma'm (sic).
Q: After marking the sachets of shabu with your initials, what did you do with it?
A: I hand[ed] it over to PO2 Sarmiento, ma'm (sic).
Q: And do you know what PO2 Sarmiento do with it?
A: He also put his initials, ma'm (sic).[42]
In view of the aforementioned unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from
Pulgado were compromised, thereby warranting his acquittal.

As a final word, the Court, in People v. Miranda,[43] issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It declared that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set forth in
the law, then the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in
the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first
time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review."[44]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 16, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11074 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Marko Pulgado y Magno a.k.a. "Mako" is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director General is DIRECTED to inform this Court the
action he/she has taken within five days from receipt of this Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1] See Notice of Appeal dated July 22, 2020; rollo, pp. 24-25.
[2] Id. at 4-23. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Bonifacio S. Pascua, concurring.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 46-52. Penned by Judge Raymond C. Viray.
[4] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[5] Criminal Case No. 2016-996 is for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (see id. at 46); while Criminal Case No. 2016-997 is for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 (see id.).
[6] Rollo, p. 46.

[7] Id.
[8] See id. at 4-6; 46-47.
[9] See CA rollo, p. 48.
[10] See id. at 51.

[11] Id. at 46-52.

[12] Id. at 51-52.

[13] Id. at 49-50.

[14] See id. at 49 and 51.
[15] See Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 2017; id. at 10.
[16] See Brief of the Accused-Appellant dated November 21, 2018; id. at 34-37.
[17] Rollo, pp. 4-23.
[18] Id. at 22.
[19] Id. at 11-16.
[20] Id. at 18-21.

[21] The elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: ( a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; ( b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. (See People v. Crispo, 828 Phil. 416, 429 [2018]; People v. Sanchez, 827 Phil. 457, 465

[2018]; People v. Magsano, 826 Phil. 947, 958 [2018]; People v. Manansala, 826 Phil. 578, 586 [2018]; People v. Miranda, 824 Phil. 1042, 1050 [2018]; and People v. Mamangon, 824 Phil. 728, 735-736
[2018]; all cases citing People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 348 [2015] and People v. Bio, 753 Phil. 730, 736 [2015]).
[22] See People v. Crispo, id.; People v. Sanchez, id.; People v. Magsano, id.; People v. Manansala, id.; People v. Miranda, id.; and People v. Mamangon, id. at 736. See also People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil.
593, 601 (2014).
[23] See People v. Gamboa, 867 Phil. 548, 570 (2018), citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1039-1040 (2012).
[24] See People v. Año, 828 Phil. 439, 448 (2018); People v. Crispo, supra; People v. Sanchez, supra; People v. Magsano, supra at 959; People v. Manansala, supra; People v. Miranda; supra at 1051;
and People v. Mamangon, supra at 736. See also People v. Viterbo, supra.
[25] 724 Phil. 788 (2014).

[26] Id. at 818. See also People v. Ramirez, 823 Phil. 1215, 1225 (2018).

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 254254. February 16, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX,[1] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

Rape by sexual assault committed against a child twelve (12) years of age and below eighteen (18), shall be punished as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610.[2] Likewise, the failure of an accused to object to a duplicitous Information constitutes a waiver, and thus, he/she may be convicted of as many offenses as are indicated therein, and proven during

the trial.
This resolves the appeal[3] filed by accused-appellant XXX, praying for the reversal of the October 2, 2019 Decision [4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12277, which affirmed the May
16, 2018 Consolidated Decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court of x x x xx x x xxxx City, Branch 69 (RTC), finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Qualified Rape by Carnal Knowledge
and Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault.
Antecedents
On December 11, 2015, three (3) separate Informations for the crime of Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. No. 8353 [6] were filed against XXX.
The accusatory portion of each Information reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 158506
That sometime in 2009, in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of complainant AAA, a
minor 13 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with said minor complainant, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 158507

That sometime in October 2011, in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of complainant
AAA, a minor 15 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with said minor complainant, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 158508
That on or about the 06th day of March 2012 in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of
complainant AAA a minor 15 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously force
said minor complainant to perform fellatio, then her father had sexual intercourse with her, against complainant AAA's will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

When arraigned, XXX pleaded not guilty to the charges. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.[8]
AAA was born on March 17, 1996. She is the daughter of XXX. AAA related that XXX started raping her when she was thirteen (13) years old. He would rape her three or four times every week. She did
not report the incidents, out of fear that he would kill her.[9]
Sometime in 2009, when AAA was thirteen (13) years old, XXX woke her up from her nap. He pulled her and removed her shorts and panty. AAA resisted, but XXX prevailed upon her. Then, XXX inserted
his penis into her vagina. After the dastardly act, AAA went to the comfort room and saw blood gush out from her vagina. She was in pain. She informed her mother BBB that she has a wound in her
vagina. However, XXX dismissed her claim, and said that her menstrual period had started.[10]

Again, on March 6, 2012, when AAA was fifteen (15) years old, XXX tried to have sexual intercourse with her. However, AAA refused his advances. This angered XXX who shouted invectives at her. He
wanted to insert his penis into her mouth but when the latter refused, he pulled her hair and forced her to open her mouth. After inserting his penis into AAA's mouth, he then inserted his penis into her
anus.[11]
Then, on March 7, 2012, XXX again approached AAA to have sex with her but she refused as she was in pain due to her swollen " pwerta." XXX kicked her. Fed up, AAA left their house and stayed with
her classmate. She texted her mother to meet her on March 9, 2012.[12]
During the meeting, AAA told her mother everything that XXX had done to her. Thereafter, AAA and her mother went to the hospital, where AAA's cervix was operated on. She was confined for five (5)
days. Upon recovering, AAA went to the police station to file a complaint against XXX.[13]
On the other hand, XXX vehemently denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that AAA concocted the charges out of spite, because he disciplined her after he saw her naked with a boy at their

house sometime in March 2009.[14]

Ruling of the RTC

On May 16, 2018, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Decision[15] declaring XXX guilty of the separate crimes of qualified rape by carnal knowledge in Criminal Case No. 158506, and qualified rape by
sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 158508.
In Criminal Case No. 158506, the RTC held that the prosecution proved all the elements of qualified rape by carnal knowledge, along with the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. It
further noted that AAA's narration of the rape incident was consistent, candid, and straightforward.[16]
As for Criminal Case No. 158508, the RTC stated that the prosecution proved that XXX inserted his penis into AAA's mouth and anus against her will, thereby rendering XXX liable for qualified rape by
sexual assault.[17] It explained that although the Information charged XXX with qualified rape by carnal knowledge, XXX may still be held liable for qualified rape by sexual assault pursuant to the variance
doctrine.[18]
However, the RTC acquitted XXX of the charge of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 158507, due to the prosecution's failure to prove the charge.[19] The RTC decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158506, the court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua, without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay complainant civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00), moral damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) and exemplary damages also in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) and interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid;
2. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158507, as the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court hereby ACQUITS him;

3. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158508, the court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay complainant the amounts of Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php30,000.00 as
moral damages, and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Complainant is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal assailing his conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 158506 (qualified rape by carnal knowledge) and 158508 (qualified rape by sexual assault).
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed XXX's conviction in its October 2, 2019 Decision.[21] It stated that the prosecution established all the elements of qualified rape by carnal knowledge and qualified rape by sexual assault.
It found AAA's testimony to be credible, positive, and straightforward, and rejected XXX's denial as unworthy of credence.[22]
As for Criminal Case No. 158508 (qualified rape by sexual assault), the CA conceded that the prosecution erroneously charged XXX with two separate crimes. However, it stressed that XXX may no

longer question the defective Information, considering that he failed to timely contest it and even actively participated during the trial. The CA clarified that XXX was rightly convicted of qualified rape by
sexual assault, not pursuant to the variance doctrine, but rather, due to his failure to question the duplicitous Information before the trial.[23]
Moreover, the CA stated that there was no violation of XXX's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him considering that all the elements constituting the crimes charged
were sufficiently set forth in the Information.[24]

Finally, the CA modified the amount of damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 158508, by increasing the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages from P30,000.00 each to
P100,000.00.
The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The judgment of conviction of accused-appellant XXX in the assailed Consolidated Decision dated May 16, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of x
x x xx x x xxxx City in Criminal Case Nos. 158506 and 158508 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS with respect to the penalty for damages imposed in Criminal Case No. 158508 for
Qualified Rape By Sexual Assault:
(1) Civil Indemnity is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00;

(2) Moral damages is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00;

(3) Exemplary damages is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00.
All monetary awards are subject to legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Aggrieved, XXX filed a Notice of Appeal and Compliance[26] with the CA.
Issues
The main issues in the instant case are whether or not XXX is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (i) qualified rape by carnal knowledge in Criminal Case No. 158506; and (ii) qualified rape by sexual
assault in Criminal Case No. 158508.
Both parties filed separate Manifestations[27] indicating that they are adopting the Briefs[28] they filed in the CA, in lieu of their Supplemental Briefs before the Court.
Seeking his exoneration from the charges, XXX laments that the RTC erred in convicting him of qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 158508 despite the defective Information. [29] He

argues that the Information in Criminal Case No. 158508 is duplicitous as it alleged the commission of two separate crimes, namely, forcing AAA to perform fellatio and coercing her to have sexual
intercourse. He further urges that contrary to the RTC's ruling, rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape by carnal knowledge. [30] Hence, he may not be convicted of qualified rape by
sexual assault pursuant to the variance doctrine.[31]
Likewise, XXX claims that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for the crimes charged against him. He questions AAA's credibility, as well as her failure to report the incident or to seek help from her
mother. He alleges that her story defies reason and is incredible.[32]
Furthermore, XXX points out that AAA's Medical Certificate failed to corroborate her claim that he inserted his penis into her anus. Likewise, said Medical Certificate failed to indicate the presence of any

external signs of physical injuries, thereby belying AAA's claim that he kicked her during the alleged rape incident on March 6, 2012.[33]
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the prosecution proved XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of qualified
rape by carnal knowledge and qualified rape by sexual assault.[34] It avers that AAA concretely detailed how XXX defiled her.[35] Also, AAA's minority and her relationship with XXX were established from
her Certificate of Live Birth.[36] Moreover, the OSG clarifies that a medical certificate and a medical examination of the victim are not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.[37]
The OSG further asserts that it is too late for XXX to question the allegedly duplicitous Information. His failure to raise an objection and file a motion to quash before entering his plea constituted a waiver
of his right to assail the duplicitous Information in Criminal Case No. 158508. [38] Due to his failure to object to the Information, he may be charged for all offenses asserted therein and proved during the
trial.[39]
Ruling of the Court

The appeal is denied for lack of merit.

XXX is guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of Qualified Rape in Criminal

Case No. 158506.

Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353[40] defines the crime of rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Notably, Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape." [41] The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge,
which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[42] On the other hand, Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." [43] The
act must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.[44]
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for qualified rape through sexual intercourse as charged in Criminal Case No. 158506. AAA narrated the sordid details of
the sexual abuse she suffered in XXX's hands. The linchpin of her testimony was that he raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina despite her struggles and protests:
ACP Alcaraz

Q: Naalala mo ba kung kailan ka niya ginahasa?

A: Hindi ko na po matandaan kung kailan yun, 13 years old lang po ako nun eh.

Q: 13 years old ka lang nun, nung sinumulang ka niyang gahasain?

A: Opo.

Q: Anong ginawa niya sayo nung sinabi mong ginahasa ka?

A: Nung araw po na yun tulog po ako nun e.

Q: Tulog ka, anong oras ba yun?

A: Alas 2:00 po.

Q: Alas 2:00 ng hapon?

A: Opo.

Q: Tapos nung tulog ka anong ginawa niya sayo?

A: Hinihila niya po ako nun.

Q: Hinila ka niya, pagkatapos kang hilahin?

A: Hinubad niya po ying short ko at tsaka yung panty.

Q: Tapos?

A: Lumalaban po ako sa kanya pero wala po akong nagawa.

Q: Tapos anong ginawa niya kahit lumaban ka?

A: Ginalaw niya pa rin po ako.

Q: Nung sinabi mong ginalaw ka, pano talaga ang ginawa niya sayo?

A: Pinasok niya po yung ari niya sa ari ko po.

Q: Pinasok niya yung ari niya sa ari mo, pagkatapos niyang gawin yun ano na ang sumunod na nangyari?

A: Tapos pumunta na po ako ng CR nun.

Q: Pumunta ka ng CR, ano naramdaman mo pagkatapos?

A: Marami pong dugong lumabas sa ari ko po.

Q: Maraming dugo ang lumabas sa ari mo, pagkatapos, masakit ba?

A: Masakit po.

Q: Mahapdi ba?

A: Opo.[45] (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, XXX is liable for qualified rape. He forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, despite her protests. AAA's minority at the time of the rape incident, as well as her relationship with XXX, were

established through her Certificate of Live Birth.[46]

XXX is guilty of Lascivious

Conduct under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case
No. 158508.

With respect to the finding of rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the crime, its corresponding penalty, and the award of
damages.
In the seminal case of People v. Tulagan[47] (Tulagan), the Court clarified that in the crime of rape by sexual assault, if the victim is 12 years old and below 18 years old, or at least 18 years old under
special circumstances, instead of convicting the accused of rape by sexual assault, the proper crime should be lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, with the corresponding

penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.[48]

Relatedly, Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
xxxx

Notably, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610, defines lascivious conduct as:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. – x x x
xxxx
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person;
xxxx
Likewise, in Tulagan[49] the Court expounded on the meaning of the phrase "children exploited in prostitution," as follows:
The phrase "children exploited in prostitution," on the one hand, contemplates four scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious
conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who, due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse.[50] (Emphasis supplied)
Markedly, the terms "coercion or influence" are broad enough to cover any acts of force or intimidation.[51]

In this case, XXX forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's mouth to arouse and gratify his sexual desire, when the latter was fifteen (15) years old. AAA related the details of the harrowing ordeal she suffered
in the hands of her father:
ACP Alcaraz

Q: Meron ka ring binanggit dito sa salaysay mo na may ginawa ulit sayo si Papa mo nung March 6, 2012, maari mo bang sabihin sa court kung ano ang ginawa sayo ng Papa mo noong
March 6, 2012?

A: Minura po ako ni Papa nun.

Q: Bakit ka niya minura?

A: Kasi nga ayaw ko na siyang pagbigyan nun e.

Q: Anong sinabi niya sayo?

A: Minura niya po ako ang sabi niya po may lalaki na daw ako.

Q: May lalaki ka na kaya ayaw mo na siyang pagbigyan?

A: Opo.

Q: Pinilit ka pa din ba niya?

A: Opo.

Q: Nagalaw ka rin niya, anong pinagawa niya sayo nung time na yun?

A: Pinasubo niya po yung ari niya sa akin.

Q: Pagkatapos niyang ipasubo, anong nangyari?

A: Nung ayaw ko pong isubo sinabunutan niya po ako.

Q: Sinabunutan ka kasi ayaw mong isubo? So pinilit kang isubo mo?

A: Opo.

Q: Pagkatapos mong isubo, pinasok pa rin ba niya yung ari niya?

A: Pinasok po.

Q: Saan niya pinasok?

A: Sa puwet po.[52] (Emphasis supplied)

Certainly, XXX's act of forcibly inserting his penis into AAA's mouth constitutes lascivious conduct, punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. AAA, who was then a child, was subjected to
lascivious conduct through the coercion and influence of her very own father. Her age and relationship with XXX were established through her Certificate of Live Birth. Accordingly, instead of rape through
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, XXX should be held liable for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, both the recital in the Information and
the evidence presented by the prosecution provide for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

XXX waived his right to question

the Information in Criminal Case
No. 158508, and thus, may be
convicted of all the crimes charged
and proven.

A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 158508 shows that XXX was charged with two distinct offenses – inserting his penis into AAA's mouth, and having carnal knowledge of her. This
duplicitous Information transgresses Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which ordains that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."[53]
Parenthetically, Section 3(f), Rule 117[54] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the accused to move for the quashal of an information that charges more than one offense. The objection must be
made at any time before the accused enters his/her plea.[55] Otherwise, the accused is deemed to have waived the ground for objection.[56]
The records reveal that XXX failed to timely interpose an objection against the duplicitous Information. He simply entered his plea of not guilty during his arraignment, without questioning the defective

Information, and even actively participated throughout the trial.

On this score, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense." [57]
To stress, the Information charges XXX with willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously forcing AAA to perform fellatio on him. [58] Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that XXX indeed
forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's mouth despite the latter's struggle and protest. Furthermore, as discussed, such egregious act constitutes lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. Therefore, XXX shall be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

To clarify, the RTC erred in applying the variance doctrine[59] to convict XXX of rape by sexual assault. It is jurisprudentially settled that rape by sexual assault is not included in the crime of rape by carnal
knowledge, considering that the modes of committing said crimes are utterly different. [60] Besides, the Information properly charged XXX with acts constituting rape by sexual assault, which was also
proven during the trial. Thus, it is stressed that XXX is rightfully convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on the basis Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
The alleged lacuna in AAA's
Medical Certificate, and her failure
to immediately report the incident
do not tarnish her credibility.

In People v. Zafra,[61] and People v. Austria,[62] the Court stressed that the absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape.
The primary consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. Rather, the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[63]
Relatedly, in People v. Ramos,[64] the Court declared that, in view of the peculiar nature of rape cases, a conviction often rests solely on the basis of the offended party's testimony as long as it is credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[65]

Likewise, in People v. Agudo,[66] it was stressed that the fact of rape and the identity of the perpetrator may be proven through the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the victim, which is the most
important proof of the commission of rape.[67] Similarly, in People v. Udtohan,[68] it was emphasized that "[t]he revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence."[69]
It further bears stressing that AAA's failure to immediately report the incident to her mother does not destroy her credibility. Although the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of the charge, it is not correct to expect a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. [70] The workings of the human

mind when placed under emotional stress is unpredictable.[71] Not every victim can be expected to act with reason or conformably with the usual expectation of mankind.[72] Thus, it is unfair to expect a
rational reaction from AAA, a minor, who was confronted with a startling and traumatic experience. AAA further explained that she was cowed into silence out of fear that XXX would kill her. [73]

Equally important, the trial court and the CA regarded AAA's testimony as credible and unequivocal. These factual findings regarding AAA's credibility are accorded great weight and respect, and shall not
be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court had the full opportunity to directly observe the victim's demeanor, conduct, and manner of testifying.[74]
Pitted against the prosecution's strong evidence, XXX's denial falters. Mere denial, sans any strong evidence to support it, may not overcome the positive declaration of the child-victim who has positively
identified her assailant.[75]
Neither is the Court convinced that AAA created a trumped-up charge out of spite. In People v. Austria,[76] it was held that not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would accuse her own
father, unless the accusation against him is true.[77]
In the same vein, in People v. Descartin, Jr.[78] the Court articulated that:
[I]t is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity

or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not been aggrieved. [79]
Thus, the Court believes that AAA was impelled by a sense of justice in filing the charges against XXX.

Damages and Penalty for Qualified

Rape in Criminal Case No. 158506,

and for Lascivious Conduct in
Criminal Case No. 158508.

Article 266-B, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. However,
R.A. No. 9346,[80] has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[81] Likewise, the RTC rightfully
ordered the payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 each.[82]
Anent XXX's conviction for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, considering that AAA was more than 12 years old but less than 18 years old at the time of the incident, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its medium period, to reclusion perpetua. The crime is aggravated by relationship, as it was alleged in the Information and proven during the trial that XXX is

AAA's father. There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. This is likewise in
conformity with Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is, among others, the parent of the victim.
Furthermore, in Criminal Case No. 158508, XXX is ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P75,000.00. In addition, XXX shall pay a fine of
P15,000.00, as mandated under Section 31(f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610.[83]
Finally, all amounts adjudged against XXX shall be subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until full payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed October 2, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12277 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 158508, XXX is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY the victim AAA, (i) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (ii) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (iii) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (iv) a
fine of P15,000.00.
All monetary awards are subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum, reckoned from the finality of the Court's Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 253428. February 16, 2022 ]

GUERRERO ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. LEVISTE & GUERRERO REALTY CORPORATION AND THE HEIRS OF CONRAD C.
LEVISTE, AS REPRESENTED BY LAURO S. LEVISTE II, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated June 26, 2019 and the Resolution[3] dated August 24, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
157982. The CA reversed and set aside the Orders dated February 19, 2018[4] and September 6, 2018[5] of Branch 274, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 12-003 that granted
the Motion to Deposit Rentals in Court[6] (Motion to Deposit) filed by Guerrero Estate Development Corporation (GEDCOR).
The Antecedents
Guillerma Santos (Guillerma) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Brgy. San Dionisio, Parañaque City. The lot has an area of 33,895 square meters, more or less, and is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 96 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. After the death of Guillerma, the property was inherited by her surviving heirs, namely: Iluminada Guerrero, Fabiola

Vda. De Guerrero, Guillermo Guerrero, Cecilia Guerrero Cardeno, Fernando Guerrero, Isidro Guerrero, Perlinda Guerrero Irinco, Salvador Guerrero, Sylvia Guerrero Aguilar, Juanita Guerrero Ferry,
Edilberto Guerrero, Josefina Maria T. Guerrero, and Leonila Guerrero Caoili.[7]
Because the property was basically a saltbed site which has been traversed by the Imelda Marcos Avenue, the surviving heirs entered into a Joint Venture Agreement [8] with Allanigue Realty and
Development Corporation (ADRC) for the conversion of the 20,379-square-meter portion of the property to commercial and industrial sites on January 13, 1983. The surviving heirs of Guillerma formed
GEDCOR, a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of Philippine laws on October 28, 1985. After the conversion of the portion of the property to commercial and industrial sites, the parties
divided the developed lots on a 60%-40% sharing scheme, with 60% going to GEDCOR and 40% going to ADRC pursuant to their Updated Joint Venture Agreement[9] on April 29, 1986.[10]
One of the properties allocated to GEDCOR was a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Parañaque City with an area of 1,506 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(103259) 23998 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City (subject property). GEDCOR entered into a Joint Venture Contract [11] with Conrad Leviste (Conrad) on June 2, 1987 for the purpose of

constructing a warehouse on the subject property.[12] The contract included the following terms:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous to develop the land for warehouse purposes;

WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY is a real estate developer who is capable and willing to construct and supply labor and material for the construction of the said warehouse based on the attached
building plans and specifications;
WHEREAS the parties herein agree that upon the signing of this agreement, the SECOND PARTY will immediately initiate the construction of the said warehouse within a period of 30 days and to be
completed within 6 months;
WHEREAS, after the completion of the warehouse, the parties have agreed to register a corporation that shall be the holding company of said asset and the participation of the FIRST PARTY and the
SECOND PARTY to the said corporation will be 45% for the FIRST PARTY and 55% for the SECOND PARTY;
x x x x[13]
Conrad was able to complete the construction of the warehouse at an estimated cost of P995,102.20. He then formed Leviste & Guerrero Realty Corporation (LGRC), a corporation duly organized and

existing under Philippine laws on August 3, 1988.[14]

LGRC started leasing out the warehouse in 1988. From then on, 45% of the rental income of the warehouse was remitted to GEDCOR and 55% thereof went to Conrad. At present, the lessee of the

warehouse is Lambert Williams Logistics, Inc.[15]

On October 23, 2006, GEDCOR sent a Letter [16] to Conrad offering the termination of their Joint Venture Contract for the consideration of P1,000,000.00. In the Letter, GEDCOR noted the existence of
the warehouse for more than 18 years and that Conrad had been adequately compensated for the cost of the construction thereof. This was not acted upon by Conrad. After two years, GEDCOR sent
another Letter[17] to Conrad demanding the turnover of possession and control of the subject property. Claiming that Conrad had already recouped his investments, GEDCOR offered him a settlement in

order to reacquire possession of the subject property.[18]

Thereafter, LGRC stopped remitting GEDCOR's 45% share in the monthly rental income of the subject property starting from the month of June 2009. As of September 1, 2011, the total unremitted share
amounted to P2,596,041.09. This prompted GEDCOR to send a Letter[19] to LGRC demanding the remittance of P2,596,041.09, representing its share in the rental income from June 1, 2009 to
September 1, 2011 and the subsequent rental income to be collected by LGRC. Despite receipt of the letter, LGRC continued to refuse to heed the demands of GEDCOR. [20]
Thus, GEDCOR filed a Complaint[21] for Fixing of Period under Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code), Collection of Sum of Money and/or Accounting against Conrad and LGRC
before the RTC of Parañaque City. The case was raffled to Branch 274 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 12-003.[22]
GEDCOR claimed that: (1) the Joint Venture Contract failed to state a period for its effectivity; (2) the parties did not intend for the subject property to be held indefinitely by LGRC; (3) GEDCOR did not
also intend to relinquish the enjoyment and possession of the subject property to Conrad indefinitely on account of his investment in the amount of P995,102.20; (4) the Joint Venture Contract needs to be
terminated because Conrad has recouped his investments and already earned reasonable profits from it; (5) because the Joint Venture Contract is akin to a build-operate-transfer scheme which has a
customary period of 25 years, the court should fix the term of the agreement to 25 years under Article 1197 of the Civil Code; and (6) because LGRC failed to remit GEDCOR's 45% share despite due

demand, Conrad and LGRC should be jointly and severally held liable to pay the amount of P2,596,041.09, along with the 45% share in the rental income from September 1, 2011 up to the present.
GEDCOR also prayed that LGRC be ordered to render an accounting of the rental income.[23]
Conrad and LGRC filed an Answer with Counterclaims[24] dated February 27, 2012. They posited that: (1) the parties to the Joint Venture Contract intended the effectivity of the agreement to coincide
with the life of the corporation; (2) the Joint Venture Contract is a contract of partnership and not a build-operate-transfer scheme; (3) the cause of action of GEDCOR is governed by the Corporation Code
and not by the Civil Code; (4) LGRC is not required to regularly declare dividends; (5) the decision to temporarily stop issuing dividends is a management prerogative that was made by the Board of
Directors of LGRC; and (6) the action is premature because LGRC has not received any demand for accounting from any of the stockholders. [25] LGRC prayed for an award of actual, moral damages,
and attorney's fees.[26]
The parties filed their Pre-Trial Briefs. After pre-trial, trial of the case ensued.[27]
After filing a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence for the Plaintiff,[28] GEDCOR filed its Motion to Deposit. Conrad and LGRC filed their Comment[29] on the motion, and GEDCOR filed its Reply.[30]
The RTC Ruling

On February 19, 2018, the RTC issued an Order[31] (Deposit Order) granting the GEDCOR's Motion to Deposit. The dispositive portion provides:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Deposit Rentals In Court is granted. Defendants are directed to deposit in Court within 30 days from receipt of this Order, the following:
(1) the amount of P5,936,461.65 representing plaintiff's 45% share in the rental income of the subject warehouse from June 1, 2009 to September 30, 2015;

(2) the amount equivalent to 45% share in the rental income of the subject warehouse from October 1, 2015 and every month thereafter until the case is finally resolved.

SO ORDERED.[32]
Conrad and LGRC filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 19 February 2018),[33] but the RTC denied it in an Order[34] dated September 6, 2018.
Thereafter, Conrad died and was substituted by respondents Heirs of Conrad as represented by Lauro S. Leviste II.[35]
Dissatisfied, LGRC and the heirs of Conrad (collectively, respondents) filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.[36]

The CA Ruling
In the Decision[37] dated June 26, 2019, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated February 19, 2018 and September 6, 2018.[38]
The CA ruled that respondents sufficiently established grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it granted GEDCOR's Motion to Deposit. It gave the following grounds for its finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC: (1) the Deposit Order was akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, and yet, GEDCOR was able to obtain
the same without strictly complying with the procedure under the Rules of Court; and (2) it amounted to a prejudgment of the case.[39]
The CA explained that the Rules of Court do not expressly provide for deposit as a provisional relief. Further, the RTC cannot pass off the order as a means of carrying its jurisdiction into effect by invoking
Section 5(g) and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court because the proper procedure to be followed in the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically provided under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. [40]
In finding that the issuance of the Deposit Order amounted to a prejudgment of the case, the CA explained that the RTC already passed upon the issue as to the proper amount of rental income which

GEDCOR is entitled to despite the absence of any accounting to support the figure demanded by GEDCOR. Specifically, the RTC had already admitted the table of computation presented by GEDCOR
showing that the latter is entitled to P5,936,461.65 representing 45% share from June 2009 up to September 2015. The table of computation simply multiplied 45% by the total amount of rent to arrive at

the monthly share of GEDCOR. The RTC adopted completely the figure presented by GEDCOR notwithstanding the following: (1) the existence of a cause of action for Accounting in the Complaint; (2)
the lack of documents to support the computation of the same; and (3) the fact that the previous official receipts, tables of computation and deposit slips of the 45% share of GEDCOR involved deductions
of withholding taxes, registration fees, occasional real estate taxes, and other maintenance expenses.[41]
The CA further ruled that with the issue of the proper computation of GEDCOR's 45% share in the lease income of LGRC not having been resolved yet, it was premature for the RTC to act favorably on
the Motion to Deposit filed by GEDCOR. Such relief may only be granted once LGRC has rendered a complete accounting of its income and expenses and the figure representing 45% share of GEDCOR
in the lease has already been definitively determined. Further, the issuance of the Deposit Order resulted in an absurd situation where there is a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof. Specifically,
GEDCOR is supposed to prove its proposition as to the amount of rentals, i.e., P5,936,461.65, but this is already assumed considering the Deposit Order of the RTC.[42]
GEDCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[43] but the CA denied it in its Resolution[44] dated August 24, 2020.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Petition

GEDCOR maintains that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting its Motion to Deposit.[45]
GEDCOR argues the following:
First, the Deposit Order, the provisional relief granted by the RTC, has been sanctioned by the Court pursuant to the general and inherent power of the courts to issue such orders as may be conformable
to law and justice, and to employ such means as necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect, as provided under Sections 5(g) and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[46]

Second, the Deposit Order of the RTC is not akin to the grant of a writ of preliminary attachment that would require GEDCOR to comply with the requirements under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. This is
because GEDCOR did not seek to create a lien or act as security for the payment of an obligation. GEDCOR's 45% share in the rental income is not LGRC's property and is not being levied as security for
whatever judgment it may be entitled to. The Deposit Order of the RTC is meant to preserve and protect the rights and interests of the parties while the case is being litigated and is, in fact, preservatory in
character.[47]
Third, Section 6, Rule 135 and Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are not mutually exclusive and inconsistent with each other. A perusal of Section 6, Rule 135 shows that when jurisdiction is conferred on the
court, the court may employ all such means as may be necessary to carry such jurisdiction into effect, and the court may adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding if the procedure to be followed
is not specifically provided by law or by the Rules of Court. Reading Section 6, Rule 135, there is nothing to support the conclusion that if a similar remedy is available under a different rule, Section 6,
Rule 135 cannot apply.[48]
Fourth, the Deposit Order of the RTC directing Conrad and LGRC to deposit 45% of the monthly rental income over the warehouse with the RTC did not amount to a prejudgment of the case because it is
merely provisional and preservatory in character and is not intended to be an adjudication on the merits of the main case. GEDCOR maintains that there is no truth to the claim of respondents that there

was no accounting or documents presented to support the computation of the amount of rentals to be deposited with the court. In fact, the computation of the rental income and the 45% share was based
on the last known rental rate as of 2006. Said rate is supported by lease contracts which were executed by LGRC and the lessee and which were admitted by the RTC. Further, GEDCOR's claim over its
45% share in the rental income is based on LGRC's longstanding and consistent practice of remitting the 45% share on a monthly basis. Such practice was expressly admitted by respondents during pre-
trial proceedings.[49]
In their Comment,[50] respondents maintain that the CA was correct in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued the Orders dated February 19, 2018 and September 6, 2018.
Respondents argue the following:
First, the Deposit Order of the RTC is akin to the provisional remedy of attachment. It sought to attach the amount of deposit as security for satisfaction of judgment that may be had; yet, GEDCOR was
able to obtain relief without strictly complying with the procedures required under the Rules of Court. Further, the RTC cannot invoke Sections 5(g) and 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court because the rules
provide for a specific process or procedure to afford the relief sought in the form of Rule 57 on preliminary attachment.[51]
Second, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC Orders amounted to a prejudgment of the case. Specifically, the RTC departed from the following well settled principles: (1) that courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party; and (2) that courts cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining and requiring the due presentation of supporting

evidence. In its original complaint, GEDCOR prayed for the RTC to order Conrad and LGRC to render an accounting of the income derived from the lease of the subject warehouse. With the issuance of
the RTC Orders, the hypothetical claim of money by GEDCOR was already being set aside for its benefit even before full adjudication of the original case, and even before a resolution of the issue of
accounting of expenses and income.[52]
Issue
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it granted GEDCOR's Motion to Deposit.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

Branch 274, RTC, Parañaque City,

correctly exercised its jurisdiction over
GEDCOR's complaint.

At the outset, the Court deems it proper to dispel any doubt as to the jurisdiction of the RTC over the present case. This is considering that "[a] judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect." [53] Here, respondents argued before the RTC and the CA that GEDCOR's claim for advance dividend entitlement is an
intra-corporate issue which is within the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts and not Branch 274, RTC, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 12-003.[54]
First, the Court finds that the present case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
To determine whether a dispute involves an intra-corporate controversy, the courts apply two tests: the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, which are characterized as follows:
Under the relationship test, there is an intra-corporate controversy when the conflict is (1) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership, or
association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit, or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
and (4) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves.

On the other hand, in accordance with the nature of controversy test, an intra-corporate controversy arises when the controversy is not only rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but
also in the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. [55]

Here, the conflict does not fall under any of the enumerations under the relationship test. More particularly, there is no conflict between a corporation and its stockholders. As admitted by respondents in
their Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 19 February 2018),[56] GEDCOR is not a stockholder of LGRC.[57] Further, the Court finds that the case does not pass the controversy test because
following the same admission of respondents, there is no claim for advance dividend entitlement by GEDCOR to speak of.
In fact, in its Comment to the Petition for Certiorari[58] before the CA GEDCOR aptly pointed out the following:
66. [Respondents] contradict themselves when they claim that the subject Orders intrude upon their power to declare dividends and deprives them of due process when the Orders require them to
purportedly deposit the "dividend entitlements" of [petitioner] GEDCOR, while at the same time claiming that [petitioner] GEDCOR is not a stockholder entitled to a dividend share.
xxxx
69. Thus, [respondents'] arguments concerning the corporation's power to declare dividends, the business judgment rule and it being an intra-corporate dispute are absolutely without basis and are clearly

being made just to confuse the issues in this case.[59]

Second, it must be emphasized that "a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of jurisdiction." [60] The Court in
Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc.[61] (Gonzales) differentiated these two matters as follows:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from
time to time by the Court. In Lozada v. Bracewell, it was recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its original jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.[62]

The Court then ruled in Gonzales that under Section 5[63] of Republic Act No. (RA) 8799,[64] the jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5[65] of Presidential Decree No. 902-A[66] is transferred
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs in general and not only in favor of particular RTC branches, i.e., the Special Commercial Courts.[67] Notably, among the cases
transferred from the SEC to the RTCs are intra-corporate controversies.
The Court further elucidated in Gonzales that the Court's orders or issuances designating certain or specialized courts, i.e., particular branches, to try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the SEC,
among other cases, is to promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the RTC's jurisdiction and has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799.[68]
Thus, the Court ruled that "the erroneous raffling to a regular branch [of the RTC of Muntinlupa] instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure—that is an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction—and thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa already acquired."[69]
Following the Court's ruling in Gonzales, the existence of an intra-corporate dispute in a case pending before a regular RTC will not warrant its dismissal. This, however, is subject to the prospective rule
laid down by the Court that to avoid future confusion, all initiatory pleadings shall state the action's nature both in its caption and body, and failure to do so will warrant the dismissal of the complaint but
without prejudice to its refiling after due rectification.[70]

The Court laid out the following guidelines to govern the transfer of commercial cases erroneously raffled to a regular branch of the RTC, as well as ordinary cases erroneously raffled to a Special
Commercial Court:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to
the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off
among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial

region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re -docketing as
an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same
as regular branches), as provided for under existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess,
refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order
of the court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.[71]

Considering the discussion above, the Court now clarifies that in effect, what respondents were harping on was not the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC. Rather, they were assailing the purportedly
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by a particular branch thereof which is a regular court, premised on the belief that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute which should be tried before a Special
Commercial Court. As there is no intra-corporate dispute in this case, the Court finds that Branch 274, RTC, Parañaque City, correctly exercised its jurisdiction.

The CA erred in finding grave abuse

of discretion on the part of the RTC in

issuing the Deposit Order.

The issuance by the courts of deposit orders is not novel.

In Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Villarin[72] (Lorenzo Shipping Corporation), the Court explained that the provisional remedy of deposit exists despite not being included as one of the provisional

remedies under Rules 57 to 61 of the Rules of Court. The Court explained:

Based on jurisprudence, a deposit order is an extraordinary provisional remedy whereby money or other property is placed in custodia legis to ensure restitution to whichever party is declared entitled

thereto after court proceedings. It is extraordinary because its basis is not found in Rules 57 to 61 of the Rules of Court on Provisional Remedies but rather, under Sections 5(g) and 6, Rule 135 of the
same Rules pertaining to the inherent power of every court "[t]o amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;" as well as to issue "all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary" to carry its jurisdiction into effect.[73]
In justifying the availability of deposit as a provisional remedy, the Court explained that Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the courts wide latitude in employing means to carry their jurisdiction into effect.
[74]
Specifically, Sections 5(g) and 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the provisions relied upon by the RTC in granting GEDCOR's Motion to Deposit, provide:
Section 5. Inherent power of courts. - Every court shall have the power:
xxxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;
xxxx
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
The Court in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation identified the two categories of provisional deposit orders as follows:

To elucidate further, provisional deposit orders can be seen as falling under two general categories. In the first category, the demandability of the money or other property to be deposited is not, or cannot
—because of the nature of the relief sought—be contested by the party-depositor. In the second category, the party-depositor regularly receives money or other property from a non-party during the
pendency of the case, and the court deems it proper to place such money or other property in custodia legis pending final determination of the party truly entitled to the same.
The cases of Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v First Special Cases Division, intermediate Appellate Court and Reyes v. Lim fall under the first category. Eternal Gardens involved an interpleader
case where the plaintiff-buyer (Eternal), who was seeking to compel the litigation of the two conflicting claims to the property in question, refused to comply with an order of deposit in custodia legis the
installment payments for the disputed property. In upholding the provisional deposit order, the Court ruled that Eternal's disavowal of interest in the disputed property, and the deposit of such disputed
money or property with the court, are essential elements of an interpleader suit. Thus, Eternal was ordered to deposit the installment payments with the trial court. In Reyes, the Court upheld a provisional
deposit order covering the down payment for a parcel of land pending the resolution of the case for annulment of contract, viz.:
[S]ince Reyes is demanding to rescind the Contract to Sell, he cannot refuse to deposit the P10 million down payment in court. Such deposit will ensure restitution of the P10 million to its rightful owner.
Lim, on the other hand, has nothing to refund, as he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell.

In both Eternal Gardens and Reyes, the nature of relief sought precluded the depositor-party from contesting the demandability of the amounts sought to be deposited. Stated differently, the depositor -
parties effectively resigned their respective interests over the amounts deposited. The most equitable solution to prevent unjust enrichment in such cases, therefore, is a provisional deposit order, so that
the amount deposited may easily be turned over to whoever would be adjudged properly entitled thereto.
The second category of cases involve provisional deposit orders covering sums regularly received from non-parties to the case by the depositor-party during the pendency of the proceedings. These are
turned over to the custody of the court since the entitlement of the depositor-party thereto remains disputed, and to ensure the timely transfer of such sums to whoever would be adjudged properly entitled
thereto. In Go v. Go, Bustamante v. CA, and Province of Bataan, the Court upheld the trial court's order directing the depositor-parties therein, who regularly received rental payments from the lessees of
the disputed properties, to deposit such rental payments with the court pending the resolution of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties.
A common thread running through these cases is the existence of an agreement or a juridical tie, which either binds the depositor- party and the party to be benefited by the deposit; or forms the basis for
the regular receipt of payments by the depositor-party. In Eternal Gardens, Eternal had a contract of sale with one of the interpleading parties; while in Reyes, Reyes had a contract to sell with Lim; and in
Go, Bustamante, and Province of Bataan, the regular payments received by the depositor-parties are based on lease agreements.[75] (Citations omitted; italics in the original and supplied.)

The Court finds that the Deposit Order issued by the RTC falls under the second category, i.e., the party-depositor regularly receives money or other property from a non-party during the pendency of the
case, and the court deems it proper to place such money or other property in custodia legis pending final determination of the party truly entitled to the same.[76]
Here, GEDCOR is the owner of the lot where the warehouse being leased by LGRC is situated. LGRC, the party-depositor in this case, is the recipient of the rental payments for the lease of the
warehouse. Further, as indicated in the Pre-Trial Order[77] dated November 8, 2012, respondents admitted that "since the warehouse was first leased out in 1988, [respondent] LGRC remits 45% of the
rental income warehouse to [GEDCOR] on a monthly basis, while the remaining 55% went to defendant Leviste" [78] and that "at present, the warehouse is being leased out to Lambert Williams Logistics,
Inc."[79] Further, Conrad and LGRC admitted in their Pre-Trial Brief [80] that on July 16, 2009, the Board of Directors of LGRC resolved to stop the distribution of the rental income of the warehouse. [81]
For its part, GEDCOR presented receipts which it issued to LGRC on various dates until June 9, 2009 that showed LGRC remittance of GEDCOR's 45% share in the monthly rental income of the
warehouse.[82] The last receipt dated June 9, 2009 was for the payment of GEDCOR's 45% share for the month of May 2009.[83]
Considering the circumstances, the Court finds that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the RTC deemed as proper the issuance of the
Deposit Order. The RTC's issuance of the Deposit Order was for the preservation of the rental income and protection of the interest of its rightful owner pending adjudication of the parties' claims.

The Court finds no merit in respondents' argument that the issuance by the RTC of the Deposit Order is tantamount to a prejudgment of the case. As correctly argued by GEDCOR, the RTC Orders are
merely provisional and preservatory in character and not intended to be an adjudication on the merits of the main case.[84]
In Province of Bataan v. Villafuerte,[85] respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government filed with the trial court an "Urgent Motion to Deposit Lease Rentals" during the pendency of the action
for annulment of sale and reconveyance. The trial court granted the motion and issued an escrow order on the lease rentals being paid by the lessee to the Provincial Government. [86]
In upholding the issuance of the escrow order, which the CA therein also affirmed, the Court ruled that such order was merely incidental to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the main case. The Court,
aside from finding Sections 5(g) and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court as basis for the escrow order, adopted the position that the court's power to preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to maintain

the status, or to issue some extraordinary writs provided by law should not be taken as an advanced determination of the rights of the parties pending final adjudication. Rather, such power should be
considered as a means by which the court may ensure that it can effectuate its judgment and protect the interests of the rightful claimants of the property subject of the case.[87] The Court ruled:
It is beyond dispute that the lower court exercised jurisdiction over the main action docketed as Civil Case No. 210-ML, which involved the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the subject properties.
Under this circumstance, we are of the firm view that the trial court, in issuing the assailed escrow orders, acted well within its province and sphere of power inasmuch as the subject orders were adopted
in accordance with the Rules and jurisprudence and were merely incidental to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the main case, thus:
xxxx
"In the ordinary case the courts can proceed to the enforcement of the plaintiff's rights only after a trial had in the manner prescribed by the laws of the land, which involves due notice, the right of the trial
by jury, etc. Preliminary to such an adjudication, the power of the court is generally to preserve the subject matter of the litigation to maintain the status, or issue some extraordinary writs provided by law,

such as attachments, etc. None of these powers, however, are exercised on the theory that the court should, in advance of the final adjudication determine the rights of the parties in any summary way
and put either of them in the enjoyment thereof; but such actions taken merely, as means for securing an effective adjudication and enforcement of rights of the parties after such adjudication. Colby c.

Osgood Tex. Civ. App., 230 S.W. 459;)"[88] (Citations omitted; italics supplied.)
A perusal of the records show that on August 12, 2009, LGRC and Lambert Williams Logistics, Inc. renewed their Contract of Lease dated July 14, 2006. [89] The renewed contract provided for the rental
in the amount of P173,580.75 per month, albeit subject to escalation clause on the fourth year of the renewal. Based on this rental fee, GEDCOR claimed that from June 1, 2009 to September 30, 2015, it
was already entitled to the amount of P5,936,461.65, its 45% share in the rental income.[90] It is this amount that the RTC ordered Conrad and LGRC to deposit along with the amount equivalent to
GEDCOR's 45% share in the rental income of the warehouse from October 1, 2015 and every month thereafter until the case is finally resolved.
By issuing the Deposit Order, the RTC is merely holding in custodia legis the amount corresponding to 45% of the rental income to ensure that it can enforce the rights of the parties after adjudication.[91]
The fact that GEDCOR did not pray for the issuance of a Deposit Order in its Complaint and opted to file a Separate motion for the deposit of its claimed 45% share in the rental payments will not negate
the RTC's Order. Suffice it to state that the Deposit Order is an extraordinary remedy which the RTC aptly issued considering the allegations and relief sought in the complaint, i.e., that GEDCOR sought

to collect its 45% share in the rental income of the warehouse, and the judicial admissions of respondents as regards the rental income of the warehouse.
Lastly, as aptly pointed out by GEDCOR, the RTC correctly addressed respondents' contention that the 45% portion of the rental income cannot be deposited in full and should be subject to deductions for

expenses and liabilities. The RTC, in its Order[92] dated September 6, 2018 ruled that "[t]he concern of [respondents] that it will affect the operations of the corporation if the motion is granted has no
basis. The Court, upon motion of either party, may order the release of the deposit for operating or maintenance expenses when the need arises."[93]
To emphasize, the Deposit Order of the RTC in this case is merely preliminary. The precise interest of GEDCOR in the rental income of the warehouse situated at GEDCOR's property will have to be
determined by the RTC after trial on the merits.[94]

All told, the Court finds that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered Conrad and LGRC to deposit in court GEDCOR's claimed 45%
share in the rental income of the warehouse.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2019 and the Resolution dated August 24, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 157982 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated February 19, 2018 and September 6, 2018 of Branch 274, Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 12-003 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 252226. February 16, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMMEL DELA CRUZ Y MENDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

INTING, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal[1] seeking the reversal of the Decision[2] dated December 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11874 which affirmed the Decision [3] dated August
7, 2018 of Branch 68, Regional Trial Court (RTC), xxxxxxxxxxx, Pangasinan that found Rommel dela Cruz y Mendoza (accused-appellant) guilty of two (2) counts of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. L-10160 and L-10161.
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC, the accusatory portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. L-10160

"That sometime in the morning of February 10, 2012 in xxxxxxxxxxx Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, an adult taking advantage of the
vulnerability of AAA, a 14 year old minor child (DOB-August 25, 1998), did, then and there willfully and unlawfully coerce and influence the said minor child to indulge into a sexual intercourse with him
inside the bedroom of the residential house of his grandmother to the prejudice and damage of the said minor child.
Contrary to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Act)."[4]
Criminal Case No. L-10161
"That sometime in the morning of October 18, 2013 in xxxxxxxxxxx Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, an adult taking advantage of the vulnerability
of AAA, a 15 year old minor child (DOB-August 25, 1998), did, then and there willfully and unlawfully coerce and influence the said minor child to indulge into a sexual intercourse with him inside the
bedroom of the residential house of his grandmother and damage of the said minor child.
Contrary to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Act)."[5]

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial and trial ensued.[6]
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution narrated that on February 10, 2012, AAA [7] was on her way to school when she saw accused-appellant, her textmate. Accused-appellant held her hand, hailed a tricycle, and brought her
to the house of his grandmother in xxxxxxxxxxx, Pangasinan. There, they watched a television show for 30 minutes. Thereafter, accused-appellant pulled AAA towards a room and started kissing her on
the lips. He took off her uniform, pushed her towards the bed, went on top of her, and kissed her. Accused-appellant then removed his pants and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina for about 25 minutes.
Accused-appellant succeeded in his lustful act. They left the house, boarded a tricycle, and headed to the town proper. Out of fear, AAA did not tell anyone about the incident. [8]

The second incident occurred on October 18, 2013 when AAA was in the public market. Accused-appellant saw her and called a tricycle. As in the previous incident, they proceeded to his grandmother's
house in xxxxxxxxxxx. They were watching a television show when accused-appellant pulled her towards a room. Inside the room, he kissed her on the lips. Accused-appellant undressed her, went on top
of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to resist by slapping and pushing him away, but she failed. Later, accused-appellant called a tricycle, and they headed to the town proper. [9]
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA, but denied that he forced her. According to him, AAA was his girlfriend. They often went to the house of a friend or the house of his
grandmother to watch television shows and listen to music.[10]
The RTC Ruling
In the Decision[11] dated August 7, 2018, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges. It ruled that: (1) accused-appellant induced and unduly influenced AAA to have

sexual intercourse with him; (2) assuming they were sweethearts, their relationship will not exonerate him from the charges as AAA was just a minor during the incidents, while accused-appellant was
already 20 years old; and (3) with his age, accused-appellant could easily force his will upon AAA.[12]

The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. L-10160 (violation of Section 5(b), R.A. 7610) - accused ROMMEL dela CRUZ y Mendoza is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of other sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay private complainant AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. The accused is also ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00; and
2) In Criminal Case No. L-10161 (violation of Section 5(b), R.A. 7610) - accused ROMMEL dela CRUZ y Mendoza is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of other sexual abuse under

Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay private complainant AAA the amounts of

P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. The accused is also ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00.
The accused, who is detained, is credited with the number of days he spent under detention, if he is qualified, otherwise, he shall be credited only with four fifths (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment,
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision,[14] the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The judgment of conviction of accused-appellant ROMMEL dela CRUZ y MENDOZA in the assailed Decision dated 07 August 2018 of the Regional Trial
Court of xxxxxxxxxxx, Pangasinan City, Branch 68 for both Criminal Case Nos. L-10160 and 10161 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant appeals his conviction before the Court.
In the Resolution[16] dated September 14, 2020, the Court noted the transmittal of the records forwarded by the CA. The Court also ordered the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, should
they so desire, within 30 days from notice.

In his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)[17] dated November 25, 2020, accused-appellant adopted his Supplemental Brief filed before the CA as it adequately discussed all the matters
pertinent to his defense. Meanwhile, in its Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) [18] dated December 21, 2020, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused
from filing a supplemental brief as it had already extensively addressed all the matters and issues raised by accused-appellant in its brief filed before the CA.
Issue
In the main, the issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
The RTC and the CA were correct in their assessment of the testimonies of AAA and her mother. On the basis of AAA's testimony, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will or without her consent.[19] The Court sees no reason to depart from the RTC's assessment of AAA's credibility.[20]
AAA's recollection of her ordeal clearly established that on two separate dates, accused-appellant forced her to board the tricycle going to the house of his grandmother. [21] Thereat, he pulled her towards
a room and pushed her onto the bed after undressing her.[22] She resisted the sexual advances of accused-appellant by slapping him but to no avail.[23] Considering the RTC's "unique position to
observe and weigh that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,"[24] the Court "accords great respect and even confer[s] finality to the findings of

the trial court as to matters which are factual in nature as well as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses." [25] In the absence of any evidence "that the trial court's factual findings were tainted with
arbitrariness or that the trial court overlooked or misapplied relevant facts and circumstances, or inadequately calibrated the witnesses' credibility, the reviewing court is bound by its assessment." [26]
The RTC convicted accused-appellant of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in both Criminal Case Nos. L-10160 and L-10161. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. However, there
is a need to fix the error in the nomenclature of accused-appellant's crime. Accused-appellant should be held criminally liable for two (2) counts of Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to
Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. The Court cannot sustain the RTC's pronouncement that the prosecution had established accused-appellant's criminal liability under Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610, which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of

age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
Sexual Abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 has the following elements: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[27] Under the circumstances, AAA cannot be deemed to be a child "exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse;"[28] hence, the second element is patently lacking in the case. Instead, the prosecution's evidence clearly established the elements under paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353.[29] Thus:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The circumstance applicable in the case is paragraph 1(a). The fact of carnal knowledge was established through AAA's positive identification of accused-appellant as her abuser. She testified that
accused-appellant undressed her, positioned himself on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina on two separate dates. [30] With the prosecution sufficiently establishing all the elements of Rape

applicable in the case, accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In People v. Ejercito,[31] the Court held that the Anti-Rape Law or RA 8353, amending the RPC, should be uniformly applied in rape cases against minors. Accordingly, "penal laws are crafted by

legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special in nature, regardless of the time of enactment, should
prevail."[32]
In People v. Tulagan,[33] the Court further explained:
Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information — e.g., carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added phrase of "due to coercion or influence," one of the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully
designate the crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," although this may be a ground for quashal of the Information under
Section 3 (f) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — and proven during the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should still be
prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610.

Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty ( reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b) thereof would

be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age or below 18.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence, its short title
"The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A. No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it imposes a more
severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, x x x[34]

All the same, in bidding for his acquittal, accused-appellant argued that he and AAA were sweethearts.
The Court is not convinced.
As an affirmative defense, the "sweetheart theory" is actually "an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim," and consequently, the Court "places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence."[35] Moreover, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof like tokens, mementos, and photographs are required.
[36] Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he presented no such evidence to substantiate his claim. Assuming that they have a relationship, accused-appellant cannot just force AAA to have sex against
her will. Verily, "[a] man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his unreciprocated carnal desires." [37] Besides, "the filing of criminal charges are not acts of a woman savoring a
consensual coitus but that of a maiden seeking retribution for the outrage committed against her."[38]
In the case, accused-appellant may properly be convicted of Rape without violating his due process rights and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. It is very
clear from the allegations in the Informations that they constitute criminal charges for Rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. To be sure,
the Informations satisfactorily mentioned and charged accused-appellant with carnal knowledge of AAA, a minor, by willfully and unlawfully coercing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him on

February 10, 2012 and October 18, 2013.[39] These allegations are sufficiently clear to inform him of the acts he is being liable for and adequate to enable him to form a defense.
As both the recital in the Informations and the evidence presented by the prosecution provide for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A in relation to
Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, accused-appellant should be properly convicted and penalized therefor. The Court imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua against accused-
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. L-10160 and L-10161. He is also ordered to pay AAA the following for each count of Rape: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) legal interest rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[40]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11874 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant
Rommel dela Cruz y Mendoza is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, the following amounts: (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count. All amounts due shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1] See Notice of Appeal dated January 16, 2020, rollo, pp. 31-33.
[2] Id. at 3-30; penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos with Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Walter S. Ong, concurring.

[3] CA rollo, pp. 55-64; penned by Judge Maria Laarni R. Parayno.

[4] Id. at 55-56.
[5] Id. at 56.
[6] Rollo, p. 5.
[7] The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise their identity, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No.
(RA) 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and For Other Purposes;" RA 9262,
"An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and For Other Purposes;" Section 40 of Administrative Matter
No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children," effective November 15, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006); and Amended Administrative Circular
No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious
Names/Personal Circumstances. To note, no unmodified CA Decision was attached to the records to verify the real name of the victim.

ECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207606. February 16, 2022 ]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. TEODORA T. HERMOSURA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

For the Court's resolution is the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated October 23, 2012 and the Resolution[2] dated May 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.

SP No. 118223, which reversed the Decision[3] dated January 29, 2010 and Order[4] dated October 14, 2010 of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Facts

Private Complainant, Brenda Ortiz (Ortiz), is a businesswoman engaged in the lending business while Teodora Hermosura a.k.a. Teodora Cornelio (respondent), was employed as a Computer Operator II
at the University of Makati (UMAK) until her optional retirement was approved on June 15, 2008.[5]
In 2005, the respondent initially borrowed P10,000.00 from Ortiz. The loan was renewed several times and the respondent was able to pay on time, thus, the two became friends, and Ortiz eventually
engaged the respondent as an agent in her lending business.[6]
As Ortiz's agent, the respondent was to extend loans or loan accommodation to their clients at an agreed interest rate. It was also the respondent's task to look for borrowers, determine their credit
standing and the amount to be lent to each of them. As part of their process, the respondent: receives the money from Ortiz in trust with the obligation to deliver them to the borrowers, collects the
installments or payments from the borrowers, and finally remits the same to Ortiz. As her compensation, the respondent receives from Ortiz a commission equivalent to five percent (5%) of the total loan
collected. This process worked for them for quite some time, until in 2007, when the respondent started to fail in remitting her collections.[7]

Ortiz tried to contact the respondent but to no avail. Ortiz only got hold of the respondent's new phone number from an employee of UMAK. Ortiz and the respondent then met in person at a restaurant in
Pasay City, where the respondent allegedly admitted that she spent the unremitted collection for her personal needs. However, she promised Ortiz that she would repay her. Subsequent to their meeting,

the respondent could no longer be contacted.[8]

Through her counsel, Ortiz sent two demand letters to the respondent, warning her of the institution of legal action should she fail to return Ortiz's money in the amount of over P40,000,000.00. [9] Despite
the foregoing, the respondent still failed to remit her collections. Consequently, Ortiz filed an administrative complaint for dishonesty against the respondent.
In her counter-affidavit, the respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint. She repudiated the contract of agency between her and Ortiz, and claimed that they had a business venture where

she was the industrial partner and Ortiz was the capitalist. She professed that she experienced difficulties in collecting from their borrowers due to the high interest rates imposed on the loans. Also, the
university/companies imposed strict policies on salary deduction which made it difficult for her to collect from the borrowers. In another counter-affidavit, she maintained that she already remitted the sum
of P65,693,770.00 to Ortiz.[10]
The Ombudsman's Decision
On January 29, 2010, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision[11] which found the respondent guilty of dishonesty. The Ombudsman rejected the respondent's contention that it has no jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint considering the approval of her optional retirement on June 15, 2008, whereas the complaint was filed only on October 24, 2008.[12] The Ombudsman also observed that the
respondent did not present evidence to support her claim of payment while her explanation on the difficulties she encountered in collecting from the borrowers was unsubstantiated. [13]
As regards the penalty, the Ombudsman cited Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 which provides that as a grave offense, dishonesty is
punishable by dismissal for the first offense, with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in government service. [14] The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds respondent TEODORA HERMOSURA a.k.a. TEODORA CORNELIO guilty of Dishonesty. As she had already retired from government service, she
is meted the penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In an Order[16] dated October 14, 2010, the Ombudsman denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration, which led the respondent to lodge an appeal before the CA.
The CA Decision
On October 23, 2012, the CA promulgated its Decision[17] reversing the judgment of the Ombudsman. The CA ruled that the respondent could not be held administratively liable, given that there is no
proof that she availed of optional retirement to prevent the filing of an administrative complaint against her.[18] The CA expounded as follows:
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. Andutan, Jr., the Supreme Court explained that a public official who has validly severed his/her ties with the civil service may no longer be the subject of an
administrative complaint up to his/her deathbed, viz:
"To recall, we have held in the past that a public official's resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official's resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with
an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative

sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which be or she shall still be answerable [ Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April
2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No.
207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [ Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [ Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)].
Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004].
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials - subject of the administrative cases – resigned,

either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
xxxx
While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent
with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which
annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful and judicious review of the records of this case, We find no evidence on record showing that the petitioner only availed of her optional retirement in order to pre-empt the imminent filing of
the administrative case against her. Absent proof to the contrary, petitioner's retirement from the civil service is deemed bona fide which renders her an ineligible subject of an administrative investigation.
Thus, the public respondent committed a reversible error when it did not dismiss the administrative complaint filed by the private respondent against herein petitioner, considering that the latter had already
validly severed her ties with the civil service several months before the filing of the aforesaid complaint.
x x x x[19]
In conclusion, the CA disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision and Order of the honorable public respondent, finding petitioner Teodora T. Hermosura, guilty of Dishonesty, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[20]
The CA likewise denied the Ombudsman's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[21] dated May 23, 2013.

Thus, the Ombudsman filed the present petition. In her Comment, [22] the respondent submits that the Ombudsman failed to establish that her retirement was aimed at pre-empting the imminent filing of
the administrative case against her. Thus, the presumption is that her retirement is considered valid and lawful. [23] She further contends that pursuant to the Court's ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Andutan, Jr. (Andutan),[24] "she may no longer be the subject of an administrative complaint up to her deathbed." [25] Rebutting the respondent's arguments, the Ombudsman, in its Reply,[26] raised the
fact that the respondent's severance from the government service prior to the filing of the complaint was due to her availment of optional retirement, after Ortiz informed her, through demand letters, that
cases would be filed against her in case of non-payment of her obligation.[27]
Essentially, the issues are: 1.) Whether the Ombudsman should not have taken cognizance of the complaint against the respondent in view of her retirement from the government service; and 2.) Whether
the respondent should be held administratively liable for the charge against her.
The Court's Ruling

Respondent can still be held

administratively liable as her

retirement was voluntary

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan,[28] a public officer tendered his resignation a day after he confessed to the commission of an administrative offense. Holding that the respondent's resignation
does not render the case moot, the Court ruled that "resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court personnel is facing administrative sanction." [29]
The Court reiterated the same principle in a case[30] where a public officer filed her resignation prior to the date she was set to appear for a formal investigation, to wit:
x x x we view respondent's act of filing her resignation before the investigation as indicative of her guilt. Indeed, an employee's act of tendering her resignation immediately after the discovery of the
anomalous transaction is indicative of her guilt as flight in criminal cases. And, resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.[31]
Here, in holding that the respondent cannot be held administratively charged for dishonesty in view of the absence of proof that she applied for optional retirement to pre-empt the imminent filing of the
administrative complaint against her, the CA applied, albeit erroneously, the Court's pronouncements in Andutan.

Indeed, in Andutan, the Court dismissed the administrative case against Andutan, which was filed one year and two months after his resignation. The Court ruled that "the Ombudsman can no longer
institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed." However this was decided in light of the circumstances obtaining in Andutan:
The Ombudsman's general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would
eventually reach him" is unfounded. First, Andutan's resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while
the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman's sweeping assertions in light
of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the
Ombudsman's position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.[32]
To emphasize, Andutan's resignation from the government service was not voluntary, as he was merely forced to resign. Therefore, whether he knew that a case would be filed against him or not is
immaterial – what is certain is that, he could not have resigned with the purpose of pre-empting the filing of administrative case against him.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the respondent availed of optional retirement after Ortiz's counsel sent her letters, which informed her of the possibility of the institution of legal action against her

should she fail to settle her obligation. Verily, a complaint was filed against her four months after her optional retirement. This is in huge contrast with Andutan, who was forced to resign from his post.
Thus, Andutan cannot be applied to respondent's case. The respondent's voluntary separation from the government service, in addition to her knowledge that a complaint would most likely be filed against
her at anytime, bolsters the Ombudsman's position that the respondent attempted to
forestall the filing of an administrative case against her by availing of optional retirement.
The foregoing also finds support in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman and Jamorabo,[33] where the Court arrived at a similar conclusion:
Given the suspicious timing and the circumstances surrounding his voluntary retirement from the service, coupled with his actual departure from the Philippines in April 2010, barely four months after the
loan was finally settled by his wife and sister-in-law, this Court finds that Jamorabo's voluntary separation from government service was calculated to pre-empt the charges that will inevitably result from
the discovery of the illicit loan he entered into. As it turned out, RBKSI did report the loan to the BSP in the very next examination period; and the complaint against Jamorabo was filed shortly thereafter.
[34]
Certainly, the respondent's voluntary severance from the government service is not a bar to the filing of an administrative case against her given that the surrounding circumstances of her optional

retirement reveal that it was availed of to avert impending administrative charges concerning her unfulfilled obligation.

Respondent is administratively liable

for Simple Dishonesty

Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the Administrative Offense of Dishonesty defines dishonesty as "the concealment of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a
disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an intent to violate the truth."[35] This Resolution was issued "to provide a classification for the offense of Dishonesty to impose the corresponding
penalty based on the circumstances of the case."[36] Thus, dishonesty is classified as serious, less serious, or simple.
For dishonesty to be considered serious, the presence of any of the following circumstances is necessary:

a. The dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the Government;
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act;

c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to
commit material gain, graft and corruption;
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent;
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act related to his/her employment;
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or various occasions;
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited to impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets;
h. Other analogous circumstances. x x x[37]
Dishonesty is less serious under any of the following circumstances:

a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government, which is not so serious as to qualify under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.

c. Other analogous circumstances.[38]

Lastly, if any one of the following circumstances is present, dishonesty is classified as simple:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act has no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the respondent.

c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances.[39]
In this case, the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of dishonesty for which she was meted the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits along with perpetual disqualification from government
employment. Indeed, the respondent's act of not remitting her collections to Ortiz and evading the latter constitute dishonesty. The respondent could have simply forwarded the names of the defaulting
borrowers to Ortiz if she was in fact having difficulty collecting payment from them. Aside from her bare allegations, she did not present any proof regarding the borrowers' unpaid loans.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that none of the circumstances provided in the case of serious dishonesty obtains in the case at bar. The respondent's act, although dishonest, did not cause serious damage
or grave prejudice to the government, nor was it committed in relation to or in connection with her duties. Thus, the respondent is administratively guilty of simple dishonesty only.
Simple dishonesty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. [40] Considering that the respondent has already voluntarily retired from the government
service, the forfeiture of six months' salary to be deducted from the respondent's retirement benefits is sufficient penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 23, 2012 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118223 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Teodora T. Hermosura a.k.a. Teodora Cornelio is hereby found GUILTY of simple dishonesty and is FINED in an amount equivalent to her salary for six (6) months to be deducted from her retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 44-52; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes Carpio with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (retired Member of this Court), concurring.
[2] Id. at 54-55.
[3] Id. at 57-69; signed by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Adelyn P. Alvarado and approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez.
SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 254254. February 16, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX,[1] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

Rape by sexual assault committed against a child twelve (12) years of age and below eighteen (18), shall be punished as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610.[2] Likewise, the failure of an accused to object to a duplicitous Information constitutes a waiver, and thus, he/she may be convicted of as many offenses as are indicated therein, and proven during

the trial.
This resolves the appeal[3] filed by accused-appellant XXX, praying for the reversal of the October 2, 2019 Decision [4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12277, which affirmed the May
16, 2018 Consolidated Decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court of x x x xx x x xxxx City, Branch 69 (RTC), finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Qualified Rape by Carnal Knowledge
and Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault.
Antecedents
On December 11, 2015, three (3) separate Informations for the crime of Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. No. 8353 [6] were filed against XXX.
The accusatory portion of each Information reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 158506
That sometime in 2009, in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of complainant AAA, a
minor 13 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with said minor complainant, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 158507
That sometime in October 2011, in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of complainant

AAA, a minor 15 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with said minor complainant, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 158508
That on or about the 06th day of March 2012 in the City of x x x xx x x xxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the biological father of
complainant AAA a minor 15 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously force
said minor complainant to perform fellatio, then her father had sexual intercourse with her, against complainant AAA's will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
When arraigned, XXX pleaded not guilty to the charges. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.[8]
AAA was born on March 17, 1996. She is the daughter of XXX. AAA related that XXX started raping her when she was thirteen (13) years old. He would rape her three or four times every week. She did

not report the incidents, out of fear that he would kill her.[9]
Sometime in 2009, when AAA was thirteen (13) years old, XXX woke her up from her nap. He pulled her and removed her shorts and panty. AAA resisted, but XXX prevailed upon her. Then, XXX inserted

his penis into her vagina. After the dastardly act, AAA went to the comfort room and saw blood gush out from her vagina. She was in pain. She informed her mother BBB that she has a wound in her
vagina. However, XXX dismissed her claim, and said that her menstrual period had started.[10]
Again, on March 6, 2012, when AAA was fifteen (15) years old, XXX tried to have sexual intercourse with her. However, AAA refused his advances. This angered XXX who shouted invectives at her. He
wanted to insert his penis into her mouth but when the latter refused, he pulled her hair and forced her to open her mouth. After inserting his penis into AAA's mouth, he then inserted his penis into her

anus.[11]
Then, on March 7, 2012, XXX again approached AAA to have sex with her but she refused as she was in pain due to her swollen " pwerta." XXX kicked her. Fed up, AAA left their house and stayed with
her classmate. She texted her mother to meet her on March 9, 2012.[12]
During the meeting, AAA told her mother everything that XXX had done to her. Thereafter, AAA and her mother went to the hospital, where AAA's cervix was operated on. She was confined for five (5)
days. Upon recovering, AAA went to the police station to file a complaint against XXX.[13]
On the other hand, XXX vehemently denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that AAA concocted the charges out of spite, because he disciplined her after he saw her naked with a boy at their
house sometime in March 2009.[14]
Ruling of the RTC
On May 16, 2018, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Decision[15] declaring XXX guilty of the separate crimes of qualified rape by carnal knowledge in Criminal Case No. 158506, and qualified rape by
sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 158508.

In Criminal Case No. 158506, the RTC held that the prosecution proved all the elements of qualified rape by carnal knowledge, along with the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. It
further noted that AAA's narration of the rape incident was consistent, candid, and straightforward.[16]
As for Criminal Case No. 158508, the RTC stated that the prosecution proved that XXX inserted his penis into AAA's mouth and anus against her will, thereby rendering XXX liable for qualified rape by
sexual assault.[17] It explained that although the Information charged XXX with qualified rape by carnal knowledge, XXX may still be held liable for qualified rape by sexual assault pursuant to the variance
doctrine.[18]
However, the RTC acquitted XXX of the charge of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 158507, due to the prosecution's failure to prove the charge.[19] The RTC decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158506, the court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay complainant civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00), moral damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) and exemplary damages also in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) and interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid;
2. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158507, as the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court hereby ACQUITS him;
3. In Criminal Case No. Criminal Case No. [sic] 158508, the court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay complainant the amounts of Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php30,000.00 as

moral damages, and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Complainant is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal assailing his conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 158506 (qualified rape by carnal knowledge) and 158508 (qualified rape by sexual assault).
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed XXX's conviction in its October 2, 2019 Decision.[21] It stated that the prosecution established all the elements of qualified rape by carnal knowledge and qualified rape by sexual assault.
It found AAA's testimony to be credible, positive, and straightforward, and rejected XXX's denial as unworthy of credence.[22]
As for Criminal Case No. 158508 (qualified rape by sexual assault), the CA conceded that the prosecution erroneously charged XXX with two separate crimes. However, it stressed that XXX may no
longer question the defective Information, considering that he failed to timely contest it and even actively participated during the trial. The CA clarified that XXX was rightly convicted of qualified rape by
sexual assault, not pursuant to the variance doctrine, but rather, due to his failure to question the duplicitous Information before the trial.[23]

Moreover, the CA stated that there was no violation of XXX's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him considering that all the elements constituting the crimes charged
were sufficiently set forth in the Information.[24]

Finally, the CA modified the amount of damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 158508, by increasing the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages from P30,000.00 each to
P100,000.00.
The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The judgment of conviction of accused-appellant XXX in the assailed Consolidated Decision dated May 16, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of x
x x xx x x xxxx City in Criminal Case Nos. 158506 and 158508 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS with respect to the penalty for damages imposed in Criminal Case No. 158508 for

Qualified Rape By Sexual Assault:

(1) Civil Indemnity is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00;
(2) Moral damages is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00;
(3) Exemplary damages is increased from Php30,000.00 to Php100,000.00.
All monetary awards are subject to legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Aggrieved, XXX filed a Notice of Appeal and Compliance[26] with the CA.
Issues

The main issues in the instant case are whether or not XXX is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (i) qualified rape by carnal knowledge in Criminal Case No. 158506; and (ii) qualified rape by sexual
assault in Criminal Case No. 158508.

Both parties filed separate Manifestations[27] indicating that they are adopting the Briefs[28] they filed in the CA, in lieu of their Supplemental Briefs before the Court.
Seeking his exoneration from the charges, XXX laments that the RTC erred in convicting him of qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 158508 despite the defective Information. [29] He
argues that the Information in Criminal Case No. 158508 is duplicitous as it alleged the commission of two separate crimes, namely, forcing AAA to perform fellatio and coercing her to have sexual
intercourse. He further urges that contrary to the RTC's ruling, rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape by carnal knowledge. [30] Hence, he may not be convicted of qualified rape by
sexual assault pursuant to the variance doctrine.[31]
Likewise, XXX claims that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for the crimes charged against him. He questions AAA's credibility, as well as her failure to report the incident or to seek help from her
mother. He alleges that her story defies reason and is incredible.[32]
Furthermore, XXX points out that AAA's Medical Certificate failed to corroborate her claim that he inserted his penis into her anus. Likewise, said Medical Certificate failed to indicate the presence of any

external signs of physical injuries, thereby belying AAA's claim that he kicked her during the alleged rape incident on March 6, 2012.[33]
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the prosecution proved XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of qualified
rape by carnal knowledge and qualified rape by sexual assault.[34] It avers that AAA concretely detailed how XXX defiled her.[35] Also, AAA's minority and her relationship with XXX were established from
her Certificate of Live Birth.[36] Moreover, the OSG clarifies that a medical certificate and a medical examination of the victim are not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.[37]
The OSG further asserts that it is too late for XXX to question the allegedly duplicitous Information. His failure to raise an objection and file a motion to quash before entering his plea constituted a waiver
of his right to assail the duplicitous Information in Criminal Case No. 158508. [38] Due to his failure to object to the Information, he may be charged for all offenses asserted therein and proved during the

trial.[39]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is denied for lack of merit.

XXX is guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of Qualified Rape in Criminal
Case No. 158506.
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353[40] defines the crime of rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Notably, Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape." [41] The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge,
which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[42] On the other hand, Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." [43] The
act must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.[44]
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for qualified rape through sexual intercourse as charged in Criminal Case No. 158506. AAA narrated the sordid details of
the sexual abuse she suffered in XXX's hands. The linchpin of her testimony was that he raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina despite her struggles and protests:
ACP Alcaraz

Q: Naalala mo ba kung kailan ka niya ginahasa?

A: Hindi ko na po matandaan kung kailan yun, 13 years old lang po ako nun eh.

Q: 13 years old ka lang nun, nung sinumulang ka niyang gahasain?

A: Opo.

Q: Anong ginawa niya sayo nung sinabi mong ginahasa ka?

A: Nung araw po na yun tulog po ako nun e.

Q: Tulog ka, anong oras ba yun?

A: Alas 2:00 po.

Q: Alas 2:00 ng hapon?

A: Opo.

Q: Tapos nung tulog ka anong ginawa niya sayo?

A: Hinihila niya po ako nun.

Q: Hinila ka niya, pagkatapos kang hilahin?

A: Hinubad niya po ying short ko at tsaka yung panty.

Q: Tapos?

A: Lumalaban po ako sa kanya pero wala po akong nagawa.

Q: Tapos anong ginawa niya kahit lumaban ka?

A: Ginalaw niya pa rin po ako.

Q: Nung sinabi mong ginalaw ka, pano talaga ang ginawa niya sayo?

A: Pinasok niya po yung ari niya sa ari ko po.

Q: Pinasok niya yung ari niya sa ari mo, pagkatapos niyang gawin yun ano na ang sumunod na nangyari?

A: Tapos pumunta na po ako ng CR nun.

Q: Pumunta ka ng CR, ano naramdaman mo pagkatapos?

A: Marami pong dugong lumabas sa ari ko po.

Q: Maraming dugo ang lumabas sa ari mo, pagkatapos, masakit ba?

A: Masakit po.

Q: Mahapdi ba?

A: Opo.[45] (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, XXX is liable for qualified rape. He forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, despite her protests. AAA's minority at the time of the rape incident, as well as her relationship with XXX, were
established through her Certificate of Live Birth.[46]

XXX is guilty of Lascivious

Conduct under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case
No. 158508.
With respect to the finding of rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the crime, its corresponding penalty, and the award of
damages.
In the seminal case of People v. Tulagan[47] (Tulagan), the Court clarified that in the crime of rape by sexual assault, if the victim is 12 years old and below 18 years old, or at least 18 years old under
special circumstances, instead of convicting the accused of rape by sexual assault, the proper crime should be lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, with the corresponding
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.[48]

Relatedly, Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
xxxx
Notably, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610, defines lascivious conduct as:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. – x x x

xxxx
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person;
xxxx

Likewise, in Tulagan[49] the Court expounded on the meaning of the phrase "children exploited in prostitution," as follows:
The phrase "children exploited in prostitution," on the one hand, contemplates four scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious
conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who, due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse.[50] (Emphasis supplied)
Markedly, the terms "coercion or influence" are broad enough to cover any acts of force or intimidation.[51]
In this case, XXX forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's mouth to arouse and gratify his sexual desire, when the latter was fifteen (15) years old. AAA related the details of the harrowing ordeal she suffered
in the hands of her father:
ACP Alcaraz

Q: Meron ka ring binanggit dito sa salaysay mo na may ginawa ulit sayo si Papa mo nung March 6, 2012, maari mo bang sabihin sa court kung ano ang ginawa sayo ng Papa mo noong

March 6, 2012?

A: Minura po ako ni Papa nun.

Q: Bakit ka niya minura?

A: Kasi nga ayaw ko na siyang pagbigyan nun e.

Q: Anong sinabi niya sayo?

A: Minura niya po ako ang sabi niya po may lalaki na daw ako.

Q: May lalaki ka na kaya ayaw mo na siyang pagbigyan?

A: Opo.

Q: Pinilit ka pa din ba niya?

A: Opo.

Q: Nagalaw ka rin niya, anong pinagawa niya sayo nung time na yun?

A: Pinasubo niya po yung ari niya sa akin.

Q: Pagkatapos niyang ipasubo, anong nangyari?

A: Nung ayaw ko pong isubo sinabunutan niya po ako.

Q: Sinabunutan ka kasi ayaw mong isubo? So pinilit kang isubo mo?

A: Opo.

Q: Pagkatapos mong isubo, pinasok pa rin ba niya yung ari niya?

A: Pinasok po.

Q: Saan niya pinasok?

A: Sa puwet po.[52] (Emphasis supplied)

Certainly, XXX's act of forcibly inserting his penis into AAA's mouth constitutes lascivious conduct, punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. AAA, who was then a child, was subjected to

lascivious conduct through the coercion and influence of her very own father. Her age and relationship with XXX were established through her Certificate of Live Birth. Accordingly, instead of rape through
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, XXX should be held liable for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, both the recital in the Information and
the evidence presented by the prosecution provide for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

XXX waived his right to question

the Information in Criminal Case
No. 158508, and thus, may be
convicted of all the crimes charged
and proven.

A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 158508 shows that XXX was charged with two distinct offenses – inserting his penis into AAA's mouth, and having carnal knowledge of her. This
duplicitous Information transgresses Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which ordains that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law

prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."[53]

Parenthetically, Section 3(f), Rule 117[54] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the accused to move for the quashal of an information that charges more than one offense. The objection must be
made at any time before the accused enters his/her plea.[55] Otherwise, the accused is deemed to have waived the ground for objection.[56]
The records reveal that XXX failed to timely interpose an objection against the duplicitous Information. He simply entered his plea of not guilty during his arraignment, without questioning the defective
Information, and even actively participated throughout the trial.
On this score, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense." [57]
To stress, the Information charges XXX with willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously forcing AAA to perform fellatio on him. [58] Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that XXX indeed
forcibly inserted his penis into AAA's mouth despite the latter's struggle and protest. Furthermore, as discussed, such egregious act constitutes lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. Therefore, XXX shall be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

To clarify, the RTC erred in applying the variance doctrine[59] to convict XXX of rape by sexual assault. It is jurisprudentially settled that rape by sexual assault is not included in the crime of rape by carnal
knowledge, considering that the modes of committing said crimes are utterly different. [60] Besides, the Information properly charged XXX with acts constituting rape by sexual assault, which was also
proven during the trial. Thus, it is stressed that XXX is rightfully convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on the basis Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

The alleged lacuna in AAA's

Medical Certificate, and her failure
to immediately report the incident
do not tarnish her credibility.

In People v. Zafra,[61] and People v. Austria,[62] the Court stressed that the absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape.
The primary consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a

prosecution for rape. Rather, the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[63]
Relatedly, in People v. Ramos,[64] the Court declared that, in view of the peculiar nature of rape cases, a conviction often rests solely on the basis of the offended party's testimony as long as it is credible,

natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[65]
Likewise, in People v. Agudo,[66] it was stressed that the fact of rape and the identity of the perpetrator may be proven through the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the victim, which is the most
important proof of the commission of rape.[67] Similarly, in People v. Udtohan,[68] it was emphasized that "[t]he revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence."[69]
It further bears stressing that AAA's failure to immediately report the incident to her mother does not destroy her credibility. Although the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of the charge, it is not correct to expect a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. [70] The workings of the human
mind when placed under emotional stress is unpredictable.[71] Not every victim can be expected to act with reason or conformably with the usual expectation of mankind.[72] Thus, it is unfair to expect a
rational reaction from AAA, a minor, who was confronted with a startling and traumatic experience. AAA further explained that she was cowed into silence out of fear that XXX would kill her. [73]
Equally important, the trial court and the CA regarded AAA's testimony as credible and unequivocal. These factual findings regarding AAA's credibility are accorded great weight and respect, and shall not

be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court had the full opportunity to directly observe the victim's demeanor, conduct, and manner of testifying.[74]
Pitted against the prosecution's strong evidence, XXX's denial falters. Mere denial, sans any strong evidence to support it, may not overcome the positive declaration of the child-victim who has positively

identified her assailant.[75]

Neither is the Court convinced that AAA created a trumped-up charge out of spite. In People v. Austria,[76] it was held that not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would accuse her own
father, unless the accusation against him is true.[77]
In the same vein, in People v. Descartin, Jr.[78] the Court articulated that:
[I]t is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity
or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not been aggrieved. [79]
Thus, the Court believes that AAA was impelled by a sense of justice in filing the charges against XXX.

Damages and Penalty for Qualified

Rape in Criminal Case No. 158506,
and for Lascivious Conduct in
Criminal Case No. 158508.

Article 266-B, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. However,
R.A. No. 9346,[80] has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[81] Likewise, the RTC rightfully
ordered the payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 each.[82]
Anent XXX's conviction for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, considering that AAA was more than 12 years old but less than 18 years old at the time of the incident, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its medium period, to reclusion perpetua. The crime is aggravated by relationship, as it was alleged in the Information and proven during the trial that XXX is
AAA's father. There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. This is likewise in
conformity with Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is, among others, the parent of the victim.
Furthermore, in Criminal Case No. 158508, XXX is ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P75,000.00. In addition, XXX shall pay a fine of
P15,000.00, as mandated under Section 31(f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610.[83]
Finally, all amounts adjudged against XXX shall be subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed October 2, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12277 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 158508, XXX is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY the victim AAA, (i) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (ii) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (iii) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (iv) a
fine of P15,000.00.
All monetary awards are subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum, reckoned from the finality of the Court's Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1] Pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise the identity of the victim, including
the names of her family members or relatives, and the barangay and town where the incidents occurred, are withheld. The names of the victim and her family members or relatives are replaced with
fictitious initials. Likewise, the real name of the accused-appellant is replaced with fictitious initials by reason of his relationship to the minor victim.
[2] Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"

approved on June 17, 1992.

[3] Rollo, pp. 26-28.
[4] Id. at 4-24. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Louis P. Acosta, concurring.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 60-73. Rendered by Judge Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores.

[6] Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on September 30, 1997.

[7] Rollo, pp. 5-6.

[8] Id. at 7.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 254622. February 16, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARKO PULGADO Y MAGNO A.K.A. "MAKO," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated June 16, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11074, which affirmed with modification the Decision [3] dated
October 25, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 2016-996 and 2016-997, finding accused-appellant Marko Pulgado y Magno a.k.a. "Mako"
(Pulgado) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts
The present case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations [5] filed before the RTC charging accused-appellant with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively

defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 2016-996
(Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs)
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of June 2016, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully

authorized[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously deliver and sell to PO3 Sherwin G. Tan P300.00 (SN-DE994536, WA251104 and KN886910) worth of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug weighing One Hundred Six Thousandths (0.106) of a gram placed in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with marking "Exh A
ST BCS."
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 2016-997
(Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs)
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of June 2016, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his effective possession and control four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, with following markings and weight:
B1 (Exh B ROJ BCS) = 0.108 gram

B2 (Exh B-1 ROJ BCS) = 0.175 gram

B3 (Exh B-2 ROJ BCS) = 0.143 gram
B4 (Exh B-3 ROJ BCS) = 0.093 gram
Total = 0.519 gram
said accused not having the corresponding license or prescription to possess said dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around 2:30 in the morning of June 14, 2016, officers of the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operations Team (CAIDSOT) successfully conducted a buy-bust operation
against Pulgado at the Caltex Station in front of a 7/11 Convenience Store along Arthur Street, West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, during which, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.108 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered from him by Police Officer 3 Sherwin Tan (PO3 Tan). After Pulgado's arrest, Police Officer 2 Rexyboy Jugatan (PO2 Jugatan) frisked him and
recovered four (4) more heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a combined weight of 0.519 gram of the same substance from his possession. The police officers then brought Pulgado to the
police station in Brgy. Barretto, Olongapo City, and thereat, PO3 Tan and PO2 Jugatan placed their initials on the seized items and turned them over to Police Officer 2 Benedick C. Sarmiento (PO2

Sarmiento) for marking, inventory, and photography in the presence of Pulgado, members of the CAIDSOT, Barangay Kagawad Dave Antonio (Brgy. Kgd. Antonio), and media representative Jeffrey B.
Valdez of Brigada Siete. Thereafter, the seized items were taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory where, after examination by Police Senior Inspector Maria Cecilia G. Tang (PSI Tang),
their contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.[8] Thereafter, PSI Tang turned over the specimens to the prosecution office for safekeeping until their
presentation during trial.[9]
In defense, Pulgado denied the charges against him, as well as the ownership of the items purportedly seized from him. He claimed that on the day of the alleged incident, at around 7:00 in the evening,
he was on his way home from the public market when he was arrested for allegedly stealing at the Caltex Station.[10]
In a Decision[11] dated October 25, 2017, the RTC found Pulgado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the following penalties: ( a) in Criminal
Case No. 2016-996, for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 plus costs without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 2016-997, for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00 plus costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [12] Giving

credence to the testimony of PO3 Tan, the RTC held that the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crimes charged, and that the apprehending team adequately preserved the chain of
custody over the dangerous drugs from the moment of seizure up to their presentation in court as evidence. [13] Meanwhile, the RTC found Pulgado's defense of denial untenable for lack of clear and
convincing evidence showing that the CAIDSOT did not regularly perform their duties.[14]
Aggrieved, Pulgado appealed[15] to the CA, arguing, among others, that he should be acquitted on account of the apprehending team's failure to comply with the chain of custody rule considering that the
police officers failed to immediately mark the drug evidence at the place of arrest. [16] However, in a Decision[17] dated Jun 16, 2020, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification, sentencing
Pulgado to suffer the following penalties: (a) for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00;

and (b) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.[18] Echoing the trial court's findings, it ruled that the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crimes charged. [19] Moreover, it
held that the chain of custody rule was duly complied with, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been properly preserved.[20]
Hence, this appeal seeking that Pulgado's conviction be overturned.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Pulgado is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,[21] it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.[22] Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.[23]

To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.[24] As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.
In People v. Beran,[25] the Court clarified when the physical inventory and photography shall be conducted. In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photography must be
conducted at the place where the search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the same may be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.[26] Notably, however, RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), are silent as to the
procedure of marking.

Marking is the first and most crucial step in the chain of custody rule as it initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. This is when the apprehending officer or poseur-buyer places his or her initials and signature on the item/s seized. [27]

Thus, in People v. Sanchez,[28] the Court ruled that marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain of custody. This is considering that marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link and is vital to be immediately undertaken because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. Marking serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.[29]

On this note, it must be emphasized that compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law."[30] This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment."[31] Thus, in the case of People v. Lim[32] (Lim), the Court En Banc definitively held that the prosecution has the positive duty to demonstrate observance with the chain of custody rule
under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, in such a way that it must acknowledge and justify any perceived deviations therefrom. This is especially true in cases where the quantity of the seized drugs is
miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration of evidence,[33] as in this case.[34]
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. [35] As such, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: ( a) there is a justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. [36] The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21 (a), [37] Article II of
the IRR of RA 9165, which was adopted into the text of RA 10640. [38] It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses,[39] and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[40]

Thus, when it comes to the marking requirement, the standard rule is that it should be done immediately after confiscation of the seized item from the accused. Nonetheless, marking said item/s at any
other point in time may be allowed, but only if there are justifiable reasons therefor.
In this case, there appears to be a deviation from the chain of custody rule as records show that the marking of the items purportedly seized from Pulgado was performed only at the police station.
Notably, while the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the immediate marking requirement would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon the prosecution to account for such deviation by presenting a justifiable reason therefor. Here, the prosecution did not duly explain such deviation, and merely insisted that the
apprehending team complied with the marking requirement by conducting the same at the police station. This may gleaned from the testimony of PO3 Tan, to wit:
[Prosecutor Melani Fay V. Tadili]: After you gave the money to the accused, what happened next?
[PO3 Tan]: I executed the pre-arranged signal by removing my bull (sic) cap, ma'm (sic).
Q: What happened next?
A: And when I felt that somebody from our team was approaching and I saw PO2 Jugatan frisking Alias "Maco", we introduced ourselves as police officers, ma'm (sic).
Q: Who frisked the accused?
A: PO2 Jugatan, ma'm (sic).

xxxx
Q: And what happened next?
A: We introduced ourselves as police officers after PO2 Jugatan informed him of the Miranda doctrine, we brought him to the Police Station, ma'm (sic).

Q: Where is the police station?

A: At our Office at Police Station 1, ma'm (sic).
Q: Who was in possession of the sachets of shabu sold to you by the accused from the place of your operation to the Station?
A: I was holding it, ma'm (sic).
Q: How about the other sachets of shabu recovered by Police Officer Jugatan, who was in possession of the same?
A: In his possession, ma'm (sic).[41]
xxxx
Q: Do you know what PO2 Sarmiento do (sic) with the sachets of shabu during your inventory?

A: Yes, ma'm (sic).

Q: What?
A: We put markings, ma'm (sic).
Q: After the inventory?

A: Before he prepared the inventory we put our initials, ma'm (sic).

Q: How were you able to put your initials on the sachets of shabu sold to you when you said that the sachets of shabu were already in the possession of PO2 Sarmiento?

A: Before I turn[ed] over to him, I already put my initials, ma'm (sic).

Q: What initials did you place?
A: ST, ma'm (sic).
Q: After marking the sachets of shabu with your initials, what did you do with it?
A: I hand[ed] it over to PO2 Sarmiento, ma'm (sic).
Q: And do you know what PO2 Sarmiento do with it?
A: He also put his initials, ma'm (sic).[42]
In view of the aforementioned unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from

Pulgado were compromised, thereby warranting his acquittal.

As a final word, the Court, in People v. Miranda,[43] issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It declared that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set forth in

the law, then the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in
the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first
time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review."[44]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 16, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11074 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Marko Pulgado y Magno a.k.a. "Mako" is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director General is DIRECTED to inform this Court the
action he/she has taken within five days from receipt of this Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

[1] See Notice of Appeal dated July 22, 2020; rollo, pp. 24-25.
[2] Id. at 4-23. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Bonifacio S. Pascua, concurring.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 46-52. Penned by Judge Raymond C. Viray.
[4] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[5] Criminal Case No. 2016-996 is for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (see id. at 46); while Criminal Case No. 2016-997 is for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 (see id.).
[6] Rollo, p. 46.
[7] Id.
[8] See id. at 4-6; 46-47.
[9] See CA rollo, p. 48.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEXANDER OLPINDO Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

The rule on automatic review of death penalty cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court was rendered ineffective by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[1] which prohibited the imposition of
death penalty. While R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, no criminal case may be elevated motu proprio by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) for automatic review.
This is an Appeal[2] from the November 22, 2019 Decision[3] of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08984 which affirmed the December 1, 2016 Decision [4] of the RTC of San Jose City, Branch 38 in Criminal
Case No. 1307-08-SJC, finding Alexander Olpindo y Reyes (accused-appellant) guilty of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal

Code (RPC).
Antecedents
On October 6, 2008, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610, in an information which reads:
That on or about February 27, 2008, in the City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with [AAA], [5] a 14 year-old minor, without her consent and against the will of the latter, which act
debases, degrades and demeans the dignity of [AAA] and impairs her normal growth and development, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
After evading arrest, accused-appellant was eventually apprehended on December 4, 2012. During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[7] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 2008, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, and her sister, BBB, were on their way home from the city public market, when a tricycle driven by accused-appellant stopped in front

of them. Accused-appellant and his sister Mary Ann Olpindo (Mary Ann), who was on board the tricycle, asked AAA to send BBB home as they allegedly had something important to tell her. AAA refused
but BBB got scared so she ran away and went home to ask for help. [8] Thereafter, accused-appellant and Mary Ann forced AAA aboard the tricycle. Accused-appellant drove to Barangay X with Mary Ann
sitting beside AAA to prevent her from escaping. Mary Ann allegedly got off the tricycle before reaching Barangay X, but AAA was unable to ask for help since the tricycle was moving fast.[9]
Upon arrival at Barangay X, accused-appellant forcibly took AAA to an uninhabited place. He tied her hands with rope, slammed her to the floor, then removed her short pants and underwear. He took off

his clothes and thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina and made up and down movements. AAA felt pain and cried.[10]
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant withdrew his penis, untied AAA, and got dressed. He told her not to tell anyone about the incident. AAA, however, reported the incident to her aunt the following

day.[11]
The prosecution offered for stipulation the proposed testimony of Dr. Janine Duran (Dr. Duran), who examined AAA and consequently prepared a medico-legal report. In its May 10, 2016 Order, [12] the
RTC admitted the following as Dr. Duran's testimony:
1.) That she is a Licensed Physician connected with PJGMRMC, Cabanatuan City during the time [AAA] underwent medical examination;

2.) That she is an expert to perform the necessary medical examination she conducted on the subject minor victim;

3.) That she reduced her findings into writing as shown by the Medico-Legal Report marked as Exhibit "B"; and

4.) That she can identify the said Medico-Legal Report which she prepared.[13]

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant testified that on February 27, 2008, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at the city public market waiting for his girlfriend, AAA. After AAA boarded his tricycle, Mary Ann, accused-appellant's
sister who also worked at the public market, boarded the tricycle. He dropped them off near their respective houses. AAA's grandmother saw him dropping them off. Afterwards, he plied his tricycle for
passengers the whole night.[14]
On that same night, accused-appellant narrated that after parking his tricycle in front of the church, police officers arrived and asked around for the driver of a tricycle with body number 626. When
accused-appellant admitted being the owner of the said tricycle, the police officers invited him to the police station. At the police station, accused-appellant saw AAA's mother and grandmother waiting for
him. Upon seeing him, AAA's grandmother approached and slapped him several times. Initially, he did not know the nature of the complaint against him. When he was informed about the alleged rape, he
denied the same. He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with AAA multiple times, but with her consent because they were in a relationship for about five months already. Prior to that, they had already
known each other for a long time because they were neighbors.[15]
During cross-examination, accused-appellant added that he and AAA were already cohabiting in his place and that AAA's grandmother, who strongly opposed their relationship, was the one who forced
AAA to charge him with rape.[16]

The defense offered for stipulation the proposed testimony of one Fedelita Colorena, which states:
1.) That she knows that [AAA] and the accused [have] a relationship and that they are neighbors;
2.) That she was also working in the public market and on 27 February 2008, [AAA], together with the [accused's] sister, Mary Ann Olpindo, was fetched by the accused;

3.) That the accused did not force [AAA] to board in his tricycle; and

4.) That when they went away on 27 February 2008, they were all happy.[17]

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of rape considering that the prosecution had sufficiently proven all the elements of the said crime. It also ruled that accused-appellant's flight for
more than four years from the filing of the information before his arrest, indicates his guilt. Further, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by accused-appellant had no sufficient basis, and was deemed to be
self-serving and uncorroborated. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused ALEXANDER OLPINDO y REYES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and hereby sentenced

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[18]
CA Ruling

In its decision, the CA first noted that accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal and that, in its December 15, 2016 Order,[19] the RTC, citing People v. Mateo[20] (Mateo), forwarded the records of
the case to the CA for automatic review. The CA opined that the RTC decision, which imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death, was not subject to automatic review and, thus, had already

become final and executory after accused- appellant did not file a notice of appeal. However, the CA proceeded to review the records of the case as if a notice of appeal was timely filed. It explained that
the gravity of the crime committed, as well as the fact that the life and liberty of the accused are at stake, necessitated a review of the factual issues in order to minimize the possibility of errors of
judgment.
Nonetheless, the CA still affirmed the ruling of the RTC and gave credence to the testimony of AAA. It held that the straightforward testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings on her physical
condition, was sufficient to convict accused-appellant of rape. Moreover, the positive identification of AAA prevailed over accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi. The CA observed that the
damages awarded must be increased according to People v. Jugueta,[21] but it did not modify the damages, reiterating that the RTC decision had already attained finality. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by accused-appellant ALEXANDER OLPINDO y REYES is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[22]

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the Court.

Issues

Accused-appellant submits the following errors on the part of the CA:

I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S QUESTIONABLE
BEHAVIOR AND THE PALPABLE [INCONSISTENCIES], AND INCREDIBILITY OF HER TESTIMONY WHICH PUT GRAVE AND SERIOUS DOUBTS ON HER CREDIBILITY.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THERE IS NO CONCLUSIVE FINDING OF RAPE.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND FOR SOLELY RELYING ON THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION.[23]

In its September 21, 2020 Resolution,[24] the Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In its December 23, 2020 Manifestation and Motion, [25] the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that it had thoroughly discussed the assigned errors in its appellee's brief. In his January 4, 2021
Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,[26] accused-appellant averred that he would no longer file a supplemental brief to avoid repetition of the arguments raised in his appellant's brief.
In his Appellant's Brief[27] before the CA, accused-appellant questions the credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA's testimony is too incredible to be given any credence and is full of inconsistencies. He
also claims that there was no conclusive finding of rape. Accused-appellant likewise ascribes ill motive to AAA's grandmother, who disapproves of their alleged relationship, and denies resisting
authorities.

On the other hand, the OSG argues in its Appellee's Brief[28] that the prosecution had duly established all the elements of rape and that AAA's failure to call for help when accused-appellant sexually
abused her is not enough to discredit her testimony. The records show that AAA testified in a forthright manner and remained steadfast even under cross-examination.
Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of rape?
The Court's Ruling
The Court dismisses the appeal.
The present case is not subject
to automatic review.
At the outset, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the procedural milieu of this appeal which involves the application of automatic review and intermediate review of criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In its December 15, 2016 Order,[29] the RTC motu proprio elevated the case to the CA, citing Mateo as basis:

Pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in People vs. Mateo allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[30]
This was an erroneous application of the Mateo ruling.
Prior to its amendment on September 28, 2004, Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides for a direct appeal to this Court for criminal cases where the RTC imposed the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, to wit:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of
this Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.

On July 7, 2004, the Court En Banc promulgated Mateo and, pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec. 5, Rule VIII of the Constitution, introduced an intermediate review by the CA of criminal cases
where the RTC imposed the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The Court emphasized in Mateo the need to provide an additional avenue to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused where his life and liberty are at stake, to wit:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must

be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of
an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.[31]
Consequently, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases) dated September 28, 2004, which resolved to
amend, among others, Secs. 3 and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same

occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this
Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review
and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter, (underscoring supplied)

As correctly explained by the CA, the Court, in People v. Rocha,[32] clarified the confusion that might have arisen because of the pronouncement in Mateo:
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were

grouped together with death penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode
of review, however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on
automatic review.
xxxx

After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 July 2004, this Court promptly caused the amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases.[33]
It is clear that despite adding an intermediate review by the CA, the new rule as introduced in Mateo, retained the modes of appeal prescribed in the old rule. As the rule now stands, in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC. On the other hand, in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed by the RTC is death, the CA shall automatically review the same without need of a notice of appeal.
The difference in the procedural treatment of death penalty cases was explained in the 1910 case of The United States v. Laguna,[34] whereby the Court emphasized the need to protect the accused,
thus:
The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of
the accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded
placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined . Such procedure is merciful. It gives the accused a second chance

for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions.[35] (emphasis supplied)
This is similar to the Court's declaration in Mateo that "[w]here life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused."[36]
However, on June 24, 2006, R.A. No. 9346 was signed into law, prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The pertinent provisions of the said law states:
SEC. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. x x x.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.[37]
As a result, trial courts are precluded from imposing the penalty of death and, instead, shall mete out either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, depending on the nomenclature of penalties used by
the law violated. Corollary to this, Secs. 3(d) and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which prescribe an automatic review by the CA of cases where death penalty is imposed, became ineffective without,
however, the Court simultaneously resolving to suspend the aforesaid rule. At present and during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, an automatic review of criminal cases is no longer available and

in no instance should the RTC elevate motu proprio the case records to the CA.
Notwithstanding the clarification of the Mateo ruling and despite initially recognizing that the case may be dismissed outright, the CA proceeded to review the records of the case as if a notice of appeal
was timely filed, thus:
In this case, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 has become final and executory after accused-appellant Olpindo, who was represented at the trial by his counsel de parte, Atty. June Elva G.
Dumangeng, did not file a notice of appeal. This appeal should thus be dismissed outright as provided under Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by these Rules;
xxxx
In view however of the gravity of the crime committed by accused-appellant and the penalty imposed on him by the RTC. and in view of the ruling in Mateo, supra, that "[w]here life and liberty are at stake,

all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be undone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment" , We have assiduously reviewed the records of this case as if an appeal has timely been made by accused-appellant .
We find no reversible error in the conviction of the accused-appellant, except in the award of civil liability.[38] (underscoring supplied)
The CA, however, after reviewing the merits of the case, still concluded that the RTC decision had already become final and executory because accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal within the
period allowed by the Rules:
However, as discussed, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 has already attained finality and thus has become immutable and may no longer be amended. Olpindo did not file a notice of appeal within

the fifteen (15) day period allowed under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.[39]
As a result, the CA dismissed the appeal without modifying the award of damages.
The Court, however, finds it proper to exercise its prerogative to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interests of justice, particularly the right of the accused to life and liberty.
Strict adherence to the procedural rules facilitates the adjudication of cases and avoids unnecessary delay in the administration of justice, but when such would defeat the ends of justice, the Court may
allow exceptions to the Rules:
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.[40]

In a fairly recent case, the Court exercised its equity jurisdiction and relaxed a rigid application of procedural rules where it would tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice:
It has been held that if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where

strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. [41]
In the instant case, accused-appellant's non-filing of a notice of appeal may be excused because the RTC, on its own, elevated the records of the case to the CA based on its erroneous assumption that
the verdict of conviction is subject to an automatic intermediate review. To be clear, the RTC order forwarding the records of the case pursuant to the Mateo ruling was issued on December 15, 2016,
which was 14 days after the RTC promulgated its ruling on December 1, 2016, or within the 15-day reglementary period under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court [42] for the accused to file a notice of
appeal. As initially discussed, the CA could have just treated the automatic review as if a notice of appeal was timely filed by herein accused-appellant considering "the gravity of the crime committed by
accused-appellant and the penalty imposed on him by the RTC."[43] This would better serve the interests of justice as it provides an additional layer of protection against a possible erroneous judgment. In
Latogan v. People,[44] the Court liberally construed the rules in the interests of justice:
However, procedural rules were precisely conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must

yield to the latter. Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court enjoins the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote its objective to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[45]

In the absence of a rule on how to treat criminal cases elevated motu proprio for automatic review when it is no longer applicable, it is fair to consider the same as if a notice of appeal had been timely
filed. In such manner, the accused will be provided with another opportunity to defend his case and convince the courts of his innocence of the accusations against him.
In the instant case, accused-appellant cannot be faulted for not filing a notice of appeal considering that the adverse RTC decision erroneously ordered the records forwarded to the CA for automatic
review. The RTC order to elevate the records had initiated the appellate procedure in which accused- appellant had actively participated on the presumption that the motu proprio elevation of the records

of the case was valid. Consequently, it is premature to say that the appeal was dismissible under Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court on the ground of failure to file a notice of appeal within the
prescribed period. It is also hasty to conclude that the RTC judgment of conviction had become immutable when the period to appeal had not lapsed or accused-appellant has not waived in writing his right
to appeal. To reiterate, the RTC order forwarding the records of the case to the CA was made within the 15-day reglementary period.
Even assuming that the judgment of conviction had become final and executory because accused-appellant failed to file a notice of appeal before the RTC, the Court has relaxed the rule on immutability of
judgments to serve the ends of justice, such as where life and liberty are at stake and the party favored by the relaxation of rules is not at fault. Again, Latogan v. People[46] discussed:
Withal, as in the liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, the Court has enumerated the factors that justify the relaxation of the rule on immutability of final judgments to serve the ends of
justice, including: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.[47]
As a matter of equity, considering that the case was elevated motu proprio within the reglementary period to file an appeal and accused-appellant had shown his intent to appeal his conviction by actively

participating in the CA proceedings and by timely filing a notice of appeal before the CA, the Court takes cognizance of the instant appeal. This throws the whole case open for review by the Court,
including modifying the amount of damages.
Appeal by certiorari in cases
involving reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
As the remedies regarding criminal cases where the penalty imposed by the courts are either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are the subject matter in the case at bench, the Court deems it proper
to address the remedy of appeal by certiorari.
Sec. 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that appeal by certiorari is a mode of appeal. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[48] On the other hand, Sec. 1 of Rule 45 provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari."[49] Accordingly, appeal by certiorari is the mode of appeal; while a petition for review on certiorari is the pleading where the said mode of appeal is effectuated.
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be

raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already
been considered in the lower courts.[50] A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. In contrast, what is involved is a question of fact when
the resolution of the same demands the calibration of evidence, the determination of the credibility of witnesses, the existence and the relevance of the attendant circumstances, and the probability of
specific situations.[51]
With respect to criminal cases, Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. —
xxxx
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules 45. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.

xxxx
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
There are other related provisions found under Rules 45 and 56 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 9, Rule 45 states:
Sec. 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

In connection therewith, Sec. 3, Rule 56 provides:

Sec. 3. Mode of appeal. — An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court states that except as provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. On the other hand, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 states that "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment
imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals." [52] Conspicuously, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 used the word "may" in stating
how appeal from the decision of the CA can be taken to the Supreme Court. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.[53] In addition, the said provision does not contain the word "only," which would have imposed the essential and exclusive means by which an appeal to the Court may be perfected. [54]

Further, a deeper analysis of Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 13(c), Rule 124, would demonstrate that a petition for review on certiorari is simply not allowed in cases of
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment when the purpose of the appeal is to open the case for review, including questions of fact.

Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court contemplates an appeal of a judgment involving reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by notice of appeal. Thus, the mode of appeal undertaken is an ordinary
appeal. As early as the case of United States v. Clemente,[55] the Court stated that an appeal taken by the accused from a criminal conviction throws the whole case open for reconsideration by the
appellate tribunal. Indeed, when the mode of appeal is through a notice of appeal, it is an appeal in a criminal case that throws the whole case wide open for review; and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[56]
When ordinary appeal is chosen as the mode of appeal, the Court can review the entire records of the criminal case, including those where the penalty involves reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Thus, an examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion. [57] Since the appeal throws the whole case open for review, there were instances
of cases on appeal that the Court even imposed a graver penalty than that provided in the assailed judgment.[58]
Accordingly, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court mandates the remedy by filing a notice of appeal, when the purpose of the accused, who is convicted of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, is

to throw the case open for review, which includes questions of fact. This interpretation is consistent with Sec. 9, Rule 45, which states that Rule 45 shall not apply to appeals in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, because those appeals contemplate opening the whole case for review, including questions of fact. Likewise, it is coherent with Sec. 3, Rule 56,

because it proscribes a petition for review on certiorari except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, because appeals in these cases include questions of
fact.
Notably, Sec. 3(e), Rule 122; Sec. 13(c), Rule 124; Sec. 9, Rule 45; and Sec. 3, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court do not categorically prevent the accused, who was convicted, from filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 based purely on questions of law. Instead, these provisions proscribed the said petition for review on certiorari if it raises a question of fact. In such situation, the proper mode of

appeal is an ordinary appeal which will throw the whole case open for review by the Court, including questions of fact.
Based on the foregoing, if an accused wants to file a petition for review on certiorari to purely raise a question of law before the Supreme Court without absolutely raising any question of fact, when the CA
has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, there is no ostensible legal roadblock to such remedy. Indeed, the Supreme Court has the inherent authority and ultimate prerogative,
based on its sole discretion, to entertain purely questions of law and to determine whether the applicable laws were properly applied in any pending case.
However, a review of relevant jurisprudence shows that if the accused, who is convicted of a crime penalized by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, files a petition for review on certiorari raising
questions of fact, it may still be entertained by the Court if there is compelling reason to evaluate the findings of fact of the courts a quo.
In Dungo v. People,[59] a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the accused even though the CA had imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court stated that "[a]n accused, nevertheless, is
not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Moreover,
such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons." [60] However, in that case, the questions of fact raised by the
petition were still entertained because, "due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review."[61]

Similarly, in People v. Del Rosario,[62] the CA imposed a penalty of life imprisonment against the accused. However, the accused filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. In that case, the
Court still examined the records of the case because the appeal was meritorious.
Recently, in Bartolome v. People,[63] petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari even though the penalty imposed by the CA was reclusion perpetua. The Court recognized that a petition for review
on certiorari may only raise pure questions of law. However, the Court was constrained to review the evidence presented as the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In contrast, in Alicando v. People,[64] the petitioner therein was convicted by the CA of the crime of rape with homicide and which imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari before this Court. However, the Court did not grant the petition because it raised questions of fact and the factual findings of the courts a quo were neither arbitrary nor
unfounded.
In the same manner, in Macad v. People,[65] even though the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court after the CA imposed the penalty of life imprisonment, it was underscored that
only questions of fact may be raised in such an appeal. The Court also highlighted that even if the questions of fact raised by the petitioner are considered by the Court, the petition was still bereft of merit.
[66]
There are other cases when a petition for review on certiorari is filed against the decision of the CA, which imposes reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, that the Court has treated as an ordinary
appeal in the interests of substantial justice.

In Arambulo v. People,[67] the petitioner therein filed a petition for review on certiorari even though the CA had imposed a penalty of life imprisonment. It was underscored that, in the interests of
substantial justice, the Court would treat the instant petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the substantive issue at hand with finality. Likewise, it was stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and that the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.[68]
Similarly, in Matabilas v. People,[69] the petition for review on certiorari assailing a judgment of the CA imposing life imprisonment was not outrightly dismissed. Instead, it was held that in the interests of
substantial justice, the Court would treat the petition as an ordinary appeal in order to finally resolve the substantive issues at hand.
After thorough analysis of the relevant rules and jurisprudence, the Court finds that a petition for review on certiorari may be filed by an accused where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, provided that purely a question of law is raised. However, if a petition for review on certiorari raises a question of fact, it can be treated as an ordinary appeal based on the interests of
substantial justice, which would throw the whole case open for review, including the factual findings of the courts a quo.
The prosecution duly proved the

elements of rape.
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be convicted of rape on the
basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering
that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. Indeed, it is more consistent with human experience to hold that a rape victim of
tender age will truthfully testify as to all matters necessary to show that she was raped.[70]
In the instant case, accused-appellant hinges his present appeal on the issue of credibility of AAA as prosecution witness. It is well-settled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is

entitled to great weight particularly when affirmed by the CA. In People v. Descartin, Jr.,[71] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that:
The rule is settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are accorded
finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" – all of which, are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges,
therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings
are sustained by the CA.[72]

Accused-appellant attempts to discredit AAA's testimony for being incredible because she did not even ask for help or at least offer any resistance in defense of herself. The Court has invariably ruled that
rape victims react differently.[73] There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. Some may shout, some may faint, some may choose to

keep their ordeal, and some may be shocked into insensibility. None of these, however, impair the credibility of a rape victim, let alone negate the commission of rape. [74]
It is also well-settled that the accused in a rape case may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[75]
Here, both the RTC and the CA found that AAA's testimony was straightforward and candid. Thus, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule, since accused-appellant failed to
demonstrate that the RTC and the CA overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of weight and substance that would alter the assailed decision.
Art. 266-A of the RPC provides that rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Whereas, Art. 266-B of the RPC provides the penalties for the crime of rape:
ART. 266-B. Penalty. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
For a charge of rape by sexual intercourse under Art. 266-A(1), as amended by R.A. No. 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that; (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he
accomplished this act under the circumstances mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.[76]
In the instant case, this Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of rape by sexual intercourse. First, accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim. AAA was unwavering in her assertion that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, making an up and down movement. Her testimony was strongly corroborated by
the medico-legal findings. Second, accused-appellant employed threat, force, and intimidation to satisfy his lust. In this case, AAA testified that accused-appellant forcibly took her into an uninhabited
place, tied her hands with rope, slammed her to the floor, and then removed her short pants and underwear. As a minor, AAA could not reasonably be expected to resist in the same manner that an adult
would under the same or similar circumstances. Thus, the crime of rape was established.

In addition, the physical examination conducted on March 1, 2008, or only two days after the incident, showed that AAA sustained multiple abrasions which indicate the application of force and violence on
her person, and hymen laceration on her private part which proves sexual assault. The CA correctly held that accused-appellant cannot find exculpation simply because the attending physician did not
identify the medico-legal report confirming that AAA suffered sexual assault. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape or acts of lasciviousness. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential for the conviction of perpetrators of such crimes.[77]
The defenses of denial and alibi
of accused-appellant were weak.
Accused-appellant's defense of denial deserves scant consideration. He mainly invokes the "sweetheart theory," claiming that he was in a romantic relationship with AAA for about five months as of the
date of the incident and that they had previously copulated for at least six times. However, bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be
substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos, and the like. [78] Here, aside from accused-appellant's bare testimony, no other evidence
was presented to support his claim.

Also, as pointed out by the CA, accused-appellant's claim that he was maliciously charged with rape has no leg to stand on. His defense of denial and alibi cannot take precedence over the rape victim's
categorical and positive narration of facts.
Interestingly, the fact that accused-appellant's whereabouts could not be determined for four years since the information was filed shows that he has evaded arrest and is highly indicative of his guilt. He
has not even presented a reasonable explanation for his prolonged absence from the authorities.
In People v. Lopez, Jr.,[79] the Court held:
Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may

be established "for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence."[80]
Penalty and Damages
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC under Art. 266-B of the RPC. However, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amount of damages. Pursuant to People v.
Jugueta,[81] if the penalty imposed for simple rape is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages shall be P75,000.00 each, all subject to six percent (6%)
interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
Summary
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court pronounces that since the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, in 2006, prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the procedure on automatic review of
death penalty cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has been rendered ineffective and is, thus, suspended. The suspension of the procedure on automatic review of death penalty cases shall not,

however, impact the manner of imposing penalties in view of R.A. No. 9346, and shall remain only during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect.
Considering further that criminal cases imposed with the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment have still been elevated motu proprio to the appellate courts for automatic review, the Court

adopts the following guidelines:

1. In cases where the prescribed penalty is death, but where reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment was imposed by reason of R.A. No. 9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of
appeal either before the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

2. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed not by reason of R.A. No. 9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal either before the
Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

3. When the case records of a criminal case imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, whether due to R.A. No. 9346 or not, are elevated motu proprio for
automatic review, the following rules shall apply:

1. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued beyond fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order and
the accused did not file a notice of appeal within the same period, the automatic review shall not be given due course. The Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

2. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued within fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order, the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall issue an order requiring the accused within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to manifest whether they are
adopting the order to elevate the records as their notice of appeal. If the accused shall refuse to adopt or fail to timely manifest despite due notice, they shall be
deemed to have waived their right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

4. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and the accused files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. However, based on the interests of substantial justice, a petition for review on certiorari that raises questions of fact may be treated as an ordinary
appeal in order to throw the whole case open for review.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals in its November 22, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08984. Accused-

appellant Alexander Olpindo y Reyes is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, he is ORDERED to PAY AAA civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00, with interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1] An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, June 24, 2006.
[2] Rollo, pp. 25-27: see December 18, 2019 Notice of Appeal.
[3] Id. at 3-24; penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Louis P. Acosta, concurring.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 50-57; penned by Presiding Judge Leo Cecilio D. Bautista.
[5] The real name of the child victim shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy and, instead, fictitious initials shall be used in accordance with the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No.

83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, reiterating and supplementing the Guidelines in Administrative Matter No. 12-7-15-SC dated September 4, 2012.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 246868. February 15, 2022 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELIQUE PEARL O. CLAUR AND MARK A. CLAUR, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case
This petition for review on certiorari assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107744 entitled Angelique Pearl O. Claur, Petitioner-Appellee v. Mark A. Claur,

Respondent, Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor-Appellant:

1) Decision[1] dated January 30, 2018, affirming the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of petitioner Angelique Pearl O. Claur with respondent Mark A. Claur; and

2) Resolution[2] dated April 11, 2019, denying the Republic's motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents
In her verified petition below, Angelique Pearl sought to have her marriage with Mark declared void ab initio on the ground that they were both psychologically incapacitated. Mark failed to file his answer
despite notice.[3]
Angelique Pearl testified that she and Mark were schoolmates in high school. She had a crush on Mark even though he had a notorious reputation for being flirtatious and for drinking alcohol at such a
young age. She got Mark's mobile number from their common friends. Soon after, she became his girlfriend.[4]
During their relationship, she discovered that Mark was the "jealous type" and was too obsessed with her. [5] At the same time though, she also found out that Mark was still texting other girls and had
been lying to her. Mark also had the habit of not disclosing his whereabouts to her. When Mark tried to break up with her, she threatened to commit suicide. [6] On the other hand, when she would try to

break up with him, Mark would devise a way for her to stay in the relationship. He would manipulate her dormmates to convince her not to break up with him. He would also wait outside her dorm and even
call her parents. For about three (3) to six (6) months, they alternated between breaking up and reconciling.[7]

When they went to different universities for college, Mark's jealousy had escalated as well as their fights. They would curse each other and sometimes their quarrels would turn physically violent. During
the five (5) years of their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, they broke up and reconciled around twenty (20) times.[8]
Then, she got pregnant unexpectedly. She was only twenty (20) years old while Mark was twenty-one (21) years old at that time. [9] When her parents found out, they did not consider marriage as an
option. She, too, was hesitant about it. But Mark insisted that they get married. His parents even deceived her by promising that she and Mark would move to the United States of America if she married

their son. Thus, on January 3, 2009, they tied the knot at the Ascension Chapel of Villa Escudero.[10] But after the wedding, they only stayed in the house of Mark's family. She had difficulty living with
them since she was not accustomed to doing household chores. Too, Mark's parents would borrow money from her claiming they needed it to pay for Mark's tuition fees.[11]
Not long after, she discovered all the lies that Mark fed her. One of them was when Mark made her believe that he was only one (1) semester away from his college graduation. But the truth was, he still
needed several years to finish his degree. Another was when Mark told her that his father was working for a certain company. She found out though that Mark's father was a security guard. [12]
Subsequently, they moved in with her parents in Quezon. Since she was used to their household helper doing chores for her, she did not unpack their things. Mark got irritated and threw the bags at her.
She retaliated by hitting him with her "happy feet" clogs. Mark sustained a laceration in the head which bled. He panicked because he feared the sight of blood. But instead of helping Mark, she did not do
anything and simply watched him as his head continued to bleed. It was her mother who helped Mark clean the wound and stop the bleeding. She did not tell her mother what happened because she
thought her mother would not believe her anyway.[13]
On April 4, 2009, their son Malique Antonio was born. Mark, nonetheless, wanted to end their relationship. They separated several times, each incident lasting for a few days or a week. Mark had a habit
of leaving her and their child to meet up with his friends whenever he got upset. Their married life had been marred by quarrels, disagreements, and even violence. There was one (1) incident when he

accidentally locked her up in the bathroom. When she finally got out, she and Mark fought and he hit her in the face, breaking her jaw.[14]
When Mark eventually finished college, he made no attempt at all to find gainful employment. He was lazy, extravagant, and given to vices. [15] He refused to find a job and merely relied on her for
financial support. Sometime in September 2011, she insisted that they part ways. Mark retaliated by falsely telling her parents that she had a male text mate and lover.[16]
In January 2012, she was expecting to go out on a date with Mark to celebrate their anniversary. Mark, however, came home late and drunk. She then asked their household helper to pack Mark's things.
Mark left and they have since been separated in fact.[17]
Johnson C. Tiu testified that he is Angelique Pearl's uncle and confidant. He is very close to her and he fondly calls her "Apol". He first heard about Mark when Apol admitted to him that she had a crush
in their school at the De La Salle, Lipa City, Batangas. Apol would always talk about Mark so he (Johnson) told her that she must introduce Mark to him. He eventually met Mark when he went to Apol's
dorm in Batangas to pick her up. Apol introduced him as her boyfriend but Mark just kept quiet.[18]
Thereafter, Apol would confide in him about her "rocky" relationship with Mark. She told him about their constant fights over her jealousy and Mark's philandering. He advised Apol to just end things with
Mark, but then, she got pregnant. He (Johnson) and Apol's parents did not want her to marry Mark but they eventually accepted her decision to get married.
After they got married, Apol confided in him about all the lies that Mark made her believe. Mark also lacked a sense of responsibility and still lived his life like a bachelor. Apol, on the other hand, would
always be jealous and was a "nagger."[19] She also disclosed that Mark continued his philandering ways and started to physically assault her. The worst incident was when Apol broke her jaw when Mark
hit her on the face. He wanted to confront Mark at that time but Apol asked him not to.[20]

Dr. Jay Madelon Castillo-Carcereny testified that she is a physician and a psychiatrist. She personally examined Angelique Pearl. She also interviewed Angelique Pearl's father Antonio Tan Ong.
Based on the interviews and tests she conducted, she diagnosed Angelique Pearl with "borderline personality disorder", thus:
(1) she has frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment, e.g., she held on to the relationship with Mark by having sexual intercourse with him and eventually becoming pregnant;
(2) she has a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation, e.g., she idealized Mark thinking that he was the
escape from her past life experiences;
(3) she is impulsive in at least two (2) areas that are potentially self-damaging, e.g., she spends excessively, and considers purchases as a "quick fix", and money as a form of affection;
(4) she has recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures or threats, or self-mutilating behavior, e.g., she drank insecticide and hurt herself in response to being rejected;
(5) she has affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood, e.g., she has mood swings, temper tantrums, and tendencies for assault;
(6) she has chronic feelings of emptiness; and
(7) she has inappropriate intense anger or difficulty controlling anger, e.g., she breaks things and makes a scene when she is angry.[21]

As for Mark, although she was not able to personally examine him, the information she gathered from Angelique Pearl and Antonio, who personally saw Mark's coping mechanisms when the couple lived
with them, was adequate for her to diagnose Mark with "narcissistic personality disorder", thus:
(1) he has a grandiose sense of self-importance, e.g., he painted stories of his family's wealth and did not want anyone to know the real status of his family;
(2) he is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love, e.g., he took review classes, but did not take the board examinations;
(3) he requires excessive admiration, e.g., he had simultaneous relationships and flirted with other women before and during his marriage with Angelique Pearl;
(4) he has a sense of entitlement, or unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his expectations, e.g., he did not try to gain employment and provide for his

family;
(5) he is interpersonally exploitative or takes advantage of others to achieve his own ends, e.g., he used Angelique Pearl by making her pay for his education;
(6) he lacks empathy and is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others, e.g., he only visited his son once a year and was verbally and physically abusive towards Angelique
Pearl; and
(7) he shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes, e.g., he is disrespectful towards his parents.[22]
Dr. Castillo-Carcereny explained that the root cause of their personality disorders was their respective dysfunctional families classified as "double bind" in Mark's case and "pseudo hostility" in Angelique
Pearl's case.[23] They had developed it during childhood and had become deeply entrenched in their persons such that neither of them thought they were problems, [24] Any medication or recommended
treatment to address the condition would be useless since each of the parties' personality disorder is "grave, permanent and incurable."[25]

Dr. Castillo-Carcereny recommended that the marriage of Angelique Pearl and Mark be declared void on the basis of each party's "psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations which
manifested during early adulthood, increasing in gravity and severity from adolescence to present."[26]

Mark did not present evidence.

The Ruling of the Trial Court
Under Decision[27] dated November 26, 2015, the Regional Trial Court – Branch 260, Parañaque City granted the petition for declaration of nullity of Angelique Pearl and Mark's marriage on the ground of
both parties' psychological incapacity. It found that the totality of evidence shows that Angelique Pearl and Mark were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.
Acting for the Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration, which got denied under Order[28] dated July 4, 2016.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the OSG argued that the trial court failed to specify the pieces of evidence pertaining to the supposed existence of the parties' psychological incapacity. It argued that Angelique Pearl's
statements were "inherently biased and self-serving," Johnson's testimony was "hearsay," and Dr. Castillo-Carcereny's findings were "not credible." Thus, even if taken together, their testimonies deserve

scant consideration.[29]
On the other hand, Angelique Pearl was deemed to have waived her right to file her Appellee's Brief.[30]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Through its assailed Decision[31] dated January 30, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that from the totality of evidence presented, the trial court correctly determined that Angelique Pearl and
Mark were both suffering from psychological incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.[32]
The Court of Appeals found that the assessment and professional opinion of Dr. Castillo-Carcereny conformed with the factual milieu of the case and the evidence presented by Angelique Pearl. Dr.

Castillo-Carcereny's comprehensive analysis and findings sufficiently established the parties' psychological incapacity.[33]
The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the OSG's motion for reconsideration.[34]
The Present Petition
The Republic, through the OSG, now seeks the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction to reverse the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals. It maintains that Angelique Pearl failed to establish that
her marriage to Mark is void due to the psychological incapacity of her husband and even herself. For other than the self-serving testimonies of Angelique Pearl and her biased witnesses, no other
evidence was presented to substantiate the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court that the parties were indeed psychologically incapacitated. [35]
More, even on the assumption that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible, they still failed to establish a debilitating personality disorder that renders the spouses incapable of performing their
essential marital obligations.[36] While Angelique Pearl established that: a) Mark lied about his schooling and his father's occupation; b) both parties inflicted physical injuries on each other; and c)
Angelique Pearl forced Mark to leave the conjugal home, these facts did not render their marriage void.[37] They are, at most, mere grounds for legal separation.[38]
In her Comment,[39] Angelique Pearl ripostes that the petition should be denied considering that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that the evidence presented sufficiently

established that she and Mark are psychologically incapacitated.[40]

She experienced and suffered first-hand the manifestations of Mark's psychological incapacity. [41] Thus, she was merely stating a fact when she testified about it before the trial court. Meanwhile, as her
confidant, Johnson had personal knowledge of the physical manifestations of her "borderline personality disorder", her turbulent relationship with Mark, and the emotional and physical pain that the latter
inflicted on her.[42]
As for Dr. Castillo-Carcereny, her findings were based on psychological tests and interviews of the witnesses who gave their personal accounts, observations, perceptions, and experiences with her
(Angelique Pearl) and Mark. The data she gathered allowed Dr. Castillo-Carcereny to diagnose her and Mark's psychological disorder and to trace the root causes thereof. [43] Her professional expertise
and findings cannot be discounted just because she did not have the opportunity to personally examine Mark. At any rate, the personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
is not a mandatory requirement for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[44]
Issue
Did the evidence on record sufficiently support the petition of Angelique Pearl O. Claur for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Mark A. Claur on ground of psychological incapacity?
Ruling

Article 36 of the Family Code recognizes the psychological incapacity of a spouse as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, thus:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is a legal,
not a medical, concept
In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal,[45] the Court clarified that "psychological incapacity" should be understood as a legal concept rather than a medical one. As such, it does not require clinical
diagnosis to be established. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from
the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
Tan-Andal, too, set new parameters in appreciating the three (3) main criteria for psychological incapacity. First, gravity still has to be established, if only to preclude spouses from invoking mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts as ground for nullity. Second, incurability should also be understood in the legal sense. So long as the couple's respective

personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable breakdown of the marriage, the psychological incapacity of a spouse or both spouses is
deemed "incurable". Third, juridical antecedence or the existence of the condition prior to the celebration of marriage, is a statutory requirement which must be proven by the spouse alleging
psychological incapacity.
Tan-Andal likewise decreed that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case by clear and convincing evidence. Notably, this quantum of proof requires more than preponderant evidence but less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt.[46] The Court, nonetheless, reiterated that judgments in cases involving the alleged psychological incapacity of a spouse should be based on the totality of
evidence adduced during the course of the proceedings.[47] Each case must be resolved based on its particular set of facts and Article 36 of the Family Code applied on a case-to-case basis. For Tan-

Andal was not meant to strait-jacket lower courts, forcing them to apply the guidelines in nullity cases of all shapes and sizes.[48]
The totality of evidence on record
clearly and convincingly establishes
the psychological incapacity of both
Angelique Pearl and Mark
In Republic v. Mola Cruz,[49] the Court stressed that the findings of the trial court on the existence or non-existence of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. A sharper pronouncement on the respect accorded to the trial court's
factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was made in Kalaw v. Fernandez,[50] viz.:

It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an
inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No

protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
Here, the Republic failed to provide compelling reason to convince the Court to deviate from the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The totality of evidence presented clearly
and convincingly show that both Mark and Angelique Pearl are psychologically incapacitated from discharging their respective duties as husband and wife.
First. Their psychological incapacity has juridical antecedence since their personality structures were manifest even before the celebration of their marriage.
Angelique Pearl admitted she got attracted to Mark despite his notoriety when they were still in high school. Their relationship had already been "rocky" since the beginning. Mark was too jealous and
obsessed with her, yet, he still flirted with other women. When Mark tried to break-up with her, she threatened to commit suicide. On the other hand, when she tried to break up with Mark, he pressured
her into staying together.
Their quarrels even escalated when they went to college. They would curse each other and their fights had gotten violent. During the five (5) years they had been in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, they

broke up and reconciled around twenty (20) times.[51] But then, she got pregnant unexpectedly. She was only twenty (20) years old while Mark was only twenty-one (21). She herself was hesitant to get
married but got forced to yield because Mark and his parents insisted otherwise.

Unfortunately, their relationship turned for the worse after they got married. She struggled living with Mark's parents. She also uncovered Mark's lies about the financial status of his family and his studies.
[52] He lived extravagantly, yet, he was unemployed and merely relied on her for financial support.[53]
Their relationship did not improve even when they moved in with her parents. They separated several times. Mark would leave her and their son whenever he got upset. They kept fighting like they did
before and they ended up physically hurting each other. There was one incident when she wounded Mark in the head and just watched him bleed. [54] On another occasion, it was Mark who hit her in the

face and broke her jaw.[55] Their married life has been marred by disagreements, quarrels, and violence.[56]
Evidently, the testimony of Angelique Pearl successfully discharged the burden to prove her and Mark's psychological incapacity. The trial court and the Court of Appeals properly gave credence to her
personal account of what transpired before and during her marriage to Mark considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other."[57]
Further, Angelique Pearl's uncle and confidant, Johnson, corroborated her testimony. He witnessed her turbulent relationship with Mark even before they got married. Subsequently, despite their marriage
and the birth of their son, Angelique Pearl and Mark's relationship spiraled downward. Mark lacked a sense of responsibility and still lived his life like a bachelor. Angelique Pearl, on the other hand, was
always jealous and became a "nagger."[58] Worse, Mark continued his philandering ways and started to physically assault Angelique Pearl. Johnson bore witness to how Mark broke the jaw of Angelique
Pearl during one of their violent fights.[59]
Clearly, the respective personality structures of Angelique Pearl and Mark were already present even before they got married. Their dysfunctional acts when they were in a boyfriend – girlfriend
relationship and even when they were already husband and wife have made it impossible for either of them to understand and, more important, to comply with their essential marital obligations.

Second. The gravity of their condition cannot be categorized as mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and mere occasional emotional outbursts.
They resented each other and it never failed to manifest each time. Their relationship started from being "rocky", to turbulent, to violent. Neither of them accorded the other the love and respect that was
due to a spouse or life partner. Their incongruity depicted a pattern of persistent failure to be a loving, faithful, respectful and supportive spouse. As shown, their misunderstandings had escalated to
frequent quarrels, cursing, and worst, physical violence. Surely, we cannot, by any means, consider them as mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty in the performance of their marital obligations.
Third. Their respective personality structures are "incurable" in the legal sense. Their conditions prevented them from complying with their marital obligations as embodied in the Family Code, particularly
the observance of mutual love, respect and fidelity, and rendering mutual help and support.[60]
Their behavior before and after their wedding clearly manifests their psychological incapacity and show their utter lack of willingness to properly treat each other as husband and wife. Their dysfunctional
on and off relationship, though solemnized, was not salvaged by their marriage. On the contrary, their formalized union only served to trap both of them in a perpetually loveless relationship. They are so
incompatible and antagonistic toward each other that the only result of their marriage would be its inevitable and irreparable breakdown.[61]
True, physical and verbal abuse, neglect and abandonment of spouse and children, or acts of infidelity including adultery or concubinage, each constitutes a ground for legal separation. But where each
one of these grounds or a combination thereof, at the same time, manifests psychological incapacity that had been existing even prior to marriage, [62] the court may void the marriage on ground of

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Here, Mark's acts of infidelity, abuse, neglect, and abandonment, on one hand, and Angelique Pearl's suicidal behavior, ill temper, and verbal and physical abuse, on the other, collectively manifest both of
their psychological incapacity in the legal sense. They satisfy the criteria of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability. Their behavioral patterns and personality structures clearly show that they are
psychologically incapacitated from fulfilling their obligations as husband and wife and as parents to their son.
Fourth. The findings of Dr. Castillo-Carcereny support this conclusion.
To emphasize though, Tan-Andal categorically declared that the testimony of a medical expert is no longer required for purposes of establishing psychological incapacity as a legal concept. We no longer
look at psychological incapacity as a medical condition or personality disorder, the root cause of which has to be identified. Instead, courts may rely on the testimonies of ordinary witnesses for purposes of
determining whether one or both spouses are psychologically incapacitated.
Even then, Tan-Andal discussed the parameters for determining the sufficiency of a report rendered by a psychologist or psychiatrist, viz.:[63]
x x x [T]he rule [on admissibility of expert opinion] requires the following. First, that the "knowledge" testified on must be "scientific," that is, it must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported

speculation." Second. The specialized knowledge be of such character that the trial judge be "able to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Third, the trial judge, like a "gatekeeper,"
takes a firsthand look on "the scientific validity...[or] the evidentiary relevance or reliability... of the principles that underlie" the testimony being offered as expert opinion. "The focus...must solely be on
the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate." (emphases added, citations omitted)
xxxx
On hearsay, x x x they are generally inadmissible. However, if "the expert opinion [is] based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, [it is] to be admitted only if the facts or date are 'of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon a subject.'" xxx (emphases added, citations omitted)

Here, the State does not challenge the expertise of Dr. Castillo-Carcereny as a psychiatrist. As the Court of Appeals found, her credentials and expertise to testify as an expert witness in the field of
psychiatry have been duly established.[64]
On the methodologies and procedures applied by Dr. Castillo-Carcereny, records show that aside from conducting personal interviews of Angelique Pearl and her father Antonio, Dr. Castillo-Carcereny
also did several tests to arrive at her findings, viz.: (1) Culture Fair Test; (2) Basic Personality Inventory; (3) House-Tree-Person; (4) Draw-A-Person Test, (5) Bender Gestalt Visual Motor Test, (6) Luscher
Full Color Test; and (7) Zung Depression Scale.[65] These tests bore the following results:
REMARKS:
x x x Mark Claur is suffering from a NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER[.]
xxxx

Mark Claur presented with 7 out of 9 traits of a Narcissistic Personality, wherein only 5 are needed to satisfy the criteria[.]
xxxx

Mark Claur is an [unprincipled narcissist [with] antisocial features[,] a charlatan[,] x x x a fraudulent, exploitative, deceptive and unscrupulous individual[.]
On the other hand, x x x, the Petitioner Angelique Pearl Ong-Claur is suffering from a BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER[.]
xxxx
Angelique Ong-Claur presented with 7 out of 9 traits, wherein only 5 w[ere] needed to satisfy the criteria for a Borderline Personality[.][66]
Dr. Castillo-Carcereny found that Mark is suffering from a "narcissistic personality disorder." The manifestations of his condition are: (1) grandiose sense of self-importance which made him concoct stories
of his family's wealth; (2) fantasies of unlimited success as shown when he took review classes although he did not take the board examinations; (3) need for excessive admiration which fueled him to flirt
with other women before and during his marriage with Angelique Pearl; (4) sense of entitlement such that he merely relied financially on Angelique Pearl; (5) exploitative character when he used Angelique
Pearl to pay for his education; (6) lack of empathy which clearly showed when he got verbally and physically abusive toward Angelique Pearl and then abandoned her and their son; and (7) arrogance and

haughty behavior.[67]
On the other hand, Dr. Castillo-Carcereny testified that Angelique Pearl is suffering from a "borderline personality disorder" which is manifested by: (1) frantic efforts to avoid abandonment by having pre-

marital sex with Mark which got her pregnant; (2) idealization of Mark as an escape from her past life experiences; (3) impulsiveness by spending excessively and using money as a form of affection; (4)
suicidal behavior in response to being rejected; (5) instability through mood swings, temper tantrums and tendencies for assault; (6) chronic feelings of emptiness; and (7) inappropriate intense anger or
difficulty controlling anger.[68]
Verily, the fact alone that Dr. Castillo-Carcereny was not able to personally interview and administer tests on Mark does not render her findings inadmissible. As stated in Tan-Andal, expert opinion based

on otherwise hearsay evidence could still be admitted if the facts are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon a subject." The Court has
ruled that doctors, within their acknowledged field of expertise, can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources.[69]
Here, Dr. Castillo-Carcereny still managed to draw a reasonable conclusion on Mark's condition based on the information which Angelique Pearl and her father Antonio had given her. As held in Tan-
Andal, this method of data collection, i.e., clinical interviews of patients and collaterals, remains to be a principal technique in diagnosing psychiatric disorders up to this date. Thus, the information she
gathered were "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts", hence, (her) expert opinion based thereon may be admitted in evidence."
Thus, based on the evidence on record and applying Article 36 of the Family Code (as clarified in the recent landmark case of Tan-Andal), we affirm the uniform findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that there is clear and convincing evidence here to support the conclusion that Angelique Pearl and Mark are psychologically incapacitated, in the legal sense, from complying with their marital
obligations. Consequently, the marital union between them is declared void ab initio. As correctly underscored by the Court of Appeals:
This court has been convinced that the quantum of evidence sufficient to declare the nullity of marriage was met in this case . To reiterate, this court shuns granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage unless on the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, x x x. However, it

cannot ignore the fact that the totality of evidence shows that the parties are indeed suffering from psychological incapacities which are grave, permanent or incurable, and ha[ve] juridical
antecedence. In this particular case, it is distinctly clear that [the] spouses have failed to establish a functional family because of their failure to perform their essential marital obligations. There is no
more love and respect and this is not the kind of family that the State wants to preserve. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2018 and Resolution dated April 11, 2019 in CA-G.R. CV No. 107744 are AFFIRMED.
The marriage between Angelique Pearl O. Claur and Mark A. Claur is declared VOID on ground of their psychological incapacity. Accordingly, their property relation as husband and wife is DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and concurred in by Justices Normandie B. Pizzaro and Pablito A. Perez; rollo, pp. 48-61.
[2] Rollo, pp. 62-63.

FIRST DIVISION

[ UDK-16915. February 15, 2022 ]

JOSEPH ROBLE PEÑAS PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE UNIT RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

Petitioner Joseph Roble Peñas assails the following issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 14-422 entitled Commission on Elections represented by the Campaign
Finance Unit v. Joseph Roble Peñas.

1. Resolution No. 18-0665[1] dated November 5, 2018, finding probable cause for his indictment for violation of Section 100[2] in relation to Section 262[3] of Batas Pambansa 881 (BP
881), the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7166,[4] for election overspending;

2. Resolution[5] No. 20-0121-33 dated December 9, 2020, denying his motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents
On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Digos City, Davao Del Sur for the 2010 National and Local Elections (NLE). He ran under the banner of the Nationalist

People's Coalition (NPC). For the 2010 NLE, Digos City had a total of 93,801 registered voters.
On June 7, 2010, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8944,[6] petitioner filed with respondent COMELEC his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE)[7] where he declared his total
election campaign expenditures in the amount of P600,000.00.
By Letter[8] dated October 1, 2014, respondent's Campaign Finance Unit informed petitioner that under Section 13[9] of RA 7166, a candidate who belongs to a political party is only allowed to spend
three pesos (P3.00) for every registered voter in the constituency where he or she seeks to be elected. Hence, petitioner was allowed to spend up to P281,403.00 only for his election campaign. By
spending P600,000.00 for his election campaign, as reported in his SOCE, petitioner clearly exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law. Petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the letter to
submit his written explanation why no charges should be filed against him for election overspending.
On October 29, 2014, petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation[10] to the COMELEC Law Department. He explained that he failed in good faith to specify the breakdown of his expenses

in his SOCE. Because he was overwhelmed with emotions for having won in the mayoralty elections in his city, he failed to thoroughly review the SOCE which his secretary prepared. Petitioner clarified
that of his reported P600,000.00 total campaign expenditures, P112,924.10 was spent for the printing of sample ballots and P245,000.00, for lawyer's fees. These items, he claimed, should not have been

included in the computation of expenses incurred by a candidate conformably with Section 8[11] of COMELEC Resolution No. 8944 for the May 10, 2010 NLE, and Section 3, Rule 4[12] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9476[13] for the 2013 NLE. Had these amounts been deducted from the P600,000.00 expenditure he earlier reported, his expenses would have only totaled P241,574.01 for his election
campaign, well within the expenditure limit prescribed by law.
On November 6, 2014, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit filed a formal complaint[14] against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC, as amended by RA
7166, for election overspending.
On February 9, 2015, petitioner submitted his Counter-Affidavit[15] dated January 26, 2015 where he essentially averred that on September 22, 2009, he was appointed party Chairman of NPC for Digos
City, Davao Del Sur for the 2010 NLE. As City Chair, he was authorized by the NPC to pay for any and all expenses of NPC-Digos City as well as reasonable expenses redounding to the benefit of all
NPC local candidates. For this reason, he spent P112,924.10 for the printing of sample ballots for NPC candidates both for the national and local elections. Too, he engaged the legal services of Atty.
Leopoldo Diones (Atty. Diones) to address the collective legal concerns of NPC local candidates in Digos City. He paid Atty. Diones P245,500.00 as lawyer's fees, albeit, it was listed as "Miscellaneous
Expenses" in his SOCE.
The expenses for the printing of sample ballots and payment for the legal services of Atty. Diones were NPC political party expenses and not his own personal expenditure as mayoralty candidate, thus,
should have been excluded from the computation of his expenditures during the 2010 campaign period. This is in accordance with Section 102(i) and (k) of the OEC [16] which categorically state that the
expenses for engagement of legal services and printing of sample ballots, respectively, are excluded from the computation of campaign expenses. The exclusion of these items would bring his total
campaign expenditure to P241,574.01 only, well within the allowed expenditure limit of P281,403.00 for Digos City.

Rulings of the COMELEC En Banc

By Resolution No. 18-0665[17] dated November 5, 2018, the COMELEC En Banc found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial and consequently ordered the filing of an Information against him for
violation of the OEC, viz:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department finding probable cause to hold respondent JOSEPH R. PEÑAS for trial and the filing of
information for violation of Section 100 of B.P. Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), as amended by R.A. No. 7166, in relation to Section 262 of the same Code.
Let the Law Department implement this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC En Banc essentially ruled that petitioner's plea to admit the correction of entries in his SOCE was a mere afterthought to avoid criminal liability. At any rate, the correction and supporting
receipts were self-serving and should be scrutinized in a full-blown trial.[18]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 13, 2018 which was denied under Resolution No. 20-00121-33 dated December 9, 2020.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now charges the COMELEC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict him for overspending for his campaign during the 2010
NLE, notwithstanding that: (1) he submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation to rectify the errors in his SOCE; (2) the SOCE was considered though the same had not been duly executed; and (3) the
COMELEC incurred inordinate delay in resolving the complaint.
On number (2), he asserts that the notarized SOCE he filed on June 7, 2010 had not been duly executed. For although the aforesaid SOCE stated that it was "supported by receipts, vouchers and other
documents reflecting full true, accurate and complete election contributions received and expenditures incurred xxx" ,[19] in truth, the SOCE was not supported by such documents. Hence, although the

SOCE was notarized, the same does not bind him since he himself admits that the document was defective.[20]
As for number (3), he charges respondent with inordinate delay in conducting the preliminary investigation in his case, thus, violating his right to a speedy disposition of his case. He invokes Section 8,
Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure ordaining that preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days from receipt of the counter-affidavit and other evidence of the
respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter. As it was, the COMELEC failed to observe the prescribed period because it took the COMELEC approximately three (3)
years and nine (9) months from submission of his counter-affidavit to issue the resolution finding probable cause to charge him with election' overspending, and approximately two (2) more years to
resolve his verified motion for reconsideration. In total, it took the COMELEC more than ten (10) years from the filing of his SOCE to indict him for alleged violation of the OEC.[21]
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through Assistant Solicitor General Henry S. Angeles, and Associate Solicitors Michael Pio V. Cua and Gerard
Samuel Alphonsus B. Contreras, counters that the petition must fail on both procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural ground, petitioner alleged that on February 4, 2021, he received Minute Resolution No. 20-00121-33, denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then counted thirty (30) days from
February 4, 2021 before filing the present petition before the Court on March 8, 2021, citing Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner, however, failed to deduct the seven (7)-day period between

his receipt of Minute Resolution No. 18-0665 on December 6, 2021 until the filing of his motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2021 as required under Section 3, Rule 64.
Applying the provision, petitioner only had twenty-three (23) days left, not a full thirty (30)-day period, from February 4, 2021 or until February 27, 2021 to file a petition for certiorari. But since February 27,
2021 was a Saturday, petitioner's recourse could have only been filed on March 1, 2021 at the latest. Clearly, the present petition was filed seven (7) days late on March 8, 2021, hence, should be
dismissed outright.
Too, dismissal of the present petition is warranted because petitioner is not without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For the issuance of Resolution No. 20-
0121-33 signaled the end of preliminary investigation before the COMELEC and the start of the criminal proceedings before the trial court. What petitioner should have done was submit himself to the

jurisdiction of the trial court, appear during arraignment and enter his plea, and proceed to the trial of the ensuing criminal case[22] instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the Court.
Going now to the issue of inordinate delay, its determination is not a numbers game [23] and the entire context of the case should be considered, more so in this case where the government agency
involved is tasked to administer the elections of the country.
The complaint here was filed in 2014. It was only resolved in 2018 or four (4) years later. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in 2018 which eventually got resolved in 2021. Meantime, the Comelec
was busy with the intervening elections in 2016 and 2019, hence, it was unable to immediately act on the complaint and petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
At any rate, petitioner failed to make a timely assertion of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. As held in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[24] petitioner should have done overt acts to manifest his
assertion of the right, such as the filing of a motion for early resolution. Failing in this, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced to the delay, if any, and had already waived his right to the speedy
disposition of the case.

On substantive grounds, the OSG asserts that the finding of probable cause against petitioner was well-supported by evidence, specifically, by his own SOCE. Besides, under Section 7, Rule 34 [25] of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a complaint initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, as in this case, is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause.

In any event, petitioner cannot deny the due execution of his SOCE. As a notarized document, petitioner avowed therein, under penalty of law, the truth of the contents of the instrument or document.
Further, the COMELEC did not err when it did not give weight to petitioner's Affidavit of Correction/Explanation, the same being self-serving and having been filed merely as an afterthought when petitioner
had already been notified of the legal consequences of the declaration in his SOCE. In any case, the legal effect, if at all, of petitioner's affidavit should be threshed out during the proceedings in the
criminal case in court, not during the preliminary investigation.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
On the late filing of the petition
As correctly argued by the OSG, petitioner erred in reckoning the thirty (30)-day period within which to file the present petition from his receipt of the denial of his motion for reconsideration. In Pates v.

COMELEC,[26] the Court already decreed that the fresh-period rule which resets the reglementary period for seeking judicial relief is inapplicable to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64. On the contrary,
the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration is deductible from the thirty (30) days granted under Section 3 thereof.

Petitioner received copy of the COMELEC En Banc's Resolution No. 18-0665 finding probable cause for his indictment on December 6, 2018. It took him at least seven (7) days therefrom to file his motion
for reconsideration dated December 13, 2018. Deducting this seven (7)-day period from the thirty (30) days granted under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, petitioner had twenty-three (23) days
left to file the present petition for certiorari from February 4, 2021 when he received the Minute Resolution No. 20-0121-33, denying his motion for reconsideration. In other words, he had until February 27,
2021 to file the present petition. But petitioner filed his petition only on March 8, 2021, clearly beyond the period prescribed by Rule 64.

Even then, we cannot lose sight of the fact that procedural rules were precisely conceived to aid the attainment of justice such that if a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.[27] In exceptional cases, the Court allows a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote its objective to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[28]
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, the Court has not been oblivious to, or unmindful of, the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, this Court's decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. The Court hastens to add though
that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
cause.[29]Here, the Court finds a compelling reason to relax the strict application of procedural rules -- the COMELEC's assailed actions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion which is correctible
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as will be further discussed below. To rule otherwise would unnecessarily expose petitioner to the expense and rigors of a public trial when records indubitably
show that his plea for relief is based on meritorious grounds. The Court, thus, deems the relaxation of procedural rules warranted in this case as the ultimate purpose of substantial justice so requires.

Certiorari as the plain, speedy, adequate remedy

The COMELEC contends that petitioner erroneously resorted to this Court via a petition for certiorari when he is not without a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
COMELEC posits that petitioner should have just allowed the trial of the criminal case against him to proceed where he may participate and adduce evidence of his innocence.
To emphasize, however, recourse to Rule 65 does not require absence of a judicial remedy to a party. It is the inadequacy – not the absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.[30] Adequate remedy simply means that "xxx a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal concerned."[31]
Indeed, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may even prosper despite the availability of other remedies in certain exceptional circumstances, such as: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy so dictate; (b) when the interests of substantial justice so require; or (c) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[32]
In petitioner's case, a full-blown trial is not a speedy and adequate remedy. Going through a public trial would not afford petitioner an expeditious relief from the detrimental effect of a wrongful charge of an
election offense, especially one that is filed despite inordinate delay.
Petitioner had already been deprived of the prompt disposition of the complaint against him by the protracted preliminary investigation. It would be more unjust to further subject him to public trial when

there is evidence early on that otherwise contradicts the initial findings of the COMELEC. Withal, the original action of certiorari will afford petitioner immediate relief from the deleterious effects of the
COMELEC's whimsical and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court will not shun from its duty of affording petitioner a prompt and effective legal remedy.
Respondent COMELEC Acted in Grave
Abuse of Discretion
The COMELEC, through its authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations of ail election offenses and to prosecute them. [33] This power emanates from Article IX,
Section 2, Paragraph 6 of the 1987 Constitution which empowers the COMELEC to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices."[34] This grant of authority is reiterated in Section 265 of the OEC as amended by RA No. 9369, viz.:
SECTION 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.
As with ordinary criminal cases, the COMELEC is tasked with finding probable cause whenever it conducts preliminary investigation of election-related offenses. It. is settled though that the finding of

probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. [35] Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion.[36]
A court or tribunal can only be considered as having acted with grave abuse of discretion when its act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari can only strike an act down for
having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.[37]

Here, the Court finds that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it recommended the filing of an Information against petitioner despite the
inordinate and oppressive delay which attended the conduct of preliminary investigation.
The COMELEC is guilty of inordinate delay
Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the guarantee to speedy disposition of cases, thus:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
As elucidated in Magante v. Sandiganbayan,[38] the provision expanded the speedy trial guarantee afforded to the accused in a criminal proceeding under the 1935 Constitution:
x x x Though both concepts are subsumed under the more basic tenet of procedural due process, the right to speedy disposition of cases, to contrast with the right to speedy trial, sweeps more broadly as
it is not confined with criminal cases; it extends even to other adversarial proceedings before any judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals. No branch of government is. therefore, exempt from

duty observing the constitutional safeguard and the right confirms immunity from arbitrary delay. x x x
Hence, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice, including herein respondent COMELEC.

In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[39] the Court laid down certain guidelines in resolving issues concerning inordinate delay, viz.:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time

periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given lime period and the right
is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the
defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case;
second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the
issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution
despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the
case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional
right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Applying these guidelines, there is clear inordinate delay in how the COMELEC handled the preliminary investigation and subsequent resolution of petitioner's case.
First. The right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked to question the inordinate delay in the course of preliminary investigations by the COMELEC. While fact-finding proceedings and
investigations such as these do not form part of the criminal prosecution proper, the respondent may already be prejudiced by such proceedings.[40]
To be sure, a respondent, such as petitioner, though not yet imprisoned is nevertheless disadvantaged by the uncertainties of his potential criminal case. He is forced to live under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. [41] Not to mention, his reputation is already tarnished despite the
presumption of innocence in his favor.
Second. The COMELEC failed to observe its own prescribed period for resolving cases when it finally recommended the filing of an Information against petitioner on December 9, 2020 or more than six
(6) years from when the formal complaint was filed on November 12, 2014.
The COMELEC is Constitutionally committed to act promptly on cases filed before it. In fact, this is one of the reasons why Article IX-C, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution authorized the COMELEC to
promulgate its own rules of procedure:
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation

controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis added)
Article IX-A, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution reiterates this authority of the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it, thus:
SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
Pursuant to its rule-making power, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules of Procedure, Section 8, Rule 34 of which ordains that a preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days and
a resolution must thereafter be issued within five (5) days, thus:
xxxx
Sec. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and
resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter.
xxxx

As stated, the complaint against petitioner was filed on November 12, 2014. Subsequently, petitioner filed his counter-affidavit on February 9, 2015. By Resolution No. 18-0665 dated November 5, 2018,
or about four (4) years from when the complaint was filed, the COMELEC ordered the filing of an Information against petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and this time, it took the
COMELEC another two (2) years to issue Resolution No. 220-00121-33 dated December 9, 2020 to deny the motion. Indubitably, the COMELEC went beyond the prescribed period for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.
Third. In view of the COMELEC's failure to observe its own prescribed period for resolving petitioner's case, the burden of justifying the delay is shifted to it. Consequently, it must prove first, that it
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay

inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. The COMELEC, however, failed to establish these circumstances.
For one. Instead of proving compliance with its own prescribed procedure, the COMELEC merely attempted to justify the delay by citing the two (2) general elections which it had to administer during the
pendency of the investigation, i.e. the 2016 and 2019 NLE.
But this hardly justifies the delay it took the COMELEC to conclude the preliminary investigation. On the contrary, a prolonged investigation should have been avoided at all cost precisely because of the
looming elections at that time.
Consider. An adverse finding during preliminary investigation would give rise to a criminal charge for an election offense. If found guilty thereof, petitioner would have been disqualified from running for
public office[42] let alone sit as mayor of Digos City. Surely, the fact that petitioner was an incumbent elected official who was set to run for re-election if not higher office during the 2016 and 2019 NLEs
should have prompted the COMELEC to conclude its investigation with utmost dispatch. Otherwise, those who intended to vote for petitioner could have ended up wasting their vote for a disqualified

candidate.
For another. Petitioner's case did not at all involve complex or intricate issues which require voluminous records or evidence. The lone issue needed to be resolved was whether petitioner went beyond the

prescribed campaign expenditure limit. To determine if there had indeed been an excess, a simple mathematical equation is all that is required: multiply the number of registered voters in Digos City by
three pesos (P3.00). The product must then be parried with the amount actually spent by petitioner. If the amount spent was greater than the product, then there is probable cause to charge petitioner with
election overspending, subject to any valid defense which petitioner may raise in his counter-affidavit.
Indeed, why the preliminary investigation lasted for an unreasonable period of time is clearly unfathomable considering the simplicity of the issue, that there is only one respondent charged in the
complaint, and the evidence involved here was not at all voluminous. As the Court pronounced in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[43] absent any extraordinary complication which the prosecution must
adequately prove, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved m the case, or any event external thereto that effectively stymied the prosecution's normal work activity, any delay in the
resolution of the preliminary investigation is not justified.[44]
Yet another. The six (6)-year period it took to resolve the complaint grossly prejudiced petitioner. Prejudice is assessed in light of the interests of the accused which the speedy disposition right is designed

to protect, such as: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [45]
The Court notes that the first criterion does not apply in this case because petitioner was never arrested or incarcerated. The second and third criteria, however, apply to petitioner.

The unjustified delay caused petitioner mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, [46] which naturally attend every
criminal prosecution. The pendency of the investigation unduly affected his reputation, an invaluable asset for an elected official like him. The ascription of an offense to him eroded the confidence reposed
on him by the people of Digos City, all the more so because he was a "first time" mayor from whom much was expected by his constituents and adversaries. Too, the prolonged investigation impaired his
defense in the event of a full-blown trial, for witnesses may no longer be available to testify for him, or documentary evidence such as receipts may have gotten lost along the way.

Clearly, the COMELEC failed to discharge its burden to justify the length of time it took for it to conclude the preliminary investigation in this case. There was no showing that the COMELEC followed its
prescribed procedure to the letter in order to obviate any delay in the proceedings. Nor was it established that the issues were too complex and the evidence required voluminous, making delay inevitable.
Indubitably, therefore, inordinate delay attended the COMELEC's conduct of the preliminary investigation of petitioner's case.
Finally. Petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived his right to a speedy disposition of his case and against inordinate delay.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan[47] (Javier) is apropos:
Here, the Court holds that Javier and Tumamao's acts, or their inaction, did not amount to acquiescence. While it is true that the records are bereft of any indication that Javier and/or Tumamao "followed-
up" on the resolution of their case, the same could not be construed to mean that they acquiesced to the delay of five years.
For one. the case of Coscalluela v. Sandiganbayan (Coscalluela) provides that respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings do not have any duty to follow up on the prosecution of their
case. The Court categorically stated:
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's

responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
The Court in Cagang did not explicitly abandon Coscolluela — considering that it explicitly abandoned People v. Sandiganbayan in the said case — and even cited it in one of its discussions. Thus, the
pronouncements in Coscolluela remain good law, and may still be considered in determining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was properly invoked.
Moreover, the Court is not unreasonable in its requirements. The Ombudsman's own Rules of Procedure provides that motions to dismiss, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are
prohibited. Thus, respondents like Javier and Tumamao have no legitimate avenues to assert their fundamental right to speedy disposition of cases at the preliminary investigation level . It
would be unreasonable to hold against them — and treat it as acquiescence — the fact that they never followed-up or asserted their right in a motion duly filed.
Lastly, the Court holds that Javier and Tumamao timely asserted their lights because they filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest opportunity. Before they were even arraigned, they already
sought permission from the Sandiganbayan to file the Motion to Quash to finally be able to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. To the mind of the Court, this shows that Javier and
Tumamao did not sleep on their rights, and were ready to assert the same given the opportunity. Certainly, this could not be construed as acquiescence to the delay. (Emphases added)
As in Javier,[48] the Court cannot fault petitioner herein for only invoking his right to a speedy disposition of his case in the present petition. As held, a respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation
is not duty bound to follow up on his or her case; it is the governing agency that is tasked to promptly resolve it. As held in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,[49] "[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily

resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to
causes directly attributable to him."
Further, the Court observes that similar to the Rules of Procedure before the Ombudsman, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise prohibits the filing of motions to dismiss. Section 1(a), Rule 13
pertinently reads:
Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:
a) motion to dismiss;
xxxx
In other words, there is also no legitimate avenue to invoke ones right to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC. Petitioner's failure to do so should not therefore be taken against him.
At any rate, petitioner timely asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case since he filed this petition immediately after the COMELEC directed the filing of an information against him. As held in
Javier, it is sufficient that the right is asserted before entering a plea during arraignment.

All told, given the inordinate delay of about six (6) years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and COMELEC's utter failure to provide sufficient justification therefor, the rulings of the COMELEC
should be reversed and the criminal action filed against petitioner, if any, abated and dismissed.[50] On this score, we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the other issues raised herein.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 18-0665 dated November 5, 2018 and Resolution No. 20-0121-33 dated December 9, 2020 are NULLIFIED for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The formal complaint against petitioner, Joseph Roble Peñas for alleged violation of Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC,
as amended by RA 7166, for election overspending is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 73-83.

[2] SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. — No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in
kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, that where the land, water or aircraft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the expenses for the
use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses inclined by the candidate.
[3] SECTION 262. Other election offenses. — Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182,

184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239
and 240.

[4] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS THERFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
[5] Rollo, pp. 97-99.
[6] Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
[7] Rollo, p. 39.
[8] Id. at 40.
[9] SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. — The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:

EN BANC

[ A.M. No. RTJ-11-2289 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3656-RTJ). February 15, 2022 ]

IN RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER DATED AUGUST 12, 2010, COMPLAINING AGAINST JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60,
ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court is a Plea for Partial Judicial Clemency[1] dated July 28, 2021 (petition) filed by former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 60 (RTC), Ofelia T.
Pinto (petitioner), seeking the "restor[ation] or reinstate[ment] [of her] retirement benefits, considering her financial situation and the difficulty of surviving in [the] pandemic." [2]
The Facts

In an anonymous letter-complaint dated August 12, 2010 filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act, Gross Misconduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment. [3] The charge was based on her act of granting the motion to reopen Criminal Case No.
91-937 filed by the convicted accused (at large) despite the finality of the decision in said case.[4]
In her Comment, petitioner claimed that the outright denial of the motion to reopen the case was improper because it would violate the accused's opportunity to be heard, considering the presence of
exculpatory evidence and the lack of objections by the public prosecutor and the private complainant. She also alleged that, even if the granting of the motion was erroneous, it was done in the exercise of
her adjudicatory functions which cannot be made the subject of disciplinary action.[5]

Finding the letter-complaint meritorious and having found petitioner guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, the OCA recommended that she be suspended from service without salary and
other benefits for a period of six (6) months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with utmost severity.[6]

While agreeing with the OCA's findings, the Court, in a Decision[7] dated October 2, 2012, modified the recommended penalty from suspension to dismissal from service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in government service,[8] and held petitioner guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law for violating Section 24, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[9] On imposing the penalty of dismissal, the Court noted that it was not the first time that petitioner was found administratively liable. In Pineda v. Pinto,[10] the Court
reprimanded petitioner for charges of Gross Inefficiency and Neglect of Duty, while in Marcos v. Pinto,[11] the Court found petitioner liable for Simple Misconduct and violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, and imposed on her a fine in the amount of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Seven (7) years after her dismissal from service, or on June 12, 2019, petitioner filed a letter appealing for judicial clemency, [12] which was referred to the Court by the OCA on February 17, 2020,[13] but
was denied in the Resolution[14] dated July 28, 2020 for lack of merit. Petitioner filed another Petition for Judicial Clemency [15] dated August 1, 2020, praying that she be allowed to receive her retirement
benefits "in the interest of justice and for compassionate and humanitarian reasons." [16] The same was only noted without action by the Court in the Resolution [17] dated August 25, 2020 in view of the
denial of her initial request for judicial clemency for lack of merit.

Shortly after the denial of her first two pleas for judicial clemency, petitioner again comes before the Court with the abovesaid petition, praying for the restoration or reinstatement of her retirement benefits,
considering her financial situation and the difficulty of surviving in the pandemic. Among others, she cites the recent Decision in Re: Allegations Made under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan (Re: Ong),[18] wherein the Court granted partial judicial clemency to former Sandiganbayan Justice
Gregory S. Ong,[19] seeking that the Court exercise the same compassion since she and her husband are without proper resources from buying medicines to address their medical conditions. In
particular, petitioner claims that she is suffering from Type II Diabetes Mellitus and Hypertension, while her husband has been dependent on his wheelchair from a cerebrovascular accident.[20]

Furthermore, petitioner claims that she has displayed remorse, and has been active in social and religious activities in her community, through her various positions in different organizations, and by
providing free legal services to its members.[21] In support thereof, petitioner submitted various certifications and testimonials, including but not limited to: (1) a certification from St. Joseph the Worker

Parish;[22] (2) a certification from Our Lady of the Holy Rosary-Sub-Parish Pastoral Council;[23] (3) a certification from Kapisanan ng Flores de Maria;[24] (4) a certification from Cofradia ni San Jose;[25]
(5) a certification from St. Joseph the Worker Parish-Basic Ecclesial Community;[26] (6) a certification from Barangay Pandayan of Meycauyan City, Bulacan;[27] and (7) a certification from her village
association.[28] Aside from these certifications, she presented various certificates of recognition and appreciation coming from different groups.[29]

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the present petition should prosper.

The Court's Ruling

"Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring official." [30] It is well-settled that judicial clemency "is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time. The
Court will only grant it in meritorious cases. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are considered as indispensable requirements to the grant of judicial clemency." [31]

Clemency is both personal and public. While judicial clemency is an act of compassion accorded by the Court to benefit a particular individual, its grant must always be viewed within the context of its
public consequences. As held by the Court in Re: Ong, the mercy of the Court in clemency cases must always be tempered by the greater interest of preserving the public confidence in the
courts.

[C]lemency should not only be seen as an act of mercy. It is not only for the wrongdoer's convenience. The interests of the person wronged, as well as society in general — especially its value in
precedent — should always be taken into primordial consideration.

[Verily, clemency] is neither a right nor a privilege that one can avail of at any time[, and its grant] must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts [and in the legal

profession in general.][32]

It was in the 2007 case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing For Judicial Clemency (Re: Diaz),[33] that the Court first framed the
operative guidelines for judicial clemency relative to a clemency petition filed by a disrobed judge. There, the Court, "[i]n the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and all personnel thereof, x x x [laid] down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:"[34]

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, judges or judges['] associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for
 the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.[35]

In the 2013 case of Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[36] the Court explicitly applied the Re: Diaz guidelines to a clemency petition seeking the reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. Re: Diaz would then be
consistently cited by the Court as the jurisprudential guidelines in resolving clemency petitions, whether filed by a disrobed judge or a disbarred lawyer.

Fairly recently, the Re: Diaz guidelines were later refined in the 2021 cases of Re: Ong (with respect to clemency petitions filed by judiciary employees, including judges), and Nuñez v. Ricafort (Ricafort)

[37] (with respect to lawyers). As explained in those cases, the main impetus behind the Re: Diaz refinement was the necessity to curb the subjectivity of dealing with clemency petitions, and hence, the
institutionalization of more uniform standards and more objective fact-finding process in resolving clemency petitions.

Thus, as a uniform standard, the Court, in Re: Ong, ruled that, unless for extraordinary reasons, there must be a five (5)-year minimum period before "dismissal or disbarment [can] be the subject of any
kind of clemency."[38]

Meanwhile, with respect to the process of resolving clemency cases, it has been further ruled that " allegations of those who apply for clemency must first be evaluated by this Court to find whether
prima facie circumstances exist to grant the relief. Should there appear to be so, a commission must be created to receive the evidence, with due notice to any offended party and the public.

The commission will then determine if there is substantial evidence supporting the allegations ."[39] Necessarily, if no prima facie case exists, the clemency plea should be dismissed without the
need of referring the case to the fact-finding commission.

For guidance, a prima facie case exists when the clemency petition sufficiently demonstrates, on its face, that the petitioner has sincerely expressed remorse for his or her past infraction/s, has
convincingly reformed his or her ways, and is forthwith deserving of the relief prayed for based on the surrounding circumstances.[40]

Due to the peculiarities of every clemency petition, as well as the administrative case penalizing the petitioner, the determination of whether or not a prima facie case exists must be made on a case-to-
case basis.

Nevertheless, in all instances, the allegations contained in the clemency petition must be duly supported by proof; otherwise, the Court would not be able to have an objective analysis of the clemency plea
due to the lack of any supporting evidence on record. In Re: Ong, the Court definitively pronounced that:

This Court cannot rely on allegations without corresponding proof, which could be testimonies and certifications attached to the plea. These supporting documents must not merely be pro-forma, but
should contain specific details on one's actions after being dismissed.[41] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the foregoing regard, the Court's first duty in resolving clemency cases is to thoroughly sift through the petition and ascertain whether or not there is proof of a prima facie showing that would merit the
clemency prayed for. It is only when such prima facie case exists that this Court would, as per the new procedure in Re: Ong, refer the case to a fact-finding commission. In turn, the commission's duty is
to receive the evidence in support of the petition and submit a report thereon containing its factual findings and recommendation. Subsequently, the report shall be submitted to the Court which will resolve
the clemency petition.

Ultimately, the need for an objective analysis in clemency cases hearkens to the nature of judicial clemency as an act that not only benefits the petitioning individual, but more so, affects the public
confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court discerned that, as matter of judicial policy, it was high time to replace the old procedure in clemency cases and replace it with a refined and integral process of
screening, referral, and fact-finding by a commission. In Ricafort, the Court rationalized as follows:

As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency is granted based on a policy framework created solely by the Court pursuant to its constitutional power of: ( a) administrative supervision over all courts and all
personnel thereof with respect to dismissed judiciary employees; and (b) regulation of the legal profession with respect to disbarred lawyers. In deciding whether to grant clemency, the Court endeavors to
strike a balance between extending an act of mercy to an individual on the one hand, and on the other hand, preserving public confidence in the courts, as well as the legal profession. Certainly,
safeguarding the integrity of the courts and the legal profession is an indispensable consideration in this assessment. Hence, the petitioner should convincingly hurdle a high bar to be granted
judicial clemency.
However, as per the current procedure following the Re: Diaz guidelines, the Court, when resolving clemency cases, is not impelled to go beyond the allegations in the petition and written documents
appended thereto. Institutionally, the Court is not a trier of facts; thus, it lacks the proper capability to probe into the finer details of the factual assertions made in a clemency petition . In the
same light, the Court cannot, on its own, authenticate the petition's supporting evidence, or examine, under oath, the sincerity of the person seeking clemency, as well as of those who vouch for him or
her.

In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that, more likely than not, all of the submissions in a clemency petition are self-serving since it would always be in the petitioner's natural desire to submit everything

beneficial to him or her so as to convince the Court to reinstate him or her back to the Bar. Moreover, the number of testimonials/certifications, as well as the perceived clout of the petitioner's
sponsors/endorsers, are unspoken factors that influence the Court's disposition. In the end, without a proper fact-finding procedure, the Court is constrained to resolve a clemency petition based
on a subjective — instead of an objective — analysis of the petition.

Thus, in Re: Ong, the Court cautioned that:

Judicial clemency cannot be subjective. The more we have personal connections with one who pleas for clemency, the more we should seek to distance ourselves. It is also anticipated that pleas for
judicial clemency are largely self-serving. x x x

Aside from the problem of subjectivity, equally significant is the quandary of authenticating the alleged socio-civic activities meant to prove that the petitioner has indeed reformed. Due to the lack of a
fact-finding mechanism, the Court is hard-pressed to determine whether or not these activities were actually undertaken, or if so, how many times they were undertaken and their actual scope. In this
regard, the Court cannot simply discount the possibility that these so-called "socio-civic activities" may just be isolated instances which are not truly reflective of the petitioner's sincere and genuine
reformation but rather, listed only to pad up the petition.

In light of these issues, the Court, in the recent case of Re: Ong, resolved that prospectively, all clemency petitions which, upon the Court's evaluation, demonstrate prima facie merit, should be referred
to a commission created to receive the evidence to prove the allegations by substantial evidence[.][42] (emphases and underscoring in the original)

At this juncture, it should be pointed out that the Re: Ong guidelines are prospective in application; hence, the new parameters stated therein took effect from the time of its promulgation on January 19,
2021.[43] Since the present petition for judicial clemency was filed last August 19, 2021,[44] the Re: Ong guidelines apply.

In accord with Re: Ong, it is preliminarily observed that the present clemency petition was filed after the five-year minimum period. As records show, petitioner's first clemency petition was dated last June
12, 2019,[45] or after seven (7) years from her dismissal from service through the Court's Decision [46] promulgated last October 2, 2012. Necessarily then, the present petition filed last August 19, 2021

complies with the five (5)-year minimum period.

In Ricafort, the Court explained the underlying impetus of establishing a default uniform period before one becomes eligible to file a clemency petition:

To be sure, the underlying impetus of establishing a default uniform period is to curtail the broadly subjective process of determining the appropriate period within which genuine remorse
and reformation are perceived to have been attained. Conceptually, the five (5)-year requirement is a reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period necessary for the [petitioning
lawyer's] reflection of his or her past transgressions for which he or she was meted the ultimate penalty of disbarment . For clarity, the period is reckoned from the time the Court's resolution is
promulgated since it is only by then that the lawyer becomes duly informed of his administrative liability and hence, would be able to begin atoning for his or her malpractice.

This uniform period also addresses the apparent inconsistency of the Re: Diaz guidelines which, on the one hand, requires "[s]ufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation" (second guideline), while on the other hand, mandates that "[t]he age of the person asking for clemency must show that he or she still has productive years ahead of him or her that
can be put to good use by giving him or her a chance to redeem himself or herself" (third guideline). Indeed, time maybe perceived as a single continuum and to require sufficient time to first lapse but at
the same time demand that productive years still remain, may be contradictory in concept and purpose.

xxxx

Noticeably, Re: Ong allows a reinstatement application to be filed before the five (5)-year minimum period for "extraordinary reasons." It should, however, be clarified that this phrase should only pertain to
the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances, else the Court reverts back to the subjectivity problem tainting the Re: Diaz guidelines. Pressing and serious health concerns, as
well as highly exemplary service to society post-disbarment, provided that they are supported by evidence, may be taken into account by the Court, among others. [47] (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

As stated above, the five (5)-year requirement is but "a reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period necessary for the [petitioning lawyer's] reflection of his or her past transgressions." [48]
This requirement was conceptualized based on the need "to curtail the broadly subjective process of determining the appropriate period within which genuine remorse and reformation are perceived to
have been attained."[49] Once this minimum requirement is complied with, however, it must be emphasized that the petition must show convincing proof of the petitioner's remorse and rehabilitation. For it
is entirely possible that despite the minimum period of reflection set by the Court, which hence, renders him or her eligible to file a clemency petition, petitioner, throughout all these years, has not yet fully
accepted the decision against him or her, or has failed to change his or her ways so as to warrant the mercy of the Court.
To expound, "[r]emorse and reformation must reflect how the claimant has redeemed [his or her] moral aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity and consequences of [his or her]
conduct."[50] Concomitantly, "there must be an acknowledgment of the wrongful actions and subsequent showing of sincere repentance and correction. This Court must see to it that the long period
of dismissal moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and repentance, and develop a capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers ."[51]

Here, there is a prima facie showing of genuine remorse and repentance by petitioner. As can be seen even in her first clemency petition, she averred that she has been humbled by her dismissal from
service and has expressed regret of how her past actions has affected the conditions of her family, viz.:

The undersigned is not questioning the decision dismissing her from the service. In fact, she has owned up to her mistakes and learned from her lesson therefrom . x x x She was dismissed
eight (8) years ago and regrets what she did because she saw how her family suffered as a consequence of the same. She is a much better person now, with so much faith in God.

She has been humbled by her experience and has become remorseful of previous acts causing her to reform her ways. She has devoted the past years to "mending her ways and proving to herself and to
the community that he (sic) can be a better person."

xxxx

Again, herein movant is offering her sincerest repentance and spiritual renewal to her previous misdemeanor. She is assuring Your Honor that she will endeavor to avoid all appearance of impropriety
especially those that create unlawful motive. Surely, any and all her actions and deeds will be guided by the words and teachings of the Lord Almighty.[52]

Considering the denial of her previous plea for clemency, she lamented in the present petition that she was already "trying to get accustomed to a life of pure hardship, with no relief in sight for her
situation."[53] However, due to the Court's partial grant of judicial clemency in Re: Ong, she took a chance to seek the Court's forgiveness once more, viz.:

Having pleaded for clemency before and was denied it (sic), petitioner was trying to get accustomed to a life of pure hardship, with no relief in sight for [my] situation.

However, sometime in June 2021, petitioner heard from the news, that former Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory Ong, who was dismissed from the judiciary in 2014, was given partial clemency.

It appears that the Supreme Court has given more emphasis to humanity, taking into account, the pandemic.[54]

Aside from her expression of remorse, petitioner attached supporting documents to reinforce her claims of repentance and renewal through her socio-civic activities. To note, in Re: Ong, it was held that
the testimonies and certifications attached to the plea of clemency should "not merely be proforma, but should contain specific details on one's actions after being dismissed."[55]

In the present petition, the certifications attached by petitioner prima facie contain specific details of her participation in different socio-civic activities as follows:

(1) A certification from Our Lady of the Holy Rosary-Sub-Parish Pastoral Council stating:

This is to certify that I personally know [petitioner], and I vouch that she is a member in good standing – morally and spiritually – of the Parish of St. Joseph the Worker. She is my co-worker at the parish,
having been involved in the running of the parish community and church affairs for more than 10 years now. She is at present the Vice Chairman of the SJWP Parish Pastoral Council, next to our parish
priest, Rev. Fr. Benito B. Justiniano.

She is a regular supporter – in terms of leadership and financial – of our sub-parish, the Our Lady of the Holy Rosary of Metrogate Complex, Pandayan, City of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

x x x x[56]

(2) A certification from Cofradia ni San Jose stating:

[Petitioner] is the President of Cofradia ni San Jose (CONSAJOS) since 2015 up to the present.

[Petitioner] is an active officer of our organization having led to successful completion every project that our organization had taken and continues to embark. She also acts as our legal adviser and takes
care of our legal problems for free.

x x x x[57]

(3) A certification from St. Joseph the Worker Parish-Basic Ecclesial Community stating:
[Petitioner] is the adviser of our [Basic Ecclesial Community] and she is dependable, hardworking, trustworthy, and a person of integrity. She attends to the legal needs of our members all for free as it was
her advocacy to render free legal services to the people in the community. Actually, she has been doing this since she passed the Bar Examination in 1977.

x x x x[58]

(4) A certification from Barangay Pandayan of Meycauyan City, Bulacan stating:

This is to certify further that [petitioner] is a hardworking person. She represents the religious sector of the community and she is a member of three (3) different Barangay Committees, namely, the

Barangay Committee on Peace and Order, the Barangay Committee on Ecological Solid Waste and Management, and the Barangay Committee on Anti-Drug Abuse. She regularly attends the meetings of
these Committees which benefit very much from the ideas and suggestions she shares during the meeting.

[Petitioner] also renders free legal services to the people in our barangay.

x x x x[59]

(5) A certification from her village association stating:

[Petitioner] renders free legal services not only to our members but (sic) to the people of this community.

She is dependable, fair in her dealings and can be trusted upon on any tasks assigned to her. She is presently one of the Advisers and the COMELEC Chair of the Association, the position she holds for
three (3) consecutive terms (7 years). She is an asset to our Association.

x x x x[60]

Furthermore, petitioner alleged that: (a) she is already seventy-five (75) years old; (b) she is suffering from Type II Diabetes Mellitus and Hypertension and could not afford her medications due to lack of
source of income; (c) she could not rely on her husband to support her due to his own medical condition; and (d) she could not obtain financial support from her relatives and friends due to the financial
constraints caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.[61] In Re: Ong, the Court held that other factors, such as the petitioner's advanced age, deteriorating health, and economic difficulties, may be considered
in granting judicial clemency,[62] as were alleged in this case. Hence, the Court may consider these averments – should the same be established – during the fact-finding process.

All told, the Court finds that the instant petition has prima facie merit. Consequently, the Court refers the present petition to the OCA, which is directed to, within ninety (90) calendar days from notice of this

Resolution: (a) conduct the requisite fact-finding in order to verify the details and the authenticity of the statements in and evidence attached to the clemency petition; and ( b) submit its fact-finding report to
the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding prima facie merit in the instant Plea for Partial Judicial Clemency, resolves to REFER the case to the Office of the Court Administrator, which is DIRECTED to, within
ninety (90) calendar days from notice of this Resolution, conduct the requisite fact-finding and submit its report thereon in accordance with this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 8111. February 15, 2022 ]

ADELITA S. VILLAMOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ELY GALLAND A. JUMAO-AS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

HERNANDO, J.:

For the Court's En Banc's consideration is respondent Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as (Jumao-as)' Motion to Reduce Penalty.[1]
On December 9, 2020, the Court suspended Atty. Jumao-as from the practice of law for two years for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
Canon 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

xxxx

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Atty. Jumao-as was found to have represented conflicting interests by committing the following acts: he facilitated the incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. (AEV), complainant Adelita S. Villamor
(Villamor)'s lending company; he persuaded Villamor to borrow money from one Debbie Yu (Yu) to beef up AEV's capital; he left AEV to join 3 E's Debt Equity Grant Co. (3 E's), a lending company owned

by Yu; he incited a diaspora of AEV's collectors to join 3 E's; he told AEV's collectors to remit their collections to 3 E's since Villamor owed Yu; and he even sent a demand letter to Villamor, for and in
behalf of Yu, demanding that Villamor pay the amount she owed Yu.[2]

Atty. Jumao-as now moves to reduce his penalty, either to a stern warning or a two-month suspension. Humbly admitting to his faults, he prays that this Court consider the reasons quoted hereunder for
the mitigation of his administrative punishment:

1. I was a new lawyer at that time and I fall short of my professional judgment;

2. Long before the promulgation of this case, I already realized my mistake during the mediation stage of my case x x x. I quickly offered to pay the debts of [Villamor] and I paid her
debt [to Yu] x x x I also brokered the reconciliation of complainant with [her] general manager;

3. Even though the Affidavit of Desistance cannot dismiss the administrative case, I pray that it will be considered as a mitigating factor x x x;

4. The bounced checks of the complainant did not reach to court because I personally settled her obligations;

5. In the spirit of compassion especially during this time of pandemic where the means of living is difficult to meet, I plead for consideration to shorten my suspension.[3]

The Court treats Atty. Jumao-as' Motion to Reduce Penalty as a motion for reconsideration, and grants the same and accordingly reduces the penalty originally meted to Atty. Jumao-as.

His speedy initiative to make amends and take responsibility of the entire debt of Villamor to Yu in the amount of P650,000.00 is by all means remarkable. He also expended extraordinary efforts to
straighten out the corporate scuffles involving him and complainant Villamor and they have resumed their business dealings in good terms. Grave though his transgressions may have been, the sincerity
of Atty. Jumao-as' remorse is reflected in his words and actions, which impresses this Court.

These acts of contrition, however, will not reduce Atty. Jumao-as' administrative liability to the full extent that he desires.

As he says in his Motion to Reduce Penalty, Atty. Jumao-as may truly have been incapable to spot the beginnings of attorney-client relationships and conflicting interests. However, lawyers such as he
can never effectively claim legal ignorance. That he violated his oath as a lawyer is already a permanent dent on his record. His misdeeds towards Villamor must have put the image of the Bar and its
members in some degree of embarrassment. He may have been forgiven by his complainant, but the disrepute to the legal profession that he had caused cannot simply be repaired by a mere warning or

serving a short-lived suspension from law practice.

The Court turns to a case factually-similar to the one at hand for guidance.

In Legaspi v. Atty. Gonzales,[4] complainant therein consulted respondent attorney how to eject an illegal settler who refuses to leave their land. While she never formally engaged respondent's legal
services in her personal capacity, complainant still relayed to respondent the details of her quandary. Later, complainant discovered that respondent had become the counsel defending the same illegal
settler in an unlawful detainer case filed by complainant's realty development company. The unlawful detainer case ended in an amicable settlement – the illegal settler received money from complainant's
company and a parcel of land owned by complainant. Respondent even had a share in the settlement money from the illegal settler. Determining his administrative culpability for advocating conflicting

interests, the Court sanctioned the erring lawyer with a year-long suspension from the practice of law.

All told, the Court finds good reason in jurisprudence and in fact to reconsider its previous administrative sentence of suspension for two years upon Atty. Jumao-as. He shall remain suspended from the
practice of law, but for the shorter period of one year.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as' Motion to Reduce Penalty is TREATED as a Motion for Reconsideration and the same is GRANTED IN PART. The Court's December 9, 2020
Decision in this case is MODIFIED, in that respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for the reduced period of one year and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as as an attorney-at-law; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their guidance and information.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3907-RTJ). February 15, 2022 ]

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 167, RESPONDENT.

[A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3736-RTJ), February 15, 2022]

HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JOSE ROBERTO F. PO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 167, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is the Petition for Judicial Clemency[1] dated September 8, 2021[2] filed by former Regional Trial Court (RTC) Presiding Judge Rolando G. Mislang (petitioner) seeking that he be allowed
to retire with full benefits and that his disqualification to be employed in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, be lifted.

The Facts

In 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a preliminary investigation against Delfin S. Lee (Lee) and other officers of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) for the

alleged fraudulent loans taken out by Globe Asiatique's agents, on behalf of fake borrowers, from the Pag-IBIG Fund/Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), which caused the latter damages in the
amount of P6.5-billion, docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10J-00319 (1st DOJ case). The NBI Anti-Graft Division also recommended the filing of criminal charges against Lee and the others for
syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage, which was later docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10L-00363 before the DOJ (2nd DOJ case).[3]

Meanwhile, Lee and Globe Asiatique filed a Complaint[4] for specific performance and damages against the HDMF before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (specific performance case),
praying that HDMF be compelled to faithfully comply with its obligations under the agreements governing their housing loan program with Globe Asiatique's real estate development projects.[5]

Eventually, Lee filed a petition[6] for injunction with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the RTC of Pasig City (injunction case), seeking the suspension of the proceedings in the 2nd
DOJ case on the ground that the issues raised in the specific performance case posed a prejudicial question thereto. [7] Petitioner, as handling judge, granted the prayer for TRO in an Order[8] dated
August 16, 2011.

On August 25, 2011, Lee filed an amended petition[9] to likewise enjoin the DOJ from filing an Information with respect to the 1st DOJ case . For its part, the DOJ opposed the application for the issuance
of a TRO.[10]

The DOJ's opposition notwithstanding, petitioner, on August 26, 2011, granted a TRO in favor of Lee enjoining the conduct of the 1st DOJ case. [11] Averring that petitioner's actions in the
injunction case were constitutive of Gross Ignorance of the Law, both the HDMF and the DOJ filed the instant administrative disciplinary complaints against petitioner .[12]

In the meantime, petitioner converted the August 26, 2011 TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) in an Order[13] dated September 5, 2011. The DOJ assailed[14] this Order before the Court
of Appeals (CA), which, in a Decision[15] dated April 16, 2012, annulled the same for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

On April 26, 2012, Lee filed an Urgent Motion[16] in the injunction case, praying for the issuance of a status quo order against the DOJ on the basis of the supervening favorable summary judgment
rendered by the RTC of Makati City in the specific performance case which allegedly foreclosed the criminal prosecution in the 1st and 2nd DOJ cases. However, on the same date, the DOJ proceeded
with the filing of the Information[17] before the RTC of Pampanga; hence, Lee filed a Supplemental Motion[18] to enjoin the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) from raffling the said criminal case. In an
Order[19] dated April 27, 2012, petitioner issued a status quo order enjoining the OCC from raffling the criminal case.

The Court's Ruling on the Administrative Complaints

In a Decision[20] dated July 26, 2016, the Court found petitioner guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In so ruling, the Court, upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), adopted
the CA's reasoning in its April 16, 2012 Decision, finding that no prejudicial question exists so as to justify petitioner's order enjoining the 1st DOJ case:

After a thorough and judicious study of the attendant factual and legal milieu, this Court has come to the conclusion that no prejudicial question exists that would justify the issuance by public
respondent Judge of the writ of preliminary injunction as both cases before the DOJ can proceed independently of that with the Makati RTC .

This Court agrees with [the DOJ's] contention that no prejudicial question exists with respect to the first DOJ case. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action

and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. As it was shown that the recommendation by the NBI for DOJ to investigate Lee and other officials of the GA for [ Estafa] was filed ahead of the civil case which Lee filed
against HDMF before the [RTC] of Makati City, the doctrine of prejudicial question is untenable in the first DOJ case.

Moreover, it did not escape this Court's attention that when Lee moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the DOJ, in the first DOJ case, x x x he did not file a petition for
suspension of criminal action by reason of prejudicial question before the panel of DOJ prosecutors, in violation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court x x x. The rule is
clear that in filing a petition for suspension of criminal action based upon a pendency of a prejudicial action in a civil action, the same should be made before the office of the prosecutor or
the court conducting the preliminary investigation. If an information had already been filed before the court for trial, the petition to suspend should be filed before the court where the
information was filed.

Considering that no information has yet been filed against Lee and the action that was brought before the court a quo was one for injunction and damages, the public respondent Judge gravely erred
when he took cognizance of Lee's prematurely filed petition and granted his prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Nevertheless, even if the civil case was filed ahead of the first DOJ case, the doctrine of prejudicial question is still inapplicable.

xxxx

x x x [I]njunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and protected for the protection of society. It is only in extreme
cases that injunction will lie to stop criminal prosecution. Public respondent Judge anchored his issuance of the writ on the existence of a prejudicial question. However, this Court finds that the facts and

issues in the Makati civil case are not determinative of Lee's guilt or innocence in the cases filed before the DOJ . Verily public respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from filing an information of estafa against Lee in the first DOJ case and from proceeding with the

preliminary investigation in the second DOJ case.

x x x x[21]

Accordingly, the Court ruled that:

Judge Mislang issued two (2) TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction and a status quo order, both of which did not satisfy the legal requisites for their issuance, in gross violation of clearly established laws
and procedures which every judge has the duty and obligation to be familiar with. The antecedent incidents of the case brought before Judge Mislang were clear and simple, as well as the applicable
rules. Unfortunately, he miserably failed to properly apply the principles and rules on three (3) points, i.e., the prematurity of the petition, the inapplicability of the prejudicial question, and the lack of
jurisdiction of the court. His persistent disregard of well-known elementary rules in favor of Lee clearly reflects his bad faith and partiality.[22]

The Court noted that this was not the first instance that petitioner committed a serious infraction. In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2104,[23] petitioner was already found administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of
the Law and was meted the penalty of a fine of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. [24] In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2434,[25] he was also
found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, and was therein suspended for a period of six (6) months with another warning that a similar transgression would merit a more serious penalty. [26]

Consequently, owing to petitioner's repeated infractions and refusal to correct his ways, the Court imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits,
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.[27]

Further Proceedings Before the Court

Subsequent to the promulgation of the July 26, 2016 Decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, [28] as well as second,[29] third,[30] and fourth[31] motions for reconsideration. The first three

were denied,[32] while the last one was noted without action.[33] However, petitioner nevertheless filed several motions to resolve his fourth motion for reconsideration, [34] the latest of which was
received by the Court only on June 14, 2021.[35] Overall, petitioner maintained his innocence, and alternatively, posited that the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the offense committed.

Notably, petitioner likewise filed a letter-request[36] dated January 31, 2019 with the Office of the President, seeking the Executive's assistance with regard to the Court's continued inaction on his fourth
motion for reconsideration.[37] He also filed a letter-request[38] to the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2021 again reiterating his appeal that the merits of his case be revisited. In both the foregoing letters,
petitioner stressed that his administrative cases were politically/personally motivated by then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, then Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima, and
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul B. Villanueva.[39]
A little over three (3) months later, or on September 22, 2021, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency, praying that he be allowed to retire with full benefits and that his disqualification from
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, be lifted, citing a long and satisfactory track record of government service both
in the Executive and Judicial departments, mounting indebtedness, and ailing conditions requiring continuous medical maintenance in his plea for clemency.[40]

The Issue Before the Court

The central issue in this case is whether or not the instant petition for judicial clemency should prosper.

The Court's Ruling

It is well-settled that judicial clemency is neither a right nor a privilege that may be availed of at any time by erring lawyers or judges. [41] Clemency rests in the sound discretion of the Court after weighing
the merits thereof against the preservation of the public confidence in the judicial system.[42] In the landmark case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing For Judicial Clemency (Re: Diaz),[43] the Court framed the operative guidelines for resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges['] associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.[44]

With respect to judicial employees, including judges, these guidelines were refined in the 2021 case of Re: Allegations Made under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on
September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan (Re: Ong).[45] Among others, the Court ruled that, unless for extraordinary reasons, there must be a five (5)-year
minimum period before "dismissal or disbarment [can] be the subject of any kind of clemency." [46] Moreover, "allegations of those who apply for clemency must first be evaluated by this Court to
find whether prima facie circumstances exist to grant the relief. Should there appear to be so, a commission must be created to receive the evidence, with due notice to any offended party and the
public. The commission will then determine if there is substantial evidence supporting the allegations."[47] By logical inverse, should there be no prima facie case shown, the clemency plea ought to be
dismissed.

To clarify, the term prima facie means "at first sight," "on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information"; or "sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or
rebutted."[48]

When it comes to judicial clemency, a prima facie case may be said to exist when the petition therefor sufficiently demonstrates, on its face, that the petitioner has sincerely expressed remorse for his past
infraction/s, has convincingly reformed in his or her ways, and is forthwith deserving of the relief prayed for based on the surrounding circumstances.[49]
While the determination of whether a prima facie case exists is to be conducted on a case-to-case basis, it is essential that the allegations contained in the petition are duly supported by proof, else they
be regarded as conveniently self-serving. In Re: Ong, it was explained that:

This Court cannot rely on allegations without corresponding proof, which could be testimonies and certifications attached to the plea. These supporting documents must not merely be pro-forma, but
should contain specific details on one's actions after being dismissed.[50] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The reason therefor hearkens to the nature of judicial clemency as an act of mercy by this Court that is primordially imbued with public interest. Once more, in Re: Ong, the Court elucidated that:

Clemency is in the nature of pardon based on mercy. Pardon and mercy translate to the commutation of the penalty, either wholly or partially. Pardon and mercy are, therefore, uniquely personal to the
wrongdoer. However, the act of granting clemency should not go against a public or moral good. Clemency can only be granted when its conditions are fully, unequivocally, and unconditionally
accepted by the wrongdoer.

Judicial clemency is "an act of mercy removing any disqualification," which may be granted only upon a strong proof that it is warranted. To be granted judicial clemency, a claimant must show
evidence of reformation and potential.

However, clemency should not only be seen as an act of mercy. It is not only for the wrongdoer's convenience. The interests of the person wronged, as well as society in general — especially its
value in precedent — should always be taken into primordial consideration.[51] (emphases and underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the Court cannot simply allow clemency cases to proceed without first thoroughly sifting through the petition and uncovering, at least, ostensible proof of a prima facie case. Indeed, to permit
the contrary would undermine the public's confidence in the genuineness of the clemency process and, in turn, reflect poorly on the sanctity of the judicial system. It is only when such prima facie case
exists that this Court would, as per the new procedure in Re: Ong, refer the case to a fact-finding commission, whose role is to receive the evidence and render a report thereon on the
authenticity/probative value of such evidence in support of the petitioner's claims. Once the commission renders its report containing its factual findings on the case, the Court can then proceed to render
its verdict on the clemency plea.

Verily, this refined and integral process of screening, referral, and fact-finding introduced in Re: Ong, with respect to judiciary employees, as well as in Nuñez v. Ricafort[52] (Ricafort), with respect to
lawyers, aims to rectify the old procedure that was institutionally problematic insofar as it failed to provide for a more objective analysis of clemency pleas. As was extensively discussed in Ricafort:

As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency is granted based on a policy framework created solely by the Court pursuant to its constitutional power of: ( a) administrative supervision over all courts and all
personnel thereof with respect to dismissed judiciary employees; and (b) regulation of the legal profession with respect to disbarred lawyers. In deciding whether to grant clemency, the Court endeavors to

strike a balance between extending an act of mercy to an individual on the one hand, and on the other hand, preserving public confidence in the courts, as well as the legal profession. Certainly,
safeguarding the integrity of the courts and the legal profession is an indispensable consideration in this assessment. Hence, the petitioner should convincingly hurdle a high bar to be granted
judicial clemency.

However, as per the current procedure following the Re: Diaz guidelines, the Court, when resolving clemency cases, is not impelled to go beyond the allegations in the petition and written documents
appended thereto. Institutionally, the Court is not a trier of facts; thus, it lacks the proper capability to probe into the finer details of the factual assertions made in a clemency petition . In the
same light, the Court cannot, on its own, authenticate the petition's supporting evidence, or examine, under oath, the sincerity of the person seeking clemency, as well as of those who vouch for him or
her.

In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that, more likely than not, all of the submissions in a clemency petition are self-serving since it would always be in the petitioner's natural desire to submit everything
beneficial to him or her so as to convince the Court to reinstate him or her back to the Bar. Moreover, the number of testimonials/certifications, as well as the perceived clout of the petitioner's
sponsors/endorsers, are unspoken factors that influence the Court's disposition. In the end, without a proper fact-finding procedure, the Court is constrained to resolve a clemency petition based
on a subjective — instead of an objective — analysis of the petition.

Thus, in Re: Ong, the Court cautioned that:

Judicial clemency cannot be subjective. The more we have personal connections with one who pleas for clemency, the more we should seek to distance ourselves. It is also anticipated that pleas for
judicial clemency are largely self-serving. x x x

Aside from the problem of subjectivity, equally significant is the quandary of authenticating the alleged socio-civic activities meant to prove that the petitioner has indeed reformed. Due to the lack of a
fact-finding mechanism, the Court is hard-pressed to determine whether or not these activities were actually undertaken, or if so, how many times they were undertaken and their actual scope. In this
regard, the Court cannot simply discount the possibility that these so-called "socio-civic activities" may just be isolated instances which are not truly reflective of the petitioner's sincere and genuine
reformation but rather, listed only to pad up the petition.

In light of these issues, the Court, in the recent case of Re: Ong, resolved that prospectively, all clemency petitions which, upon the Court's evaluation, demonstrate prima facie merit, should be referred
to a commission created to receive the evidence to prove the allegations by substantial evidence x x x[.] (emphases and underscoring in the original)
Notably, the Court's ruling in Re: Ong was held to be prospective in application;[53] hence, the new parameters stated therein took effect from the time of its promulgation on January 19, 2021. Since the
present petition for judicial clemency was filed last September 22, 2021,[54] Re: Ong squarely applies here.

In this case, while the petition complied with the five (5)-year minimum period set in Re: Ong, it nonetheless failed to demonstrate a prima facie case warranting the grant of judicial clemency.

To expound, records show that petitioner's clemency petition was filed last September 22, 2021, or after five (5) years from his dismissal through the Court's Decision promulgated last July 26, 2016.

While Re: Ong appears to be silent on the rationale behind the five-year period, the wisdom for a similar five (5)-year minimum period, as applied to clemency cases involving lawyers, was explained in

Ricafort as follows:

To be sure, the underlying impetus of establishing a default uniform period is to curtail the broadly subjective process of determining the appropriate period within which genuine remorse
and reformation are perceived to have been attained. Conceptually, the five (5)-year requirement is a reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period necessary for the [petitioning
lawyer's] reflection of his or her past transgressions for which he or she was meted the ultimate penalty of disbarment . For clarity, the period is reckoned from the time the Court's resolution is
promulgated since it is only by then that the lawyer becomes duly informed of his or her administrative liability and hence, would be able to begin atoning for his or her malpractice.

This uniform period also addresses the apparent inconsistency of the Re: Diaz guidelines which, on the one hand, requires "[s]ufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation" (second guideline), while on the other hand, mandates that "[t]he age of the person asking for clemency must show that [he or she] still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving [him or her] a chance to redeem [himself or herself]" (third guideline). Indeed, time maybe perceived as a single continuum and to require sufficient time to first lapse but at the
same time demand that productive years still remain, may be contradictory in concept and purpose.

xxxx

Noticeably, Re: Ong allows a reinstatement application to be filed before the five (5)-year minimum period for "extraordinary reasons." It should, however, be clarified that this phrase should only pertain to
the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances, else the Court reverts back to the subjectivity problem tainting the Re: Diaz guidelines. Pressing and serious health concerns, as
well as highly exemplary service to society post-disbarment, provided that they are supported by evidence, may be taken into account by the Court, among others. [55] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

However, it should be borne in mind that "[c]onceptually, the five (5) -year requirement is a reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period necessary for the petitioner's reflection of his or her
past transgressions."[56] Thus, considering that the said period is just a reasonable estimation of the minimum period of reflection, this does not mean that proof of remorse and rehabilitation is dispensed

with by the Court. For a clemency plea to prosper, there must be a convincing showing of genuine repentance and remorse for one's past infractions.

Here, although the instant petition was filed after the five (5)-year minimum period as above-mentioned, the Court finds that there is a lack of prima facie showing of petitioner's genuine repentance and
remorse for his past infractions.

Jurisprudence states that "[r]emorse and reformation must reflect how the claimant has redeemed their moral aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity and consequences of their conduct."[57]
Concomitantly, "there must be an acknowledgment of the wrongful actions and subsequent showing of sincere repentance and correction. This Court must see to it that the long period of dismissal
moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and repentance, and develop a capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers ."[58]

Here, records show that not up until recently, petitioner was still insistent upon his innocence and the unfairness of his dismissal. His most recent assertion of innocence, as seen in his letter-
request[59] to the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2021, was made only three (3) months prior to the filing of the instant petition . Worse, he even sought the intervention of the President[60] in a
matter that is wholly within the discretion of the Judiciary. It was only in this present petition filed last September 22, 2021 that petitioner openly admitted that he was remorseful for his misdeeds and has
accepted the Court's verdict of dismissal against him.

In Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos,[61] the Court denied a plea of clemency that failed to show repentance and acceptance of the judgment. In said case, it was observed that therein
respondent did not deserve clemency since she still defended herself and insisted on her innocence and self-righteousness which evinced her lack of remorse for her misdeeds. [62] As the Court sees it,
the lack of remorse of petitioner throughout the years negates a prima facie finding that he had genuinely repented for his ways. His bare statement in the petition that he "expressed his heartfelt apology
and remorse for [his] misdeeds"[63] leaves much to be desired as it appears that he had only accepted the Court's ruling to dismiss him in the present petition filed a few months ago.

Furthermore, petitioner claimed that after his dismissal, he gave "free legal advice" for "needy individuals," and has been assisting the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community in their socio-civic legal
services.[64] In support, he attached a Certificate from the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community [65] to attest to his alleged socio-civic legal services in his succeeding Manifestation with Motion to
Submit[66] dated October 4, 2021. However, an evaluation of the said Certificate shows that it is generally worded, and lacks any specific details, such as the scope/extent as to how these
socio-civic legal services were actually rendered, as well as how often these were conducted.[67] There are likewise no written testimonies or accounts of his rendition of free legal advice following
his dismissal. Again, in Re: Ong, it was held that "[t]hese supporting documents must not merely be pro-forma, but should contain specific details on one's actions after being dismissed."

Notably, petitioner claimed that he is under immense economic strain, being the primary breadwinner of his family, and owing to enormous costs for his son's medical procedure, [68] as well as for the
payment of his own maintenance medicine.
Indeed, "[t]his Court has also considered other factors such as the petitioner's advanced age, deteriorating health, and economic difficulties." [69] However, the grant of clemency must still always be
delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. When there is no showing of genuine remorse or that the petitioner has sufficiently reformed his ways, the Court must temper its
grant of mercy with the greater interest of the public. In the final analysis, while the Court can only commiserate with the dire personal circumstances of a petitioner pleading for clemency, genuine remorse
and reformation are indispensable in according such relief. As ruled in Re: Ong, the Court's "willingness to extend mercy" is reserved for "those who have rectified their errors and mended their ways." [70]
Verily, "the grant of clemency should not excuse or remove the fault of the offender's past acts, nor should it amount to a condonation. Clemency is not blind acceptance or tolerance of a wrongful act." [71]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency dated September 8, 2021 is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. Nos. 214336-37. February 15, 2022 ]

QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

Before the Court is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision [2] dated January 16, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated September 12,
2014 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, convicting petitioner Quirino M. Libunao of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act ( R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Antecedents

At the heart of the present controversy is the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allocated to accused Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., then Surigao Del Norte First District representative. By virtue of
Assignment Order No. 00-002 dated January 17, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special review of the utilization of Navarro's CDF for the years 1997 to 1998. The audit team
discovered that P13,832,569.00 of said CDF was used to purchase, on different occasions, assorted medicines, shabu testing kits, nebulizing machines, sporting materials, rice paddy plows (araro),
blackboard erasers, chalks, and notebooks from various suppliers. But instead of conducting a public bidding, the purchase was done through direct contracting, in violation of Section 3 of Executive Order

(E.O.) No. 302[4] resulting in an overpricing of the items purchased amounting to P2,863,689.36 or equivalent to 13.6% to 506% of the prevailing market prices. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of
Disallowance dated January 23, 2001.[5]

After due proceedings and finding probable cause, the Office of the Ombudsman criminally charged the following persons before the Sandiganbayan for their involvement in the said illegal purchases:

(1) Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro);

(2) Quirino M. Libunao (Libunao), Carlos T. Derecho (Derecho), and Romeo S. Jardenico (Jardenico), all as Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG)-Caraga Region, the implementing agency at the time of the transactions;

(3) Benito R. Catindig (Catindig), as Assistant Secretary for Support Services, and Regional Operations, DILG-Quezon City;

(4) Iluminada C. Tuble (Tuble), President of San Marino Laboratories Corporation (San Marino);
(5) Marlene B. Corpus (Corpus), Owner-Proprietor of Mt. Bethel Pharmaceutical (Mt. Bethel);

(6) Edwin L. Dizon (Dizon), as owner-proprietor of E.G. Trading;

(7) Gerardo A. Rosario (Rosario), owner-proprietor of Revelstone Sales International (Revelstone); and

(8) Mario Tokong (Tokong), representative of Revelstone Sales International.[6]

In several Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27796-27805, the accused public officers were charged for acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits to the
accused suppliers by entering into contracts without the benefit of public bidding. The accusatory portions of the Amended/Re-Amended Informations filed against Libunao and said public officers, read:

Criminal Case No. 27803

That in the month of October 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional Director of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support Services & Regional Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all high ranking public officials,
committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, President
of San Marino Laboratories Corporation, a private enterprise, and mutually helping one another, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, through gross inexcusable
negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to San Marino Laboratories Corporation and cause undue injury to the

Government, by entering into a contract, without conducting the required public bidding, with said San Marino Laboratories, for the purchase of forty five (45) boxes of assorted medicine in the amount of
TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00), which price was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that similar medicines available in the market, as canvassed by the

Commission on Audit (COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO & 25/100 PESOS (P762,262.25), inclusive of 10%
allowance, thereby resulting to an overprice in the total amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY & 75/100 PESOS (P1,237,740.75), to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

x x x x.

Criminal Case No. 27805

That during the period from October 16, 1998 to December 10, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused CONSTANTINO H. NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st District of Surigao del Norte,
the Regional Director of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support Services & Regional Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all
high ranking public officials, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused
GERARDO A. ROSARIO and MARIO TOKONG, proprietor and representative, respectively, of Revelstone Sales International , a private enterprise, and mutually helping one another, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, through gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
Revelstone Sales International and cause undue injury to the Government, by entering into a contract, without conducting the required public bidding, with said Revelstone Sales International, for the
purchase of one thousand two hundred (1,200) sets of araro tools in the amount of NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P900,000.00), which price was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the

government considering that similar araro tools available in the market, as canvassed by the Commission on Audit (COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P792,000.00), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby resulting to an overprice of in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P108,000.00), to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

Upon arraignment, Libunao pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued. To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Rosalina G. Salvador, an
auditor of the COA, Ruby D. Pascual, a pharmacist editor, Manuel M. Parian, Deputy Regional Chief of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, and Manuel Dy Sio, a businessman engaged in
selling hardware and farm construction supplies.[9]
In Criminal Case No. 27803, the prosecution established that Navarro requisitioned for the purchase of 45 boxes of assorted medicines in the amount of P2,000,000.00 from San Marino. Libunao
approved the transactions, certified that the expense was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his direct supervision; he then signed checks payable to San Marino. This was supported by documentary
exhibits such as Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIVs), Purchase Orders (POs), Disbursement Vouchers (DVs), certificates, and checks.[10]

In Criminal Case No. 27805, it was established that Navarro requisitioned for 1,200 sets of araro tools in the amount of P900,000.00 from Revelstone. Again, Libunao approved the transactions, certified
that the expense was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his direct supervision, and he signed the checks payable to Revelstone. These were also supported by documentary exhibits such as RIVs,

POs, DVs, certificates, and checks.[11]

In his defense, Libunao testified that he assumed his position as Regional Director of DILG-Caraga based in Butuan City on October 17, 1998. According to him, he signed the documents in relation to the
transactions relying on his subordinates who assured him that the same were in order. Since his position as regional director had many functions, he had to rely on these financial people who prepared the
documents he signed.[12]

On January 16, 2014, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution successfully proved with moral certainty that public officers, Libunao and Derecho gave unwarranted benefits to Revelstone, San
Marino, Mt. Bethel, and E.G. Trading when they resorted to direct contracting, instead of public bidding. As for the accused suppliers Rosario, Tuble, Corpus, and Dizon, however, it was held that the
prosecution failed to establish the same quantum of proof that they were patently propelled by criminal designs when they allowed their companies to receive undue benefits. Thus, with respect to Libunao
in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, the Sandiganbayan disposed as follows:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

xxxx

7. In Criminal Case No. 27803, accused QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

9. In Criminal Case No. 27805, accused QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Accused GERARDO A. ROSARIO, is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

Except for accused Tuble who is hereby ordered to pay the DILG-CARAGA the amount of P1,071,721.80, no civil liability may be assessed against accused Rosario, Corpus and Dizon considering that
the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise does not exist.

Let the hold departure order against accused Rosario, Tuble, Corpus and Dizon by reason of this case be lifted and set aside, and their bonds released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedure.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Libunao moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's January 16, 2014 Decision. [14] On September 12, 2014, however, said court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and undated
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.[15]

Unfazed, Libunao filed the present petition on October 9, 2014 essentially reiterating the following arguments:

I.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM.

A. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME DIFFERENT FROM THOSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS, AMENDED INFORMATIONS, AND RE-AMENDED
 INFORMATIONS.

B. THE THEORY THAT OFFENSE WHEREIN WHICH PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED INCLUDES OR IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

C. ALLOWING THE PETITIONER TO BE CONVICTED OF A CRIME DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HE IS CHARGED WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE AS STATED IN SECTION 13, RULE 110 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM.

II.

THERE COULD BE NO VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(g) OF R.A. NO. 3019 AS THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE ELEMENTS THEREOF.

A. PETITIONER DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY CONTRACT WITH THE PRIVATE SUPPLIERS IN THE PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF THE GOODS.

B. THERE IS NO CONSPIRACY.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT SECTION 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019 WAS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, THE ELEMENTS THEREOF WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[16]

Libunao argues that the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him by convicting him under Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 when he was actually charged in the Informations of an offense under Section 3(g) thereof. He claimed that there was neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the two offenses. To insist
that one is a mode or manner of committing the other violates the principle of duplicity of offense in Section 13 [17] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Be that as it may, petitioner
posits that even assuming the possibility of the same, he must still be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of either Section 3(e) or Section 3(g).

Our Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

Prefatorily, it must be remembered that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, such as the one filed by petitioner, must raise only questions of law. Settled is the rule that issues raised on whether
the prosecution's evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded, the accused are all, in varying degrees, questions of
fact.[18] In view of the absence of the recognized exceptions[19] to this rule, the Court shall refrain from reviewing the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan as it duly considered the totality of
circumstances that led to the conclusion that petitioner violated the law.

To begin with, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the charge was designated as Section 3(g) in assailing the validity
of the Informations filed against him. However, well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that it is not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, but the facts
alleged in the body of the information that determines the character of the crime.[20] As early in United States v. Lim San,[21] the Court has explained that:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits.

x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure
or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense[,] he need not know the
name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?"
not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the
court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what it is named. x x x.[22]

Indeed, what is controlling is not the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[23] As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity and reasonable certainty
that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the information is considered sufficient. [24] If the elements of the crime are duly alleged in the information, the accused can be rest assured

of being informed of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.[25]

It would not take more than a plain and simple reading of the Re-Amended Informations herein to be properly apprised of the nature of the offense charged against petitioner. Specifically, he, together with
his co-accused, Navarro and Catindig, all high-ranking public officers, were accused of acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality or at the very least, through gross inexcusable negligence, in
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to another, and thereby causing undue injury to the Government, by entering into a contract for the purchase of various goods at disadvantageous
prices without conducting the required public bidding. One cannot mistake this to be something other than the elements of a violation of Section 3(e)[26] of R.A. No. 3019.

Accordingly, petitioner's claim that the Informations violate the rule on duplicity of offenses in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is untenable. As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.[27] Petitioner insists that the Informations accused him of both Sections 3(e) and 3(g). The argument fails to convince. While it is true that
entering into a contract is also an element of Section 3(g), [28] We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the allegation can be considered simply as the means by which the accused persons violated Section
3(e).[29] As such, his conviction under the latter could not have been on a defective Information.

But even assuming that the Informations charged more than one offense, the fact remains that petitioner did not question the validity of the same before entering his plea. Time and again, the Court has
held that an accused who fails to move for the quashal of a duplicitous Information is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. [30] This is in consonance with Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this
Rule."[31] Indeed, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged

and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.[32]

Ultimately, petitioner can no longer deny the validity of the Informations against him. In no uncertain terms, said Informations sufficiently charged him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019

carefully identifying the essential elements thereof. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

In Tio v. People,[33] We laid down the elements of Section 3(e), to wit: (1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions, or a private individual acting in

conspiracy with such public officer; (2) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the Sandiganbayan's finding that the
elements of the crime charged were sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The first element is self-explanatory. As borne by the records, petitioner was a public officer acting in his official capacity as Regional Director of the DILG-Caraga at the time of the commission of the
crime.

The second element pertains to the modalities by which the offense may be committed. Well-settled is the rule that proof of any of the three modes, namely: manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross

inexcusable negligence, in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.[34] In a long line of cases,[35] the Court elucidated that:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. " Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. " Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.[36]

The third element requires that the act constituting the offense must consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions. [37] The former act need not be proven with actual certainty but by some reasonable
basis by which the court can measure it.[38] As for the latter act, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
[39] The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. [40]

The second and third elements discussed above are positively proven by the records of the case. We, therefore, find no error in the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner gave unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference to San Marino and Revelstone through gross inexcusable negligence in approving the subject transactions despite the absence of public bidding.

Section 3 of E.O. No. 302[41] expressly provides that awarding of contracts shall be done through public/open competitive bidding to ensure efficiency and equitable treatment. As an exception to the rule,
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) enumerates the conditions under which direct contracting instead of public bidding may be resorted to:

a. Procurement of items of proprietary nature which can be obtained only from the proprietary source, i.e., when patents, trade secrets and copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the same item;

b. Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the
Government;

c. When the procurement of critical plant components from a specialist manufacturer/supplier/distributor serves as a precondition of a contractor responsible for the erection of the project for his guarantee
of project performance;

d. For purposes of maintaining standards, such as a purchase involving a small addition to an already existing fleet of equipment;

e. In emergencies where procurement must be immediately accomplished regardless of cost. Emergencies shall be defined as those situations where there is imminent danger to life and/or property as
determined by the Head of Agency concerned or his duly authorized representative.

Settled is the rule that as a matter of policy, public contracts are awarded through competitive public bidding. Not only does competitive bidding give the public the best possible quality of goods and
services garnering contracts most favorable to the government, it also avoids suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public transactions. [42] It promotes transparency in government
transactions and accountability of public officers as it minimizes occasions for corruption and temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government authorities in awarding contracts. [43] For these
reasons, important public policy considerations demand the strict observance of procedural rules relating to the bidding process.[44]

In the present case, not only were the subject purchases of medicines and araro tools done through direct contracting; petitioner utterly failed to present any justification sufficient to forego the conduct of a
competitive public bidding as expressly mandated by E.O. No. 302. Neither was there any effort to invoke the exceptions under the IRR. In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, he merely engaged

in a finger-pointing expedition seeking to pass the blame to both his superiors as well as his subordinates. Unfortunately for him, however, We cannot give credence to his defenses in light of the glaring
evidence of his gross inexcusable negligence.

As duly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was the Regional Director of the DILG, no less, who served thereat for 39 years. It is the mandate of the DILG, as an agency that acts on behalf of the
President to achieve the effective delivery of basic services to the citizenry.[45] Explicit in its Charter is its duty to faithfully conduct the procurement process in strict compliance with the provisions of
applicable law on procurement.[46] Hence, in all procurement of goods and services, the DILG ensures that they be governed by the principles of: (1) transparency in the process and implementation of
contracts; (2) competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable all eligible parties to participate in public bidding; (3) streamlined procurement process that will uniformly apply to all government
procurement; (4) system of accountability where both public officials directly or indirectly involved in the procurement process are held liable for their actions relative thereto; and (5) public monitoring to
guarantee that contracts are awarded strictly in accordance with law.[47]

The Court cannot, in good conscience, accept his reasoning that Navarro was "a very powerful congressman" and as such, he simply implemented the directive to approve the transactions with the pre-
selected suppliers. It is well to remember that the power of members of the House of Representatives on the disbursement of the CDF is limited to the identification of projects, while the determination of
the mode of procurement is vested in the DILG, which in this case, was under the leadership of petitioner. As such, he was mandated by law to make an independent assessment of the subject contracts.
However, despite the blatant absence of the required public bidding, he fully consummated the illegal transactions in blindly signing the POs, RIVs, certifications, and checks payable to the pre-selected
companies. Indeed, the Sandiganbayan is justified in saying that by tolerating the direct purchase from Navarro's favored suppliers, petitioner reduced his office to a mere puppet. [48] Contrary to his
incessant claims that he merely exercised a ministerial duty, it was because of his gross inexcusable negligence that allowed San Marino and Revelstone to derive unwarranted benefit, advantage or

preference from the subject transactions.

As the head of the very agency tasked with ensuring that government contracts strictly adhere to the laws on procurement, the Court cannot reduce petitioner's acts to simple errors of judgment. At the
time of the commission of the offense in 1998, E.O. No. 302, had already been in existence since its passage in 1996. In fact, during said time, the concept of procurement through public bidding can
hardly be considered novel or complex so as to excuse petitioner's non-compliance therewith. As can be seen in Our discussion in Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr.,[49] the laws on procurement dates back to
the 1900s, thus:

History of Philippine Procurement Laws

It is necessary, at this point, to give a brief history of Philippine laws pertaining to procurement through public bidding. The United States Philippine Commission introduced the American practice of public
bidding through Act No. 22, enacted on October 15, 1900, by requiring the Chief Engineer, United States Army for the Division of the Philippine Islands, acting as purchasing agent under the control of the
then Military Governor, to advertise and call for a competitive bidding for the purchase of the necessary materials and lands to be used for the construction of highways and bridges in the Philippine
Islands. Act No. 74, enacted on January 21, 1901 by the Philippine Commission, required the General Superintendent of Public Instruction to purchase office supplies through competitive public bidding.
Act No. 82, approved on January 31, 1901, and Act No. 83, approved on February 6, 1901, required the municipal and provincial governments, respectively, to hold competitive public biddings in the

making of contracts for public works and the purchase of office supplies.

On June 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission, through Act No. 146, created the Bureau of Supply and with its creation, public bidding became a popular policy in the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment for the use of the national government, its subdivisions and instrumentalities. On February 3, 1936, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued E.O. No. 16 declaring as a matter of general policy
that government contracts for public service or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government should be subjected to public bidding. The requirement of public bidding was likewise
imposed for public works of construction or repair pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

Then President Diosdado Macapagal, in E.O. No. 40 dated June 1, 1963, reiterated the directive that no government contract for public service or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities, should be entered into without public bidding except for very extraordinary reasons to be determined by a committee constituted
thereunder. Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 1594 prescribing guidelines for government infrastructure projects and Section 4 54 thereof stated that they should generally be undertaken by
contract after competitive public bidding.

Then President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 301 (1987) prescribing guidelines for government negotiated contracts. Pertinently, Section 62 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterated the

requirement of competitive public bidding in government projects. In 1990, Congress passed RA 6957, 55 which authorized the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure by the
private sector. RA 7160 was likewise enacted by Congress in 1991 and it contains provisions governing the procurement of goods and locally-funded civil works by the local government units.

Then President Fidel Ramos issued E.O. No. 302 (1996), providing guidelines for the procurement of goods and supplies by the national government. Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued E.O.
No. 201 (2000), providing additional guidelines in the procurement of goods and supplies by the national government. Thereafter, he issued E.O. No. 262 (2000) amending E.O. 302 (1996) and E.O. 201

(2000).

On October 8, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 40, the law mainly relied upon by the respondents, entitled Consolidating Procurement Rules and Procedures for All National

Government Agencies, Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations and Government Financial Institutions, and Requiring the Use of the Government Procurement System. It accordingly repealed,
amended or modified all executive issuances, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent therewith.

On January 10, 2003, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9184. It took effect on January 26, 2004, or fifteen days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation.[50]

In fact, petitioner even expressly testified that he was "in charge of the implementation of the projects identified by a congressman wherein his PDF will be used" and was "tasked under law to be the
particular office to handle procurement and distribution."[51] But despite knowledge of this, he went on to state that "his responsibility stops" "after the delivery of the procured items to the office of the
congressman."[52] He further admitted that he no longer knows "whether as a matter of fact, these procured items were delivered to the end-users" because he "cannot just go to the congressman" and
ask "have you distributed the items already?"[53]

It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner could no longer feign ignorance to settled law or claim innocence to the acts charged against him. He persistently blames Navarro as the one who entered into

the purchase agreement without public bidding. He insists that he merely performed his ministerial duty of signing the DVs, POs, RIVs, certificates, and checks, nothing more. The argument, however, fails
to persuade. Just because his name does not appear in the contract, does not mean he should be absolved of any liability. To repeat, petitioner was responsible for the consummation of the contract. He
approved the transaction and signed the checks, which ultimately led to the release of the funds.

On this matter, Our ruling in Tio v. People[54] is instructive. There, Tio, then Mayor of the Municipality of Luna, and Cadiz, then municipal accountant, were both convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 for awarding a road concreting project to a private corporation in the absence of public bidding. While the prosecution was unable to prove that Cadiz participated in the award of the
contract, We did not hesitate to convict her for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for her participation in the unlawful release of funds in consummation of the illegal contract. In certifying the

transactions and signing the DVs despite the presence of irregularities, Cadiz was remiss in her duty as municipal accountant, which is to ensure that public funds are disbursed only after the requirements
of law are complied with. To the Court, this constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.

In the same vein, the Court ruled in Umipig v. People[55] that when public officers make certifications that the expense is necessary and lawful, said officer attests to the transactions' legality and
regularity, which signifies that he or she had checked all the supporting documents before affixing his or her signature.[56] The existence of obvious infirmities, however, shows that the public officer
negligently failed to exercise the reasonable diligence required by law thereby resulting in government loss in favor of private persons.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(e), therefore, one's name and signature do not necessarily have to be written on a contract. For as long as the prosecution sufficiently proves the elements of the
crime, public officers can rightfully be charged and convicted of the same by their acts of negligently approving the illegal transactions and signing checks for the disbursement of funds. The Court cannot
turn a blind eye to their participation that is indispensable to the consummation of the transaction and for which, they must be held accountable.
In a last-ditch effort to save his plight, petitioner continues his finger-pointing, but this time, he tries to pass the blame to his subordinates who allegedly assured him of the validity of the transactions.
Invoking the doctrine laid down in Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[57] petitioner claims that as a head of office, he can rely in good faith on the acts of his subordinates as he cannot reasonably be expected to
examine every single document relative to government transactions. Unfortunately for petitioner, the circumstances of this case prevent him from seeking refuge behind the Arias doctrine.

The Arias doctrine is not some magic cloak that can be used as a shield by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. [58] In fact, the Court has
had numerous occasions[59] to reject this defense in light of circumstances that should have prompted the government officials to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond

what their subordinates had prepared.

Such is the case here. As duly observed by the Sandiganbayan, it is unacceptable that petitioner blindly signed the subject documents despite the fact that the absence of public bidding was readily
ascertainable on their face, being as they were, mere "one-paged documents." [60] As a high-ranking DILG official, moreover, the first thing he should have determined was the mode of procurement
employed in the transactions. Instead, he testified in court that his primary act as regional director, on his very first day, was to sign the checks for the araro procurement, simply because the accountant
told him that the transactions were in order.[61] According to him, he "just relied so much on my [his] staff that I [he] do [did] not even know persons who entered into these transactions." [62] Had petitioner
exerted the necessary precaution, he would have discovered that, as testified by the president of Revelstone, said company was never even involved in the production of medicines, araro tools, and drug
testing kits.[63] Regrettably, and with no valid reason, he failed to pay due attention to the glaring illegality of the subject contracts.

All told, the Court is convinced that based on the totality of facts herein, petitioner was correctly convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In blindly proceeding with the unlawful agreements,
he failed to perform his sworn duty as head of the DILG-Caraga office in clear violation of E.O. No. 302 and its IRR. Had he only exercised enough prudence and been more circumspect, he could have
easily discovered the absence of public bidding, and upheld the basic principles of transparency and accountability that his office was created to protect. Instead, he chose to tolerate the clear irregularities

in the transactions which resulted in unwarranted preference in favor of San Marino and Revelstone. Not only were other suppliers precluded from submitting potentially more beneficial bids, the
government was also effectively robbed of its right to determine the best possible prices in its acquisition of supplies.

Indeed, the rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are imbued with public interest. [64] As a system of transparency in the procurement process, said rules were formulated to guarantee
that the public enjoys the most advantageous transactions at the least possible expense. It cannot be denied, however, that these procurement laws, no matter how good, become meaningless without

accountable public officials to ensure faithful compliance therewith.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan. Section 9(a) [65] of R.A. No. 3019 provides that a violation of Section 3 of the same law shall be punished with, inter alia,

"imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years" and "perpetual disqualification from public office." Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner is sentenced to suffer for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to
ten (10) years, as maximum, together with the aforementioned perpetual disqualification from public office.[66]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal
Case Nos. 27803 and 27805 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Quirino M. Libunao is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and accordingly, sentenced to suffer for each count the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

SO ORDERED.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Dimaampao,* JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., (Acting Chairperson), J., See Concurring Opinion.

* Designated additional member in lieu of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo per Raffle dated November 29, 2021.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-52.

[2] Penned by Chairperson/Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz with A

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 214071. February 15, 2022 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS
THE FORMER PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 24, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CITY OF MANILA; HON. LYLIHA L. ABELLA-AQUINO, AS ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 24, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CITY OF MANILA; THE ESTATE OF TERESITA ROJO CORPUS; AND TERESITA GOMEZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order [1] (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Former Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 127303: (a) the Decision[2] dated January 27, 2014 (Assailed Decision) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner); and (b) the Resolution[3] dated August 28, 2014, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts

This case stemmed from Civil Case No. 03-107324, a money laundering case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (RTC-Manila) by petitioner, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), against Conrado Ariola, Jr. and his conspirators (Ariola, et al.). The AMLC argued before the RTC-Manila that Ariola, et al. violated Sections 8.1, 26.1, and 26.3 of the Securities
Regulation Code[4] by soliciting investments from the general public without the necessary secondary licenses to do so.[5] The AMLC prayed that the assets of Ariola, et al. be forfeited in favor of the
government.
During the civil forfeiture proceedings before the RTC-Manila, AMLC offered into evidence the testimonies of Teresita Corpus (Corpus) and Teresita Gomez (Gomez) (collectively, private respondents).
Private respondents testified that Ariola, et al. induced them to invest large amounts of money with Five Vision Consultancy, Inc. (Five Vision), which was owned by Ariola, et al. They also filed a related
case for collection of sum of money directly against Ariola, et al. before the RTC of Makati City (RTC-Makati).[6] Branch 132 of the RTC-Makati ruled that Corpus and Gomez invested P4,720,000.00 and
P11,799,000.00 in Five Vision, respectively.[7]
Subsequently, in a Decision[8] dated January 11, 2011, Branch 24 of the RTC-Manila in the civil forfeiture proceedings granted AMLC's Complaint and declared Ariola, et al.'s bank accounts forfeited in
favor of the government.
After receipt of the RTC-Manila's order of forfeiture, private respondents jointly filed a pleading captioned "Second Verified Petition" [9] dated February 8, 2011. This was in compliance with Section 35 of
A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC[10] (the Rules on Civil Forfeiture) which states:
Sec. 35. Notice to File Claims. - Where the court has issued an order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section
4 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by verified petition, for a declaration that the same

legitimately belongs to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument or property corresponding thereto . The verified petition shall be filed with the court which rendered the
order of forfeiture within fifteen days from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the said order shall be executory and bar all other claims. [11] (Emphasis supplied)

In their Second Verified Petition, private respondents prayed that a portion of the funds forfeited in favor of the government be released to them equivalent to the amounts that they were induced to invest
in Ariola, et al.'s fraudulent investment scheme. They also prayed that they be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis, alleging that they were both jobless and without sufficient means to support their
families, let alone to pay the filing and docket fees. The RTC-Manila issued an Order dated February 18, 2011, directing the AMLC to file within 15 days its Comment on the Second Verified Petition. [12]
Instead of filing a Comment or Opposition, the AMLC filed a Manifestation and Motion[13] dated February 21, 2011. Citing Sections 36[14] and 37[15] of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture, the AMLC posited
that its deadline to file a Comment should be suspended until after the RTC-Manila has ruled on the sufficiency in form and substance of the Second Verified Petition and resolved the motion to litigate in
forma pauperis.[16]
The RTC-Manila subsequently issued an Order[17] dated March 21, 2011 setting for hearing the motion to litigate as pauper litigants, and noting but without making any explicit ruling on the AMLC's
Manifestation and Motion.

On May 23, 2011, the RTC-Manila issued an Order[18] allowing private respondents to litigate as pauper litigants and exempting them from paying the docket and filing fees.
Several months later, on September 21, 2011, private respondents moved for the issuance of an order approving their claim in their Second Verified Petition, [19] pointing out that the AMLC had not filed

any comment thereon and that their claims were not contested, since the AMLC adopted their testimonies as evidence during the civil forfeiture proceedings. The AMLC opposed [20] this motion. It argued
that its 15 days to file a comment/opposition should commence only after the RTC-Manila has ruled that the Second Verified Petition was sufficient in form and substance. It also said that the fact that
private respondents were presented as witnesses by the AMLC before the civil forfeiture proceedings did not automatically result in an admission of their respective claims against the forfeited assets.
After a further exchange of pleadings, the RTC-Manila eventually issued an Order[21] dated January 31, 2012 (Assailed Order) granting private respondents' motion for issuance of an order approving an

uncontested claim. The RTC-Manila noted that prior to the Second Verified Petition and while the forfeiture proceedings were still pending, private respondents filed an earlier "Verified Petition" which the
RTC-Manila ordered AMLC to comment on in an Order dated July 27, 2006. [22] Hence, AMLC had already been given two opportunities to oppose private respondents' claims, since it was ordered to
respond to both the first and second Verified Petitions. It also pointed out that Section 37 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture does not require that a separate order explicitly declaring the petition filed by
claimants as sufficient in form and substance be issued before directing the AMLC to comment thereon. Finally, the RTC-Manila found it unfair that the AMLC would contest private respondents' claims
after using their testimonies as evidence in its favor during the civil forfeiture proceedings. Upon motion of private respondents, the RTC-Manila issued an Order [23] dated August 17, 2012 correcting the
amounts awarded to the two claimants. Subsequently, the RTC-Manila denied AMLC's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[24]
AMLC filed a Petition for Certiorari[25] with the CA assailing the RTC-Manila's Orders. Considering that the RTC-Manila subsequently issued another Order [26] on January 11, 2013 directing the issuance
of a writ of execution of its Assailed Order, the AMLC applied for, [27] and was granted by the CA, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, which were issued by the CA on March
21, 2013[28] and June 2, 2013,[29] respectively.[30]
In its Assailed Decision, the CA ruled that the RTC-Manila did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Assailed Order. Interpreting Section 37 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture, the CA concluded

that it was not necessary for the RTC-Manila to issue a separate Order finding that private respondents' Second Verified Petition was sufficient in form and substance; its Order directing the AMLC to file a
Comment to the said petition is notice enough that the petition was found acceptable. The AMLC cannot compel the RTC-Manila to issue an Order which is not required by the Rules on Civil Forfeiture.
According to the CA, the AMLC's Manifestation and Motion should be considered a motion to extend its time to file a comment, which it is not entitled to as a matter of right.

In its Resolution[31] dated August 28, 2014, the CA denied the AMLC's motion for reconsideration for alleging no new matters of substance which could justify the reversal of the Assailed Decision.
Hence, this Petition.
Before the Court, the AMLC introduces a new argument: that the Second Verified Petition was premature. It cites Section 35 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture which states:
Sec. 35. Notice to File Claims. - Where the court has issued an order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section
4 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by verified petition, for a declaration that the same legitimately
belongs to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument or property corresponding thereto. The verified petition shall be filed with the court which rendered the order of forfeiture
within fifteen days from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the said order shall be executory and bar all other claims. (Emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above provision, the AMLC notes that private respondents received a copy of the RTC-Manila's order of forfeiture on January 31, 2011, and said order would have attained finality 15 days
later or on February 15, 2011, if Ariola, et al. did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.[32] Private respondents' Second Verified Petition was, however, dated February 8, 2011; hence, it was
premature. The AMLC further argues that the issue of prematurity is jurisdictional, and may be raised at any time, even for the first time on petition for review before the Court. Aside from this, the AMLC

also reiterates its arguments before the CA: that it was deprived of due process because the RTC-Manila declared private respondents' claims as uncontested without comment from the AMLC, and that
said claims were contested and needed to be heard and supported by evidence.
For their part, private respondents argue that the AMLC availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They point out that the AMLC should have appealed from the RTC-
Manila's Decision pursuant to the Rules on Civil Forfeiture. They also point out that the AMLC's prematurity argument was raised for the first time before the Court, and that it is erroneous because Section
35 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture merely prescribes a deadline for filing a claim, not a prohibition on filing prior to finality of the order of forfeiture. They also echo the CA's ruling that the Rules on Civil
Forfeiture do not require the RTC to issue a separate order finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. Finally, they emphasize that the AMLC judicially admitted their claims when it used their
testimonies as evidence before the RTC-Manila.
On August 6, 2019, counsel for Corpus filed a Notice of Death [33] informing the Court that she passed away last January 19, 2018 and that upon her death, a petition for the probate of her Holographic
Will with an application for appointment of an administrator had been filed and pending before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71 (RTC-Pasig). [34] On August 14, 2019, the Court, via a Resolution,[35]
required said counsel to inform the Court of the duly appointed administrator/administratrix of the estate of Corpus so that s/he could be substituted for the deceased. On December 2, 2020, because no

such notification had been filed, the Court resolved to require counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt, and to comply with the Court's Resolution dated
August 14, 2019, within 10 days from notice.[36]
On January 26, 2021, Atty. Mark Anthony B. Ploteña (Atty. Ploteña) filed a Motion for Substitution [37] informing the Court that he had been appointed as the Special Administrator of the Estate of Teresita
Tirol Rojo (the maiden name of Corpus).[38] Attached thereto were original copies of the Letters of Special Administration [39] issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Pasig, and Atty. Ploteña's Oath of
Office.[40] On March 8, 2021, private respondents, through Atty. Ploteña, also filed a Manifestation and Compliance [41] with the Court's Resolution dated December 2, 2020, praying that the Court refrain
from holding him in contempt. The Court hereby finds that Atty. Ploteña has duly complied with the Court's directives and substitution as prayed for is proper.

Issues
Essentially, the issues for the Court's resolution are as follows:

1. Whether the AMLC's resort to the CA through a petition for certiorari was proper;

2. Whether the AMLC was denied due process by the RTC-Manila;

3. Whether private respondents' claims were contested or uncontested; and

4. Whether private respondents' Second Verified Petition was prematurely filed.

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds no merit in the instant Petition.

The AMLC should have appealed from the RTC's

Assailed Order

There is indeed merit in private respondents' argument that the AMLC should have appealed from the RTC-Manila's Assailed Order instead of filing a petition for certiorari. Title VII of the Rules on Civil
Forfeiture, which deals with claims against forfeited assets, states:
TITLE VII
Claims Against Forfeited Assets
Sec. 35. Notice to File Claims. - Where the court has issued an order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section
4 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by verified petition, for a declaration that the same legitimately
belongs to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument or property corresponding thereto. The verified petition shall be filed with the court which rendered the order of forfeiture within
fifteen days from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the said order shall be executory and bar all other claims.
Sec. 36. How to File a Claim; Contents. - In his petition, the claimant must state the complete facts, attach the affidavits of his witnesses, supporting documents and other evidence, and personally verify
the claim. The claimant shall file the petition with the clerk of court, pay the docket and other lawful fees and submit proof of service of a copy of the claim upon the petitioner.

Sec. 37. Effect of Non-Compliance with Requirements. - The court may dismiss the claim outright if it is not sufficient in form and substance and is manifestly filed for delay. Otherwise, it shall issue a
notice to the petitioner to file its comment on the claim.
Sec. 38. Notice to File Comment. - Within fifteen days after notice, petitioner shall file a comment admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting forth the substance of the matters which are relied
upon to support the admission or denial. If the petitioner has no knowledge sufficient to enable it to admit or deny specifically, it shall state such want of knowledge. The petitioner in its comment shall
allege in offset any fees, charges, taxes and expenses due to it. A copy of the comment shall be served on the claimant.
Sec. 39. Disposition of Admitted or Uncontested Claim. - The court may, without hearing, issue an appropriate order approving any claim admitted or not contested by the petitioner.
Sec. 40. Hearing on Contested Claim. - Upon the filing of a comment contesting the claim, the court shall set the claim for hearing within thirty days with notice to all parties.
Sec. 41. Final Order. - The court shall issue a final order on the contested claim within thirty days from submission.
Sec. 42. Appeal. - An appeal to the Court of Appeals may be taken in the same manner as prescribed in Section 34 of this Rule.
In relation to Section 42, Section 34 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture states:

Sec. 34. Appeal. -

(a) Notice and period of appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeals by filing within fifteen days from its receipt a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment and serving a copy upon the adverse party.
(b) Procedure on appeal. - The parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk of court to the parties
that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record.
The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

According to the AMLC, appeal is not available as a remedy if the order or decision to be appealed from is one that declares a claim uncontested. The AMLC points out that Section 42 (Appeal) follows
Section 40 (Hearing on Contested Claim) and Section 41 (Final Order); hence, an appeal can only be filed against final orders on contested claims after a full- blown hearing. It also points out that only an
"aggrieved party" may appeal to the CA under Section 34, and if claims are uncontested, there cannot be any aggrieved party.
Even a cursory reading of Title VII and Section 34 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture as quoted above would expose the ludicrousness of the AMLC's arguments. Appeal under Section 42 is available as a
remedy for any final orders of the RTC as regards any claims against the forfeited assets. Just because Section 42 sequentially comes after Section 40 (Hearing on Contested Claim) and Section 41 (Final
Order) is not an argument to sever Section 42 from the rest of Title VII. This sequence in provisions could not have meant to leave parties without a remedy in a case where, for whatever reason, the RTC
erroneously approves an uncontested claim under Section 39.
An order declaring a claim admitted or not contested under Section 39 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture is a final order, as it leaves nothing more to be done except to be executed in favor of the claimant.
Hence, the AMLC should have appealed to the CA instead of filing a petition for certiorari.
However, the Court notes that despite the flawed resort to certiorari, the CA nonetheless resolved the AMLC's petition on the merits and deemed it proper to forego a strict application of the rules. Courts

are not precluded from doing this in the sound exercise of their discretion. As the Court has explained:
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the
availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, generally, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The provisions of the Rules of Court, which

are technical rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations. While a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare
and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[42] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a relaxation of the rules by the CA was warranted. Given that the case involves significant sums of money which appear to have been fraudulently obtained from unwitting victims of a large-scale
investment scam, a full resolution of the case on the merits was preferable over an outright dismissal on procedural grounds. The CA had sufficient basis to exercise leniency when it acted on the AMLC's
petition for certiorari.

The AMLC was not denied due process; the RTC-

Manila could not be faulted for considering private
respondents' claims as uncontested

For clarity, the following were the material dates starting from the filing of the Second Verified Petition:
February 10, 2011 Second Verified Petition was filed, with motion to litigate as indigents.

February 18, 2011 The RTC-Manila issued an Order directing the AMLC to file its comment to the Second Verified Petition within 15 days.

February 21, 2011 AMLC filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the period within which to file its comment be suspended until the issue of indigency had been resolved.

March 21, 2011 The RTC-Manila again set for hearing on April 13, 2011 the motion to litigate as indigents. It also noted the AMLC's Manifestation and Motion without directly ruling
thereon.

May 23, 2011 The RTC-Manila granted private respondents' motion to litigate as paupers.

September 21, 2011 Private respondents moved for the issuance of an order approving and declaring their claims as uncontested, since the AMLC had not filed any comment to their
petition.

The AMLC opposed private respondents' September 21, 2011 motion. After a reply and rejoinder were filed, the RTC-Manila granted private respondents' motion.
The crux of the AMLC's claim of denial of due process is the fact that they were not given a sufficient opportunity to file a comment before the RTC-Manila declared private respondents' claims
uncontested. It admits that it was directed by the RTC-Manila to comment on the claims, but points out that given the foregoing antecedents, it could not have filed its comment because there were
pending incidents.
It is evident that the AMLC was not deprived of due process. A perusal of the records would reveal that it was given two separate opportunities to contest private respondents' claims, since the RTC-
Manila directed it to file a comment on both the first and Second Verified Petitions.[43] In both instances, the AMLC failed to file a comment as directed.[44]
The AMLC is also mistaken in expecting that the RTC-Manila should have issued a separate and explicit order declaring private respondents' petition as sufficient in form and substance. As pointed out by
the CA, Section 35 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture does not require the RTC to issue such an order. If the RTC finds the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, it will simply direct the plaintiff — the
AMLC in this case — to comment thereon.
Granted, by that time, the eligibility of private respondents to litigate as indigents was still in issue, prompting the AMLC to file its Manifestation and Motion. Nevertheless, when the RTC-Manila eventually

declared private respondents' exempt from paying docket fees on May 23, 2011, the AMLC did not file a comment, or any other pleading for that matter, whether to clarify the status of their Manifestation
and Motion or to ascertain what period should be followed for the filing of its comment. When almost five months passed without the AMLC filing any response to their claims, private respondents finally
filed their motion to declare their claims uncontested.
Given these circumstances, the AMLC's claim of denial of due process is easily seen as a bankrupt claim, and cannot be given credence. The AMLC unreasonably failed to timely contest private
respondents' claims, and the RTC-Manila cannot be faulted for granting the latter's motion. The AMLC lost the chance to file its comment through its own fault.

Private respondents' Second Verified Petition was

not dismissible for being filed early

There is no merit in the AMLC's argument that the Second Verified Petition was prematurely filed. To recall, Section 35 of the Rules on Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 35. Notice to File Claims. - Where the court has issued an order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section

4 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by verified petition, for a declaration that the same
legitimately belongs to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument or property corresponding thereto. The verified petition shall be filed with the court which rendered the order
of forfeiture within fifteen days from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the said order shall be executory and bar all other claims. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 35 does not explicitly prohibit the filing of a claimant's verified petition earlier than the finality of the order of forfeiture. Notably, under the same provision, claimants may already raise their claims
before the order is even issued through participation in the forfeiture proceedings, either by being impleaded or by intervening therein. The 15-day period to file a verified petition (for those who did not
participate in the forfeiture proceedings) certainly serves some practical purposes, i.e., to avoid multiplicity of suits and conflicting decisions in case the defendant in the civil forfeiture case files a motion
for reconsideration or appeal against the order of forfeiture, as well as to serve as a reglementary period beyond which all claims against the forfeited assets would be barred. However, to equate this
period to an absolute prohibition against early filing — as proposed by the AMLC — seems neither practical nor logical.

Section 35 does not support AMLC's argument that the RTC-Manila should have dismissed the Second Verified Petition for lack of jurisdiction. If indeed a claimant files his or her verified petition before
the 15-day period commences, the trial court may simply hold the verified petition in abeyance and defer any action thereon until after the order of forfeiture becomes final and executory. In other words,

the 15-day period prescribed by Section 35 should not be read in a way that will unduly impair a claimant's chance to assert his or her claim against the forfeited assets. This is especially true in this case
where both the RTC-Manila and the AMLC were already aware of private respondents' claims even while the forfeiture proceedings were still pending because their testimonies were used by the AMLC to
further its own case. The Court quotes with approval the RTC-Manila's Assailed Order, which says:
More importantly, it would indeed be the height of injustice and unfairness for the plaintiff Republic to have utilized these claimants as their witnesses, and their documents as their exhibits, presenting and
arguing their case for which plaintiff has procured a favorable decision, and now in a sudden turnaround, contends that claimants must still prove via clear and convincing evidence the validity of their
claims. x x x.[45]
A final note
The Court expresses profound disappointment in the procedural missteps and amateur lawyering which the AMLC resorted to before the RTC-Manila. As earlier mentioned, the AMLC was twice given an

opportunity to contest the claims of private respondents; twice also it failed to do so.
Furthermore, from the parties' submissions, it seems that the RTC-Manila's first directive to comment relative to the first Verified Petition was entirely ignored by the AMLC. To emphasize, Section 35 of

the Rules on Civil Forfeiture does not preclude an interested party from intervening in the civil forfeiture case itself. This, private respondents already attempted to do during the pendency of the civil
forfeiture proceedings, and the RTC-Manila gave due course to the same by directing the AMLC to comment. The AMLC neither complied with the RTC-Manila's directive nor offered an explanation for its
non-compliance.
The Court also frowns upon the AMLC's lackadaisical attitude towards its duty to file a comment to the Second Verified Petition. First, it expected the RTC-Manila to issue a separate order finding the said

petition sufficient in form and substance. Second, when the RTC-Manila finally allowed private respondents to litigate as indigents, the AMLC still did not file its comment within 15 days. It does not matter
that the RTC-Manila did not explicitly rule on its Manifestation and Motion asking to suspend its period to file a comment until after the indigency issue was resolved. In that same Manifestation and
Motion, the AMLC took a stance that they would be filing their comment after the issue regarding private respondents' statuses as indigents was resolved. It is ludicrous for them to assume that the RTC-
Manila would have to give them a go-signal while the case dragged on indefinitely. Nothing was preventing them from filing their comment or at the very least, clarifying the RTC-Manila's ruling on their
Manifestation and Motion. Instead, they did not only allow the 15-day period to comment to lapse; they also let almost five months pass by without contesting private respondents' claims.
The AMLC is reminded that courts are not duty-bound, in the conduct of trial and in their application of rules of procedure, to look out for and ensure that a party's interests are sufficiently protected.
Parties in cases pending before the courts have a duty to seriously and actively pursue their causes of action or raise their defenses in a timely manner. While rules of procedure may be relaxed in
exceptional circumstances in the interest of substantial justice, parties may not abuse this leniency nor rely on it as a matter of right.

In addition, it must be noted that despite having dragged this case all the way to the Court, and despite the passage of almost 10 years since private respondents filed their Second Verified Petition, AMLC
has not offered any substantive arguments against private respondents' entitlement to their respective claims. Whether before the RTC, the CA, or this Court, AMLC has merely harped on supposed
procedural technicalities, all of which have failed to hold water. AMLC forgets that "judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of technicalities." [46] Its

actions smack of bad faith, indifference to private respondents' rights as innocent victims of an investment scam, and blatant disregard for fair play. Its antics have unduly delayed the grant of private
respondents' claims — a delay so egregious especially on the part of Corpus, who died before her hard-earned money could be returned to her. The Court will not permit any further injustice to be caused
in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RESOLVES to:
 1. NOTE the Manifestation and Compliance dated March 5, 2021 filed by private respondents through counsel, Atty. Mark Anthony B. Ploteña;

2. GRANT the Motion for Substitution dated January 22, 2021 of Atty. Mark Anthony B. Ploteña and SUBSTITUTE the Estate of Teresita Rojo Corpus for private respondent Teresita
Corpus; and

3. DENY the Anti-Money Laundering Council's Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The Decision dated January 27, 2014
and Resolution dated August 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals Former Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 127303 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 230502. February 15, 2022 ]

LUISITO C. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC. AND ALFA SHIP & CREW MANAGEMENT GMBH, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Luisito C. Reyes (petitioner) against Jebsens Maritime, Inc. (Jebsens) and Alfa Ship & Crew Management
GMBH (Alfa; collectively, respondents), assailing the November 16, 2016 Decision[1] and March 9, 2017[2] Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142799, which affirmed

the June 18, 2015[3] and July 30, 2015[4] Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), denying petitioner's claim for total and permanent disability benefits.
Antecedents

Petitioner was hired by Alfa as Second Officer on September 16, 2013, through its local manning agent, Jebsens. His employment was covered by a standard employment contract for a period
of six months with the vessel MV Pacific Fantasy, which was later renamed as MV Voge Fantasy.
Halfway through his contract, on December 26, 2013, he allegedly figured in an accident while on board the vessel. He slipped and fell, hitting his buttocks on the floor while releasing the tug
line of the ship. He felt pain in his lumbar area, but he continued to work. He self-medicated and experienced slight relief. His lower back pain, however, persisted. He then requested a medical
consultation.
On March 21, 2014, he was brought to a hospital in Sweden. Radiographs and CT scan of his lumbar spine revealed a L1 vertebra fracture. He was given pain medications and was advised to
undergo physical therapy and to only take light jobs. In view of his medical condition, he was declared unfit to work and was repatriated on March 29, 2014.[5]
On April 2, 2014, he underwent an x-ray of his lumbar spine with UPMC Philippines ( UPMC), the result of which showed a "compression deformity of the L1 vertebral body," and was advised to

undergo magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the lumbar area for further evaluation.[6]
On April 21, 2014, petitioner returned to UPMC for MRI of his lumbosacral spine which revealed the following findings: (1) mild to moderate chronic compression fracture of the L1 vertebra body;

(2) non-specific signal abnormality involving the posterior aspects of the T12-L1 invertebral disc; and (3) minimal L1-L2 and L4-L5 disc bulge.[7]
On April 26, 2014, petitioner was subjected to bone mineral density measurement which found that he had low bone mass density (osteopenia). [8] Thereafter, he had a total of 12 sessions of
physical therapy in June and July 2014. Petitioner felt slight relief immediately after said sessions, but the pain returned a few hours after each session.[9]
On July 14, 2014, or 108 days from petitioner's repatriation, he was issued a final medical report with the following findings:

Final Diagnosis:

● healed Compression fracture, L1 secondary to Osteoporosis and

● s/p 2 sets of physical therapy (6 sessions each)

Recommendation:

● maximal medical improvement

● fit to work for the condition referred, case closure[10]

Petitioner was paid his sickness allowance for the duration of his treatment from March 29 until June 30, 2014.
However, petitioner was unsatisfied with the findings of the company-designated physician. He, thus, sought the opinion of a physician of his choice. On July 23, 2014, he consulted with the
Department of Orthopedics at the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center, through Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira ( Dr. Magtira), due to recurring lower back pain. Dr. Magtira declared
petitioner permanently unfit in any capacity for further sea duties after thorough history taking and physical examination.

Three months later, he consulted another physician who is an expert in the field, Dr. Noel Trinidad ( Dr. Trinidad), a Fellow of the Philippine Orthopedic Association and the Philippine College of
Surgeons. After his examination, Dr. Trinidad issued a Medical Certificate[11] declaring that petitioner was permanently unfit to go back to work as a seaman.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that petitioner already finished his contract on March 19, 2014, when the latter complained of back pains. They denied that petitioner suffered an injury
due to an accident that occurred on board the vessel. When he complained of back pains, he was advised to undergo medical examination. Upon his repatriation and arrival in the Philippines on
April 1, 2014, respondents immediately referred petitioner to the company-designated doctors at Shiphealth, Inc. led by Dr. Maria Gracia Gutay. Petitioner was submitted to thorough medical
tests which revealed that he had compression fracture L1 secondary to osteoporosis.[12]
Respondents further claimed that petitioner was given medications and advised to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon. He likewise underwent physical therapy. After a month, petitioner
claimed reduction in his back pain. Further treatment was done. Repeat laboratory tests yielded normal results and that petitioner's compression fracture had healed. Petitioner was declared fit
to work.[13]

Respondents paid petitioner's sickness allowance, but denied his claim for maximum disability benefits under a purported Collective Bargaining Agreement ( CBA) because petitioner was
declared fit to work and his condition was not the result of an accident. The CBA applied only in cases of accidents.[14]
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Mediation conferences were held, but no amicable settlement was reached.
Petitioner argued that he is entitled to, among others, US$235,224.00 as total permanent disability benefits under the CBA, citing the injury he sustained during an alleged accident that took
place while he was working on board the vessel, and that such injury impaired his earning capacity.
Respondents, for their part, countered the fact of petitioner's contract completion, that he did not suffer from any accident while on board the vessel, and that his illness was degenerative in
nature.[15]
On March 27, 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision[16] dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. The LA ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that he
suffered a work-related injury during the term of his employment. Even assuming petitioner suffered compression fracture, he failed to show that such was related to his work on board the
vessel as a seafarer.[17]

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which rendered a Resolution[18] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. It observed that nowhere in the medical reports of the company-designated physician
was it stated that petitioner's illness had anything to do with his duties on board respondents' vessel. It was noted that his fracture had been treated and healed, and that he was cleared for work
on July 14, 2014, less than the 120/240-day period required since repatriation for maximum disability benefits.[19]
Further, respondents maintained that petitioner's claim that he suffered an injury during an accident on board the vessel remained unsubstantiated and was not corroborated by anyone on the
ship. The NLRC subscribed to the observation of the LA that petitioner was a high-ranking official of the vessel who would have known the significance of putting the accident on record, but he
did not.[20] The logbook entry only confirmed that petitioner's illness started on December 26, 2013, when he felt low back pain.[21]

The NLRC did not lend credence to the declaration of permanent disability and work-related injury made by petitioner's doctors of choice, Dr. Magtira and Dr. Trinidad, because they were made
much later on July 23, 2014 and October 21, 2014, respectively, long after petitioner had disembarked from the vessel on March 29, 2014. They were also based on single consultations without
adequate tests to support the same.[22]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied. He sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA Ruling
The CA denied the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC. Similarly, the CA held that petitioner's assertion that he figured in an accident on board the vessel was not substantiated;
thus, the provisions of the CBA were not applicable.[23] However, even if the accident was not substantially proven, petitioner could still seek relief from the provisions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which are deemed incorporated in the employment contract between petitioner and respondents. Pursuant to Section

20(B) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer
suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of the contract.[24]

The POEA-SEC defines work-related illness as those which result in disability or death by reason of an occupational disease listed under Sec. 32-A thereof. The same has created a disputable
presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not listed as an occupational disease. The burden is placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection is required.[25]
According to the CA, the examinations and procedures petitioner underwent, as well as the diagnosis, showed a causal connection between his illness or injury and the nature of the work for
which he had been contracted.[26] The reasonable connection between the nature of his work and the medical condition while on board were substantially proven. The burden to overcome the
presumption is now shifted to respondents.
The CA opined that respondents failed to overcome said presumption. The medical report did not make any categorical statement as to the absence of work-relatedness of the injury sustained
by petitioner. The disputable presumption that injury or illness that results in disability, or in some cases death, is work-related stands in the absence of contrary evidence. [27] This, however,

does not automatically make petitioner entitled to his total and permanent disability benefits claim. The disability grade petitioner received, whether from the company-designated physician or
from the third independent physician in case of conflict between findings of the former and the employee's chosen physician, shall be taken into consideration.

In this case, there was a huge disparity between the findings of the company-designated physician and that of the private doctors chosen by petitioner. The POEA-SEC provides that, in such a
case, the opinion of a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon by the employer and the seafarer which opinion would be final and binding on them. Non-observance of the procedure would mean
that the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails.[28]
Unfortunately, the CA held that petitioner failed to observe the third-doctor referral provision. Moreover, the diagnoses and findings of petitioner's doctors of choice were issued much later and

after single consultations with petitioner without adequate tests to support the same. As between the company-designated doctor, who had all the medical records of petitioner for the duration of
his treatment, and petitioner's private doctors who merely examined him for a day, the former's finding must prevail.[29]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he filed the present petition raising, briefly, the following arguments:

1. Petitioner requested for referral to a third doctor and that it was respondents who failed to abide by such requirement;

2. There were serious doubts marring the findings of the company-designated physician;

3. Despite the finding of three (3) injuries, the company-designated physician assessed only one of those injuries; and

4. Petitioner has substantially proven by evidence that he suffered injury as a result of an accident.

In sum, the primary issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law are entertained. Questions of fact, which would require a re-evaluation of the evidence, are
inappropriate under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 45, Sec. 1 is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. [30] Like any other rules,
there are recognized exceptions,[31] and this case is one of them.
For disability to be compensable under Sec. 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness
must have existed during the term of the seafarer's contract. [32] In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner's injury happened during the term of his contract while on board the vessel.
The LA and the NLRC denied the disability benefits because petitioner failed to substantially show the causal connection between his work and his illness. The NLRC ruled that awards of
compensation cannot rest on bare allegations, speculations or presumptions.[33] The CA, on the other hand, disagreed with the labor tribunals and came up with a contrary finding that
petitioner's illness or injury was, in fact, work-related.
The Court, in Sestoso v. United Philippine Lines, Inc.,[34] citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[35] held that compensability of an illness or injury does not depend on whether the injury

or disease was pre-existing at the time of employment but rather on whether the injury or illness is work-related or had been aggravated by the seafarer's working condition.
Under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, referred to as the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels
(MC No. 10) and deemed incorporated in every employment contract of seafarers, work-related illness is defined as any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Sec. 32-A of
the contract with the conditions set therein; while work-related injury is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
In the same MC No. 10, Sec. 20, par. A(4) categorically provides that those illnesses not listed in Sec. 32 of the contract are disputably presumed as work-related.
The law clearly laid down a legal presumption of work-related illness or injury in favor of seafarers. This legal presumption was borne by the fact that the said list cannot account for all known
and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-
inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits .[36] Thus, the burden is on the employer to disprove the work-
relatedness, failing which, the disputable presumption that a particular injury or illness that results in disability is work-related stands.[37]
Here, the labor tribunals placed the burden of disproving the legal presumption on the petitioner. The settled rule is, as discussed above, that the burden falls upon the employer. Unfortunately,

records show that respondents failed to dispute the presumption of work-relatedness of petitioner's injury.
Nonetheless, the presumption of work-relatedness does not extend to the matter of compensability. Compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a
showing that work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of the injury or illness.[38]
Petitioner's work included, among others: the assisting in cargo handling and operations; handling of the vessel, in docking, anchoring, piloting en route, in close quarters and open sea
conditions; assisting in mooring and unmooring of the vessel in port and at off-shore locations; and the testing of equipment. The CA correctly observed that the examinations, procedures, and
diagnosis have amply proven petitioner's work-related injury. The nature and demand of his work as a seafarer, which the CA found to have been physically demanding, aggravated his medical

condition resulting in a fracture to his lumbar spine. Jurisprudence states that although the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them and
assumes the risk of liability.[39]
Having shown that petitioner's injury is compensable because it has a causal connection with his work and he suffered the same during the term of his contract, the next question is: should
petitioner be entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?
A seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits is not automatic simply because of a finding that his illness or injury is compensable. In Gamboa v. Maunlad Trans, Inc.,[40] the Court reiterated the
settled rule that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the relevant
statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Arts. 191 to 193) [41] of the Labor Code in relation to Sec. 2(a), Rule X [42] of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract,
the material contracts are the POEA-SEC, which is deemed incorporated in every seafarer's employment contract and considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the

government, the parties' CBA, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer.[43]
Medical findings of the company-designated physician are given weight as such physician is, under the law, obligated to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness or degree of

disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation,[44] subject to extension of up to 240 days when further medical attention is necessary. It is the company-designated physician's duty to
issue a final medical assessment of the seafarer's disability grade or his fitness to work. On the other hand, the law also requires the seafarer to submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so; in which case, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance.[45]
As corollary, the seafarer may also consult a physician of his choice. The same law expressly provides that in case of disagreement or conflict between the findings of the company-designated
physician and the seafarer's physician of choice, a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon by the parties. The findings of the third doctor shall be final and binding on both employer and
seafarer. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that referral to a third doctor is mandatory, and the party who fails to abide thereby would be in breach of the POEA-SEC.[46]
In the present case, the company-designated physician issued a Final Medical Report[47] on July 14, 2014, within 108 days from petitioner's repatriation, that the latter had healed from

compression fracture, after undergoing series of tests, medications, and 12 sessions of physical therapy. He was found to have attained maximal medical improvement and was deemed fit to
work.[48] Petitioner's physician of choice, Dr. Magtira, however, issued a Medical Report [49] on July 23, 2014, with the findings that petitioner had lost his pre-injury capacity and was unfit to go

back to his previous work due to the said impairment. Dr. Magtira declared petitioner to have permanent disability and permanently unfit in any capacity for further sea duties. [50]
The conflicting findings called for the referral to a third doctor jointly agreed upon by the parties and whose findings shall be final and binding upon them. The initiative for referral to a third doctor
should come from the employee, i.e., petitioner himself. He must actively or expressly request for it.[51] Consequently, the Minutes[52] of the Single Entry Approach (SENA) revealed that
petitioner provided Jebsens with the second doctor's certificate and relevant CBA provision. Also, contrary to the CA's findings, petitioner expressly proposed the referral to a third doctor. It was

respondents who refused this, claiming through their counsel, that they had not been given authority to refer the case to a third doctor.[53]
To reiterate, referral to a third doctor is mandatory in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-designated physician and the employee's physician of choice. Jurisprudence
further holds that upon notification by the seafarer of his intention to refer the conflicting findings to a third doctor, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for referral to a third
doctor commonly agreed upon between the parties.[54]
Respondents clearly failed to abide by the mandatory referral procedure under the law. As a result, the findings of the company-designated physician cannot be automatically deemed
conclusive and binding.[55] Accordingly, the Court must now weigh the inherent merits of the medical findings presented by both sides.
We give greater weight and credence on the medical report of petitioner's physician, Dr. Magtira, that the former is deemed permanently disabled and unfit for any sea duties.
Although the CA observed that the diagnoses of Dr. Magtira and Dr. Trinidad, the second physician seen by petitioner, were made only after single consultations, We still find them to be
properly supported; as they were based on the very same results of the extensive tests, procedures, and physical therapy sessions of petitioner, which respondents' company-designated
physician relied upon. While the final diagnosis of the company-designated physician deemed petitioner fit for work, it was also noted therein that petitioner still reported episodes of numbness

in the affected area. Although these episodes were rare, tolerable, and would be resolved at the end of the day, this observation is not insignificant in determining petitioner's fitness for sea duty,
especially in view of the fact that petitioner sought a second medical opinion less than two weeks after his last treatment with the company-designated physician.
Additionally, the certification of the company-designated physician would defeat petitioner's claim while the opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such claim. The law looks
tenderly on the laborer. Thus, where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor
consistent with the principle of social justice.[56]
Finally, is petitioner entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under the alleged CBA provision he invoked?
We rule in the negative.
Petitioner, a Second Officer, invoked Sec. 21 of the CBA[57] in claiming total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of $235,224.00, which provides:
Disability
§21
a) A Seafarer who suffers injury as a result of an accident from any cause whatsoever whilst in the employment of the Company or arising from her/his employment with the Company,
regardless of fault including accidents occurring while travelling to or from the Ship, and whose ability to work as a Seafarer is reduced as a result thereof shall, in addition to sick pay,

be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of the Agreement.

b) The disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a Doctor appointed by the ITF, and the Company shall provide disability compensation to the Seafarer in accordance
with the percentage specified in the table below which is appropriate to this disability.

2012

RATE OF COMPENSATION
DEGREE OF DISABILITY
RATINGS OFFICERS & RATINGS
AB & below above AB

% US$ US$

50-100 156,816 235,224

xxxx

with any differences, including less than 10% disability, to be pro-rata.

The compensation provided under this paragraph for 100% disability shall not exceed US$235,224 for Officers and $156,816 for Ratings for 2012, with lesser degrees of disability compensated
for pro-rata.[58]
Petitioner refers to Sec. 21 to support his claim for disability benefits due to his accident while employed by respondents. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioner to prove by substantial evidence
that he figured in an accident on board the vessel. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. [59]
Petitioner failed to prove the fact of accident, either by documentary or testimonial evidence.

Petitioner claimed that on December 26, 2013, he slipped and fell on the floor on his buttocks while releasing a tug line of the ship. Surprisingly, no such accident was recorded in the ship
records to validate petitioner's assertion; neither was it corroborated by anyone on the ship. The labor tribunals were correct in noting that petitioner was a high-ranking official of the vessel who

would have known the significance of putting such accident on record; but he did not. [60] Petitioner alleged that the seaman's medical form indicated that he experienced pain in his lower back
side after handling a tug line in December 2013.[61] Such entry in the form, however, does not conclusively reveal the occurrence of an accident.
Petitioner also cited an online article of the University of Maryland Medical Center entitled " A Patient's Guide to Lumbar Compression Fracture,"[62] to support his claim that his compression
fracture was caused by an accident. Nevertheless, the same article emphasized that:

There is not one single cause of compression fractures, though the word compression would indicate that the fracture occurs because of too much pressure being placed on the bone. If the
bone is too weak to hold normal pressure, it may not take much pressure to cause the vertebral body to collapse. Most healthy bones can withstand a lot of pressure and the spine will bend to
absorb the shock. However, if the force is too great for the vertebrae to sustain, one or more of them can fracture.[63] (emphasis supplied)
The same article further states that osteoporosis is a common cause of compression fracture, and trauma to the spinal vertebrae can also lead to minor or severe fractures. [64] Consequently,
petitioner must indeed convincingly prove the fact of accident in order to claim total and permanent disability benefits under the CBA. Unfortunately, he failed to do so. The CBA provision,
therefore, cannot apply here.
Nonetheless, petitioner is not without any recourse as the POEA-SEC also governs his employment contract. The POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest and is deemed incorporated in every
employment contract of seafarers. As the Court gives credence to the assessment of petitioner's physicians of choice, he is entitled to the maximum total and permanent disability benefit of
$60,000.00 provided under the POEA-SEC.
As regards moral and exemplary damages, We find that petitioner is not entitled thereto.

Moral damages are recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed has acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. [65] On the other hand, Art.
2229 in relation to Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral damages and if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.[66]
In this case, respondents did not act oppressively or in bad faith. Respondents provided petitioner with sufficient and extensive medical treatments, before and upon repatriation, and paid him
his sickness allowance in accordance with their CBA for the duration of his treatment. Hence, there is no basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages.
Be that as it may, We deem it proper to award attorney's fees in favor of petitioner at ten percent (10%) of the total monetary awards following Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code, "which allows its
recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws."[67]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The November 16, 2016 Decision and March 9, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142799, which affirmed the
June 18, 2015 and July 30, 2015 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are jointly and severally liable to PAY Luisito C.
Reyes the following:
1) Permanent and total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment; and,

2) Attorney's fees at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

Respondents are likewise liable for legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum of the foregoing monetary awards computed from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 41-53; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of the Court), with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a

Member of the Court), concurring.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 202029. February 15, 2022 ]

ISABELO CABALHIN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES BONIFACIO LANSUELA AND ISIDRA LANSUELA,* RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the July 20, 2011 Decision [1] and May 8, 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan
de Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 01914-MIN, which reversed the November 28, 2007 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court of Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7 ( RTC), in Civil Case

No. 669.
Antecedents
The present controversy involves a parcel of agricultural land (irrigated riceland) situated in Barangay Dacutan, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Agusan del Sur, with an area of 34,661
square meters. Said property is registered in the name of Isidoro Cabalhin ( Isidoro) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2133[4] issued on September 3, 1958. Isidoro passed away in
1974.[5]
On May 31, 2002, Isabelo Cabalhin (petitioner) filed a Complaint[6] for Recovery of Possession with Preliminary and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the spouses Bonifacio Lansuela
(Bonifacio) and Isidra Lansuela (collectively, respondents).
Petitioner alleged that he was in actual, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject land, having inherited the same from his father, Isidoro. During his lifetime, Isidoro

was in actual possession and cultivation of the land. In June 1993, while petitioner was visiting relatives in Barobo, Surigao del Sur, Bonifacio, with the aid of some men, by means of force,
intimidation, stealth, and strategy, entered the property and, thereafter, planted it with rice. Upon returning from Surigao del Sur in 1997, [7] petitioner immediately demanded that respondents
vacate his property, but Bonifacio made threats against his life and safety and that of his family. Bonifacio further claimed to have bought the land from Isidoro, but petitioner could not recall any
such conveyance made by his father who, one year before his demise, had given him OCT No. P-2133 and advised him to take good care of the land and administer it. Despite repeated
demands to vacate, respondents refused to do so.[8]
In their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and [Counterclaims],[9] respondents averred that since May 1988, they had been in peaceful possession of the subject land on which they planted rice

and other agricultural products. They narrated that the said property was already sold by Isidoro to Enrique Perales ( Perales) under a Deed of Sale[10] dated June 20, 1968. The heirs of
Perales sold the same to Teodoro Estorion (Estorion) by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale [11] dated August 31, 1973. Under a Deed of Sale[12] dated January
24, 1979, Estorion sold the property to Segros Manaay (Manaay)[13] who, in turn, sold it to Bonifacio under a Deed of Absolute Sale[14] dated May 9, 1988. Moreover, respondents had been
paying the real estate taxes due on the land, as evidenced by receipts of tax payments.[15]
In its April 23, 2003 Order,[16] the trial court granted petitioner's plea for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining respondents to cease and desist from further planting rice on the
disputed land, to vacate the same, and to refrain from disturbing petitioner's possession and occupation of the premises.
On September 19, 2003, the trial court ordered that the proceeds of the harvest from the subject land be deposited with the court.[17]
At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to a simultaneous filing of position papers and, thereafter, the case would be submitted for resolution.[18]
The RTC Ruling
On November 28, 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. It held that the certificate of title in the possession of petitioner serves as an indefeasible and incontrovertible title

in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. On the other hand, mere payment of taxes by the respondents is not an evidence of ownership. Significantly, the series of deeds of sale
were not registered despite the lapse of 35 years, which is not the usual practice of persons who register real property to prove their ownership by purchase. The Court opined that the failure of
the respondents to register the land over a considerable length of time implies that they do not believe themselves to be the owners. Without such registration, ownership is not transferred, thus,
petitioner, being the only child of the registered owner, became the exclusive owner of the subject property by operation of law.[19]
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff ISABELO CABALHIN the lawful owner of the land situated in Dacutan, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur with Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2133 under the name of his father Isidoro Cabalhin.
The Court further declared, ordering herein defendant under the following:
1. to pay the plaintiff the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages[;]
2. to pay the plaintiff the amount of Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages[; and]
3. to pay the plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 as necessary litigation expenses.

Likewise, in order to avoid the acts complained of by herein plaintiff, let a Permanent Injunction be issued against herein defendant.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] dated December 28, 2007, which was denied by the trial court on March 5, 2008.[22]
Subsequently, on March 14, 2008, respondents filed a Motion for New Trial [23] based on newly discovered evidence. Meanwhile, the trial court issued a Writ of Permanent Injunction [24] dated
March 19, 2008.
On March 24, 2008, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay or Lift Permanent Writ of Injunction under Supersedeas Bond. [25] On the same day, they also filed a Notice of Appeal,[26] but
this was ordered withdrawn considering that the trial court had earlier directed petitioner to submit his comment on the motion for new trial. [27] Petitioner filed his Opposition to Stay Writ of
Permanent Injunction.[28] In its May 5, 2008 Order,[29] the trial court denied respondents' omnibus motion. Respondents' motion for new trial was likewise denied under the trial court's August
15, 2008 Resolution.[30]
On August 26, 2008, respondents filed a notice of appeal, which was initially denied for having been filed out of time. [31] In their motion for reconsideration, respondents sought to avail of the

fresh period to appeal, in accordance with the ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.[32] Accordingly, the notice of appeal was given due course while petitioner's motion for execution was
denied.[33]
CA Ruling
In its Decision,[34] the CA disagreed with the trial court that the failure to register the sale over the subject land has rendered it unenforceable. It ruled that an unrecorded deed of sale is binding
between the parties and their privies because actual notice is equivalent to registration. Stressing that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership, the CA noted that the four deeds of sale
in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1988 were all notarized documents, which carried the evidentiary weight conferred by law upon duly executed instruments. [35]

The CA further faulted petitioner for failing to discharge his burden of showing that the land possessed by respondents is the very same property that belongs to him, and that the sales
embodied in the series of documents presented by the respondents were bogus. Neither was there any allegation in the complaint that the deed of sale in favor of respondents was fake, forged
or simulated.[36]
Issue
Whether or not respondents acquired ownership of the land covered by OCT No. P-2133 in the name of Isidoro.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the purported deeds of sale did not transfer ownership of the subject land to respondents and the alleged vendees before him considering that these were not registered
as required by law. Besides, respondents and the previous alleged vendees were not purchasers in good faith, being aware of petitioner's cultivation of the land at the time they supposedly

bought it, and that the title was not delivered to anyone of them. Registration being the operative act that binds the land, the unregistered deeds of sale did not make the alleged vendees, nor
respondents, the owners of the disputed land.[37]

Respondents' Arguments
Respondents contend that mere possession by petitioner of the certificate of title did not validate his claim of ownership over the subject land already conveyed by his father during his lifetime.
Isidoro had, thus, lost ownership of his property which was already excluded from the inheritance of petitioner. Moreover, none of the series of deeds of transfers had been contested by
petitioner as to their genuineness and due execution.[38]
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are Articles 1496, 1497, 1498, and 1501 which read:
ART. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner

signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
ART. 1497. The thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.

ART. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
xxxx
ART. 1501. With respect to incorporeal property, the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 1498 shall govern. In any other case wherein said provisions are not applicable, the placing of the

titles of ownership in the possession of the vendee or the use by the vendee of his rights, with the vendor's consent, shall be understood as a delivery.
Under the Civil Code, the "ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof." [39] Here, the CA recognized respondents' ownership of
the subject land pursuant to the deeds of sale which were supposedly conveyances by Isidoro, his buyer Perales, and subsequent vendees. Essentially, Bonifacio's claim is anchored on the
conveyance made by Manaay under the Deed of Absolute Sale [40] dated May 9, 1988. The CA was apparently convinced by respondents' position that the execution by Manaay of the said
document was sufficient to transfer ownership of the land described therein to them as vendees.
While a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, ownership of the thing sold is acquired only upon its delivery to the buyer. Upon the perfection of the sale, the seller assumes the
obligation to transfer ownership and to deliver the thing sold, but the real right of ownership is transferred only "by tradition" or delivery thereof to the buyer.[41]
In Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc.,[42] the Court expounded on the concept of delivery, thus:
Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act by which one party parts with the title to and the
possession of the property, and the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same. In its natural sense, delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or

title; it means transfer of possession. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving up of the control and custody
of the property on the part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the vendee."[43] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The concept of "delivery" for the acquisition of the right of ownership was further elucidated in Cebu Winland Development Corporation v. Ong Siao Hua:[44]
Under the Civil Code, ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery. Manresa explains, " the delivery of the thing [x x x] signifies that title has passed from the seller to
the buyer." According to Tolentino, the purpose of delivery is not only for the enjoyment of the thing but also a mode of acquiring dominion and determines the transmission of ownership, the
birth of the real right. The delivery under any of the forms provided by Articles 1497 to 1505 of the Civil Code signifies that the transmission of ownership from vendor to vendee has taken
place.[45] (emphases supplied)
In this case, the CA erred in ruling that ownership of the disputed land was validly transferred to respondents by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Manaay despite the latter not
being in possession of either the land or the title. Respondents, as vendees, were not placed in possession and control of the land they bought simply because Manaay did not have such
possession. In other words, Manaay could not have effected a constructive delivery of the land to respondents by his execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1988.
As the Court held in Spouses Santiago v. Villamor:[46]
Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the "ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof." Related to this article is Article

1497 which provides that "[t]he thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee."
With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule: the execution of a public instrument "shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." However, the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a [prima facie]
presumption of delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. "[A] person who does not have actual possession of the thing
sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument."
In this case, no constructive delivery of the land transpired upon the execution of the deed of sale since it was not the spouses Villamor, Sr. but the respondents who had actual
possession of the land. The presumption of constructive delivery is inapplicable and must yield to the reality that the petitioners were not placed in possession and control of the
land.[47] (emphases supplied)
There being no actual or constructive delivery of the land subject of the sale between Manaay and respondents, the latter did not acquire its ownership. Under the circumstances, when their
vendor Manaay had no possession of either the land or the title despite the alleged prior sale transactions over the property, respondents should have been put on guard and should have

investigated further why petitioner remains the possessor of the land which was supposedly sold a long time ago. In fact, none of the alleged vendees had taken possession of the land. On this
matter, the trial court aptly observed that these purported vendees' unexplained failure and neglect to register the sales in their favor for a considerable period of time is simply contrary to the
usual practice of purchasers of real property, which leads to the conclusion that they did not regard themselves as owners. Even Bonifacio failed to register his interest or claim and just
proceeded to pay real property taxes without actual delivery of the property to him.
Indeed, it is "uncharacteristic of a conscientious buyer of real estate not to cause the immediate registration of his deed of sale, as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in his
name."[48] More so in this case, where the inaction of the purported vendees lasted for more than 30 years. Petitioner was in possession of both the land and the title all through those years, his

possession and cultivation having been disturbed only in June 1993 by respondents who took advantage of his temporary absence.
While We sustain the trial court's disposition on the issue of ownership, We find its award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses in favor of petitioner, as bereft of
factual and legal support. Hence, the same must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 20, 2011 Decision and May 8, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 01914-MIN are hereby SET
ASIDE. The November 28, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. 669, is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the
awards of damages and litigation costs are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 214933. February 15, 2022 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assailing the Decision[2] dated May 12, 2014 of the Court of Tax Appeals ( CTA) En Banc in CTA
EB No. 972. The CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision[3] of the CTA Third Division dated September 24, 2012, which, in turn, granted respondent First Gas Power Corporation's (First Gas)
appeal assailing the Final Assessment Notices and Formal Letters of Demand, all dated July 19, 2004, issued by petitioner against respondent for deficiency income taxes and penalties for the
taxable years 2000 and 2001.

The Facts
On October 24, 2002, First Gas received a Letter of Authority from the petitioner authorizing the BIR representative to examine the book of accounts and other accounting records of First Gas
for all revenue taxes for the taxable years 2000 and 2001.[4]
On September 30, 2003, First Gas received a Notice to Taxpayer from petitioner requesting it to appear for an informal conference on October 15, 2003.[5]
Thereafter, on March 11, 2004, First Gas received Preliminary Assessment Notices (PAN) dated December 15, 2003 and January 28, 2004, wherein it was assessed for the following deficiency
taxes and penalties for the taxable years 2000 and 2001:
a. Deficiency Income Tax for 2000 - P84,571,959.65
b. Deficiency Income Tax for 2001 - P97,999,363.41
c. Late Payment Penalties for 2001 - P4,670,630.18.[6]
On April 6, 2004, First Gas filed its Preliminary Reply to the PAN.[7] Then on September 6, 2004, it received Final Assessment Notices (FAN) and Formal Letters of Demand all dated July 19,

2004, wherein it was assessed for the following deficiency taxes and penalties for the taxable years 2000 and 2001:
a. Deficiency Income Tax for 2000 P37,099,915.29
b. Deficiency Income Tax for 2001 P82,365,799.90
c. Late Payment Penalties for 2001 P4,670,630.18.[8]
For the calendar year ending December 31, 2000, First Gas was assessed deficiency income tax for its unreported income on pre-income tax holiday sale of electricity to Meralco and Siemens,
as well as for its alleged unreported interest income from foreign investments and dollar loan proceeds realized prior to commercial operations.[9]
For the calendar year ending in December 31, 2001, First Gas was also assessed deficiency income tax for its disallowed interest expense from dollar deposits in foreign banks and its
disallowed compensation expense.[10]
Further, First Gas was assessed penalties for the calendar year ending December 31,2001 due to the late payment of withholding tax on interest on foreign loans and the late payment of excise
tax on natural gas.[11]
Meanwhile, the record shows that First Gas, represented by Nestor H. Vasay, and the BIR, represented by Celia C. King executed three (3) Waivers of the Defense of Prescription under the

Statue of Limitations, the summary of which are as follows:

Waiver Date of Waiver Period Extended Person Who Signed the Waiver

First[12] April 12, 2004 June 15, 2004 Celia C. King

Second[13] June 14, 2004 August 15, 2004 Celia C. King

Third[14] August 13, 2004 October 15, 2004 Celia C. King

On October 5, 2004, First Gas filed a Letter of Protest before respondent which was not acted upon. [15] Thus, on June 30, 2005, it filed a Petition for Review before the CTA to assail the FAN
and Formal Letters of Demand, all dated July 19, 2004.[16]
In a Decision[17] dated September 24, 2012, the CTA Third Division granted the petition of First Gas, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the following are hereby CANCELLED and WITHDRAWN:

1. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income tax for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2000 in the total amount of Php37,099,915.29 inclusive of surcharge,
interest and compromise penalties;
2. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income tax for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2001 in the total amount of Php82,365,799.90 inclusive of surcharge,
interest and compromise penalties; and

3. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for penalties assessment for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2001 in the total amount of Php4,670,630.18 inclusive of surcharge,
interest and compromise penalties.

SO ORDERED.[18] (Emphasis in the original)

The BIR moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, which was denied in a Resolution[19] dated December 13, 2012.
This prompted the BIR to file a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc. Then, in a Decision[20] dated May 12, 2014, the CTA En Banc denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Third Division of this Court in CTA Case No. 7281 dated
September 24, 2012 and December 13, 2012, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On June 11, 2014, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated May 12, 2014 but the same was denied by the CTA En Banc in a Resolution[22] dated October 7, 2014.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue
Whether the deficiency tax assessments for taxable years 2000 and 2001 issued by petitioner against respondent are valid.

Our Ruling
In the assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc affirmed the cancellation of the FAN and Formal Letters of Demand, all dated July 19, 2004, issued by petitioner against respondent for deficiency
income taxes and penalties for the taxable years 2000 and 2001 because they were all found to be invalid.[23]
According to the CTA, the period to assess respondent for deficiency income tax for taxable year 2000 has already prescribed because the Waivers issued to extend the period to assess were
not valid, finding the dates of acceptance by petitioner were not indicated in the Waivers. Thus, the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand, which assessed respondent for deficiency income tax
for the taxable year 2000 are invalid because they were issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period.[24]
The CTA also found that the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand, which assessed respondent for deficiency income tax for the taxable year 2001 are also not valid because the assessments
did not indicate therein a specific date or period within which the tax liabilities shall be paid by respondent.[25]
In the instant Petition, petitioner contends otherwise.
According to petitioner, the absence of the dates of acceptance in the Waivers was simply due to inadvertence or oversight on the part of the person who received the same. [26] It argues that
the inadvertence is not a fatal error that will invalidate the Waivers. [27] It also submits that it can be presumed that the date of acceptance of the Waivers by petitioner should be the date of
notarization since that would be the time when the Waivers would become public instruments and be binding against other persons or entities, aside from the one which executed the same. [28]
Petitioner also asserts that the Waivers were signed and accepted by the authorized official of petitioner before the expiration of the period of prescription, or before the lapse of the period
agreed upon in the case of the subsequent Waivers.[29]

Petitioner further contends that respondent is now estopped from assailing the validity of the Waivers because it was respondent that requested for the execution and signing of the said
Waivers.[30] Petitioner also contends that respondent should not be allowed to raise the issue of prescription for the first time on appeal before the CTA because it did not raise the same issue
on the administrative level.[31]
With regard to the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand, which assessed respondent for deficiency income tax for the taxable year 2001, petitioner contends that a notice of assessment need
not state a date therein.[32] Petitioner argues that in order to be valid, the only requirement is that a notice of assessment shall state the facts, the law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on
which the assessment is based.[33] Thus, petitioner contends that the date of payment is not material to validate the notice of assessment.[34] According to petitioner, for as long as the date
can be verified on the face of the notice of assessment or the formal letter of demand, then such would already suffice to determine when the tax deficiency should be payable.[35]
The Court will resolve first the validity of the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand for taxable year 2000.
The Court agrees with the CTA that the Waivers were defective; thus, petitioner's period to issue the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand for taxable year 2000 has already prescribed.
The period of limitation in the assessment and collection of taxes is governed by Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which provides:

SEC. 203. Period of Limitation Upon Assessment and Collection. - Except as provided in Section 222, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three (3) years after the last day
prescribed by law for the filing of the return, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period: Provided, That in a
case where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the three (3)-year period shall be counted from the day the return was filed. For purposes of this Section, a return filed before
the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day.
Meanwhile, Section 222(b) of the NIRC authorizes the extension of the original three-year prescriptive period upon the execution of a valid waiver between the taxpayer and the BIR, provided:
(1) the agreement was made before the expiration of the three-year period, and (2) the guidelines in the proper execution of the waiver are strictly followed,[36] thus:
SEC. 222. Exceptions as to Period of Limitation of Assessment and Collection of Taxes. –
xxx

(b) If before the expiration of the time prescribed in Section 203 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner and the taxpayer have agreed in writing to its assessment after such time,
the tax may be assessed within the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent written agreement made before the expiration of the period previously
agreed upon.
In this case, the records show that respondent filed two (2) Income Tax Returns (ITR) for taxable year 2000. The first ITR was filed on October 16, 2000 for the fiscal year ending on June 30,
2000, and the second ITR was filed on April 16, 2001 for the calendar year ending on December 31, 2000. According to respondent, this was due to the change in its accounting period from
fiscal year to calendar year. Thus, in accordance with Section 203 of the NIRC, petitioner had until October 16, 2003 and April 16, 2004 within which to assess respondent for deficiency income
tax for taxable year 2000.
The record likewise reflect that respondent received the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand, all dated July 19, 2004, for taxable year 2000 only on September 6, 2004, which is clearly
beyond the three-year prescriptive period provided under Section 203 of the NIRC.
Petitioner, however, contends that the prescription had not set in because the parties executed three (3) Waivers, as follows:

Waiver Date of Waiver Period Extended Person Who Signed the Waiver

First[37] April 12, 2004 June 15, 2004 Celia C. King

Second[38] June 14, 2004 August 15, 2004 Celia C. King

Third[39] August 13, 2004 October 15, 2004 Celia C. King

As shown above, the Waivers appear to have extended the period to assess respondent for taxable year 2000 until October 15, 2004.

The Court agrees with the CTA that the Waivers are defective because the date of acceptance by petitioner is not indicated therein.
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kudos Metal Corporation,[40] (Kudos Metal case) the Court laid down the requirements for the proper execution of waiver, to wit:
Section 222 (b) of the NIRC provides that the period to assess and collect taxes may only be extended upon a written agreement between the CIR and the taxpayer executed before the
expiration of the three-year period. RMO 20-90 issued on April 4, 1990 and RDAO 05-01 issued on August 2, 2001 lay down the procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, to wit:
1. The waiver must be in the proper form prescribed by RMO 20-90. The phrase "but not after ______ 19 ____", which indicates the expiry date of the period agreed upon to assess/collect the
tax after the regular three-year period of prescription, should be filled up.
2. The waiver must be signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized representative. In the case of a corporation, the waiver must be signed by any of its responsible officials. In case the
authority is delegated by the taxpayer to a representative, such delegation should be in writing and duly notarized.

3. The waiver should be duly notarized.

4. The CIR or the revenue official authorized by him must sign the waiver indicating that the BIR has accepted and agreed to the waiver. The date of such acceptance by the BIR

should be indicated. However, before signing the waiver, the CIR or the revenue official authorized by him must make sure that the waiver is in the prescribed form, duly notarized, and
executed by the taxpayer or his duly authorized representative.
5. Both the date of execution by the taxpayer and date of acceptance by the Bureau should be before the expiration of the period of prescription or before the lapse of the period agreed upon in
case a subsequent agreement is executed.
6. The waiver must be executed in three copies, the original copy to be attached to the docket of the case, the second copy for the taxpayer and the third copy for the Office accepting the
waiver. The fact of receipt by the taxpayer of his/her file copy must be indicated in the original copy to show that the taxpayer was notified of the acceptance of the BIR and the perfection of the
agreement.[41]
As shown in the foregoing, RMO 20-90 and RDAO 05-01 clearly mandate that the date of acceptance by the BIR should be indicated in the waiver. In the case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Standard Chartered Bank,[42] (Standard Chartered Bank case) this Court ruled that the provisions of the RMO and RDAO are mandatory and require strict compliance, hence, the
failure to comply with any of the requisites renders a waiver defective and ineffectual.
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[43] this Court discussed the importance of the date of acceptance in a waiver, to wit:
The other defect noted in this case is the date of acceptance which makes it difficult to fix with certainty if the waiver was actually agreed before the expiration of the three-year
prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals held that the date of the execution of the waiver on September 22, 1997 could reasonably be understood as the same date of acceptance by the BIR.
Petitioner points out however that Revenue District Officer Sarmiento could not have accepted the waiver yet because she was not the Revenue District Officer of RDO No. 33 on such date. Ms.

Sarmiento's transfer and assignment to RDO No. 33 was only signed by the BIR Commissioner on January 16, 1998 as shown by the Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 14-98. The Court
of Tax Appeals noted in its decision that it is unlikely as well that Ms. Sarmiento made the acceptance on January 16, 1998 because "Revenue Officials normally have to conduct first an
inventory of their pending papers and property responsibilities."[44]
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. FMF Development Corporation,[45] the waiver was likewise found defective, and thus, did not validly extend the original three-year prescriptive period
because it did not contain the date of acceptance by the CIR. This Court said that this is necessary to determine whether the waiver was validly accepted before the expiration of the original
three-year period, thus:
Applying RMO No. 20-90, the waiver in question here was defective and did not validly extend the original three-year prescriptive period. Firstly, it was not proven that respondent was furnished
a copy of the BIR-accepted waiver. Secondly, the waiver was signed only by a revenue district officer, when it should have been signed by the Commissioner as mandated by the NIRC and
RMO No. 20-90, considering that the case involves an amount of more than P1 million, and the period to assess is not yet about to prescribe. Lastly, it did not contain the date of acceptance
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a requisite necessary to determine whether the waiver was validly accepted before the expiration of the original three-year period. Bear

in mind that the waiver in question is a bilateral agreement, thus necessitating the very signatures of both the Commissioner and the taxpayer to give birth to a valid agreement. [46]
In subsequent cases, this Court has consistently upheld the importance of the date of acceptance in waivers to validly extend the three-year period to assess the deficiency. In Kudos Metal, the
waivers were also found to be defective for the following reasons:
A perusal of the waivers executed by respondent's accountant reveals the following infirmities:
1. The waivers were executed without the notarized written authority of Pasco to sign the waiver in behalf of respondent.
2. The waivers failed to indicate the date of acceptance.
3. The fact of receipt by the respondent of its file copy was not indicated in the original copies of the waivers.
Due to the defects in the waivers, the period to assess or collect taxes was not extended. Consequently, the assessments were issued by the BIR beyond the three-year period and are void.[47]

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Stanley Works Sales (Phils.), Inc.,[48] this Court nullified the waivers based on the following:
The resolution of the main issue requires a factual determination of the proper execution of the Waiver. The CTA Division has already made a factual finding on the infirmities of the Waiver
executed by respondent on 16 November 1993. The Court found that the following requisites were absent:
(1) Conformity of either petitioner or a duly authorized representative;
(2) Date of acceptance showing that both parties had agreed on the Waiver before the expiration of the prescriptive period; and
(3) Proof that respondent was furnished a copy of the Waiver.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
In the Standard Chartered Bank case, this Court also invalidated the waivers because the date of acceptance was not indicated therein, to wit:
Applying the rules and rulings, the waivers in question were defective and did not validly extend the original three-year prescriptive period. As correctly found by the CTA in Division, and affirmed
in toto by the CTA En Banc, the subject waivers of the Statute of Limitations were in clear violation of RMO No. 20-90:
1) This case involves assessment amounting to more than P1,000,000.00. For this, RMO No. 20-90 requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to sign for the BIR. A perusal of the First and

Second Waivers of the Statute of Limitations shows that they were signed by Assistant Commissioner-Large Taxpayers Service Virginia L. Trinidad and Assistant Commissioner-Large
Taxpayers Service Edwin R. Abella[,] respectively, and not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
2) The date of acceptance by the Assistant Commissioner-Large Taxpayers Service Virginia L. Trinidad of the First Waiver was not indicated therein;
3) The date of acceptance by the Assistant Commissioner-Large Taxpayers Service Edwin R. Abella of the Second Waiver was not indicated therein;
4) The First and Second Waivers of Statute of Limitations did not specify the kind and amount of the tax due; and
5) The tenor of the Waiver of the Statute of Limitations signed by petitioner's authorized representative failed to comply with the prescribed requirements of RMO No. 20-90. The subject waiver

speaks of a request for extension of time within which to present additional documents, whereas the waiver provided under RMO No. 20-90 pertains to the approval by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue of the taxpayer's request for re-investigation and/or reconsideration of his/its pending internal revenue case.[50] (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly in this case, the failure to indicate the date of acceptance by petitioner in the First Waiver means that the same is defective, and therefore, the original three-year prescriptive period to
assess the deficiency income tax of respondent for the taxable year 2000 was never extended. Consequently, the two (2) subsequent waivers were also invalid because the original period was
not extended and had already lapsed on April 16, 2004, and there was no period to extend anymore.
Petitioner's contention that the date of the notarization should be presumed as the date of acceptance is also untenable. The CTA correctly observed that "the date of notarization cannot be
regarded as the date of acceptance for the same refers to different aspects, as the notary public is distinct from the Commissioner of [the] BIR who is authorized by law to accept Waivers of the
Statute of Limitations."[51] Besides, it appears that petitioner's representative was not present during the notarization of the Waivers. As found by the CTA, only the representative from

respondent, Vice-President Nestor H. Vasay, appeared before the notary public.[52]

Thus, the invalidity of the First Waiver and the subsequent waivers resulted to the non-extension of the three-year prescriptive period to assess respondent's deficiency income tax for the

taxable year 2000. Accordingly, the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand, which assessed respondent for deficiency income tax for the taxable year 2000 is invalid because it was issued
beyond the three-year prescriptive period provided under Section 203 of the NIRC.
Petitioner's contention that respondent is now estopped from assailing the validity of the Waivers is also unavailing. In Kudos Metal, the Court ruled that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
applied as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, which the BIR must strictly
follow. Thus:
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this case as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper
execution of the waiver, which the BIR must strictly follow. As we have often said, the doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined, is justice
according to natural law and right. As such, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. It should be resorted to solely as a

means of preventing injustice and should not be permitted to defeat the administration of the law, or to accomplish a wrong or secure an undue advantage, or to extend beyond the requirements
of the transactions in which they originate. Simply put, the doctrine of estoppel must be sparingly applied.

Moreover, the BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure to comply with RMO 20-90 and RDAO 05-01, which the BIR itself issued. As stated earlier, the BIR failed to
verify whether a notarized written authority was given by the respondent to its accountant, and to indicate the date of acceptance and the receipt by the respondent of the waivers. Having
caused the defects in the waivers, the BIR must bear the consequence. It cannot shift the blame to the taxpayer. To stress, a waiver of the statute of limitations, being a derogation of the
taxpayer's right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations, must be carefully and strictly construed.[53] (Citations omitted)

Meanwhile, petitioner's contention that respondent could not raise the issue of prescription for the first time on appeal has long been settled in the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[54] Therein, it was only when the case ultimately reached this Court that the issue of prescription was brought up. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that the CIR
could no longer collect the assessed tax due to prescription, thus:
We deny the right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST on the ground of prescription.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
If the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription, the court is mandated to dismiss the claim even if prescription is not raised as a defense. In Heirs of
Valientes v. Ramas, we ruled that the CA may motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of prescription despite failure to raise this ground on appeal. The court is imbued with sufficient

discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case. More so, when
the provisions on prescription were enacted to benefit and protect taxpayers from investigation after a reasonable period of time.[55] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lancaster Philippines, Inc.,[56] this Court categorically ruled that the Revised Rules of the CTA clearly allowed it to rule on issues not
stipulated by the parties to achieve an orderly disposition of the case, thus:
On whether the CTA can resolve an issue which was not raised by the parties, we rule in the affirmative.
Under Section 1, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, or the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA is not bound by the issues specifically raised by the parties but may also rule
upon related issues necessary to achieve an orderly disposition of the case. The text of the provision reads:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgment. – x x x x
In deciding the case, the Court may not limit itself to the issues stipulated by the parties but may also rule upon related issues necessary to achieve an orderly disposition of the case.
The above section is clearly worded. On the basis thereof, the CTA Division was, therefore, well within its authority to consider in its decision the question on the scope of authority of the
revenue officers who were named in the LOA even though the parties had not raised the same in their pleadings or memoranda. The CTA En Banc was likewise correct in sustaining the CTA
Division's view concerning such matter.[57] (Citations omitted)

In view of the foregoing, the CTA correctly ruled on the issue of prescription even if it was only raised for the first time on appeal.
As regards the validity of the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand for taxable year 2001, this Court also agrees with the ruling of the CTA that the same were not valid because they failed to
indicate a definite due date for payment.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fitness By Design, Inc.,[58] this Court held that a Final Assessment Notice is not valid if it does not contain a definite due date for payment by the
taxpayer, thus:
Second, there are no due dates in the Final Assessment Notice. This negates petitioner's demand for payment. Petitioner's contention that April 15, 2004 should be regarded as the
actual due date cannot be accepted. The last paragraph of the Final Assessment Notice states that the due dates for payment were supposedly reflected in the attached
assessment:
In view thereof, you are requested to pay your aforesaid deficiency internal revenue tax liabilities through the duly authorized agent bank in which you are enrolled within the time shown in the
enclosed assessment notice.

However, based on the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals First Division, the enclosed assessment pertained to remained unaccomplished.
Contrary to petitioner's view, April 15, 2004 was the reckoning date of accrual of penalties and surcharges and not the due date for payment of tax liabilities. The total amount depended upon
when respondent decides to pay. The notice, therefore, did not contain a definite and actual demand to pay.[59] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in this case, as pointed out by the CTA,[60] the last paragraph of each of the assessments stated the following:
In view thereof, you are requested to pay your aforesaid deficiency income tax liability/penalties through the duly authorized agent bank in which you are enrolled within the time shown in the
enclosed assessment notice.[61]

However, the due date in each of the FAN was left blank. Clearly, the FAN did not contain a definite due date and actual demand to pay. Accordingly, the FAN and the Formal Letter of Demand
for taxable year 2001 are not valid assessments.
In sum, the CTA did not err in cancelling the FAN and the Formal Letters of Demand, all dated July 19, 2004. They are all invalid assessments because the period of petitioner to issue the same
for taxable year 2000 has already prescribed, and the assessments for taxable year 2001 did not contain a definite due date for payment by respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc dated May 12, 2014 in CTA EB No. 972 is AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
the following are hereby CANCELLED and WITHDRAWN:

1. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income tax for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2000 in the total amount of P37,099,915.29
inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties;

2. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income tax for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2001 in the total amount of P82,365,799.90
inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties; and

3. Final Assessment Notice and Formal Letter of Demand for penalties assessment for Calendar Year ended December 31, 2001 in the total amount of P4,670,630.18
inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties.

SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and M. Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-47.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 244374. February 15, 2022 ]

PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO M. CRUZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

The Court reminds that procedural rules are not to be treated as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. [1] The rules were established primarily to
provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system.[2] We emphasize these precepts in the present case involving the application of the 60-day period rule in filing a special civil
action for certiorari.
ANTECEDENTS

On January 16, 2013, Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) hired Renato M. Cruz, Jr. (Renato) as a probationary store head. [3] On July 16, 2013, PPCI appointed Renato as store officer/manager at
Puregold Extra Ampid (Puregold Extra) in San Mateo, Rizal.[4] Renato's tasks include the activation of the Intruder Alarm System (IAS) located in the treasury office of the branch before store
closure and its deactivation upon store opening. The IAS was programmed to send message alerts on the mobile phones of Renato and two other officers whenever an intruder is detected in
the premises. Among them, Renato was the principal officer expected to respond when the IAS sent alerts because he lived nearest to the branch.[5]

On March 16, 2015 at 1:23 a.m., the IAS sounded an intruder alarm and sent messages to Renato and the two other officers but none of them arrived. This prompted security guard Michael
Mejaran (SG Mejaran) to send text messages to Renato and the two other officers. Still, no one responded. At 2:35 a.m., the alarm sounded for the second time and message alerts were sent to
the phones of Renato and the two other officers followed by text messages from SG Mejaran. Again, no one answered. At around 5:13 a.m., Renato arrived and asked the guard to open the
store. Renato inspected the store interiors but did not see any intruder. Thus, Renato deactivated the alarm. On his way out, Renato took four (4) plastic pails in stock at the store and brought
them home for his personal use.[6]

On May 15, 2015, PPCI's Human Resource Manager Jona Pinky J. Cañete (HR Manager Cañete) served Renato with a notice to explain why he should not be dismissed for failing to promptly
respond to the IAS and for stealing/taking the plastic pails out of the store. In his reply, Renato admitted the receipt of alerts and text messages but he only saw them after waking up at 5:00

a.m. Anent the alleged stealing, Renato explained that he merely borrowed the pails because there was a scheduled water interruption in their area. Renato even informed SG Mejaran that he
took the pails.[7] After the administrative hearing,[8] the PPCI served Renato a notice of termination dated June 16, 2015 for gross and serious omission to do vital management duty and
responsibility, serious and willful breach of trust, abuse of position, and stealing.[9]

On February 1, 2016, Renato filed a request for assistance under the Single Entry Approach (SEnA) Program of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) indicating Puregold Extra and
Noel Groyon (Groyon) as respondents. The notices of conciliation-mediation conference were sent to the address of Puregold Extra at San Mateo, Rizal. [10] At the conferences, HR Manager
Cañete and PPCI's counsel Atty. Emma Rhea B. Sadural-Capistrano (Atty. Sadural-Capistrano) attended before the SEnA desk officer. [11] However, the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. On April 8, 2016, Renato filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Puregold Extra, Lucio Co (Co) and Groyon before the Labor Arbiter (LA).[12]

On May 31, 2016, the LA rendered a decision based solely on Renato's position paper because the respondents failed to appear. The LA held that Renato was illegally dismissed and ordered
PPCI to pay his back wages and separation pay. [13] On July 15, 2016, Renato moved for the issuance of a writ of execution alleging that the LA's ruling became final and executory after PPCI
received a copy of the judgment on July 1, 2016 and did not appeal.[14] On even date, the LA issued a notice of pre-execution conference.[15]

On July 18, 2016, PPCI moved to annul the LA's decision claiming that it was not properly joined as a respondent in the complaint and did not receive summons. As such, the LA did not acquire
jurisdiction over PPCI and any decision against it is void.[16] On July 25, 2016, PPCI submitted a supplemental motion with Groyon's affidavit denying receipt of summons. [17] On July 29, 2016,
the LA noted the motions without action and pointed out that PPCI's proper remedy is to appeal with the NLRC. [18] Accordingly, PPCI filed on August 8, 2016 a petition to annul the LA's
Decision and Order before the NLRC docketed as LER Case No. 08-216-16. PPCI maintained that it had no knowledge of Renato's complaint for illegal dismissal until the receipt of his motion

for issuance of writ of execution. PPCI reiterated that it did not receive summons or a copy of the LA's decision. Renato misled the LA and fraudulently impleaded Puregold Extra as his
employer, which is different from PPCI. Lastly, PPCI prayed the case be remanded to the LA for mandatory conciliation. [19] In contrast, Renato denied that he committed fraud and explained

that he was working at Puregold Extra so he impleaded it as his employer. In any case, the service of summons upon Puregold Extra is sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over PPCI given that its
representatives attended SEnA conferences.[20]

On September 8, 2016, the Fourth Division of the NLRC remanded the case for further proceedings for failure of the LA to acquire jurisdiction over PPCI due to improper service of summons,
[21] thus:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The case is remanded back to the Labor Arbiter a quo for mandatory conciliation and further proceedings.

SO RESOLVED.

Dissatisfied, Renato sought reconsideration[22] and the inhibition of the members of division.[23] On October 28, 2016, the NLRC denied Renato's motions.[24] On March 13, 2017, Renato
elevated the case through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 149917. [25] Renato insisted that the service of SEnA notices to the address of

Puregold Extra in San Mateo, Rizal was sufficient to vest jurisdiction over PPCI. [26] In his petition, Renato stated that he received on January 12, 2017 the NLRC Resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration, hence, the petition for certiorari was timely filed on March 13, 2017,[27] viz.:

A. Timeliness

1. On January 12, 2017, petitioner-appellant received the assailed Resolution of the fourth division of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC", for short) that was promulgated on
October 28, 2016. Pursuant to the Rules of Court, this Petition filed this March 13, 2017 (Monday) is within the reglementary period. Attached as Annex "A" is an original copy of said
resolution.

2. On September 13, 2016, undersigned counsel received a copy of the assailed Resolution of the fourth division-NLRC promulgated September 8, 2016. A motion for reconsideration was
timely filed by the petitioner on September 19, 2016. Attached as Annex "B" is an original copy of said resolution.

Meantime, the LA issued summons dated March 28, 2017 and served it to PPCI's address at Paco, Manila in compliance with the NLRC's Resolutions dated September 8, 2016 and October 28,
2016 which remanded the case for mandatory conciliation.[28] Yet, the parties failed to arrive at any settlement and were ordered to submit their position papers. [29] On January 30, 2018, the
LA ruled that PPCI dismissed Renato for just cause with observance of procedural due process. [30] Renato appealed[31] to the NLRC but was denied.[32] On December 2, 2018, the NLRC
decision became final and executory absent a timely appeal.[33]

On the other hand, the CA gave due course to Renato's petition for certiorari. On August 24, 2018, the CA held that there was substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons and
that PPCI failed to establish any fraud, which supposedly prevented it from appearing before the LA proceedings. [34] The CA also ratiocinated that PPCI owned and operated Puregold Extra.
Relatively, it would be absurd for Puregold Extra not to inform PPCI about Renato's complaint for illegal dismissal. Lastly, the CA ruled that PPCI cannot us technicalities to escape the negative
consequences of an adverse decision,[35] viz.:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 08 September 2016 and 28 October 2016 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in LER Case No. 08-216-16 (NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04239-16) are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, We declare that the Decision dated 31 May 2016 of the
Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04239-16 had already become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

On September 6, 2018, PPCI moved for reconsideration.[36] On January 29, 2019, the CA denied PPCI's motion.[37] On February 13, 2019, PPCI received the CA's Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration and has fifteen (15) days or until February 28, 2019 to file a petition for review. On February 19, 2019, PPCI moved for an additional period of thirty (30) days from
February 28, 2019 or until March 30, 2019 within which to file a petition for review. Also, PPCI paid the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs. On March 15, 2019, however,
PCCI filed a petition for certiorari.[38]

Mainly, PPCI asserts that the CA's Decision dated August 24, 2018 and Resolution dated January 29, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 149917 were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PPCI avers that the CA gravely erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari despite being filed out of time or beyond the 60-day reglementary
period. PPCI explains that the Bailiff's Return showed that the counsel of Renato received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution dated October 28, 2016 denying his motion for
reconsideration. As such, Renato had until February 27, 2017 to avail a petition for certiorari. However, Renato filed the petition for certiorari only on March 13, 2017 or fourteen (14) days late. In
his comment, Renato contends that he timely filed his petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period reckoned from his receipt on January 12, 2017 of the NLRC Resolution denying
his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, Renato insists that PPCI was validly served with summons through Puregold Extra.

RULING

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that the proper remedy of an aggrieved party from the CA's decision is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule

65. Specifically, Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[39] Thus, PPCI should have filed a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The PPCI's argument that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy since the CA had no jurisdiction to
entertain Renato's petition for certiorari filed before it having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period deserves scant consideration. There is no reason why such issue could not have
been raised on appeal.

However, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under
Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari.[40] Here, PPCI received on February 13, 2019 the CA's Resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration and has fifteen (15) days or until February 28, 2019 to file a petition for review on certiorari. Within the 15-day reglementaty period, PPCI moved for an additional period of thirty
(30) days from February 28, 2019 or until March 30, 2019 within which to file the required petition. Also, PPCI paid the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs. Under Section 2,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, '[o]n motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period,

the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.' On March 15, 2019, PCCI filed the instant petition for certiorari well
within the extended period. Taken together, PPCI's petition for certiorari may be liberally treated as a petition for review on certiorari because it faithfully complied with the provisions of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Indeed, PPCI find it more prudent to observe the rules in filing a petition for review on certiorari before finally choosing the remedy of certiorari as shown in its statement of
material dates, to wit:

Data [sic] Showing the Petition is Filed on Time

4. The petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals on August 30, 2018. It had until September 14, 2018 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

5. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 6, 2018.

6. The petitioner received a copy of the Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration on February 13, 2019. It had until February 28, 2019 to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 and until April 14, 2019 to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

7. Before making the decision under which Rule would it file its petition, the petitioner filed on February 19, 2019 a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and paid
the docket and other fees on the same day. It prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days from February 28, 2019 or until March 30, 2019 to file a Petition for Review. Petitioner is
filing this petition on or before March 30, 2019, although it has chosen to file in under Rule 65. Simultaneously, petitioner will pay the additional docket fee. (Emphases supplied.)

Anent the merits of the case, the Court agrees with PPCI's argument that the CA erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari for being filed out of time. As the Rule now stands,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. There can no longer be any extension of the
60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari,[41] save in exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons.[42] Contrary to Renato's theory, the
reglementary period to avail the remedy of certiorari must be reckoned on December 29, 2016 or the date his counsel received the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and
not on January 12, 2017 when he allegedly received the assailed resolution. To be sure, the records reveal that Renato's counsel was validly notified of the assailed NLRC Resolution on
December 29, 2016,[43] thus:

Bailiff's Return

Atty. Donald V. Diaz

Copy received by Ms. Shaila Cabagtong on 12-29-16

Returned on this 29th day of December '16.

sgd.
Romeo S. Gamara
Bailiff II
Verily, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. [44] Notice to the client or to any other lawyer other than the counsel
of record, is not notice in law. Moreover, while decisions, resolutions, or orders are served on both parties and their counsel/representative, for purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted
from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record. [45] Likewise, Section 4(b), Rule III of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that for
purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of the decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record.[46]
In the parallel case of Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission,[47] the petitioner sought reconsideration from the NLRC's ruling dismissing his complaint for illegal dismissal. On November
4, 1999, the petitioner's counsel received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. On June 2, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and
claimed that he was only informed on April 18, 2000 about the denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary

period. The petitioner elevated the case to the Court and insisted that he filed the petition for certiorari on time. The petitioner argued that the reglementary period must be computed from the
moment he was informed about the denial of his motion for reconsideration. However, the Court affirmed the CA's findings and explained that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari

should be counted from the time petitioner's counsel received the assailed NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Similarly, in Cervantes v. City Service Corp.[48] the CA dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari for having been filed out of time. The CA noted that petitioner's mother received on
July 30, 2009 the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. As such, the petitioner had only until September 28, 2009 within which to file the petition. Yet, the petitioner availed
the remedy of certiorari only on October 7, 2009 or nine (9) days late. Undaunted, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court arguing that the reglementary period must be reckoned from his
counsel's receipt of the assailed resolution on November 19, 2009 and not from the date his mother received a copy of thereof. This time, the Court found merit in the petitioner's claim and
reiterated that for purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record and not the party.

Applying these precepts, Renato had sixty (60) days counted from the date his counsel received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or until
February 27, 2017 within which to avail a petition for certiorari. As intimated earlier, Renato filed his petition for certiorari before the CA only on March 13, 2017 or fourteen (14) days beyond the

reglementary period. Notably, Renato neither moved for an extension of time nor presented any exceptional or meritorious circumstance to exempt him from the strict application of the 60-day
period rule.

All told, the CA should have dismissed outright Renato's petition for certiorari for being time-barred. The CA should not have delved into the issues concerning the propriety of the NLRC
Resolutions dated September 8, 2016 and October 28, 2016 which remanded the case to the LA for further proceedings. Suffice it to say that these resolutions perfunctorily become final and
executory absent a timely petition for certiorari. On this point, the Court reiterates that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the

issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the
case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts
of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[49]

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated August 24, 2018 in CA-G.R. SP No. 149917 is REVERSED. The National Labor Relations
Commission's Resolutions dated September 8, 2016 and October 28, 2016 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

[1] Santos v. Court of Appeals, 275 Phil. 894 (1991).

[2] Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc., et al. v. Sanchez, et al., 769 Phil. 466 (2015).

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 230784. February 15, 2022 ]

HEIRS OF ANGEL YADAO, NAMELY: RUFINA YADAO, ETHERLYN YADAO-YASAÑA, RYANTH YADAO, RUTH ANN YADAO-MANGIBUNONG, DINA
JOYCE YADAO-INES, AND ANGEL YADAO, JR.; HEIRS OF JOSEFINA IDICA-YADAO, NAMELY: LOURDES YADAO -APOSTOL AND AURORA YADAO;
HEIRS OF OFELIA YADAO-NACENO, NAMELY: TEODULFO NACENO, JR., AILEEN NACENO, AND IRMA NACENO-AGPAOA, PETITIONERS, VS.
HEIRS OF JUAN CALETINA, NAMELY: HOSPICIO CALETINA, JR., ANICETO CALETINA, AND FLORIDA CALETINA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99109 entitled Heirs of Juan Caletina,[2] namely:
Hospicio Caletina, Jr., Aniceto Caletina, and Florida Caletina v. Angel Yadao, Josephine Yadao, Ernesto Guzman, Arsenio De La Peña, Antonio De La Peña, Sr., Antonio De La Peña, Jr.,
Ronald Campos, Mario De La Peña, Alfonso Agcaoili, Raisy Evilda, Ofelia Naceno, Jaime Coles, and Bella Calina:
1. Decision[3] dated February 29, 2016 affirming the trial court's decision declaring respondents as the owners of the parcel of lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-479 (S) and thus

entitled to its possession; and

2. Resolution[4] dated December 20, 2016 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents
On June 22, 1993, respondents heirs of Juan Caletina (Juan), namely Hospicio Caletina, Jr. (Hospicio, Jr.), Aniceto Caletina, and Florida Caletina filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, a complaint for ownership and recovery of possession against petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely: Angel Yadao (Angel), Josephine Yadao (Josephine),
Ernesto Guzman, Arsenio De La Peña, Antonio De La Peña, Sr., Antonio De La Peña, Jr., Ronald Campos, Mario De La Peña, Alfonso Agcaoili, Raisy Evilda, Ofelia Yadao-Naceno (Ofelia),
Jaime Coles, and Bella Calina.
In their Complaint[5] dated July 1, 1993, respondents averred that they are the grandchildren and surviving heirs of Juan, the registered owner of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 1087 of
Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-479 (S). Sometime in
1991, petitioners occupied the subject land and refused to leave despite their opposition and vigorous prohibition. Thus, they brought the matter to the Barangay Captain of Taggat Norte. They

failed to reach an agreement.

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1868-S and was raffled to RTC-Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, then presided by Judge Leo S. Reyes.

In their Answer[6] dated July 29, 1993 and Amended Answer[7] dated October 5, 1995, Angel, Josephine, and Ofelia countered that on September 28, 1962, their parents Josefina Yadao
(Josefina) and Domingo Yadao (Domingo) bought Lot 1087 for value and in good faith from Juan's surviving heirs, i.e., his second wife Casiana Dalo (Casiana), and their sons Hospicio,
Jose, and William. The sale was covered by a Contrata written in Ilocano:
(CONTRATA)
Ammoen ti suamin a makaimatang;
Dacami Jose Calitina, Hospicio Calitina, William Calitina ken ti inami Marciana Calitina, nataengan kami amin ti tawen, naasawaan ken tubo iti daytoy nga ili, palawagenmi ti kinapudnona unay
ti inkam nagtutulagan ti panangilacomi ti lote nga tawidmi iti amami a natay, isu nga masarakan ti masasao nga lote ditoy barrio Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan.
Ti lenderos daytoy a lote:

Ammianan ---- Taggat Creek & Seashore

Daya ---- Seashore
Laud ---- Taggat Creek
Bagatan ---- Rafael Guimayen
Lot No. 1087 Cad. 317-[D]
Nagtutulaganmi ngarud nga ilacomi ken ni Mrs. Josefina I. Yadao ket mayawat amin a carbengan kencuana nga isu ti agtaguicua ken ken aglac-am ti aniaman a patauden ti masasao nga lote.

Ket no addanto agriri, dacamto ti makaammo nga agsungbat a cas bileg daytoy a catulagan.
Awaten mi ita nga aldao ti dagup (P850.00) walo gasut ket lima-pulo a pesos a kas nagtutulaganmi a baler ken bayad daytoy a lote.
Tapno pamatian ti kinapudno daytoy nga kasuratan, agpirma kami amin ditoy babaenna, ita nga aldao Sept. 20, 1962, Claveria, Cagayan.
Dacami:
Jose Calitina (signed)
Hospicio Calitina (signed)
William Calitina (signed)
Marciana Calitina[8]
As translated to English, this Contrata stated:
(CONTRACT)

To All Men By These Present;

We, Jose Calitina, Hospicio Calitina, William Calitina and our mother Marciana Calitina, all of legal age, married and residents of this place, confirm the truth of our agreement concerning our
sale of the lot that we inherited from our father who had died, which lot is located at Barrio Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan.
This is the lot bound by and referred to:
North ---- Taggat Creek & Seashore
 East ---- Seashore
West ---- Taggat Creek
South ----- Rafael Guimayen
Lot No. 1087 Cad. 317-[D]
We agreed to the sale thereof to Mrs. Josefina I. Yadao and waive all our rights in this lot in her favor and in favor of all her heirs, assigns and privies.

In case of adverse claims, we will answer to and be responsible for all of them.
We acknowledge our receipt today of the amount of Eight-Hundred Fifty Pesos (P850.00) as agreed value and payment for this lot.
In witness whereof, we sign this agreement below on this date Sept. 20, 1962, Claveria, Cagayan.
We:
Jose Calitina (signed)
Hospicio Calitina (signed)
William Calitina (signed)
Marciana Calitina[9]
Marciana Calitina is also known as Casiana Dalo Calitina and Sianang.
The Contrata was not notarized. But Josefina and Casiana executed another Deed of Absolute Sale on October 15, 1962 on the same Lot 1087 for the same price though this time had it

notarized:
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, CASIANA DALO CALITINA, widow, of legal age, Filipino, and resident of Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan, hereinafter called the VENDOR, and JOSEFINA I. YADAO, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Domingo Yadao, both are residents of Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan, hereinafter called the VENDEE;
WITNESSETH:

That for and in consideration of the (sum) of EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P850.00) (sic.) Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by the VENDEE JOSEFINA I. YADAO DOES HEREBY SELL,
TRANSFER, AND CONVEY unto said Josefina I. Yadao, his heirs and assigns that certain parcel of land situated in Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan which is more particularly described as
follows to wit:
RESIDENTIAL LOT declared under the Cadastral Survey in Claveria as Lot No. 1087. Bounded on the North by Seashore and Taggat Creek, on the East by Seashore, on the South by Fausto
Udac now Rafael Guimayen, with an area of (400 sq. meters) 1,797 sq. m. (Lot 1087), more or less, assessed at P80.00 as described under tax Declaration No. 41054-a.
Of which I am the [a]bsolute owner free from all liens and encumbrances. That the said described parcel of land has not been registered under Act No. 496 now under the Spanish Mortgage
Law, the parties having agreed to register under the provision of Act No. 3344.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have agreed to sign their hand, in the Municipality of Claveria, Province of Cagayan, Philippines this 13th day of October 1962.

(signed) (signed)

___________________________________ ___________________________________
CASIANA CALITINA JOSEFINA I. YADAO

VENDOR VENDEE

(signed)

Signed in the presence of: Hospicio Calitina

(witness)[10]

As alleged by petitioners, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 479 (S) was delivered to them. They also averred, without any dispute, that from the time their parents bought Lot
1087, they had been in public and continuous possession thereof. The other defendants in the case below were their tenants in Lot 1087. Petitioners maintained that even assuming that no
sale was made on Lot 1087, the fact remained that they had been in possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. On the other hand, as petitioners stressed, respondents brought the
matter to court only on June 22, 1993 or more than thirty (30) years after they have taken possession thereof on September 28, 1962 . By petitioners' conclusion, acquisitive prescription
has ripened their de facto possession of Lot 1087 into legal possession and ownership.
Trial ensued.

To prove the allegations in the complaint, Hospicio, Jr. and his mother Dolores Corpuz-Caletina (Dolores) took the witness stand. They were the only witnesses for respondents.
Hospicio, Jr. testified that his father, Hospicio Caletina, Sr. (Hospicio, Sr.), was the only child of his grandfather Juan Caletina (Juan) with his wife - Nicetas Galoran (Nicetas). Casiana
was Juan's common law wife after the latter got separated from Nicetas. But Juan and Casiana were never married. He did not know Jose and William. He denied selling the Lot 1087 to the
Yadaos. In fact, after his grandfather died, his father took over the collection of rent from their tenants. After his father himself died, he and his siblings continued to occupy the subject lot. [11]
Dolores, on the other hand, testified that Juan was her father-in-law, being the father of her husband Hospicio, Sr.
She admitted that Jose and William were also heirs of Juan as his children. She knew Jose to be Juan's child with another woman before he (Juan) got married to Nicetas. William was
also Juan's son from another woman during his marriage to Nicetas.[12] They were the half-brothers of Hospicio, Sr.
She also averred that Juan used to live in Hawaii but returned to the Philippines after he had been separated from Nicetas. She and Hospicio, Sr. lived with Juan and his non-marital partner
"Sianang" at Lot 1087.
Interestingly, Dolores admitted against respondents' interest that after Juan had died, they sold, at least going by her admission, a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-

in-interest Domingo and Josefina. Thus:

xxxx

Q: Where did you construct your house?

A: We built our house in the lot where Juan Caletina's house is located sir.

Q: Are you referring to the land in suit?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Is that house still standing there?

A: No more sir.

Q: Why?

A: We sold it to Mrs. Yadao sir.[13]

xxxx

COURT:

Q: What was the amount of the sale?

A: P300.00 sir.

Q: Why did you sell that house?

A: They came to ask us to be used as a boarding house of Domingo Yadao sir.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q: And so you sold the house to Domingo Yadao and Josefina?

A: Yes sir.[14]
xxxx

Notably, the owner's duplicate of OCT No. P-479 (S) was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. Although it is not clear who gave the OCT to them, records bear that
petitioners were the ones who offered this document in evidence.[15] The delivery and voluntary cession of the OCT to their predecessors-in-interest and petitioners' eventual
possession thereof were not contested by respondents. Respondents were able to offer in evidence only a certified copy of OCT No. P-479 (S) from the Register of Deeds in Cagayan.
Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed Lot 1087 after its sale on September 28, 1962 and thereafter until the present time. Dolores did not deny and has never
denied this fact. She has known of their occupation and possession since September 28, 1962.[16]

For their part, petitioner Ofelia reiterated that her parents bought the subject lot on September 28, 1962 and they have possessed it since that time. Lot 1087 came with a small house built
thereon. The sale was covered by an unnotarized Contrata dated September 28, 1962 and a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 15, 1962. They later leased portions of Lot
1087 to their co-defendants.
The remaining portions of Ofelia's testimony touched mainly upon the lessees' names and the details of their lease. Some of the other defendants took the stand regarding their lease
agreements with the Yadaos.[17]
On July 10, 2009, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss[18] the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
assessed value of Lot 1087 was only P5,390.00. Thus, the complaint should have been filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not with the RTC.
Through Resolution[19] dated January 26, 2010, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
However, in its Order[20] dated February 16, 2010, the trial court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the complaint. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed at the
tail end of the hearing when only one witness of petitioner had not testified. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction at that late time of

the day.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision[21] dated November 25, 2011, the trial court granted respondents' complaint:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered:

1. DECLARING plaintiffs heirs of Juan Caletina - Hospicio Caletina Jr., Aniceto Caletina and Florida Caletina - absolute owners through succession of Lot No. 1087 Cad 317-
D covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 479(S) with an area of one thousand seven hundred ninety seven (1,797) sq. meters and located at Taggat, Claveria,

Cagayan; and

2. ORDERING defendants Josefina Yadao and Angel Yadao and all those who claim ownership and possession through spouses Domingo Yadao and Josefina Yadao, to
restore possession of the above-described land to [the] heirs of Juan Caletina and all the above-named defendants to vacate the land.

IT IS SO DECIDED.[22]
The RTC held that there was no evidence to prove the alleged sale of Lot 1087 to the Yadaos. The Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr., Jose, William, and Casiana was not notarized, hence,
it was only a private document which was unenforceable. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, on the other hand, was signed by Casiana who had no authority to do so as she was not a
legal heir of Juan Caletina, being his non-marital partner. The RTC also opined that Lot 1087 was acquired during the marriage of Juan to Nicetas.
More, despite the alleged sale, the RTC faulted petitioners for failing to transfer the title to Lot 1087 to their names, and not presenting retired RTC Judge Eugenio Tangonan, Jr. who had

allegedly notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. The RTC finally ruled that petitioners could not have acquired Lot 1087 through prescription because it was covered by a Torrens title.[23]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision[24] dated February 29, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The appellate court concurred with the trial court that prescription and laches would not apply to registered lands. Thus, as lawful owners of Lot 1087 through succession, respondents
have the right to reclaim its possession.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that, as between an unregistered deed of sale and a Torrens title, the latter has more probative weight. Petitioners cannot rely on the tax declarations in

the name of Casiana and Josefina since tax declarations do not conclusively prove ownership. In any event, the tax declarations reflect that the property was only 400 square meters, while the
subject land consists of 1,797 square meters.
In its assailed Resolution[25] dated December 20, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Present Petition
Petitioners pray that the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals be reversed and the complaint, dismissed. They assert that:
a) The complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The tax declarations submitted by respondents show that Lot 1087 had an assessed value of only P5,390.00,
way below the jurisdictional amount for RTCs.[26]
b) Respondents' right to question their (petitioners) title and possession of the subject lot by virtue of the Contrata and Deed of Absolute Sale had already prescribed as the challenge was raised
way beyond the 10-year prescriptive period.[27]
c) Respondents never specifically denied the genuineness and due execution of the Contrata and Deed of Absolute Sale.

d) Although the Contrata was unnotarized, it is binding upon the heirs of the signatories including respondents herein. The presumption of regularity favors the notarized Deed of Sale and this is
especially true as the sale was coupled with the delivery of OCT No. P-479 (S). As a result, it was they who offered in evidence this OCT. More, the Deed of Sale cannot be disregarded on the
ground that Casiana was not the legal heir of Juan because there was no proof that Casiana was not legally married to Juan.[28]
e) They have acquired Lot 1087 through prescription because they have occupied the subject land for more than thirty (30) years.[29]
In their Comment[30] dated October 29, 2017, respondents riposte that:
1) Petitioners are already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case. They raised the issue only in 2009 when they were already about to
present their last witness.[31]
2) Respondents cannot raise the defense of acquisitive prescription as this defense is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also the latter's heirs.[32]
3) Petitioners are not the owners of Lot 1087. Hospicio, Jr. vehemently denied having signed the Contrata and he could not have given valid consent to the sale considering that he was only
fourteen (14) years old at the time it was executed in 1962.
4) The Deed of Absolute Sale, on the other hand, is void as it was signed by Casiana who had no claim or right to Lot 1087. Although Juan was described as "married to Casiana Dalo" in OCT
No. P-479 (S), the same is a mere description. Also, the truth is that, Casiana and Juan were never married. There was no evidence to prove this.[33]
Issues
1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint?

2. Did petitioners acquire ownership of the subject lot through acquisitive prescription?
3. Is respondents' action already barred by prescription?
4. Is there a valid and binding contract selling Lot 1087 to the Yadaos?
Ruling
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the present case.
The general rule is that the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time in the proceedings, even on appeal.
By way of an exception, however, Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[34] has ruled that estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised later in the
proceedings of the case and only after the party raising the argument has actively participated during trial and lost.
The delay in raising the argument and the moving party's participation in the proceedings has led the court and the opposing party of the waiver of this issue, and as a result, the belated claim if

considered and more so if granted would be inefficient and iniquitous as it is opportunistic. [35] Notably, by the time the jurisdictional challenge is raised long into the proceedings: (i) scarce
judicial resources have been spent determining the merits of the claims; (ii) the truth-seeking function of the subsequent proceedings would be severely compromised due to the long passage of
time and the resultant loss of evidence and/or interest in re-litigating the same claims already passed upon; and (iii) the moving party is wagering on the basis of the latter's success or failure in
the originating proceedings.
Here, the complaint was initiated on July 1, 1993. Petitioners filed their Answer[36] on July 30, 1993 and their Amended Answer[37] in October 1995. Petitioners filed a Second Amended
Answer[38] on October 24, 2008. Pre-trial and trial commenced as early as January 1994. Yet, petitioners raised the issue of jurisdiction only on July 17, 2009 [39] or sixteen (16) years after the

complaint was filed. The trial was on going for years. In fact, petitioners, as defendants, was about to present their last witness.
Petitioners' ground for this argument was well-known to them from the start. They based their claim on the assessed value of the subject lot as stated in the tax declaration submitted by
respondents. Petitioners could not have been but be aware of this amount since they also assert that they have been paying real estate taxes on Lot 1087 since 1962. Thus, they could have
raised the issue on jurisdiction in their original answer back in 1993. Yet they did not. Petitioners slept on their right to claim this defense.
Acquisitive prescription
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) declares that "no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession." Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc.[40] ruled that the ownership and possession of registered land cannot be
obtained or acquired by prescription no matter the length of time of one's physical occupation and exercise of juridical rights of possession over the land.

Hence, since ownership cannot be gained through this means, it follows that the registered owner is not automatically dispossessed of the registered land and foreclosed from getting it back
through the passage of time as the registered owner may resort to appropriate remedies to recover the property. Appropriateness, however, requires that the rule on extinctive prescription

as explained below has not set in.

Acquisitive prescription has a wide scope of impact as to the persons or individuals protected. Thus, as consistently re-stated, this rule is unavailing not only against the registered owner but
also against their hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely a continuation of the personality of their predecessor-
in-interest.
Extinctive Prescription
Extinctive prescription refers to the rule that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their right over the subject lot. It is a shield rather than a sword – the
mere fact that the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own. The present case
demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.[41]

Pangasinan v. Disonglo-Almazora[42] is explicative:

The action has prescribed.

On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under
Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 cannot be acquired through prescription. The argument is patently erroneous.
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive
prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph

2, Article 1106 and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the
case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because
respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title
was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on
January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against
petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person
acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to

recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144. The prescriptive period to enforce the
constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there
is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in possession of the property . The subject property was
registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert
their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file
an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts. (Emphasis supplied)[43]
Hence, the result of the successful invocation of this rule is that while the registered owner keeps their substantive right over the lot, since acquisitive prescription is not a mode of acquiring
ownership of a registered land, they are nonetheless prevented by law from invoking the legal remedies otherwise available to them. When extinctive prescription sets in, the damage
done to the registered owner is not recognized as a legal injury – a legal case of damnum absque injuria – and they do not stand to enjoy any legal relief so far as their property (in both senses
of title or right and the tangible lot) is concerned.
Of course, the party invoking extinctive prescription may end up being declared the lawful possessor or owner of the disputed lot. This declaration, however, is not per se the relief arising from

extinctive, much less acquisitive, prescription. Rather, this relief is the result of the evidence on the counterclaim if any of the party's lawful right as possessor or owner. The reason for this
is that, to stress, extinctive prescription is a shield rather than a sword.
The rule is that extinctive prescription does not lie against the heirs of the registered owner seeking recovery of the disputed lot in two instances: first, if the heirs are in actual
possession of the lot; and second, if the conveyance to the party in possession of the lot is unlawful, void, or non-existent. In either of these instances, the action to recover the lot is
imprescriptible.
Here, it is not disputed that petitioners are the ones in possession of the lot. Thus, the first instance does not apply.
As regards the second instance, Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Heirs of Banguilan[44] has explained this rule, as follows:
In Casibang, the Court ruled in favor of a registered owner and upheld the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of a registered title as against the school's possession by mere tolerance. In said
case, the registered owner therein allowed the construction and operation of a school on a portion of his property because he had no use of it at the time. However, when his successors-in-
interest sought to recover possession of the lot, the DepEd refused alleging that its possession was in the concept of an owner because it had purchased it from the original

registered owner. The Court ruled against the DepEd because it failed to produce any competent proof of transfer of ownership. Hence, their possession of the subject property was
only by mere tolerance and not in the concept of an owner. The Court held:
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by OCT No. O-627, registered in the name of the Juan Cepeda . A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system
is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein . Thus, the certificate of
title becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed

that they were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property
at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon demand.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule of imprescriptibility protects not only the registered owner but also the latter's heirs because they step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation
of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
The rule applied in Department of Education, Culture and Sports was affirmed in Heirs of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. ,[46]
Aledro-Ruña v. Lead Export and Agro-Development Corporation,[47] and Bangis v. Heirs of Adolfo,[48] among others, where the possession of the other party was adjudged to be void,

unlawful or non-existent.
For clarity, the rule in these precedents is that where there was no lawful conveyance of the lot to the party in possession, or the conveyance is void or non-existent and the lot continues to

be under the name of the original registered owner, the action to recover by the latter's heirs who did not convey the lot is imprescriptible.
For purposes of extinctive prescription, Uy v. Court of Appeals[49] carefully distinguishes between conveyance that is totally void, unauthorized, or non-existent and conveyance that is
vitiated by fraud or mistake:
The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of actions for reconveyance apply when the action is based on fraud , or when the contract used as basis for the action is voidable . Under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract is voidable when the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. When the consent
is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the contract is void. An action for reconveyance may also be based on a void contract. When the action for reconveyance is based on a void
contract, as when there was no consent on the part of the alleged vendor, the action is imprescriptible. The property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs
already issued in another's name. The issuance of a certificate of title in the latter's favor could not vest upon him or her ownership of the property; neither could it validate the purchase thereof

which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Being null
and void, the sale produces no legal effects whatsoever.

Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or
constructive trust, or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract. This is evident in several of our past decisions. x x x[50]
Our erudite colleague, Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa, painstakingly parsed the evidence to prove that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest must have purchased only a portion of Lot 1087
while the rest of this lot is unlawfully occupied by petitioners. He thus dissented stating in summary:

This sole dissent is premised on decisive factual indications that appear to belie the ponencia's findings, as they find support in the records of the case, and ultimately buttress the legal
conclusion that what was lawfully conveyed to Josefina Yadao, if any, was at best a portion of the subject property, and not the whole of it, as the petitioners so claim. Consequently, with
respect to the unsold/unconveyed portions of the subject property, the same cannot be deemed to have been lawfully conveyed to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, and therefore are not
covered by the applicability of the extinctive prescription.
Justice Caguioa also referred to Dolores' testimony that she and her husband (the person who sold Lot 1087) Hospicio, Sr. merely transferred residence within Lot 1087 after the sale of their
house to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest.
While very much respectfully considered, the dissent, we rule, has no solid legal anchor.
For one, Dolores' testimony is not dispositive that Lot 1087 was not sold entirely to petitioners' predecessors . The hard fact remains that the buyers of Lot 1087, or petitioners'
predecessors were able to possess the entirety of Lot 1087 after the execution of several documents and the parties' own recollections regarding the sale of Lot 1087 and the fact that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were even able to lease portions thereof while occupying the remainder – without any objections from respondents for 31 long years. We

cannot now favor respondents' claim on the basis of faulty recollections since, as stated, petitioners and their predecessors have long exercised the rights of ownership over the entirety of Lot
1087.
Contrary to Justice Caguioa's well-considered opinion, the burden is upon respondents to prove to all and sundry that more likely than not the sale was not of the whole of Lot 1087, which
means that they ought to explain why they said nothing for 31 years notwithstanding that petitioners and their predecessors have long been exercising ownership rights over every part
and portion of Lot 1087 for these number of years and even more.
Further, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Hospicio, Sr., was himself one of the sellers of Lot 1087 as clearly mentioned in the Contrata.
True, the lot is a registered lot and registered until today in the name of Juan Caletina, the ultimate predecessor-in-interest referred to by both petitioners and respondents. True, as well, the
Contrata was unnotarized.
These truths, however, do not affect the validity and enforceability of the presumably unregistered and factually unnotarized sale. An unregistered and unnotarized sale is valid and
enforceable against the parties to the sale. Hospicio, Sr., respondents' predecessor-in-interest, is bound by the sale.
We held in Heirs of Biona v. Court of Appeals:[51]
We agree with the private respondent that all the requisites for a valid contract of sale are present in the instant case. For a valuable consideration of P4,500.00, Soledad Biona agreed to

sell and actually conveyed the subject property to private respondent. The fact that the deed of sale was not notarized does not render the agreement null and void and without any
effect. The provision of Article 1358 of the Civil Code on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability. The observance of which is only
necessary to insure its efficacy, so that after the existence of said contract had been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the proper document. Undeniably, a contract
has been entered into by Soledad Biona and the private respondent. Regardless of its form, it was valid, binding and enforceable between the parties. We quote with favor the respondent
court's ratiocination on the matter:
xxx The trial court cannot dictate the manner in which the parties may execute their agreement, unless the law otherwise provides for a prescribed form, which is not so in this case. The deed of
sale so executed, although a private document, is effective as between the parties themselves and also as the third persons having no better title, and should be admitted in evidence for the
purpose of showing the rights and relations of the contracting parties (Carbonell v. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384). Under Art. 1356 of the Civil
Code, contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into provided all the essential requisites for their necessary elements for a valid contract of sale
were met when Soledad Biona agreed to sell and actually conveyed Lot 177 to defendant-appellant who paid the amount of P4,500.00 therefore. The deed of sale (Exh. 2) is not made

ineffective merely because it is not notarized or does not appear in a public document . The contract is binding upon the contracting parties, defendant-appellant and Soledad Biona,
including her successors-in-interest. Pursuant to Art. 1357, plaintiffs-appellees may be compelled by defendant-appellant to execute a public document to embody their valid and enforceable
contract and for the purpose of registering the property in the latter's name (Clarin v. Rulona, 127 SCRA 512; Heirs of Amparo v. Santos, 108 SCRA 43; Araneta v. Montelibano, 14 Phil. 117).
[52]
Since Hospicio, Sr. as respondent's predecessor-in-interest already sold his property in Lot 1087, together with his half-brothers, respondents no longer have any valid and enforceable
claim to this lot.

Much has been said too about Juan's spouse, Nicetas, as one of Juan's heirs. But there is no evidence of her having laid any claim herself to Lot 1087. In fact, when Dolores and Hospicio,
Sr. lived with Juan at Lot 1087, it was already Juan's non-marital partner Sianang who lived with them. Neither may respondents lay any rights-based claim to the lot on behalf of Nicetas except
for Hospicio, Sr.'s status as her heir who as such, nonetheless, already sold his property over Lot 1087 on September 28, 1962.
As a result, we cannot accept Justice Caguioa's claim that there was no valid or even enforceable sale of Lot 1087 to petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, or that the sale was only for
a portion thereof. As stated, the unnotarized Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr. and his half-brothers sold to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest the whole of Lot 1087 for P850, and not only for
400 square meters as subsequently intercalated in the notarized Deed of Sale that Hospicio, Sr. witnessed. But whether for the whole of Lot 1087 or 400 square meters thereof, Hospicio, Sr.
more likely than not agreed to these series of sales since the certificate of title for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest as they too at once
occupied the entire lot, and collected rentals from the lessees of the portions they did not occupy – without objection from Hospicio, Sr. and Dolores.

Given these factual circumstances, petitioners' present occupation and possession of Lot 1087 is not unlawful, void, or based on non-existent claim. They have long planted themselves on
Lot 1087 under the series of sales by the heirs of the registered owner – without any objection from any of them until 1993 when the relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has

faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. For this reason, respondent's action to recover the lot is definitely not imprescriptible. It will be both inefficient and
unfair to the truth-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the courts to insist that prescription has not set in.
To stress, respondents are now barred from assailing the sale of Lot 1087 and petitioners' possession of this lot by reason of extinctive prescription.
The reckoning point for extinctive prescription to set in was when the right of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, i.e., Hospicio, Sr. as Dolores' spouse and respondents' father, who was the
heir of Juan, accrued and was violated. This was when Juan died and Hospicio, Sr. acquired property (in the sense of rights) by succession to Lot 1087 and when this lot was sold to and
possessed and openly occupied by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, whichever came later.
Here, this means that the starting date for extinctive prescription was September 28, 1962 and has since been interrupted only on June 22, 1993 when the complaint was filed with the RTC.
Hospicio, Sr. could not have but known of his right to Lot 1087 and the violation of his right because –

(i) he himself sold this lot to petitioners' predecessor-in-interests on September 28, 1962, and

(ii) they at once openly possessed Lot 1087 by physical occupation for their own use and by leasing portions thereof to other individuals.

By June 22, 1993, when the complaint for recovery of Lot 1087 was filed with the RTC, the ultimate and all-encompassing prescriptive period of 31 years had already lapsed. It no longer
matters whatever respondents' cause of action was - contract or constructive trust arising from a mistake or even fraud. The super prescriptive period has set in. With the lapse of the
prescriptive period to file an action, respondents could no longer seek relief from the courts.
We invoke the singular outcome of our rulings in Pangasinan v. Disonglo-Almazora and Heirs of Biona v. Court of Appeals to refute further Justice Caguioa's well-considered opinions. If
respondents do have any cause of action at all, they surely have lost it when Hospicio, Sr. sold the entirety of Lot 1087 and witnessed without objection for more than 30 years the
supposed sale of 400 square meters thereof, the physical occupation by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest of portions of Lot 1087 for their own use, and their collection of rentals from and

other forms of juridical possession of those portions of this lot not physically occupied by them.
Indeed, the law aids only the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.[53] Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.
Valid and binding contract
While it is a well-established rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and will not delve into evidentiary matters, this Court can exercise its discretion in undergoing a close examination of the
testimonial and documentary evidence on record where the findings of fact of the lower courts are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion.[54]
Here, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at a similar finding of fact and legal conclusion that respondents are the true owners of Lot 1087. They both held that petitioners have
no claim of ownership over Lot 1087 based on the Contrata dated September 28, 1962 because it was unenforceable being a mere private instrument for lack of notarization, and the Deed of
Sale dated October 15, 1962 did not confer ownership as it was void since the party identified as the seller – Casiana Dalo – was not the owner of Lot 1087.
We agree with the lower courts' unified pronouncements that respondents cannot claim ownership over the subject lot from the Deed of Sale dated October 13, 1962 between Marciana or

Casiana Dalo Calitina (or Caletina) and Josefina, because Casiana was never its owner. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. A
buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.[55]
It bears emphasis that aside from the phrase "Juan Caletina, Filipino, of legal age, married to Casiana Dalo " in OCT No. P-479 (S), no other evidence was submitted to prove that Casiana Dalo
was indeed married to or in any manner an heir of Juan Caletina. On the contrary, respondents presented the marriage certificate [56] between Juan Caletina and Nicetas Galoran. There was
dearth of proof that Juan and Nicetas' marriage was ever annulled or declared a nullity or she was dead when Juan and Casiano were allegedly married.
On this score, Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat[57] is binding.
In Tambuyat, Adriano M. Tambuyat was married to Wenifreda Balcolm-Tambuyat. They separated in fact. Later, Adriano and one Rosario were allegedly married. Adriano acquired some

properties including a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. For this sale, TCT No. T-145321(M) was registered in the name of "Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis." Adriano died intestate. Wenifreda, as Adriano's spouse, sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-145321(M) on the ground that it was erroneously
registered to "Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis". In granting the petition for cancellation, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the inclusion of Rosario's name
in TCT No. T-145321(M) was an error or mistake. In affirming this, the Court held:
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties'
respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union – indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while
Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said
that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in
TCT T-145321 as Adriano's spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
Thus, the phrase "married to Casiana Dalo" in OCT No. P-479 (S), on its own, is not evidence and does not constitute proof, whether presumptive or conclusive, that Juan and Casiana were

married. Absent any other evidence that Casiana and Juan were married or that she is the latter's heir or that she has in any other way a juridical tie to or right over the lot, Casiana could not
have validly sold or transferred any right in it to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Josefina Yadao.
We, however, disagree with the trial and appellate courts that petitioners cannot claim ownership over Lot 1087 through the Contrata dated September 28, 1962 because it was not notarized.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code[58] states that a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights or in any manner deals with immovable property is to be embodied in a public document.
Nonetheless, as already mentioned above, it is a settled rule that the failure to observe the proper form prescribed by Article 1358 does not render the acts or contracts invalid . This is
because the purpose of Article 1358 is merely to suggest a convenient form in which to deal with real rights, convenience being measured in terms of the ease by which to prove the

underlying transaction over the immovable.

Thus, although a conveyance of land is not made in a public document, this form does not affect the validity of such conveyance. As referenced above, the form mentioned under Article
1358 is not essential to the validity or even the enforceability of the embodied agreement or transaction, but is intended for convenience. So long as the elements of consent, cause, and
consideration are present, the binding effect of a contract in any other form extends to the parties and their heirs and assigns. [59] As a result, even an oral contract involving real rights
produces legal effects between the parties, their heirs, and assigns.
Thus, as already adverted to above, it was grave error on the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have completely ignored the Contrata simply because it was not notarized.
We must not also forget that respondents' own witness, Dolores, respondents' mother, categorically affirmed the presence of all the elements of a valid sale when she testified that after Juan
had died, they sold Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest – Domingo and Josefina. [60] As respondents themselves admitted this sale, and the fact that the owner's duplicate copy of

OCT No. P-479 (S) was delivered contemporaneously to petitioners' predecessors, petitioners can justify their occupation and possession of the lot on the basis of this other sale, regardless of
the form, oral or written, notarized or unnotarized, in which this sale was embodied.

On this, as we reiterate the case law referenced above, the Court's pronouncement in Diampoc v. Buenaventura[61] is similarly instructive:
It must be remembered, however, that "the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the transaction evidenced therein"; it merely "reduces the evidentiary
value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence." x x x
x x x Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet the failure to
observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. The necessity of a public document for said contracts is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. Even
a sale of real property, though not contained in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding, for even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects
between the parties. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard originally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.

xxxx
Thus, following the above pronouncements, the remaining judicial task, therefore, is to determine if the deed of sale executed by and between the parties should be upheld. The RTC and the CA

are unanimous in declaring that the deed should be sustained on account of petitioner's failure to discredit it with her evidence . The CA further found that petitioner and her husband
received in full the consideration of P200,000.00 for the sale. As far as the lower courts are concerned, the three requirements of cause, object, and consideration concurred. x x x
xxxx
It is also a well-settled principle that "the law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous agreement they entered into with all the required formalities and with full

awareness of what they were doing. Courts have no power to relieve them from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments. Neither the law nor the courts will extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they entered into with all the required formalities and with full knowledge of its
consequences."[62] (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the fact that the Contrata was not notarized does not mean that there was no sale of Lot 1087 between the Caletina's (or Calitina) and the Yadaos. As discussed, even an oral sale of a
real property is valid and binding between the parties, their heirs, and assigns.
More important, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the other pieces of evidence proving that: (i) respondents' privies themselves in fact sold supposedly a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest; (ii) the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered contemporaneously to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest; and (iii) on
September 28, 1962, contemporaneously with the execution of the Contrata, petitioners started their occupation and possession of the entirety of Lot 1087 with respondents' privies'
knowledge and without complaints from them and their successors-in-interest until well into June 22, 1993.
All in all, what is clear from the evidence is that the heirs of Juan sold Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and petitioners and their successors occupied and possessed the entire

lot. There were admissions to this effect from respondents themselves and respondents did not complain for thirty-one (31) years until June 22, 1993. By then, respondents have compromised
the truth-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the RTC as a result of the fact that relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence
may no longer be availed of. It is thus now too late for respondents to assail and for the courts to upend the validity and enforceability of the Contrata. As we have concluded above, since
there is nothing in and about the Contrata that makes it invalid and unenforceable, and in view of the presence of all the elements of a valid and enforceable sale, the Contrata must be
upheld in toto to affirm the validity of petitioners' ownership including of course possession of the whole of Lot 1087.
To reiterate, as regards Juan's spouse, Nicetas, she being the mother of Hospicio, Sr. and the grandmother of respondents in the marital or legitimate line, her share when Juan died, as
respondents themselves suggest, was already inherited by Hospicio, Sr. and included in their complaint for recovery that started this case. Thus, any disposition in the instant case will
also apply to Nicetas' share.
So, when we say that, (i) as we have earlier explained above, respondents are now precluded from recovering the subject lot due to extinctive prescription, and (ii) as we discussed immediately
above, there was a valid and enforceable sale by Hospicio, Sr. and his half-brothers of Lot 1087, this ruling covers the entirety of Lot 1087 including Nicetas' share as Juan's spouse and heir
through Hospicio, Sr.'s status also as her
heir.

All told, the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed in full the trial court's ruling that respondents may still recover from petitioners Lot 1087 of Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay
Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by OCT No. P-479 (S). Their claim has prescribed and the series of sales thereof to petitioners'
predecessors as discussed in this Decision are declared valid.
Respondents can no longer recover Lot 1087 from petitioners. They are already barred from assailing petitioners' possession of the lot on their claims that do not amount to the sale of Lot
1087 as being unlawful, void, or non-existent. Their right of action to establish these claims has become stale due to extinctive prescription. Falling short of being unlawful, void, or non-
existent, their claims can no longer be established as facts with legal consequences.
Thus, with this bar against respondents, coupled with the validity of the series of sales of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, there are no more vices vitiating petitioners' acquisition
of the lot. As a result, their ownership of the lot will be declared, as they are declared, to be valid. Petitioners are entitled to secure from respondents, as respondents are ordered to provide, all
the documents of title to complete the registration of petitioners' acquisition and ownership, or their title, to Lot 1087 in accordance with the Court's ruling in Heirs of Arao v. Heirs of Eclipse:
[63]

The intent to transfer the ownership over the subject land has been established and effected by the execution of the 1940 Deed of Sale by the heirs of the registered owner, as well
as the delivery thereof to petitioners. What is needed is merely the issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title on the basis of the said 1940 Deed of Sale. To make this
possible, certain documents (pertaining to estate settlements, as well as registrable Deeds of Conveyance) are needed to facilitate the transfer of the title of the lot from the heirs of the original
owners to herein petitioners, not to mention payment of corresponding taxes. Hence, this Court directs the parties herein to execute all necessary documents as required by law to effect the
smooth issuance of the new Certificate of Title based on the 1940 Deed of Sale. This is not the first time this Court made such directive even if not prayed for by the winning parties in their
pleadings. The case of Spouses Aguinaldo v. Torres, Jr. is instructive:

To be sure, the directive to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor - albeit not specifically prayed for in respondent's Answer with Counterclaim - is but a
necessary consequence of the judgment upholding the validity of the sale to him, and an essential measure to put in proper place the title to and ownership of the subject
properties and to preclude further contentions thereon. As aptly explained by the CA, "to leave the 1991 deed of sale as a private one would not necessarily serve the intent of the country's
land registration laws, and resorting to another action merely to compel the petitioners to execute a registrable deed of sale would unnecessarily prolong the resolution of this case, especially
when the end goal would be the same." In this relation, case law states that a judgment should be complete by itself; hence, the courts are to dispose finally of the litigation so as to preclude
further litigation between the parties on the same subject matter, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits between the parties and their privies and successors-in-interests. [64] (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated February 29, 2016 and Resolution dated December 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99109, REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1868-S of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan is ordered DISMISSED.
Petitioners Heirs of Angel Yadao, namely: Rufina Yadao, Etherlyn Yadao-Yasaña, Ryanth Yadao, Ruth Ann Yadao-Mangibunong, Dina Joyce Yadao-Ines, and Angel Yadao, Jr.; Heirs of

Josefina Idica-Yadao, namely: Lourdes Yadao-Apostol and Aurora Yadao; and the Heirs of Ofelia Yadao -Naceno, namely: Teodulfo Naceno, Jr., Aileen Naceno and Irma Naceno -Agpaoa are
declared co-owners of Lot 1087 of Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-479 (S).
Respondents heirs of Juan Caletina, namely: Hospicio Caletina, Jr., Aniceto Caletina, and Florida Caletina, are DIRECTED to EXECUTE AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE a registrable deed of
conveyance in petitioners' favor for the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their names as co-owners of Lot 1087. In case respondents refuse or neglect to execute such registrable
deed, the Clerk of Court or the Officer-in-Charge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan is authorized and ordered to execute such document on their behalf and to
collect the lawful expenses for such purpose as part and parcel of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., See Dissent.

[1] Rollo, pp. 15-39.

[2] Spelled as "Calitina" in other portions of the records.

[3] Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Stephen
C. Cruz; rollo, pp. 51-58.
[4] Id. at 48-49.
[5] Record, pp. 1-4.

[6] Id. at 36-40.

[7] Id. at 63-67.
[8] Id. at 371.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 372.
[11] Rollo, pp. 100-101.

EN BANC

[ A.M. No. 18-07-142-RTC. February 15, 2022 ]

RE: REPORTS ON THE ERAFFLE PROCEDURE IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA

DECISION
INTING, J.:

The instant administrative matter has its origin from reports regarding delays in the conduct of electronic raffle (eRaffle) and the distribution of cases in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The Antecedents

In 2013, the Court launched an automated case management information system called the eCourt for trial courts. [1] The eCourt is a computer-based system used to organize and control case
workflow from filing to implementation. It is used to capture basic case information as they are filed, and it ensures that basic case data is entered only once to avoid the repetition of

administrative processes. Simply put, the assigning or docketing and raffling of cases to judges are all done electronically through the eCourt system.[2]

The eCourt system was first piloted in the RTC and Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City where the caseloads are among the highest in the country. [3] Hence, there is now a shift in
these eCourts from the manual raffle, which was done using a roulette or bingo tambiolo, as provided under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,[4] or the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, to the eRaffle of cases using the eCourt software. Under the system, the docketing of cases shall be done immediately
and the raffle thereof to the different eCourt branches shall be in real-time.[5]

In 2016, an additional of 120 eCourts were set up in the cities of Manila, Pasig, and Mandaluyong. Consequently, the judges and court personnel of the RTC Manila underwent eCourt training
from June 19, 2017 to July 7, 2017. On July 3, 2017, or before their training officially concluded, the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC Manila started encoding cases using the
eCourt system with the assistance of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) trainers and/or representatives as well as the Court's personnel from the Management
Information Systems Office.[6]

Subsequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received reports of persistent delays in the conduct of eRaffle and distribution of cases in the RTC Manila. [7] Thus, the OCA sent an
Audit Team to investigate the matter in January 2018. It also instructed Assistant Court Administrator Atty. Maria Regina Adoracion Filomena M. Ignacio (ACA Ignacio) to conduct a dialogue
with the RTC Manila judges and officials of the OCC.[8]

On January 10, 2018, the Audit Team went to the RTC Manila and observed the procedure undertaken by the OCC from the filing of cases and encoding of data required by the eCourt system
up to the actual eraffle of cases. The Audit Team learned that the cases filed for the day were simultaneously raffled in the afternoon through a formal raffle proceeding, and it noted the delay of

several days before the cases were forwarded to the branches to which they were raffled.[9]

Thereafter, the OCA directed then RTC Manila Executive Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Judge Alhambra) to do away with the simultaneous raffle of cases every afternoon and instead focus on

the immediate encoding and eraffle of cases.[10]

On May 2, 2018, the Audit Team went back to the RTC Manila to again monitor the conduct of eRaffle therein. It found a backlog of 300 cases set to be raffled, which tally even increased to 423
cases by May 25, 2018. In addition, the Audit Team found that criminal cases with motions for consolidation were first referred to judge Alhambra, as then the Executive Judge, for evaluation
before raffle, and the inclusion of these cases in the eRaffle was done only after the motion for consolidation was granted or denied.[11]

On June 28, 2018, ACA Ignacio met with Judge Alhambra and Judge Andy S. De Vera, then the Executive Judge of the MeTC Manila, and learned that the latter had zero cases pending raffle
while the RTC had 29 cases still not raffled. Judge Alhambra explained that the RTC OCC was having difficulty in using the eCourt system due to the influx of drug cases filed every day, internet
connectivity issues, and lack of personnel to encode case details in the system. ACA Ignacio then requested Judge Alhambra to reduce the number of cases pending raffle, to aim for a zero
backlog, and to submit a status report on the conduct of eRaffle twice a day.[12]

On July 2, 2018, ACA Ignacio held a dialogue with the following: 32 RTC Manila judges; Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-Buendia (Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia), the Clerk of Court (COC); Atty. Clemente
M. Clemente (now Judge Clemente), then the Assistant COC; and other OCC staff. During the meeting, some judges voiced out their complaints on the delay in the eRaffle of cases and
transmittal of records which also caused a lag in the issuance of commitment orders, as well as Judge Alhambra's action on the bail applications in several criminal cases that were already
raffled to their branches.[13]

Upon the recommendation of the OCA, the Court En Banc issued the Resolutions dated July 17, 2018[14] and July 24, 2018[15] as follows:

Resolution dated July 17, 2018

(a) RELIEVE Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Branch 53, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, as Executive Judge; and

(b) DESIGNATE the following judges as new Executive and Vice Executive Judges of the RTC, Manila:

(i) Judge Thelma B. Medina, Branch 32, as Executive Judge;

(ii) Judge Marivic B. Umali, Branch 20, as 1st Vice Executive Judge;

(iii) Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, Branch 37, as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge; and

(iv) Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Branch 4, as 3rd Vice-Executive Judge.[16]

Resolution dated July 24, 2018

(a) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz Buendia, Clerk of Court, and Atty. Clemente M. Clemente, Assistant Clerk of Court, both of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC),

Regional Trial Court, Manila, for ninety (90) days pending the completion of a more comprehensive investigation;

(b) DESIGNATE Atty. Marilou M. Anigan, Judicial Supervisor, OCA, as Officer-in-Charge of the OCC, RTC, Manila; and

(c) DESIGNATE Atty. Abegail P. Layson, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 32, as Acting Assistant Clerk of Court of the OCC, RTC, Manila.[17]

Pending investigation, Judge Clemente was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 127, MeTC, Makati City.[18]

Pursuant to the Court's directive to investigate the delay in the eRaffle of cases, the OCA sent an Audit Team to conduct a spot audit of randomly-selected courts focusing on cases filed from
January to July 2018, which included the RTC Manila.[19]

The Report on the Results of the Spot Audit

The Audit Team reported that the audited RTC Manila branches took an average of 4.95 days before commitment orders were issued, but this could not be considered as a delay because
courts are given 10 days within which to determine probable cause and issue commitment orders for the transfer of the accused to a jail facility. [20] It also found that it took an average of 5.76
days for the OCC to eraffle the cases, which is contrary to the objective of real-time raffling of cases under the eCourt system.[21]

The Audit Team then observed that upon the assumption of office of Judge Thelma B. Medina (Judge Medina) as the new Executive Judge, Atty. Marilou M. Anigan (Atty. Anigan) as the Officer-
in-Charge, and Atty. Abegail P. Layson (Atty. Layson) as the Acting Assistant COC, the eRaffle and distribution of cases to the RTC Manila branches in real -time were achieved within the
following month.[22]

With respect to the procedure on the applications for bail and corporate surety bonds in the OCC, the Audit Team found that Judge Alhambra had issued several memoranda on the submission

of reports on surety companies with outstanding obligations. It likewise noted that Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia submitted to the Docket and Clearance Division, Legal Office, OCA, monthly reports
from March to June 2018, which were based on orders directing the forfeiture of bonds and writ of execution issued by the Presiding Judge and the Branch Clerk of Court of the concerned

branches. The Audit Team also learned that some branches referred the order of forfeiture of bonds to the OCC while the others executed their own orders through their sheriffs. It thus
concluded that there was no uniform procedure in the implementation of the orders of forfeiture of bonds and writs of execution in the RTC Manila.[23]

Lastly, the Audit Team discovered that Judge Alhambra indeed approved bail bond applications in some criminal cases which were already raffled to other branches.[24]

In the Resolution[25] dated November 13, 2018, the Court, acting upon the recommendations of the OCA, resolved to:

(a) DIRECT Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Branch 53, RTC, Manila, to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he acted on bail applications in the following cases that were
already assigned to other branches during the time that he was the Executive Judge:

(i) Criminal Case Nos. R-MNL-17-03158; 18-01506, 18-03117; and 18-00248, already raffled to Branch 13;

(ii) Criminal Case Nos. R-MNL-18-05110-CR; 18-05118-CR; 18-05017-CR; and 18-05580-CR, already raffled to Branch 18; and

(iii) Criminal Case Nos. R-MNL-18-00396; 18-00487; 18-00393; 18-06043; and 18-00394, already raffled to Branch 31;

(b) DIRECT Judge Reynaldo Alhambra, Atty. [Jennifer H.] Dela Cruz-Buendia, and Judge Clemente M. Clemente, in his capacity as then Assistant Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Manila, to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why they failed to address the problem of delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC, Manila, from the time of its launch in July
2017 until July 30, 2018;
(c) DIRECT Judge Clemente and Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice, why they failed to set up a uniform system in the execution of Order of Forfeiture of
Bonds and in giving of clearance to bonding companies[.][26]

Comment of Judge Alhambra

Judge Alhambra asserted that he was not remiss in overseeing the functions of the OCC under Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia. He countered that he had devised ways to address the problem of delay
in the eRaffle of cases, such as: (1) assigning more OCC personnel to assist in the encoding of case data before their raffle; (2) the use of USB [27] flash drives to store the encoded data, which

were later transferred to the computers set up for the purpose of the eCourt system; (3) requiring Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia to submit a weekly update on the implementation of the eRaffle of
cases; and (4) reminding the various RTC branches to back-encode the cases in their dockets.[28]

Further, Judge Alhambra intimated that notwithstanding the new setup, there was still a delay in the eRaffle of cases due to: (a) the limited number of existing eCourt ports; (b) the lack of
expertise of some personnel; (c) the slow internet connection, especially when all the RTC branches were simultaneously utilizing the system for the back-encoding of their old cases not yet
included in the eRaffle; (d) the work suspensions due to unforeseen events and holidays; (e) the voluminous number of drug cases filed; and (f) the eRaffle system itself, which disallowed the
consolidation of more than 15 cases thereby causing an additional delay on how to raffle the cases exceeding the limit.[29]

With respect to his action on the bail applications in some criminal cases, Judge Alhambra argued that as the Executive Judge, he was authorized to resolve motions to post bail if the criminal
case had yet to be raffled to a particular branch pursuant to the Manual for Executive Judges. [30] Thus, he explained that he only acted on the subject criminal cases, which were not yet raffled
at the time, as he needed to act expeditiously on motions submitted for his action so that the public would have a positive impression that the RTC Manila delays no man for money or malice.
[31]

Comment of Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia

Meanwhile, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia alleged, among others, that during the first few months of the implementation of the eCourt system, the eRaffle was only conducted once a day, usually
between 2:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. She pointed out that the ABA ROLI trainers were present in many instances when the eRaffle of cases was conducted, but they never called the attention of
the OCC regarding the procedure it adopted.[32] She also asserted that the eCourt system itself was not perfect as the ABA ROLI was not able to anticipate the problems that the OCC

encountered in its implementation, and the ABA ROLI personnel, too, was scarcely available in the court to handle queries and to provide solutions.[33]

Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia insisted that the cause of delay in the eRaffle of cases are: (1) the long holidays and inclement weather; (2) the slow internet connection; (3) no control as to how many

cases were filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor; (4) the sheer volume of cases filed; (5) the lack of additional ports; and (6) no assistance coming from the ABA ROLI. [34]

As to the system regarding the execution of orders of forfeiture of bonds and the issuance of bail bonds and clearances, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia explained as follows:

First, the writs of execution against the bonds issued by the RTC branches were, in most cases, implemented by the branch sheriff, who reported directly to the court where the writ was issued;
and that the OCC was not furnished or notified of these issuances, or of the action taken by the branch sheriff. In fact, there were branches that had their own list of blacklisted bonding
companies only known to them. Thus, she can only report on the pending liability of surety companies if the OCC is furnished with a copy of the writs of execution issued against them; [35] and

Second, there is no occasion that a surety company will be issued clearance if there is a pending liability appearing on the OCC files. However, it has been observed that several surety
companies have been allowed accreditation by the OCA even before a clearance is issued by the OCC. Hence, when the list of the accredited bonding companies was issued and their office
furnished copies by the OCA, such list became its guide as to which bonding companies are of good standing.[36]

Comment of Judge Clemente

For his part, Judge Clemente admitted that there was indeed a delay in the eRaffle of cases on multiple occasions, [37] but he asserted that such delay was due to extraneous factors [38]
including: (a) the unfamiliarity of court personnel to the new eCourt system and how to use and troubleshoot it; (b) the insufficient work stations and slow internet connection that affected the
encoding process; (c) the multiple times when the eCourt system slowed down or completely shut down because of the simultaneous use thereof by the OCC and the other RTC branches for
the back-encoding of previous cases; and (d) the work suspensions due to natural conditions or holidays.[39]

Judge Clemente maintained that he and the OCC tried their best to find solutions to the problems in the implementation of the eCourt system. Nevertheless, he extended his apologies if any of

his actions directly contributed to the delays in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila.[40]

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

At the outset, the OCA noted that Judge Alhambra, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia, and Judge Clemente (collectively, respondents), who all had a direct part in the raffle of cases, failed not only to
comply with the mandate to fully implement the eCourt system[41] but also to address the serious delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila.[42]
The OCA pointed to the backlog of 520 cases pending raffle for the month of July 2018, which then steadily declined upon the assumption of office of Atty. Anigan and Atty. Layson as the
Officer-in-Charge and the Acting Assistant COC, respectively, until the OCC achieved the real-time eRaffle of cases about a month later.[43]

The OCA considered respondents' repeated failure to implement a real-time raffle of cases for a period of more than one year to be a blatant relegation of their duties and functions as
administrative officers of the court.[44] It also observed that even the simple act of indicating the time when the document was received, which is a very basic rule in the receipt of the documents
as required under Section 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, was not followed.[45]

Moreover, the OCA found that Judge Alhambra inappropriately acted on the bail applications in Criminal Case Nos. R-MNL-17-03158-CR, 18-03117-CR, 18-05110-CR, 18-05017-CR, 18-
05580-CR, 18-00396-CR, 18-00487-CR, 18-00393-CR, 18-06043-CR, and 18-00394-CR considering that the cases had already been raffled to various branches of the RTC Manila when he
took cognizance of the applications in his capacity as the Executive Judge.[46] In this regard, the OCA noted that Judge Alhambra, in the guise of expeditiously resolving such applications for
bail, had wantonly disregarded the rules and order of preference set forth in the Manual for Executive Judges and plainly stepped into the jurisdiction of his fellow RTC judges.[47]

As for Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia, the OCA noted that she, too, had failed to set up a uniform system in the OCC for the execution of orders of forfeiture of bonds and in giving clearances to surety
companies with pending obligations.[48] It pointed out that Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia's failure to accurately report the status of surety companies resulted in prejudice not only to the court users
but also to the judiciary as a whole.[49]

Thus, the OCA deemed respondents administratively liable for their individual actions as follows:

For Judge Alhambra, the OCA found him guilty of: (a) Simple Neglect of Duty for his failure to observe the procedure in the conduct of eRaffle; and (b) Grave Misconduct for inappropriately
acting on bail applications in criminal cases that had already been raffled to other branches.[50]

In the case of Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia, the OCA found her guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty on two counts: (a) for failing to observe the procedure for the eRaffle in the RTC Manila, which
resulted in the persistent delay in the raffle of cases therein; and (b) for issuing four certifications of no pending obligation and/or liability to four surety companies found to have outstanding
obligations in the RTC Manila.[51]

Finally, as regards Judge Clemente, the OCA found him guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty for his failure to observe the procedure in the conduct of eRaffle and to address the problem of delay in

the raffle of cases in the RTC Manila.[52] However, as then the Assistant COC, the OCA noted that his administrative liability is only secondary to his superiors given that he was under the
supervision of both Judge Alhambra and Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia at the time.[53]

The OCA recommended the imposition of the following penalties, to wit:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

(1) Presiding Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Branch 53, RTC, Manila, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct, and be meted the following penalties:

(a) FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) for Simple Neglect of Duty; and

(b) FINE in the amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary for Grave Misconduct, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely;

(2) Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-Buendia, Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila, be found GUILTY of two (2) counts of Gross Neglect of Duty and be meted [out] the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; and

(3) Presiding Judge Clemente M. Clemente, Branch 127, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, in his capacity as then Assistant Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect
of Duty and be meted the penalty of FINE in the amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
[54]

The Court's Ruling

It cannot be denied that there was indeed a delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila for the months of July 2017 to July 2018 or during its transition period from the manual raffle of cases
to the implementation of the eCourt system. Nevertheless, after careful consideration, the Court does not find the actions of Judge Alhambra, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia, and Judge Clemente to

be tantamount to neglect of duty, whether it be simple or gross in nature, as to warrant the imposition of any administrative sanction on their parts for such delay.

Dereliction of duty is classified as either simple or gross depending on the gravity of negligence or the character of neglect of an official or employee in the performance of his or her duties. [55]
Simple Neglect of Duty is the failure to give proper attention to a required task, thereby signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[56] The offense then becomes
Gross Neglect of Duty when such failure to perform a required task or to discharge a duty is willful and intentional,[57] "characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious
indifference to the consequences insofar as other persons may be affected, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty."[58]

In the case, the Court sees no indication that the actions of respondents, in relation to the implementation of the eCourt system and the consequent delay in the eRaffle of cases, are a result of
carelessness and indifference or a flagrant and palpable breach of their respective duties as the Executive Judge, the Clerk of Court, and then the Assistant Clerk of Court of the RTC Manila,

respectively.

Though it is true that the delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila was not sufficiently addressed by respondents, the Court cannot disregard outright the following solutions they devised
in order to remedy the issue:

For his part, Judge Alhambra conducted personal visits to the OCC to observe how the eRaffle was being implemented and held meetings with Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia to address the backlog
of cases for raffle. To this end, some OCC personnel were pulled out of their regular duties and reassigned to assist in the encoding of data for the eRaffle of cases. Judge Alhambra also
required the OCC to provide him with a weekly update on the implementation of the eRaffle of cases.[59]

In addition, Judge Alhambra likewise visited various RTC Manila branches, met with the judges and staff therein to obtain information regarding their implementation of the eCourt system, and
reminded them to back-encode the cases in their dockets.[60] Lastly, he directed the OCC to add encoders and to use USB flash drives to store data to be encoded in the system, in addition to
desktop computers.[61]

The directives were then implemented by Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia and Judge Clemente in the OCC to ease the backlog of cases for eRaffle.

Similarly, the Court, too, cannot just overlook the various reasons that contributed to the delay in the eRaffle of cases cited by respondents, which the OCA apparently failed to take into account
in determining their administrative liabilities:

a) the limited number of computers set up for the purpose of implementing the eCourt system;

b) the lack of expertise of court personnel in using and troubleshooting the eCourt software;

c) the slow internet connection;

d) the slow down or complete shut down of the eCourt system due to the simultaneous use thereof by the OCC and the other RTC branches for the back-encoding of previous cases;

e) the work suspensions due to unforeseen events and holidays; and

f) the voluminous number of drug cases filed in the RTC Manila.

While the reasons do not completely justify the delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila, the fact that respondents did their best to solve the issues in the new eCourt system is enough to
exonerate them from any administrative liability in relation thereto. After all, the eCourt system is still in its early stages of implementation even now, which means that the problems that the RTC
Manila encountered during its transition period are not only to be expected, but also, in a way, are welcomed so that solutions can be formulated early on before the system goes live in all courts
nationwide. More importantly, there is no evidence presented that respondents' actions were tainted with bad faith.

In this regard, the OCA itself pointed out that persons with active participation in the raffle of cases, such as herein respondents, are tasked to devise a new process to achieve the objectives of
the eCourt system.[62] This shows that as of the moment, there is no fixed procedure in implementing the eRaffle of cases, particularly in the method and time of raffle. In fact, the pertinent
guideline for eRaffle per OCA Circular No. 57-2013 only provides that the cases shall be immediately docketed and the raffle thereof shall be done "in real-time." [63] As the OCA observed, this
rendered nugatory the existing procedure for manual raffle under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which, in effect, gave the eCourts, like the RTC Manila, limited discretion as to the implementation of the
eRaffle of cases in their jurisdictions.

Notably, the eRaffle in the case was conducted once on a daily basis,[64] though it appears that the delay at the outset was largely due to the fact that 172 cases scheduled for manual raffle
had to first be encoded,[65] coupled with the influx of new cases that needed to be raffled "in real-time" under the eCourt system. Viewed from this perspective, the backlog in the eRaffle of
cases hardly seems unreasonable considering, among others, the lack of expertise of the RTC Manila's court personnel in using the eCourt software as well as the other hardware and technical

issues that they encountered at the time.

Hence, it would be quite unfair for the Court to penalize respondents for formulating their own procedure for the eRaffle, given that they were mandated to do so in the first place.

The Court likewise cannot assign administrative liability on the part of respondents for the backlog in the eRaffle of cases simply because of the improvements in the implementation of the
eCourt system upon the assumption of office of Atty. Anigan and Atty. Layson as Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Clerk of Court of the OCC, respectively.

It bears noting that the problems faced by respondents in the eRaffle of cases were no longer novel by the time Atty. Anigan and Atty. Layson took over. The OCC staff, too, by then, had a year
of experience in using and troubleshooting the new eCourt software. In other words, the conclusion reached by the OCA that Atty. Anigan and Atty. Layson would have done a better job than
respondents is purely speculative at this point. The peculiar situation of the RTC Manila during its transition period from the manual raffle to the eCourt system clearly played a huge role in how
the eRaffle of cases therein turned out to be under respondents' leadership.

In finding respondents administratively liable, the OCA cited as a judicial precedent the case of Ferrer, Jr. v. Judge Dating[66] (Ferrer, Jr.) wherein the respondent judge was found guilty of
Simple Neglect of Duty for his failure to adhere to the provisions of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, specifically on the conduct of raffle of cases.

The circumstances in Ferrer, Jr., however, are vastly different from those in the present case. In particular, Ferrer, Jr. involved the manual raffle of cases, and the respondent judge therein
undoubtedly violated A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC since he purposely delayed the raffle of cases for unjustifiable reasons, i.e., there was supposedly no urgency to conduct a raffle and the number of
cases was not sufficient for a raffle – meaning, there was no raffle conducted at all, in blatant violation of the required procedure under Section 2, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. Here, the
delay in the eRaffle of cases was clearly unintentional and without bad faith on the part of respondents and, as earlier mentioned, they did try to solve the issues they faced in order to better

implement the eCourt system.

In view of the foregoing reasons, the Court exonerates respondents from any administrative liability for the delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila during its first year of implementation

of the eCourt system, or in the months of July 2017 to July 2018.

It is also for the above-mentioned reasons that the Court cannot hold Judge Alhambra accountable for acting on the bail applications in several criminal cases in the RTC Manila in his capacity
as the Executive Judge.

A review of the records clearly shows that Judge Alhambra only acted upon those bail applications in criminal cases which had yet to be raffled. In other words, he acted on these matters as a
necessary consequence of the delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila. Though it is true that in some instances, Judge Alhambra appears to have acted on bail applications on the same
day that the criminal cases were eraffled, he sufficiently explained that he resolved those motions before the cases were actually raffled to a particular branch.

Under the circumstances, Judge Alhambra cannot be deemed to have acted inappropriately when he resolved the bail applications in criminal cases that were still pending eraffle in the OCC.
After all, Executive Judges are given the power to grant bail when the application is filed before the criminal case is raffled, or in this case, eraffled, to a particular branch.[67]

In this regard, the OCA justified its recommendation to find Judge Alhambra guilty of Grave Misconduct for acting on these bail applications as follows:

x x x As such, for all intents and purposes, once filed with the OCC, it is presumed that the case details were encoded and case numbers were generated. Therefore, for all intents and purposes
under the eRaffle, the said cases were already considered raffled to a particular branch . Clearly, Judge Alhambra, as Executive Judge, should have realized the impropriety of taking cognizance
of those bail applications. For this, we construe his acts as deliberate violations of the rules on bail.[68] (Italics supplied)

The Court strongly disagrees. To be sure, an Executive Judge in any multi-branch eCourt should not be prevented from acting on a pending bail application under the mere presumption that the
criminal case should have already been encoded and eraffled in real-time to a particular branch that can resolve the motion. To hold otherwise would result in an absurd situation where a bail

application cannot be acted upon because the criminal case was "considered" to have already been assigned to a branch, when, in reality, it was still actually pending eraffle with the OCC.

Besides, to be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, it must be sufficiently shown that there was an intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior involving any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, and/or a flagrant disregard of an established rule.[69]

To reiterate, Judge Alhambra only acted on bail applications in criminal cases that were still pending raffle, which means that he neither disregarded the rules and order of preference on who
must resolve motions for bail nor overstepped into the jurisdiction of his fellow RTC judges. Simply put, Judge Alhambra acted within the bounds of his authority as the Executive Judge under
the Manual of Executive Judges on the guidelines concerning bail.

As earlier explained in detail, the delay in the eRaffle of cases in the RTC Manila is not a result of respondents' neglect of duty. In the same way, the Court cannot penalize Judge Alhambra for
exercising his authority to expeditiously act on bail applications in criminal cases whose eRaffle had been unintentionally delayed.

The Court now discusses the alleged irregularities in the processing of bailbonds, forfeiture of bonds, and issuances of clearances to bonding companies in the RTC Manila.

Section E(1) paragraph 1.3.5 (j.2) of The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court [70] provides the reportorial requirements for judgments of forfeiture and writs of execution on bail and/or

judicial bonds as well as for bonding companies with outstanding obligations, viz.:

All Branch Clerks of Court shall furnish the Clerk of Court a copy of all judgments of forfeiture and writs of execution, including subsequent orders/proceedings relative thereto. The Clerk of
Court shall keep a separate file of such orders for his ready reference.

The Clerk of Court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a quarterly report of all bonding companies with outstanding obligations, the amount executed together with the judgment
of forfeiture and writ of execution, and subsequent motions/orders relative thereto.

In addition, Item IV of A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC,[71] or the Proposed Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds, also mandates Clerks of Court to submit to the Docket and Clearance Division of the

OCA a monthly report on surety companies with outstanding obligations, viz.:

The Clerks of Courts of all concerned courts shall submit to the Docket and Clearance Division, Legal Office, OCA, a monthly report on surety companies with outstanding obligations on or
before the 10th day of the succeeding month (SB Form No. 06-2004, Annex "B"). The report shall specify the name of the surety company, the amount of bond, bond number, the case, number,
case title, name of the accused or party in a case, date of order of forfeiture and status or action taken thereon, attaching in support thereto, the following:

1. Judgment of forfeiture with the corresponding writ of execution;

2. Subsequent motions/orders relative thereto; and

3. Sheriff's Return.

Thus, as a matter of procedure, the reports on the status of surety companies begin with the Branch Clerks of Court, who are tasked to furnish the Clerk of Court with copies of judgments of

forfeiture and writs of execution on surety bonds. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court must, in turn, submit two reports to the OCA which are: (1) a monthly report on surety companies with
outstanding obligations on or before the 10th day of the succeeding month pursuant to the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds; and (2) a quarterly report of all bonding companies with

outstanding obligations in accordance with The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

The importance of these reports cannot be understated as they later become the bases for the OCA's action on applications for accreditation filed by surety companies pursuant to Item II(A)
(A.8)[72] of the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds.

In the case, the records show that Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia issued certifications that the following surety companies had no pending obligation and/or liability for the period February 1, 2018 to

July 31, 2018: (a) Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation; (b) Commonwealth Insurance Company; (c) Milestone Guaranty and Assurance Corp.; and (d) Alpha Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
However, as the OCA observed, the four surety companies had, in fact, been issued judgments of forfeiture and writs of execution during the same period per the sworn reports of the RTC
Manila's Branch Clerks of Court.[73]

In her defense, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia explained that the OCC is guided by the list issued by the Supreme Court as to which bonding companies are in good standing.[74]

The Court, however, finds this excuse unacceptable. After all, as the Clerk of Court, it is Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia's duty to report to the OCA which surety companies had outstanding obligations
with the RTC Manila branches. This presupposes that she had competent knowledge of the surety companies transacting in the RTC Manila that are in good standing. Thus, she cannot evade
accountability for issuing the above-mentioned certifications to surety companies with pending obligations, which effectively enabled the latter to continue transacting with the RTC Manila, when
their respective certifications of accreditation and authority should have been suspended or cancelled instead.

Based on these considerations, there is no question that Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia had failed in her duty to accurately report the standing of surety companies in the RTC Manila. Even so, this
failure appears to be a product of mere inadvertence and is not willful and intentional on her part. Thus, the Court finds Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty as her apparent

carelessness or indifference in discharging her duty resulted in the issuance of certifications of no pending obligation and/or liability to delinquent surety companies.[75]

Notably, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia has previously been held administratively liable for Simple Neglect of Duly or Simple Negligence on two separate occasions: the first was in the 2006 case of
Sy v. Esponilla,[76] wherein she was meted out with the penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 for having failed to verify the authenticity and origin of a court order pertaining to the withdrawal of
deposits; and the second was in the 2010 case of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Lanzanas[77] in which the Court suspended her for a period of three months for having failed to check the
veracity of the documents presented to her in relation to the release of funds. In both cases, Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall
be dealt with more severely.

Under Section 50(D), Rule 10 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[78] Simple Neglect of Duty is classified as a less grave offense that is punishable by suspension

from office for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal from the service on the second offense.

As the law dictates, the penalty of dismissal from the service is imposed when the administrative offense of Simple Neglect of Duty is committed more than once. However, despite Atty. Dela
Cruz-Buendia's previous violations, significant factors attending the case call for the Court to reduce the penalty to be imposed.

In several administrative cases,[79] the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties after considering certain mitigating factors, including, among others, respondent's length of
service, acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and advanced age.[80]

In the present case, the Court similarly takes into consideration the following mitigating factors: (1) Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia's 34 years of service in the government; (2) her advanced age of 60
years old; (3) the absence of any indication of malice or some ulterior motive behind her actions; and (4) humanitarian considerations in relation to the adverse economic effects of the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 to the country. "Indeed, while the Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline errant employees and weed out those who are undesirable, it
also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy."[81] Thus, in view of the aforementioned significant mitigating factors, the Court resolves to impose the penalty of
reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-Buendia, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty for issuing certifications of no pending
obligation and/or liability to delinquent surety companies. She is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

The other charges against Presiding Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Branch 53, Regional Trial Court, Manila, and Presiding Judge Clemente M. Clemente, Branch 127, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Makati City, in his capacity as then Assistant Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

Marquez, J., no part but voted.

[1] Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Memorandum for Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta dated August 14, 2020 signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (now a Member of

the Court) and Assistant Court Administrator Maria Regina Adoracion Filomena M. Ignacio, citing American Bar Association, Case Management System to Improve Efficiency in Philippine Trial
Courts, August 1, 2013, <https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/ruleoflaw/wherewework/asia/philippines/news/newsphilippinesecourt0813/> (last accessed February 2, 2022); rollo, p. 580.
[2] Id. at 581.

[3] Id. at 580.

[4] Took effect on February 15, 2004.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 238041. February 15, 2022 ]

BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH AND JAMES L. KENNEDY, TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF
CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH, PETITIONERS, VS. MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 238502]

MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH AND JAMES
L. KENNEDY, TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Cases

In G.R. No. 238041, the Bankruptcy Estate of Charles B. Mitich a.k.a. Charlie Mitich and its trustee James L. Kennedy (Mitich, et al.) assail in part the Decision[1] dated November 27, 2017 and
Resolution[2] dated March 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104238 insofar as the same deleted the award of legal interest and attorney's fees in their favor and denied their
subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively.

In G.R. No. 238502, Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. (Mercantile) assails the same dispositions of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's order to enforce a default judgment
rendered by a foreign court against Mercantile.

Antecedents

On April 7, 1998, Mitich, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court – Manila a civil case for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment against Mercantile docketed Civil Case No. 98-
88259[3] and entitled Bankruptcy Estate of Charles B. Mitich a.k.a. Charlie Mitich and James L. Kennedy, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Charles B. Mitich a.k.a. Charlie Mitich v.
Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. It got raffled to Branch 10.

Mitich, et al. essentially alleged:

Charles B. Mitich (Mitich) was the owner and operator of a teen club in San Diego, California, United States of America (USA) called Club Tronix. On March 30, 1991, a gunfight erupted in the
parking lot of Club Tronix which claimed the life of a patron – a young man named Theodros Zewdalem (Zewdalem).[4]

On March 13, 1992, the estate and heirs of Zewdalem filed a wrongful death action before the San Diego Superior Court against Mitich, doing business as Club Tronix. [5] At that time, Mitich and
Club Tronix had a comprehensive general liability insurance policy issued by Mercantile.[6] Mitich thus made a tender of defense[7] to Mercantile which, in turn, hired US attorney Jay Kopelowitz
(Kopelowitz) to represent him. Mercantile's broker paid Kopelowitz's legal fees, but only until July 1992.[8] Hence, Mitich proceeded with the trial before the San Diego Superior Court sans
Mercantile's assistance. On May 28, 1993, the San Diego Superior Court ruled in favor of the Zewdalems and awarded USD$285,500.00 in their favor.[9]

On February 18, 1994, both Mitich, et al. and the Zewdalems filed a Complaint before the Superior Court of the State of California, USA (California Court) against Mercantile for insurance bad

faith. The case was docketed Case No. 673936 and entitled Charlie Mitich, individually and dba Club Tronix; Amde Zewdalem as Special Administrator of the estate of Theodros Zewdalem;
Zewdalem Kebede and Yaromnesh Admasu v. Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. and Does 1-10 inclusive.[10]

By Default Judgment[11] dated July 21, 1994, the California Court ruled in favor of Mitich and awarded $1,135,929.14 in his favor, viz.:

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CHARLIE MITICH, individually and dba CLUB TRONIX; AMDE ZEWDALEM as Special Administrator for the ) CASE NO. 673936
estate of THEODROS ZEWDALEM; ZEWDALEM KEBEDE; AND YAROMNESH ADMASU, ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY
Plaintiffs, )
)
COURT
)
v.
)
)
MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and DOES 1-10 inclusive, )
ENTERED
)
)
Defendants.
) JUL 22 1994

_______________________________________
Judgment Book__Pg__

2391_277

The Application of Plaintiff Charles B. Mitich, individually and dba Club Tronix (hereinafter referred to as "Mitich"), for a default judgment against defendant Mercantile Insurance Company

("Mercantile") came on for hearing on July 18, 1994, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 16 of this Court, the Honorable Wayne L. Peterson, Judge Presiding. Pamela J. Naughton and Steven E. Comer
of Baker & McKenzie, appeared on behalf of James L. Kennedy, as trustee[s] of the bankruptcy estate of Mitich. Mercantile did not appear. Testimony was given by Mr. Mitich, Jay Kopelowitz,
and Pamela Naughton.

It appearing that Mercantile was properly served with process and failed to appear and answer the complaint herein, and that its default was duly entered on May 25, 1994; and the Court having
considered the evidence and points and authorities filed in support of Mitich's application, the documents on file in this action, and the testimony and evidence presented at the prove-up hearing,
and good cause appearing[,] therefore, the Court enters judgment in favor of James L. Kennedy, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Charles B. Mitich, as follows:

THE COURT FINDS that Mitich has been damaged by Defendant Mercantile in the amount of $635,929.14. Said damages include the following:

Judgment in the Zewdalem action $285,500.00

Prejudgment interest, $78.22 per diem, (10% simple interest from [the] date of Zewdalem Judgment entered June 31,053.34

18, 1993, through July 20, 1994)

Attorney's fees, costs[,] and disbursements 64,219.00

Prejudgment interest, $17.60 per diem (10% simple interest from last billing, October 1, 1993, through July 20, 5,156.80
1994)

SUBTOTAL $385,929.14

Emotional distress $250,000.00

 TOTAL $635,929.14

The Court further finds that Mitich is entitled to punitive damages from Defendant Mercantile in the amount of $500,000.00

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that James L. Kennedy, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Charles B. Mitich, shall have and recover judgment against defendant
Mercantile Insurance Company in the amount of $1,135,929.14, together with interest on such judgment as provided by law.

Dated: July 21, 1992 [handwritten]

[Signature of Judge Wayne L. Peterson]

Judge of the Superior Court

WAYNE L. PETERSON

The foregoing instrument is a full, true[,] and correct copy of the original on file in this office.

Attest: July 29, 1994

KENNETH E. MARTONE
Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Diego.

By: [Signature of Louise Shroeder] Deputy LOUISE SCHROEDER[12]

Notably, a handwritten date "July 21, 1992"[13] appeared on the fallo of the Default Judgment. It preceded the signature of Wayne L. Peterson, Judge of the Superior Court who rendered the
judgment. The body of the judgment though bore the entry "July 18, 1994, at 8:30 in the morning" as the date and time of promulgation. The rest of the Default Judgment also bore the entry
"1994" as the year judgment was rendered.

The judgment got entered into the records of the California Court on July 22, 1994, and personally served [14] on Mercantile on October 13, 1994, at its principal place of business on General
Luna St. corner Beaterio Street, Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.[15] It was received by Carol de la Cruz who represented herself as person-in-charge of receiving documents.

Despite Mercantile's receipt of the Default Judgment, however, Mercantile did not file an appeal in accordance with the California Rules of Court. Consequently, the Default Judgment lapsed
into finality.[16]

For these reasons, they filed the petition for recognition of foreign judgment in order to compel Mercantile to pay $1,135,929.14 or its equivalent in pesos (P42,710,935.66) plus interest,
attorney's fees of P200,000.00, and costs of suit.

In response, Mercantile filed a motion to dismiss[17] on two (2) grounds:

First, the complaint stated no cause of action. The Default Judgment of the California Court was void due to invalid extraterritorial service of summons on Mercantile, hence, it cannot be

enforced in the Philippines.

To be sure, extraterritorial service of summons is governed by lex fori or the internal law of the forum. As it was, the California Code of Civil Procedure[18] required that summonses be
served[19] on "the president or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary, or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized
by the corporation to receive service of process"; only then could the California Court acquire jurisdiction over it (Mercantile). [20] But here, the summons from the California Court got served on
Ms. Imelda Caseres (Caseres), a Claims Clerk III of Mercantile who was neither authorized to receive summonses on its behalf nor among those authorized to receive summons for a
corporation under the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Second, the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaint were defective and not properly authenticated. The complaint was prepared in April 1998, but the certifications were
executed by Charles B. Mitich and James L. Kennedy way earlier on December 3, 1997 and December 23, 1997, respectively. This was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.[21] More, the certifications were notarized in California but not authenticated in accordance with Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence.[22]

In opposition,[23] Mitich, et al. riposted that by filing a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action, Mercantile was deemed to have admitted the allegations[24] in the
complaint against it, including the proper service of summons and the jurisdiction of the California Court. Further, Caseres represented herself as someone authorized to receive summonses on
Mercantile's behalf. Finally, Mercantile was estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the California Court over its person as it bound itself to the jurisdiction of any court of the USA when it
issued an insurance policy in favor of Mitich.[25]

The certifications against forum shopping were not defective either. The date "April 7, 1998" appearing in the complaint was merely inserted when said complaint was filed. But when the
corresponding certifications were executed in December 1997, a copy of the complaint was already appended thereto. Too, the required authentication was clearly stamped on the dorsal portion
of the first page of the complaint. All told, the motion had no basis in law; it was a dilatory tactic purposely aimed to delay Mercantile's payment of the amount it owed.

By Order[26] dated January 14, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and required Mercantile to file its answer within five (5) days from receipt. The trial court ruled that their
allegations required the presentation of evidence, considering that the matter of service of summons was hinged on provisions of California law. The trial court denied reconsideration by
Order[27] dated June 4, 1999.

Subsequently, Mercantile sought to nullify the twin orders of the trial court before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 55005. By Resolution[28] dated
October 27, 1999, however, the Court of Appeals denied due course, ruling that Mercantile's petition was filed four (4) days late. [29] By Resolution[30] dated May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied reconsideration for lack of merit.

Unrelenting, Mercantile elevated the case to the Court via another petition for certiorari under G.R. No. 143509. By Resolution dated July 19, 2000, the Court dismissed the petition for being an

improper remedy[31]

Meantime, back to Civil Case No. 98-88259, Mitich, et al. moved to declare Mercantile in default.[32] It called the trial court's attention to Mercantile's failure to file its answer for over two (2)

months reckoned from receipt of the Order dated June 4, 1999.

In its Opposition,[33] Mercantile explained that in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 55005 at that time, it was procedurally constrained from filing an answer to the complaint; it would
have been a waste of the trial court's time had Civil Case No. 98-88259 been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

In its Reply,[34] Mitich, et al. asserted that absent an injunctive writ, the mere pendency of special civil action for certiorari did not interrupt the case. In any event, Mercantile was already in
default even before it filed CA-G.R. SP No. 55005.

By Order[35] dated July 16, 2001, the trial court declared Mercantile in default. It also denied the subsequent motion to lift or set aside order of default for lack of merit under Order [36] dated
September 5, 2008

The Court of Appeals later on upheld the orders of the trial court in CA-G.R. SP No. 105992,[37] noting that Mercantile's recourse was meant to further delay the proceedings.

The Court affirmed via G.R. No. 185564.[38]

Meanwhile, Mitich, et al. presented evidence ex parte in Civil Case No. 98-88259. Despite due notice, Mercantile never came to even at least observe the proceedings. On October 13, 2009,
Mitich, et al. formally offered their documentary evidence, terminating their presentation of evidence in chief.[39]

Rulings of the Trial Court

By Decision[40] dated July 25, 2014,[41] trial court ruled in favor of Mitich, et al., thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered enforcing the foreign judgment against the defendant and ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S.

$1,135,929.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso, amounting to Php42,710,935.66 with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of entry of judgment by the California Court on
July 22, 1994, together with interest until fully paid and ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Php200,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of suit.
It held that Mitich, et al. successfully established the existence and authenticity of the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 of the California Court. Said Default Judgment had been certified by
the clerk of the California Court and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, USA, in compliance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence prior to
amendment. More, the Default Judgment was rendered in accordance with the California Code of Civil Procedure.

The trial court did not give credence to Mercantile's claim that the California Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over its person. On the contrary, summonses were served on Mercantile three (3)
times, all in accordance with the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Finally, the trial court held that the handwritten date of July 21, 1992, appearing on the Default Judgment was obviously a mere typographical error. The correct date of the judgment was July
21, 1994, considering that (a) the complaint was filed with the California Court only on February 18, 1994; (b) summons against Mercantile was issued on February 18, 1994; (c) requests for
Default Judgment were filed on May 24, 1994, May 27, 1994, and July 6, 1994; and (d) the application for default judgment was heard by the California Court on July 18, 1994.[42]

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, Mercantile faulted the trial court for ruling that the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 was valid and regular considering that the California Court allegedly did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person. More, the trial court seriously erred in effecting a change of date of the Default Judgment from July 21, 1992 to July 21, 1994. Finally, there was no basis for the
award of legal interest, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

Dispositions of the Court of Appeals

By Decision[43] dated November 27, 2017 in CA-G.R. CV No. 104238, the Court of Appeals affirmed in the main but deleted the award of interest and attorney's fees. It noted that the Default
Judgment dated July 21, 1994 itself did not allegedly award interest and attorney's fees; it did not even contain a computation of the interest due or, at the very least, the law of California on the
imposition of interest.

By Resolution[44] dated March 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied the parties' respective motions for partial reconsideration.[45]

The Present Petitions

In G.R. No. 238041,[46] Mitich, et al. seek to restore the deleted award of interest and attorney's fees. They claim to have proven that California law imposes ten percent (10%) interest per

annum on judgment awards based on deposition transcripts and authenticated copies of the California Code of Civil Procedure. At any rate, post-judgment interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from judicial demand should be applied in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption. It is simply inequitable to deny Mitich, et al. twenty (20) years of post-judgment

interest considering the dilatory tactics of Mercantile.

As for their claim for attorney's fees, they assert that it is simply erroneous to require the Default Judgment to contain an award for attorney's fees locally incurred in Civil Case No. 98-88259.
They are entitled to the award as they were forced to litigate here in the Philippines to enforce the Default Judgment.

In its Comment[47] dated September 21, 2018, Mercantile defends the dispositions of the Court of Appeals relative to the deletion of the award of interest and attorney's fees.

In G.R. No. 238502[48] though, Mercantile harps anew on its theory that the California Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person. It insists that Mitich, et al. failed to discharge the burden
of proving the pertinent foreign law applicable to the service of summons, thus, the doctrine of processual presumption should apply. Following Section 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[49] on service of summons upon foreign corporations, the California Court should have served summons on the resident agent of Mercantile in the USA.

More, the handwritten entry "1992" is a material discrepancy that renders doubtful the foreign judgment itself. Petitioners, therefore, failed to establish the authenticity of the foreign judgment.

In its Comment,[50] Mitich, et al. defend the rulings of the Court of Appeals and assert that Mercantile failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Default Judgment was invalid.

Core Issues

1. Have Mitich, et al. successfully established the authenticity of the Default Judgment?

2. Was the Default Judgment rendered void by the alleged improper service of summons on Mercantile?
3. Are Mitich, et al. entitled to interest and attorney's fees?

Our Ruling

The courts below did not err in ordering the enforcement of the Default Judgment
rendered by the California Court

Under Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties involved,
viz.:

Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to the thing, and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)

But before the presumption may be invoked, the party seeking the enforcement of the foreign judgment must first prove it as a fact. This, in turn, demands compliance with Sections 24 and 25,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence prior to its amendment, viz.:

Section 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication

thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or

consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)

Verily, the fact of foreign judgment may be proved through: (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in that country and authenticated by the seal of office.
[51]

Here, Mitich, et al. presented the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 [52] before the trial court, together with a Certification dated August 3, 1994 [53] of Kenneth E. Martone, Clerk of the San
Diego Superior Court who has custody of the seal and all records pertaining to cases of that court, to the effect that the Default Judgment had been entered in his record last July 22, 1994, as
attested to by James R. Milliken, Judge of the San Diego Superior Court. These documents were authenticated by Consul Antonio S. Curameng of our Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles,
State of California, USA through Authentication dated August 9, 1994.[54] Certainly, Mitich, et al. complied with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence.

Mercantile nevertheless questions the authenticity of the Default Judgment since there was an error in the handwritten date "1992" which should have been "1994" – a material discrepancy that
allegedly renders doubtful the foreign judgment itself.

We are unconvinced.

Since Mitich, et al. have proven the existence and authenticity of the Default Judgement in accordance with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence, the Default Judgment
already enjoys presumptive validity. The burden has therefore shifted to Mercantile to prove otherwise. But instead of presenting preponderant evidence [55] against the authenticity of the
Default Judgment, Mercantile simply indulged in conjectures.

At any rate, the trial court and Court of Appeals uniformly ruled that the handwritten year "1992" was a mere clerical error. Indeed, it is settled that when the factual findings of the trial court are
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, said facts are final and conclusive on the Court unless the same are not supported by the evidence on record. The Court will not assess all over again the
evidence adduced by the parties, particularly whereas in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[56]

As consistently found by the courts below, the handwritten date July 21, "1992" was a mere typographical error. Circumstances showed that the actual date of the Default Judgment was July 21,

1994: the complaint before the California Court was dated February 18, 1994 summonses on Mercantile were issued on February 18, 1994; Mitich requested for default judgment on May 24,
1994, May 27, 1994 and July 6, 1994; and the application for default judgment was heard by the California Court on July 18, 1994. The Default Judgment showed that the year "1992" was
erroneously written thereon; the rest of the Default Judgement specifically pointed to 1994 as the year when it was promulgated.

The California Court validly acquired jurisdiction over Mercantile

Mercantile invokes the final proviso of Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in its bid to repel the enforcement of the Default Judgment. It asserts that the California Court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over its person because it was not validly served summons, hence, the Default Judgment may not be enforced in this jurisdiction.

We do not agree.

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.[57] As found by the courts
below, the pertinent provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure state:[58]

§ 415.30 Service by mail; Articles mailed; Form of Notice; When service complete; Liability for Expense on failure to return acknowledgment; Approved form

(a) A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to
be served, together with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.

xxxx

§ 415.40 Service outside state; Completion of service

A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-

class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th days after such mailing.

§ 416.10 Service on corporation

A summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint by any of the following methods:

(a) To the person designated as agent for service of process as provided by any provision in Section 202, 1502, 2015, or 2107 of the Corporation Code x x x

Also relevant is § 1604, California Insurance Code, viz.:[59]

§ 1604 Stipulation for service on commissioner

Every foreign insurer, as a further condition precedent to admission and in consideration thereof, shall file with the commissioner an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities
of such insurer, in form and substance as follows:

The (giving name of insurer) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of the permission granted by the State of California to it to transact insurance business in this State, that if at any
time it leaves this State, ceases to transact business in this State or is without an agent for service of process in this State, then in any case where such agent could be served, service may be
made upon the Insurance Commissioner, and such service upon the commissioner shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the insurer.

When a foreign insurer, prior to the date this code takes effect, has filed with the commissioner an agreement for service upon him pursuant to the provisions of section 616 of the Political Code
as then in effect, such filing is a compliance with this section while such agreement remains in effect.
Here, Mitich, et al. presented three (3) modes by which Mercantile got served with summonses of the California Court:[60]

(a) on March 18, 1994, via certified mail, return receipt to Atty. Zosimo B. Namit of Mercantile Insurance Co., Mercantile Insurance Building, General Luna comer Beaterio Streets,
Intramuros, Manila with Proof of Service by Certified Mail/Return Requested dated May 23, 1994;[61]

(b) on April 11, 1994, by personal service on registered agent to Michael Bayless, Agent of Service for Mercantile under the insurance policy, with address at 45 Fremont St., 24th Floor,
San Francisco, California 94105, with Declaration of Service dated April 21, 1994;[62] and

(c) on April 20, 1994, again by personal service at the principal place of business in Manila of Mercantile, with address at General Luna corner Beaterio Streets, Intramuros, Manila with
Affidavit of Service dated April 25, 1994.[63] This was received by Caseres who represented herself as someone authorized to receive processes on Mercantile's behalf.

Despite valid services of summons on these three (3) occasions, however, Mercantile chose to ignore them and refused to appear or file any responsive pleading before the California Court.
Consequently, the California Court properly declared Mercantile in default and rendered the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 pursuant to Rule 3.110, (g) and (h), California Rules of Court.
[64]

Mercantile argues though that Mitich, et al. should have first established the rules on summons of California in the same way that the fact of a foreign judgment may be proved, that is, by
compliance with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence prior to amendment. Otherwise, the doctrine of processual presumption would apply and summons upon foreign
corporations under Section 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prior to amendment should have been observed.

The argument utterly lacks merit.

Mercantile had already raised the same arguments and tactics in Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. v. Yi.[65] There, Sara Yi (Yi) filed a personal injury action before the same Superior Court of

the State of California, County of San Diego, USA against FAM MART which was owned by Young C. Chun and Young H. Chun (Chuns) and insured by Mercantile. Pursuant to FAM MART's
insurance policy, Mercantile defended FAM MART in said personal injury action. Before the trial concluded, however, Mercantile withdrew its representation. Eventually, on November 2, 1993,

the California Court adjudged damages in the amount of USD$350,000.00 in favor of Yi. Thereafter, the Chuns and Yi filed a complaint for breach of insurance against Mercantile for
withdrawing its representation. As Mercantile never appeared despite summonses, a Default Judgment was rendered against it on September 22, 1995, in the amount of USD$1,552,664.67. Yi
then filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment before the Philippine courts. Mercantile opposed the petition, alleging it was not validly served summons by the California Court.

The Court nevertheless ruled in favor of Yi, noting that Yi sufficiently established valid service of summons on Mercantile, viz.:

In disputing the foreign judgment, MIC argues that there was want of notice to it as there was no proper service of summons in the trial before the California court.

On this note, we highlight that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum,
which is the State of California in this case. This Court is well aware that foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.

Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the records of the official acts of a sovereign authority may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by its
legal custodian, his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has a custody, in case the record is not kept in the Philippines. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

An exception to this rule, however, is recognized in the cases of Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, wherein we
emphatically ruled that the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of a foreign state, who quoted verbatim the applicable law and who stated that the same was in force at the
time the obligations were contracted, was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. In Manufacturers Hanover Trust, we stated that it is necessary to state the
specific law on which the claim was based.

In this case, Atty. Robert G. Dyer (Atty. Dyer), [a] member of the bar of the State of California for more than 30 years, testified as to the applicable law related to summons. In detail, he stated
the exact pertinent provision under the California Code of Civil Procedure, to wit:

Section 415.40. A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such

mailing.

Indeed, pursuant to the above-proven law in the State of California, the service of summons by mail to MIC, an entity outside its state, was valid. As such law was sufficiently alleged
and proven, it is beyond the province of this Court's authority to pass upon the issue as to the factual circumstances relating to the proper service of summons upon MIC in the case before the
State of California.[66] (Emphases added)

Verily, the Court has allowed the use of expert testimony in proving foreign law as well as compliance therewith. Indeed, Mr. Jay Ghoreichi's unrebutted and compelling testimony on the validity
of the methods by which Mercantile got summoned deserves full weight and credence.[67] We simply see no cogent reason to depart from our ruling in Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. v. Yi.

So must it be.

Mitich, et al. are not entitled to post-judgment interest

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Default Judgment should be enforced sans ten percent (10%) interest per annum because the computation of interest was supposedly not contained on the
fallo thereof, and for failure of Mitich, et al. to prove California's law on interest.

We agree.

The Default judgment does not contain the rate and manner by which the monetary award would earn interest. It simply states "with interest on such judgment as provided by law." But what is
this rate of interest? Is it computed per annum or compounded? The foreign judgment is silent on this matter. Surely, we cannot supply words, nay, vary the terms of the foreign judgment. As
held in BPI v. Guevara:[68]

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their

successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits

of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.[69] (Emphases and italics supplied)

Verily, Philippine courts cannot delve into the merits of the foreign judgment under a policy of limited review. In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to

substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.[70] Thus, we cannot simply impose post judgment interest here unless it was specifically and categorically awarded by
the California Court. In other words, the foreign court itself should have fixed the amount of legal interest taking all necessary factors into account, but did not. For sure, the Court cannot now
assume this task. We cannot substitute the discretion which should have been exercised by the California Court with our own.

In any case, it is a conflict of law policy that foreign law ordinarily applicable will not be applied if to do so would violate domestic public policy. In other words, the normal operation of foreign law
is subject to a public policy limitation. When a judge rejects the application of foreign law on public policy grounds, it is not that the foreign law does not seem so reasonable to the judge as his or
her own good homemade precedent, only that it violates some fundamental principle of justice, good morals, or some deep -rooted tradition of society. Relief may be refused at the forum state
because of disapproval of a particular cause of action on grounds of policy.[71]

Insofar as awards of interest are concerned, Philippine courts are flexible on the matter. The computation of interest is never mechanical. It always takes into account the surrounding
circumstances but is always guided by fairness and equity.[72]

There is no hard and fast rule in determining whether an interest rate is unconscionable. It "may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, but may be totally just and equitable in

another."[73]

Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc.,[74] opined that interest functions as a
replacement for the opportunity lost by the owner in profiting from his or her money, which could have been used in a remunerative investment. In this case, interest is the forbearance of money
and is called monetary or conventional interest. But interest also functions as a form of penalty or indemnity for damages. It may be stipulated by the parties as a consequence of delay, or it may
be imposed by the courts for breach of contract in accordance with Articles 2209, 2210, and 2212 of the Civil Code, thus:

ARTICLE 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.

ARTICLE 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.

ARTICLE 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.[75]

Interest which takes the form of damages for either delay or breach of contract is called compensatory interest. As with monetary interests, compensatory interests are subject to the
unconscionability standard under Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.

ARTICLE 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.[76]

Thus, in Ligutan v. Court of Appeals,[77] the Court has this to say:

The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be partly subjective and partly objective. Its resolution would depend on such factors as, but not necessarily confined
to, the type, extent and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences, the supervening realities, the standing and relationship of the parties, and
the like, the application of which, by and large, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, just an example, the Court has
tempered the penalty charges after taking into account the debtor's pitiful situation and its offer to settle the entire obligation with the creditor bank.[78] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Verily, if a penalty is so unconscionable that its enforcement constitutes a "repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property," the courts can strike it down for being invalid.[79]

Here, we find the award of ten percent (10%) legal interest per annum iniquitous and unconscionable considering that the California Court already awarded moral damages ( i.e., emotional
distress) of $250,000.00 and punitive damages of $500,000.00. This, by itself, is already almost triple the amount it owed Mitich ( i.e., $285,500.00) based on the latter's insurance policy. And if
we are to reinstate the 27 years' worth of interest awarded by the trial court, Mercantile's debt would balloon to $4,202,937.82. This amount is certainly shocking to the senses and would drive

Mercantile to bankruptcy. Post-judgment interests were never meant to drive a litigant to the ground, especially when the right to litigate and its exercise are allowed by law and rules. To award
the ten percent (10%) would wreak havoc to the financial solvency [80] of Mercantile and surely result in financial distress, or worse, insolvency proceedings, to the detriment of Mercantile's

insurance undertaking, creditors, and other obligations. The Court is simply not prepared to do that. Hence, the Court is disinclined to exacerbate the colossal financial burden on Mercantile.

Even then, we cannot simply ignore the fact that the California Court awarded "interest on such [Default Judgment] as provided by law." In view however, of the failure of the California Court to
specify the rate of interest and the manner of its accrual, compounded by the iniquitous result of applying the supposed prevailing rate of post-judgment interest in California, the Court deems it
just and equitable to award temperate damages of P500,000.00.

Mitich, et al. are entitled to attorney's fees

In Civil Case No. 98-88259,[81] Mitich, et al. prayed for attorney's fees of P200,000.00 and costs of suit. The trial court granted this relief, albeit the Court of Appeals disagreed on the supposed
ground that attorney's fees were not awarded in the Default Judgment.

We agree with the trial court.

Article 2208 of the Civil Code[82] provides that attorney's fees may be recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Applying this provision, Mercantile is liable for attorney's fees.

To be clear though, the basis for the award is not the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 per se, but the fact that Mitich, et al. were forced to litigate and hire counsel in the Philippines in
order to collect from Mercantile which refused to meet its defense and indemnity obligations for about thirty (30) years now. Hence, on this score, the award of attorney's fees of P200,000.00 is
justified. This amount shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.[83]

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated November 27, 2017 and Resolution dated March 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104238 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. is also REQUIRED to pay the ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH and JAMES L. KENNEDY, TRUSTEE OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH a.k.a. CHARLIE MITICH P500,000.00 as temperate damages and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees. This amount shall earn six percent (6%)
legal interest per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

[1] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 8-24.

[2] Id. at 25-29.

[3] Id. at 165-178.

[4] Id. at 135.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] The act in which one party places its defense and all costs associated with said defense with another due to a contract or other agreement.

[8] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 135-136.

[9] Id. at 137.

[10] Id. at 47-48.

[11] Id. at 158-160.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 160.

[14] On October 13, 1994, by personal service to Mercantile, with address at General Luna corner Beaterio Streets, Intramuros, Manila. G.R. No. 238041, see Affidavit of Service dated October
17, 1994, rollo, p. 163.

[15] G.R. No. 238041, rollo, p. 567, See also Affidavit of Service of Lauro M. Ferrer dated October 26, 1994, id. at 587-593.

[16] Id. at 568.

[17] Id. at 180-189.

[18] 416.10 - A summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint:

(a) To the person designated as agent for service of process as provided by any provision in Section 202, 1502, 2105 or 2107 of the Corporation Code (or Section 3101 to 3303, inclusive or
Section 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporation Code as in effect on Dec. 31, 1976 with respect to Corporation which they remain applicable);

(b) To the president or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary, or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the

corporation to receive service of process[;]

(c) If the corporation is a bank, to a cashier or assistant cashier or to a person specified in subdivision (a) or (b)[;] or

(d) When authorized by any provision in Section 1701, 1702, 2110, or 2111 of the Corporation Code (a Section 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Section 6500 to 6504, inclusive of the Corporation
Code as in effect on December 31, 1976 with respect to Corporation which they remain applicable), as provided by such provision. (Chapter 4, Title 5, Code of Civil Procedure of the State of
California), G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 182-183.

[19] Section 413.10 - Except as otherwise provided by the statute, a summons shall be served on a person:

(a) Within this state, as provided in this Chapter.

(b) Outside this state but within the United States, as provided in this Chapter or as prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served.

(c) Outside the United States, as provided in this Chapter or as directed by the Court in which the action is pending, or if the court before or after service finds that the service is reasonably
calculated to give actual notice, as prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served or as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory. These rules are subject to
the provisions of the Convention on the "Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents" in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention), (Chapter 4, Title 5, Code of Civil
Procedure of the State of California), id. at 182.

[20] Section 410.50 of the said Code on "Jurisdiction in Action" provides that,

Section 410.50(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the Court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him as provided by Chapter
4 (Commencing with Section 413.10). A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons to such party.

(b) Jurisdiction of the Court over the parties and the subject matter of an action continues throughout subsequent proceedings in the action, (Chapter 4, Title 5, Code of Civil Procedure of the
State of California) id.

[21] Rule 7, Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present

status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n) (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, As
Amended).

[22] Rule 132, Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (25a), (Revised Rules on Evidence, As Amended).

[23] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 191-197.

[24] See Madrona, Sr. v. Rosal, 281 Phil. 1, 8 (1991), citing Republic Bank v. Cuaderno, 125 Phil. 1076, 1083 (1967).

[25] G.R. No. 238041, rollo, pp. 191-197.

[26] Id. at 287-289.

[27] Id. at 291-292.

[28] Penned by Associate Justice (now Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice) Conchita Carpio Morales, concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Edgardo P. Cruz;
G.R. No. 238041, id. at 294-296.

[29] It is gathered that petitioner received a copy of the questioned first Order on March 26, 1999, ten days after which on April 5, 1999, it filed a motion for reconsideration.

On July 30, 1999, petitioner received a copy of the second assailed Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Following Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 of Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 of the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court which took effect on September 1, 1998,
since petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 10 days after notice of the first order, the 60-day period to file for certiorari was interrupted. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by

the court a quo, petitioner had remaining period, reckoned from notice of the order denying said motion, within which to file the petition for certiorari.

Since 10 days of the 60-day period to file petition had lapsed when petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, it had 50 days from July 30, 1999, when it received copy of the Order denying the
motion for reconsideration or up to September 18, 1999 to file the instant petition. As reflected above, however, it was filed On September 22, 1999, hence, it was 4 days late. G.R. No. 238041,
id. at 294-296.

[30] Id. at 298-301.

[31] Id. at 303.

[32] Id. at 305-309.

[33] Id. at 311-313.

[34] Id. at 315-319.

[35] Penned by Judge Ricardo G. Bernardo, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10; G.R. No. 238041, id. at 337-345.

[36] Id. at 402-411.

[37] Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

[38] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 427-428.

[39] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. II, rollo, pp. 647-661.

[40] Penned by Judge Virgilio M. Alameda, Regional Trial Court of Manila - Branch 10, id. at 698-703.

[41] Id.

[42] Id. at 702.

[43] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 8-24.

[44] Id. at 25-29.

[45] Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Petitioner), G.R. No. 238041, Vol II, rollo, pp. 842-856; Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Mercantile), id. at. 811-840.

[46] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 45-85.

[47] G.R. No. 238041, Vol II, rollo, pp. 1211-1240.

[48] G.R. No. 238502, rollo, pp. 11-41.

[49] Section 12. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel of the corporation wherever they may be found, or in
their absence or unavailability, on their secretaries.

If such service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing persons, it shall be made upon the person who customarily receives the correspondence for the defendant at its principal office.

In case the domestic juridical entity is under receivership or liquidation, service of summons shall be made on the receiver or liquidator, as the case may be.

Should there be a refusal on the part of the persons above-mentioned to receive summons despite at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be made electronically, if
allowed by the court, as provided under Section 6 of this rule. (11)

(Rule 14, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, As Amended).

[50] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. II, rollo, pp. 1127-1168.

[51] See Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, 642 Phil. 420, 433 (2010).

[52] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo pp. 158-160.

[53] Id. at 161.

[54] Id. at 157.

[55] See Riguer v. Atty. Mateo, 811 Phil. 538, 547 (2017).

[56] See Catan, et al. v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 273-274 (2017), citing BPI v. Leobrera, 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003).

[57] See St. Aviation Services v. Grand International Airways, 535 Phil. 757, 763 (2006), citing Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 203, 216 (1995), 241 SCRA 192;
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 13, 31 (2001).

[58] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 472-519.

[59] Id. at 472-545.

[60] Id. at 116.

[61] Id. at 117-120.

[62] Id. at 128-129.

[63] Id. at 131-132.

[64] Id. at 456-545.

[65] G.R. No. 234501, March 18, 2019.

[66] Id.
[67] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 456-545.

[68] 755 Phil. 434-466 (2015).

[69] Id. at 458-459.

[70] See Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., 712 Phil. 524, 554 (2013).

[71] Monrad G. Paulsen and Michel I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Columbia Law Review, November 1956.

[72] See Vitug v. Abuda, 776 Phil. 540, 569 (2016).

[73] Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 101, 126 (1998) [Per J. Melo, Second Division].

[74] G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019.

[75] REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386, AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPROVED ON JUNE 18, 1949.

[76] Id.

[77] 427 Phil. 42-55 (2002).

[78] Id. at 52.

[79] Ibarra v. Aveyro, 37 Phil. 273, 282 (1917) [Per J. Torres, First Division].

[80] Section 200- An insurance company doing business in the Philippines shall at all times maintain the minimum paid-up capital and net worth requirements as prescribed by the
Commissioner. Such solvency requirements shall be based on internationally accepted solvency frameworks and adopted only after due consultation with the insurance industry associations.
Whenever the aforementioned requirement be found to be less than that herein required to be maintained, the Commissioner shall forthwith direct the company to make good any such
deficiency by cash, to be contributed by all stockholders of record in proportion to their respective interests, and paid to the treasurer of the company, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order: Provided, That the company in the interim shall not be permitted to take any new risk of any kind or character unless and until it make good any such deficiency: Provided; further, That a
stockholder who aside from paying the contribution due from him, pays the contribution due from another stockholder by reason of the failure or refusal of the latter to do so, shall have a lien on

the certificates of stock of the insurance company concerned appearing in its books in the name of the defaulting stockholder on the date of default, as well as on any interests or dividends that
have accrued or will accrue to the said certificates of stock, until the corresponding payment or reimbursement is made by the defaulting stockholder. (Republic Act No. 10607, The Insurance

Code, Approved on August 15, 2013).

[81] G.R. No. 238041, Vol. I, rollo, pp. 165-178.

[82] Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

x x x x;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

x x x x.

[83] See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013).
 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

The ponencia affirms, with modification, the Decision dated November 27, 2017 and Resolution dated March 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and rules in favor of the bankruptcy estate of
Charles B. Mitich and its trustee, James L. Kennedy (Mitich, et al.). In sum, while the ponencia affirms the enforcement of the Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 (Default Judgment) of the
Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. (California Court) in Case No. 673936 and reinstates the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) award of Php200,000.00 as attorney's fees in favor of
Mitich, et al., it nevertheless rejects the RTC's award of post-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum and, in lieu thereof, awards temperate damages of Php500,000.00.[1]

I concur with the ponencia that the lower courts did not err in ordering the enforcement of the Default Judgment rendered by the California Court. [2] Indeed, Mitich, et al. have proven the
existence and authenticity of the Default Judgment and as such, said judgment enjoys presumptive validity which can only be overturned by preponderant evidence. [3] I likewise agree with the
ponencia's award of attorney's fees of Php200,000.00, as Mitich, et al. were clearly forced to litigate and to hire counsel in the Philippines in order to collect from Mercantile Insurance Company,
Inc. (Mercantile Insurance), which had refused to make good on its indemnity obligations for about 30 years.[4]

Nevertheless, I write this opinion to express my disagreement with the ponencia that Mitich, et al. are not entitled to post-judgment interest, and that the Court should simply award
Php500,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of such interest.

I expound.

First, it is clear from the Default Judgment, the existence and authenticity of which have been duly established, [5] that the California Court's monetary award includes legal interest. The decretal
portion of the Default Judgment reads, to wit:

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that James L. Kennedy, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Charles B. Mitich, shall have and recover judgment against defendant
Mercantile Insurance Company in the amount of $1,135,929.14, together with interest on such judgment as provided by law.[6]

Notwithstanding the clear import of the Default Judgment however, the ponencia proceeds with the following disquisition:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Default Judgment should be enforced sans ten percent (10%) interest per annum because the computation of interest was supposedly not contained [in] the
fallo thereof, and for failure of Mitich, et al. to prove California's law on interest.

We agree.

The Default [J]udgment does not contain the rate and manner by which the monetary award would earn interest. It simply states "with interest on such judgment as provided by law." But what is

this rate of interest? Is it computed per annum or compounded? The foreign judgment is silent on this matter. Surely, we cannot supply words, nay, vary the terms of the foreign judgment. As
held in [Bank of the Philippine Islands Securities Corporation] v. Guevara:[7]

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits
of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states. x x x[8]

Verily, Philippine courts cannot delve into the merits of the foreign judgment under a policy of limited review. In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. [9] Thus, we cannot simply impose post[-]judgment interest here unless it was specifically and categorically awarded by
the California Court. In other words, the foreign court itself should have fixed the amount of legal interest taking all necessary factors into account, but did not. For sure, the Court cannot now
assume this task. We cannot substitute the discretion which should have been exercised by the California Court with our own.[10]

The foregoing pronouncements in the ponencia suggest that the California Court's judgment imposing said interest is neither specific nor categorical, and imply, further, that the Court may not
award interest here without necessarily "delv[ing] into the merits of the foreign judgment."[11]

Respectfully, I disagree.

At the outset, it bears stressing that while the ponencia underscores that Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment, [12] it seems to nevertheless proceed to do just
that. It suggests that the "foreign court itself should have fixed the amount of legal interest taking all necessary factors into account, but did not[,]" [13] implying that a foreign judgment imposing
legal interest which does not follow such standard does not warrant enforcement by the Court. To my mind, this statement appears to be both tangential and, to an extent, antithetical to the
essence of an action for the recognition of a foreign judgment, in which the ponencia itself acknowledged that Philippine courts are "incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law."[14]

Moreover, the Default Judgment is by no means equivocal that the monetary award should earn interest. Even granting that the Default Judgment is "silent" on the specific rate and manner by

which the monetary award would earn interest,[15] it is nevertheless clear and categorical that the award of US$1,135,929.14 should earn interest, and further, that the rate and manner by
which the monetary award would earn interest that is "provided by law."

In other words, to enforce the Default Judgment to its fullest extent, it was simply incumbent upon Mitich, et al., to allege and prove not only the existence and authenticity of the Default
Judgment, as they did,[16] but also the provisions of the "applicable law" referred to in the Default Judgment, i.e., the California law providing for the rate and manner by which the monetary
award would earn interest. After all, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. [17] As such, like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.[18]

Proceeding from the foregoing, I concur with the majority that post-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum may not be awarded by the Court, but not because the
California Court failed to specify the "rate and manner by which the monetary award would earn interest;" rather, it may not be awarded in this case simply because of the failure of
Mitich, et al. to prove California's law imposing such rate of interest.[19]

On this score, I respectfully disagree with the ponencia's conclusion that the Court cannot impose post-judgment interest for the Default Judgment's failure to "specifically and categorically"
award such interest. On the contrary, the Default Judgment is clear and express that Mitich, et al. are entitled to legal interest "as provided by law." Hence, in order for the Court to
enforce the Default Judgment in full without unnecessarily delving into its merits, the Court should award, in addition to the California Court's monetary award of US$1,135,929.14, legal interest
under Philippine law, following the doctrine of processual presumption.

In this regard, the doctrine of processual presumption has been explained in this wise:

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the noncompliance therewith.[20]

Here, it is clear that the Default Judgment imposes interest "as provided by law" [21] although Mitich, et al. failed to prove California's law on interest.[22] As such, applying the doctrine of
processual presumption, California's law on the imposition of legal interest shall be presumed to be the same as Philippine law, [23] which, at present, is governed by the Court's ruling in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[24] (Eastern Shipping Lines), as modified in its subsequent ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames[25] (Nacar).

In the same vein, I find the award of temperate damages of Php500,000.00 in lieu of post-judgment interest unwarranted in this case, as the Court may simply award legal interest based not on
California law, but on Philippine law.

Here, the ponencia awards temperate damages of Php500,000.00 in lieu of post-judgment interest not only "[i]n view x x x of the failure of the California Court to specify the rate of interest and
the manner of its accrual,"[26] which I have addressed above, but also because of "the iniquitous result of applying the supposed prevailing rate of post-judgment interest in California." [27] The
ponencia reasons in this regard that:

Here, we find the award of ten percent (10%) legal interest per annum iniquitous and unconscionable considering that the California Court already awarded moral damages ( i.e., emotional

distress) of $250,000.00 and punitive damages of $500,000.00. This, by itself is already almost triple the amount it owed Mitich ( i.e., $285,500.00) based on the latter's insurance policy. And if
we are to reinstate the 27 years' worth of interest awarded by the trial court, Mercantile's debt would balloon to $4,202,937.82. This amount is certainly shocking to the senses and would drive
Mercantile to bankruptcy. Post-judgment interests were never meant to drive a litigant to the ground, especially when the right to litigate and its exercise are allowed by law and rules. To award
the ten percent (10%) would wreak havoc to the financial solvency of Mercantile and surely result in financial distress, or worse, insolvency proceedings, to the detriment of Mercantile's
insurance undertaking, creditors, and other obligations. The Court is simply not prepared to do that. Hence, the Court is disinclined to exacerbate the colossal financial burden on Mercantile.[28]

Again, I respectfully disagree.

For one, the foregoing discussion is founded on the premise that the "supposed prevailing rate of post-judgment interest in California" [29] of ten percent (10%) per annum has been duly proved
by Mitich, et al. In fact, the ponencia already attempts to painstakingly demonstrate why the imposition of post-judgment interest of ten percent (10%) per annum is "unconscionable[,] x x x
shocking to the senses and would drive Mercantile to bankruptcy." [30] Yet, the CA already made a definitive finding that Mitich, et al. failed to prove California's law on interest in the first place.
[31] In other words, the foregoing discourse should not even be relevant in this case, in view of the express finding that Mitich, et al. actually failed to prove California's law on interest.[32]

For another, the amount and manner by which legal interest is to run can easily be ascertained by the Court. It is well-settled that temperate damages may only be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with a reasonable degree of certainty. [33] Such, however, is not the case here,

considering that the Court, as discussed above, may easily impose legal interest by simply applying Philippine law under the doctrine of processual presumption. Undoubtedly, there is, in this
case, no uncertainty to speak of, as the Supreme Court, in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar already provided the "rules of thumb for future guidance"[34] by "la[ying] down the guidelines
regarding the manner of computing legal interest."[35]

Squarely on point is the Court's ruling in Bank of the Philippine Islands Securities Corporation v. Guevara[36] (Guevara), which is, in fact, relied upon by the ponencia.[37] In the said case,
therein respondent sought to enforce a judgment rendered by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston which awarded in respondent's favor the sum of US$49,450.00.
[38] On the other hand, while therein petitioner did not dispute the fact of said foreign judgment, it nevertheless opposed its enforcement and prayed that the Court look into the merits of the
same.

Since the fact of the foreign judgment was established, the Court refused, in Guevara, to "review and pronounce its own judgment" on the merits of the said foreign judgment, and ultimately,
ruled in favor of respondent. Notably, the Court ordered the payment to respondent of "the sum of US$49,450.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso, with interest at six percent (6%) per
annum from the filing of the case before the trial court on May 28, 1992 until fully paid[,]"[39] following the guidelines on interest in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar.

Interestingly enough, while the ponencia banks on Guevara to emphasize the "rule on limited review" of foreign judgments to reject the RTC's earlier award of post-judgment interest in the
amount of ten percent (10%) per annum, it nevertheless glosses over how the Court in Guevara actually applied Philippine law to award legal interest counted from May 28, 1992, or around 23
years' worth of legal interest.[40] Notably, the Court, in Guevara, applied the guidelines on the imposition of legal interest in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar in enforcing a foreign judgment
which granted a monetary award, despite said judgment not having specifically fixed the "rate and manner by which the monetary award would earn interest" [41] — contrary to what the

ponencia seeks to require in this case.[42]

Moreover, to precipitously award, in lieu of legal interest, temperate damages of Php500,000.00 without any factual basis would be to shortchange Mitich, et al. Indeed, as aptly pointed out by

Mitich, et al., it would simply be "inequitable to deny [them] twenty (20) years of post-judgment interest," [43] especially in light of the "dilatory tactics" employed by Mercantile Insurance [44] and
its refusal to meet its indemnity obligations for about 30 years.[45]

To this end, rather than to award temperate damages, I submit that the Court should instead impose, as in Guevara, legal interest on the monetary award based on Philippine law. Hence,
following the guidelines in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar, the sum of US$1,135,929.14, or Php42,710,935.66 should earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from judicial demand,
or from April 7, 1998,[46] until full payment. Meanwhile, the award of Php200,000.00 as attorney's fees shall likewise earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of
the Court's Decision until full payment.

In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the instant Petition and to reinstate the RTC's award of Php200,000.00 as attorney's fees. However, rather than award temperate damages, I maintain
that the sum of US$1,135,929.14 or Php42,710,935.66 awarded by the Default Judgment should likewise earn legal interest. Following the guidelines in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar, said

amount should earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from judicial demand, or from April 7, 1998, until full payment.

[1] Ponencia, pp. 3, 20-22.

[2] Id. at 12-14.