SANDERS vs.
VERIDIANO II [162 SCRA 88]
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA).
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Respondent Rossi is an
American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, as so was private respondent
Wyer, who died two years ago. They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA.
Respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time
to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance
proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of
Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the
proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report and
asked for the rejection of the recommendation. The letter contained the statements that:
a) “Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;”
b) “Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;” and
c) “even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, they placed
the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear.”
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter coming from Moreau as the commanding
general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent’s employment status and requesting concurrence
therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. “by
direction,” presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance
of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the petitioners.
The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings
was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
Respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. However, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties and the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts
for which the respondents have sued them for damages.
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
RULING:
1. Yes. The acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand
in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not
disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other
petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in
the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer’s
criticism — in effect a direct attack against him — that Special Services was practicing “an
autocratic form of supervision.”
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for
concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents’ type of employment even before the
grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its
timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior
of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services
department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the
private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
The petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted
on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can
proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award
will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United
States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
2. No. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against
them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve
only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately. President Aquino’s
speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
The private respondents must, if they are still so minded, pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and
under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws
are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our
courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim.
NB: The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that “there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.” In the case of
foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which
wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would
“unduly vex the peace of nations.” Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article
II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land.”
CASE DIGEST: Sanders vs. Veridiano II
Sanders vs. Veridiano II
No. L-46930 | 1988, June 10
Petitioner: Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, jr.
Respondent: Hon. Regino, Veridiano II (presiding Judge, CFI Zambales, Olongapo)
Anthony M. Rossi and Ralph L. Wyers
CRUZ, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic
Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private respondents were American citizens
with permanent address in the Phil and were both game room attendants of the
NAVSTA.
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Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed from
permanent full time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of
Defense then was gave a recommendation for their reinstatement. The controversy of
the case was when Sanders sent a letter to Moreau that he disagrees with the
recommendation. Because of the letters private respondents filed a case with CFI of
Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous content and has caused
them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.
The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion to
lift the default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to
dismiss which was subsequently denied by the respondent court.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
2. Wether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private
capacities when they did the acts where they are sued for damages.
Ratio:
1. Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge of
their official duties, the petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials of
USA. If the trial will proceed damages will not be on the petitioner’s
personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA government.
thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued
for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment
that may be rendered against them
2. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are sued by are acts in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA had
supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and
employment. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write
the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the
private respondent’s type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced.
Decision/ Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8, 1977,
August 9, 1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is
directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of
September 26, 1977, I made PERMANENT. No costs SO ORDERED.
Sanders v. Veridiano GR L-46930 (June10, 1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau
was thecommanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American
citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were
both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer
recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers
and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were
under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where
others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief
of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So,
private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and
that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and
proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them
under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that
the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of
the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because
they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is
that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in
his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public
officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere
invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an
act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-
settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the
person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex
the peace of nations."
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution,
where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED.
