NOVEMBER 2022

THE EU STRATEGIC COMPASS AND TÜRKİYE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY IN DEFENCE COOPERATION

The long-awaited “Strategic Compass” (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a
European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace
and security”)document was formally approved by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2022
and endorsed by the European Council at the end of March. The Strategic Compass aims to steer the
course of EU’s security and defence polices in the next five to ten years

European security architecture is undergoing a profound transformation due to Russia’s war on

Unlike its predecessors, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the
Strategic Compass is not just a strategy document, but also a guide for action with timetables and
concrete deliverables.

the document includes a detailed action plan consisting of more than fifty actions to be fulfilled over
the next five years

A major novelty regarding the Strategic Compass has to do with the fact that it includes the first-ever
EU-wide threat assessment which is regarded as a significant step on the path to a common strategic
culture.

Four Pillars of the Strategic Compass

the Strategic Compass aims to boost the EU’s role as a security provider and to equip it with the
ability to think and act strategically building on the following four pillars: Act, Secure, Invest, Partner.

the Strategic Compass proposes the creation of an “EU Rapid Deployment Capacity” consisting of
5,000 troops by 2025, which is the most striking initiative in the document. This force is an evolution
of the EU Battlegroups consisting of 1,500 troops which despite reaching full operational readiness in
2007 have never been deployed mainly due to lack of political will.

the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity will be modular and consist of air, land and maritime components
to be deployed in different operational scenarios. The incorporation of strategic enablers is another
novelty for this flexible, modular force which will increase its readiness through EU-wide regular live
exercises.

Moreover, in order to bolster the EU’s ability to act in the face of crises, the document underlines the
necessity to reinforce Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations through
a more rapid and flexible decision-making process. This implies mobilising the Treaty provisions
providing for flexibility and differentiated integration in CSDP such as forming ad hoc “coalitions of
the willing” and the use of “constructive abstention” enshrined in Articles 44 and 31 of the Lisbon
Treaty. Increasing financial solidarity, military mobility and developing the capacity to station 200
fully equipped civilian experts in conflict areas within 30 days by mid-2023 form the other actions
foreseen under this pillar.
Under the second pillar, which focuses on improving the EU’s ability to deter and respond to the
rapidly evolving nature of threats, the document concentrates on boosting the EU’s ability in
countering hybrid and cyber threats. To this end, various “toolboxes” combining different
instruments in a more coordinated manner are to be developed.

Based on the understanding that EU’s collective ambition to become a more robust security provider
should be matched with adequate resources, the Strategic Compass includes a pledge by Member
States to substantially increase their defence spending and invest more in disruptive technologies,
under the third pillar.

EU’s recent defence initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the
European Defence Fund (EDF) have become more important than ever. The Strategic Compass puts
forward proposals such as VAT exemption and a bonus system to encourage joint capability
development and joint procurement to encourage making full use of these instruments.

Finally, the fourth pillar focuses on strengthening cooperation with long-standing strategic partners
such as NATO, UN and regional organisations including the OSCE and ASEAN as well as developing
tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners such as the US, the
UK and Norway. Establishing tailored partnerships with Western Balkan countries as well as
southern and eastern neighbours through enhanced dialogue and promoting participation in CSDP
missions is described as another priority in this regard.

The Strategic Compass and Türkiye

The document’s position on Türkiye highlights the dichotomy between the short-term interests of
certain Member States and the collective interests of the EU in the EU's effort to set a long-term
strategic vision. Given Türkiye’s status as an EU candidate country and a key NATO Ally and the
significant role Ankara has been playing as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, the way the
document refers to Türkiye is quite problematic and difficult to comprehend.

Türkiye is mentioned in two sections in the Strategic Compass, firstly in a rather negative light in the
context of the Eastern Mediterranean where the strategic environment in the “Euro-Mediterranean”
region is analysed and secondly in the section on bilateral partnerships as a cooperation partner with
long-standing contributions to CSDP missions and operations.

In the former section, the Strategic Compass makes the following observations concerning the
security environment in the Eastern Mediterranean:

“Finally, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain, due to provocations and unilateral actions
against EU Member States and violations of sovereign rights in breach of international law, as well as
the instrumentalisation of irregular migration, and have the potential to escalate quickly; ensuring a
stable and secure environment as well as a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship, in line
with the principle of good neighbourly relations, is in the interest of both the EU and Turkey.

The language adopted in this section reflects the claims and the position of Greece and the Greek
Cypriot Administration and points the finger at Ankara for the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Since the presentation of the first draft of the Strategic Compass in November 2021, there were
reports that two countries (i.e. Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus) had
been engaged in heavy lobbying for Türkiye to be explicitly portrayed as a threat in the section
describing the challenges to EU’s security

In the section on partnerships, the document expresses the EU’s aspiration to deepen its bilateral
partnership with like-minded countries sharing its core values namely the US, the UK, Norway,
Canada and Japan. Although the document mentions Türkiye later in this section, the fact that
Türkiye is not categorised among this first group of countries which are depicted as EU’s preferred
strategic partners, raises fundamental questions regarding the way in which Türkiye is viewed by
Brussels.

In yet another omission, the document makes no mention of Türkiye’s status as an accession
candidate, nor of its position as a long-standing NATO Ally with invaluable contributions to Euro-
Atlantic security. The kind of partnership the EU would like to develop with Türkiye is defined in the
Strategic Compass as follows:

“With Turkey, a contributor to CSDP missions and operations, we will continue to cooperate in areas
of common interest. We remain committed to developing a mutually beneficial partnership, but this
requires equal commitment on Turkey’s side to advance on a path of cooperation, sustained de-
escalation and to address EU concerns, in accordance with the statement of the members of the
European Council of 25 March 2021.”

While underlining the EU’s determination to build a partnership with Türkiye based on mutual
benefits, the Strategic Compass signals that from the EU’s perspective this would ultimately depend
on Ankara’s performance in easing the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and addressing the EU’s
concerns in this regard. Maintaining its distorted portrayal of Türkiye as the party responsible for the
tension in the Eastern Mediterranean in this section, the document reconfirms that the nature of the
EU’s engagement with Ankara would be conditional upon its ability to defuse the tension in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the reference to the European Council Statement of 25 March
2021 makes a nod to the “phased, proportional and reversible” approach to guide EU’s future
engagement with Türkiye in areas of common interest.

The Strategic Compass and the View from Ankara

Unsurprisingly, the fact that the section on the Eastern Mediterranean was written with a language
reflecting Greek and Greek Cypriot claims, has triggered strong criticism from Ankara. The Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued on 22 March 2022, noted that this section “seems
to have been dictated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot duo who have maximalist maritime boundary
claims at the expense and persistent denial of the rights of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots

the statement warned that the approach evident in the document risked making the EU part of the
problem rather than the solution in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Given the Strategic Compass’ failure to point the right direction, the Turkish Foreign Ministry went on
to say that in its current form, the document could be perceived neither as a “compass” nor as
“strategic.”

Finally, referring to the document’s failure to acknowledge the critical role Ankara has assumed as a
mediator between Moscow and Kyiv in the context of the Ukraine crisis, “Taking into account the
latest developments, it is unfortunate and non-visionary for the EU that the document misses the
truth and reality and sees a candidate country and a NATO Ally from such a shallow perspective”, the
statement noted

the Strategic Compass could have been a gamechanger by bolstering Türkiye-EU cooperation in the
security domain at an overly critical time when war has returned to Europe. Not only could it
present concrete opportunities for revitalising Türkiye-EU relations which would ultimately
contribute to the deepening of NATO-EU cooperation – one of the stated objectives of the
Strategic Compass, but it could also reinforce the EU’s global actorness. In its present form
however, the document represents a missed opportunity in all these respects.

Türkiye’s progress in meeting the accession criteria noted that the foreign policy priorities of the two
actors continued to collide over the past year, citing Türkiye’s military operations in Iraq and Syria
and Ankara’s failure to align with the EU sanctions regime targeting Russia

The fact that Türkiye’s lack of alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia is viewed in
a critical light whereas its mediation efforts and particularly its crucial role in brokering the landmark
grain corridor deal between Moscow and Kyiv are hailed presents a contradiction on the part of the
EU

Pursuing a balanced course between the West and Russia, has enabled Ankara to maintain
channels of communication between the parties open

Despite its vast potential, Türkiye’s prospective participation in PESCO projects has been another
area which has suffered from vetoes. The Greek and Greek Cypriot duo plus Austria have voiced
opposition to Türkiye’s request to take part in PESCO projects.

In May 2021, Türkiye had formally applied to be included in the Dutch-led Military Mobility project
under PESCO, which aims at easing and standardising the procedures for crossborder mobility of
military personnel and equipment and is thus seen vital for EU-NATO cooperation.

The US, Canada and Norway were the first non-EU countries which received a green light to join the
project in May 2021. Earlier this month, despite initial reluctance towards PESCO, the UK became the
latest third country invited to join the Military Mobility project.

It is important to note that Türkiye’s involvement in PESCO was also among the key points
addressed in the 10-point Trilateral Memorandum enabling Ankara to lift its veto on the NATO bids
of Sweden and Finland. Under the Memorandum, Helsinki and Stockholm committed “to support
the fullest possible involvement of Türkiye and other non-EU Allies in the existing and prospective
initiatives of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy, including Türkiye’s
participation in the PESCO Project on Military Mobility.”

Conclusion

Both Türkiye and the EU have a lot to gain from closer cooperation in the security and defence
domain, a fact further accentuated by the changing geopolitical environment and threat perceptions
in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. Although the Russia-Ukraine war is described as a watershed
moment which has triggered the EU’s geopolitical awakening, the EU has so far been missing out on
the chance to capitalize on its relations with Türkiye.

For this to happen, rather than bowing to pressure from Greece and the Greek Cypriot
Administration and allowing bilateral disputes determine the level of EU cooperation with Ankara in
the security and defence domains, the EU should embrace a balanced and nuanced approach vis-à-
vis Türkiye.

It should be taken into consideration that Türkiye is a key player in the European security scene
and also a candidate to join the EU. The EU lacks a deep understanding of Turkey’s interests and
viewpoint in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean regions. A more balanced and nuanced
approach to the Cyprus and Aegean issues could also step up the EU’s role in the region as an
honest broker and security provider. Finally, the EU should invest energy in overcoming the
obstacles to Ankara’s participation in PESCO projects as Türkiye could provide substantial added
value to these and contribute significantly to the EU’s emergence as a geopolitical actor.

JULY 2022

EU GLOBAL GATEWAY AND TÜRKİYE’S KEY ROLE

In December 2021, the European Commission unveiled its 300 billion euros Global Gateway strategy
to support the development of physical and digital infrastructure worldwide and to challenge China’s
influence in the Balkan region, Africa, and Asia.

the main impacts of the pandemic, have underlined the importance of infrastructure and
connectivity.

For instance, China has made large-scale investments in transportation projects in Asia and Africa. It
realizes these investments as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a roof design. China, which
is purchasing most of the transport infrastructure even in Europe, seems to be ready for this
transformation and open-ended evolution of the world. In the face of these changes and
developments, the EU needs to strengthen its influence in world trade, in the meanwhile defending
its values and interests while building this capability.
The Importance of Integrated Infrastructure and Connectivity: Impacts on Growth, Production, and
Trade

Connectivity has become one of the most important trends of the 21st century and is high on the
policy agenda of many countries. There are also numerous initiatives to improve infrastructures to
meet the growing demand for transport, energy, and telecommunications networks that span across
the globe and to enhance economic, political, and social interaction

Connectivity is one of the most defining characteristics of the modern economy since it expresses the
interdependence of multiple economies. Connectivity is therefore largely about increasing
interaction, productivity, competition, and market opportunities between cities. Infrastructure
connectivity within and between countries is crucial in terms of serving economic growth, increasing
supply chain efficiency, and ensuring resilience

Based on the data obtained, according to GDP forecasts for the year 2060, the US and the EU will
remain far behind China, even though their GDP ratios will increase (Similarly, Türkiye is far behind
three actors.)

the Belt and Road Initiative, it has connected countries to itself by improving the broken buttons of
connectivity by enabling them to increase their infrastructure investments.

In an environment of such competition between these actors, the cost of not investing in
infrastructure and ultimately connectivity for the EU was growing day by day. It can be argued that
the EU was late in declaring the Global Gateway

EU Global Gateway: Brussels Acts Against China

In response to the growing strategic importance of connectivity, for the first time in July 2021, the
Council of the EU requested the European Commission and the High Representative to initiate an EU
global connectivity strategy. The Council’s decision emphasized that ensuring a strategic approach to
connectivity is fundamental for economic growth, security, and resilience within and outside the EU.
The decision of the Council of the EU paved the way for a new "geostrategic and global EU approach
to connectivity".

Following the Council's decisions, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented
the EU's new Global Gateway plan in the State of the Union Address on September 15, 2022.

Von der Leyen stressed that the EU will be a reliable partner worldwide with its connectivity
strategy; it will adopt a ‘values-based and transparent’ approach to create connections, not
dependencies. Although von der Leyen did not address China's infrastructure investments, experts
have interpreted the EU’s Global Gate strategy as an EU response to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative.

The Global Gateway initiative, designed for a "new era of hyper-competitiveness”, was presented in
its final form on 1 December. The program envisages a €300 billion budget for infrastructure, digital,
health, energy transition, education, and research projects globally by 2027 to improve Europe's
supply chains and global infrastructure, strengthen transport and energy networks, boost EU trade,
support the green and digital transition and help to fight the climate change

In the details of the Global Gateway, the strategy focuses on connecting infrastructure, global
products, people, and services. First, it envisages investing in fibre optic cables, satellite
communications and cloud infrastructure between countries and building a secure internet network
for the development of global cooperation in the digital field, such as digital infrastructure, data
sharing and artificial intelligence-specific technologies. With the scope of the initiative, for example,
the EU intends to extend its 35,000 km highspeed fibre optic network to Latin America.

Secondly, it is planned to support the transition to renewable energy and to increase renewable
hydrogen production with its partners under the umbrella of Global Gateway. Through this
initiative, the EU is committing 2.4 billion euros to Sub-Saharan Africa and 1 billion euros to North
Africa to increase renewable energy production and energy efficiency.

Thirdly, the EU plans to invest in transport infrastructure - railways, roads, ports, harbours, airports,
and border crossings - in developing countries. Thus, the EU aims to diversify its supply chains,
especially due to the supply crisis it experienced during the pandemic. In addition, with the supply
routes to be created by the EU, it is planned to challenge China's "China-Europe Express Railway"
project, which reduces the delivery time from China to Europe to 15 days.

The Global Gateway's transport-based objectives will also have a significant impact on Türkiye. To
expand the Trans-European Network, 9 billion euros are planned to grant for the region between
the Western Balkans and Türkiye. The initiative also announced an additional 4.6 billion euros in
support, including linking North African countries to the Union with the establishment of a trans-
Mediterranean network.

Fourth, as a response to pandemics like COVID-19, the initiative aims to strengthen countries' local
vaccine production capacities and to help diversify pharmaceutical supply chains, but the initiative
does not provide a specific financial target for this objective.

Finally, in the field of education and research, it is also envisaged to invest in education, including the
global expansion of online education/learning in case of a pandemic

Together with these five areas, the Global Gateway aims to bring countries, societies, and people
closer together. However, the feasibility of the project regarding Global Gateway will depend on the
EU values and international rules, such as democracy, rule of law and human rights.

According to statement made by the European Commission, the initiative will be financed by €135
billion in grants (plus an additional €18 billion) and €145 billion in investments from the Member
States, national development banks, the private sector and EU financing institutions, including the
European Fund for Sustainable Development+ (EFSD+), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Commission also stated that it will
create a new credit facility to improve the competitiveness of the European companies trading in
markets outside the EU.
In conclusion, the implementation of the Global Gateway is expected to make a strategic
contribution to the European continent, especially through investments in sustainable connectivity
and quality infrastructure. Some of these benefits are

• enhancing EU interests and competitiveness worldwide,

• contribute to the diversification of value chains,

• reducing strategic dependencies, including on critical raw materials,

• effective in building a secure, flexible, and human-centred digital ecosystem

• it also makes Europe more active as a global player and is an alternative to the Belt and Road
Initiative.

An Alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative?

BRI, which aims to connect Asia to Africa and Europe by sea and land, seeks to create trade links by
investing in infrastructure such as roads, ports, rail and railway tunnels, bridges, airports, dams, coal-
fired power plants. With the BRI, China has expanded its political and economic influence
significantly and spread its reach across the globe with the implementation of high-budget loans and
investments. Most importantly, however, this strategy has become the main tenet of China's foreign
policy

With all these infrastructure and transport investments, China appears as an immensely influential
actor in Asia, Indo-Pacific, Africa, Europe-Eastern Europe, and Western Balkans.

Commission President von der Leyen's statement on transparency and commitment to values, EU
standards and rules while introducing the Global Gateway strategy is very important in terms of
signalling that the EU’s project will be different from China's initiative.

The announcement of the Global Gateway clearly shows the EU's growing discomfort with China's
assertive foreign policy and its rising influence in European countries.

However, the EU plans to make a difference by choosing, as always, a European way of dealing with
the BRI. This European way is intended to be an alternative to the BRI based on the following points:

• green infrastructure investment globally,

• economic recovery, at the heart of a sustainable growth model

• transparency, equal opportunities, anti-corruption, and affirmation of human rights in public

First of all, it seems difficult for countries that are willing to benefit from Global Gateway projects and
investments to participate in the initiative, as opposed to the more pragmatic and feasible BRI. This is
because it is obligatory to meet the European standards for participation in the initiative, especially
for African countries. Secondly, China offers a model of rapid economic growth and industrialization
in a relatively short period time. It can therefore have more influence in less developed countries
rather than the EU. China also benefits from anti-Western narratives, and this enables it to find a
fertile ground in Africa and Asia. Third, the Global Gateway strategy is unlikely to offer a significant
alternative unless it is coordinated with other infrastructure initiatives.

Considering these three possibilities, it can be claimed that the Global Gateway can be seen as an
important step towards breaking the cycle of continued dependence on the BRI by countries in need
of infrastructure investment, building mutually beneficial relations with the EU, and a true
partnership.

EU Global Gateway and Türkiye: Strong Support from Business Community

Türkiye is one of the countries that closely follow the developments and statements regarding the
strategy because the initiative aims to expand The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) in the
Western Balkans and Türkiye. Although politicians or decision-makers in Türkiye have not yet made
any statement or official assessment of the initiative, it seems that Turkish non-governmental
organizations and the business community are quite excited.

The representatives of the NGOs met in Brussels, the heart of the EU, hosted by the Permanent
Representation of Türkiye to the EU. They issued a declaration titled “EU Global Gateway for the
Solution of the EU-Asia Trade Bottlenecks”. They stated in this declaration that 4.6 billion euros
would be given to investment projects within the scope of the initiative, and this was an opportunity
to strengthen the logistics links between Türkiye and the EU. Noting that Türkiye is the most
convenient and safest route for the EU to reach the Central Asian markets, representatives also
underlined the support given by the business community in Türkiye to the initiative. At this point, it
should be pointed out that Türkiye should be a part of the projects within the scope of the EU Global
Gateway. This brings many mutual interests for both Türkiye and the EU

• The inclusion of Türkiye in the projects will further strengthen the economic cooperation between
the two actors and will enable EU countries to benefit from Türkiye’s increasing export capacity.

• Türkiye will also become a hub country in road transportation as well as energy, and its relations
with the EU will gain a much more strategic perspective.

• It will ensure that the supply chain problem of the EU, which has still been experiencing disruptions
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, is resolved.

• It will contribute to the improvement of Türkiye’s deteriorated image in Europe.

• It will make it easier for the EU to reach distant geographies and Türkiye’s current infrastructure
will greatly reduce the cost of this transportation.
The cooperation of the two actors within the scope of the Global Gateway is very significant in terms
of maintaining and protecting these economic achievements. It is stated that the Global Gateway,
which is expected to reach 300 billion euros by 2027, will be devoted to improving the infrastructure
in areas such as digitalization, transportation, energy, and health. The fact that Türkiye’s involvement
in these investments will enable the economic relations to reach a new level and bring the bilateral
trade volume to easily exceed 200 billion $.

Türkiye can become a hub country in transportation as well as energy and its relations with the EU
can improve. Being in a strategic position in terms of energy transmission routes, Türkiye has similar
importance in terms of road transportation and connectivity. However, delays and long waiting
times, especially at the Bulgarian border, negatively affect trade between Türkiye and the EU.
Considering that 45% of the trucks passing through this border consist of transporters belonging to
EU countries, solving the problem becomes very significant for the sustainability of the supply chain
between the two actors. For this reason, as a starting project, the business community in Türkiye
recommend launching new border crossing projects between Türkiye and the EU to reduce waiting
times.

Fitch Ratings also emphasized in its latest analysis that Türkiye is the country that will gain the most
from the change in supply chains in European continent.

In particular, it was observed that Türkiye prevented the disruption of the supply chain in Europe
during the pandemic and ensured the continuation of production and trade smoothly. In this context,
the procurement of emergency products such as surgical masks and ventilators by Türkiye remains in
the memories. After the pandemic, many international companies operating in areas such as food,
medicine, furniture, electronics, and packaging announced their new investment plans for Türkiye,
which has a strong logistics infrastructure and industrial capacity

The grain crisis, which is also experienced due to the war in Ukraine, is trying to be resolved with
Türkiye’s efforts. Through the corridor to be opened over the Black Sea with the patrol of Türkiye, the
supply problems in the grain are tried to be overcome.

In today’s world, where economic nationalism has increased considerably, furthering cooperation
with Türkiye as a partner, neighbour and candidate country will prevent similar problems in the
future and will enable early measures to be taken for EU countries.

it will also contribute to the improvement of Türkiye’s deteriorated image in the West and its
relations with the EU. After Russia’s intervened in Ukraine, it was seen that the Western alliance
demonstrated a will to take joint steps against Russia. In this respect, the EU’s further cooperation
with Türkiye within the scope of the Global Gateway will enable Türkiye to consolidate its political
position in the Western bloc, especially in an atmosphere of new cold war discussions.

In this context, it will be possible to use Türkiye’s current infrastructure for EU countries to reach
distant geographies. With the construction of the “Marmaray Tunnel” under the Bosporus, a railway
connection was established between London and Beijing without interruption. In addition, Türkiye
has become a key actor providing quite significant connections with the increasing road and railway
investments and new bridges built over the Istanbul and Çanakkale straits. Undoubtedly, the use of
these infrastructures will reduce the cost of reaching distant geographies and facilitate
transportation for the European countries.

To Sum Up

Even though there have been various conjunctural problems throughout history, it seems that
Türkiye has not given up on this perspective. For this reason, the EU continues to maintain its leading
position as Türkiye’s largest trading partner. As a matter of this fact, Türkiye’s involvement in the
projects within the scope of the Global Gateway will bring multidimensional gains for both Türkiye
and the EU. This will strengthen the economic relations, which have been increasingly maintained for
many years, and will ensure the protection of mutual interests between the two actors.

JULY 2022

European Solidarity and Türkiye: “What About Us?”

In June, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Georgia, Moldova, Western Balkan countries
and Ukraine all need a better perspective in terms of their prospective EU membership. “Germany is
on their side,” he said. The German parliamentarians clapped in response. He also said that he would
advocate for giving Ukraine an official candidate status the next day at the European Council, which
he did. Not only the chancellor but also his political opponents, the Christian Democrats, who
constitute the biggest opposition party in the German Bundestag, have submitted a motion aiming at
“renewing the EU perspective for the states of the Western Balkans with a committed policy.”

"The EU must recognize the European future of its neighbourhood,” Scholz says. But aren’t we
forgetting another country? The recently demonstrated European solidarity with EU’s neighbours has
somehow left out Türkiye.

Turks, who consider themselves Europeans, feel left alone, or at least forgotten, as the EU
enthusiastically opens or widens its doors to multiple countries at the same time.

Especially the European Commission recommending Ukraine to receive an official candidate status
has caused a shattering among Turks, who have been waiting for EU membership for a long time.
Enthusiasm and support given by many European politicians and citizens for Georgia, located in
Caucasia to accede to the EU, has been the cherry on top.

The circumstances are obviously different. It is understandable and, in my humble opinion, very
much necessary, that Brussels, Berlin, Paris and others show such solidarity with Kyiv and send out a
message.

The circumstances are obviously different. It is understandable and, in my humble opinion, very
much necessary, that Brussels, Berlin, Paris and others show such solidarity with Kyiv and send out
a message. The general euphoria about the future membership of as many Eastern and South-
eastern European countries as possible can be explained by the West’s quest for preventive
measures to curb Putin’s imperial ambitions. The now tangible, aggressive aspirations of the
Kremlin have understandably motivated European decision-makers to move fast in order to
proactively push back the Russian influence and secure the European future in its immediate
neighbourhood.

Despite all the facts, the frustration among Turks is understandable. Over the past few years, one of
the ongoing discourses among Turks, who express displeasure with the EU policies towards Türkiye,
has been the following argument: “We have been waiting way too long at their door. Maybe we
should not anymore.” The recent “quick invitation to all” except for Türkiye has only increased that
sentiment.

It is evident that things have been going south -increasingly- since 2016 between Brussels and
Ankara. Some European foreign ministers’ statements just a few years ago were revolving around the
argument that the Balkans “should not be left over to countries like Russia, China and Türkiye.” It is
evident that Türkiye has been pursuing an agenda to expand its sphere of influence – but not even
slightly comparable to that of Russia and China in size. Still, Türkiye was put into the gang of rogue
states

The EU must pay particular attention to not giving the impression that it is forgetting those who have
had Europe in their hearts and identities for a long time. The citizens of an (everlasting) candidate
country should not be left asking themselves the question: “What about us?” If the EU insists on its
reactive trajectory-shaping policy, it might be Serbs, Georgians, Macedonians or someone else who
are asking the very same question tomorrow. In the end, it would be Europe which loses.

With regards to Türkiye, the EU respectfully needs to start to see the glass half full instead of half
empty – otherwise the glass might get emptier. There is still a vast number of people in Türkiye, who
identify with European values. Moreover, it is not about doing Turks a favour but acting as such
would also be in EU’s interest in the long-term perspective. The Christian Democrats seem to have
understood this already: As Jürgen Hardt, the foreign policy speaker of the Christian Democrats, said
on 1 July in reaction to the Turkish ban of the international broadcaster of Germany: “The future of
Türkiye lies on the side of the West, in the rule of law, freedom, democracy and international
solidarity.

JUNE 2022

PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT, EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL AND TURKEY'S POSITION

The Paris Agreement was adopted at the COP21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France on 12 December 2015 and entered into force in 2016. The
Paris Agreement, also referred to as Paris Climate Accords is an international treaty on climate
change mitigation, adaptation, and financing under the UNFCCC.

With the Paris Agreement, the parties agreed that the average global temperature increase should
be kept below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels and should be limited to 1.5°C if possible.
Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C will greatly lessen the dangers and impacts of
climate change.
Each nation must identify, plan and report on its contribution to limiting global warming under the
Paris Agreement. There are no mechanisms that obligate a country to adopt a specific emissions
target by a certain date, but each target must exceed the specified goals.

The convention is based on the concept that some countries should have greater responsibility for
climate change since they release more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere after the industrial
revolution than other countries.

As a result, broad principles for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been established
taking into consideration the countries' development objectives and unique circumstances.

Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the distinction between the developed and developing countries is
not clear-cut, therefore developing countries are also under the commitment to submit emission
reduction plans.

countries are obliged to limit greenhouse gas emissions, protect and develop greenhouse gas sinks,
and also notify the precautionary measures and policies towards climate change that they have
adopted and communicate the level of their greenhouse gas emissions.

2) Why did Turkey Wait 5 Years to Ratify the Agreement?

As an OECD member, Turkey has included in Annex I and Annex II lists from the commencement of
the process in 1992. In 2001, the UNFCCC's 7th Conference of Parties (COP) decided to remove
Turkey's name from Annex-II and Turkey was no longer obliged to give funds to developing countries.
As a result, Turkey was only listed in Annex-I.

Despite being listed in Annex-I, Turkey had no historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions
in 1992.

In this regard, it lacks access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and multi-stakeholder programs in the
fight against climate change, notably the Green Climate Fund.

The announcement of the European Green Deal in 2019 had a considerable impact on Turkey’s
efforts in climate policy. The implementation of circular economy principles, transition towards green
production and consumption and the planned Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
created a sense of emergency in Turkey regarding its position vis-à-vis the Green Deal.

The first step for Turkey would be to ratify the Paris Climate Agreement and adopt a target date and
roadmap for transition to a carbon-free economy.

They(NGOs) emphasized that the first step (ratifying the Paris Agreement) is important in terms of
demonstrating Turkey's will to take place as a serious actor in the global low-carbon economy
transition agenda.

As Turkey is not a member of the EU, the Paris Climate Agreement is also a guideline for
harmonization with the European Green Deal (EGD). The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
(TCBAM) that will start in 2023 within the scope of EGD, creates a serious cost potential for non-EU
trade partners.
3) Nationally Determined Contributions

With the Paris Agreement, countries define how they will contribute to the achievement of the
treaty's objectives. As a result, these plans are known as "nationally determined contributions"
(NDCs). Unless a government delivers an update, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDC) made during the 2015 Climate Change Conference is converted to NDCs when a country
ratifies the Paris Agreement

According to Article 3, NDCs must be "ambitious efforts" toward achieving the goal of this
Agreement” and "demonstrate a progression over time." Every five years, the contributions shall be
determined and registered by the UNFCCC Secretariat. The concept of 'progression’ refers to the
understanding that each subsequent desire should be more ambitious than the one before it.

4) Turkey's NDC and Its Comparative Position Regarding GHG Emissions

Turkey's policies and actions for 2030 are incompatible with the 1.5°C temperature target set by the
Paris Agreement. Global temperature rise would reach 4°C if other countries followed Turkey's lead.
Turkey must concentrate on enacting further policies and actions to halt the increase in emissions to
comply with the agreement.

To comply with the Paris Agreement, countries must reduce their use of fossil fuels and increase
their share of renewable energy usage in energy production and other sectors. Turkey continues to
rely on fossil fuels, even though renewable energy costs are at alltime lows.

Renewable energy in Turkey contributed 42% of the electricity generation in 2020, and its share has
increased at a faster rate (37%) than the G20 average increase (24%) between 2015-2020.

5) Turkey’s Possible Future Climate Strategy

To accelerate the green transformation; public and private sector parties need to cooperate. For
Turkey to minimize the new costs of emissions, the government must take steps to convince the
private sector.

To achieve this, a new economic growth strategy; based on re-manufacturing and repairing, in other
words a circular economy model should be implemented. A circular economy model proposes to use
of natural resources to be more efficient, and energy consumption based on fossil fuels should be
gradually reduced. It has been put forward as a model that emphasizes energy and raw material
efficiency and renewable energy sources.

The EU has been implementing the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in phases since 2005, within the
scope of measures to fight against climate change, and the number of emissions quotas that facilities
can purchase is being reduced every year.

Turkey should establish an Emissions Trading System (ETS) to accelerate the transformation in the
private sector. The emissions trading system (ETS) sets a limit (or upper limit) to greenhouse gas
emissions (SGE) from the installations covered by the system. Because the cap directly limits
greenhouse gas emissions, this tool gives policymakers some certainty about the amount of
emissions that will occur over a period of time. Facilities covered by the ETS must use their
allowances to cover the total greenhouse gas emissions they cause.

Another priority of Turkey's climate strategy is carbon pricing. Currently, Turkey does not have a
carbon pricing mechanism. With the European Green Deal, the Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism will come into effect.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to bring the competitiveness of high-
emission products, which are generally produced at lower costs, to the same level as alternative
products that can be produced with relatively lower emissions but at a higher cost. In other words, it
brings the cost of high-emission products to the level of low-emission products with regulations
such as carbon tax.

In addition to reducing emissions, Turkey could introduce more than one carbon pricing mechanism
until the amount of carbon emissions decreases with the green transformation which varies
according to the domestic and foreign markets to reduce additional costs. Because the carbon tax at
the border occurs if there is a pricing difference with the EU member country and the exporter third
country.

To determine the possible effects of the European Green Deal on Turkey and the steps that Turkey
should take, with the cooperation of the private sector and 12 ministries the “Green Deal Action
Plan” was created. The plan collects 81 actions under nine main headings.

Turkey is currently implementing the "Climate Change Action Plan" for the years 2011-2023. Policies
and initiatives for greenhouse gas emission mitigation and climate change are included in the
National Climate Change Strategy and the objectives of the Ninth Development Plan. However, in
recent years, especially after 2015, the fight against climate change has gained strategic importance.
Turkey should update its plan so that it can adapt to the Paris Climate Agreement and the European
Green Deal. Otherwise, the possible costs will be higher for Turkey in the long run than the
investments it will make in the fight against climate change.

Turkey is a country with a high potential in terms of wind and solar energy and is capable to diversify
its renewable energy investments. Increasing renewable energy investments will reduce Turkey's use
of fossil fuels with high emissions such as coal and will alleviate its responsibilities under the Paris
Climate Agreement.

6) Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Until 2053 (Turkey’s target year for becoming climate-neutral) Turkey should give priority to
increasing renewable energy investments to have decreasing NDC targets over the years. However,
the energy crisis that Europe has been experiencing with Russia since Autumn 2021 has shown that
renewable energy investments should not be made without alternative sources.
JUNE 2022

EU-AU Summit: Do the EU’s and Turkey’s Interests on Africa Coincide with or Contradict each
other?

The main objectives of the Summit were solidarity, security, sustainable economic development,
human rights, women’s rights, environment, climate, protection of biodiversity, establishment of the
rule of law and the fight against inequalities. In this context, updating the partnership, emphasis for
multilateralism, providing of vaccine supply to Africa, implementation of the Africa-Europe
Investment Package, a part of the Global Gateway Investment Package, energy transition, digital
transformation, migration, security, education and innovation were on the agenda of the Summit. On
the last day of the Summit, leaders settled on the publication of the final statement of the Sixth EU-
AU Summit, titled “A Joint Vision for 2030”.

APRIL 2022

MODERNIZING THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION

Although the existing Customs Union has significantly increased the value of bilateral trade in goods,
has positive growth effects on welfare and has improved the quality of production and international
competitiveness, 25 years have passed since its creation, and the situation has completely changed.
Since then, the global trade and world economy have evolved, become more interlinked and have
made the Customs Union outdated.

The Customs Union's problems are mainly derived from its asymmetric nature which does not
include Turkey in any policy-making procedures or negotiation process of FTA with third countries, its
narrow scope which only covers industrial and processed agricultural products, and issues such as
visa obligation, limited transportation quotas, and insufficient dispute settlement mechanism.

Both parties, aware that an update is undoubtedly needed, were initially willing to find a solution to
address the Customs Union's problematic features. Including those of Turkey and the EU, various
impact assessments and studies revealed that modernising the Customs Union was the most fruitful
alternative for Turkey and the EU, among other options.

However, relations between Turkey and the EU suffer from several crises and conflicts, and it has
changed the tone of the discussion process. Modernising Customs Union, which is an economic
matter, has turned into a political issue and has been conditioned upon political developments. Even
though European Council's positive agenda call on 1 October 2020 helped to deescalate disrupted
relations between Turkey and the EU, the EU did not take a realistic step to realise it.
Consequently, the Commission's call to the Council for a mandate to begin negotiations is still waiting
to be responded positively since 2016.

While the recovery efforts continue in the EU after the pandemic, essential lessons have been taken
from this process. Today, global logistic problems or issues in the supply of some critical products
during the pandemic made reorganising supply chains necessary
In this context, desiring to have a climate-neutral, sustainable, resource-efficient and resilient
economy by 2050, the EU on 18 February unveiled to the public its renewed trade strategy aimed at
recovering more resiliently in the post-pandemic era and implementing a green and digital
transformation, defined as twin transformation.

Within the framework of this strategy, the EU, which envisages increasing investments in clean
energy and promoting circular, responsible and sustainable supply chains, declared that it would
make a will to adopt higher standards in areas such as the environment, human rights and the labour
market. In addition, the EU emphasised that in its new trade strategy, production and investment can
be shifted to countries geographically closer to it to make supply chains more resilient.

Thanks to the Customs Union, Turkey could undertake a vital role in the supply chains, which the EU
is reshaping. Turkey has the power and the advantage of making production in the direction of the
EU market's needs and supplying these productions rapidly to the EU market. In addition, the EU's
aim to diversify its supply chains by moving from China to closer geographies within the scope of its
new trade strategy provides an advantage for Turkey.

Taking into account and adopting the points emphasised by the EU in its new trade strategy,
especially on green and digital transformation, may strengthen Turkey's negotiating position in
updating the Customs Union.

Starting the modernising process of the customs union will allow further development of the Turkish
economy and commercial relations with the EU. In this way, it will be possible to develop the trade in
goods and services, which have become more complex, overcome the obstacles encountered in
service sectors such as logistics, and increase agricultural trade. It is possible to foresee that these
advantages will maximise both parties' gain with accomplishing to modernise the Customs Union.

APRIL 2022

Revisiting the Prospects for a Cyprus Settlement: Assessing the Outlook for 2022 and Beyond

Ankara viewed the establishment of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum by Egypt, Italy, Israel, Jordan,
Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration in 2019 as a hostile axis trying to exclude Turkey from the
energy equation by cornering into a small portion of the Mediterranean

Thus, the subsequent signature of the intergovernmental agreement on the EastMed Pipeline Project
aiming to transfer 10 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe has angered Ankara.

Moreover, in parallel to the recent normalisation steps between Ankara and Tel-Aviv, the idea of
building a pipeline between Israel and Turkey has also been voiced as an alternative

The East Med hydrocarbons are expected to become more important in the wake of the Russia-
Ukraine war with the EU looking for alternative suppliers to reduce its dependency on Russian
natural gas. Despite the window of opportunity increasing prospects for cooperation in the energy
domain between regional states, it is too early to predict whether this would translate into improved
dynamics for the launch of a new settlement process in Cyprus.

In addition, the EU membership applications submitted by Ukraine and later by Georgia and Moldova
accompanied by a call for EU accession under a new expedited procedure suggest that changes to
the EU’s enlargement policy might be on the cards. Although there is no appetite for further
enlargement on part of some Member States such as France and the Netherlands, others such as
Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia have issued an open letter
calling for Ukraine to be granted immediate EU candidate status.

It is important to note that EU enlargement has suffered from a considerable loss of momentum due
to divergences of opinion over the level of preparedness concerning the countries covered by the
EU’s current enlargement agenda and the timing of EU accession.

Despite the rather unfavourable climate regarding the future of EU enlargement, the notion of
sending the right message at an extraordinary juncture could prevail in the EU’s handling of the
membership applications by the three Eastern Partnership countries. This may lead to the EU
rethinking the modus operandi of European integration which could in turn create a stronger
momentum for differentiated integration to accommodate the membership applications submitted
by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

As the deteriorating geostrategic environment and the return of war in the European continent is
compelling the EU to reinforce its capacity to think and act strategically as indicated in the Strategic
Compass, the EU could step up its engagement in frozen conflicts in its vicinity

In this respect, the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly Cyprus could come under the spotlight.
Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean could see increased focus both in terms of the emerging security
architecture and energy security, which could reignite the EU’s interest in a Cyprus settlement paving
the way for the EU to come up with creative proposals to unite the stakeholders of the Cyprus issue
around common projects

MARCH 2022

VISA LIBERALISATION DIALOGUE BETWEEN TURKEY AND EU: THE ROAD SO FAR

In accordance with the Readmission Agreement which was signed by Turkey and the EU on 16
December 2013, it was decided to commence a Visa Liberalisation Dialogue (VLD). Turkey and the
European Commission have been at the negotiation table for eight years. Although Turkey had
already fulfilled 66 of the 72 criteria embodied in the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, the negotiations
over visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals have almost stalled.There are still several problems to be
solved yet which require the existence of a favorable environment for restoring mutual trust
between both sides.
The Background of Visa Liberalisation Dialogue

The beginning of the free movement and visa liberalisation agenda between Turkey and the EU goes
back to the initial relations established between the two parties. Even before the signing of the
Ankara Agreement, Turkey became a party to the “European Agreement on Regulations governing
the Movement of Persons between Member States of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 025)

Turkey became the 13th Member State of the Council of Europe on 13 April 1950.

The Agreement aimed to facilitate personal travel of nationals of the Parties concerning visits of not
more than three months duration between the signatory States based on the possession of a valid
passport and documents which were listed in the appendix of the Agreement

The issue of free movement also constituted an important aspect of Turkey-EU relations both within
the scope of the Association and accession perspectives. The Ankara Agreement which aimed to
establish the basis of an Association between Turkey and the EEC of the time embodied provision for
the four freedoms which formed the basis of the Common Market. Free movement of workers and
free movement of services were part of these freedoms.

The political instability in Turkey that had risen to a climax in 1980 gave way to an increasing number
of Turkish citizens leaving the country and seeking refuge in European countries such as Germany. In
order to prevent citizens who were charged and/or tried for political reasons from leaving the
country, the Turkish government wanted to suspend the Council of Europe Agreement ETS No 025. It
was also seen as necessary by the German government to control the entry of Turkish nationals into
Germany due to the increasing number of those seeking asylum. Although the visa requirement was
seen as a temporary measure and noted that it would be re-evaluated after three years, it became a
permanent measure which was later simulated by other Member States of the Council of Europe and
also the EU.

In order to prevent a possible influx of political migrants due to the political turmoil in Turkey,
Germany issued a declaration related to the implementation of the Agreement with respect to
Turkish citizens on 10 July 1980. Germany notified the Council of Europe secretariat that it would
introduce a general obligation for Turkish citizens to obtain a visa to enter Germany as from 5
October 1980 and that the 1953 Germano-Turkish Agreement on visas was terminated

Then five EU members, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, developed a
new border control system with the Schengen Agreement which was signed on 14 June 1985. This
system was operated separately from EU law until 1999. With the Schengen Implementation
Agreement signed in 1990, the Member States within Schengen Area decided to abolish border
controls on persons and implement a common border control system. The abolition of border
controls on persons under Schengen Area, officially took place on 20 March 1995. The fact that
Turkish citizens are faced with the visa requirement and thus being exposed to discrimination has
become institutionalized by this amendment.

Turkey aimed to make use of the legal rights embodied in the Association Agreement and the
Additional Protocol by bringing cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Two of the many
cases were brought to the ECJ based on the aforementioned articles, were striking. Soysal case in
2009 is related to the “freedom to provide services” provision
To put it another way, the relevant article of the Additional Protocol bans introducing new
restrictions, including the visa requirement of those Member States that recognised right of
establishment and freedom to provide service of Turkish nationals before 1973. The result of the
Soysal case increased hopes for lifting visas towards Turkish citizens due to the functioning of ECJ on
the axis of case law.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important works of IKV was the “Visa Hotline Project” that was
launched on 17 November 2009 by IKV in cooperation with TOBB (Union of Chambers and
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and ECAS (European Citizen Action Service).

IKV aimed to focus on the problems of Turkish citizens arising from efforts to obtain Schengen Visa
and to explain them with the political, economic and social aspects of the readmission process. “Visa
Hotline Project”, whose duration time was four years, divided into two phases. In the first phase, a
report was prepared in order to enable the necessary steps to tackle problems arisen from Schengen
Visa requirement and demonstrate the unfair and discriminatory treatments against Turkish
nationals. The second phase of the project covered the discussions held by the experts at various
meetings both in Turkey and in the EU Member States on economic, judicial and humanitarian
aspects of the problems Turkish citizens faced due to the visa requirement.

In the seminar titled “The Principle of Non-Discrimination in the European Union and Rights of
Turkish Nationals”, Kabaalioğlu stated that ECJ, which delivered a judgment as the visa-free entry
rights of Turkish truck drivers to Germany with the status of “service providers” in the Soysal Case,
was in a contradiction from its original interpretation in the Demirkan case by getting affected from
political influence. After this development, visa liberalisation negotiations started to be conducted
not within the framework of Association law, but with a new process, VLD.

Following the failure of the legal process to produce any concrete results in terms of visa
liberalisation, Turkey agreed to signing the readmission agreement and in return starting the VLD
with the EU. Hence, the issue was linked to Turkey’s cooperation with regards to the fight against
irregular immigration. IKV continued its activities in this issue publishing regular analyses and reports
regarding visa liberalisation and refugee cooperation.

Stages and Important Notes of Visa Liberalisation Dialogue

VLD process has started for negotiations between Turkey and EU in parallel with the Readmission
Agreement on 16 December 2013.

The VLD is completely different from the legal and institutional mechanism covered by the Turkey-EU
Association Agreement

According to regulation, the implementation of visa exemptions for third country citizens holding a
biometric passport in line with EU standards for short stays up to 90 days within any 180 days is
included in the Schengen Regulation.
The final decision will be made ratification of the proposal for Turkey with the ordinary legislative
procedure that EP and Council jointly participated.

Within the framework of VLD between Turkey and EU, Turkey has to fulfil the requirements
determined by EU titled “the Roadmap towards a visa free regime with Turkey”. This Roadmap
comprises 72 criteria that are divided into five blocks:

Block 1: Document Security,

Block 2: Migration Management,

Block 3: Public Order and Security,

Block 4: Fundamental Rights

Block 5: Readmission of Irregular Migrants.

The monitoring process of Turkey’s performance regarding the fulfilment of the requirements is
being held by the Commission. The Commission has published three reports; however, the third and
the latest one was on 4 May 2016.

In considering the First Progress Report that was published on 20 October 2014, the performance
of Turkey was criticised especially on the blocks of Migration Management and Public Order and
Security.

Despite of this, the report was welcomed by Turkish authorities and indicated that Turkey made
remarkable progress. The importance of this progress was stressed as:

“The first years of the visa liberalisation dialogue paved the way for many important achievements in
Turkey. First, a comprehensive Law on Foreigners and International Protection came into force in
April 2014. Turkey, herewith, for the first time adopted legislation on international protection that
provides detailed and broad protection to foreigners. However, reforms for visa liberalisation have
been the impetus to meet the requirements of 21st century, such as e-visa, high-tech biometric
security measures, and the development of technological infrastructure in visa/consulate affairs.
Perhaps one of the most precious achievements of the first years of the process was the becoming of
the Directorate General of Migration Management, established under the umbrella of the Prime
Ministry, Turkey’s “pupil in migration management”, into an effective agency with over 3000
personnel operating in Turkey’s 81 provinces.”

The Statement of Turkey and EU on Meeting of Heads of State or Government with Turkey has been
published on 29 November 2015. Intensifying irregular migration to Europe lies behind the agenda of
this Summit. The EU started to search for ways to accelerate measures to prevent irregular migration
flows. Meanwhile, the number of refugee crossings over the Eastern Mediterranean Route reached
885,386 in 2015. Promising to provide financial and technical incentives to Turkey and to increase
the political dialogue, the EU desired the full implementation of the Readmission Agreement to be
accelerated as soon as possible with the Joint Action Plan announced in October.

In the fifth article of this statement, it is explicitly expressed that an agreement has been reached
between Turkey and EU that the Readmission Agreement will be fully applicable from June 2016.
In addition to that, both parties were welcoming the announcement regarding the opening of
Chapter 17: Economic and Monetary Policy to negotiations. It was also stated that if the criteria
would be met, the visa requirements for Turkish citizens to travel to the Schengen Area would be
lifted until October 2016. Again, in this declaration, both sides declared that they would take
measures against the flows of irregular migrants and improve the level of cooperation with the Joint
Action Plan.

On 4 March 2016, Commission published its second report. Unlike the First Report, Turkey had made
a striking progress on other blocks. In Block 1 Document Security, Turkey performed well. The most
nontrivial topic in the Block 1 was undoubtedly biometric passports. In order to provide visa
liberalisation, the passports of Turkish citizens should have biometric security marks, including
fingerprints and should comply with ICAO standards and Council Regulation

On the withdrawal and renewal of passports not in line with this Regulation, the Commission
appreciated Turkey’s performance and welcomed the introduction of the project regarding biometric
passports with EU support under IPA funds. In 2021, Turkey has fulfilled all the criteria in this block.
In total, Turkey fulfilled 62 criteria out of 72 and made a clear advance on institutional capacity.
Some of the advances on the latter were:

• The strengthening operational capacity of the General Directorate of Migration Management, the
achievements on demilitarization and modernisation of Integrated Border Management Strategy and
improvement on the level of cooperation with relevant EU units such as Frontex,

• Temporary protection status was provided to Syrians who entered Turkey with mass migration and
access to basic services was ensured for Syrians and all foreigners under protection,

• Tightening visa policy to countries such as Iraq, Syria and Libya,

• Readmission agreements with 14 countries which is the source of irregular migration, began to be
negotiated,

• Taking into account the EU standards, the capacity of the e-visa system has been increased,

• The Council of Europe regulations in critical areas such as cyber security (ratification of Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime), fight against money laundering and human trafficking were
undertaken by Turkey and action plans were commenced in areas such as the fight against organized
crime,

• The capacity of the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu - MASAK)
was strengthened,

• The draft bill for Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was ratified by
GNAT.

With the Third Progress Report that was published on 4 May 2016, Turkey also fulfilled all the
benchmarks in Block 2: Migration Management. One of the most persistent knots of this has been
solved with the approval of the internal Turkish legislation on protection for refugees by the
Commission even though the decision of Turkey to maintain geographical limitations to the Geneva
Convention. In the Annotated Road Map which is an Annex of “First Meeting of the EU-Turkey Visa
Liberalization Dialogue Agreed Minutes”, Turkish officials have declared that the lifting of
geographical limitations can only be possible after EU accession.

Turkey showed solid progress on legislative and institutional arrangements on almost all benchmarks
in a period as little as two months. By this, Turkish citizens obtained an important chance accessing
Schengen Area due to the fulfilment of 66 criteria out of 72.

Current Status in Remaining Criteria

Although the progress of Turkey was found promising by Commission and thus Commission
proposed the introduction of visa exemption for Turkish nationals to the EP, declaring that Turkey
showed a solid progress and could complete the remaining benchmarks

However, EP rejected the proposal of the Commission, stating that it would not even deliberate
until all benchmarks were completed. The proposal of Commission was also the closest Turkey
could get to obtain visa exemption for its citizens.

In addition to that, there seemed some structural obstacles that were hard to tackle for Turkey. First
of all, the negotiations and agenda on visa liberalisation dialogue are apparently on standstill.

Following that, on 7 March 2016, leaders of Turkey and EU Member States have issued a statement.
In this statement, it is indicated that leaders of both parties have agreed on to accelerate the
implementation of the visa liberalisation roadmap, in return for the provision that “for every Syrian
being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU”.
On 18 March 2016, Turkey-EU Statement, also known as 18 March Agreement has been published
and comprised of the EU’s promises to implement the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme, to
speed up the disbursement of the allocated three billion euros, to continue in negotiations for the
modernisation of the Customs Union and to make progress in the accession negotiations in return of
the readmission of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016.

More importantly, this agreement once again stated that with the completion of all benchmarks, the
fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated to lift the visa requirements for
Turkish people, “at the latest by the end of June 2016”. This argument was perceived as the
completion date of the VLD by Turkish side, but this became the final promising and technical joint
statement regarding this process.

Yet the progress momentum of Turkey did not last a long time. There are several political reasons
behind of this fact. Turkey accused the EU of not keeping its promises on financial support, visa
liberalisation, the modernisation of the Customs Union, resettlement of 70 thousands of Syrian
refugees from Turkey to the EU annually, and progress in Turkey-EU accession negotiations. After
that, Turkey decided to suspend its obligations under the Readmission Agreement for third country
nationals.

On the other hand, the EU criticized Turkey’s movement away from Europe in terms of not fulfilling
the political criteria for accession to the EU anymore. Problems in terms of democracy, human rights,
fundamental freedoms and rule of law were criticized in consecutive reports of the European
Commission and the EP. These developments led to the stalemate of relations and escalated the
distrust between Turkey and the EU.

Secondly, there are six remaining benchmarks for the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap.
Turkey has established working groups within the body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate
for EU Affairs for each benchmark.

The first benchmark “implementing the National Strategy and the Action Plan on Fight against
Corruption and the Recommendations of GRECO” requires the implementation of the
recommendations of Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) which is a monitoring body of the
Council of Europe on anti-corruption principle. These recommendations include a comprehensive
strategy for combat corruption such as financing of political parties, codes of conduct for
parliamentarians and public officials, compliance with transparency-based codes of conduct in public
tenders etc. Presidential circulars or decrees were not perceived as sufficient, as this benchmark
also requires an independent institution. Moreover Turkey has to make regulations that should take
into account the remaining 10 of the 17 recommendations made in the third round of evaluation and
20 of the 22 recommendations made in the fourth round of evaluation in the Interim Compliance
Report.

The second one is the “provide effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all the EU
Member States, including in extradition matters inter alia by promoting direct contacts between
central authorities”. This criterion is also one of the partially fulfilled benchmarks, which is easier to
fulfil completely from a technical aspect rather than others. The contents of this benchmark such as
the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking are critical transnational issues that
require judicial cooperation. The main issue to tackle here is the possible recognition of GCASC. Yet,
Turkey is offering some proposals to solve this problem such as ensuring this cooperation through EU
institutions (e.g. Eurojust), intermediary countries or international organizations in unofficial ways
that will not adversely affect the status of parties.

The third remaining benchmark is “conclude new cooperation agreements with EUROPOL and fully
and effectively implement an Operational Cooperation Agreement” which is difficult for Turkey to
make progress for fulfilment. In order to provide the requirements of Operational Cooperation
Agreement, Turkey should exchange personal data with the parties to the Agreement. Therefore, the
current Turkish legislation is not in line with EU standards. Turkey should directly change its regime
on protection of personal data and start the exchange process with EUROPOL after signature. In
addition to that, there is also a technical obstacle from the perspective of EU side. In order to sign an
agreement with Turkey, the EUROPOL shall have the authorisation of both the EU Council and
Parliament.

The fourth one titled “adopt and implement legislation on the protection of personal data in line with
the EU standards, in particular as regards the independence of the authority in charge of ensuring
the protection of personal data” is relevant to the previous benchmark. Turkey was very close to
fulfilling this criterion. The requirements were ratified; the independent authority has been
established by Turkey. Yet, EU amended its legislation into one of the first regulations such as
protection of personal data by determining a time limit for the exchange in 2019. This benchmark
probably is the most important one in Block 3: Public Order and Security because it aims to prevent
transnational crimes.
The fifth remaining benchmark is “revise – in line with the ECHR and with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, the EU acquis and EU Member States practices – the legal
framework as regards organised crime and terrorism, as well as its interpretation by the courts and
by the security forces and the law enforcement agencies, to ensure the right to liberty and security,
the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, of assembly and association in practice”. This topic
is highly critical for Turkey. EU demands an amendment in Turkish legislation since the broad
conception of terror by referring to the 2002/475/JHA Council Framework Decision that was
amended in 2008. According to the Commission reports, this law was enacted as highly open to
misinterpretation and manipulation and thus, freedom of expression and right to association could
be arbitrarily restricted.

The final one is generally regarding “Block 5: Readmission of Irregular Migrants”. Turkey has
temporarily suspended the obligations that came from the 18 March Agreement. The number of
refugees readmitted by Turkey until the suspension was 2,139. But, Turkey is still at full capacity,
especially in considering of DGMM, to implement the provisions of agreement when the dialogue
becomes re-accelerated. Concerning the last Annual Migration Report of DGMM in 2016, a sharp
increase happened in the number of irregular migrants held and migrant smugglers caught in Turkey
between 2014 and 2016. Although the DGMM haven’t published a new annual report on this scope
after 2016, it continues to meet its duties. The Directorate has started to publish the Annual Report
on Combating Human Trafficking in 2017. Turkey is still bound to the strategy against irregular
migration and decision to maintain the cooperation with EU and UNHCR on this topic.

Evaluation of VLD Process

As mentioned above, even the fulfilment effort of criteria for visa liberalisation created a lot of
opportunities for the improvement and modernisation of the institutional capacity of Turkey. In
addition to these developments, it is considered important to discuss the benefits that visa
liberalisation will bring to Turkey. At the end of this dialogue process, Turkish citizens will benefit
from visa exemption. First of all, the technical follow-up of transnational crimes will be carried out
in a more comprehensive and systematic way by exchanging personal data information and
improving the level of cooperation with Member States. Whether Turkey is a part of the route, to
prevent transnational criminal organizations such as migrant smugglers, drug traffickers and global
terrorists and to achieve the least damage, this exchange is an issue of great importance.
Therefore, Turkey’s success at the end of the negotiations will positively affect border securities
both Turkey and EU in this context.

Secondly, VLD has positive effects for both parties, including the measures to be taken to improve
the migration management capacity in Turkey in line with the relevant benchmarks. Turkey’s being
able to cope with irregular migration and convergence of its capacity to EU standards in follow-up
would be also beneficial for the EU. Turkey’s control over irregular migration from the Middle East is
also important as well as reimplementation of the Readmission Agreement for preventing the flows
of migrants entering the EU’s borders.

Thirdly, the visa requirement for Turkish people causes injustices on the basis of economic, political
and financial costs. For instance, more than 906 thousand Turkish people applied to have a Schengen
visa in 2019. With a simple measurement, it costs more than 54 million euros for the applicants.
According to IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu, the expenses spent in 2015 on Schengen visa, could be
directly used in more than 10 different humanitarian aid projects. At the same time, the possibility of
carrying out financial and commercial relations directly into people-to-people contact, instead of a
virtual platform, will minimize transaction costs for both parties. Therefore Turkish citizens who want
to work, travel and study in Europe would get rid of both time and material costs and paperwork by
obtaining the right to enter the Schengen Area without a visa.

Undoubtedly, one of the reasons of the prejudices against Turkish people in the basis of potential
“Turkish influx into Europe” is the number of asylum applications made from Turkey to Europe.
According to the answer of Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany to the parliamentary question
submitted by the Left Party (Die Linke), 10,356 asylum applications were made from Turkey to
Germany in 2018, 10,833 in 2019 and 5,782 in 2020. A total of 47,7% of Turkish asylum seekers were
accepted. In the report prepared by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), it is announced
that approximately 71,400 asylum applications were made to the EU in November 2021, of which
2571 (3.6%) were made by Turkish nationals. This percentage places Turkish people in sixth rank
behind Afghans, Syrians, Iraqis, Venezuelans and Pakistanis. In addition to that, the news that many
of the Turkish citizens who went to Europe with the grey passports provided by the municipalities in
Turkey as part of temporary travel did not return, became a very hot issue. According to the
statement made by the Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, 804 of the 2,872 people who went
Europe as a group from the municipalities after 2018 did not return despite the expiry of their
passports.

Here, the prejudices that form the basis of the phenomenon of “Turkish influx into Europe”, which
is one of the most salient campaigns of far-right populism and an illusory political threat that
accelerates the decision of Brexit process, should be re-evaluated.

The scope of visa exemption to the Schengen Area allows up to 90 days travel for nonSchengen Area
citizens and requires a different legal regulation from work and residence permits. In addition to this,
the EU developed a mechanism titled “Visa Suspension Mechanism” in 2013 and fortified it in 2017.
Following this, if there is an increase of more than 50% in irregular migration or asylum applications
from a country benefiting from visa liberalisation, a decrease in cooperation in readmission or a rise
in security risk for member countries, there is a right for the member states to temporarily suspend
the visa exemption against that country.

Furthermore, this regulation also gives the Commission the right to activate the visa suspension
mechanism if it considers that some conditions in the visa roadmap are no longer fulfilled. For
instance, the Netherlands applied to Commission to suspend the visa exemption of Albania in 2019
due to the increase in the crimes of Albanian citizens.

The roadmap that Turkey has to fulfil is conducted on a different scale as a separated bargaining
table from the accession negotiations. But it is worth stressing that some of the criteria in the
roadmap are not different from the Commission’s suggestions on the chapters in the accession
negotiations. For example, Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security has got many elements in
common with the obligations of Turkey in the Readmission Agreement, 18 March Agreement and the
VLD. As a matter of fact, with the completion of the VLD roadmap, Turkey expected that an
important step will be taken for the accession and Chapter 24 would be opened to negotiations.
Unfortunately, this chapter has not been open to negotiations yet despite the implementation of
these criteria in the VLD and is still situated in the chapters blocked by the GCASC. However, EU can
eliminate this arbitrary practice of GCASC and open Chapter 24 for negotiations to help improve
Turkey’s performance on the notions of democracy and rule of law that it has always been
criticised.

Among the countries with visa liberalisation (Annex II), there are EU candidates Albania,
Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; countries within the scope of the neighbourhood policy
such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; many island countries such as Panama, Samoa and Tuvalu,
and countries from different continents such as Argentina, Australia, Singapore and UAE. This
indicates that the EU conducts and concludes the visa liberalisation dialogue on a very wide
spectrum.

Turkey’s performance on the notions of democracy and rule of law could not be excused for the
completion of VLD because of the conditions of Georgia and Ukraine who achieved to enter into
Annex II as haven’t got a successful performance on these notions. In addition to this, the third
countries whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement cannot be categorized in a sense of
major political priorities. Therefore it is the undue attitude to pay attention to the discourses of
opposite groups against visa exemption of Turkish nationals who also perceive a VLD to be
completed with Turkey as a threat and constantly bring it up in the Parliament.

Similar to the debates on Chapter 24, many of the promises given by the EU to Turkey have not been
fulfilled. The first of these is the completion of the allocation of 6 (3+3) billion euros in total in
December 2020 instead of should the end of 2018. As a result of Turkey’s suspension of its
obligations under the Readmission Agreement after the coup attempt in 2016, the issue of visa
exemption for Turkish citizens, which was expected to start in October 2016, has also been
suspended by EU.

This situation led to the cessation of the visa liberalisation negotiations, deepening of mutual
distrust. The aforementioned distrust is so deep that Turkish authorities and Turkish people believe
that visa liberalisation will not be possible even if the requirements are met.

Ultimately, the decision regarding visa libaralisation with Turkey will be approved with a qualified
majority in EU Council, which is hard to achieve. Even if the EU Council will decide in favour of
Turkey, there is still the approval of Parliament, which in recent years reiterated its demand to
suspend negotiations with Turkey.

For example, even though the Commission stated that Kosovo fulfilled all the benchmarks in the
roadmap for visa liberalisation in July 2018 and the Parliament approved the visa liberalisation of
Kosovo in November 2021, the EU Council is still pending its decision.

On the other hand, while the Turkish side frequently reiterates its expectations for visa liberalisation,
the attitude of the EU is perceived as an example of “carrot and stick” policy. This is due to the EU’s
use of democracy and rule of law within the scope of conditionality, regardless of the context.
Undoubtedly, Turkey should take concrete steps on improving its performance of those vital
principles, but if the EU’s stance will be changed on this issue as not taking it as a “carrot”, the EU can
be more supportive of Turkey to make progress.
Nevertheless, Turkey calls on the EU to take concrete steps mutually to reactivate the VLD and bring
it to a conclusion. The Turkish side has made many statements that it maintains its institutional
capacity and its willingness to take concrete steps in this regard.

New Amendment Proposals within the Scope of the Schengen Area and EU Visa Policy

While the VLD with Turkey continues, the EU develops new reforms to partially tighten its legislation,
functioning and instruments on its visa policy. At the same time, these reforms also mean that the EU
desires to reduce the costs only for itself and to increase the capabilities against security threats.
These new amendments consist of European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)
and so-called “Schengen Reform”.

European Commission has put forward a solution in order to reduce margin of error and to address
security concerns arose from terrorism and migration crisis: ETIAS.

This regulation will be an IT-integrated electronic system that will be used to detect security,
irregular migration and epidemic risks that may be posed by visa-exempted countries, and to monitor
regularly the visa-free travel beneficiaries that do not pose a risk to cross the European borders.
ETIAS will determine whether the applicant can be allowed to enter the Schengen Area country up to
90 days and will confirm that the applicant do not pose a security threat. For this, it will collect,
follow and update the necessary information about the travellers. However, the information
collection process will be applied one-sidedly. To put it simply, only “Schengen States” will collect the
data of the citizens of the countries that have the right to visa-free travel to the Schengen Area.

ETIAS was proposed by the Commission in 2016 and is expected to be implemented until the end of
2022. The then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that on 14
September 2016:

“We need to know who is crossing our borders. (…) Every time someone enters or exits the EU, there
will be a record of when, where and why. By November, we will propose a European Travel
Information System – an automated system to determine who will be allowed to travel to Europe.
This way we will know who is travelling to Europe before they even get here.”

The only thing that has changed since this statement was the addition of “Authorisation” to the
name of the system to be implemented. The main reason behind ETIAS has always been security. Its
purpose has been preventing the entry of travellers who will endanger the security of the countries
within the Schengen Area before their travel, and more importantly, to acquire the data of the
citizens of the countries with visa exemption. In summary, Schengen States aim to shorten
application period, to accelerate the detection and reduction of international crime and terrorism, to
control irregular migration and strengthen the EU visa policy.

However, this system will not be concerned by Turkey if it fulfils the remaining obligations of VLD
Road Map and enters Annex II. Because Turkey completed the regulations regarding biometric
passports and will have fulfilled the benchmark of “provide effective judicial cooperation in criminal
matters to all the EU Member States, including in extradition matters inter alia by promoting direct
contacts between central authorities”.
As it is known, France took over the Presidency of the EU as of 1 January 2022. In the announced
priorities, great importance was attributed to the revision of the Schengen regulation. At this
point, it is expected that the relevant revision will be brought into force in reference to defence
and sovereignty within the six-month period of the French Presidency. This revision contains
introducing new rules and common tools to control the European borders. Besides the security
threats, the lessons taken from the COVID-19 pandemic seem to be very effective in taking it to
priorities to be enforced. Speaking at the meeting where “New Rules” was announced, Commissioner
for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson stressed that the pandemic has shown the importance of the
Schengen Area for European economies and societies and that the EU provides new tools for
common border controls as a last resort, to draw attention to the effects of the pandemic. The focus
of the EU is to tighten visa policy and prepare a prescription to implement in case of a public health
crisis as well as taking one more step close to the goal of “fully sovereign Europe”.

Under the “New Rules”, Member States will have alternative tools at the EU’s borders such as more
frequent, operational and co-operational police checks in borders, tools for facilitating crossings of
cross-border workers and guaranteeing the smooth transit of essential goods. Member States will
prepare a six-month risk analysis report and be able to impose restrictions on border crossings in
cases where migrants are “instrumentalised for political purposes”. Finally, making an analogy with
Eurozone, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed the establishment of the “Schengen
Council” that would facilitate the joint decision-making and coordination in times of crisis
regarding migration, asylum or public health.

Conclusion: There is Not Enough Ground for Despair

Although the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue (VLD) between Turkey and the EU has continued since 16
December 2013, the visa requirement issue dates back to the past.

With the decision on visa requirements by five Member States and the implementation of a
permanent border control system with the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, Turkish citizens are
obliged to have a visa to travel within the borders of the EU. Turkey’s main argument with respect to
taking a stand against visa requirement was the “standstill” clause in Article 41(1) of the Additional
Protocol. Under this provision, although Turkey gained achievement in the first case was referred to
ECJ, another decision was taken against Turkey, which turned into case law in the second case.

With the launch of the VLD in parallel with the Readmission Agreement, the EU has committed that
Turkish citizens would benefit from visa exemption in exchange for a Roadmap of 72 criteria that
Turkey must fulfil. As stated in the Third Progress Report, which is the last published progress
report, in 2016, Turkey still has six criteria to fulfil.

In addition, the first-ever High Dialogue and agreed points on migration and security between
Turkey’s Minister of Interior Soylu and European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Yohansson on
12 October 2021 raised hopes for the re-implementation of the provisions of the Readmission
Agreement. The other technical barriers for visa liberalisation are “cooperation with EUROPOL” and
“adopting a new legislation on the protection of personal data” which can be easily solved with the
comprehensive alternative suggestions of Turkey and so on. However, Turkey and the EU launched
negotiations for an agreement regarding the exchange of personal data with EUROPOL on 30
November 2018. But, no further development in the negotiations could be achieved.

Although the visa liberalisation dialogue process, which Turkey has been carrying out with the EU for
about eight years, has not come to an end yet, there is no room to be hopeless. Turkey keeps its
hopes and technical capacity quite high despite and to a degree because of the conditionality policy
it has faced.

the VLD, which was offered in return for the Readmission Agreement, was to be completed in 2016,
as stated in the 18 March Agreement.

Considering Turkey’s successful struggle against irregular migration and its intention to continue
cooperation, it is essential and rational to re-establish the relations between Turkey and the EU
based on mutual trust.

Turkish side continuously declares its intention for the revitalization of negotiations on visa
liberalisation and its preparedness for the completion of VLD.

In addition, reviving Turkey-EU relations in line with positive agenda and the Green Deal can be
crowned with the progress on modernisation of Customs Union and especially visa liberalisation.
And also, visa liberalisation can add a significant dynamism for spilling over the process and gaining
momentum towards improving the hope for the accession of Turkey into EU. In other words, visa
liberalisation still has the potential to restore the trust between two parties.

JULY 2021

JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND POSITIVE AGENDA IN TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: IS THERE LIGHT AT
THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

Currently, the EU and Turkey are engaged with the promotion of a positive agenda in their relations
with a view to instigating a mutually beneficial and interest-oriented relationship.

This situation is caused by a generally shared conviction that EU membership will be beneficial for
Turkey and its citizens especially in terms of democratisation, economic welfare and right to move
and reside in the EU. However despite the high level of support for EU membership, there is
considerable disappointment and lack of trust that Turkey will be able to become a member of the
EU in the near future. The stalemate in Turkey’s accession process and decline of the credibility of
the EU enlargement perspective are responsible for this downturn. In addition, Turkey’s diversion
from the EU reform path has led to further deterioration in the accession perspective and also
contributed to growing estrangement between the parties.
Background: Turkey’s Perception among the European Public

Although Turkey is officially a candidate country “destined to join the Union under the same
conditions as the other candidate countries” –as expressed in the Helsinki European Council of 1999-,
it has recently been described in many other ways by the EU and its leaders. Turkey is generally
referred to as a “neighbouring country”, a “regional actor” even as a “threat” or “rival” for European
security interests.

A survey conducted by the ECFR reveals that 41% of the respondents see Turkey either as a rival
(15%) or adversary (26%), while 25% view Turkey as a necessary partner. Only 4% said that they
regard Turkey as an ally which shares European values and interests. Another interesting result of the
survey is that 30% of the respondents said they did not know, meaning that they did not have an idea
about how to position Turkey

Based on these results it could be said that there is still a chance to mend ties between Turkey and
the EU based on the existence of those who see Turkey as a necessary partner and those who are not
yet decided about Turkey’s vocation in Europe.

Turkey is a candidate to join the EU, a member of the Council of Europe since its foundation and a
member of NATO that has served a vital role in the defence of the transatlantic area during the Cold
War. Turkey is still serving a vital purpose in the fight against terrorist organisations such as ISIS, and
hosting nearly 4 million refugees who would otherwise seek to find refuge in other countries
including EU Member States.

The Positive Agenda as a Panacea for Turkey-EU Relations?

Relations with Turkey were again on the agenda of the European Council which met on 24 June 2021.
In the previous European Council meeting which convened online on 25 March, the strategy towards
Turkey was defined as being “phased, proportionate and reversible” and aiming to “enhance
cooperation in a number of areas of common interest”. The leaders stated that they would return to
the issue in their June Summit. The 24 June Conclusions included a reference to the “EU’s readiness
to engage with Turkey” based on the conditionalities set out in the March European Council. They
also welcomed the “de-escalation” in Eastern Mediterranean which was propelled by Turkey’s
withdrawal of its vessels from the contested waters and restart of exploratory talks and high-level
visits between Turkey and Greece and also underlined the need to sustain this situation.

Customs Union modernisation: Can it be the low-hanging fruit?

Expectations regarding the start of talks on the modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union were
running high as the European Council in March referred to the June Summit to take further action on
the positive agenda. While the matter was deliberated among the leaders, it became evident that the
time to finalize the mandate to start negotiations was still not ripe. The Council conclusions stated
that the Council “takes note of the start of work at technical level towards a mandate for the
modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union and recalls the need to address current difficulties in
the implementation of the Customs Union, ensuring its effective application to all Member States”.
Hence, technical talks between Turkey and the EU would need to continue with a view to resolving
the current trade irritants in the Customs Union while at the same time, preparations for a mandate
for the modernisation of the Customs Union would be pursued.

This mandate could be adopted by the Council “subject to additional guidance by the European
Council”. This quite tricky expression implied that the European Council would have to specifically
task the Council to go ahead with the mandate, a process which would again bring about bargaining
and compromise among the Member states at the highest level. Taking into account the critical and
sanctions-oriented approaches towards Turkey espoused by some Member States, deliberations on
whether or not to task the Council to finalize the mandate to start modernisation talks could be quite
cumbersome and would depend upon the progress of technical work between the parties regarding
the resolution of current difficulties in the functioning of the Customs Union. Whether or not the
Cyprus issue would still be utilized to prevent the start of the modernisation process is quite
ambiguously formulated in the Conclusions and not yet clear.

Engagement at the highest level: Window dressing or sincere exchange?

While the “jewel in the crown” of the positive agenda can be denoted as the Customs Union
modernisation, refugee cooperation, restart of high level dialogues and people-topeople contacts –
which was omitted from the June 24 Conclusions- are the other components. The European Council
noted that preparatory work was ongoing with regard to the high level dialogues on “issues of
mutual interest, such as migration, public health, climate, counterterrorism and regional issues”. This
seems to be a more easily attainable part of the positive agenda and despite the lack of high stakes
involved due to the absence of an integration perspective, it may turn out to be a useful tool for
engagement between the parties. Taking into account that high level dialogues will address very
relevant issues such as climate, public health and counterterrorism, both Turkey and the EU may use
this platform to coordinate their respective policies and strategies and engage in meaningful
cooperation.

Refugee cooperation as a trigger for closer relations?

Last but not least, refugee cooperation remains as the most critical issue on the agenda of Turkey-EU
relations especially from the point of view of the EU which finds it difficult to develop a coherent
migration policy based on equitable burden sharing. The most concrete step has been taken by the
European Council in this issue area by calling on the Commission “to put forward without delay
formal proposals for the continuation of financing for Syrian refugees and host communities in
Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and other parts of the region”. However, refugee cooperation between
Turkey and the EU is part of a larger framework of the EU’s support to Syrian refugees and host
communities in the region and is not directly linked to the other aspects of Turkey-EU relations. In
this respect, it cannot be seen as a continuation of the 18 March 2016 Turkey-EU Statement which
included a more general perspective on Turkey-EU relations including targets such as opening of
chapters in accession negotiations, visa liberalisation and Customs Union modernisation.
The enduring shadow of the Cyprus issue

The Cyprus issue remained a primary concern of the European Council which creates a flash point in
Turkey-EU relations due to the differing positions of the parties. The European Council noted its
support for a comprehensive settlement of the problem “on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal
federation with political equality, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions”. It
also referred to the informal meeting which took place in Geneva in April and noted its regret that
the meeting did not lead to the resumption of formal negotiations. The Council aimed to continue to
play an active role in the process which seems to be quite challenging since the Turkish side
expressed its preference for a two-state solution on the island.

Continuing relevance of values as the basis of common interests

The elephant in the room was political criteria that the EU criticized Turkey for failing to implement in
recent regular reports and declarations. The European Parliament has been quite vocal in this respect
calling for the suspension of the accession negotiations due to failure to fulfil the political aspects of
the Copenhagen criteria. The European Council included the political criteria in its new strategy
towards Turkey, yet avoided to attribute priority to this issue area. Reference to rule of law and
fundamental rights as a key concern came towards the end of the part on Turkey in the conclusions
of the June European Council. It was noted that dialogue in these issues remains “an integral part of
the EU-Turkey relationship”.

The positive agenda was earlier devised by the EU in 2020 mostly in connection with the rising
tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and contain Turkey with the promise of a revitalisation of the
relations. The membership perspective is absent and hence the political criteria for membership are
placed on the back burner. The relevance of democratic and good governance issues for Turkey-EU
relations not only in the accession perspective but also in the other areas of the positive agenda
should be taken into account. It is impossible to conceive a durable cooperation between Turkey and
the EU based only on interests since coinciding of interests is closely linked with shared values and
world views.

The Conclusions ended with a note on “shared interest of the EU and Turkey in regional peace and
stability” and statement that Turkey and all actors are expected to contribute to the resolution of
regional crises. While this statement may be seen as a routine formulation, it still provides an idea
about the evasive approach the EU displays towards regional crises in the neighbourhood. While the
EU fails to make a strong impact for conflict resolution in this region, it also does not appear to
appreciate that concrete action should accompany discursive statements in foreign and security
policy.

The Way Forward

In a nutshell, it may be concluded that there is still some way to go in the implementation of the
positive agenda. Preparations are underway regarding the current problems in the Customs Union
and convening of high level dialogues while a decision has already been taken to continue financial
support to Syrian refugees in Turkey. The issue of people-to-people contacts is not clarified at this
point due mostly to the restraining effects of COVID-19 and the unpopularity of visa liberalisation
issue. It should also be added that 6 out of 72 criteria embodied in the visa liberalisation roadmap are
yet to be fulfilled by Turkey.

As supporters of Turkey’s integration to the EU, we very much look forward to an effective
implementation of the positive agenda, most prominently the modernisation of the Turkey-EU
Customs Union as a way to revitalize Turkey-EU relations, accelerate harmonisation and convergence
in such areas as good governance, circular economy, digitalisation and Green Deal, and contribute to
the final goal of membership to the Union. To answer the question posed in the title of the brief
note, it could be said that there is light at the end of the tunnel but it is up to Turkey and the EU’s
resolve to make sure that this light is not just a flicker of a candle but a powerful light source that will
shine over the future of the relations and clarify any ambiguities and misunderstandings between the
parties

JUNE 2020

DECODING ENLARGEMENT POLICY REFORM ON THE ROAD TO THE ZAGREB SUMMIT AND BEYOND

While the refugee crisis of 2015 has presented an opportunity for the revitalisation of Turkey-EU
relations, with the Turkey-EU Statement of 18 March 2016 promising the opening of new chapters,
realisation of visa liberalisation by June 2016 and launching the modernisation of the Customs Union
along with financial support for the refugees, this optimism was short-lived as relations hit an historic
low point following the heinous coup attempt in July 2016. The aftermath of the coup attempt was
epitomised by the EU becoming increasingly critical of Turkey over the state of emergency measures
and its failure to comprehend the gravity of the situation and with Turkey criticising the EU over the
lack of solidarity it has shown in the face of this threat.

Although the relations entered a period of normalisation with the lifting of the state of emergency
measures, they were recently strained over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Siding with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration under the pretext of “Union solidarity”, the
EU has imposed a series of sanctions on Turkey over its hydrocarbon drilling activities in the Eastern
Mediterranean since July 2019.

Due to the political blockages, Turkey’s EU accession talks have been virtually frozen with the last
chapter being opened to negotiations in June 2016. Since June 2018, this situation has been reflected
in successive Council Conclusions with the assessment that “no chapters could be considered for
opening or closing”. Meanwhile, Customs Union modernisation and visa liberalisation which have
the potential to relieve the tension and inject new impetus to the relations in the short-term are
yet to be realised.

As the EU is working on ways to recalibrate the enlargement policy, Turkey stood out as the only
enlargement country that received no mention in the initiatives aimed at enlargement reform. While
it is clear that Turkey presents a different case from the Western Balkan countries with the size of its
population, the scale of its economy and its global standing, it is still covered by the EU’s
enlargement agenda. Given the massive mutual interests between Turkey and the EU and common
challenges requiring Turkey’s and EU’s attention, the need to put the accession process back on track
is urgent. While reiterating the European perspective of the Western Balkans, the EU should also
work for reaffirming the European perspective of Turkey and work on creative steps to revitalise the
accession process and restore mutual trust in the relations.