Doctrines:
Doctrines:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. However “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
“residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This case a petition for review on Certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, to assail the decision of
the Court of Appeals which denied the opposition of the petitioners to the issuance by the court of the letters of
administration to respondent, Elise Quiazon. The facts of the case were as follows:
When Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on December 12, 1992, a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo was filed by Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes) and Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise) who are Eliseo’s common-
law wife and daughter, respectively. This was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. This
was however opposed by petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Thus in her petition, respondent Elise then sought for her appointment as the administratrix of her late father’s
estate. She further alleged in her petition that she was the natural child of Eliseo, having been conceived and born
when her parents were both capacitated to marry. Elise also impugned the the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
The petitioners on the other hand, apart from citing the lack of factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratrix of Eliseo’s estate, also raised the issue on the improper venue of the petition. According to
petitioners as shown by his Death Certificate, it was indicated that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not
of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The RTC however ruled in favor of respondents and directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise. It
ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. And since the same decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed the present petition for review.
In this Petition, apart from arguing that the lower court erred in declaring that Amelia and Eliseo were not legally
married due to a preexisting marriage and the fact that Elise has not shown any interest as an administratrix,
petitioners insisted the fact of the improper venue of the petition based on the entry of Eliseo’s last residence in
his death certificate.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in ordering the issuance of letters of administration to Elise, based
on improper venue and on the other issues raised by petitioners?
RULING:
No. The lower courts decision was proper.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
However, the Supreme Court held that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished
from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and
“domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
As to the other issues, the Supreme Court also held that petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio—was unmeritorious. As held in the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,
328 SCRA 122 (2000), which was the applicable law during the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, it was emphasized
that in a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Thus relevant to the foregoing, there was no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, had the right to impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father.
As to petitioners’ contention on the lack of interest by Elise in the administration of the decedent’s estate, the SC held
that this was just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court or Appeals. Letters of
Administration; Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person; An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
Case Digest by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 1
Doctrines:
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. In this case, as it was established that Elise, as
a compulsory heir stood to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, and was therefore deemed to be an
interested party.
Thus in view of the foregoing, the court moved to deny the petition.
Case Digest by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 2
