Magbanua vs. Junsay

6/14/22, 7:06 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 515
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 419

Magbanua vs. Junsay
*
G.R. No. 132659. February 12, 2007.
CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE

MAGBANUATABORADA, the latter assisted by her husband
ARTEMIO TABORADA, petitioners, vs. PILAR S. JUNSAY,
asssisted by her husband VICENTE JUNSAY, IBARRA LOPEZ,
and JUANITO JACELA, respondents.
Malicious Prosecutions; Words and Phrases; The term malicious

prosecution has been defined as “an action for damages brought by one
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding
has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein.”—In this jurisdiction, the term “malicious prosecution”
has been defined as “an action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.”
While
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Magbanua vs. Junsay
generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and
humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable
cause.
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018161e92fbe4d515388000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/20
Same; Same; The term malicious prosecution has been defined in

various ways.—This Court, in Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211
(1997), elucidated, viz.: The term malicious prosecution has been defined in
various ways. In American jurisdiction, it is defined as: “One begun in
malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained
(Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with
intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which
terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the
case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29
S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625).” In
Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as: “An action for damages
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal
process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury
(Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).”
Same; The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a

complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation
of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
—This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to
recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious
prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the
prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that
he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with
an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice—an
improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not
the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the
deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were
false and groundless.
421
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 421
Magbanua vs. Junsay
Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” means

such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.—On
the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for purposes of
malicious prosecution, “probable cause” means “such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.” It is merely based on

opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.
Same; Damages; In an action to recover damages based on malicious

prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by
legal malice.—In an action to recover damages based on malicious
prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by
legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently
malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21, of the
Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover,
it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.
Same; Actions; There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to

one, who, as a victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings.
—Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister design on the
part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by
instituting the criminal case against her and her co-accused. Respondent
Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be expected to
bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should
be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal
proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription
against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate must not be violated.
Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law
422
Magbanua vs. Junsay
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. There was
no other explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute
baseless prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that
there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie
prior to the supposed robbery.
Same; The Regional Trial Court had ruled that the instant case is not
an action on the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but
rather for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking damages for
her injuries should have been deemed prescribed.—As was clear from the
outset, the instant case is a suit seeking damages for malicious prosecution,
and not for the violations and maltreatment that respondents allegedly
committed against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting the admission from
her. At any rate, the RTC had ruled that the instant case is not an action on
the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but rather for
malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking damages for her
injuries should have been deemed prescribed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Luz D. Lacson for petitioners.
Reynaldo C. Depasucat for private respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
This is an Appeal by Certiorari from the Decision, dated 26
January 1998, of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51750,
which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 25 July 1995, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, Bacolod City, in Civil Case
No. 4361, dismissing the Complaint for
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya with Associate Justices Delilah

Vidallon-Magtolis and Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-26.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon B. Posadas; Id., at pp. 128-132.
423
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
Damages for malicious prosecution, filed by petitioners against

respondents. The RTC rendered judgment declaring that the
prosecution was not prompted by sinister design to vex and
humiliate petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua. The Court of Appeals
similarly found the appeal without merit.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in
the residence of complainant and herein respondent Pilar S. Junsay
was charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery before the
RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 28 entitled,
People of the Philippines v. Rosemarie Magbanua, et al., by virtue
of an Information, which recites, thus:
“That on or about the 18th day of July, 1982, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and with the use of force upon things by then and there
making a hole on the lower portion of the kitchen’s door of the house of the
herein offended party, Dra. Pilar S. Junsay, situated at Bata Subdivision,
Bacolod City, through which opening made (sic) them, said accused gained
entrance thereto and once inside the said house, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them, assorted
jewelries and cash, valued all in all in the amount of P29,624.00, Pesos,
Philippine Currency, to the damage 3and prejudice of the herein offended
party in the aforementioned amount.”
The records show that only petitioner Rosemarie was tried in

Criminal Case No. 28. Her co-accused, Ernesto Fernandez and a
certain Gudo, remain at large.
The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession
made by petitioner Rosemarie, admitting her participation in the
crime of Robbery. The defense contested the admissibility of the
confession, and averred that the same was made under duress.
_______________
3 Records, p. 31.
424

Magbanua vs. Junsay
On 20 December 1985,4
the RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City,
rendered a Decision, acquitting petitioner Rosemarie of the crime of
Robbery. The RTC held:
“The evidence for accused [herein petitioner Rosemarie] more particularly

the Medical Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician as well
as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers guilty
has clearly establish (sic) the fact that accused was physically maltreated by
the investigating officers in an attempt to force her to confess her
participation in the robbery. Whatever declaration of accused therefore
against her interest is inadmissible in evidence against her, hence, the
alleged admission of the accused that she participated in the commission of
the Robbery made to the police investigator and complainant [complainant
respondent Pilar] even if it is true cannot be used against her.
Notwithstanding however, accused could still be found guilty if the
evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to establish her participation in the
crime without said alleged admission by the accused. Record, however,
shows that other than the alleged admission of the accused made to the
police investigator and the complainant, the only evidence to establish the
participation of the accused in the robbery is the testimony of the
complaining witness that after accused informed her that part of the jewelry
stolen was inside her bag at her room, the complaining witness searched the
room of accused and found one (1) piece of gold necklace. On this point, the
evidence adduced shows that the police authorities went at (sic) the scene of
the robbery and thoroughly investigated the incident including dusting for
fingerprints, tending to show that the investigation of the police authorities
was extensive, hence, it was quite improbable and difficult to believe that
the police investigator would fail to search the bag nor the room of accused.
This Court[,] therefore[,]
5
find said testimony of the complaining witness on
this point discredited.”
The decretal portion of the 20 December 1985 RTC Decision

pronounced:
_______________
4 Penned by Judge Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.; Id., at pp. 3134.

5 Id., at p. 34.
425
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the

evidence for the prosecution not only insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima
facie case against her for having participated in the robbery subject of the
above entitled case and therefore ACQUITS accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The bailbond
6
of the accused for her provisional
liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.”
On 9 March 1987, petitioner Rosemarie, assisted by Artemio

Taborada, and together with co-petitioner Conrado Magbanua
(Rosemarie’s father) filed7 with the RTC, Branch 51, Bacolod City, a
Complaint for Damages against respondent Pilar, assisted by her
husband Vicente Junsay, Ibarra Lopez, and Juanito Jacela.
Respondent Pilar was the employer of petitioner Rosemarie, while
respondents Ibarra and Juanito were members of the police force of
Bacolod City, and assigned at the Police Station in Taculing,
Bacolod City. The Complaint, alleged, inter alia, that by reason of
respondents’ false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing
Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie, the
latter suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation, worry, and mental
anguish, which8
if assessed in monetary terms will not be less than
P200,000.00. It was further alleged therein that Conrado,9
Rosemarie’s father, lost his job and his entire family suffered.
Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and
mental torture due to the filing of the false criminal charge against
10
10
her. They sought moral and exemplary damages, including
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings
and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemarie’s defense in
_______________
6 Id.
7 Id., at pp. 7-19.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
426

Magbanua vs. Junsay
11
Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery. They similarly prayed for
payment of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant
case.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Petition to litigate as pauper
which the RTC granted in its Order dated 9 March12 1987, it
appearing that they had no means to prosecute their
13
action.
Respondent Pilar filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
the cause of action is barred 14
by the Statute of Limitations, as
crystallized in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. From the time the
cause of action arose to the filing of the Complaint, four years and
eight months had already lapsed. 15
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
contending that their cause of action is not for damages based on the
physical injuries suffered by Rosemarie during the investigation of
the criminal case nor the violation of her rights for the indignities
foisted upon her16 by the respondents from 18 July 1982, and several
days thereafter. They posited that the damages sought are for the
malicious prosecution of Rosemarie. They reasoned that the baseless
filing of the criminal case for Robbery against Rosemarie, despite
her protestations of innocence and the lack of evidence against her,
caused her family to incur17
expenses and subjected her to untold
shame and humiliation. Petitioners clarified that the allegations
about the violation of Rosemarie’s rights as a person were included
only to demonstrate respondents’ pal-
_______________
11 Id.
12 Id., at p. 20.
13 Id., at pp. 25-26.
14 Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict; x x x.
15 Records, pp. 28-30.

16 Id., at p. 28.
17 Id.
427
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
pable malice in the filing of the said criminal case against her.
Petitioners postulated that as the Complaint for Damages is for
malicious prosecution, the prescriptive period should be counted
from the date of Rosemarie’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. 28, or
on 20 December 1985, and not from 18 July 1982, the date when
respondents injured the rights of Rosemarie. From the time
judgment in Criminal Case No. 28 was rendered to the filing of the
Complaint in the instant
18
case, not more than one year and three
months had passed. 19
On 24 March 1988, the RTC issued an Order denying
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found that the
cause of action of petitioners’ Complaint was based on malicious
prosecution; hence, the prescriptive period shall be counted from the
date of petitioner Rosemarie’s acquittal. According to the RTC, the
allegations about the wanton violation of the rights of Rosemarie as
a person were to show the pattern of respondents’ malice.20
Respondent Pilar filed before the RTC an Answer, dated 18
May 1988, disclaiming petitioners’ allegation that she maltreated
petitioner Rosemarie while the latter was being investigated by the
police authorities. She posited, inter alia: that she was not present
during the investigation, and was subsequently informed of
petitioner Rosemarie’s participation in the robbery by the
investigators, the same being reflected in the Joint Affidavit of the
police investigators; that she never laid a hand on petitioner
Rosemarie before, during, or after the investigation, as, in fact, she
had no inkling of her participation in the crime; that she had no hand
in the filing of the case except to execute an affidavit regarding her
ownership of the lost jewelry; and that she has no liability
whatsoever to petitioner Rosemarie, much less, to her father,
petitioner Conrado, who does not appear to have any involvement
_______________
18 Id., at p. 29.
19 Id., at pp. 39-40.
20 Id., at pp. 41-48.
428

Magbanua vs. Junsay
21
in the matter. By way of counterclaim, she sought damages,
including attorney’s fees, and costs of suit from the petitioners. 22
Petitioners filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,
reiterating the allegation in the Complaint, that respondent Pilar
actually participated in the maltreatment of petitioner Rosemarie,
and she cannot deny her participation as she was always present in
the police station during the investigation. Petitioners alleged that
respondent Pilar cannot claim lack of knowledge of the
maltreatment and indignities suffered by petitioner Rosemarie
because she herself participated in such maltreatment. Petitioners
further contended, inter alia, that they have a proper and valid cause
of action against the respondents, including petitioner Conrado who
suffered and incurred expenses to defend his daughter, Rosemarie,
who was then a minor against unjust accusation, maltreatment and
torture.
On 9 September 1988, at the pre-trial, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts. Counsel for the petitioners manifested that they
were claiming damages not for physical injuries which petitioner
Rosemarie allegedly suffered in the hands of respondents
23
during her
investigation, but for her malicious prosecution. In concurrence
thereto, counsel for respondents declared that the main issue was
whether Rosemarie was maliciously24
prosecuted with the filing of the
criminal case for Robbery. Following the stipulations and
counterstipulation of facts, pre-trial was terminated.
Meanwhile, respondents Ibarra and Juanito, members of the25
police force of Bacolod City, filed an Answer and Manifestation,
adopting the Answer filed by their co-respondent
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 45-47.

22 Id., at pp. 49-55.
23 Id., at p. 61.
24 Id.
25 Id., at p. 63.
429
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
Pilar, dated 18 May 1988, insofar as the allegations therein were

applicable to them, and further adopting the counterclaim interposed
in the aforesaid action.
Trial, thereafter, ensued.
Seeking to fortify their case, petitioners offered the following
exhibits, to wit:
Exhibit “A”—The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teodoro S. Lavasa,

Medico-legal officer and Chief, Crime Laboratory, Bacolod Metro Police
District, dated July 27, 1982.
This exhibit is offered to show the many injuries sustained by [herein
petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua at the hands of the [herein respondents] in
their joint effort to make her admit the crime in the absence of proof that she
participated therein and despite her protestations of innocence.
Exhibit “B”—The note of Dr. Teodoro S. Lavada to the jail warden.
This exhibit is offered to show the result of the maltreatment and/or
physical injuries inflicted by the [respondents] on the person of [petitioner]
Rosemarie Magbanua—hemoptysis, fever, and body pains—which made
the medico-legal officer recommend hospitalization for her.
Exhibit “C”—The information filed by Fiscal Ricardo F. Tornilla, 2nd
Asst. City Fiscal, Bacolod City, dated July 20, 1982.
This exhibit is offered to show the result of the [respondents’]
confederated efforts for Rosemarie Magbanua to be prosecuted for the crime
she did not commit, including untrue affidavits, a biased and false
investigation report mentioning Rosemarie Magbanua’s alleged confession
of her participation in the robbery when she never did, despite the injuries
and indignities to which she was subjected, all of which made the Asst. City
Fiscal Ricardo F. Tornilla file the information against said plaintiff
Rosemarie Magbanua.
Exhibit “D”—The Decision rendered by Hon. Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr., Judge, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch XLI Bacolod
City, in Criminal Case No. 28 entitled, “People of the Philippines vs.
Rosemarie Magbanua, et al.” dated December 20, 1985.
430

Magbanua vs. Junsay
Exhibit “D-1”—The portion appearing on page 4 of said decision stating

that, “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the
evidence for the prosecution not only insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima
facie case against her for having participated in the robbery subject of the
above entitled case and therefore ACQUITS accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The bailbond of the accused for her provisional
liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.”
This exhibit with its sub-marking is offered to show that the [petitioner]
Rosemarie Magbanua was acquitted of the crime charged because the
evidence for the prosecution was not only insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a
prima facie evidence against her for having participated in the robbery, thus
glaringly exposing the utter lack of basis for charging and/or prosecuting
Rosemarie Magbanua for the crime of robbery which was nevertheless filed
at the behest of the [respondents] who knowing fully the bereftness of their
stand even tried to concoct additional evidence of having found still more
jewelry in [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua’s handbag, a maneuver which
was debunked by the honorable Court in its decision.
Exhibit “E”—The decision of the National Police Commission
Adjudication Board No. 11 in Adm. Case No. 83-0888 finding the
respondent PFC Ibarra Lopez and respondent Patrolman Juanito Jacela, two
of the defendants, guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their suspension
for two (2) months without pay.
Exhibit “E-1”—The bracketed dispositive portion of the decision
appearing on page 3 thereof which is as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Board finds respondents PFC
IBARRA LOPEZ AND PAT JUANITO JACELA guilty of Misconduct and
they are hereby ordered SUSPENDED FOR TWO (2) MONTHS
WITHOUT PAY WITH WARNING THAT A REPETITION OF THE
SAME OFFENSE SHALL BE PENALIZED MORE SEVERELY.”
This exhibit with its submarking is offered to show that the two (2)
[respondents], PFC Ibarra Lopez and Patrolman Juanito Jacela, employed
unnecessary force on the person of the [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua
just to make her admit and/or confess to a crime she did not commit, thus
contributing to and even making
431
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
possible the26 unnecessary, baseless, and malicious prosecution of the

[petitioner].”
27
On 25 January 1991, the RTC issued an Order, admitting Exhibits
“A” to “E,” including the sub-markings thereon for the purposes for
which they had been offered and for such 28
purpose as may serve the
court a quo in the resolution of the case.
On 25 July 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
Complaint. The RTC applied the established rule that for a malicious
prosecution suit to succeed, two indispensable elements must be
shown to exist, to wit: (a) malice and (b) absence of probable cause.
It found that the elements were not successfully shown by
petitioners. It held that the mere filing of a suit does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful
for the law

29
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate.
In sustaining the respondents, the RTC said that the filing of the
criminal complaint against petitioner Rosemarie was not prompted
with a sinister design to vex, or humiliate her. It reasoned that
respondent Pilar reported the robbery which occurred on 17 July
1982 to the Bacolod Police Station; consequently, police
investigators, including respondents Ibarra and Juanito, proceeded to
the residence of respondent Pilar. It ratiocinated that there was no
legal malice on the part of the latter as victim of the crime of
robbery for bringing the same to the attention of the police
authorities. The RTC similarly did not find legal malice on the part
of her co-respondents, Ibarra and Juanito, as they were merely
performing their duties when they conducted the investigation; and
subse-
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 95-99.

27 Penned by Presiding Judge Designate Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon; Id., at p.
116.
28 Id.
29 Id., at p. 341.
432

Magbanua vs. Junsay
quently filed the case against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-
accused pursuant thereto.
In denying petitioners’ prayer for damages arising from
malicious prosecution, the RTC ruled that:
“In the course of the investigation, Rosemarie Magbanua admitted her

participation in the robbery together with a certain Ernesto Fernandez and a
person named “Gudo.” The necklace given to her as her share was
recovered in her shoulder bag.
After the police authorities had completed their investigation, they filed a
case for robbery with the office of the City Fiscal of Bacolod City (now City
Prosecutor) against Rosemarie Magbanua, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain
“Gudo.” The Office of the City Fiscal after conducting a preliminary
investigation filed a case for robbery against the three suspects. After trial,
as against then accused now [herein petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua, the
Court acquitted her.
[Herein respondent] Dra. Pilar Junsay, cannot be faulted for reporting to
the police. She was robbed of valuables worth P29,974.00. Besides, she did
not tell the police that she was robbed by herein [petitioner] Rosemarie
Magbanua. And, there is no legal malice for a victim of a crime to report the
matter to the police. Furthermore, the mere filing of a suit does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
(Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16).
Neither can [respondents] police investigator Ibarra Lopez and Juanito
Jacela be faulted for filing a complaint of robbery with the Office of the City
Fiscal, against herein plaintiff Rosemarie Magbanua, Ernesto Fernandez and
a certain “Gudo.” It is part of their duties to conduct an investigation of a
case reported to their office. And Rosemarie Magbanua admitted to them
her participation to the commission of the crime together with her co-
accused Ernesto Fernandez and Gudo. Thus, there was probable cause of the
crime of robbery against said accused. Their finding of a probable cause
against the accused was shared by the City Fiscal’s Office when an
Information for robbery against said accused was filed after conducting a
preliminary investigation.
433
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Magbanua vs. Junsay
[Respondents] police investigators Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela do not

know [respondent] Dra. Pilar Junsay nor [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua,
prior to July 18, 1982, when the crime was reported by the former to their
office. And, the criminal complaint filed by them was not only against
Rosemarie Magbanua, but also against Ernesto Fernandez and a certain
“Gudo.” Hence, it cannot be said that they were prompted by 30
a sinister
design to vex, and humiliate [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua.”
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on the 25 July 1995 Decision of

the RTC. Thus, the records of the case were subsequently forwarded
to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto.
The appellate court declared that the design to vex and humiliate
petitioner Rosemarie in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 28
was wanting. It held that respondent Pilar as complaining witness
merely reported the matter to the police authorities; while
respondents Ibarra and Juanito were merely performing their duties
as investigating police officers. Thus:
“In the present case, there was no proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a design to vex and humiliate the [herein petitioner] Rosemarie
Magbanua. The crime of robbery was actually committed and [petitioner]
Rosemarie Magbanua admitted her participation therein. There was nothing
illegal, sinister or malicious in prosecuting her on the part of [herein
respondent] Dra. Junsay who, as a victim of the crime of robbery, reported
the incident to the police authorities. In fact, the [respondent] did not
suspect that the [petitioner] was one of those who committed the crime.
On the part of the police investigators, they were only performing their
duties in accordance with the standard procedure of their office. They came
to know the victim Dra. Junsay and [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua only
during the investigation. The fact was that Rosemarie Magbanua admitted
participation in the commission of the crime. Finding that there was a prima
facie case, the City
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 342-343.
434

Magbanua vs. Junsay
Fiscal who investigated the case filed a31case for robbery in the then Court of
First Instance of Bacolod (now RTC).”
The Court of Appeals was also convinced that there was probable
cause to believe that the robbery was committed by petitioner
Rosemarie and her co-accused. The finding of probable cause,
according to the appellate court, was confirmed by the filing of the
Information for Robbery32 by the City Fiscal’s Office after the
preliminary investigation.
The Court of Appeals disposed:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated July 25, 1995 33
is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the [herein petitioners].”
Hence, petitioners come to the succor of this Court via the instant
Appeal by Certiorari to assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, that there was no malicious
prosecution.
For our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled
to damages for malicious prosecution. However, before we could
resolve said issue, we should first determine whether the filing of a
criminal case for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie constituted
malicious prosecution.
It is petitioners’ submission that the prosecution 34of petitioner
Rosemarie was founded upon baseless accusations. Petitioners
posit that the charges were based on false affidavits and false police
reports, without which the criminal 35
case against petitioner
Rosemarie would not have been filed. Petitioners further decry the
maltreatment which petitioner Rosemarie allegedly suffered from
the hands of respondents.
_______________
31 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

32 Id., at p. 25.
33 Id., at p. 26.
34 Id., at p. 172.
35 Id.
435
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 435

Magbanua vs. Junsay
According to petitioners, Rosemarie was maltreated to extract a

confession from her, and to make her admit to a crime she did not
commit. They reasoned that petitioner Rosemarie, who was then a
minor, an uneducated farm girl, and a stranger36in Bacolod City, was
subjected to torture and inhumane treatment. Petitioners contend
further that respondent Pilar employed her privileged status in the
society as a medical doctor; and her co-respondents Ibarra and
Juanito utilized their positions as members of the Bacolod 37
City
Police to secure an admission from petitioner Rosemarie.
In this jurisdiction, the term “malicious prosecution” has been
defined as “an action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution,
38
suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein.” While generally associated with unfounded
criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded
civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the 39defendant despite
the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
40
This Court, in Drilon v. Court of Appeals, elucidated, viz.:
“The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In

American jurisdiction, it is defined as:
“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained
(Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of
injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the
person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the
_______________
36 Id.
37 Id., at p. 173.
38 Yasoña v. De Ramos, G.R. No. 156339, 6 October 2004, 440 SCRA 154, 157.
39 See Bayani v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., 386 Phil. 980, 986; 330 SCRA 759, 764
(2000), citing Equitable Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 218 Phil.
135, 140; 133 SCRA 135, 139 (1984).
40 336 Phil. 949, 956-957; 270 SCRA 211, 219-220 (1997).
436

Magbanua vs. Junsay
case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459,
102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625).”
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution,
civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in
force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota,
14169-R, November 19, 1956).”
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution
are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and
on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and
2219 (8). To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that
his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution.”
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to
concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for
a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was
himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2)
the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing
the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the
prosecution
41
was impelled by legal malice—an improper or a sinister
motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of
a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but
_______________
41 Villanueva v. United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), 384 Phil. 130, 140; 327
SCRA 391, 400 (2000).
437
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 437

Magbanua vs. Junsay
the deliberate initiation of an action 42

with the knowledge that the
charges were false and groundless.
We shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of
petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of Robbery, all four elements
were in attendance.
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
The prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery
did occur, and respondents Pilar, Ibarra and Juanito instigated its
commencement. On 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch XLI,
Bacolod City, rendered a Decision acquitting Rosemarie Magbanua
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for
purposes of malicious prosecution, “probable cause” means “such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person43
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was 44
prosecuted.” It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry 45
into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
Anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without
probable cause in bringing the action against petitioner Rosemarie,
we find no reason to depart from the conclusions reached by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals. The filing of Criminal Case No. 28
for Robbery was not without probable cause.
_______________
42 Id.
43 Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1194; 321 SCRA 574, 580 (1999),
citing Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915).
44 Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, 18 November 2005, 475
SCRA 495, 511.
45 Id.
438

Magbanua vs. Junsay
Indeed, during the investigation petitioner Rosemarie admitted her

participation in the commission of the incident complained of. The
investigation report, which prompted the filing of the Information
for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie showed that she admitted
to receiving instruction from her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez and46
a certain Gudo to leave the barrel belt of the kitchen door unlocked,
so her coaccused can gain entry to the house of respondent Pilar.
Moreover, she admitted that after her co-accused had taken the
pieces of jewelry owned by respondent Pilar, they gave her a
necklace which she kept in a shoulder bag. During the investigation,

she was shown the said necklace, and she positively 47identified the
same to be the necklace her co-accused had given her. On the basis
of the said admission, the Office of the Prosecutor found basis and
probable cause to file the appropriate Information with the RTC
against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez
and a certain Gudo. The inadmissibility of the aforesaid admission
on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an
evidentiary matter, which does not detract from the fact that based
on petitioner Rosemarie’s admission, there was reason for the
respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded, and that the
crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious
prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled
by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so
patently malicious48
as to warrant the award of damages under
Articles 19 to 21, of the Civil Code, or that
_______________
46 Records, p. 194.
47 Id.
48 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
439
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 439

Magbanua vs. Junsay
49
the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover, it is a
doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law 50
would not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister
design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner
Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her co-
accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable
belongings can only be expected to bring the matter to the
authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to
one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal
proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the
proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate
must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the
law could51
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. There was no other explanation or motive as to why
respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner
Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood
_______________
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
49 See Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No.
153535, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 429, citing ABSCBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 531; 301 SCRA 572, 604 (1999).
50 Martires v. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 696, 709,
citing Lao v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 191, 203; 271 SCRA 477, 488 (1997).
51 See China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94182, 28 March
1994, 231 SCRA 472, 478; Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, 31 August
2004, 437 SCRA 259, 290.
440

Magbanua vs. Junsay
between respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the

supposed robbery.
We also do not find the actuations of respondents Ibarra and
Juanito to be impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the
action against petitioner Rosemarie and her coaccused was pursuant
to their duties as police officers. The same was made subsequent to
the report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and
the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then,
mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any
clear showing that they were 52motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, which was not established in the
case at bar.
Moreover, as was clear from the outset, the instant case is a suit
seeking damages for malicious prosecution, and not for the
violations and maltreatment that respondents allegedly committed
against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting the admission from her.
At any rate, the RTC had ruled that the instant case is not an action
on the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but rather
for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking
53
damages for
her injuries should have been deemed prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated 26
January 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51750,
which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 25 July 1995, of the RTC,
Branch 51, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 4361, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairp erson), Austria-Martinez and

Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., On Leave.
_______________
52 Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, 13 March 1991,

195 SCRA 168, 178.
53 Supra note 14.
441
VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 441

Canton vs. City of Cebu
Appeal denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the

authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. (Yasoña vs. De Ramos , 440 SCRA 154 [2004])
It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for allegedly
maliciously instituting a prosecution where there is a probable cause.
(Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 12 [2001])
——o0o——
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6/14/22, 7:06 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 515

VOL. 515, FEBRUARY 12, 2007 419

CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE

Malicious Prosecutions; Words and Phrases; The term malicious

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED