CASE 1: PEOPLE V.

NARVAEZ TOPIC: INCOMPLETE DEFENSE

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • MAMERTO •
• DAVID NARVAEZ
FLEISCHER
• FLAVIANO
RUBIA
FACTS:
• Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia.
• On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice
mill.
• NARVAEZ was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence
being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over.
• Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." NARVAEZ lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed.
• Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with NARVAEZ and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property.
• At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted
granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
• He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after the letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
• CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• CFI CONVICTION: Thus, we have a crime of
MURDER qualified by treachery with the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is
RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64,
Revised Penal Code).
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not NARVAEZ ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE (no)
• W/N NARVAEZ IS ENTITLED TO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE. (yes)

RULING:
DEFENSE OF SELF DEFENSE SHALL NOT PROSPER BECAUSE THERE IS NO
UNLAWFUL AGRESSION
• The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim.
• However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his
rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of
the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing
the right of owners to close and fence their land.
• Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

NARVAEZ IS ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE

JUSTIFYING/EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

Justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art.
11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

• Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left
him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up
fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired
through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right
to be respected in his possession
• Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing
was disproportionate to the attack.
• Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, Narvaez is credited with the special mitigating circumstance
of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.

• These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation
(read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is
not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased.
• The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on
the part of the deceased.
• Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.
249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to
arresto mayor.

But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the
shooting.

• Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime.
 The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the
highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being
unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to
the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was
dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for
his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.
• Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier
migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity
and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his
dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should
be credited with this mitigating circumstance.

Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being
attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance but extenuated by the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation.

• Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of the requirements
for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to
prision correccional and under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be
reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
DOCTRINES:
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the
elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death
of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES,
• MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE,
• APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR
(4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF
DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND
(P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY
AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

• CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST

FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST
22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
CASE 2: PEOPLE V. ULEP TOPIC: INCOMPLETE DEFENSE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • ERNESTO ULEP • Accused-appellant prays
• BUENAVENTURA for his acquittal mainly on
WAPILI the basis of his claim that
the killing of the victim was
in the course of the
performance of his official
duty as a police officer, and
in self-defense.
FACTS:
BUENAVENTURA WAPILI was not feeling well and talking insensibly to himself inside the
room. After a little while he was smashing the furniture and acting like crazy.

• At around two o' clock in the morning of 22 December 1995 Buenaventura Wapili was
having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room. His
brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him to come out of his room and talk to him, but
Wapili told Leydan that he could not really understand himself. After a while, Wapili went
back to his room and turned off the lights. Moments later, the lights went on again and
Leydan heard a disturbance inside the room, as if Wapili was smashing the furniture.
Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of
Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili, but they could not enter the latter's room as
he became wild and violent.
• Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan. Thereafter, Leydan
with the aid of two (2) of his neighbors attempted to tie Wapili with a rope but was
unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger than anyone of them.
Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on running without any
particular direction.

His brother in-law named Dario tried to pacify him but he failed that is why he asked for some
help from their neighbor – a policewoman.

This policewoman radioed SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin
Pillo. The three responding policemen were armed with M-16 rifles. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning
shot and told the victim to put down his weapon otherwise he will be shot. The police claimed
that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he
had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.

However, the victim refused and instead advanced towards the police officers. SPO1 Ulep shot
the victim. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and fired another bullet
into his head.

The case was filed against SPO1 Ulep through the office of the Ombudsman for the Military.
The accused argued that he was not guilty since he acted in self-defense.

• Accused-appellant prays for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing
of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official duty as a police
officer, and in self-defense.
 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• CHARGE: Murder
• Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found guilty of
murder and sentenced to death by the trial court
for killing Wapili. Ulep was also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N ULEP CAN INVOKE THE DEFENSE OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY (no)
• W/N ULEP CAN INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE (NO)
• W/N ULEP IS ENTITLED TO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE (yes)

RULING:
ULEP FAILED TO PROVE THE DEFENSE OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY AND SELF
DEFENSE

• Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The
Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the
presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.
• Sound discretion and restraint dictated that accused-appellant, a veteran policeman,11
should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the ground.
The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of mounting
an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously
unnecessary.

Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense (Absence of unlawful
aggression)
• The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records show
that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet
wounds he sustained, and possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in
the head. The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when
accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to
his life.

HOWEVER, ULEP MAY AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE FOR

FAILURE TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HIS DEFENSE

• Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not

only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Undoubtedly, the instant case would
have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal Code had the two (2) conditions
therefor concurred which, to reiterate: first, that the accused acted in the performance of
a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office; and second, that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
 lawful exercise of such right or office.
• But here, only the first condition was fulfilled. Hence, Art. 69 is applicable, although
its "that the majority of such conditions be present," is immaterial since there are only
two (2) conditions that may be taken into account under Art. 11, par. 5. Article 69 is
obviously in favor of the accused as it provides for a penalty lower than that prescribed
by law when the crime committed is not wholly justifiable. The intention of the legislature,
obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of either freedom of
action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.

We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender. The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately
after killing Wapili, accused-appellant reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily
surrendered himself.

DOCTRINES:
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot
be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law.
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1
ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of
prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty
(20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Buenaventura Wapili in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

CASE 3: GUILLERMO V. PEOPLE TOPIC: INCOMPLETE SELF-

DEFENSE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• NOEL • PEOPLE •
GUILLERMO • WINNIE ALON
(VICTIM)

FACTS:
Vicente Alon averred that at 5:40 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, Winnie Alon, Wilfredo
Cabison, Eddie Roque, and him were at the public market of Cuartero, at the restaurant of
Melecio Heyres to eat. Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and Joemar Palma were at the restaurant
drinking beer. Noel Guillermo and Arnel Socias are known to him since childhood since they
come from the same barangay. Joemar Palma is known to him only recently in that incident.

While sitting at the table inside the restaurant, an altercation between Arnel Socias and
Winnie Alon regarding the cutting of wood using a chainsaw transpired. Noel Guillermo
suddenly took hold of Winnie Alon and stabbed the latter at the neck three (3) times. Joemar
Palma went to the kitchen and got a knife. Arnel Socias hit him with a bottle of beer by the head.
He fell down and lost consciousness.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
 • the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, AFFIRMED RTC DECISION
Roxas City convicting and penalizing the
petitioner for the crime of homicide with an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum
ISSUE(S):
• W/N GUILLERMO IS ENTITLED TO SELF DEFENSE(NO)

RULING:
THERE IS NO VALID SELF-DEFENSE (INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE)

As a justifying circumstance, self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It is complete when

all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete when the mandatory element of
unlawful aggression by the victim is present, plus any one of the two essential
requisites.
• In the present case, we find it beyond dispute that the victim Winnie started the fight that
ended in his death; he struck the petitioner on the head when the latter intervened to
pacify the quarrel between Winnie and Arnaldo. In short, the victim was the unlawful
aggressor while the petitioner was in the lawful act of pacifying the quarreling parties;
thus, the latter has in his favor the element of unlawful aggression by the victim.
• We consider it also established that the petitioner did not provoke the fight that
ensued; he was a third party to the quarrel between the original protagonists – Winnie
and Arnaldo – and did not at all initiate any provocation to ignite the quarrel. Thus, the
petitioner also has the element of lack of sufficient provocation in his favor.
• The third element – the reasonableness of the means to repel the aggression – is the
critical element that the lower courts found lacking in the petitioner’s case. In the present
case, the attack on the petitioner came as he intervened in a quarrel between the victim
and another party. As we concluded above, we deem it established that the victim was
the unlawful aggressor who attacked the petitioner.

Use of Excessive means to repel the aggression

The weapons that caused these injuries were a beer bottle and, quite possibly, fingernails as
the victim and the appellant grappled with each other. In contrast, the victim suffered three stab
wounds: at the neck, at the abdomen and in the chest. The weapon used was a Batangas
knife that admittedly belonged to the petitioner. Thus, the physical evidence in the case stands.

The petitioner claims self-defense on the position that Winnie, after hitting him on the head three
times with an empty bottle, grabbed another bottle, broke it against the wall, and thrust it
towards him. It was at this point that the petitioner used his knife to inflict Winnie’s fatal wounds.
Clearly, the petitioner wants to impress upon us that his response to Winnie’s attack was
reasonable; he used a knife to repel an attacker armed with a broken beer bottle.

However, we beg to disagree. There is intrinsic disproportion between a Batangas knife and a
broken beer bottle. And as the CA aptly observed as well, the knife wounds were all aimed at
vital parts of the body, thus pointing against a conclusion that the petitioner was simply warding
off broken beer bottle thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he
avoided.
GUILLERMO IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE

Since the petitioner’s plea of self-defense lacks only the element of "reasonable means," the
petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. Consequently, the penalty for homicide may be lowered by one or two degrees, at the
discretion of the court.
• The penalty which the RTC imposed and which the CA affirmed lowered the penalty of
reclusion temporal by one degree, which yields the penalty of prision mayor. From this
penalty, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is determined by taking into account
the attendant modifying circumstances, applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance intervened, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be prision mayor in its medium period whose range is from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years.
• To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor has to be
reduced by one degree without taking into account the attendant modifying
circumstances. The penalty lower by one degree is prision correccional whose range is
from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The trial court is given the widest discretion to fix
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty provided that such penalty is within the range
of prision correccional.
• The CA affirmed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, as imposed by the RTC on
petitioner. We affirm this to be the legally correct and proper penalty to be imposed upon
petitioner.

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The assailed decision
and resolution of the CA dated November 15, 2001 and April 5, 2002, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 24181 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
ordered to pay the heirs of Winnie Alon the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs against the petitioner.

CASE 4: PEOPLE V. SABALBERINO TOPIC: PASSION AND

OBFUSCATION
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • WILLIAM •
• DELIA SABALBERINO
FERNANDEZ-
SABALBERIN
O
FACTS:
William Sabalberino (William) and the victim, Delia Fernandez-Sabalberino (Delia) were
husband and wife who used to live together at Barangay 59, Picas, Sagkahan, Tacloban City.
William was employed as a painter, while Delia worked as a laundrywoman. They have five (5)
children, namely, Wendel, Wedylyn, William, Angela and Jessica.

Around one o'clock in the morning of August 17, 2005, Angela and Jessica were roused from
their sleep when they heard their parents shouting at each other. They were prompted to get out
of bed and, thereafter, stood by the door of their room while witnessing their parents argue with
each other. While in the middle of their quarrel, William punched Delia hitting her face. Angela
and Jessica then rushed to their mother and embraced her. Thereafter, William went to the
kitchen to get a knife and proceeded to stab Delia hitting her chest below the armpit
while the latter was holding Angela and Jessica. Delia, on the other hand, managed to stand
and walk towards the door of their house. However, before reaching the door, she decided to
walk back towards the bed but before she could make it to the bed she collapsed.

William then went to her aid, embraced her and cried. He asked his children to call for help, but
Delia died soon thereafter.

William, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Delia. However, he claimed that the
stabbing was accidental. William alleged that in the afternoon of August 16, 2005, he arrived
home tired and took a nap while waiting for his daughters to prepare their meal. He woke up
around 6:30 in the evening and took dinner with his children. When he inquired about his wife,
their children told him that she was still washing clothes. After eating, he went to sleep inside
the master's bedroom.

Around midnight, he woke up to urinate. Upon turning on the lights and stepping out of their
bedroom, he saw his wife half naked with a completely naked man on top of her. Angry at
what he saw, he went to the kitchen to get a knife and approached the two. His wife and the
man then stood up, and the latter tried to gain possession of the knife.

They grappled. When William was able to take control of the knife, he tried to stab the man but,
unfortunately, he accidentally hit his wife who at that time stood between him and the man. The
man then picked up his clothes and hurriedly jumped out of their window. William tried to run
after him, but he came to the aid of his wife when he saw her fall down. He then asked his
children to call for help, but his wife died before help arrived.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant as charged.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban AFFIRMED RTC’s RULING
City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 2005-08-
446, finding herein accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of parricide and imposing upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay damages.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N SABALBERINO IS GUILTY OF PARRICIDE
• W/N SABALBERINO CAN INVOKE THE ABSOLUTORY AND EXEMPTING CAUSE IN
ARTICLE 247
 RULING:
SABALBERINO IS GUILTY OF PARRICIDE
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

• In the present case, there was no dispute that the victim, Delia Sabalberino, was killed
as shown by her Certificate of Death stating that the cause of death was "shock and
hemorrhage intra thoracic due to stab wound of the left side of the chest, hitting the
heart." The said Certificate was admitted by the RTC and the defense did not object to
its admissibility.
• Also, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that it was herein appellant who
stabbed and killed Delia based on the eyewitnesses' account. Appellant and the victim's
thirteen-year-old daughter, Angela, narrated the details of the stabbing incident.

ART 247 IS INAPPLICABLE TO SABALBERINO

In his defense, accused-appellant cites Article 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and exempting
cause, the first paragraph of which states that:

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro.

For Article 247 to apply, the defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or
daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the
court that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing
evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable.

In the present case, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC and
the CA that accused-appellant failed to prove his allegation to the satisfaction of both courts that
he indeed chanced upon his wife in the vilest act of infidelity and that he was blinded by impulse
and acted out of rage when he stabbed the victim.

• Both courts held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim pales in

comparison to the consistent testimonies of their daughters, Angela and Jessica,
that at the time of the stabbing incident, and immediately prior thereto, no person,
other than the family members, was inside their house and that the killing of the victim
was immediately preceded by an argument between her and accused-appellant.

This Court, likewise, agrees with both the RTC and the CA that the defense failed to prove that
the accused-appellant's and the victim's daughters were motivated by malice or ill-will in
testifying against their father. As such, the testimonies of Angela and Jessica, having been
found credible by the RTC and the CA, are sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether
they are telling the truth. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding and conclusive on this Court, except under specific instances which
this Court finds to be absent in the instant case.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Accused-appellant also invokes the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender, which the
court finds to be unavailing.

(1) It has been held that there is passion & obfuscation when the crime was committed due to
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. The obfuscation must originate from
lawful feelings.
• The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to
such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
• The excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not
constitute obfuscation.
In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that the crime was precipitated by a
quarrel between accused-appellant and the victim. However, such kind of argument, no
matter how heated or serious it was, is not the kind that would cause the passion or obfuscation
contemplated under the law.

(2) As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same can be appreciated if
the accused satisfactorily complies with three requisites, to wit:
a. he has not been actually arrested;
b. he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
c. the surrender is voluntary.
There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the
trouble and expense concomitant to his capture.

In the instant case, there was no showing of spontaneity on the part of accused-appellant
as it was not he who asked for the police to go to their house. Neither was there proof that
he acknowledged his guilt when apprehended by the police authorities.

While it appears that he did not resist when the police officers brought him to the police station
for questioning, such lack of resistance does not necessarily equate to his voluntary
surrender. The voluntariness of one's surrender should denote a positive act and not a mere
compliant or submissive behavior in the presence of authorities.

(3) the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, this circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when such offender executes or commits the criminal act. In the instant case, the
undeniable fact is that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, the former used a deadly
weapon and inflicted a mortal wound on the latter. While intent to kill is purely a mental process,
it may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained by the offended
party and the circumstances of the aggression, as well as the fact that the accused performed
all the acts that should have resulted in the death of the victim. Indeed the location and nature
of Delia's stab wound belie accused-appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong against the victim.

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02230, convicting accused-appellant
William Sabalberino y Abulencia of Parricide, is AFFIRMED

CASE 5: MIRANDA V. PEOPLE TOPIC: SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

OR THREAT
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• ISIDRO • PEOPLE •
MIRANDA • WINARDO PILO
(VICTIM)

FACTS:
In the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo) attended the party of his niece at
Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon.

After the party, he and his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they
passed by the house of Miranda and threw stones at the latter’s home.

While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo’s right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his
left arm.

In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed
possession of the bolo. In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo
twice, but claimed that his acts were done in self-defense.

He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00 p.m., while he was at home with his wife
and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door, followed by several other thuds and
stones hurled at their house.

Miranda peeped through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that before he
peeped through the door, he heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that they could kill
each other.Miranda asked Pilo if something was wrong, but the latter ignored him and
continued hurling stones.

According to Miranda, Pilo approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo
stretched his two arms downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly
hacked Pilo’s arm with his bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo’s oncoming attack.

At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter’s bolo.
Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained injuries.

Regional Trial Court

• The Regional Trial Court RTC rendered a Decision finding Miranda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC held that Miranda’s claim
of self-defense is biased, self-serving, inconsistent, illogical and contrary to the common
experience of man. The RTC further held that Miranda failed to prove that his act of
hacking Pilo was legally justified.

Court of Appeals
• The CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the conviction meted by the trial court
against Miranda. The CA ratiocinated that Miranda’s claim of self-defense had no leg to
stand on, considering that the act of Pilo of hurling stones at the house of Miranda
cannot be regarded as an unlawful aggression that warranted the latter’s act of hacking
Pilo with a bolo.
• However, the CA held that although the act may not be regarded as an unlawful
aggression, it may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation on the part of
Pilo, which mitigates Miranda’s liability.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• The Regional Trial Court RTC rendered a • AFFIRMED RTC’s DECISION
Decision finding Miranda guilty beyond • However, the CA held that
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated although the act may not be
homicide. regarded as an unlawful
aggression, it may nonetheless
be appreciated as sufficient
provocation on the part of Pilo,
which mitigates Miranda’s
liability.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N MIRANDA IS ENTITLED TO SELF DEFENSE (NO)
• W/N THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM SO AS
TO ENTITLE MIRANDA OF THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION OR THREAT (YES)

RULING:

THERE IS NO VALID CLAIM FOR SELF DEFENSE

In invoking self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
attack was accompanied by the following circumstances:

a. unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

b. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
c. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense

Furthermore, the most important element of self-defense is unlawful aggression. This is a

condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense. Significantly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:

a. there must have been a physical or material attack or assault;

b. the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
c. the attack or assault must be unlawful.

To be sure, the accused must show that the aggression caused by the victim in fact put his life
or personal safety in real and grave peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined threat.

Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the attack against the accused is
impending or at the point of happening. This scenario must be distinguished from a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong.

It is all too apparent that Miranda’s life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed
against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with
him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.

Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the
latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force
beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant’s attack — and is certainly
unjustified. The act of the accused in repeatedly hacking the victim was in no way a reasonable
and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter.

The Court elucidated that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he
ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the
accused did thereafter is no longer self defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-
defense.

• In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused
injured the aggressor. In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after the
latter stopped throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda’s act constituted a retaliation against
Pilo. Certainly at this point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful desire of
defending himself, but of the evil intent of retaliating and harming Pilo.
• In addition to the fact that there was no unlawful aggression, the Court, likewise, notes
that the means employed by Miranda was not reasonably commensurate to the nature
and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert.
• Here, the victim Pilo was armed with a stone, in contrast to the 1 1/2-inch bolo that
Miranda was brandishing. More so, as correctly observed by the CA, Miranda could
have stayed hidden and protected at his house. He himself even admitted that he hid
among the banana shrubs before hitting Pilo. In fact, he waited for Pilo to come out of
his house, while he was hiding among the banana shrubs outside of the yard of their
 house.

2. The Supreme Court (SC) considered that although there may have been no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have given
sufficient provocation, then the accused’s liability shall be mitigated.

Although Pilo' s act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression,
admittedly, however, such deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda
into anger. The fact that Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable considering that his
wife and daughter were at his home, and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the
stones.

In Gotis v. People, the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an unlawful
aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as sufficient
provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. "As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient
provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to
excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity." The
victim must have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused. Likewise, in order to
be mitigating, the provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.

In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although there may have been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have
given sufficient provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated.

Such acts which were deemed vexatious range from the victim's act of challenging the
accused's family while armed with a bolo; or thrusting a bolo at the accused while threatening to
kill him with the lives of the accused's wife and children placed in peril; and the victim attempting
to hack the accused. Certainly, Pilo's act of hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully
enjoying their supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of
Miranda the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

DOCTRINES:
As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act
of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly
proportionate in gravity." The victim must have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the
accused. Likewise, in order to be mitigating, the provocation must be sufficient and should
immediately precede the act.
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated May 15, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
38523, convicting petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification, in that Miranda is hereby ordered to
pay victim Winardo Pilo the following amounts of damages in line with People v.
Jugueta: (i) Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and
(iii) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The total amount due shall earn a legal rate
of interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision
until the full satisfaction thereof.

CASE 6: URBANO V. PEOPLE TOPIC: PRAETER INTENTIONEM

 PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• RODEL • PEOPLE •
URBANO • BRIGIDO
TOMELDEN
(VICTIM)
FACTS:
On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were
at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-
workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant.

While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden,
when drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking
up the fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by
eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and
prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious.

Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general
manager where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day, September
29, 1993. Upon arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife,
Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been rendered unconscious. He
complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him
to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his
lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness,
headache, and other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of
drowsiness and frequent vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison
Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon
Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider
cerebral hemorrhage."

Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due
to financial constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition
improvement. Upon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme
head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr.
Arellano again attended to him.

This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-
conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00
p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that
hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• WHEREFORE, the prosecution having AFFIRMED RTC’ DECISION
established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused of the crime of
HOMICIDE.
• This Court in the absence of any modifying
circumstances, hereby sentences said
accused to suffer the indeterminate prison
term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the
legal heirs of the victim in the amount of
PHP50,000.00, plus cost of the suit.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N URBANO IS GUILTY OF HOMICIDE (yes)
• W/N THERE IS AN EXISTENCE OF PRAETER INTENTIONEM SO AS TO MITIGATE
URBANO’s CRIMINAL LIABILITY (yes, plus sufficient provocation)

RULING:
HOMICIDE WAS DULY PROVED; PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS THE LUCKY PUNCH

• It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the fistic injury Tomelden sustained was not "the
main underlying cause of his death." In this regard, petitioner draws attention to the fact
that the fist fight in question happened on September 28, 1993. Tomelden, however,
died only 12 days thereafter and that, during the intervening days, the deceased
regularly reported for work. Moreover, petitioner avers that days prior to the fateful
incident, Tomelden failed to come to work as he was suffering from malignant
hypertension and that this circumstance greatly engenders doubt as to the proximate
cause of the victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends that he could only be adjudged
guilty of physical injuries. We are not persuaded.

The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden right
smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his co-workers
averted that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious
right after the fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospital complaining
of headache, among other pains, until his demise 12 days after the blow that made Tomelden
unconscious.

The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed by that of
Rosario who related about her husband’s post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly
establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it.

Petitioner’s suggestion that Tomelden succumbed to heart ailment and/or that his death was the
result of his malignant hypertension is untenable, given that the post-mortem report yields no
positive indication that he died from such malady.

THERE IS A VALID MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO

GRAVE A WRONG AND SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s
favor.

On this score, we agree with petitioner.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.––The following are mitigating circumstances:

xxxx
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.

Sufficient Provocation
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential
element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act and should immediately precede the act.

This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the
provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if
a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate
to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the
one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

Petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on the events immediately preceding the fisticuff and earlier
dovetails with the testimony of Salazar.

In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of
Bugallon for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro,
Chairperson of LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goat’s meat and drank
beer. When it was time to depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in
another table, to prepare to leave.

When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no business stopping
him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner
returned to his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already
consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half
hours before returning to the LIWAD.

Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him,
calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarro’s tricycle driver. Tomelden
allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him
despite his evasive actions. Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter’s blows.

It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden. In
fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to
avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s
lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot
and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a
fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be
considered in favor of petitioner.

NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG (PRAETER INTENTIONEM)

Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered
when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner
tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of
Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight.
And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and
would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-
knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the
potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that
lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial
means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of
"no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor
of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at
Tomelden’s face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium
that he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 is, in
the light of the presence and the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in
favor of petitioner, hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment. As
thus modified, petitioner Rodel Urbano is hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate
prison term of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
whatever imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the service of this
sentence. The rest of the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE 7: PEOPLE V. BENITO (CHECK TOPIC: IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
FEBRUARY DECISION YUN ATA YUNG GRAVE OFFENSE
TAMA)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • ALBERTO • RECONSIDERATION
• PEDRO BENITO
MONCAYO
(VICTIM)
FACTS:

According to the suspect ALBERTO BENITO, he was a former clerk of the Civil Service
Commission at its main office located at P. Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as
Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965 when he
was suspended for "DISHONESTY".

After two months, BENITO was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT,
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his dismissal
from the Civil Service on February 1966.

On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested
MONCAYO to help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA
NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO".

The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m, and when they met again, the
MONCAYO allegedly remarked in the presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO
ANG MAGNANAKAW". BENITO who was humiliated and incensed, left.

At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22
black revolver loaded with nine (9) live Cal. 22 bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside
the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st. Sampaloc, Mla.

The victim showed up and drove his green Chevrolet 2 door car along P. Paredes st. The
suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and when the latter's car
was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor
vehicles, the suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot
the victim eight (8) times on the head and different parts of the body at closer range
which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car.

The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car by his co-
employees to the FEU Hospital. Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P.
PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40 p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.

The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim,
Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission
near the canteen at eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 (about six hours before
the shooting): "Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said:
"Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw."

Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. — Benito contends

that Moncayo insulted him when he (Moncayo) remarked that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount to
kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made
publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates.

Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January
16, 1975, acquitting him of the charge of malversation in connection with his alleged
misappropriation of the fees collected from the examinees of the 1974 patrolman examination.
That same decision makes reference to Benito's exoneration from the administrative charge.

The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise
to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically
directed at Benito.

Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded
guilty to the charge of murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on
December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and
disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• Sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal • Court in its decision of February
Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of
the charge of murder conviction. It appreciated in
• The killing was qualified by treachery and Benito's favor the mitigating
aggravated by premeditation and disregard circumstance of voluntary
of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty. surrender. The penalty was
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE(S):
• Is BENITO entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should not
be appreciated against him. (No)
RULING:
NO. BENITO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE SINCE HE HAD
SUFFICIENT TIME TO SUPPRESS HIS EMOTION OVER MONCAYO’S REMARKS

Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the
circumstances recited above for changing our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of
"haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada al autor del
delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice
Esguerra, Benito "had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he
ever did resent it."
• The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo
against Benito and the assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to
recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved
the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo
just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and
evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
• The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate
Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory remark that the Civil Service
 Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for thieves but the refusal of
Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to
vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for
having exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and
for obstinately refusing to change his report.

Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank

Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be considered against him because there was
no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank" of Moncayo. That
contention has no merit.

It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service
Commission and that the killer was a clerk in the same office who resented the victim's
condemnatory report against him. In that situation, the existence of the aggravating
circumstance of "desprecio del respeto que por la dignidad mereciere el ofendido" is manifest.

The instant case is similar to a case where the chief of the secret service division killed his
superior, the chief of police (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167) and to the killing of the acting
Spanish consul by his subordinate, the chancellor of the consulate, who had misappropriated
the funds of the consulate, which misappropriation was discovered by the victim (People vs.
Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil, 597, 606). In these two cases the murder was aggravated by
disregard of rank.
DOCTRINES:
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the
circumstances recited above for changing our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of
"haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada al autor del
delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice
Esguerra, Benito "had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark
if he ever did resent it."
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied
• PREVIOUS DECISION IS UPHELD AND MAINTAINED
• Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of conviction. It
appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua

CASE 7: PEOPLE V. BENITO TOPIC: IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A

(CORRECTED) GRAVE OFFENSE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • ALBERTO • RECONSIDERATION
• PEDRO BENITO
MONCAYO
(VICTIM)
FACTS:
According to the suspect ALBERTO BENITO, he was a former clerk of the Civil Service
Commission at its main office located at P. Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as
Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965 when he
was suspended for "DISHONESTY".

After two months, BENITO was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT,
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his dismissal
from the Civil Service on February 1966.

On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested
MONCAYO to help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA
NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO".

The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m, and when they met again, the
MONCAYO allegedly remarked in the presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO
ANG MAGNANAKAW". BENITO who was humiliated and incensed, left.

At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22
black revolver loaded with nine (9) live Cal. 22 bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside
the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st. Sampaloc, Mla.

The victim showed up and drove his green Chevrolet 2 door car along P. Paredes st. The
suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and when the latter's car
was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor
vehicles, the suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot
the victim eight (8) times on the head and different parts of the body at closer range
which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car.

The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car by his co-
employees to the FEU Hospital. Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P.
PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40 p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.

The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim,
Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission
near the canteen at eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 (about six hours before
the shooting): "Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said:
"Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw."

Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. — Benito contends

that Moncayo insulted him when he (Moncayo) remarked that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount to
kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made
publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates.

Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January
16, 1975, acquitting him of the charge of malversation in connection with his alleged
misappropriation of the fees collected from the examinees of the 1974 patrolman examination.
That same decision makes reference to Benito's exoneration from the administrative charge.
The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise
to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically
directed at Benito.

Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded
guilty to the charge of murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on
December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and
disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• Sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal • Court in its decision of February
Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of
the charge of murder conviction. It appreciated in
• The killing was qualified by treachery and Benito's favor the mitigating
aggravated by premeditation and disregard circumstance of voluntary
of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty. surrender. The penalty was
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE(S):
• The issues raised by the accused revolve around the alleged errors of the lower court
in considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
accused.
RULING:
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

I. BENITO IS ENTITLED TO VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

On the first assignment of error regarding the failure of the lower Court to consider the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, both the accused and the Solicitor General
are agreed that the said mitigating circumstance should be considered in his favor.

The intention of the accused to surrender could be clearly discerned from the fact that
immediately after the shooting, the accused having all the opportunity to escape, did not do so
but instead called up the Manila Police Department. When the policemen went to the scene of
the crime to investigate, the accused voluntarily approached them and, without revealing his
identity, told them that he would help in connection with the case as he knew the suspect as
well as the latter's motive.

While it may be true that the accused did not immediately tell the police that he was the
assassin, perhaps because he was momentarily shocked by the enormity of his crime,
nevertheless when brought to the police station immediately thereafter as a possible witness
(accused was with the police investigators all that time), he confided to the investigators that
he was "voluntarily surrendering" and "also surrendering the fatal gun used in the
shooting of the victim" (pp. 9, t.s.n. December 26, 1969).

We fully subscribe to appellee's observation that all the aforementioned acts of the accused
were strongly indicative of his intent or desire to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. The
accused must be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
II. BENITO NOT ENTITLED TO VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE (MERE
PROVOCATION AND SUFFICIENT TIME TO SUPPRESS EMOTIONS)

It is the contention of the accused that the criminal act of murder was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense done by the victim against the accused and,
therefore, this mitigating circumstance must be credited in his favor. The supposed grave
offense done by the victim was an alleged remark made in the presence of the accused at about
11:00 a.m. of December 12, 1969, that the Civil Service Commission is a hangout of thieves.
The accused felt alluded to because he was facing then criminal and administrative charges on
several counts involving his honesty and integrity.

There is merit in appellee's argument that said victim's remark even if actually uttered in the
presence of the accused, cannot be considered a grave offense against the latter. The remark
itself was general in nature and not specifically directed to the accused. If he felt alluded
to by a remark which he personally considered insulting to him, that was his own
individual reaction thereto. Other people in the vicinity who might have heard the remark
could not possibly know that the victim was insulting the accused unless they were aware of the
background of the criminal and administrative charges involving moral turpitude pending against
the accused.

• At most, said remark might be considered a mere provocation and not a grave
offense which might have impelled the accused to commit a crime in immediate
retaliation. As the provocation was not sufficient and did not immediately precede the
act, it may not be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

In this case, however, the provocation was the remark uttered at 11:00 a.m. of December 12,
1969, while the crime of murder was committed by the accused at about 5:30 p.m. of the same
day giving him several hours to reflect and hold his temper. Stated otherwise, the act of killing
did not immediately or proximately follow the supposed sufficiently insulting and
provocative remark.

The juridical reason for appreciating this mitigating circumstance is the implied recognition by
the law of the weakness of human nature such that an ordinary human being if sufficiently
provoked would immediately retaliate in the unchristian spirit of vindictive retribution. But the
circumstances of this case are such that the act of murder committed by the accused could not
reasonably be attributed to an immediate or proximate retaliatory action on his part to vindicate
what personal appeared to him as sufficient provocation in the form of an insulting remark
allegedly uttered by the victim. The failure of the accused to immediately react to the supposed
provocative insulting remark might even be taken as his ignoring it altogether or considering it
unimportant at the moment he heard the remark.

• In other words, the remark was inadequate to stir or drive the accused to violence
at the time it was uttered and he had more than sufficient time to suppress his
emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it. The trial Court did not commit an
error when it rejected the aforementioned incident as a basis for crediting mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused.

III. BENITO NOT ENTITLED TO SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION (NOT ACCOMPANIED BY

OVERT ACTS AND DID NOT PRECEDE THE KILLING)

The accused also claims that the lower Court should have considered the mitigating
circumstance that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the deceased immediately
preceded the act because of the alleged statement of the deceased in Tagalog uttered at about
7:00 p.m. on the night of December 11, 1969 (night preceding the day of the crime), to wit,

"Umalis ka na nga diyan baka may mangyari pa sa iyo at baka ipayari kita dito" (Get out of
there, because something might happen to you and because I might have you finished here).

That statement of the deceased was supposed to have been uttered in the presence of other
people almost twenty four (24) hours before the crime was committed. It was not accompanied
by any overt act against accused and nothing more happened during that night, so that
the accused by that utterance could not have felt sufficiently provoked or threatened so as to
immediately react in his defense or retaliate by committing a crime.

The provocation or threat, did not immediately precede the shooting. In other words, the
accused had almost a day to mull over the alleged threat or provocation before he
reacted by shooting the victim.

The inevitable conclusion is that the accused did not feel sufficiently threatened or provoked by
the alleged utterance of the victim at the time it was uttered, or within a reasonable time
thereafter, and when he shot the victim the next day, it was a deliberate act of vengeance and
not the natural reaction of a human being to ward off a serious threat or to immediately retaliate
when provoked.

• We agree with appellee's contention that "provocation or threat to constitute a mitigating

circumstance, must, in the language of the law, be "sufficient", that is, adequate to
excite the person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity and must also immediately precede the act."

The lower Court correctly rejected the claim of the accused to this mitigating circumstance.

DECISION

For all the foregoing, the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
with two mitigating circumstances in his favor, that of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender.
However these are offset by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
disregard of respect due to the deceased.

The crime of murder being punishable with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
(Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), the penalty, pursuant to Article 248 in relation to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, should be, as it is hereby, imposed in its medium period, reclusion
perpetua.

The penalty of death imposed by the trial court is hereby modified and reduced as above
indicated, to reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINES:
 • Refer to ruling

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied
• PREVIOUS DECISION IS UPHELD AND MAINTAINED

CASE 8: BACABAC V. PEOPLE TOPIC: immediate vindication of a

grave offense
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• RICARDO • PEOPLE •
BACABAC • HERNANI QUIDATO
(VICTIM)

FACTS:
In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok
4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio
(Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).

Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left
and on their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups
then and there figured in a misunderstanding.

On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a
commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his
hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." He thus told the victim and his
companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon
Eduardo told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to
Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and
Jonathan managed to flee.

The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews,
and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto.
Domingo Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel
were carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.

Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook
Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that
you are brave. You are only bullying small children." Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite
into the air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim
and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike
[the victim] with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling
position, and as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again. Meanwhile,
Melchor escaped.
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced
dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.

Two Informations for Murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against
Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner.

Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of the pronouncement of guilt, should
have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense,
in the same manner that the other Accused were so credited.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC, finding the • By Decision of June 28, 1999,
presence of conspiracy among petitioner and the Court of Appeals affirmed
his co-accused, convicted them of murder the trial court's decision. Entry
qualified by treachery of final judgment was made by
the Court of Appeals on July
22, 1999.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N BACABAC SHOULD HAVE BEEN CREDITED WITH THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE (no)

RULING:
NO. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IS NOT CREDITED SINCE THERE WAS NO GRAVE
OFFENSE COMITTED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IN THE FIRST PLACE

As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave

offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following
Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication
of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degree."

The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a
bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "he was hit at [his] ear, not on
[his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is
petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated
in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
CASE 9: PEOPLE V. GONZALES TOPIC: COMPLETE ABSENCE OF
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • INOCENCIO • The appellant seeks a reversal
• NOEL GONZALES and prays that judgment be
ANDRES rendered exempting him from
• FELIBER criminal and civil liabilities
ANDRES
(victim)
• KENNETH
AND KEVIN
ANDRES
FACTS:

On October 31, 1998, a day intended to pay homage to the dead, the families of Noel Andres
(driving a maroon tamaraw fx with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, 2y/o son Kenneth, nephew
Kevin and sister-in-law Francar Valdez) and Inocencio Gonzalez (driving a white isuzu esteem
with his grandson and 3 housemaids) were both on their way to the exit of Loyola Memorial
Park when their vehicles almost collided at the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance.

Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. Gonzalez continued driving while Andres drove
behind and eventually cut the former off after finding an opportunity to do so, got out of his car
and knocked on the car window of Gonzalez. The shooting happened in a matter of seconds
and that it was preceded by a heated argument between the parties.

Both parties had different stories of what had happened next, but both leading to the death of
Feliber because of serious and mortal wounds by the gunshot on the head, injuries of
Kenneth and Kevin causing both to be hospitalized for 6 days, all due to the shot fired by
Inocencio Gonzalez with a glock cal. 9mm pistol.

• CHARGE
• Feliber did not die instantaneously for she was still able to give birth through caesarian
section to a baby girl and died the following day. Inocencio Gonzalez was charged
with and found guilty by the trial court of the complex crime of murder of Feliber
Andres, frustrated murder of Kevin and Kenneth and attempted murder of Noel Andres.
Hence, the petition for reversal and prayer to be exempt from criminal liability.

Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor
the children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him
backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right
hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired.

The single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The appellant
claims that he did not see the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is
corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the
windows of Andres’ vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would not be
able to see if there are people inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot
Noel Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly. The defense asserts that
the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of treachery and without the
attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime committed is homicide, not murder.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• The trial court found the accused guilty of the
complex crime of murder and two counts of
frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced
him to death. This case is before us on
automatic review.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N GONZALES IS GUILTY OF HOMICIDE OR MURDER? (HOMICIDE)
• IS GONZALES ENTITLED TO ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE? (no)

RULING:
Homicide and not Murder; No existence of Treachery
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by
treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and
not murder.

• The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They
were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the
memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near
collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was
augmented by the improvident use of a firearm.
• Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to
have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
• The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount
to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned
himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the
contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellant’s car was not
of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his
path.

ACCUSED GONZALES IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense,
were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender.
Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards the gate of the memorial park
while he was questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers
blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.

• The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this
mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2)
that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of
the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that (3) "the
passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
 lawlessness or revenge". Noel Andres’ act of shouting at the appellant’s son, who was
then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it
is claimed by the accused. Besides, the appellant’s son, Dino was shouting back at Noel
Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellant’s son appeared helpless and oppressed
that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres.

• The same holds true for the appellant’s claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres.
Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and
that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of
provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior
of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it
is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.

• The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the
appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino
Gonzalez.

• Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is
obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used,
the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use
of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have
reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The
use of a Gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
• For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and
Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its
medium period.

CASE 10: BONGALON V. PEOPLE TOPIC: FATHER’S LOVE AND DUTY

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• GEORGE • PEOPLE •
BONGALON
 FACTS:

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his
older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in
Legazpi City and that when the procession passed in front of the Bongalon’s house, the
Bongalon’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him
"sissy" and that BONGALON confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like
"strangers" and "animals" and that the also struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and
slapped Jayson on the face.

Furthermore, Bongalon went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their
father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner.

Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that
Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital.

The doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson
suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1
cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.

On his part, Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor
daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about
Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to
a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or
slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why
he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling
him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones
during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.

CHARGE
• On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing The CA affirmed the conviction, but
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered modified the penalty
finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is
hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N BONGALON was not guilty of Child Abuse (no)
• W/N that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he
 had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters. (yes, passion and obfuscation)

RULING:
BONGALON IS NOT GUILTY OF CHILD ABUSE BUT HE IS GUILTY OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
BONGALON struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-
quoted provisions.

• The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson
as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson.
• The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm
at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. It is not trite to
remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the
BONGALON was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment.

BONGALON IS ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION AND

OBFUSCATION
In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.

Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the
accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and
Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s
hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of
any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly,
with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
 DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code;
• (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and
• (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the costs of suit.

CASE 11: PEOPLE V. PAGAL TOPIC: PLEA OF GUILT,

PROVOCATION
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • PEDRO PAGAL •
• GAU GUAN • JOSE TORCELINO

FACTS:

That on or about December 26, 1969, in the City of Manila, Philippines, PAGAL and
TORCELINO, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, take
away from the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting P1,281.00. Philippine currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Gau Guan in the said sum of P1,281.00.

And the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and
carry away the said amount of P1,281.00, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy,
with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the said Gau Guan, by then and there stabbing him with
an icepick and clubbing him with an iron pipe on different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.

Contrary to law, and with the generic aggravating circumstances of (1) nightime purposely
sought to better accomplish their criminal design; (2) evident premeditation; (3) in disregard of
the respect due the offended party; and (4) with abuse of confidence, the accused being then
employees of the offended party.

When the case was called for arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused informed said
court of their intention to enter a plea of guilty provided that they be allowed afterwards to
prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.

After the trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
 • WHEREFORE, both accused are hereby found guilty beyond reasaonable doubt as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and there being proven the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation and disregard of respect
due the offended party offset only by the mitigating circumstance of their plea of
guilty,
• sentences each one of them to DEATH, jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Gau Guan; P15,000.00 for moral damages; P15,000.00 for exemplary
damages, all amounts to bear interest until they shall have been fully paid; the sum of
P1,281.00 represnting the amount taken from the victim; and to pay proportionately the
costs

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, the accused,
Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino
y Torazo were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N THERE IS CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED (yes)
• W/N THERE CAN BE A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE (plea of guilt)

RULING:
PAGAL IS AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY UPON HIS CONFESSION OF
GUILT IN HIS STATEMENT SIGNED BY HIM; EFFECT OF PLEA OF GUILT

The appellant Pedro Pagal contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of
robbery with homicide instead of declaring him liable only for his individual acts, claiming that
the record is bereft of any proof or evidence that he and his co-appellant Jose Torcelino
conspired to commit the crime of robbery with homicide.

• The appellant's position is not well-taken. His denial of conspiracy with his co-appellant
Jose Torcelino cannot be given credence in view of the clear and convincing
confession of his guilt in his statement signed by him before the police
investigators several hours after the commission of the crime.
• Besides, when he pleaded guilty to the charge, he is deemed to have admitted all the
material facts alleged in the information. By his plea, the appellant admitted not only
the commission of the crime but also the circumstances surrounding its
commission, including the allegations of conspiracy.

A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even
for a capital offense without the introduction of further evidence, the requisite proofs having
been supplied by the accused himself. We find, therefore, that the trial court did not commit any
error in convicting the appellant Pedro Pagal of the crime of robbery with homicide

NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE CAN BE AVAILED IN FAVOR OF PAGAL EXCEPT TO

HIS PLEA OF GUILT
The appellants further assail the trial court in not appreciating in their favor the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation. Again, the appellant’s'
contention is devoid of merit.

1. Firstly, since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the appellants
arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the
appellants by GAU GUAN, these two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as
two distinct and separate circumstances but should be treated as one.

2. Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime

which — as in the case at bar — is planned and calmly meditated before its execution.
Thus, in People vs. Daos, a case of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected the claim
of the appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in
their favor, because the death of the victim therein took place on the occasion of a
robbery, which, before its execution, had been planned and calmly meditated by the
appellants.

3. Thirdly, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against
them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation
in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately
proceeding the act. We hold that the trial court did not commit any error in not
appreciating the said mitigating circumstances in favor of the appellants.

DOCTRINES:
Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately
proceeding the act

DECISION:
• ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is modified and the appellants Pedro
Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcefino y Torazo are hereby sentenced to suffer each the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. With costs against the appellants
• It results that in the commission of the crime, there is only generic aggravating
circumstance, i.e., nighttime or nocturnity
• Robbery with homicide is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed
upon the appellants

CASE 12: PEOPLE V. IGNAS TOPIC: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

AND PASSION
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • JUNE IGNAS •
• NEMESIO
LOPATE

FACTS:
JUNE IGNAS is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad,Benguet,
where he operated a bakery. He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of
minor age. Wilma Grace used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by
Pauline Gumpic. Pauline had a brother,Nemesio Lopate. It was he whom appellant fatally shot.

Sometime in September 1995, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend, Romenda
Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate. On the evening of October 16,
1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila.

Romenda and Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
as she was leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio
checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room. All three of them
stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.

Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various
dates. Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma
Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio.

In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to reveal to JUNE IGNAS her affair
with Nemesio. It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom
friends written instructions, informed June Ignas about the extramarital affair between Wilma
Grace and Nemesio. June became furious. He declared that there will be a day for that
Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio. June then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda.

• At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness,
Annie Bayanes, a trader in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Witness Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan), conversing
with another dealer at the latters booth, when suddenly two gunshots shattered the
quiet evening.
• Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She
testified that she saw a person falling to the ground. Standing behind the fallen
individual, some 16 inches away, was another person who tucked a handgun into his
waistband and casually walked away.
• Initially, she only saw the gunman’s profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of
his face. She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she
was familiar with him as he was her townmate and had known him for several years.
Witness Bayanes was five or six meters away from the scene, and the taillight of a
parked jeepney, which was being loaded with vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of
the bagsakan, aided her recognition of appellant.
• Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified
that on hearing gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the
place where the gunfire came from. He saw people converging on a spot where a
bloodied figure was lying on the ground. Witness Manis saw that the fallen victim was
Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had known since Grade 2 in elementary school.
Manis then saw another person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from the
scene. He could not see the persons face very well, but from his gait and build, he
identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas. Manis said that
the scene was very dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing
vehicles, but he was familiar with appellants build, hairstyle, and manner of walking.

On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as
prosecution witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to
invite appellant to shed light on the slaying of Nemesio. The law enforcers found appellant
selling bread at Kayapa and brought him back to La Trinidad, Benguet.

• SPO4 Arthur Bomagao51 of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that
investigated the fatal shooting of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant
voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the victim with a .38 caliber handgun.
Bomagao further testified that appellant surrendered to him the letters of Wilma Grace,
wherein the latter admitted her affair with Nemesio.
• Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February
1996, he said, he entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma,
to operate a bakery in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya. He averred that he was baking bread
with Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio was killed. Under oath, appellant said
that he never left Kayapa since his arrival on March 8, 1996. He and Anoma were
engrossed in baking and marketing their produce, he testified, until the policemen from
La Trinidad brought him back to Benguet for questioning on March 14, 1996

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER.
• And considering the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, nighttime and
the special aggravating circumstance of
the use of an unlicensed firearm, without
any mitigating circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
ISSUE(S):
• Whether there are mitigating circumstances, which could modify the penalty of Ignas
(none)

RULING:
THERE IS COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF
IGNAS
Coming now to the obverse side of the case, is the appellant entitled to benefit from any
mitigating circumstance?

Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court
should have considered at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense as well as that of passion and obfuscation.

Passion and Obfuscation

• Appellant points out that the victim’s act of maintaining an adulterous relationship with
appellant’s wife constituted a grave offense to his honor, not to mention the shame,
anguish, and anxiety he was subjected to.
• Even the mere sight of the victim must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional
outburst on appellant’s part, so that even a chance meeting caused in him an irresistible
impulse powerful enough to overcome all reason and restraint. Secondly, appellant
 points out that the trial court failed to consider his voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance.

We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent.

• The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and
passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from
the same facts or motive.

In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he
could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him.

Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of
his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for
appellant to reflect and cool off.

Voluntary Surrender
Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as
a mitigating circumstance.

On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually
been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary.

Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for information to bring
the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then
went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to
Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the victim. Clearly, appellant’s claimed surrender
was neither spontaneous nor voluntary.

Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of homicide the penalty
imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on
appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum

DOCTRINES:
• The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and
passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same
facts or motive.
• The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense
when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold
that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellants favor.
DECISION:
 • WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
8, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED:
• Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
• There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.

CASE 13: NIZURTADO V. SANDIGANBAYAN TOPIC: RESTITUTION OF THE

QUESTIONED FUNDS
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• FELIX • SANDIGANBAYAN •
NIZURTADO

FACTS:

Felix Nizurtado (Nizurtado), Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Panghulo, received a check worth Php
10,000.00 from the Ministry of Human Settlements for the barangay. However, before it can be
encashed, the barangay must submit a resolution approved by the Barangay Council identifying
a livelihood project for the barangay.

Subsequently, several council meetings were held but the council was not able to agree on a
project. Later, Nizurtado asked the barangay treasurer, and a councilman, to sign an
unaccomplished resolution in mimeograph from stating that the project would be
barangay service center. Later, Nizurtado submitted the resolution to the Ministry of Human
Settlements which identified T-shirt manufacturing as the project.

However, it turned out that no meeting where T-shirt manufacturing was identified as the project
by the Barangay Council. In addition, the Php 10,000.00 which was received by Nizurtado
was not invested to the identified project but instead distributed as loans to Nizurtado
and some other councilmen.

Nizurtado was charged with the crime of malversation thru falsification of public document
under Article 171, par. 2.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

SANDIGANBAYAN RULING:
• the Court finds Felix Nizurtado y Victa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of malversation of public funds
committed through falsification of public
document
• The Sandiganbayan has considered the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary
 surrender and restitution in favor of
Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of Court Luisabel
Alfonso Cortez, on 17 January 1989, has certified
to the voluntary surrender of the accused
ISSUE(S):
• W/N NIZURTADO IS GUILTY OF MALVERSATION (YES)
• Whether or not petitioner is entitles to the mitigating circumstances that he claims (yes)

RULING:
NIZURTADO’s ACTS CLEARLY CONSTITUTED MISAPPROPRIATION

Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon,
Metro Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he received and later encashed a check for
P10,000.00, specifically intended by way of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood program;
and the funds had come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila
Commission and "Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."

Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a resolution of the
Barangay Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that a livelihood project, i.e.,
"T-shirt manufacturing," had already been identified by the council. The money, however,
instead of its being used for the project, was later lent to, along with petitioner, the members of
the Barangay Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted "misappropriation" within the
meaning of the law.

NIZURTADO IS ENTITLED TO 3 DISTINCT MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Art. 13, par. 3,
Revised Penal Code), entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances. Voluntary
surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be treated as a modifying
circumstance independent and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner.

• Voluntary surrender (1) (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be
treated as a modifying circumstance independent and apart from restitution of the
questioned funds (2) by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code). We are
convinced, furthermore, that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed (3), entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances.

AS TO THE PENALTY IMPOSED

The actual attendance of two separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and restitution, also found by the Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General,
entitles the accused to the penalty next lower in degree.

For purposes of determining that next lower degree, the full range of the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense, not merely the imposable penalty because of its complex nature, should, a
priori, be considered.

In fine, the one degree lower than prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum is
prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (being the next two periods in the scale of
penalties) the full range of which is six years and one day to ten years.
This one degree lower penalty should, conformably with Article 48 of the Code (the penalty for
complex crimes), be imposed in its maximum period or from eight years, eight months and one
day to ten years.

The presence of the third mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem (lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed) would result in imposing a period the court
may deem applicable.

• Considering, however, that the penalty has to be imposed in the maximum period, the
only effect of this additional mitigating circumstance is to impose only the
minimum portion of that maximum period, that is, from eight years, eight months and
one day to nine years, six months and ten days, from which range the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken.

DOCTRINES:
• Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be
treated as a modifying circumstance independent and apart from restitution of the
questioned funds by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code).
• The only effect of this additional mitigating circumstance is to impose only the minimum
portion of that maximum period

PROSEC NOTES:
The supreme court said restitution is akin to voluntary surrender. So aside from the real
voluntary surrender, another one shall be appreciated because he returned the funds. Such
restitution is akin to voluntary surrender and as such, shall be treated as another mitigating
circumstance
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Nizurtado for
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document is
AFFIRMED but the sentence, given the circumstances here obtaining, is MODIFIED by
imposing on petitioner a reduced indeterminate sentence of from two years, four months
and one day to eight years, eight months and one day, perpetual special disqualification
and a fine of P2,000.00.

CASE 14: MARIANO V. PEOPLE TOPIC: COURT DISCRETION NOT

TO APPLY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• REYNALDO • PEOPLE •
MARIANO

FACTS:

At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner
type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their
two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of
Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused,
Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their
helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just attended a worship service in Barangay
Engkanto.

The Toyota pick-up driven by MARIANO overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost
bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo
Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo.

Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him.
Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened
and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo
si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate
ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his

mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of
the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle,
thrown four (4) meters away and . Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie."
She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota
pick-up driven by Reynaldo.

On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand
stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters
away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which
he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand.
However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by
the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for
fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions.

After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo
proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the
incident.

Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall
and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the certification
issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount
of ₱50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt
dated September 15, 1999.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed
after trial, however, the RTC convicted decision on June 29, 2006, modifying
MARIANO of frustrated homicide the felony committed by the petitioner
from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries
 ISSUE(S):
• W/N CA IS CORRECT IN FINDING MARIANO AS GUILTY FOR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
• W/N the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance
in his favor

RULING:
YES. MARIANO IS LIABLE FOR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
• As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal
rate of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s
injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist
must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with
the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway
• Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of
the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from
his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries.

NO. MARIANO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY

SURRENDER

Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code,
expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

"The rationale of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:

x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary
from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in
order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have
ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the
mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis
of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article
64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with
no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries. The error should be avoided because no person should be
condemned to suffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for the offense
charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished
in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment. Injustice would
always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition
of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due process of law.
 DOCTRINES:
in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence
which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent,
and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the
penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what
We may call the mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On
the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article
64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no
aggravating circumstance to offset them
DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by CA, subject to the
modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and moral
damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.