Republic Act No.

4200, or the Anti-Wiretapping Law, was passed on June 19, 1965, to

Republic Act No. 4200, or the Anti-Wiretapping Law, was passed on June 19, 1965, to
safeguard the constitutional right to privacy of communication.
The law prohibits the tapping of any wire or cable or using other devices to record, intercept, or
secretly overhear any private communication or spoken word when it is unauthorized by all
parties in the conversation, except when it is done pursuant to a court order and complies with
all conditions imposed by the law.

Possession of any tape, wire, disc, or other record, or copies of an illegally obtained recording of
a private communication and replaying an illegal recording for another person or furnishing
transcripts of the communication, whether complete or partial, are also punishable by law.
According to the explanatory note in the Senate Bill No. 9 introduced by Sen. Lorenzo Tañada
in 1962, the law also intends to stop the practice of government officials of spying on each other
—a “most obnoxious instrument of oppression or arbitrary power.”

Any illegally obtained recordings are inadmissible in any judicial, quasijudicial, administrative,
and legislative hearings or investigations.
Direct participants to the wiretapping and anyone who aids, permits, or causes the violation are,
upon conviction, punished by imprisonment of not less than six months or more than six years.
If the offender is a public official at the time of the offense, he shall be penalized with perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office. If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be subject to
deportation.

GAANAN vs IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of
the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No.
4200
Held:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party
or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their

purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.  

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,”
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced
a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other
reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based
was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From
the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and
void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party
is a violation of R.A. 4200.
 
Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall
be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even
those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
 
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
     Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to
the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment
shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters,
lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left
eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight.
During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
 
ISSUES:
       1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping.
    2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated in favor of the accused.
HELD:
    1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made.
    The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.
    2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused,
constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The
provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be
sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be
accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro
after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill
the latter.
 
 
 
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008 Ponente:
Puno 
FACTS: A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to destabilize the
administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was alleged to have been
audio-taped through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary Raul
Gonzales of the Department of Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who are in possession
of copies of the said conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies and/or
publishers that they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release
strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the same – that the
broadcasting/airing of such information shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued by the
Commission. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition against respondent Chavez
and NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition for the
nullification of the acts, issuances and orders of respondents – as they were outright
violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of
the press. 
HELD: Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated
by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,
which limits speech once a rational connection has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a
standard when courts balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and (c)
the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil
the government has a right to prevent. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law.
However, respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger
test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the
voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
“complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of
its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether
its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law. We rule that not every violation of a law
will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. The need
to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free
press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.

G.R. No. 179736 : June 26, 2013. SPOUSES BILL AND

FACTS: Spouses Hing alleged that they are the registered owners of a
parcel of land adjacent to Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo)
owned by Choachuy. The latter constructed an auto-repair shop building
to the adjacent land. Aldo filed a case against Hing for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, alleging that Hing
were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building. Said application for
preliminary injunction was denied. Choachuy illegally set-up and
installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing Hing’s property. Thus, Hing filed an
application for a TRO or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
Choachuy, which was granted by the RTC. Choachuy claimed that they
did not install the video surveillance cameras and also clarified that they
are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders and later on filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted by the CA. Hence the
filing of the instant petition 

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioner’s right to

HELD: The SC gives merit to the petition. The right to privacy is defined
as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or
from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an
individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is
not necessarily concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right
to be let alone.” The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only
certain individuals are allowed to enter. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code,
on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides
a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by
other individuals. It states that: Art. 26. Every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of
another’s residence; This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his
castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by
others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the
latter.” The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,”
however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: Our Code specifically
mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not
mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the
law covers also “similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same
privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals
as are allowed to enter may come in. Thus, an individual’s right to
privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or
even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as
his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on
his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application
of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. The Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223
are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.