G.R. No.

139405            March 13, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent.
Before us is a petitioner for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 dated February 3,
1999 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution2 dated October 20, 1998 denying herein respondent's Motion to Dismiss
the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 and the Resolution3 dated July 23, 1999
which denied petitioner's urgent motion for reconsideration.
On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile
co-accused, Jose T. Marcelo,4 were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in an Information5 that reads:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and
Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private
corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over
parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban
Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50
hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and
conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as the
consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time
was P862,150.00 thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted
benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
government in the amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in
Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by
prescription; and
2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Constante A.
Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to
Dismiss the Information ruling that:
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription
of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983,
122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office also
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on
January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate
investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an
allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating
body which investigated this case, to enable us to determine with certainty if the offense
charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the
proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts
and circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and
2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in
San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed
of sale as not illegal and with justly adequate consideration.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10,
1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent
on the ground of prescription. It ruled thus:
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificador's Motion to Dismiss. We applied Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA
538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office or investigating
body interrupts the running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an
oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, . . ., We utilized Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows
that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained
in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. x x x
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held
that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings"
and do not include administrative proceedings. x x x
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6,
1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan
on July 23, 1999.
Hence, the petition.
In its Brief,6 the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the
provision of Act No. 33267 on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is
not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019
provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses
committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years.
However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state exactly when the fifteen-
year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code should be
applied suppletorily.8 Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which adopts the
"discovery rule" for the prescription of offenses, provides:
ARTICLE 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as
discovered only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez. Hence, the filing of the information on October 27, 1988 with the
Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive period.
Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply
in this case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts
which prevented the discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption
that the registration of the Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document
was executed by the parties, and thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole
world of the existence of the said Deed of Sale, the registration thereof could not have
given notice of fraudulent acts of the parties to the sale. The situation prevailing at that
time, that is, during the authoritarian regime of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, did
not permit the investigative and prosecuting arms of the government to institute
complaints against him, his wife and his cronies.
In his Comment,9 respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of
Sale in question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the
fact of registration of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only
of its existence but also of all the facts contained therein, that, aside from the ground of
prescription, the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the
ground that it does not charge an offense inasmuch as the issue of whether or not the
contract of sale was disadvantageous to the government had long been settled in the case
of San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,10 and that the dismissal
of the criminal case against him by the Sandiganbayan on the ground of prescription is
tantamount to acquittal which bars prosecution of the respondent for the same offense
under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription
of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan,11 this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied
by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case
involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly
recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,12 we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis
ours)
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period
shall commence to run on the day it was committed
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975
to January 6, 1976." Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides
that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It
appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P.
Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period
of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to
the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the
crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.
The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the
time it was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the
Information should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then
Solicitor General, Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale
dated December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel
Corporation to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in
the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original
Certificate of Title No. 0440 in the name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled
and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the
vendee Philippine Smelters Corporation. On February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters
Corporation even filed an action for quieting of title with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2882,13 which case forms the
basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the subject Deed of Sale may be deemed
registered on the said date, at the latest.14
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its
commission, the registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds
constitutes constructive notice thereof to the whole world including the petitioner. Well
entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate
registry is a notice thereof to the whole world. The registration is a constructive notice of
its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains.15 Hence, even if the period of
prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when
the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. 16 The
said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes
which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.
In the case of People v. Moran,17 this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of
limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the
offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence,
for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of
the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
which it destroys proofs of guilt.
The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v.
Duque18 and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto19 wherein we upheld the view that the prescriptive period started to run only
upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the acts constituting the offense. The first case
involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the accused, Napoleon Duque, was found
to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants as a registered employment
agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Due to
the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive period began to run
not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from the time his
recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have been
carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second,
or Desierto case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the
grant of alleged behest loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial
institutions to several individuals and corporations closely associated with the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his relatives. It was alleged that the public officials
concerned, who were charged in the corresponding Informations, connived or conspired
with the beneficiaries of the loans in covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the
circumstances, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made. The
prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery of the alleged illegality of the
transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show
how the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any
illegality in the transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no
allegation that the government officials involved in the transactions connived or
conspired with respondent Pacificador. The said government officials were not even
charged in the instant Information. On the other hand, it was never disputed by the
petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Camarines Norte and that the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee, Philippine Smelters Corporation.20
In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by
the respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 101724. July 3, 1992.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and

CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME; COMMENCES FROM DATE OF

VIOLATION OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. — The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that
"the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of
the period of prescription." Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to
recommend approval of his application for free patent (which both of them denied doing),
the date of the violation, for the purpose of computing the period of prescription, would
be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the
"crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes’ application for a free patent in January 1976
or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10)
years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio’s complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed
late. Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and
issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration
being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run
its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and
more than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the
Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the information therein.

3. ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The reason for the extinction of the State’s right to
prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the criminal
action, is that: "Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a
surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its
discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are
founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs
necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond
availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy
evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after completion,
when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity." (22 CJS
573-574.). "In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations
begins to run on the commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is
discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the
crime is complete."
4. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT) AS AMENDED BY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 195; FIFTEEN (15) YEAR
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION, NOT RETROACTIVE. — Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by
increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be
given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January
1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the
substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A.
3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply
B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already
been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EX POST FACTO LAW, DEFINED.

— An ex post facto law is defined as: "A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or
commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations
of such fact or deed. It is a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a
person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes
the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a
law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they
have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1,
5." (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)

6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION; NEGATED BY SANDIGAN’S CORRECT APPLICATION OF B.P.
195 TO CASE AT BAR. — Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution
(Sec. 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible
error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of
R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982.
The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which
were committed after the approval of B.P. Blg. 195.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
resolution promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the
private respondent’s motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime
charged.

Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the
Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent
had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986 (p.
235, Rollo). Gelacio’s complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he
was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67,
with an area of 1,391 sq.m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

On February 23, 1989, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of
Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on,
and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not
serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City
Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex parte. He
recommended that an information be filed in court. His recommendation was approved
by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the following information in the
Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:

"That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of
his public position, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and
induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to
violate an existing rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by
misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an application filed by the accused
with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that
the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused’s personal
misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant
for a free patent, a report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given
by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a
decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the
accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest." (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)

Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the
information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been denied his
right to a preliminary investigation, Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition
for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 193
SCRA 464), but we denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file
a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move
to quash the information before being arraigned.

On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed;

2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared by the Tanodbayan

and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid for lack of notice to
him of the preliminary investigation conducted by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M.
Brocoy and Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez; and

3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation.

After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
on August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the
offense charged. The Sandiganbayan’s ratiocination of its resolution is quoted below:

"The crime charged is alleged to have been committed `on or about January 21, 1976’
when the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands
that the land subject of the herein movant’s Application for a Free Patent was disposable
land. This misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the issuance of a Torrens Title under a
Free Patent to the herein accused-movant. This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to
the public interest because the land in question had been reserved for a school site and
was, therefore, not disposable.

"Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused
had allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands Inspector to violate
existing law, rules and regulations by recommending approval of the free patent
application.

"The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime
(January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A.
No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution seems to agree with
the movant’s statement as to the term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that
the period of prescription should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the
complaint was allegedly filed by the Republic for the cancellation of the title.

"The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have commenced to
run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and induced the
Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the
accused for a free patent?
"The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of public
documents, prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of Deeds when
the existence of the document and the averments therein theoretically become a matter of
public knowledge.

"The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands Inspector
allegedly applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may have been unknown
to others besides the two of them because their interaction would presumably have been
private. The fact of the improper segregation of the piece of land in question and the
grant thereof to the accused, however, became, presumptively at least, a matter of public
knowledge upon the issuance of a Torrens Title over that parcel of non-disposable public
land.

"4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on May 28, 1976 when
the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title No. 8379 in
the name of the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on the school site
reservation;

"5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice duly
given to the various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the Department
(Ministry) of Agriculture and the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby specially
because it is the Bureau of Lands which files the approved patent application with the
Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was indeed reserved for a school site, then the
Department (Ministry) of Education would also know or would be presumed to know."
(pp. 28-33, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison) who was
supposedly induced by Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by
recommending approval of Paredes’ free patent application was not charged with a crime.
The Sandiganbayan

"It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of the law, rules or
regulation by the Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school site had been
titled in the name of the alleged inducer Pimentel), the beneficiary thereof could not have
been suspected of having induced the violation itself. It would be grossly unfair and
unjust to say that prescription would run in favor of the Lands Inspector who had actually
violated the law but not to the public official who had benefitted therefrom and who may
have, therefore, instigated the favorable recommendation for the disposition of non-
disposable land.

"In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted." (p. 36,
Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the
computation of the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by
Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:

"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy."

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes
the operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).

Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his
application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation,
for the purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his
application on January 21, 1976.

The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the
filing of Paredes’ application because no one could have known about it except Paredes
and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed:
"it is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . .
other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of
the land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed,
practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the
application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its
location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description; (3) the
regional director who assessed the application and determined the land classification; (4)
the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary
who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was
nondisposable public agricultural land.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of
Paredes’ application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced
Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986.
Gelacio’s complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.

The reason for the extinction of the State’s right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the
statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that:

"Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are
considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal
theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the
government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of
accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. They serve, not only to
bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for
crimes a reasonable time after completion, when no further danger to society is
contemplated from the criminal activity." (22 CJS 573-574.)

"In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on
the commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is discovered or
when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the crime is
complete." (22 CJS 585; Emphasis ours.)

Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and
issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration
being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run
its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and
more than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the
Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the information therein.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11
of R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes
in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of
the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11,
R.A. 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.

"Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where

the statute fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the
limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is
a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed
within the time prescribed." (22 CJS 574.)

"Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a

prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense." (People v.
Allen, 118 P 2d, 927; Emphasis supplied.)

"Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to
crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People v. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine v. State,
24 Tex 61; Emphasis ours.)

To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter
his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post
facto law is defined as:

"A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art.
I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass `any ex post facto law.’ Most all
state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

"An ‘ex post facto law’ is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of
punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a
law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that
changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense
or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v.
Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5." (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes
may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6)
years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period
under that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed after the
approval of B.P. Blg. 195.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The resolution dated
August 1, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A statute of limitations is an enactment that sets the maximum time after an event that
legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated. It is a defense that is ordinarily
asserted by the defendant to defeat an action brought against him after the appropriate
time has elapsed.
*****
The essence of the statute of limitations has been explained by the Supreme Court in the
case of Conspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144, 151, as follows: "It is the essence of the statute
of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the possession or not, if he entered
under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period (ten years) named
in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who had the better title is
barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not
depend upon, and has no necessary connection with, the validity of the claim under which
the possession is held. Otherwise there could be no use for the statute of limitations or
adverse possession as a defense to an action, for if the decision is made to depend upon
the validity of the respective titles set up by the plaintiff and the defendant, there can be
no place for the consideration of the question of adverse possession. It is because the
plaintiff has a better title that the defendant is permitted to rely upon such uninterrupted
possession, adverse to the plaintiff's title, as the statute prescribes, it being well
understood and an element in such cases, that the plaintiff does have the better title, but
that he has lost it by delaying asserting it. (Probst vs. Presbyterian Church, 129 U.S.,
182)”.
*****
One reason for statutes of limitation is that, over time, evidence can be corrupted or
disappear, memories fade, crime scenes are changed, and companies dispose of records.
The best time to bring a lawsuit is while the evidence is not lost and as close as possible
to the alleged illegal behavior. Another reason is that people want to get on with their
lives and not have legal battles from their past come up unexpectedly. The injured party
has a responsibility to quickly bring about charges so that the process can begin. The
purpose of the law on prescription and the statute of limitations is to protect the person
who is diligent and vigilant in asserting his right, and conversely to punish the person
who sleeps on his right. The statute of limitations applies both in civil and in criminal
cases. They are also known as periods of prescription.
*****
For civil cases, the defendant must plead the defense before thecourt upon answering the
plaintiff's complaint. If the defendant does not doso, he is regarded as having waived the
defense and will not be permitted touse it in any subsequent proceedings. Article 1139 of
the Civil Code providesthat an action prescribes by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
Here areexamples of prescriptive periods: (a) real action over immovables: 30 years;(b)
an action upon a written contract, or upon an obligation created by law, orupon a
judgment:  10 years; (c) actionsfor the recovery of movables: 8 years; (d) actions upon an
oral contract, orupon a quasi contract: 6 years; (e) actions for the rescission or annulment
ofcontracts: 4 years; (f) forcible entry and unlawful detainer: 1 year.
*****
For criminal cases, this means that the public prosecutor must prosecute within some time
limit. Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code (our laws on crimes) provides that crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) or reclusion temporal (12
years and 1 day to 20 years)shall prescribe in 20 years; crimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties(such as perpetual disqualification and prision mayor –
imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years) shall prescribe in 15 years; those
punishable by a correctional penalty (6months and 1 day to 6 years)  shall prescribe in 10
years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months),which shall prescribe in 5 years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall
prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in
six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months.
*****
Penalties also prescribe. Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides the following
prescriptive periods for penalties: (a) Death and reclusion perpetua, 20 years; (b) other
afflictive penalties, 15 years; (c)correctional penalties, 10 years; with the exception of the
penalty of arrestomayor, which prescribes in 5 years; (d) light penalties, 1 year. The
period ofprescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culpritshould evade the service of his sentence.
*****
It must be noted, however, that there are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil
Code. One is acquisitive, i.e. the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time. (Art. 1106,
par. 1). The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by
the lapse of time. (Arts. 1106, par. 2 and 1139.) This latter kind is what is known as
statute of limitations which we are talking about here.
*****
The differences between acquisitive and extinctive prescriptions are well-stated as
follows: "Prescription was a statute of limitations. Whereas …. (acquisitive prescription)
expressly 'vests the property' and raiseda new title in the occupant, prescription did
nothing more than bar the right of action. The concept most fundamental to a system of
title by possession isthat the relationship between the occupant and the land in terms of
possessionis capable of producing legal consequences. In other words, it is the
possessorwho is the actor. Under a statute of limitations, however, one does not look
tothe act of the possessor but to the neglect of the owner. In the former theimportant
feature is the claimant in possession, and in the latter it is theowner out of possession
which controls." (Montgomery, Prescriptive Acquisitionof Land Titles, XXVI, Philippine
Law Journal, 353, 356-357 [1951].)
*****
Examples ofacquisitive prescription appear in Article 1132 of the Civil Code which
statesthat the ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession forfour
years in good faith; the ownership of personal property also prescribesthrough
uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-948-MTJ (Loreto P. Cabelic vs. Judge Isagani A. Geronimo,
MTCC-Branch 2, Antipolo City.)
In a Sworn Letter-Complaint dated June 16, 2000, Loreto P. Cabelic charges respondent
Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Antipolo
City with Gross Ignorance of the Law in relation to Criminal Case No. 00-0329 for Slight
Physical Injuries entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Neil Martinez".
Complainant Cabelic avers that he was manhandled by the son of the owner of La Pacita
Biscuit, his former employer in Antipolo City, hence he filed a criminal case for slight
physical injuries and grave coercion before the Prosecutor's Office which referred the
same to the barangay authorities of Mambugan, Antipolo.No settlement was reached and
the barangay chairman returned the case to the Prosecutor's Office.A criminal case for
Slight Physical Injuries penalized under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code was
eventually filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Antipolo, Branch 2 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0329.The said case was assigned/raffled to respondent
Judge Isagani A. Geronimo .In the Order dated February 29, 2000, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case on the ground of prescription. He was of the opinion that the
crime of slight physical injuries is a light offense which prescribes in two months
pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, since the criminal case was filed
only on February 14, 2000, or more than sixty days from October 9, 1999, the date of the
alleged incident, the case had prescribed. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the respondent judge's order but the same was denied. Respondent judge stated that the
filing of the criminal action with the Office of the Public Prosecutor did not stop the
running of the period of prescription. Said order of denial was no longer questioned
before a higher court.
In this administrative case, herein complainant now charges respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law. He is of the view that the filing of the criminal case for slight
physical injuries with the Prosecutor's Office on November 3, 1999 tolled the running of
the prescriptive period.
In his Comment, respondent judge explained that the criminal case for slight physical
injuries falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and therefore the interruption of the
prescriptive period under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does
not apply.
The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative case.
He opined that the filing of the case with the Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period as such filing is not filing directly in court. The
proceeding that would have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with
the MTCC of Antipolo City, Rizal on February 14, 2000 citing the case of Luz Zaldivia
vs. Judge Andres Reyes.[1]He further stated that even assuming that respondent judge
erred in his interpretation of the law, the matter is judicial in nature for which an
administrative complaint against him would not lie.
We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator only insofar as the
dismissal of the instant case is concerned. We take exception to the conclusion of the
Court Administrator that "the filing of the case with the prosecutor's office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as such filing is not filing directly in
court" and that the "judicial proceeding that would have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the MTCC of Antipolo City, Rizal, which was done on 14
February 2000, after the crime had already prescribed."
It should be noted that the criminal case filed with the Prosecutor's Office was one for
slight physical injuries which carries with it the penalty of arresto menor under the
Revised Penal Code.[2]The penalty of arresto menor, which has a duration of one day to
thirty days,[3] is a light penalty.[4]Being a light offense, the crime of slight physical injuries
prescribes in two months.[5] On this point, respondent judge was correct.
The question now is whether the filing of the criminal action with the Public
Prosecutor's Office suspended or tolled the running of the period of prescription.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall be
"interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. "Notably, the said article does
not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the merits. However, this Court, in the case of
Reodica vs. Court of Appeals[6] declared that the filing of the complaint even with the
fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations citing the cases of
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals[7] and People vs. Cuaresma.[8]
In the Reodica case, it was further declared that Section 9 [9] of the Rule on Summary
Procedure which provides that in cases covered thereby, "the prosecution commences by
the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC" cannot
be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a
complaint or information directly with said court. This Court ruled therein that in case of
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the
Revised Penal Code which is a substantive law, the latter prevails.
The Zaldivia case cited by the Court Administrator is not controlling. What was involved
therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance where the applicable law was not Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code but Act No. 3326[10] as amended. Hence, the Court, in said
case, held that the period of prescription was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Thus, on this score, it is clear that the respondent judge erred in declaring that the crime
of slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of the complaint before the
prosecutor's office did not toll or suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge made an erroneous interpretation of the
law, the matter is judicial in nature. Well-entrenched is the rule that a party's remedy, if
prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing
court, and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative
complaint.[11]
Moreover, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a
judge deemed aberrant or irregular. The administrative case cannot be used as a remedy
to challenge the assailed order or decision rendered by respondent judge nor can it be
used as a substitute for other judicial remedies.[12]Administrative liability for ignorance of
the law does not necessarily arise from the mere fact that a judge issued an order that may
be adjudged to be erroneous.[13] He may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision. The rule is settled that it is only when a judge acts
fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are called for.[14]The
error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, an erroneous order or decision is presumed to have been
issued in good faith.[15]
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court Administrator, this administrative case is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity

as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO
SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases"
appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that
is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation
conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. —
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference
is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF
MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it is clearly provided in the Rule on
Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation
of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS
ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. — Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a
prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if
he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326.
— This interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party."
The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW;
PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court
feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS
INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it
is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable
rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The
remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected.
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez,
in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez
on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
the denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the
following cases:
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances:
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00),
or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil
liability arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided,
however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before
the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory
period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing
with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint
with the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived
at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the
other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the
revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases"
appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that
is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation
conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference
is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor
from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides
to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date
before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision
would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave
oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could
have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2,
1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 169588               October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager
and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial
Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN
DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City
Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to
render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando
City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma
Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin
Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624
owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended
at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which
was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00
for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the
respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B.
Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003,
along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey
Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan
Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was
earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing
the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and
value which is ₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the
declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other.
Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-
1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was
eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary
investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed
a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees
with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-
respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He
admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that
the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further
that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that
he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp
with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he
filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La
Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case
of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against
respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of
Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things
are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel
clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the
prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000
which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents,
except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only
by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for
violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the
corresponding informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there,
with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly
dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin
Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for
violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of
private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such
clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other
accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash
and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation
sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of
criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-
2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May
7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was
filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the
alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in
this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was
filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the
February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period
of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed
only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal
complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply 14 on
April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order
granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the
ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been
extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations
of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that
(Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec.
1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH
PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS
AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent
judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in
court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the
complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in
their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal
action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged
unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City,
not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning
point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure.
Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal
cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and
procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary
Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed
Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of
municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court
as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand,
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as
aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the
offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely
abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides
that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in
Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date
of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7,
2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2,
2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7,
through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional
Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by
the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be
interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000)
against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7,
ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated February
10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission
of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter
Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the
violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming
arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered
cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in
dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds
for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged
constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense,
were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner
had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil
liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling
in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal
the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground.
The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on
which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation
proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for
Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period
of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months
for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized:
Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are
those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or
component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by
Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 29 this
Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909,
otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v.
Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was
committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference
is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31 categorically stated that
Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan
referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of
the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information.
They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by
filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation
of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information.
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the
discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not
err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need
not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient
if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in
which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution
for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a
deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged,
e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with
the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of
prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the
time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint
or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff
and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution
Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed.
Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San
Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt.
Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated
to file the Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as
amended.1âwphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it
resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the
doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also
upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia
also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.