WEEK # 11 - DAY 1

Overview of Succession

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
A. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTS

1. ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-15499, February 28, 1962, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

The transmission of the property, rights and obligations to the heirs takes effect upon the death of the decedent. (Art. 777) Thus,
at the time of death of the decedent, the heirs shall automatically be considered as co-owners of a property which is co-owned by
the decedent with other people. As such, should the co-owned property be sold by any of the co-owners, the heirs may exercise
the right of legal redemption embodied in Art. 1620.

2. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC OF
SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA BRANCH 31, respondents.
G.R. No. 162784. June 22, 2007. PUNO, C.J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Upon the death of the original buyer, the estate of the decedent must be taken into consideration as the next person to fulfill the
obligation to pay, because juridical personality is acquired by the estate where it may continue the transmissible obligations and
 rights of the decedent.

3. Estate of Hemady v Luzon Surety

G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956, REYES, J. B. L., J.:
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

The solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the creditor had the right to file against
the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.

4. ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, Petitioner -versus – INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, Respondent

G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948, HILADO, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The estate of a deceased is a person in legal contemplation which is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own, the
purpose of which is to enable the disposition of the assets.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
A. SUBJECTS OF SUCCESSION

5.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO WITH APPLICATION FOR
CHANGE OF NAME OF ADOPTEE FROM “JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO” TO “JAN AUREL BULAYO
KIMURA”
G.R. No. 205752. October 1, 2019. Bersamin, C.J.
 By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Jan Aurel was a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree of Mary Jane. Excluding an illegitimate child from the
contemplation of Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) of R.A. No. 8552 is tantamount to saying that it is easier for an alien spouse to jointly
adopt with the Filipino spouse the latter's cousin, a relative within the fourth degree, or the nephew or niece, a relative within the
third degree of consanguinity or affinity,' than the Filipino spouse's own biological child. An illegitimate child is a relative within
the first civil degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew and niece, an illegitimate child belongs to the
direct maternal lineage, which is never uncertain, and which is not as remote as the nephew and niece.

6.
DR. NIXON L. TREYES, PETITIONER, V. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L.
LARLAR, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020, CAGUIOA, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the
compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for
recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without
the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
SUBJECTS OF SUCCESSION - CAPACITY TO SUCCEED

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
 By: Liban, Clarisse M.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.

7. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA
RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979, AQUINO, J.

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

For one to be capacitated to succeed, he or she must be living at the time succession opens pursuant to Art. 1025 of the Civil
Code except in cases of representation, when it is proper. The Court ruled that since there was no nephew pursuing an
ecclesiastical career at the time of the death of the testator pursuant to his will, legal or intestate succession shall take place under
Art. 960 of the Civil Code and no charitable trust was created in favor of the parish priest of Victoria.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
OBJECT OF SUCCESSION

8. Reyes v Dimagiba,
G.R. No. L-5620, July 31, 1954
By: Resus, Jarvin David

General Rule is that properties alienated before the death of the decedent cannot be validly claimed by the heirs because the
rights to succession are transmitted at the moment of death. An exception exists where the alienation is subsequently declared
 void. Thus, even if the property is sold, it shall still form part of the object of succession, and of the estate.

9. ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-appellant

G.R. No. L-8437, 28 November 1956, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him;
however, these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. The heirs, by virtue of the rights of
succession, are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to
a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased.

10.
LEON GUINTO VS. SANTIAGO MEDINA (DECEASED), DOMINADOR MEDINA ET AL.

50 O.G. #1 p. 199, October 7, 1953 , DIZON, J.

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

Heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. The action to recover damages survives despite the
death of the adverse party whom damages are sought to be recovered.

In this case, the heirs of the deceased defendant are liable to pay the damages as they are merely substituted in the place of latter upon
his death. However, their liability is only to the extent of the value of the property, which they might have received from the deceased
defendant.

11. NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF
MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.

G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, MENDOZA, J:

 By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

When there is an implied trust, it shall be subject to collation as provided under Art. 1061 of the Civil Code which states that each
compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, shall bring into the mass of the estate any property or right that he
may have received from the decedent, during the decedent’s lifetime, which was made by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title for the purpose that such properties or rights may be computed to determine the legitime of each heir and in the
account of the partition.

12.
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, et. al., Petitioners -versus – HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, et. al.,
Respondents

G.R. No. 166748 September 14, 2011, MENDOZA, J

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

When a Deed of Sale executed by the decedent in favor of his other heirs is void, the subject properties are properly included in a
subsequent Extrajudicial Partition of the estate without the need for a prior independent action to rescind or annul the Deed of
Sale, as such deed produces no effect whatsoever, and an action to declare such deed void is imprescriptible. Thus, in this case,
where the Deed of Sale was declared absolutely simulated and void, the Extrajudicial Partition distributing the subject properties
therein should be upheld.

13.
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, v. JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD,
AND SPOUSES JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY CRUZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 198434, 29 February 2016,
PERALTA, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

 Pursuant to Articles 774, 776, and 781 of the New Civil Code, succession as a mode of acquisition of contains a person’s
property, rights and obligations to the value of the inheritance which are transmitted through death or by law, such that
inheritance include those property, rights, and obligations which were not extinguished by death and those which existed at the
time of death that have accrued since the opening of succession. Thus, the respondents as heirs of Sergio are liable to settle the
transmissible obligations, including the amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of Sergio’s estate.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
OPENING OF SUCCESSION AND ITS EFFECTS

14. ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors, petitioners, vs. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the
Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents
G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976, FIRST DIVISION, MARTIN, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Under Article 777 of the New Civil Code, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
The determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance of the deceased is the moment of death.
Therefore, the claim or right of the deceased over the parcels of land in litigation were transmitted to her heirs upon her death and
was not extinguished by reason of her death.

15.
MARGARITA SALVADOR, in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-fact of CANDIDA SALVADOR, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, DOMINADOR CARDENAS, REMEDIOS CABRERA, ALBERTO M. K.
JAMIR and SIMEON ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
 G.R. No. L-25952, June 30, 1967, BENGZON, J.P., J.:

By: Borra Filipino

Should a plaintiff die pending action, the reward of such action shall benefit the estate. The reward is also subject to its debts and
obligations. The heirs cannot distribute the reward of such action without the debts of the estate being first satisfied.

Here, pending action, Salvador died. The heirs substituted him in the action for reconveyance. After the favorable judgment over
the reconveyed properties, the heirs cannot deny the liabilities over the properties by claiming that the reward was conveyed to
them as heirs. The properties, being a reward of the action by Salvador, forms part of the estate, so are the debts attached thereto.

16.
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner -versus- PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC.,
represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent

G.R. No. 177066, September 11, 2009, NACHURA, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

The heirs of a shareholder do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation upon the shareholder's death and take on
the rights and privileges of the deceased as a shareholder of the corporation; instead, the shares must first be distributed to the
heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the shares must be recorded in the corporation's books.

17. OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008, BRION, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

 Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, upon one’s death, her heirs acquire legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in a corporation),
and they are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof. However, the transfer of title by means of succession,
though valid between the decedent’s estate and her heirs, does not bind the corporation and third parties unless such transfer is
registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition.

18. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO JOSE DE BORJA , administrator-appellee, JOSE DE BORJA, as
administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees -versus- TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, appellant

G.R. No. L-28040, August 18, 1972, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the causante or
predecessor in interest (Article 777, Civil Code), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir.

19. JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of
Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, Petitioners - versus -
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH
CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix,
and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their behalf, Respondents.

G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004, CORONA, J.

 By: Areta, Karen M.

The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without the order of the probate or intestate court is
void and passess no title to the purchaser. An heir can only alienate allotted portions made by the probate or estate court after
final adjudication. Prior to that, he may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate.

In this case, the heirs sold specific properties. The sale of the decedent’s shares of stock is null and void.

20. Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II,
RAMON R. SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by
ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C.

In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.

21. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS. VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS,
ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right. The rights and obligations the
decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the
liability affecting their common ancestor.

22. HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, NAMELY: ROSARIO M. DANGSALAN, EVELYN M. SANGALANG, NENITA M.
 SALES, ERNESTO JOSE MORALES, JR., RAYMOND MORALES, AND MELANIE MORALES, Petitioners, vs.
ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 224849, June 06, 2018, REYES, JR. J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The rights to the succession are transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of death of the decedent. Hence, the heir is
not barred from disposing his or her aliquot share immediately after such death in favor of whomever he or she chose.

23. SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners -versus- HEIRS OF RESURRECCION
MARTINEZ FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 240199, April 10, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Under Article 777 of the New Civil Code om relation to P.D. 1529 and the Rules of Court, an heir may dispose and transfer his or
her share but before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title of the property in his or her name, a final
order of distribution of the estate or order in anticipation of the distribution issued by the testate or intestate court is required.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
REQUISITES FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS

24. MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND
FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

 By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested.

25. TORIBIA FONTANILLA PACIO, SANTIAGO PACIO, ESPERANZA PACIO, and ROSARIO PACIO,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MANUELA PACIO BILLON, BRIGIDA PACIO, and DOMINGA PACIO, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-15088, January 31, 1961, BENGZON, J.:

By: Berame. Julius Ernhest P.

Under the old Civil Code a donation propter nuptias of real property should be in a public instrument. Such a donation, if made
in a private document, is not valid even between the parties.

26.
HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON, JOVENCIA REGANON, MENCIA REGANON, JOSEFA REGANON, VIOLETA
REGANON, and FLORA REGANON, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. RUFINO IMPERIAL, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-24434, January 17, 1968, BENGZON, J.P., J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

The rights to succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death. As such, when the estate is not burdened with any
debts, by force of law the said heir immediately succeeds to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the properties of his
predecessor. Moreover, the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution, even
if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts.

27.
FILEMON RAMIREZ, MONICA RAMIREZ, and JOSE EGUARAS, Plaintiffs-appellants -versus- ARTEMIO
 BALTAZAR, ET AL., Defendants-appellees

G.R. No. L-25049, August 30, 1968, ANGELES, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, the Supreme Court
has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration.

28. JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO ONG vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON
CITY
G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, PARAS, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantive rights to
dispose of one’s ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between his and the other heirs/co-owners. It was
explained in this case that it is an ideal share, not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with the death of petitioner’s
husband, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code).

WEEK # 11 - DAY 2

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
WILLS
 29. ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA
FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990, SARMIENTO, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined
as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death."

In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No.
35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
CHARACTERISTICS

30.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, petitioners, vs HON. AMOR A.
REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO,
respondents.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, AZCUNA, J.

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

 The holographic will of the decedent although may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument must be probated, as it
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is entirely written, dated and signed by the decedent himself.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines and need not be witnessed.

31. Baltazar v Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012 Del Castillo, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

The very existence of the will is prima facie proof of that the testatrix willed that her estate be distributed in the manner
provided therein. It is incumbent that the desire be given full effect. Bare allegations of duress of fear or threat, undue or
improper influence or pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as a basis to deny probate.

32. TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. PEDRO DE
LA CRUZ, ET AL. , oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-24819, May 30, 1969, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

When a will is contested, the subscribing with are regarded as the best qualified to testify on its due execution. However, for a
testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit, the testimony must be reasonable and unbiased and it must not be
overcome by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. The law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental
witnesses, it also demands that they are credible.

33. RAMON OZAETA, ET.AL, Petitioner, - versus – MARIA CUARTERO, ET.AL., Oppositor, G.R. No. L-5597, May 31,
1956, REYES, A., J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

 Appellants' case is built mainly on surmises unsupported by evidence. As to the question of whether or not the will was obtained
thru undue influence and improper pressure, it is not enough that there was an opportunity to exercise undue influence or a
possibility that it might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

34.
PASCUAL COSO vs. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA ET AL.
G.R. No. 16763, December 22, 1921, OSTRAND, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Mere affection, without showing the presence of duress, deceit, or fraud, is not within the scope of “undue influence”
which invalidates a will. According to the English and American rule, mere general influence over a testator is not
sufficient to invalidate a will. It must be shown that the influence exerted on the mind of the testator was undue and must
be the kind that overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator destroying his own free will and making him express
the will of another.

35. LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, v. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, PANGANIBAN,J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Pursuant to Art. 799, for the testator to be considered of sound mind, he must know three things: (1) the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. To constitute a sound
and disposing mind, the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. Testamentary incapacity does not require that a person be actually insane or of unsound mind.
36. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DECEASED,
AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION: FIDEL A. DEGUZMAN and EMETERIO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DIONISIA VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES VALENZUELA , respondents.
G.R. Nos. 61167-68, January 20, 1989, GRIÑO-AQUINO J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

The issue raised was the soundness of the mind of the testator which the Supreme Court found to be a purely factual issue not
reviewable by an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals
carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez
and found "no compelling reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question hinged
on the credibility of the witnesses.||
37. SALUD TEODORO VDA.. DE PEREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 18, RTC Bulacan, Respondent.
G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994, QUIASON, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

There is necessity to prove in our courts that (1) the foreign law, and (2) the formalities prescribed under (a) the foreign law
where it was executed or the (b) Philippine law, in order for a Will executed abroad by foreigner to have effect in the
Philippines. Moreover, the wills in this case may be probated jointly. Although the wills executed by the testators are separate
wills, it however involved essentially the same provisions, and pertained to properties in conjugal nature.

38. PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964, REYES, J.B.L., J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

The NCC expressly prohibits the execution of joint wills, but once a decision of the court attains finality, it can no longer be
 disturbed. Hence, when a probate court approves and admits into probate a will jointly executed by spouses, and such decision
already attained finality, it can no longer be challenged as the decision of the probate court is already conclusive as to the will
notwithstanding the prohibition in the NCC.

However, the testamentary provisions is valid only as to the estate of the deceased spouse and will not be valid as to the
surviving spouse since the latter’s estate is not yet the subject of the probate.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
INTERPRETATION OF WILLS

39. BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987, CRUZ, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article
1061. Anything less than an express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.

40. MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970, TEEHANKEE, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. If a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred.
41. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Similar to the settled principle in statutory construction, the provisions of a will must be interpreted as a whole which will give
life to all of the provisions therein, rather than making other provisions inoperative. Furthermore, testacy is favored than
intestacy. (Art. 791) The general rule is that the ordinary and grammatical sense of words in a will shall be upheld unless a clear
intention to use it in another sense appears, and such meaning can be ascertained. In the present case, the decedent was
unequivocal in giving only a usufruct to his wife because he indicated that the latter will only have “the use and possession of
the properties while still alive”, instead of stating “will have absolute dominion over the properties”.

42. JULIAN SOLLA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. URSULA ASCUETA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 24955. September 4, 1926. VILLA-REAL, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

For purposes of determining the intention of the testator, the courts must consider placing themselves as near as possible in the
former’s position. Thus, in cases where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, courts must take into account the
situation of the testator as well as the facts and circumstances that surround the time when such will was executed.

43.
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, Petitioner vs. HON.
ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and
DELIA B. LANABAN, Respondents
G.R. No. L-39247, 27 June 1975, AQUINO, J.
 By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless
it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made. Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated
from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
LAW GOVERNING FORM

44.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA DE ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL., Petitioners, -versus- MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954, MONTEMAYOR, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time the instrument was executed.

45.
IN THE MATTER ESTATE OF EDWARD RANDOLPH HIX, deceased. A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. 32636. March 17, 1930. Malcolm, C.J.
 By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized
to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Where the
witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it is the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other
means. Also, it is necessary to prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the Philippine Islands.

46.
Testamentaria del finado William R. Giberson. LELA G. DALTON, solicitante-apelante, vs. SPRING GIBERSON,
opositor-apelado.
G.R. No. L-4113, June 30, 1952, PABLO, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that “a will made out of the Philippine Islands… may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” is still in
force and has not been repealed by Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantive in
nature and therefore could not have been repealed by the Rules of Court which are only procedural in nature.

47. PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-20234. December 23, 1964, REYES, J.B.L, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

Article 818 of the New Civil Code prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and is continued to be
used. In this case, since the joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent
jurisdiction, the valid provisions thereof should be given effect as the share of the deceased husband and not tje include the
 disposition of the share of the wife who was then still alive.

48. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.,
heirs-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967, BENGZON, J.P., J.

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The 3rd paragraph of Art. 17 in relation to prohibitive laws does not find application in this case. Whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, it does not extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals because it
is their national law that will govern. Notwithstanding the execution of the will in the Philippines, jurisprudence provides that a
provision in a foreigner’s will saying that Philippine law shall govern and not his national law with respect to distribution of his
properties is illegal and void.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
LAW GOVERNING CONTENT

49. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C.
AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
1963-01-31 | G.R. No. L-16749, LABRADOR, J.

By: Resus, Jarvin David

Art. 16 governs the validity of testamentary dispositions of wills stating that intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
 nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

This is subject to the doctrine of renvoi. Hence, when the national laws of a foreign decedent in the Philippines refers to the
decedent's domicile, Philippine Courts should not refer the case back to the foreign law and Philippine laws shall apply,
otherwise it would be an endless back and forth referral.

50. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET
AL., heirs-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967, BENGZON, J.P., J.:
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

The intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and amount of successional rights are governed by the national law of the
decedent. Hence, the Civil Code provision on Philippine laws on legitime cannot be applied for a foreign national. Verily, the
laws of Texas do not have forced heirs or legitimes, therefore, illegitimate children cannot assert their legitimes on the estate of
Bellis.

51.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

The national law of the decedent must apply with respect to the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code and with reference to the ruling on the case of Bellis v Bellis. In this case, the law which
governs the decedent’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., the national law of the decedent, does not provide for legitimes and all
the estate may be given away to a stranger.

Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, the Congress has not intended to extend the
 same to the succession of foreign nationals.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT

52. In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO, heir, appellee, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-25966, November 1, 1926, STREET, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

Portions of inheritance left vacant due to the death or the disqualification of one of the heirs or portions which the latter
renounced shall be subject to accretion under Art. 912 of the Civil Code. Such portions shall not be limited by the rules on
intestate succession.

53.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, et. al., Petitioners -versus – LORENZO LAXA, Respondent

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

In proving whether the testator is of unsound mind at the time of execution of the will or was made to execute the same due to
duress or influence of fear of threats, undue and improper influence, or fraud and trickery, the burden of proof lies on those who
allege such circumstances. However, in this case, petitioners failed to prove the unsoundness of the mind of Paciencia, as they
only presented testimony on the latter’s forgetfulness without any substantial evidence, such as medical evidence. Furthermore,
they only provided bare allegations of duress caused by a member of Lorenzo’s family, which was rebutted by the showing of
an unquestioned good relationship between Paciencia and Lorenzo’s family.
 54.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact, MERCEDES A. FAVIS and
NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, -versus- JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA.
THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS.
MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

A Deed of Donation is deemed as null and void when, at the time of its execution, the person who had no full control of his
mental capacities due to illnesses. As in this case, when Dr. Favis, Sr. executed the Deed of Donation, he was already at an
advanced age of 92, afflicted with different illnesses which impair his brain or mental faculties.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS

55. NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981 SECOND DIVISION, AQUINO, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Article 804 of the New Civil Code provides that the will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. The
will was read and was translated into Filipino to the testatrix, but in the will which is written in English, it was stated that
English was the language that he understands and knows. The probate judge should have perceived the testatrix as illiterate and
the will is void.

56.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES,
 petitioner-administrator-appellant, vs. DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee.

G.R. No. L-2862, April 21, 1952, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

By: Borra Filipino

To allow the probate of a will, the signature has to be genuine, written in a language known to the testator, and the testator has
to be of sound mind when he signed the will.

Here, SC upheld the genuineness of the signature by giving credence to the expert testimony of the petitioner as the specimen
signatures examined were closer to the date of the will. The SC also ruled that Spanish was known to the testator; this was
emphasized in the attestation clause and supported by other evidence. The varied signature of the decedent does not prove
unsound mind, rather it only shows the spontaneity of the signature further proving its authenticity.

57.
In re will of Ana Abangan. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, Executrix-appellee -versus- ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL,
represented by JESUSA PUNO, Opponents-appellants

G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919, AVANCEÑA, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

In a will consisting of two sheets, both sheets don’t need to be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses
if the first page contains all the testamentary dispositions, signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the
second page contains only the attestation clause and is signed at the bottom by the three witnesses only as it pertains only to the
witnesses and not to the testator.

In the absence of any proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the testatrix knows the dialect in which the will is written if it is
executed in a city where he/she is a neighbour.
 58. Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

G. R. No. L-1787, 27 August 1948, TUASON, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. In this case, the testator who
was suffering from "partial paralysis" affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. While the testator
might have directed someone else to sign for him, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the
use of a mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
NOTARIAL WILLS - SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

59. MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ , petitioner - versus - DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, respondents

G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010, BRION, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805
and 806, respectively), this indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own.
On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the
execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution. An attestation must state all the details the third
paragraph of Article 805 required and in the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause
 can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

60. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased):
APOLONIO TABOADA, Petitioner, - versus - HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of
Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), Respondent.

G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982, GUTIERREZ, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

Under Art. 805 of the Civil Code, subscription refers to the signing of the witnesses’ names upon the same paper for the
purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was signed by the testator. Here, the interpretation of the respondent
judge is that a valid notarial will requires the signatures of the testatrix and three subscribing witnesses to be at the same place
or at the end. However, the signatures of the three subscribing witnesses were at the left hand margin.

Nonetheless, the Court ruled that it was still subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification. The
unsubstantial departure from the usual form should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.

61. In re: Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino, VICTORIO PAYAD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. AQUILINA TOLENTINO,
Oppositor-Appellant.
G.R. No. 42258. January 15, 1936, GODDARD, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C.

A statute requiring a will to be ’signed’ is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s mark. It was not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the
testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

62. AUREA MATIAS, petitioner, vs. HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALES, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite and AUGUSTO DE LA ROSA, respondents.
 108 Phil. 195, No. L-13391 May 25, 1960, MONTEMAYOR, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and the record on appeal on time because she sent the same by
registered-special delivery mail from the Manila Post Office under registry receipt No. 33488 on December 4, 1957, which was
the 30th day. As provided for under Section 1, Rule 27, Rules of Court, the date of mailing is the date of filing.

63. In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al.,
oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-15153 August 31, 1960, LABRADOR, J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

In order that a will be admitted to probate, the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some
other person in his presence and by his express direction.

64. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSIO ICASIANO,
Petitioner -versus- NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO
G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964, REYES, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Formal lapses in the execution of a will such as a witness’ failure to affix his signature on the left margin of the third page of
the original copy of the 5-page will but a duplicate original copy of the will contained all the required signatures is not
sufficient to cast doubt as to the genuineness and authenticity of the will therefore admitting the same to probate.

65. BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911, CARSON J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

 The phrase “in the presence” required by law simply means that position of the parties with relation to each other at the
moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. The
question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument “in the presence” of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription
by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by
merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

66. Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
G. R. No. L-1787, 27 August 1948, TUASON, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

There is no statutory requirement that the testator’s understanding of the language used in the will be expressed therein. It is a
matter that may be established by proof aliunde.

67.
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner, vs. LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.

G.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind.
Moreover, the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will.
68.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner -versus- DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON
and VICTORIA L. TUAZON, Respondents

G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

 By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

The purpose of the pagination is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of the pages and
prevent any increase of decrease in the pages.

Thus, where the Acknowledgement portion of the will states that it consisted of seven (7) pages but the will actually consists of
eight (8) pages, which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
extraneous evidence, such will is void.

69. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE v. ALIPIO ABAJA and
NOEL ABELLAR
G.R. NO. 147145, January 31, 2005, CARPIO, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of
the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A
will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. In this case, the Court applied
the liberal construction on the probate of the will to conclude that there are three witnesses. Even if the attestation clause does
not indicate the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.

70. In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner, vs JULIANA
LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951, PARAS, C.J

By: Magpili, Airish A

The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the
testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways
by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark,
and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

71.
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee, vs ELAGIO CAGRO, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants

G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953, Paras, C.J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The absence of the signatures of the three attesting witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause renders the will fatally defective. The
fact that the signatures of the witnesses appear on the left-hand margin on the page containing such attestation clause does not cure the
defect. The Supreme Court held that an unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of
their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

72. Azuela v CA, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006 Tinga J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will and failure of the attestation clause to state that the
witnesses signed in the presence in one another’s presence are both fatal flaws, thus a will may not be admitted to probate.

Moreover, the will must be acknowledged before a notary public, not merely subscribed and sworn to. Acknowledgment
provides for a legal safeguard against spurious wills.

73.
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION
 SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA,
PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA ,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF
BUENAVENTURA GUERRA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978, GUERRERO, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Presumption of regularity can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence but it is not easily by the mere expediency of a
negative testimony of the attesting witnesses that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. A negative testimony does not
enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and is faced with the convincing appearance of the will. Unlike other deeds,
ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause, which, significantly, is a separate memorandum or record
of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, compliance with the indispensable
legal formalities had been observed.

74. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL OF GREGORIO GATCHALIAN,
deceased. PEDRO REYES GARCIA, Petitioner, - versus – FELIPE GATCHALIAN, ET.AL., Oppositor, G.R. No.
L-20357, November 25, 1967, DIZON, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Compliance with the requirement contained in Art. 806 of the New Civil Code to the effect that a will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity. As the document under
consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.

75. BELLA A. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007, CORONA, J.
 by: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Acknowledgment of the will by the testator and the witnesses before a notary public with respect to the execution of a notarial
will under Art. 806 of the Civil Code is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. Non-compliance with this
formal requirement renders the notarial will void. The notarial acts of a notary public outside the place of his commission have
no force and effect. The acknowledgement of a testator and his or her witnesses before a notary public who performed such a
notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction, could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Therefore, the will
shall be considered void.

76.
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973, ESGUERRA,J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of
the will. The function of the notary public to guard against illegal or immoral arrangements would be defeated if he were one
of the attesting or instrumental witnesses.

77. PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant, v. FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN et al., opponents-appellees

G.R. No. L-6285, February 15, 1912, MORELAND, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

With respect to the validity of a will, it is not an essential requisite that the person who writes the name of the testator should
also sign his own. The important thing is that it should clearly appear that the name of the testator was signed at his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and in the presence of the testator and of each other. In this case, to hold a will
invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the name of the principal is a complete subrogation of the law of
 wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which the statute expressly declares as valid.
|

78. MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner, v. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent.

A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008, CORONA, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

Formal validity is governed by the law in effect at the time of the execution. The form prescribed by law in the execution of a
will is intended to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments, and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. In this case,
the will in question was attested by only two witnesses, therefore the will must be considered void. Moreover, the requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. First, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses in the acknowledgment. Second, the notation of the testator's old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will. Furthermore, the
notary public was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division under Art. 806 of
the NCC. Atty. Tambago’s attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 1999 must fail, as he presented only a
mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000, and its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the
contested will in his notarial register.

79. IN RE WILL OF ANTONIO VERGEL DE DIOS, DECEASED, RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,

HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, Legatees-Appellants, -versus- FERNANDO VERGEL DE
DIOS ET AL., opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-21151, February 25, 1924, ROMUALDEZ, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

The signature of the testator is not necessary in the attestation clause. The will is distinct and different from the attestation
clause, although both are necessary to the validity of the will. The last paragraph of Section 618 (now 3rd paragraph of Article
805) refers to the textual contents of the attestation clause and does not pertain to requirements or signatures thereof outside of
its text. When the law stated that the will “be attested and signed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
 testator and of each other”, it meant that the signing of the attestation clause pertained to the witnesses and not the testator.

80. JOSE VILLAFLOR, petitioner-appellant, vs. DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-27440 December 24, 1927, OSTRAND, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the last page of the body of the document is a
matter of minor importance. It is explained by the fact that if the clause had been written on the eight page of the will, there
would have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause.

81.
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD JAVELLANA, petitioner-appellee, vs. DOÑA MATEA
LEDESMA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-7179, June 30, 1955, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the
participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Thus, their separate execution out of
the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses is not violative of the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption.

82. JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE
YSALINA and NELDA G. ENCLONAR, Respondents-Appellees.
G.R. No. L-51546, January 28, 1980, AQUINO, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

The non-payment of Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) for the acknowledgement of the notarial will is not a fatal defect for its
 probate and it may be cured by the subsequent payment thereof. The Old Tax Code provided that a document, to which a
documentary stamp tax (DST) must be paid, and such DST is not paid, shall not be admissible or used in evidence in court.
However, if the DST is not stamped in a notarial acknowledgement of a will because of non-payment, the probate court should
not immediately dismiss the proceeding on the ground of inadmissibility of the will, rather, it should allow the subsequent
payment of the DST because the Tax Code also provided that the non-admissibility shall subsist only until the requisite DST is
paid and affixed.

83. TEODORO C. TORTONA, RODRIGO C. TORTONA, PEDRO C. TORTONA, ERNESTO C. TORTONA, and
PATRICIO C. TORTONA, petitioners, vs. JULIAN C. GREGORIO, FLORENTINO GREGORIO, JR., ISAGANI C.
GREGORIO, CELEDONIA G. IGNACIO, TEODOCIA G. CHAN, LEONILA G. CAAMPUED, CONCORDIA G.
MIJARES, ROMEO C. GREGORIO, EDNA S. TAN, NELIA S. REYES, CECILIA S. FRIEDMAN, LAMBERTO
SUANTE, JULIUS SUANTE, CORAZON YASAY-GREGORIO, DONALDO Y. GREGORIO, ELMER Y.
GREGORIO, and ROY JOHN Y. GREGORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 202612. January 17, 2018. LEONEN, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

A notarized document carries with it the presumption of regularity. However, such presumption is disputable and the same can
be refuted by clear and convincing evidence. Although the credible testimony of the expert witness is to be accorded
persuasive weight, it is not the only factor that determines its value. It is incumbent upon the judge to exercise his independent
judgment in appraising the authenticity of a signature or of a fingerprint in place of a signature.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
WITNESSES TO A WILL

84.
 RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES , Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, Respondents
G.R. No. L-37453, 25 May 1979, GUERRERO, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The credibility of the subscribing witnesses is immaterial to the validity of the will. The law requires only that witnesses
possess the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821. There is no
requirement that the subscribing witness is of good standing or reputation for trustworthiness, honesty, and uprightness in order
that his testimony is believed and accepted in court.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEAF, ETC

85.
REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR.
JAIME ROSARIO, Petitioners, -versus- HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch and CONSUELO GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-26615, April 30, 1970, FERNANDO, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary
public before whom the will is acknowledged, in order to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
oppose if they are not in conformity with his desires. This is to ensure that the dispositions of the will are appropriately
communicated to and comprehended by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire.
86.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO,
petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and
HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and
BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 74695. September 14, 1993. Bellosillo, C.J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also, to those who, for one reason or another, are “incapable of reading their
wills. Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their
execution due to his “poor,” “defective,” or “blurred” vision, there can be no other course for the Court but to conclude that
Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term “blind” as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he
had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions.

87.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
CECILIA ESGUERRA COSICO, THELMA ESGUERRA GUIA, petitioner, VS. JOSE M. COSICO, JR., MANUEL M.
COSICO, MINERVA M. COSICO, AND ELEANOR M. COSICO-CHAVEZ, respondents

G.R. No. 246997, May 05, 2021, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Though Alvarado seemingly extended the application of Article 808 to cover not just the blind but also illiterates, the same
case also recognized an exception to the rule - substantial compliance. Article 808 is meant to protect the testator from all kinds
of fraud and trickery but is never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy testamentary privilege.
CASE CASE DOCTRINES
No.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

88.
Testate estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee, v.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO
G.R. No. L-3362. March 1, 1951. JUGO, J.:

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

The failure to state in the attestation clause that the alleged testator signed the will and that it was only signed by the witnesses is
a fatal defect. The precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most
essential element of the clause. Without such, there is no attestation at all.

89. TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO,
OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA,
MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD
CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, Respondents.

G.R. No. 103554 28 May 1993, REGALADO, J.

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The absence of the statement “that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another as required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection. The rule on substantial compliance under Art. 809 refers to the
defects and imperfection only with regard to the form and the language of the attestation in the will which can be cured or
 supplied by the examination of the text of the will itself. Defects must be remedied by the intrinsic evidence supplied by the will.
Omissions will not be considered a fatal defect provided that such omissions can be supplied by examining the will but if cannot
be supplied except by other evidence, the result would be an invalidation of the attestation clause and the will itself.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS

90. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND

BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS,
petitioners, vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
1985-01-28 | G.R. No. L-38338, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

As a general rule, Art. 810 requires that the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the
Will is established and the month and day appears on the holographic appears on the holographic Will, then it is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code and probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.

91.
Labrador v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-83843, April 15, 1990, Paras, J
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

In a holographic will, there is no particular location as to where the date should be placed as prescribed by law. The only
requirements that the will shall be dated itself and executed in the hand of the testator. Hence, regardless if the date is included
in a paragraph, provided that it is executed by the hand of the testator, the requirement has been complied with.
CASE CASE DOCTRINES
No.
PROBATE

92. FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.

G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code – which requires the presence of three (3) witnesses if the will is
contested – is merely directory and is not mandatory.

Article 811 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the
execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence
of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.

93. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY,
JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999, PARDO, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

The law requires three witnesses to declare that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. In this case, the
Court held that the holographic will was not in the handwriting by the deceased. It is because in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike
that of the holographic will.
94.
JOSE RIVERA, Petitioner -versus – INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA,
Respondents

G.R. No. 75005-06 February 15, 1990, CRUZ, J

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, in proving holographic wills, at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator must be presented to explicitly declare that such handwriting and signature are the testator’s. Here, the
will was already authenticated by the testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. Therefore, Jose Rivera, who was proven to
be a stranger to the will, had no personality to contest the same, and his opposition that there must be three witnesses cannot be
upheld as the will in question is a holographic will.

95. TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
ILDEFONSO YAP, Oppositor-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958, BENGZON, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. The law requires that the will itself must be presented as it is the only guarantee of
authenticity for it contains the handwriting and signature of the testator; failure to present the said will would produce no effect.

96. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased,
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL., oppositors- appellees, ATTY.
LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor
 G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982, FIRST DIVISION, RELOVA, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

A holographic will that has been lost or destroyed cannot be probated because the best and only evidence of a holographic will
is the handwriting of the testator. However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of a holographic will may be allowed because it
may be compared with the standard writings of the testator for the probate court to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting in the said copy of the will.

97.
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

By: Borra Filipino

Ordinarily, erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will without the signature
authenticating the same, the Will is not invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined.

However, here, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, and that alteration was without the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will
is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid.

98.
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, Petitioners -versus- THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE
SAND, Respondents

G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994, PUNO, J.

 By: Arenas, Gissela M.

A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. The
lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes (alterations, cancellations, or insertions).

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

99. Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. In this case, there was no valid revocation. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the 1939 will. The earlier
will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation which applies when a testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as
substitute for some reason.

100. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO
MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO,
petitioners -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.

G.R. No. 76464. February 29, 1988, SARMIENTO, J.

 By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi (or intention to revoke) on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself, it may be performed by another person but under the express direction and
in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention
to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or canceling the will carried out by
the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction, such was not proven. Nowhere in the records
shows that the two witnesses were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.

101. Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant, - versus - CORNELIO MAMUYAC,
AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927 JOHNSON, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

In the absence of competent evidence to prove otherwise, a will is presumed to have been cancelled or destroyed if it cannot be
found though it was last seen in the possession of the testator. The same presumption arises when it is shown that the testator
had a ready access to the will then after his death, it can no longer be found. However, it cannot be presumed that the will was
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge of the testator.

In this case, a mere carbon was submitted since the original copy can no longer be found after the testator’s death. There is also
a positive proof that the will has been cancelled. Thus, the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the will was cancelled by
the testator in 1920.
 102.
In the matter of the estate of Jesus de Leon. IGNACIA DIAZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANA DE LEON,
Opponent-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-17714. May 31, 1922, ROMUALDEZ, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

The destruction of a will with animus revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. Applying the Doctrine of
Dependent Relative Revocation, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that
the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. Hence,
the original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will
and last testament of Jesus de Leon.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ALLOWANCE OF WILLS - CONCEPT OF PROBATE

103. ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner and appellant, VS. ROSARIO GUEVARA AND HER HUSBAND PEDRO
BUISON, respondents and appellees.
74 Phil., 479 December 29, 1943, Ozaeta, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Even if the decedent who left a will had no debts, the heirs and legatees must first present that will to the court for probate and
divide the estate in accordance with the will. Presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

104. PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE
 COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-20234. December 23, 1964, REYES, J.B.L, J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

Where a joint will was executed by a husband a wife, and upon the death of the husband said will was admitted to probate by
a final decree of the court although erroneous, such decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband and could not
include the share of the surviving spouse whose estate is not yet in issue.

105. PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA -versus- HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL

G.R. No. L-29300, June 21, 1978, AQUINO, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as the due execution of the will which means the testator was of sound mind as to the
time of execution of the will and was not acting under duress or undue influence, and that the will was in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.

106. SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR
JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985, GUTIERREZ JR., J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constraints it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
107. CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ (now deceased), substituted by SUSANA A. LLAGAS, Petitioner, vs.
EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ, BELEN RODRIGUEZ and BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated—this cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy;
A Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant to a will that was not probated can not be given effect.

108.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners, vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. Otherwise stated, a last will and testament which has not been
probated has no effect whatsoever and thus, rights may not arise therefrom.

109.
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, Petitioner -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, Respondents

G.R. No. 108581, December 8, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. The intrinsic validity is
another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly
 executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void.

110. SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, PLANA, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.

111. TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ,
MODESTO JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON JIMENEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, FERNAN, CJ

By: Magpili, Airish A.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result
in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
 title because the probate court cannot do so.

112.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, petitioner, vs SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, respondents.

G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011, NACHURA, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings. As an exception, the probate court may here matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate on the ground of expediency and convenience.

113. Maninang v CA, No. L-57848, 19 June 1982

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Probate proceedings merely determine if the will is executed in accordance with the requisites prescribed by law. Generally,
opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will cannot be entertained as it normally comes only after authentication of the will.
However, the Court may, for practical consideration, meet the issue if in its face it appears intrinsically void.

114.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF CONSUELO SANTIAGO
GARCIA CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO TANCHANCO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIVIDAD GARCIA
SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020, HERNANDO, J.

 By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

The law favors testacy over intestacy. Hence, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. In a similar
way, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ALLOWANCE OF WILLS - NECESSITY OF PROBATE

115. DE BORJA, Plaintiff, - versus – DE BORJA, Defendant, G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967, DIZON, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, a compulsory heir’s successional interest existed independent of the decedent’s
last will and testament, and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate
of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case.

116.
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM,
respondents.
G.R. No. 55509, April 27, 1984, AQUINO, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

The probate of a will is mandatory as provided under Article 838 of the Civil Code and under Rule 75, Section 1 of the
 Rules of Court. The consolidation of the intestate proceeding with the testate proceeding is proper as in the case where
the testator left two wills. The Supreme Court further ruled that it would be inconsistent with for the estate of a
deceased, who died testate, to be settled in an intestate proceeding.

117.
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON,
respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-48840, December 29, 1943, OZAETA, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The probate of the will is enjoined by law and required by public policy because unless the will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The presentation
of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

118.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR ,

MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS , petitioners,vs.ERNESTO

PALAGANAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, ABAD J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

According to the Supreme Court, Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the NCC states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
CASE CASE DOCTRINES
No.
ALLOWANCE OF WILLS - MODES OF PROBATE

119. TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
ILDEFONSO YAP, Oppositor-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958, BENGZON, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

The courts will not allow probate of a holographic will unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. The execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed Holographic Will shall not be proven by mere testimony of a witness who saw or read it
because the law requires that the will must be presented since it is the document itself which serves as a material proof. If it is
not presented, it will not produce any effect.

120. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased,
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, -versus- AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL., oppositors- appellees, ATTY.
LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor
G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982, RELOVA, J.

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best
and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. There must be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. Thus, a will may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any since what is important is that the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
 ALLOWANCE OF WILLS - REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

121.
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON

G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960 , REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

Article 811 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses. Unlike the
probate of notarial wills, the probate of a Holographic will cannot be denied on the ground of the failure to present three witnesses
to identify the handwriting of the testator. If there are no witnesses may have been present at the execution of a holographic will,
none being required by law because it is beyond the control of the proponent.

122. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, Petitioners, v. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY,
JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999, PARDO, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

The law requires the declaration of three witnesses that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased when a holographic
will is contested.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ALLOWANCE OF WILLS - EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE OF WILLS

123.
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, et al. vs. HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, et al.
G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978, AQUINO, J.
 By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

The final order of allowance of a will is conclusive as to its form and due execution. (last paragraph of Art. 838) Therefore,
any action questioning its due execution, even through a criminal case for forgery, shall be barred by res judicata.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS

124. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO,

NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, petitioners, vs. LORENZO LAXA,
respondent.
G.R. No. 174489. April 11, 2012. DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

A will is not simply disallowed on the ground that the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution, nor should it be
allowed because they declare in its favor its legalization. The determining factor is that the court was convinced by evidence
presented before it. Mere allegations of vices of consent that are not supported by evidence do not void a will.

125.
TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee vs. PEDRO DE
LA CRUZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-24819, 30 May 1969, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

 The mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and
undue pressure or influence. To disallow a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

126.
RAMON OZAETA, Petitioner. ROSA GONZALES, ET. AL. Co-Petitioners , -versus- MARIA CUARTERO, ET. AL.
Respondents. SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, MARCIANA PALANCA and ANGEL C. PALANCA, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-5597, May 31, 1966, REYES, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

In determining whether or not the will was obtained by undue influence and improper pressure, there has to be substantial
proof that it was actually employed. It is not enough that there has been a chance to employ undue influence or the possibility
that it might have been exercised.

127.
PASCUAL COSO vs. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA ET AL.
G.R. No. 16763, December 22, 1921, OSTRAND, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a
will. Here, no imposition or fraud has been shown. "Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as
'undue,' if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition
of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made."

128. Ortega v Valmonte, G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005

 LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005, PANGANIBAN J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

The probate of a will is preferred by the law. The onus of proving why it should not be permitted falls with those who
opposed. In this instance, the petitioner has not satisfactorily discharged this duty. Because of this, the Court is unable to say
that the Court of Appeals made any reversible mistakes in approving the will's probate.
 WEEK # 12 - DAY 1

LEGITIME AND COLLATION

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
A. CONCEPT

1.
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners, v. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001, PARDO, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

A legitimate daughter may not be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring
the property of her father to his illegitimate children. Article 888 of the Civil Code provides that respondent, the legitimate child,
is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. Here, Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property.
The simulated contract of sale would deprive respondent of her share in her father’s estate.

2. SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL
JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES
ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN,
and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 126376, November 20, 2003, CARPIO, J
 By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of death of the decedent. While the decedent lives, the right of a
compulsory heir to the former’s properties is merely inchoate and only vests upon the decedent’s death. The decedent is free to
dispose of his or her property while he or she is still living.

3. Maononsong v Estimo, G. R. No.

G.R. No. 136773, 2003-06-25, CARPIO, J.

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

A valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller therefore impairing the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution of values, meaning the property sold is replaced by the equivalent in money.

Thus, a sale embodied in a notarized valid Kasulatan of the property does not deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitimes.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
B. WHO ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES: COMPULSORY HEIRS

4. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES,
MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987, GANCAYCO, J.:

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

 A surviving spouse cannot inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by right of representation. Verily, the estate
of a parent-in-law does not consider as a compulsory heir the child or children-in-law but is only considered a third person
therein.

5. ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED) et al. v LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,

RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA ,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013, Del Castillo, J.:

By: Cabaltera. Neil Zigmund T.

An individual merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter. The petitioner in this case cannot assert
that he repudiated the co-ownership and claim sole ownership since he was never a co-owner for being a mere son-in-law of the
decedent.

6. MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee. vs. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

The law in effect at the time of the death of the decedent does not extend successional rights to illegitimate children. Therefore,
the new right recognized by the Civil Code which includes illegitimate children in the list of heirs entitled to successional rights
cannot be given effect because it impairs the vested right of the widow over the lands which were subject of the dispute.

7.
JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, Petitioners, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL
AND BENITA C. NAVAL, Respondents
 G.R. Nos. L-50974 May 31, 1989, GUTIERREZ, J

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Illegitimate children should first be recognized voluntarily or court action to be able to inherit, as their rights arise not from
filiation or blood relationship, but by the acknowledgement by the parent. In this case, Benita’s acknowledgement by Eustaquio
was sufficiently proved through her enjoyment of open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Eustaquio, as she lived with her father until his death, and it was her father himself who had her birth reported and registered
(even if Eustaquio was not able to sign the said certificate, there was no showing that he should have known that such step was
required, thus his omission is excusable).

8.
ORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRITCUYUGAN,
respondents. G.R. No. 95229, 09 June 1992, REGALADO, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs and the same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. In this case, the allegations provided in the
complaint filed by private respondent can be considered as one to compel recognition and claim for inheritance.

9. EDGARDO SANTOS, ZENAIDA SANTOS HERRERA, CORAZON SANTOS CANTILERO, ARMANDO SANTOS,
SONIA SANTOS MAGPAYO, CIELITO SANTOS BALMEDIANO, EVELYN SANTOS NICOLAS, FELIXBERTO
SANTOS, MARIA BETTINA DIAZ SANTOS, REUBEN JOSEPH SANTOS, JEROME SANTOS DE GUZMAN, AND
JERICK SANTOS DE GUZMAN, petitioners, VS. MARIA D. SANTOS AND/OR HER SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST,
respondent
G.R. No. 250774, June 16, 2021, FIRST DIVISION, CARANDANG, J.
 By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

By right of representation, the children of the compulsory heirs who predeceased the decedent may inherit per stirpes pursuant to
Article 974 of the Civil Code which provides that, “whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate
shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person
they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit." Since Nestor, Milagros, and Ruben predeceased Jose Santos,
their respective children shall inherit their corresponding share through right of representation. Cielito, Evelyn, and Felixberto
shall divide equally the portion granted to Nestor Santos; Jerome and Jerick shall divide equally the share belonging to Milagros
Santos De Guzman; and Maria Bettina, and Reuben shall divide equally the share of Ruben Santos.

10. DANIEL RIVERA AND ELPIDIO RIVERA, Petitioners, v. FLORA P. VILLANUEVA, RUPERTO PACHECO,
VIRGILIO PACHECO AND THE HEIRS OF DONATO PACHECO, JR., NAMELY, ESTELITA PACHECO, ROLAND
PACHECO, DANILO PACHECO, AND EDMOND PACHECO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197310, June 23, 2021, CARANDANG, J.

By: Borra, Filipino

As the decedent died in 1956, that is, during the effectivity of the NCC but before the Family Code, the legitime of the heirs are
governed by Art 895 of the NCC. The Family Code will be not applied retroactively because it shall impair vested rights or
acquired rights of the petitioner-heirs. Therefore, the respondents, being acknowledged illegitimate children, shall receive only
4/5 of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child pursuant to Art 895 of the NCC.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
C. CONCURRENCE OF COMPULSORY HEIRS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING LEGITIMES

11.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
 and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by
her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.:

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

Legitimate and adopted children are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of their deceased parents in conformity with Article
979 NCC.

12.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner.
G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to the Family Code and RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother. Notably, the law is silent as to what middle name an adoptee (illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father) may use. There being no express prohibition, Stephanie may thus use as middle name her mother's surname.

13. ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67,
ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special
Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and
ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

 For as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. Petitioner,
whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are
mere collateral relatives (nieces and nephews) of the latter. As held in Santos v. Aranzanso, "From all the foregoing it follows
that respondents …and those who, like them,…, claim an interest in the estate … was alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as
such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first
cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code).”

14. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA
P. LIM, petitioner.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009, CARPIO, J.:

By: Areta, Karen M.

The husband and wife must adopt jointly as required under RA 8552. The contention that joint parental authority is no longer
necessary since the children have been emancipated must fail. The effects of adoption is not limited to parental authority as it
includes the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
In this case, only the wife filed for adoption while the husband manifested his consent through an Affidavit of Consent. Thus,
failed to comply with RA 8552.

15. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY
III, Petitioner,
vs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010, NACHURA, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C.

The order of preference in the appointment of administrator of an estate, as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case and the selection of an administrator lies in
 the sound discretion of the court. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties be represented in the management of the estate.

16. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, PEREZ, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

The prospective administrator’s interest in the estate is the paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent, hence, the order established under Section 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court must be followed. Moreover,
the Court ruled that it cannot make a final declaration of heirship and distribute the presumptive shares if the issue on who will
administer the properties of the decedent has yet to be settled.

17.
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

Biological parents have the right to succeed to the estate of their child whose adopted parents died during the adopted child’s
minority. In such a case, parental authority and custody reverts back to the biological parents who are left to care for the minor
adopted child.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
E. DETERMINATION OR COMPUTATION
18. PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, Petitioner -versus- THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, Respondent
G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986, NARVASA, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

By virtue of Art. 909 (2) and (3) of the New Civil Code, one may not donate everything he owns during his lifetime to the
detriment of his widow such that nothing will be left for her at the time of his death.

19. BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners,vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.

GR No. L-26270, October 30, 1969, REYES J.B.L, J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting a payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.

With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can
it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the
donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor.

20. PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO –
LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001, BUENA, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

 Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

21.
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987, CRUZ, J.

By. Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general provided
for under Article 1062. Without any clear indication of that intention, the exception will not apply.
22.
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City,
and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998, FRANCISCO, J.:

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

The surviving spouse of the donee cannot be obliged to account for the donation inter vivos given to the donee by the donor in
the settlement of the estate of the latter. The obligation to collate is personal to the donee, and is thus not transmissible to the
spouse of the donee.

23. ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON,
RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes J.
 By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

It is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is brought to collation. Where the
collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same
nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable
securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold
in public auction.

24.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, petitioner,
vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL AND MIGUEL PASCUA L, respondents

G.R. No. 189776 , December 15, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

WEEK # 12 - DAY 2

PRINCIPLES AFFECTING LEGITIME

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
PRETERITION
25.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, petitioners, vs HON. AMOR A. REYES,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D.
SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, AZCUNA, J.

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will as it was the testator’s last expression to bequeath his estate
to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of his son, Alfredo because of his maltreatment towards the testator which
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the NCC. Article 854 of the NCC
provides that preterition is the total omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. In this case, the testator did not institute an heir to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir as her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between the
testator and his son, Alfredo.

26. URETA v URETA

G.R. 165930, Sept. 14, 2011, Mendoza J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

The principle of freedom of disposition by will is embodied under Art. 842. Under said principle, one who has no compulsory
heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
 In this case, what was involved is a deed of sale, not a will. Thus, the heirs may question the validity of the sale without having to
prove that the disposition prejudiced their legitime.

27.
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-17818; January 25, 1967; REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

The legal precept of Article 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs – without distinction
between forced, voluntary or intestate ones, and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; the testator was at liberty to assign the free portion
of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir. Where the testator allotted in his will to his
legitimate daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstance would not invalidate the institution of a stranger
as an heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of the forced heir.

28. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased, ADOLFO C. AZNAR,
Executor, - versus – MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, Oppositor, G.R. No.
L-24365, June 30, 1966, MAKALINTAL, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

The testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir
or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not
ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Thus, Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be given no more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to
 one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will
of the decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude
towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who
alone was expressly recognized by him.

29.
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner, vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao Branch VI; AVELINA B.
ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975, AQUINO, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

|||The preterition of the surviving spouse does not result in intestacy nor does it render the will intrinsically void, especially if the
surviving spouse signified his conformity to his wife’s will wherein the latter disposed of her husband's one-half conjugal share
which became part of her estate, and has effectively renounced his hereditary rights. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that it
is the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line that annuls the institution of heirs.

30. CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON , respondents.
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987, Paras, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Art. 854 of the Civil Code does not apply to the surviving spouse since she does not ascend or descend from the testator. Even
though she is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition if she is omitted from the inheritance since she is not from the direct line.

31.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and
 appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966, SANCHEZ, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of an heir. This annulment is in toto, unless there is
a testamentary disposition in favor of devisees or legacies. In this case, the testator left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
which are her parents. Since the will omits both of the testator’s parents, there is preterition of a compulsory heir and the
universal institution of herein petitioner to the entire inheritance of the testator abrogates the will in its entirety as if no will was
ever written.

32.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

By: Martin, Dominic

In the case of a foreign testator (American citizen and permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A) who omits in his
or her will the compulsory heirs in the direct line (preterition), the governing law shall be the national law of the decedent under
Art. 16 (2) and 1039 of the NCC, and not Art. 854 of the NCC, since the issue concerns the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
a will. Moreover, the national law of the decedent in this case does not provide for legitimes.

33.
EMILIO ESCUIN Y BATAC, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ESCUIN, ET AL., defendants. — JULIA BATAC,
appellant.

G.R. No. 4359, September 24, 1908, TORRES, J.:

 By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

If a compulsory heir has been left out or omitted in or from a will, or was excluded from the will, the designation of heirs made in
such a will is annulled insofar as the legal portion of the preterited heir is impaired. Here, where the testator, who did not leave
behind any legitimate descendant or ascendant, designated his wife and his natural father as his sole heirs, and ignored his
recognized natural child, the latter is considered a general heir of the decedent and may not be deprived of his legitime. The
testamentary dispositions in favor of the decedent’s wife and natural father are therefore annulled insofar as it impaired the
legitime of the recognized natural child.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
RESERVA TRONCAL

34. MARIA MENDOZA, ET AL., Petitioners vs. JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs,
CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ET AL., Respondents
G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013, REYES, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property
by gratuitous title. Article 891 requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. In the case at bar, the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After
his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.

35. IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
G.R. No. L-29901, August 31, 1977, MARTIN, J.
 By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

In reserva troncal, it is required that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title. In relation, as long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the
deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It matters not whether the property transmitted
be or be not subject to any prior charges.

36.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990, MEDIALDEA, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Reserva troncal (Art. 891) does not apply to a property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant. The reservor should be a
legitimate ascendant of the prepositus. Therefore, it does not apply when the purported reservor is the son of the purported
prepositus. Accordingly, the son is not obliged to reserve the property in favor of the relatives of his mother within the third
degree, such as an aunt.

37.
RICARDO LACERNA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. AGATONA PAURILLO VDA. DE CORCINO,
defendant-appellee. JACOBA MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee.

G.R. No. L-14603. April 29, 1961. CONCEPCION, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Article 891 of the New Civil Code, which establishes reserva troncal, applies in cases where the property was inherited by an
 ascendant from a descendant, not in cases where the same were inherited by a descendant from an ascendant.

In consonance with the rule, the legitimate half-blood sister cannot be considered as the reservor of a property acquired from a
legitimate half-blood brother who is the prepositus, where such property was accordingly acquired by the latter from his
deceased mother.

38.
MARCELINA EDROSO, Petitioner-Appellant vs. PABLO AND BASILIO SABLAN, Opponents-appellees
G.R. No. 6878, 13 September 1913, ARELLANO, CJ.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded.

39.
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. L-12957, March 24, 1961, DIZON, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The reservor’s title to the reservable property is subject to two resolutory conditions: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2) the
survival of a reserve. Upon the happening of these conditions, the reservor’s title to the reservable property is extinguished and
the ownership thereof passes to the reservees who inherit the reservable property from the prepositus.

40. Florentino v Florentino, 40 Phil 480

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees..
G.R. No. L-14856, November 15, 1919, TORRES, J.:
 By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from
his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. If during the
lifetime of the said ascendant, all the relatives, within the third degree, of his predecessor in interest should die or disappear,
according to law the condition of reservation with which the property had been burdened ceases to exist, said property now
becomes a part of the legitimate legitime of the ascendant who had inherited same through the death of those for whom it had
been reserved (reservatarios).

41.
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MANUELA ALCALA and
JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-13386, October 27, 1920, JOHNSON, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Article 811 of the Civil Code, now Article 891 of the NCC, applies only to legitimate relatives. Hence, the reservee must be a
legitimate relative of the origin and propositus.

42. FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, v.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986, NARVASA, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

Reversion of the reservable property is governed by the rules on intestate succession. Under Article 1009, a decedent’s uncles
 and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. Hence, the aunts and uncles of the propositus are not entitled to the reservable property because they are excluded by
his niece.

43. Padura v Baldovino

G.R. No. L-11960.December 27, 1958, 104 Phil 1065

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The concept of reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the Civil Code merely determines the reservatarios to whom the property
should be returned but within that group, the rules on ordinary intestate succession shall apply in determining the individual right
to the property. The reservable property should pass only to the reservatorios nearest in degree within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (propositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. The right of representation
operates in favor of nephews.

44. Gonzales v CFI, 104 SCRA 161

G.R. No. L-34395, 1981-05-19, AQUINO, J.:

By: Resus, Jarvin David.

The reservable properties do not form part of the estate of the reservor. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of
the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree
from the prepositus. As long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot,
by means of his
will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
 Thus, Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives
within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

45. PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and appellants, Vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and
ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and appellees.

G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, BENGZON, J.P., J.:

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

As contemplated under the doctrine of reserva troncal, an ascendant who inherits any property from his descendant which has
been acquired by his descendant by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve the
property for the benefit of relatives within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
DISINHERITANCE

46. RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011, Reyes, J.:

By: Cabaltera. Neil Zigmund T.

Disinheritance can only be effected through a will and its legal cause shall be specified.
In this case, the respondents sought the disinheritance of the petitioner through a complaint without any will or instrument
effecting such disposition. Furthermore, the prayer for petitioner's disinheritance was made in an ordinary civil action which
does not partake in the nature of special proceedings.
 WEEK # 13 - DAY 1

Principles Affecting the Free Portion

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS

1. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA v. HEIRS OF LIBERATO URETA

G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011, MENDOZA, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

Art. 842 refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will, whereby any person with compulsory heirs may freely dispose
by will all his or her estate as long as it does not contravene the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. However, in this case what is
involved is a Deed of Sale and not a will. Therefore, the heirs of Alfonso need not show proof that the disposition prejudiced
their legitimes.

2.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, Executrix-appellee, versus ESTELITA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA
DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, Oppositors-appellants

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970, TEEHANKEE, J

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

In testamentary succession, the testator’s wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law, thus, when expressed clearly
and precisely in the will, this shall be the only law which must be faithfully obeyed and complied by the executors, heirs,
devisees, and legatees. Thus, the testator has a right to partition her whole estate through her will, and the use of the words “I
 bequeath” does not convert dispositions pursuant to such partition into devises when these were intended for the partition of the
whole estate.

3. RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES
REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ- MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ,
ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA, respondents.
G.R. No. L- 23079, 27 February 1970, CASTRO, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

An annulment of institution of heirs under Article 850 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following: first, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. In this
case, the absence of any express or specific stipulation in the decedent’s will that the she would have willed her estate other than
the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes entails that the same cannot be
annulled by the Court merely on the basis of guesswork or uncertain presumptions of the petitioners.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
KINDS OF INSTITUTION

4. CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO,
petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City,
Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late
EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 45425 & 45965. March 27, 1992, Third Division, ROMERO, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

 There is no fideicommissary substitution because the will of the testator did not impose upon the instituted heir a clear obligation
to preserve the estate in favor or another, and neither does it provide for a vulgar or simple substitution. When a testator merely
names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary
substitution. The substitution is construed as a vulgar or simple substitution, and it shall be effective only if the first heir dies
before the testator. Since the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix Maria, there is no substitution of heir because upon
the latter’s death, the properties unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS

5. PAZ GARCIA vda. de MAPA, * SEGUNDO MAPA, PRISCILLA M. MONZON, TERESA MAPA, IGNACIO
SALAZAR AND JOSE SALAZAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS HIDROSOLLO et al, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38972 September 28, 1987, FERNAN, J.:
By: Borra, Filipino

The decedent may oblige a trustee to deliver certain properties to other heirs through her will. Here, although the word "trust"
itself does not appear in the Will, the decedent’s intent to create one is demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. In
designating her husband as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the properties to herein petitioners and
respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in him, and in referring to others as "beneficiarios", she intended that the
beneficial or equitable interest to these properties should repose in them.

6. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix , petitioner-appellee,
v. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982, ABAD SANTOS, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

 A simple or vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir designated survives the testator inasmuch as vulgar substitution
can take place also by refusal or incapacity to inherit of the first heir.

A fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related in the first degree to the second heir. The fideicommissary
can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir.

7. CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DR. MANUEL SINGSON,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962, DIZON, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

A fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing
upon the first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. The testamentary clause herein
shows that the substitution provided for is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement
that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights. It merely provides that upon appellee's death, her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. Thus, the will of the deceased established a mere substitution of heirs, not a
fideicommissary substitution.

8. METERIO A. RODRIGUEZ (in substitution of RUFINO A. RODRIGUEZ, who died during the pendency of this case in
the Court of Appeals), and JOSE AYALA, executors-petitioners v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA
RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIA RODRIGUEZ and ROSA RODRIGUEZ, oppositors-respondents.
G.R. No. L-28734, March 28, 1969, J. Fernando

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

What is declared void under Article 870 of the NCC, is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year
period. In the interim, such a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. Time and time
again, when a legal provision is clear and to the point, there is no room for interpretation. It must be applied according to its
 literal terms. In this case, the court found the clause on “perpetual prohibition to alienate the property” insofar as the first
twenty-year period is concerned, in accordance with the Article 870.

9. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE VENICIO
ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974, BARREDO, J.:

By: Areta, Karen M.

The testamentary provision which provides: “At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters…” is not a substitution contemplated under the Civil Code. The law provides two kinds
of substitution, namely: (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Art. 859) and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Art. 863).

A simple substitution, requires alternative conditions to be present: that the first designated heir (1) should die before the
testator; (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance, or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. Here, none of the conditions apply
thus no simple substitution. Also, it cannot be a fideicommissary substitution because there is no obligation on the part of the
husband to preserve the properties for the alleged substitute heirs.

WEEK # 13 - DAY 2

Legacies and Devises

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
LEGACIES AND DEVISES
10. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23638, October 12, 1967, REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C.

Paragraph 2 of Article 957 prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it be because of the nullity of the
contract" does not revive the legacy, but the nullity of contract is not absolute. It cannot be maintained if a testator's subsequent
alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time and the revocatory effect of the provision would
still ensue. The same thing could be said if the alienation was done through undue influence. In such cases, the transferor is not
expressing his real intent, and it cannot be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior
bequest.

11. ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,

vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14474, October 31, 1960, REYES, J.B.L., J.:

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

The word descendants, when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property in substitution of named legatees,
includes not only children but also grandchildren, unless otherwise indicated by the testator.

12. GONZALO VILLANUEVA, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FROILAN AND LEONILA
BRANOCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The donor’s express waiver of title over the property in case the donee predecease her coupled with reservation for herself the
beneficial title thereto, in consideration of the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, all
show that the disposition is a donation inter vivos which is perfected upon the moment the donor learns of the donee’s
acceptance. Time and again, the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria but are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor. In this case, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the property
vested no title to Vere.
 WEEK # 14

Intestate Succession up to Partition

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
A. IN GENERAL

1. AMPARO S. CRUZ, et. al. v. ANGELITO S. CRUZ, et. al.

G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

In no uncertain terms that the exclusion of heirs in the extrajudicial settlement of an estate renders it a “total nullity” and not binding
upon the excluded heirs. No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice and the exclusion of a compulsory heir will be a ground for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate.
2. ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.

GR No. L-21993, June 21, 1996, REYES JBL, J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy takes place only in the absence of a valid operative
will. Only after a final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted. The institution of
intestacy proceedings in one court may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of the deceased is pending in
 another cour

3. GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant

G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971, VILLAMOR, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

In an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a
nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons
and daughters of brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his
deceased uncle.
4. OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner, v. PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.

G.R. No. 140975, December 8, 2000, VITUG, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

Generally, in every inheritance, the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent excludes the more distant ones. However, by right of
representation, by operation of law, a more distant relative is “raised to the same palace and degree of relationship as that of a closer
blood relative of the same decedent”. Such that a representative steps into the shoes of the person he represents and therefore,
succeeds from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
5. HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and
FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO,
represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO, petitioners v. COURT OF APPEALS
and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents

G.R. No. 116775, January 22, 1998, MENDOZA, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

 The relatives nearer in degree exclude the more distant ones. Thus, a nephew excludes grandnephews and grandnieces.
6. VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P.
MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016, Reyes, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register,
and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION

7. SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAÑOS, Petitioners, v. ROSCEF ZUÑIGA BERNARTE, CLARO
ZUÑIGA, PERFECTO ZUÑIGA, and CEFERINA ZUÑIGA-GARCIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 180997, November 17, 2010, NACHURA, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

In the absence of whatever evidence that he executed a will, his legitimate children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot
in equal share[s] as intestate heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P has to be divided among them into eleven
equal shares. Considering that Roman died on August 9, 1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on succession, then the law in force,
should apply, particularly Articles 979 and 980:
 Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages. x x x.

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
8.
EUGENIO C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellant -versus – AUREA S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor JESUS SANTOS
DEL PRADO, defendant-appellee

G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966, MAKALINTAL, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Under Article 988 of the NCC, in the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. In this case, the decedent died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants, therefore his
illegitimate child shall succeed to his entire estate, to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral relative.

9.
Vda. De Crisologo V. CA,

GR No. L-44051, 27 June 1985, Gutierrez, Jr., J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code - an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.

10. WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

 Collateral relatives will only inherit in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Despite brothers and sisters
concurring with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do not concur, but rather are excluded by the surviving children,
legitimate or illegitimate. The presence of the illegitimate child, Francisco Udon, as acknowledged by the testator, excludes John and
Rustico, the brothers of the testator.

11. TOMAS CORPUZ, Plaintiff, - versus – ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco,
RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, ET.AL., Defendants,

G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978, AQUINO, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

The rule in Article 943, now Article 992 of the New Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child." Hence, Yangco’s half brothers on the Corpus side had no right to succeed to his estate under the
rules of intestacy because Yangcho was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and the Corpus’ siblings were legitimate
children.

The rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of
resentment.
12. BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995, VITUG, J.
By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.
 The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family contemplated in Article 992 of the New
Civil Code absolutely prohibits a succession ab intestato in the collateral line between the legitimate relatives and the illegitimate
relatives. Article 992 provides for a barrier between the legitimate family and illegitimate family by virtue of which, the former cannot
inherit from the latter and vice versa. Petitioners, the half-siblings of the decedent who is an illegitimate child, do not have legal
standing nor cause of action to initiate the complaint being the collateral relatives from the legitimate family.

13. CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and
RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983, De Castro J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

A child born outside wedlock cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased. An illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.
14. ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.||

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

G.R. No. L-66574, 17 June 1987, PARAS, J.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain as it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.

G.R. No. 66574, 21 February 1990, PARAS, J.

The Supreme Court reiterated its prior ruling in this case and held that although Articles 902, 989, and and 990 of the New Civil
 Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, Article 992 (reproduction of Art. 943 of the Civil Code of Spain) still
prohibits the exercise of the right of representation if the person to be represented is a legitimate child. The determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented.
15. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, PEREZ, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

The order of preference is not absolute because it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. The selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Moreover, the order of preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators when justice and equity demands that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates.

16. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON,
petitioner-appellant, v. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965, BENGZON, C.J.

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Article 996 of the NCC which provides that "if a widow and legitimate children are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession
the same share as that of each of the children", should be interpreted to include a situation wherein only one legitimate child was left
along with a surviving spouse. Hence, when the deceased Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving only one child and a surviving
spouse, the heirs shall share in the estate in equal parts, applying Article 996 of the NCC.
17. GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977, GUERRERO, J.

 By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Article 1003 of the NCC provides that in the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, collateral
relatives succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. In the case at bar, since Maura Bagsic died intestate, and her husband and all her
ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the (a) daughter of her sister of full
blood and (b) the ten children of her brother and two sisters of half blood
18.
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,

CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,

JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed. The absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
Right of Accretion

19.
HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA, Petitioner, vs. SEVERINO, JOEL, GRACE, CENON, JR., RENATO, EDUARDO,
HILARIO, all surnamed SOLIVA, ROGELIO V. ROLEDA, and SANVIC ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its
 Manager, SANTOS PORAQUE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 159611, April 22, 2015, Brion, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Art. 1015 grants the right of accretion in favor of persons who, together with others, are called to the same inheritance, devise, or
legacy. In accretion, the part assigned to the person who renounces, predeceased the testator, or is incapacitated, is added to or
incorporated to that of his voluntary co-heirs,, co-devisees, or co-legatees. In the present case, there is no accretion because there was
no renunciation, incapacity, nor predeceasing, rather, one of the heirs was no longer given a share in the estate because he already
previously received his share. As such, rather than applying accretion, his supposed share was no longer given to him but was divided
among the other heirs.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
Right of representation

20.
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,

CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965. REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

The Court held that there is right of representation in view of Articles 975 and 1005 of the New Civil Code in case the nephews and
the nieces of the decedent survive with the latter's brothers and sisters. Thus, in the absence of concurring brothers and sisters of the
decedent, the nephews and nieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent.
21.
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., Petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-66574, 21 February 1990, PARAS, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. Thus, petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

22.
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, Petitioner -versus- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA
PUERTA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990, CRUZ, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

An adopted child cannot represent his/her adopting parent in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother vice-versa.

23.
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant -versus- ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant
 G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965, Bautista Angelo, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in
the property to be effected by it either as an executor or as a claimant of the tate, and an interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate like a creditor. Here, under the terms of the will an oppositor has no interest in the estate either as
heir, executor or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, nor would she acquire any interest in
any portion of the estate as legal heir if the will were denied probate, it is held that said oppositor cannot intervene in the probate
proceedings.
24. MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

The adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter, and has the same right as that of a legitimate child.
However, an adopted child does not have the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In this case, Delia and Edmundo, as adopted children of Teodoro, do not have the right of representation in the inheritance of the
intestate estate of Teodoro’s parents.
25.
Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006. CORONA, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

 Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the
only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, the surviving spouse, they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code.
26. ANDY ANG, Petitioner, vs. SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA LOBERANES,
CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO, and PEDRITO P. AZARCON, represented by their attorney-in-fact, GALILEO P.
TORRALBA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208928, July 8, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

As mere grandchildren, respondents have no successional rights to their grandmother’s estate. The right of representation under
Article 970, in relation to Article 982 of the Civil Code applies when the person being represented predeceased, is incapacitated to
inherit, or was disinherited by the decedent. Records do not show that the right of representation is available to the respondents.
27. Aquino v Aquino
G.R. No. 208912, Dec. 7, 2021, LEONEN, J.:
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their right of representation, regardless of the
grandparent's marital status at the birth of the child's parent.

Grandparents and other direct ascendants are outside the scope of “relatives” under Article 992. Both marital and nonmarital
children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Thus, When a
nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall
apply which does not differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct descendants.

Grandchildren, regardless of their status and the status of their parents, should be able to inherit from their grandparents by right of
representation in the same way that the grandchildren, also regardless of their status, are called upon by law to support their
 grandparents, if necessary.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE

28.
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE
HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE, petitioners, vs.LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.

G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

The RTC has jurisdiction as to whether or not the advance distribution of the estate shall be granted. Moreover, to be guaranteed of
advance distribution of estate the following should be present: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending
controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution; and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate.

29.
PACITA, FILOMENO, REMEDIOS, ADELAIDA and NELIA, all surnamed DIMAYUGA, and HEIRS OF SOCORRO
DIMAYUGA-LASALA; SERGIO LASALA, MARCELINO; SATURNINO and Minors AIDA, DANTE, BELEN, LITO,
JOHN, ESTER and EDWIN, all surnamed LASALA, represented by guardian ad litem Sergio Lasala, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DIMAYUGA, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-48433, 30 April 1984, AQUINO, J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

The execution of a will is necessary to partition a property by an act inter vivos. A person who makes an inter vivos partition must
 first execute a will. The partition is void if the will is void or in case where there is no will.

In this case, a partition was made through a will but it was not in accordance with the law. Genaro, the predecessor of the private
respondent, partitioned the subject property and bequeathed a portion of the same to his illegitimate children to the prejudice of the
successional rights of his children. The Supreme Court nullified the partition.
30. RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, Petitioners, v. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and
CONCEPCION CHAVEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 68282. November 8, 1990

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

Partition under Art. 1080 refers to two modes: a) by an act inter vivos, and b) by will. A partition by will must be made in accordance
with the law concerning wills, however as for partition by an act inter vivos, it is not required to be in a form of a will as it may be oral
or written as long as the partition will not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
31. Intestate estate of the deceased spouses Magdaleno Fajardo and Candelaria Firmalino. PETRONILA FAJARDO,
Petitioner-Appellee, v. MELCHOR FAJARDO, opponent--appellant.
G.R. No. L-32195, August 19, 1930, ROMUALDEZ, J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Partitions inter vivos involving real estate must be reduced into writing in a public instrument, or, if by last will and testament, in
compliance with the legal requisites. In this case, none of the aforementioned requisites were observed, hence the petition for judicial
administration is proper, unlike in the cases of Fule v. Fule and Garcia v. Tolentino where the existence of the formalities was not an
issue.

32. VIVENCIO LEGASTO, special administrator of the Intestate estate of Sabina Almadin, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIA
VERZOSA, ET AL, Defendants-Appellants.
 G.R. No. L-32344. 31 March 1930, Villareal, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

A testator, may, by an act inter vivos partition his property, provided that he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by
law. In this case, the disallowance of the will of the testator due to the lack of all the essential requisites provided by law for its validity
shall result in the partition made of her estate among her nieces to likewise be not valid.

33. ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,
defendants and appellees.
G.R. No. L-3404, April 2, 1951, MONTEMAYOR, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

An obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold is a mere incident to the
main object of dissolving the co-ownership. It does not violate the prohibition against a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to
the community under Article 400 (now Article 494) of the Civil Code. The contract precisely has for its purpose and object the
dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale
among the co-owners.
34.
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
PADUA, respondents.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987, CRUZ, J.

By: Borra, Filipino

The Court's deviation from the strict letters of Art. 1088 NCC on giving written notice to co-heirs of the sale of an heir's share is not
 being abandoned. The ruling here should be deemed an exception due to peculiar circumstances of this case. In this case, the co-heirs
were informed of the sales despite no notice in writing was given, there is no doubt that the 30-day period began and ended during
the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their
right of redemption. Hence, justifies the exception.

35. Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, SR., and ROSARIO SALAS, and Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, JR., and GAUDELIA
VEGA, petitioners v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENA JAVELLANA, respondents

G.R. No. L-36083, September 2, 1975, BARREDO, J:

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

In case the decedent left a co-owned property, the daughter may exercise the right of redemption of her deceased parent when such
property has been sold by other co-owners to third parties.
36. TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, Attorney-in-Fact, Petitioner, v. ALEGRIA BAUTISTA,
ANGELICA BAUTISTA, PRISCILLA BAUTISTA, GILBERT BAUTISTA, JIM BAUTISTA, GLENDA BAUTISTA,
GUEN BAUTISTA, GELACIO BAUTISTA, GRACIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO S. TANDOC and CESAR TAMONDONG,
Respondents.

G.R. NO. 160556, August 3, 2007, CARPIO MORALES, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

An extra-judicial partition which excludes heirs who are entitled to equal shares is invalid. As a rule, no extra-judicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. In this case, the deed of extra-judicial partition
is invalid. Hence, it transmits no rights upon the transferees, and the action to have it annulled does not prescribe.
37. REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.

G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000, VITUG, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The exclusion of Delia Viado (petitioner), alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect
of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of her share in the
estate.

41. EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late Manuel Bautista and Evangeline Bautista, petitioner v. HON. JUSTICES
CAROLINA C. GRIÑO AQUINO AND JAIME M. LANTIN in their capacity as Justices of the Special First Division of
the Court of Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias
BEATRIZ BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA, GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N. BAUTISTA and ROSALINA
BAUTISTA, respondents

G.R. No. 79958, October 28, 1988, GANCAYCO, J:

By: Areta, Karen M.

An extrajudicial settlement of the estate only applies to the estate left by the decedent. In this case, the property subject to partition
does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera rather to Manuel Bautista. The extrajudicial partition of the deceased wife and all
subsequent transactions regarding the property are null and void because it partitioned a property belonging to the surviving husband.
42.
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant
 G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971, VILLAMOR, J.:

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

When a partition includes a person believed to be heir, but who is not, the partition shall be void only with respect to such person.
Additionally, mere inclusion and participation, of such person, in the extrajudicial partition agreement does not confer upon him the
right to institute such action.
43.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO
ALSUABUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S.
ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.

92 SCRA 332, July 30, 1979, GUERRERO, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Under the Old Civil Code, an extrajudicial partition which was made before a testator executes a will is void, and neither is it a valid or
enforceable contract because it involves future inheritance. As such, there is the necessity of a prior will before the testator can
partition his properties among his heirs.
44. HEIRS OF URETA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF URETA, respondents

G.R. No. 165748; G.R. NO. 165930, September 14, 2011, MENDOZA, J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

Preterition cannot apply if there is no will involved. It is a concept of testamentary succession which refers to the total omission of a
compulsory heir from the inheritance, either by not mentioning him at all or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but
 without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. In essence, preterition only applies in
testamentary succession.
45. LEONARDO NOTARTE, GUILLERMO NOTARTE, REGALADO NOTARTE and HEIRS OF FELIPE NOTARTE v.
- GODOFREDO NOTARTE
G.R. No. 180614, August 29, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The validity of an oral partition is already settled and after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested
estate, the parties are estopped from denying the existence of oral partition.

46. JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs, Petitioners,vs. ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A.
CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY. ALICIA B. FABIA, in her capacity as
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized representative,Respondents

G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013, REYES, J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in
common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for
partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to
the co-owners.

47. SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO BANGI and
GENOVEVA DICCION, represented by NOLITO SABIANO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 185745, October 15, 2014, REYES, J.

 By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which
is intended to put an end to indivision among co heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may be inferred
from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may
be presumed.
48. Marcelo v Marcelo, GR 209651, Nov. 26, 2014

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, AND THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T.

MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN
STEVEN J. MARCELO, Petitioners, v. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 209651, November 26, 2014, Perez, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

An administrator is still necessary despite the settlement of the estate being at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. The
rules under the ROC provides that “No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond..”.
49. SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by
VILLAFRIA, petitioners v. MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, respondents

G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015, Peralta, J:

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an estate.
50. BERLINDA ORIBELLO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH DIVISION), AND
 REMEDIOS ORIBELLO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The party demanding the partition of property has the burden to establish his or her right to a share in the property by
preponderance of evidence. Failure to provide the factual basis of said right to the partition warrants the dismissal of the claim for
judicial partition.
51. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as administratrix of the estate of the late santiago c. divinagracia, petitioner, v. CORONACION
PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall
be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
52.
GEORGE AGCAOILI, petitioner -versus – ELMER MATA, respondent

G.R. No. 224414, February 26, 2020, LAZARO-JAVIER, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The Supreme Court held that in an action for partition, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; that being the case, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. However, if there is
 non-joinder of indispensable parties, the case should not be dismissed rather the non-party who claims to be indispensable must be
impleaded. Here, the case was remanded to the RTC in order to implead as party-defendants, the Heirs of Pedro Mata, Jr. and all
other persons interested in the property, being indispensable parties and, thereafter, be allowed to present their evidence and proceed
with the resolution on the merits including the determination of the claimed heirship of petitioner George Agcaoili, the adopted child
of the deceased.

53. TIROL V SOL NOLASCO

G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020, Caguioa J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

In the settlement of a deceased’s estate, the court first taking cognizance shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
This includes the authority to determine who the lawful heirs of the decedent are and the distribution of their shares.

As to intervention, it is well-settled that the same is not a right, but depends upon the sound discretion of the court. Such
intervention may be denied by the court where it enlarges the issue in the action and expands the scope of remedies.

Thus, an issue as to whether a person is a lawful heir will definitely enlarge the issue in a probate proceeding and involve
determination of facts peculiar only to them which does not involve the original parties.
54. Nieves Navarro, in her capacity as one of the Vendees of a portion of estate of Dionisia Cayabyab and as one of the Heirs of
Victoria Cayabyab, and Irene Navarro, in her capacity as on the Heirs of Victoria Cayabyab Vs. Zenaida Cayabyab Harris and
Robert E. Harris, et al.

G.R. No. 228854. March 17, 2021, INTING, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

While the partition of the estate of Leoncia is null and void because of the exclusion of an heir in the extrajudicial partition, the
subsequent sale made by Dionisia of her share in favor of the Navarro Vendees is valid, but only with respect to her proportionate
share. Dionisia has acquired her respective share in the properties of Leoncia from the moment of the latter's death and that, as
owner thereof, she can very well sell her undivided share in the estate. As a surviving heir of Leoncia, she became a co-owner of the
latter's properties with full ownership rights over her pro indiviso share. Dionisia may therefore sell her undivided interest in Leoncia's
estate and this disposition shall affect only her pro indiviso share.