CIVIL CODE CASES

Cases Digest
With the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the
Tanada v. same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the
Tuvera Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that
all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise
provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.

FACTS
• Que Po Lay (Que) was charged of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 for failing to sell
foreign exchange in his possession consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks, and U.S. money orders
amounting to $7,000 to the Central Bank within one day from the receipt of such foreign
exchange.
• The trial court found him guilty.
• Hence, this appeal where Que contends that Circular No. 20 had no force and effect because it
was not published in the Official Gazette, prior to the act or omission imputed to him.

ISSUES/HELD
Should the circular have been published to produce legal effects? – YES. JUDGMENT REVERSED.

RATIONALE
People v. • It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
Que Po Lay implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence.
• Thus, it has to comply with the requirements of publication of a statute before it may take effect
as mandated by Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
• Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for their violation should
be published before becoming effective; this is on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
• It is clear that Circular No. 20 did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication
in the Official Gazette or after November 1951.

Thus, Que could not be held liable for its violation for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the

Facts : Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin
DM
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety
Consunji v.
lock. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
CA
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
1
 Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the company
anymore an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Labor Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensatory
damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the Civil Code
after recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code.

Held: The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the
Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In the case at bar,
the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not
aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine
of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral
premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to
prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of a
party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.

However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on
the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows
that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to claim
from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner-company.
Petitioner’s argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that “Ignorance of the law excuses no
one” cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a
person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing
private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her .

Emeterio Cui was a law student at the Arellano University. He finished the first three years of his law
degree at said law school. He was an academic scholar and so at the end of every semester he was being
refunded his tuition fee.
Meanwhile, in 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued a Memorandum ordering schools not to hold
back the credentials of former student scholars who choose to transfer to other schools if said students
fail to pay their tuition. The Memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding
to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school.
Cui v.
In 1951, Cui and Arellano University entered into an agreement whereby Cui agreed to waive his right to
Arellano
transfer to another school unless he would refund the school the scholarship granted to him.
But then when Cui was about to be a senior student, he decided to transfer to Abad Santos Law School.
He finished his law degree at Abad Santos.
In order to take the 1953 bar exams, Cui must obtain his transcripts from Arellano University but the
latter refused to issue his credentials unless he pay them back the amount of his scholarship. Cui paid in
protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver made by Cui is valid.
HELD: No. The waiver is not valid for being contrary to public policy. The waiver was repugnant to
sound morality and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in the Memorandum issued by the Director of
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 Private Schools is sound policy. Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of Arellano University, scholarships award
is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Such
understanding is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. Arellano University is
hence ordered to refund what Cui paid with interest.

Facts: On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for allegedly having misappropriated
a lady’s ring with a value of P1, 000.00 received from them from Atty. Prudencio De Guzman for sale on
commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced. They then filed an appeal to the Court
of First Instance and after that to the respondent city court which was also dismissed and ordered for
execution of judgment “for having been erroneously addressed to this court”. Petitioner spouses then
filed for prohibition and mandamus against the People and respondent city court to elevate their appeal
to the Court of Appeals which was again dismissed after finding that the city court’s judgment was
directly appealable to it. Still, the couple moved for reconsideration and stressing the merits of their
appeal and of their defense but was again denied “for lack of sufficient merit”.

Spouses
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case due to wrong procedure.
Bello v. CA
Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a mandamus

Ruling: Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is issued for the execution of its
judgment of conviction. And, said city court is commanded to elevate petitioner’s appeal from its
judgment to the Court of Appeals for the disposition on the merits.
The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but should have certified the case to the
proper court. It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result
of injustice and absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results.

FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code:
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated”
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance
Miciano v. with the Turkish laws. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. Therefore,
Brimo no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied
with and executed
The exclusion of the appellant as a legatee is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
“…it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this
will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the approval of the said scheme of partition was valid or not?
Whether or not the denial of his participation in the inheritance is legal or not?
Whether or not the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this case?

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 The Supreme Court Held:
The approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous
“…inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)”
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
this particular case.
the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law, as stated in article 792 of the Civil Code.
The said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects.

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an
affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for
adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the
court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering
Pilapil v.
that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
Ibay Somera
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby
made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender
at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action
for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
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 matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne
and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the
Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental
custody of the children was granted to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree
Roehr v.
from a German court.
Rodriguez
2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?
RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the
parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings.

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On
May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On
June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace
Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had
been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved
Garcia v. and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
Recio ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the
court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to
marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry
Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage
between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles
15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The
party was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim
Nikko Hotel
who was also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes
Manila v.
(popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find
Reyes
out who invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes,
Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes

5
 however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of
the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was
invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim
approached him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was
invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was
escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is
true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the
hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely
for her to make a scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave,
Lim did so very close to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended
that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They
do not know each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes
himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned
away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that
Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not
even present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself,
neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon
City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business
name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs.
Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club,
Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. On March 3, 1995,
MERALCO’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot
inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of
asking permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed
the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO 's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the
meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and
Sps.
there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the
Quisumbing
inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. The spouses were advised by MERALCO
v. Meralco
's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for
verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered,
MERALCO had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the spouses unless they pay the amount
of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina
informed the spouses that they were just following their standard operating procedure. An action for
damages by the spouses alleging that MERALCO acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and
malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and
without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.
Whether MERALCO observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electric supply of the
spouses?
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 Under the law, MERALCO may immeadiately disconnect any electric services on the ground of meter
tampering. However, they may do only in the presence of an officer of law or by a duly authorized
representative of the energy regulatory board where they can personally witnessed and attested the
discovery of the tampering. If there’s no government representative, the prima facie authority to
disconnect granted to MERALCO by RA 7832 can’t apply. The presence of government agents who may
authorize immediate disconnection goes into the essence of due process. MERALCO can’t be prosecutor
and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. MERALCO can’t rely
on the contractual right to disconnect if there is non-payment of bills. An adjusted bill shall be prepared
and only upon failure to pay the company disconnect or discontinue service. This alo true in regard with
the provision of the revised order no. 1 of the former public service commission which requires a 46 hour
written notice before the disconnection may be justified. Hence, this case is partially granted wherein both
of the parties are to pay each other.

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21
years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents
where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and
relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But
in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually
revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged
to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino
customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Gasheem Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
Shookat shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Baksh v. CA Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying
Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the
opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi
delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly
covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the
absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and
there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or
criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise
(expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

FACTS:
Albenson v.
CA
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation

7
 Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the
reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature
belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied
that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for
violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who
manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of
such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:

Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RATIO:

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the
respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them.

There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:

Ø SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao

Ø Bank said signature belonged to EB
Ø EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
Ø the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
Ø that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1 there is a legal right or duty
2 exercised in bad faith
3 for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1 there is an act which is legal
2 but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3 it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor
to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V.
No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent
Baltao.

In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the
regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade (INC). He enrolled
UE v. Jader for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean.
In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year
8
 students should be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the
investiture ceremonies and later he gave blowout celebrations. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
because his academic requirements were not complete because it appears that his INC rating was not
removed.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising
from the UE’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees
and cost of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student
into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of
the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to
where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or
whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted
in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

In February 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño secretly married each other and of course
without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was
celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding
to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a re-celebration because she heard that Tenchavez was
having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went
to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American
citizen and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents
dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and caused her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking for
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought
for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
Tenchavez His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public
v. Escano humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier
(because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her
non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave
Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact
that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and
attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.
On the part of Escaño’s parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the
same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC
reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work there. She
returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceño was able to
locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else. Further, Arceño
Abunado v.
also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
People
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May 1995, Arceño filed a bigamy
case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted by

9
 the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment case he
filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the
proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.
HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present – the nullity of the prior
marriage is immaterial.

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children since then but after 24
years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s
PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she
filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran
and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue
that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the
courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the
civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC
upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in
the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
Beltran v.
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
People
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Facts:
Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988 in civil rites. They did not live
Te v. CA
together after the marriage, and later on, Choa gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989
May 20, 1990, Te contracted a second marriafe with Julieta Santilla

10
 Choa filed an affidavit on June 1990, and filed a charge of bigamy with the RTC on August 1990
July 20, 1990, Te filed in RTC an action for annulment of their marriage, alleging that Choa concealed
her pregnancy to another man at the time of their marriage, and she was psychologically incapacitated
to perform marital obligations
Nov 8, 1990, Choa also filed with the PRC (professional regulation commission) for the revocation of the
engineering licenses of Santella and Te, on grounds of acting immorally by living together and marrying,
despite the fact that petitioner was still married to her, as well as act of falsification, by stating in Te’s
marriage contract that he is still single.
Te accused RTC for showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this
case. He claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and Choa was not presented, and
the signatures were not properly identified, as well as the fact that the marriage contract between him and
Santella was not presented as well
Te filed a case in CA alleging grave abuse of discrertion on part of RTC for:
showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this case
violating requirements of due process by denying petitioners demurrer to evidence even before the filing
of such
disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by SC
ruling that in a criminal case, only prima facie evidence is sufficient for conviction of accused

CA upheld the RTCs decision, on grounds that Te failed to show any concrete evidence that the RTC
prejudged the case.

Issue:
· Did the RTC and CA gravely abused discretion and committed an error in law in not holding the
demurrer to evidence?

Held:
· SC held that there was no abuse in discretion on part of the judge of RTC, for they were not
deprived of fair and impartial trial. The denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal
proceedings are in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.
· SC also states that RTC based its denial of demurrer on two grounds: first, Choa and her counsel
established a prima facie case for bigamy against petitioner, and second, petitioners allegation of demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. SC also clarifies that by denying of demurrer of
petitioner of demurrer doesn’t mean that he is pronounced as liable for the case.
Te’s petition is denied for lack of merit

Facts: Felix Icao, a married man, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen Quimiguing several
time by force and intimidation. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite efforts to abort and had to
stop studying. Carmen Quimiging filed a petition claiming support at 120 pesos per month. Icao moved
to dismiss the petition for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had
been born. The lower court dismissed the complaint. Carmen moved to amend the complaint to allege
that she had given birth to a baby girl but the Court disallowed by saying that no amendment was
allowable. Thus the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a valid cause of action?
Held: Yes. A conceived child, although yet as unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
Qumiguing for all purposes favourable to it. It may receive donations as prescribed by Art. 742 of the Civil Code
v. Icao which states:
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born. The lower court’s theory that support does not
contemplate to children as yet unborn violates Art. 40 of the Civil Code which states: The conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's
womb) The second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of the victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for the damage caused.
11
 F: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt.
In 1950, she became preganant by her present husband before they were legally married. During to
conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by def. After the marriage w/ the pltff.,
she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became
pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again repaired to the def's clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes pltff's basis in filing this action and award of damages The
CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206
of the NCC.
RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed w/ personality.
RATIO: Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who
voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
(1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of person¬al injury or death pertains primarily to
the injured, no such right of action could deriva¬tively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by
its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Cod, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or
Geluz v. CA services from an unborn child, they would nor¬mally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of
the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is
no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous
abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affection.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the
removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation.

Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is
enough that the child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life required for juridical personality can be shown
only by complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence
that it has acquired complete respiration. Another indication of complete respiration is the floating of the
lungs when placed in water; this means that air has penetrated into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is capable of living, and this is determined by the
extent of the development of its organs.

Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24 hours completely separated from the mother's
womb, it does not acquire juridical personality. This is an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an
intrauterine life of less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
12
 "The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and consequently is not born in the
contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)

This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses and it can be proved that it could have
survived that period if it had not been prevented by the wilful act of another. On the other hand, juridical
personality is acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by medical or scientific means w/o
w/c the child would have died before the lapse of that period.

Facts:

This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose of recovering
from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the
defendant to recognize Ismael as his natural child and pay maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the
barbershop where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her
home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name.
On his trip to China and Japan, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good
condition so that “junior” will be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a
house where they lived together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She
became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

De Jesus v. Issue:
Syquia
WON (1) there would be damages for the breach to marry. (2) WON Syquia is compelled to recognize
Ismael loanco as his natural child

Held:

The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach of
promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the production of
more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.

FACTS:
-­‐ Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience with the Public Service Commission to
install, maintain and operate an ice plant. But he died pending the application. Hence, he was
substituted by his legal representative.
-­‐ Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then
pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for,
Limjoco v. which is said to be in contravention of law.
Estate of
Pedro ISSUE: W/N Fragante’s legal representative may continue the application.
Fragrante
(syllabus: HELD/RATIO: YES. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or
Limjuco) rights of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be
instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt
or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right.

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public
Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the
decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of
the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, ca not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the

13
 creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.

Facts On April 23, 1959, Pedro Oria died. On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a case
against Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag, and Juana Darang (Civil
Case T-662). On June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven, received and signed the summons1 and copies of the
complaint (Civil Case T-662) in his and his co-defendants’ behalf. . On February 18, 1962, an order was
made by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan pertaining Civil Case T-662 initially requesting Oria et
al to pay P3667.03 plus legal rates to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. This was to avoid the foreclosure of
their surety bonds. 2 However, Pedro Oria failed to pay the said amount before the decision of the lower
court became final and thus the lower court ordered the (1) foreclosure of his surety bond and (2) sale of
his public land which he had given as a security for the bond. On September 24, 1962, Pedro Oria’s land
was sold through auction by the sheriff. On March 1, 1963: Petitioners Dionisio, Fausta, Amado, and
Dumlao v. Benjamin Dumlao—all testamentary heirs in Pedro Oria’s duly probated will— sued Quality Plastic
Quality Products, Inc. for the annulment of both the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
Plastics On the other hand, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. replied that the heirs were estopped3 to question the
court’s jurisdiction over Oria. After the said hearing, the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over
Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned
out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead.
Issue WON the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case T-662 against the deceased Pedro Oria was valid.
Held No, the judgment of trial court in Civil Case T-662 was invalid Ratio Decidendi (1) The judgment
against him is patent nullity and void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. (2) He was not and could
not have validly served the summons since he had no more civil personality and juridical capacity4. Both
of these were already lost upon his death. (2) A counsel cannot validly appear for a dead codefendant.
Estoppel does not apply in this case. 4 Juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations

Facts: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa
to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a period
of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to
stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung
would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Mo Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
Comm of after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary
Immigration injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak
either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines

14
 under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during
the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is
no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine
citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the
date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

1 The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Salvador Estuye
filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of election and
proclamation of Governor Juan G. Frivaldo of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.
2 In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He
added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
restoration of democracy. Moreover, he claims that by actively participating in the elections in
this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.

3 Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to
resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end
with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest
and the vital principles of public office to be here applied. It is true that the Commission on
Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests relating
Frivaldo v.
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
COMELEC
and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the
COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a
foreigner. This stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its
approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Court may now
review.
Held: The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the
other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. The reason for this inquiry
is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times."
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo,
and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to
have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA
15
 No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged
forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary.
That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would
allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without
formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-
Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining
order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I must emphasize that my concurrence is limited to
a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many
grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly. The pragmatic
approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of
COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the
petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the
procedure pro hac vice.

Summary: Chinese national Wilfred Uytengsu was born in Dumaguete City. He finished grade school up
to college in the Philippines. He then left for US to study. When he returned to the Phils for vacation, he
applied for naturalization to become a Filipino. But right after his filing of application, he left again for
US to continue his studies. He finished his course, but did not return until after several months. Hence,
the hearing of his case was postponed. Held: His application was not granted w/o prejudice to his filing
of another application. Actual and substantial residence — not merely legal residence — is necessary to
dispense with the filing of a declaration of intention in order to give ample time for the government to
make a requisite investigation prior to his filing of application.
1 Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,
1927. He began his primary education at the Saint Theresa's College in said municipality.
Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos College and,
still later the Siliman University — all in the same locality — where he completed the secondary
Uytengsu v. course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in
Republic Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in
the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the degree
of Bachelor of Science.
2 In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be
exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned
to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another
educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana.
3 He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Hence, the hearing of the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be
postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.
4 Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the application of Wilfred Uytengsu. The Republic of the
Phils, thru the Solicitor-General appealed this decision.
Held: SC reversed the grant of application. Although his domicile is in the Philippines, the main
16
 requirement for an application for naturalization is that one must reside therein for not less than 10 years,
except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence is sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth
Act No. 473). Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant
the duty to state in his sworn application "that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the
intervening period, it can not refer merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal residence,
irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the
absence of the requirement contained in said clause. Exemption is given to "those who have resided in
the Philippines continuously for a period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." (Dy v.
Republic) The Court however ruled that "actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal
residence", or "domicile," along, is essential to the enjoyment of the benefits of said exemption.
It is nothing but to give the government sufficient time to check the truth of the statements made in said
declaration of intention, if any, and in the application for naturalization, especially the allegations therein
relative to the possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
Although data pertinent to said qualifications and disqualifications could generally to be obtained from
persons familiar with the applicant, it is be expected that the information thus secured would consist,
mainly, of conclusions and opinions of said individuals.
In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye on
petitioner herein. Immediately after the filing of his application — and — notwithstanding the explicit
promise therein made him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
"from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he
returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951. For this first time,
on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for opportunity needed by the Government to observe
petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having been born in the Philippines, where he finished his
primary and secondary education, petitioner his not have to file, and did not file, a declaration of intention
prior to the filing of his petition for naturalization. Thus, the Government had no previous notice of his
intention to apply for naturalization until the filing of his petition and could not make the requisite
investigation prior thereto. Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States,
practically without interruption, from early 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three
years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he resided — as
distinguished from domiciled — in the United States at that time and for over a year subsequently
thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6) months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the
right to suffrage in a given municipality (section 98, Republic Act No. 180); residence for sentatives (sec.
7, Art. VI, of the Constitution); and residence for two (2) years, to run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of
the Constitution).
In short, the Court is of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of
section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his
application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.
REVERSED, but without prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so desires, in conformity
with law.

1 Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995.
2 On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on
Romualdez-
the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record and in her Certificate of
Marcos v.
Candidacy.
COMELEC
3 On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in her certificate. On the same day, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that her Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be accepted on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the
same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
4 Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
17
 respondent's petition was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer,
petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was
the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She also said that Montejo has been
opposing her candidacy since the day she announced her intent to run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte. He allegedly filed a bill to transfer the town of Tolosa where the petitioner
resides from the First District to the Second District. Having failed to achieve his purpose, he
now filed this petition in order to remove her as rival.
5 COMELEC granted the petition.
Held: The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the election." The mischief which this provision — reproduced
verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community."
1 The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile":
2 The honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact (in the Voter’s Registration, publicized visits and charity works, etc.) were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
3 Her domicile is in Tacloban City. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places.
4 There was no evidence pointing to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin. What is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects
for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin
are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
5 It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The right of the
husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage
different domiciles (of origin). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence,
it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

18
 FAMILY CODE CASES
Case Name Digest
Facts:
• New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies stated that:
• In case of two of our employees (both single, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course
of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.
The complainants alleged that when they married co-employees, they were compelled to resign because of
the company policy. Arguing that said policy is illegal, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.
whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the
rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management
prerogative
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely
by reason of her marriage.
Two types of employment policies involve spouses:
• no-spouse employment policies - policies banning only spouses from working in the same •
company
Star Paper v anti-nepotism employment policies - those banning all immediate family members, including
Simbol spouses, from working in the same company
In the US, there is what they call as bona fide occupational qualification exception, that is, unless the
employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital
status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business
purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s
spouse.
And to justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In the Philippines we employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel
tothebonafideoccupationalqualificationrequirement. ThiswasillustratedinthecasesofDuncan Association of
Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome (2004) and PT&T v. NLRC (1997). These cases instruct us that the
requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy.
The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Star Paper failed to show
how the marriages of the employees could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.

FACTS:

This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.

PT&T v. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she
NLRC was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However,
her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work.

Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter,
Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover,
19
he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of
the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was
dismissed from work.

ISSUES:
4 Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was
discriminatory
5 Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of
confidence
6 Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a
female employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s
caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned
and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of
Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she
was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150
days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be
effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it
was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

20
 As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back
wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.

Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada
requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still
legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is
committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her
husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio
but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their
religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her
congregation.
Estrada v. 3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance
Escritor with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their
spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding
within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritor’s conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms—including religious freedom—may be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that
the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite

Facts: Plaintiff, Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara, was married to the defendant, Jose Campos Rueda, on
January 7, 1915. The defendant, after had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, on several times,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organ; that the plaintiff
spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any of the acts other than legal
and valid cohabitation. Because the plaintiff refused to perform the said acts, defendant maltreated the
plaintiff, by words and deeds and inflicting injuries in some parts of her body. When the plaintiff was
unable to induce the repugnant desires and maltreatment of the defendant, plaintiff was obliged to leave
Goitia v.
the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Campos-
Rueda
Issue: whether or not the plaintiff can constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance?

Held: The court held that a husband, cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drive
his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his duties there under. The court ruled that the wife, who is
forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action

21
 against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy, not withstanding the
provision of art, 149 of the CC giving the person who is `obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it
either by paying fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right
to the same. The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the
husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein
private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that
Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases)
alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead
body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any
qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Eugenio v. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Velez
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.

Ruling:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common
law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction
between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that
the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases).

Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following
offenses:

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
Cosca v.
4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
Palaypayon
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage
license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees
to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for

22
 the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.

Ruling:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite
of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily,
it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations,
bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the
scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend
the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent
another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon.
However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events.
He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer
because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
Wassmer v. exemplary and moral damages against him.
Velez ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It
is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in
part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is
also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer,
acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages
against him.

Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted evidence in relation
to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on
September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy
Navarro v.
claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s wife has
Domagtoy
been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge.
(Syllabus:
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Domagtory)
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan
did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent

23
 this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second
issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was only done by one party, the
bride, NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
“authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others,
“any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.

Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-
Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s death, to inherit the “vast properties” left
by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was
referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the
respondent to comment on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents
submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Aranes v.
Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
Judge
He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Occiano
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his
territorial jurisdiction.

Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity
to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

FACTS:

Tan alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the commercial
partnership, Glory Commercial Company with Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua".
Lim Tanhu
v. Ramolete
Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo,
through fraud and machination, took actual and active management of the partnership and although Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company, defendants managed to use the
funds of the partnership to purchase lands and buildings in the cities of Cebu, Lapulapu, Mandaue, and

24
 the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.

She alleged in her complaint that after the death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the defendants, without
liquidation, continued the business of Glory Commercial Company, by purportedly organizing a
corporation known as the Glory Commercial Company, Incorporated and sometime in the month of
November, 1967, defendants, particularly Antonio Lim Tanhu, by means of fraud deceit, and
misrepresentations did then and there, induce and convince her to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and
interests, in the assets of the partnership of Glory Commercial Company.

Thereafter, in the year 1968-69, the defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate the aforesaid
properties and assets in favor, among others of plaintiff and until the middle of the year 1970 when the
plaintiff formally demanded from the defendants the accounting of real and personal properties of the
Glory Commercial Company, defendants refused and stated that they would not give the share of the
plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether Tan has a right over the liquidated properties of the partnership

HELD:

No, Tan has no right over the liquidated properties of the partnership

The Supreme Court held that there is no alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put's allegation that she
is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary,
the evidence on record convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of a common-law
wife.
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts committed an error by awarding 1/3 of the
partnership properties to Tan because there has been no liquidation proceedings yet. And if there has not
yet been any liquidation of the partnership, the only right plaintiff could have would be to what might
result after much liquidation to belong to the deceased partner (her alleged husband) and before this is
finished, it is impossible to determine, what rights or interest, if any the deceased had.
In other words, no specific amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir or legal representative of
the deceased partner without the liquidation being first terminated.
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the
persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was
the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City
and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used
were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L.
Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and
1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax
Vda. De
Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
Chua v. CA
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court
ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter
appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of
Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner
herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best
25
 evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title,
Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when
the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged
marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he
has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the
marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with
other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the
petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.

Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name
of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter,
the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of
Republic v.
the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
CA and
Castro
Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to
prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did
not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the
marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.

Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian
family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired
Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City.
*Garcia v. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since
Recio October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided.
In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy,
claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand,
respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.
Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in
Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared

26
 that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize
a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an
Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence
regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s
failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

Facts:
Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital
discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of
marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January
15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an
action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
on January 23, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua
sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
*Pilapil v.
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
Ibay
lower court denying her motion to quash.
Somera
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Ruling:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
27
 standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong. However, in
1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was petitioning that he be granted
management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his contention that the divorce decree
they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in the Philippines, hence, despite the divorce, Reyes’s
property in the Philippines remained conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton.
The judge ruled that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over
the declared national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
Van Dorn v.
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
Romillo
(nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus,
pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue
as Reyes’s husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the
decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the
United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley, and her child by
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with
the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the
Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Republic v. HELD: Yes and No. In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court states the twin elements for the
Obrecido application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
(Syllabus: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
Obrecido) 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization he is still barred from
remarrying.

Facts:
Ninal v.
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
Bayadog
herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months

28
 thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the
Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in
San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then
Manzano v.
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
Sanchez
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article
34 of the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
29
 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2.
The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a
sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null
and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following
offenses:

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage
license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees
to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for
*Cosca v.
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Palaypayon
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.

Ruling:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite
of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily,
it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

30
 Facts:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbana and Ireneo. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana.
And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children, namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was still
unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants from his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on Lupo’s third marriage
filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot
No. 163 which were owned by their common father. The petitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
also the complaint by the respondents, children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for
not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate
children of their said parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo,
including the respondents, are entitled to equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of said decision.

Mariategui Issue:
v. CA Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the said estate.

Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the
deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact
is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his
father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife,
and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record
of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from
bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced
by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of
the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went
to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
Chi Ming In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
Tsoi v. CA week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to
31
 this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said
she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also
said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very
much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason
for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife,
she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as
VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Facts:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they
were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to
her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came
to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be
declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties
Domingo v. she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
CA Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the
petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in
his possession.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.

32
 Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court
had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the
Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
*Ninal v.
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
Bayadog
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

33
 In 1985, Roridel Olaviano married Reynaldo Molina. They begot one child. But in 1990, Roridel filed a
petition to have her marriage be declared void on the ground that Reynaldo is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Roridel alleged that Reynaldo was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought
of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple’s best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start. A psychologist testified in favor of Roridel and the doctor’s testimony was given weight by the trial
court hence, the marriage was declared void. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the finding of psychological incapacity is proper.
HELD: No. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Supreme Court also noted in this case that there has been a difficulty by courts and lawyers in
applying the concept of psychological incapacity. Hence, the Sc handed down the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or
Republic v.
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
CA and
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
Molina
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
34
 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced
by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of
the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went
to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
*Chi Ming
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
Tsoi v. CA
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to
this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said
she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also
said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very
much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason
for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife,
she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.

35
 ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as
VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Note: This was the first case where the term “psychological incapacity” was discussed by the Supreme Court.
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage,
however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as averred by Leouel. The couple also
occasionally quarreled about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from
Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months
later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year.
In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately
tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a
petition to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to
Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The
prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by
the lower and appellate court.
Louel ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
Santos v. HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term
CA “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity
than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any
examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity”
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality
36
 disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes
that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI
of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to
to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
In 1986, Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano met in Japan. They had a love affair which resulted to a
child.
In 1988, they married here in the Philippines. But only a month after their marriage, Toshio went back to
Japan. He only gave financial support to Lolita for the first two months but thereafter, he stopped sending
money to Lolita. Lolita wrote Toshio but he ignored those letters.
In 1991, Toshio returned to the Philippines but he never even bothered seeing his family here.
In June 1996, Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio. She alleged
that Toshio is psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities; that his indifference to
his wife and child is a clear manifestation of immaturity and insensitivity.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lolita. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In its ruling, the CA
stated that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs Court of Appeals and Molina are not applicable to this
case because one of the spouse, Toshio, is an alien (Japanese). In short, the CA ruled that the said case is
not applicable to mixed marriages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
Republic v. HELD: No. In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Quintero- Filipino spouse. The court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse
Hamano alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules
to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
Anent the issue of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, Lolita was not able to prove the same. The totality of
evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would
have greatly helped Lolita’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness

Facts:
Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15, 1981. Out of
this union, two children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment
of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his
evidence. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to
Choa v. evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent.
Choa Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial of
the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence.

Issue:: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of
respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

37
 The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to
support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included
Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence
presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient
to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children since then. David then found
out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-
marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she
had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and
David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity
for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
Dedel v. CA HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most
serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital
obligations. Sharon’s sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of
psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude
the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in
law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated
in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married each other. Their first child was born in the
same year. In 1972, they begot a second child. However, after giving birth, Natividad left their conjugal
home, even selling said house, and then had an affair with an engineer. She bore a child with the said
engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and cohabited with another man.
In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Natividad is
psychologically incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged the services of Dr. Cheryl Zalsos to evaluate both parties.
Republic v.
In court, Zalsos testified that both parties are psychologically incapacitated; that Rodolfo failed to perform
Rodolfo O.
his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman; that Natividad lacked the
De Gracia
willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters; that both suffered from “utter
emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons
who abide by established norms of conduct”; that the mental condition of both parties already existed at
the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after.
The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage was declared void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.

38
 ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven in this case.
HELD: No. The evidence presented failed to support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence (Molina Guidelines).
The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of
psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.

In 1976, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez married each other in Hong Kong. They had
4 children.
In 1985, Elena left Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone had an affair with another woman and even had children
with the other woman. Tyrone later on went to the US with that other woman and their children. He left
behind his 4 children. It was a househelp and their driver who had to take care of the 4 children. Elena
would only visit the children on weekends.
In 1994, Tyrone filed a petition to have his marriage with Elena be declared void on the ground that Elena
is psychologically incapacitated. He presented two expert witnesses, namely: Dr. Cristina Gates
(Psychologist) and Fr. Gerard Healy (Catholic Canon Law Expert).
Dr. Gates testified that based on her interview with Tyrone as to Elena’s personality, she concluded that
Elena is suffering from narcissistic personality disorder. This was manifested by her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends.
Fr. Healy corroborated the testimony of Dr. Gates. However, like Dr. Gates, Fr. Healy did not personally
evaluate Elena. He even said that he assumed that the factual allegations made by Tyrone were true and
that it is however the duty of the court to make a final determination as to the truth of such allegations.
He merely evaluated the statements.
On her part, Elena presented Dr. Dayan. Dr. Dayan personally evaluated both Tyrone and Elena. After
her interviews, Dr. Dayan concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. She concluded
that Tyrone is a distancer who is concerned more with his work and friends than his family, while Elena
was clingy, immature, and doubtful of Tyrone’s love – in short, both are emotionally immature.
Other witnesses presented were their children who all testified that despite their parents’ differences, both
took good care of them.
Valerio E.
The RTC ruled that the marriage is void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Kalaw v.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void.
Ma. Elena
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the plaintiff’s, in this case Tyrone’s, duty to prove
Fernandez
psychological incapacity (so the SC did not discuss Elena’s, the respondent, presentment as to their
psychological incapacity). Tyrone was not able to prove Elena’s psychological incapacity since the expert
witnesses he presented heavily relied on Tyrone’s allegations of Elena’s constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Tyrone’s allegations,
which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, during trial, Elena was able to rebut Tyrone’s allegations. Even their children testified that
Elena attended to them and had no issues with the care shown them by their mother.
The most that the evidence can prove in this case are grounds for legal separation but not psychological
incapacity.
The SC emphasized that psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely
disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
NOTE: This was reversed by the Supreme Court in January 2015 upon motion for reconsideration by
Tyrone.

39
 In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work there. She
returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceño was able to
locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else. Further, Arceño
also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May 1995, Arceño filed a bigamy
case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted by
the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment case he
filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the
proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.
HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
*Abunado crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
v. People it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present – the nullity of the prior
marriage is immaterial.

Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact
with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground
Morigo v. that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by
People the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in
the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as "void."
40
 In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private
act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is
done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

FACTS:
• July 1978 – Respondent Karl Heinz and petitioner Lilia Wiegel got married
• Subsequently, Karl filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia
o Ground: Lilia’s previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion, celebrated on June 1972
• Lilia admitted the existence of the prior subsisting marriage but claimed that said marriage was null
and void as she and Eduardo were forced to enter the said marital union
• During the pre-trial, the parties agreed upon the issue of whether or not Lilia’s first marriage was
void or merely voidable, assuming that there was force exerted upon the Lilia and Eduardo
o In contesting the validity of the pre-trial order (case did not mention the PTO), Lilia claims,
among others that Eduardo was already married to someone else at the time of their
marriage in 1972 and asked to be given the opportunity to present evidence to such claims;
RTC denied the request; hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
Whether the presentation of evidence should be allowed to prove that Lilia’s marriage with Eduardo was
Weigel v. vitiated by force.
Sempio-Dy

RULING: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO: NO.
• There is no need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming this
to be so, said marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled.
• Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she was still validly
married to Eduardo, her first husband; consequently, her marriage to Karl is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code)
• There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of Eduardo at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact; and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl; accordingly, the
marriage of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under the law.

Facts:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they
were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to
*Domingo
her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came
v. CA
to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be
declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties
she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the
41
 petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in
his possession.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court
had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code.

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992,
Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It
also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined
by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147
of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
Valdes v.
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and
RTC
all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties
owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article
147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse,
the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
42
 period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are
prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If
the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the
trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family
Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article
43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse
of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
FACTS:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the
Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the accused
now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria Gorrea died,
and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became
a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment
People v.
brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence
Aragon
the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to
Maglasang.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his
marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of
43
 such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:
Whethe or not accused is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with
the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered
into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can
not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the
second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado married a
second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought the dismissal
of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio,
there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his “second” marriage with Tan was actually his first
marriage.
Mercado v. ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.
Tan HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:
(Syllabus: 1. That the offender has been legally married;
Mercado) 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first marriage was still
subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action to declare his first marriage
void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that declaration a person who marries a
second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

Presumptive Death
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead
or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a in a
bar in England. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique.
Republic v.
After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
Nolasco
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
His efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that
he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

44
 On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker
despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to
give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter
of Janet Monica’s disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a “well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,” 2 and second,
Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a “cunning attempt” to
circumvent the law on marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD: In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decidion declaring that Parker’a
presumptive death is reversed, both decisions were nullified and set aside with costs against the
respondent.
BASIS:
Article 1 of the Family Code
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
Note: While the Court understands the need of respondent’s young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care,
still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of
the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution
Article 149 of the Family Code
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban
and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no
one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than
20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be
relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.
Lukban v.
HELD:
Republic
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband
because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration
of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration
of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
45
 FACTS:
Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. He was survived by his wife, Marietta.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married to William Bounds in January
1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico got married without Marietta securing a court declaration of
Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the
latter and that the marriage between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly bigamous is by itself null
and void. She prayed that her son be appointed as administrator of the estate of the decedent and
inheritance be adjudicated to her.
Armas v. ISSUE:
Calisterio WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive
death
RULING:
No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was solemnized in 1958 where the law in force at
the time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family Code limits its retroactive
effect only to cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is
not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is
enough to remarry, then Marietta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right to claim
a portion of Teodorico’s estate.

Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a
complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The
court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim
was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-
marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover
moral damages.

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud
against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital
duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close
relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation
of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

Anaya v. Issue: Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a
Palaroan ground for annulment of marriage?

Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall
give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage
she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent
being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

46
 Facts:
• March 1938 – Godofredo and Luida meet
• 19 September 1938 – The two become engaged
• 26 November 1938 – The two get married, Catholic cathedral of Baguio City
o Godofredo claims that he agreed to the marriage promise based on Luida’s assurance that
she was a virgin
• 23 February 1939 – 89 days after marriage, Luida gives birth to a son
o Godofredo promptly left Luida and never returned to a married life with her
• 20 March 1939 – Godofredo initiated a case in Baguio CFI, praying that the marriage be annulled
on grounds that there had been fraud [that Luida had claimed that she was a virgin]
o Although duly summoned by the trial court, Luida failed to appear; Godofredo was
allowed to present his proof – but the court decided in favor of Luida anyway.

Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
• Art 45 [Family Code]

A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or
over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian
or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
Buccat v. (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
Buccat same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to
be incurable. (85a)

• Art 46 [Family Code]

Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time
of the marriage.

NOTE: Obviously the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time, but in case it is asked how the case
would turn out today, these two provisions are to serve as the basis.

Issues:
1. Should the marriage between Godofredo and Luida be annulled on the ground that there had
been fraud (concealment of pregnancy) at the time of marriage?

Ruling:
47
 1. NO.
• Clear and authentic proof of fraud was not established.

Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Assertion of Godofredo that he had not even suspected Luida’s pregnancy, highly unlikely:
• Luida was in an advanced state of pregnancy at the time they were married (late into 2nd
trimester/early into 3rd)
• Godofredo’s contention (not rare to find persons with developed abdomens) – foolish,
especially considering that Godofredo was a first year law student
• “Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation upon which society rests. To
nullify it would need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof exists.”

FACTS: A complaint was filed against the defendant for the alleged concealment from her husband, the
plaintiff that she was pregnant by another man at the date of their marriage on December 27, 1954. Four
months after their marriage, the defendant gave birth to a child sometime in April, 1955. The defendant
answered that the child was conceived between her and the plaintiff. The complaint filed was based on the
ground of fraud for the annulment their marriage.
At the trial, only the marriage certificate of both parties was presented. Without the birth
certificate of the child born after the marriage, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff filed a
“petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence” to present the birth certificate but it was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the claim
of the plaintiff to not have noticed the pregnancy when he married her was found to be unbelievable. The
Aquino v.
plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration for a new trial. The court then denied the motion for it
Delizo
“does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes”. Thus a petition for
certiorari to review was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the annulment of the marriage between parties can persist on the ground of fraud.
HELD: Yes. Concealment of pregnancy at the time of marriage constitutes fraud as ground for
annulment. The evidences presented: Affidavit of Cesar Aquino who admitted as the father of the
defendant’s first born and the plaintiff’s brother, Affidavit of the defendant who admitted the
concealment of her pregnancy from the plaintiff and the birth certificate of the child were found to be
sufficient to constitute fraud alleged by the plaintiff. A new trial was ordered, the decision was set aside
and the case remanded to trial court for hearing of evidence.

Facts:
Matilde Menciano, in her and her children,s behalf, filed a motion for declaration of
heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on
September 28, 1944 before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S.J.; that they lived together before the said
marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, the child having enjoyed the status of a
recognized natural child; that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 25, 1945 and was
legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful wedlock.
On the other hand, on an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo
Pelaez (designated universal heir in the will of the deceased dated
Menciano v. December 19, 1940), denied the substantial allegations of Menciano,s motion for declaration of heirs and
San Jose further alleged that the deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943
which became worse a year later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation
of the legal provisions and requisites because of the latter,s age, sickness, and bombardment; that
Menciano took advantage of the deceased,s condition, forced the latter to marry her by means of deceit
and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile and impotent. Moreover, the defendants also
filed a counterclaim for the sum of fj286,000 in cash, for jewels and certain properties which, as presumed,
were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.

Issue:
(1)Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano

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 valid?
(2)Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?

(3)Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels,
and certain properties aforementioned?

Decision:
(1)Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications for a marriage
license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the deceased to marry
Menciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate
for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil
Registrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by the
deceased and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer,
and the witnesses L. B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan. The 4 documents are official and
public; there validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing
oral testimony. In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not
convincing so as to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures of
the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not have
been written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectually
incapacitated, as the defendants, witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the tests
pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show the capacity to contract
marriage of the deceased. Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity,
there is no reason why is should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage,
which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not err in declaring valid
the marriage of the deceased and Menciano.

(2)Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and Menciano. The requisite
for potency being met, the necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased with Menciano in lawful
wedlock.

No. The court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been acknowledged as a natural
child and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his
parents.

(3)No. After a careful and exhaustive review of evidence, the trial court correctly reached
the conclusion that such allegation has not been substantiated. The testimonies of
mother and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money are
contradictory. Moreover, Clotilde Galarrita de Labitad,s testimony is unbelievable. With
regard to the jewels, no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that Menciano
misappropriated them.

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios is
impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of
the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was
found that there was no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios
in the case. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals
Jimenez v. are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely
Canizares on Joel’s complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the

49
 decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy,
bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor
of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

PRINCIPLE:

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family.
It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and provides the
very bedrock on which our society finds stability. Marriage is immutable and when both spouses give their
consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.

However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the
“permanence” of the union becomes irrelevant and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the
Family Code is the justification. Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the
parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of
procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon
the petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-
compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for
proper trial.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.

Sin v. Sin
Florence is married to Philipp, a Portuguese citizen. Several years after they were married (Jan. 4, 1987 -
Sept. 20, 1994), Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court dismissed
the petition so Florence elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the decision.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
7 Whether or not psychological capacity was adequately proven

HELD:

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. After
filing a manifestation in the trial court that he found on collusion between the parties, the Fiscal did not
actively participate therein and neither did the presiding judge take any step to encourage him to
contribute to the proceedings.

Citing Article 48 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the lack of participation of the State was
not cured by the fact that the evil sought to be prevented did not come about when the lower court
dismissed the petition. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant
and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.

In Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we
50
 nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as “prematurely rendered” since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.

Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province of
the trial court upon proper re-trial.

Overview: This is an action for legal separation which Jose de Ocampo filed against his wife Serafina on the ground of
adultery. The case was dismissed by the Court of first Instance which was affirmed by the Court Appeals holding that there
was confession of judgment , plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
Facts:
Jose de Ocampo (Petitioner) and Serafina Florenciano (Respondent) got married on April 5, 1938 and as a
result of such union, they begot several children. Sometime in March 1951, Ocampo discovered that his
wife was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. He sent his wife to Manila to study beauty culture.
Again, Ocampo discovered that aside from Jose Arcalas, Serafina was going out with several other men.
Serafina left Ocampo after she finished her study and since then the two lived separately.

After Ocampo caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelsom Orzame on June 18, 1955,
he signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation. Serafina conformed to his intention
provided that she will not be charged with adultery in a criminal action.

Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation but the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it
holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription
which was AFFIRMED by the Court of Appeals.

CA’s decision:
With regard to the defendant’s adultery with Jose Arcalas, the husband’s right to legal separation had prescribed because his
action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity (art.102,NCC).

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, after discovery of such, the husband expressed his wish to file a petition for legal
separation which the defendant had readily agreed to. Before the fiscal, the defendant even reiterated her conformity to the legal
Ocampo v.
separation and admitted having sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. The Appellate Court had interpreted such facts as a
Florenciano
confession of judgment under Art.101 and thus, legal separation could not be decreed.

Issue:
Whether or not a decree for legal separation be granted.

Ruling:
Yes. As the Court understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually
happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff’s demand.

Supposing the statement of defendant constitutes a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independent of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant’s
confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess
judgment for the purpose of preventing it.

The fact that the defendant “like also” to be legally separated from her husband, is not an obstacle to the
successful prosecution of the action. When the court is informed that defendant equally desires the
separation and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists.
However, the Court of Appeals did not find collusion.

There would be collusion if the parties had arranged by making it appear that a matrimonial offense had
been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even
51
 in the absence of grounds therefor.

According to the evidence presented in the instant case, the offense of adultery had really took place. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to
jail the moment her husband request the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at
such a personal risk.

In connection to this, collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to
the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it (Williams vs.
Williams, Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig). And proof that defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, it not
by itself collusion (Pohlman vs. Pohlman).

The plaintiff’s failure to actively search for the defendant and take her home (after the latter left him in
1952) does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband’s petition, the Supreme Court hereby REVERSED the
decision being appealed and decree a legal separation between the spouses. Cost against Serafina
Florenciano.

Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married civilly on September 21,
1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered
Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of
legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative.
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With these respondent
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year
period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.

Lapuz v. Issue:
Eufemio Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing
only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that
the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

FACTS:
1. Teresita Gandionco filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against her
hubby, Froilan Gandionco, on May 1986. The complaint was based on the ground of concubinage, and
was accompanied with a petition for support and damages.
2. On October 13, 1986, she filed another concubinage case (this time a criminal case) with
the GenSan RTC.
Gandionco 3. A few months after, she filed an application for provisional remedy of support pendente
v. lite while the civil Leg-Sep case was
Penaranda pending.
4. Judge Peñaranda granted the pendente lite support on December 10, 1986.
5. The present case immediately followed when Froilan made this recourse to the SC. He
contended that the civil action for legal
separation (and all the other consequent actions that can follow from it, like pendente lite, alimony, etc.)
should be suspended in view of the pending criminal case. He relies on Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure and the Jerusalem case in making this claim. Froilan also contends that since the

52
 legal separation case is grounded on the basis of concubinage, it follows that the judgment in the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him would have to be made before the civil action can continue.

IISSUE: Should the civil action for legal separation be suspended to give room for the criminal action for
concubinage?
HELD: NO. The petition was DISMISSED.

The contention made by Froilan is a misapplication of the goal of Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985
ROCP. That provision is meant to cover only civil actions made during the pendency of a criminal case,
when the victim realizes that civil liability has also been incurred and would like to go after the culprit for
the said liability. That kind of civil action, which is to “enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”,
must be suspended because the criminal case has not been decided yet. Most of the time it is used when
the victim wants to invoke the right to live separately from the offender, and to enforce all the other legal
consequences. Art 111, Sec 3 was very explicit in the kind of civil action to be suspended and no
confusion must result from its application.

The present case is different from the one mentioned in Art 111, Sec 3. The case was filed not to
recover civil liability, but to dissolve the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.

The petitioner also cannot say that since the basis for the civil action is being determined in the
criminal action, the conviction for the criminal action must be first obtained. This is because a decree of
legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in
the action for legal separation, and no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

The court also dismissed the claim that the judge was manifestly partial to his wife. Just because
there is divergence of opinion between his lawyer and the judge does not mean that there is foul play.

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in
Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband,
before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with
Benjamin’s sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his
sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to
Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again
as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the
second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of
answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of
Bugayong Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently
v. Ginez denying the averments of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

Ruling:
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the
husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they
slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation
against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil
Code.

53
 Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she
averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979; that during her marriage
to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor
vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the
names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.
Pacete v.
Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion
Cariaga
for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation.

Ruling:
Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention
not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether
principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the
court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had
intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to
the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang
filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations,
admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the
parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the lower court dismissed
the complaint. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and
authorities.

Macadanda Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her
ng v. CA husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

Ruling:
SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and
executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility
and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give
rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during
such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form
of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

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