JAIME JOVEN and REYNALDO C. RASING vs. ATTYS.

authority from the Supreme Court had expired but their application for
PABLO R. CRUZ and FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III renewal is pending before the Supreme Court. Complainants assailed the
A.C. No. 7686 July 31, 2013 regularity of the surety bond alleging that Intra Strata no longer has the
authority to issue the surety bond. Complainants averred that the acts of
Facts: On July 16, 2007, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) respondents in allowing the filing of appeal bond of
rendered a decision. Joven's counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia, received their Bacman despite the expired accreditation of Intra Strata constitute gross
copy of the decision on August 14, 2007. As to respondents, they misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and procedure. They pray
received a copy of the decision on August 24, 2007 based on the Registry that respondents be disbarred or be imposed with the appropriate
Return Receipt 2 that was sent back to the NLRC. Joven and Rasing filed disciplinary sanctions. Respondents denied the charges and accusations
a disbarment case against Attys. Cruz and Magsalin III for deceit, against them. Respondents explained that contrary to the claims of the
malpractice, gross misconduct and falsification of public documents as complainants, the appeal bond is existing and valid.
they alleged that respondents made an alteration of the true date of
their actual receipt with the intention of extending by ten days the Issue: W/N the respondents should be disbarred.
period within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: No. Disbarment is the most severe form of
Issue: WON respondents should be disbarred. disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and
Ruling: No. The Court dismissed the disbarment case for lack of merit. in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 12 This
rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its Court has consistently held that only a clear preponderant
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty. It means
clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh that the record must disclose as free from doubt a case that compels the
penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of
innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly
An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have demonstrated. 13 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is
performed his duties in accordance with his oath. upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power
only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P. satisfactory evidence. 14 This complainants failed to do.
REVILLA, JR.
A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013 PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B.
QUINSAYAS
Facts: Atty. Quirino Revilla, Jr. notarized a complain- affidavit signed by G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013
Heneraline Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado.
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Facts: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal
Sevilla’s wife. Bernard Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla is accused in the Maguindanao Massacre. In November 2010, Atty.
disqualified to perform notarial acts per Section 3, Rule IV of the 2004 Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner for misleading
Rules on Notarial Practice. He also complains that Atty. Revilla did not the prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled the issues
require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the
identification cards. Atty. Revilla did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s case. Petitioner alleged that from November 22 to
material allegations. 23 a number of media published information about the disbarment case
against him. Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty.
Issue: W/N the singe act of notarizing the complaint- affidavit of relatives Quinsayas and the media group for active dissemination of the details of
within the court civil degree of affinity, and, at the same time, not the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the
requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for Rules of Court on confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quinsayas violated the
Ruling: No. Atty. Sevilla’s violation of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of
Practice is not a sufficient ground for disbarment. Given the clear guilt for indirect contempt of court.
provision of the
disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla to act with prudence Ruling: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18,
and refused notarizing the document. Furthermore, if the notary public Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant and as a lawyer
knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their in the disbarment case against Atty. Fortun. As a lawyer and an officer of
valid identification cards. the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
ROLANDO E. CAWALING, ET AL. vs. NAPOLEON M. confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
MENESE against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes
A.C. No. 9698 November 13, 2013 contempt of court

Facts: Complainants were employees of Bacman IN RE CUNANAN

Geothermal, Inc. (Bacman), who were dismissed from their employment. 94 PHIL. 534
They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Bacman Geothermal,
Inc., Danilo G. Catigtig, Ernesto Espinosa and Oscar. The Labor Arbiter FACTS:
declared them to be illegally dismissed. Bacman appealed. The appeal Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
was raffled to the Second Division of the NLRC where respondents were Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks
sitting as Commissioners. There being a monetary award in the decision, for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Bacman posted a supersede as bond issued by Intra Strata Assurance Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
Corporation (Intra Strata). Intra Strata stated that their certification of 1946-1951………………70%
accreditation and 1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73% 22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de parse in a case before
1955……………………..74% a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
50%. the appellate court.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. VINE DEVELOPMENT
subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the CORPORATION
general average in subsequent bar examinations.” G.R. No. 137785
September 4, 2000
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional. Facts: On July 12, 1995, petitioner National Power Corporation instituted
a complaint for expropriation of several parcels of land located at San
RULING: Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite owned by respondents Vine Development
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not Corporation and Romonafe Corporation before the Regional Trial Court,
being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite. After due trial, the lower court granted the
affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 expropriation of those parcels of land at a rate of P3,500.00 per square
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck meter. Petitioner directly appealed to the Court of Appeals on the
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact ground that the said decision was contrary to law, jurisprudence and
that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary. evidence on record. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner and
Romonafe Corp. entered into a Compromise Agreement. When the
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, Court of Appeals required the Office of the Solicitor General (OCG) to
while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The comment on the Compromise Agreement, the (OCG) commented that
portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons: the said Compromise Agreement should be disapproved and the appeal
should be resolved on the merits. During the December 10, 1998
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the hearing, the Solicitor General personally appeared and argued that
bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that subject Compromise Agreement suffered from two fatal infirmities,
this was very close to the end of World War II; namely: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the government and (2) the
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on deputized lawyers if the petitioner have no legal authority to bind the
the petitions of the said candidates; Solicitor General to the said Manifestation to the effect that the OCG
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to deputized counsel of the petitioners have authority to file notices of
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in appeal of the petitioners have authority to file notices of appeal in cases
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of being handled by them. However, such authority does not extend to
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only withdrawal of said appeal, execution of compromise agreement and
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court filing of pleadings before the appellate courts without the review and
on who can practice law; and approval of the Solicitor General. On January 19, 1999, the Court of
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation. Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that the filing of the
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not said appeal is in violation of the Administrative Code (Section 35(1),
muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV) which impliedly stated that the NAPOCOR
1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme lawyers have no authority to appear before the Supreme Court and the
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The Court of Appeals. Hence, thus petition.
same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
Ruling: The Court disagreed with the CA ruling that the deputization of
the NPC lawyers excluded the authority to file appeals in the higher
CRISELDA F. JOSE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO OMEGA
courts. Under Section 2 (a), Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court which
G.R. No. 128646
pertains to ordinary appeals, the notice of appeal is filed in the very
March 14, 2003
same court which rendered the assailed decision, which in this case is
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite. Since the notice was filed
Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City rendered a decision
before the RTC, the NPC lawyers acted clearly within their authority.
declaring that the marriage of respondent Danilo Omega and petitioner
Indeed, their action insured that the appeal was filed within the
Criselda F. Jose as null and void on the ground of psychological
reglementary period. Regardless of which mode of appeal is used, the
incapacity on the part of Criselda. During trial, her counsel on record, the
appeal itself is presumed beneficial to the government; hence, it should
Atty. Margarito D. Yap, represented Criselda. However, notice of appeal
be allowed. After all, the OCG may withdraw it, if it believes that the
was filed by Criselda without the assistance of Atty. Yap. For failure to
appeal will not advance the government's cause.
pay the docket fee, however, the appeal was dismissed and the decision
of the trial court became final and executory. The notice to pay docket
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES
fee and copy of resolution and the entry of judgment were all sent to
G.R. No. 181502
Atty. Yap. Later, Criselda inquired from the appellate court the status of
February 2, 2010
her appeal and claimed that she had not received any notice from the
appellate court. Upon knowing the notices and other incidents were sent
Facts: The petitioner filed an application for registration of a vast tract of
to Atty. Yap, Criselda, through counsel, reinstated her appeal through a
land in Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner
motion. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, as well as the motion
and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and
for reconsideration.
benefits of the same continuously publicly and adversely for more than
26 years. OSG opposed the application because the land in question was
Issue: WON Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion
within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain. CFI ruled in favor of the
Ruling: No. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes,
petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
negligence and omission of their counsel. Moreover, under Section 21,
Subsequently, CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly
settlement on the matter. The parties entered into one. However, OSG
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. Under Section
backed out from the settlement and informed the CA that the track of DECISION:
land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military YES, but with RESERVATIONS.
reservation. CA ruled in favor of OSG. Petitioner then wrote letters
addressed to Justice Quisumbing and Justice Puno alleging there was a CONTINGENT FEE – the contingent fee is the amount agreed upon by the
miscarriage of Justice and that the petitioner was tempted to go to parties subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
media regarding the situation. services only if the suit or litigation prospers.

Issue: W/N Diaz is guilty of contempt of court. YES: Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the
benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the
Ruling: Yes. Diaz has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing client has meritorious cause of action but no means to pay for legal
three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion services, unless he agrees to a contract of contingent fee. A much higher
subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk
further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Court's orders and an
abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats RESERVATIONS: Contingent fee contracts should always be subject to
to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy — although the the supervision of a court as to its reasonableness. When the courts find
tone of petitioner's compliance with our show-cause resolution was that the stipulated amount is excessive or found to have been marred by
decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters — constitutes fraud, mistake, undue influence on the part of the attorney, public policy
contempt of court. demands that said contract be disregarded to protect the client from
unreasonable exaction.
[G.R. No. 169079. February 12, 2007.]
FRANCISCO RAYOS, petitioner, vs. In the case at bar, Atty H collected 53% of the total amount due to
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, respondent. Rayos.
Rayos was unschooled and frustrated with the loss of his loved ones and
FACTS: the destruction of his family’s properties. Given these facts, Rayos would
1. Rayos was a client of Atty Hernandez in Rayos vs NAPOCOR. easily succumb to the demands of Atty H regarding his attorney’s fees.
Taking note also of Atty H’s efforts in litigating Rayos’ case for 15 years
The story of the case: and the risk he took in representing Rayos on a contingent fee basis, a
On Oct 26-27, 1978, typhoon Kading hit Bulacan and concurrently, fee of 35% of the amount awarded to Rayos would be a fair
NAPOCOR imprudently opened three floodgates of the spillway of Angat compensation for Atty H’s legal services.
Dam which caused flooding of Angat River. Consequently, 10 relatives of
Rayos died and his family’s properties were destroyed. Rayos sued Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
NAPOCOR. RTC dismissed the case for lacking credible evidence. CA temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. Thus, guided
reversed the decision and awarded damages in favor of Rayos, which by previous rulings of the Court, Atty Hernandez’s SUSPENSION FOR 6
was also affirmed by the SC. MONTHS is justified in the case at bar.

Final and executory on Aug 4, 1993. The awards were as follows: -----------------------------------------------------
a. Actual damages - P520, 000 NB:
b. Moral damages – P500, 000 Factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
c. Litigation Expenses – P10,000. Rule 20.1 of CPR:
The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
2. The check issued by NAPOCOR was turned over to Atty Hernandez as The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
he was the counsel of Rayos. Rayos demanded the check from Atty H but The importance of the subject matter;
Atty H refused The skill demanded;
The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of
3. Rayos filed a motion with the RTC to direct Atty Hernandez to deliver the proffered case;
to him the check. Despite the Court Order, Atty H refused claiming that it The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of
was his means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees. the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
4. Atty Hernandez deposited the amount of P502, 838. 79 to the bank client from the service;
account of Rayos. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
The character of the employment, whether occasional or established;
5. Rayos filed a disbarment case against Atty H for his failure to return and
the remaining P557, 961. 21. The professional standing of the lawyer.

6. Atty H replied: Rayos allegedly agreed to a contingent basis fee on a NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
40%-60% (client-lawyer) sharing: 656 SCRA 60 G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
40% - attorney’s fees
20% - litigation expenses TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

7. The Court referred the case to Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP for FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River
investigation. Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao.
Investigating Commissioner recommended the DISMISSAL of the case. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used
IBP adopted and approved the same. in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants.
MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement is binding upon Rayos and On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the
Atty Hernandez. property and a prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the
tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title
unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate dispute. The court ruled against the complainants. They wanted to file a
to safer grounds. motion of reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so.
Because of this, the complainants were constrained to contact another
ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation
lawyer to prepare the motion for reconsideration.
RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover
the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even him that the complainants were withdrawing the case from him because
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been he (the son) engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme
attempted by the taking agency. further explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the
son, ceased to be counsel of the complainants.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the
property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Issue:
Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of the Professional
compensation. Responsibility (CPR).

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain Held:
portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating Rule 22.01,
compensation for land. It is settled that the taking of private property for
Canon 22 of the CPR for abandoning the complainant’s case without a
public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement good cause. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a
practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.
use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value. For failing to protect the interests of the complainants, the respondent
violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013. The Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law
for a period of three months.
The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the
Court of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, Angelita Orcino vs Atty. Josue Gaspar
entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents pending
appeal without informing her counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to FACTS
Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights. Orcino’s husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the
suspects. She hired Atty. Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, P20,000.00 attorney’s fee which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his duty
disapproved of the tendencies of clients compromising their cases religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the
behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably preliminary investigation. But on the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects and this
Thus, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention to Protect enraged Orcino. She then went to Gaspar’s residence where Gaspar
Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right to his reasoned out that he did not receive a notice of hearing hence his
stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the interest of absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino demanded the
protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional services records of the case and advised Gaspar that she’ll be hiring another
on contingent fee basis. lawyer. Gaspar complied and thereafter he filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel. The court did not grant his motion because the same was
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, without Orcino’s written consent. Perhaps changing her mind, Orcino
the payment of the counsel’s adequate and reasonable compensation refused to give her consent. Gaspar, however, did not attend the
could not be annulled by the settlement of the litigation without the subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative complaint
counsel’s participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the against Gaspar for abandoning the case.
compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its
members are officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to his client.
protection against injustice or imposition of fraud committed by the
client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is understandable
other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the and is attributed to her over zealousness to bring justice to the death of
attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the her husband. When she uttered that she’s terminating Gaspar’s services,
attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is she did so in a burst of passion. She did not really mean to terminate
dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of Gaspar at all as evidenced by her refusal to give consent to Gaspar’s
the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of motion.
the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to
Elisa Venterez, Genero de Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, his client. Unlike the other way around where a client has the absolute
Antonina V. Palma and Ramon De Vera, Complainants, v. Atty. Rodrigo right to terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without just
R. Cosme , Respondent | A.C. No. 7421, 10 October 2007 cause. Atty. Gaspar has no reason to presume that his motion shall be
granted by the court. He should have not left Orcino in the cold and
Facts: should have continued appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of
record and a successor placed in his stead. Gaspar was admonished In the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the payment of docket
accordingly. He was also directed to return half of what was paid him. fees for six (6) days only. The reason advanced by them was because of
poverty. Evidently, in the cases where the Supreme Court disallowed the
LUISITO BALATBAT, A.C. No. 1666 late payment of docket fees, the tardiness was for a significant period of
Complainant,- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO- time.49 Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, it will
NAZARIO, and ATTY. EDGARDO ARIAS Y SANCHEZ, Respondent. April 13, be extremely harsh for the Court to take a lackadaisical attitude towards
2007 the cause of the respondents. We are convinced of the fastidiousness of
the Court of Appeals’ decision.
FACTS:
G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812 February 2, 2007
In the Complaint[1] dated September 8, 1976, Luisito Balatbat VICENTE DELOS SANTOS, ET AL,
Petitioners, vs. FRED ELIZALDE, et al,
alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to undertake his
Respondents.
defense in the said civil case.According to complainant, he did not attend
FACTS:
the scheduled hearings because respondent told him that there was no On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of
Title, Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Kalibo, Aklan RTC,
need to be involving four (4) adjoining lots for a total land area of
present. But when he verified the status of the case from the then City 14,771 sqm, located in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The Trial
Court declared intervenors Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-
Court of Manila, he was surprised to learn that a Decision[2] dated June Flores as lawful ownersof two-thirds (2/3) of the disputed land, and Fred
and Joan Elizalde as owners of the remaining one-third (1/3) of theland.
21, 1976 had already been rendered. Complainant alleged that the Thus, petitioners and respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate
Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 and May16, 1996, respectively.
enforcement of the decision caused him and his family untold miseries,
The cases were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for respondent
embarrassment and public ridicule.[3] Elizalde and CA-G.R. CV No.54136 for peti ti oners. Subsequently,
the CA issued the June 2, 1998 Noti ce to File Brief,
  requiring peti ti oners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five
ISSUE (45) days from receipt of said notice.
Won respondent is liable
On July 27, 1998, peti ti oners fi led by registered mail a July
HELD 27, 1998 Moti on for Extension of Time to File Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants. In their motion, petitioners admitted having
YES. Based on respondents own admissions, he did not received a copy of the Notice to File Brief on June 15,1998; thus, they
had unti l July 30, 1998 to fi le their brief, and prayed for an
properly withdraw as counsel for complainant. The settled rule is that
extension of forty-fi ve (45) days.
the attorney-client relation continues until the client gives a notice of
ISSUE: 
discharge, or manifests to the court or tribunal where the case is
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal, considering it
pending that counsel is being discharged, with a copy served upon the withdrawn as prayed for by counsel, Atty.Victoriano and for not
considering the fact that said cpounsel was clearly at fault
adverse party.[19] Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have
and/or grossly negligent in the performance of his duties to his clients.
either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court
RULING:
relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138,
 petitioners claim that the Undertaking or Agreement allegedly entered
Section 26 of the Rules of Court. into by them and respondents delos Santos is invalid considering that
their purported signatures in it were forged. They argue that the motion
G.R. No. 167620             April 4, 2007 to withdraw is likewise invalid; therefore, there is no basis for the
CAROLINA B. VILLENA, Petitioner,  vs. withdrawal of the appeal. In other words, petitioners question the
ROMEO Z. RUPISAN and RODOLFO Z. RUPISAN, Respondents. authenticity of said documents, raising a question of fact.
FACTS
The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to Felicidad Zamora.
Their union bore five children namely: Consuelo, Erlinda, Alejandro, No meritorious cause.
Rodolfo, and Romeo. Rodolfo and Romeo are the respondents in this
petition. Upon the death of Felicidad in 1949, 3 Nicomedes married Maria With the loss of their right of appeal to the CA, we see no need to
Rosario de Castro (Maria Rosario) on 14 October 1964. The couple did
resolve the issue of ownership. Such issue should have been first
not have any children. During the marriage of Nicomedes and Maria
Rosario, they acquired certain properties resolved by the CA, but it was not able to do so because of the dismissal

of the appeal. Thus, the claim of ownership is a non-issue before this

ISSUE Court.
WON respondent is liable
PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK
A. CARONAN”
HELD
A.C. No. 11316, 12 July 2016, (Sereno, CJ)
 counsel of the respondent’s clients. The respondent’s repeated attempts
FACTS: go beyond legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in
On 2013, a complaint was filed by the real Patrick A. Caronan against his defending the interests of his clients. The respondent violated his duty
brother Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” before the as an attorney “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In his complaint, he stated that he and artifice or false statement of fact or law.”
his older brother both completed secondary education at the Makati
High School and that he finished his college education at the University Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR, and is found
of Makati. Thereafter, he applied and got a job at a 7-11 convenience liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath;
store in Muntinlupa City, working his way up until he was promoted as Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
its store manager. 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of
On the other hand, his brother enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court disbarred the
ng Maynila and later managed to enter the Philippine Military Academy respondent from the practice of law.
in Baguio City but was discharged. in 1993. The respondent Richard then
moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and three children.
Pollo v. Constantino-David
Patrick said he learned from Richard that he had enrolled at St. Mary’s
G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
University’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya using Patrick’s
name and college records from the UM and that he passed the Bar
Facts
exams in 2004.
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter
complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of
ISSUE: WON respondent shall be liable
the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo
directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
HELD
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk
school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to
contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is imperative
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by
in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft
between him and his client, as well as between him and the
pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC
court.62chanrobleslaw
and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David
issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also
days from notice.
tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities,
which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold
copied and printed personal files in his computer.
its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal
Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name,
charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss
identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or
CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
criminal cases,
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the
Conrado N. Que v. Atty Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner
A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014
and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then
Facts:
proceeded ex parte.
Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final judgment of the
lower court against his client. Respondent successfully filed a petition of
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two petitions of annulment of
which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave
title and a petition for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for
Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of the lower court’s
reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence,
decision against his client.
this petition.
Issue:
Issue
Whether or not the respondent violated various canons and provisions
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
constitutional right to privacy
Held:
Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple actions praying
Ruling
for the same cause delayed the execution of the final judgment of the
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
court. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood is also alleged by
personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name
and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the previous
In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law
A.C. No. 270, March 29, 1974 School, of the University of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia,
this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar Confidant, confirming
FACTS the truth of the professors' statements.
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C.
Rusiana, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955,
JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI and ROMULO CUI
committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited such
G.R. No. L-1872, August 31, 1964
a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of
a member of the legal profession," ordered his disbarment.
FACTS
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-
by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and
admission, supported by resolutions from members of the Bench and
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of
helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No.
professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to
3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders
respondent's good conduct and moral character since his disbarment,
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they
and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal profession.
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied
in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers,
practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the
being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don
applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that
Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator
the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has
of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a
been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a
“convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial
profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.
document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the
“convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972,
he filed a verified petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs of his
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his
honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral character
brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him.
(clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu,
When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court
Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals,
ruled in favor of Jesus.
lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First Instance,
resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the
ISSUE
Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League,
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for reinstatement on July 18,
1972, the Court issued a resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
"x x x [A] cling on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be
member of the Philippine Bar, and considering (a) that respondent
preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before
movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the
the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one,
said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate
among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a
punishment; (c) that he has observed exemplary conduct since then,
lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
according to credible certifications attesting to his repentance for the
pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago, and may be
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics
in the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous changes in the law
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member
since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his
of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the
ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court
other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was
resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby
reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the
required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a
position of administrator of the Hospicio.
recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of this
Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the
classes attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after
subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon
Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of
his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the
certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise
custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court."
the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations
ISSUE
has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
WON Rusiana is allowed to be reinstated to the Bar
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
HELD
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because
Yes. Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath
in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working
and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this Court the requisite
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
fees.
distinct asset.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against
the Court's resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by the
defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact
individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting to
that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and
his having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same
unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was
conditions as ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated
reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Florence Teves Macarrubo vs. Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo
424 SCRA 42
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment
cases are sui generis cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor
FACTS
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal
his career as a lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence
action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
Teves while his marriage with Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000,
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In
Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves alleged
this case, the annulment of Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work
that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza was
to remove such second marriage as a ground for disbarment.
void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her
and then Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named
Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves Constancia I. Valencia v. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw
presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbo’s marriages as A.C. No. 1302, A.C. No. 1391, A.C. No. 1543, 30 June 2008
well as photos of him and his wife as a family.
Facts
Macarrubo was initially declared in default for failing to appear multiple This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the respondent who
times but was subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself. In was disbarred on 26 April 1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and
his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in introduction the same as evidence for his client. From 1993 to 2002, the
order to save her face because at that time she was already pregnant; respondent filed several motions and appeals for reinstatement to the
that Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. bar. His motions and appeals were accompanied by endorsements of his
good moral character by various organizations such as IBP-Pangasinan
He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Chapter; Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Lingayen and
Teves; that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Provincial Prosecutors’ Association of
the ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the disbarment case Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta;
because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that and past National President of the IBP.
his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to
similar circumstances. Issue
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was Whether or not the respondent should be readmitted to the practice of
never remiss in supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her law.
and that his marriage with her is void, recommended a penalty of three
months suspension from the practice of law for grave misconduct. Held
Records show that the long period of respondent’s disbarment gave him
ISSUE the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up
first one is subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such once again of conduct demanded of every member of the bar. It is well-
second marriage is subsequently declared void. settled that the objective of disciplinary proceedings is restorative
justice, not retribution. Guided by their doctrine and considering the
HELD evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his
Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is contribution and his being again worthy of membership in the legal
declared void, it is still undeniable that he contracted it while his first profession, the Supreme Court find that it is now time to lift
one is subsisting. Further, since the second marriage is void, he is then respondent’s disbarment.
liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his
defense that both second and third marriages are shot gun marriages.
He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One incident of a “shotgun
marriage” is believable, but two such in succession would tax one’s
credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the institution
of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public
assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and
must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community. Macarrubo violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.