Ram Malani

SYNDICATE BANK AND ORS. VS K. UMESH NAYAK, AIR 1995 SC 319

Facts:
1. On 10th of April 1989, there was a memorandum of settlement signed by the Indian
Banks association and all India bank employee’s union also including the national
confederation of bank employees as the fifth bipartite settlement. The appellant bank
it was binding to the settlement through its employees.
2. On 9 June 1989 there were total three settlement entered between the appellant bank
and its employee’s federation. Under this settlement the employees of
3. However, because the appellant bank did not immediately implement the settlement,
the employee Federation was forced to send a telex message to the appellant on 22
June 1989, urging it to do so without further delay or face an agitation for its
implementation.
4. The bank responded that it requires government approval to implement the
aforementioned settlement and is working to obtain it, and that the federation should
cooperate with it. The federation made the same request to the appellant again on July
24, 1989, this time threatening a token strike. The appellant's response was the same
as before.
5. On September 1, September 1989, the federation issued a strike notice for three days
beginning September 18, 1989, demanding immediate implementation of all
agreement/understandings reached between the parties. The Deputy Chief Labour
Commissioner and Conciliatory Officer took cognizance of the dispute at this point
and initiated conciliatory proceedings to resolve it. While the proceedings were
pending, the employee federation filed a writ petition before the High Court on 6
October 1989, requesting that the three settlements dated 9 June 1989 be implemented
immediately.
6. The court ordered the immediate implementation of the parties' agreed-upon
settlement in the petition. On October 12, 1989, the Bank issued a circular stating that
if the employees went on strike on October 16, 1989, the Bank's management would
deduct the employees' salary for the days they were on strike. Despite the circular, the

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 employees went on strike on October 16, 1989, and on October 17, 1989, they wrote a
letter to the conciliatory officer requesting that the proceedings be deemed closed
from their side, and on November 7, 1989, they filed a writ petition to quash the
circular of October 12, 1989, and to direct the Bank not to make any salary deductions
for the day of the strike.
7. The writ petition was granted, and the High Court issued an injunction preventing the
bank from deducting the salary. As the arguments progressed, the learned Single
Judge ruled in favour of the Bank, but when the matter was appealed to the Division
Bench, the Division Bench overruled the Single Judge's decision and ruled in favour
of the employees. Because of these two conflicts, the said appeal was filed and the
case was referred to this court.

Issues Raised:

Whether strike is legal under section 22(1)(d)1 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?

Argument of the Appellant:

The appellant he had contended that the provisions which is violated under the said sub
section (1)(d) of the section 222 of the Industrial dispute act, as the employees they were
prohibited, restricted from restoring the strike due to the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings and for more seven days from the conclusion or decision of such proceedings.
And in the case the conciliation proceeding they were pending for resolving the industrial
dispute between both the parties, so the strike which was in question is illegal.

The industrial dispute it had arrived because the bank contended that they required prior
approval of the central government for the said settlement which is in the question, where as
the staff contended that it Was no where incorporated in the settlement that such prior
approval is necessary. As this dispute being an industrial dispute under this act the
conciliation proceedings which were taking place, they were valid pending on the date of
strike.
1
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, § 22(1)(d).
2
Supra.

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Argument of the Respondent:
As per the respondent there is no industrial dispute arising out so there cannot be a valid
conciliation proceeding. The said settlement between the parties were already arrived and
there could not be any kind of further industrial dispute regarding their implementation. The
conciliation proceedings they were non est. so therefore section 22(1)(d)3 it does not have any
role in this case.

Judgement:
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the first issue, stating that the proper forum for
decision on the aforementioned issues in the present case is the adjudicator under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, who is the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner and
Conciliatory Officer.

Concerning the second issue, this Court held that the High Court erred in recording its
findings on the counts, namely, the legality and justifiability, by assuming jurisdiction that
was properly vested in the industrial adjudicator. As a result, the High Court's contested order
must be reversed.

In addition, in exercising its authority under Article 142 4 of the Indian Constitution, this
Court allowed the appellant to file an appeal with the appropriate authority under the Act
within eight weeks of the date of this judgement.

Since the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides a proper procedure for the resolution of an
Industrial Dispute, the Supreme Court is not the proper authority to decide whether the strike
is illegal or not and the proper forum for deciding this issue is the adjudicator under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Since the High court has itself erred in assuming the jurisdiction which is not vested in it and
is vested in the Industrial Adjudicator by the virtue of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
order given by the Division Bench is deemed to be set aside.

3
Supra
4
Constitution of India, 1949, § 142.

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Critical Analysis:
The apex court made its decision based on opposing viewpoints expressed by the smaller
bench in other judgments. The Supreme Court ruled that if a strike violates the terms of the
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, it is unconstitutional. The Court had to determine whether or
not the workmen's requests, such as pay scales and service issues, were legitimate in order to
determine the legality of the strike. The Court stated that in each case, a thorough
investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the strike would be carried out. The
Supreme Court declined to rule on the first point, noting that the adjudicator under the
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, who is the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner and
Conciliatory Officer, is the proper forum for judgement on the aforementioned concerns in
the current case. Concerning the second issue, this Court determined that the High Court
erred in recording its conclusions on the counts, namely, legality and justifiability, by
assuming authority legitimately bestowed on the industrial adjudicator. As a result, the
disputed ruling of the High Court must be reversed.

Conclusion:
To summarise, the legality or illegality of a strike must be determined through proper
procedure and forum, as outlined in the Industrial Disputes Act. When an industrial dispute is
pending before the proper forum provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not for the
High Court to decide. If the court goes beyond its jurisdiction and encroaches on the
jurisdiction of an industrial tribunal, the decision may be overturned.