NORMA DEL SOCORRO V.

WILSEM CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

[ GR No. 246012, Jun 17, 2020 ]

ISMAEL G. LOMARDA v. ENGR. ELMER T. FUDALAN +

The Facts

On September 27, 2006, respondent, through his wife, Alma Fudalan, applied for electrical
service from BOHECO I Electric Cooperative Inc. (BOHECO I) to illuminate their farmhouse
located in Cambanac, Baclayon, Bohol. At the pre-membership seminar, respondent paid the
amount of P48.12 as membership fee and was advised to employ the services of an authorized
electrician from BOHECO I.[5] Accordingly, on October 7, 2006, respondent employed the
services of Sabino Albelda Sr. (Albelda), a BOHECO I authorized electrician, who informed him
that the electrical connection could only be installed in his farmhouse if he procures a
certification from Raso, the Barangay Power Association (BAPA)[6] Chairperson. Respondent
then instructed his farmhand to get a certification from Raso but despite efforts to reach Raso,
the latter was unavailable. Thus, respondent consented to the tapping of his electrical line to that
of BAPA upon the assurance of Albelda that he would not be charged with pilferage of
electricity because his electric usage shall be determined by the check meter of BOHECO I at the
base of the drop line and shall be billed accordingly.[7]

In the morning of October 8, 2006, respondent still tried again to obtain Raso's certification.
However, during their meeting, Raso allegedly got mad, vowed to never issue the said
certification, and eventually then reported the matter to BOHECO I for disconnection.[8]

Feeling aggrieved, respondent and his wife went to BOHECO I on October 17, 2006 to complain
about Raso's malicious actuations. They were attended to by the receiving clerk, petitioner
Lomarda, who, after reviewing their documents, told them that he would conduct an ocular
inspection of their farmhouse. The next day, respondent, together with his farmhand, went
looking for Raso and confronted her about the latter's threat of disconnection. To appease them,
Raso guaranteed not to order the disconnection of respondent's electricity; nevertheless, she still
refused to issue the certification on the premise that respondent's farmhouse already had
electricity. In the course of their conversation, Raso uttered, "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato," which
translates to "let us just settle this."[9]

On November 5, 2006, respondent and his wife once more went to Raso to follow up on the
issuance of such certification. They met at the purok center, where Raso was conducting a
meeting with several purok members. Thereat, Raso asked why respondent's electricity has not
yet been installed. Respondent took this to be a sarcastic and rhetorical remark because Raso
was, in fact, the one withholding the issuance of the BAPA certification which was precisely the
cause of the delay of the aforesaid installation.[10]

In another confrontation, Raso explained that she was about to issue the certification but was
prevented by Lomarda, who allegedly apprised her of a pending complaint for premature tapping
against respondent. To settle the misunderstanding, Raso directed respondent to discuss the
matter with Lomarda at his house, and again uttered "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato." During their
conversation, Lomarda told respondent that he earlier received a disconnection order issued a
long time ago but misplaced the document, and that an ocular inspection of respondent's
farmhouse will be conducted on November 6, 2006. When respondent informed Raso of the date
of inspection, the latter once again remarked, "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato."[11]

On the day of inspection, or on November 6, 2006, respondent was assured that his electricity
will not be disconnected and that Raso will issue the certification, provided he would pay the
amount of P1,750.00 or sign a promissory note. Respondent, however, refused to comply with
the said conditions, reasoning that there was no official order from the concerned office. After
respondent refused to pay, Lomarda allegedly posed in front of a camera and while pointing at
the slot provided for the electric meter, shouted, "This is an illegal tapping." Thereafter,
Lomarda, in the presence of policemen, the barangay treasurer, and other several passersby,
ordered his linemen to cut off respondent's electricity.[12]

On November 9, 2006, respondent communicated with BOHECO I, through phone, and inquired
about his electric dues. He was informed that there was no system loss or excess billed to the
cooperative, and that his electric usage amounted only to P20.00.

Claiming that petitioners' acts tarnished his image, besmirched his reputation, and defamed his
honor and dignity, respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. Respondent
alleged that petitioners confederated with one another to purposely delay the approval of his
application for electric connection by: (a) withholding the issuance of the BAPA certification;
(b) falsely accusing him of premature tapping and pilferage of electricity; and (c) demanding the
payment of P1,750.00, when what was due him was only P20.00.[13]

For their part, petitioners contended that respondent committed premature tapping of electricity,
when the latter consented to the tapping of his line to the service line of BAPA without a "turn-
on" order from BOHECO I. Moreover, they claim that they cannot be faulted for the
disconnection, since they gave respondent the option to pay the penalty or sign a promissory
note, which the latter refused.[14]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[15] dated May 15, 2012, the RTC found petitioners liable for damages under Article
21 of the Civil Code,[16] and accordingly, ordered them to jointly and severally pay respondent
the following amounts: (a) P451.65 as actual damages; (b) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (e) P20,000.00 as
litigation expenses.[17]

In so ruling, the RTC held that respondent could not have committed premature electrical
connection or electric pilferage in violation of the existing rules and regulations of BOHECO I,
considering that the installation of respondent's electrical connection was only done upon the
advice of Albelda, who is an authorized electrician of BOHECO I. Moreover, the RTC pointed
out that respondent was in good faith and exerted all his efforts to comply with the requirements
of BOHECO I, while petitioners performed acts that are malicious, dishonest, and in gross bad
faith. In particular, petitioners intentionally withheld the issuance of the required BAPA
certification and worse, demanded the payment of P1,750.00, when what was due from
respondent was only P20.00. Consequently, the RTC ruled that petitioners are liable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[19] dated February 9, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.[20]

At the onset, the CA observed that respondent exerted all efforts to comply with the prescribed
requirements in good faith. Moreover, it pointed out that respondent was not caught in flagrante
delicto of premature tapping because he was the one who reported to Raso the fact of tapping,
which was only done under the context that the approving authority was then unavailable to issue
the certification despite respondent's efforts.[21] On the other hand, the CA ruled that petitioners
acted with malice and bad faith, as exhibited by their conduct before, during, and after the
disconnection, which is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution[22] dated May
19, 2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the award of
damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, deserve great weight and respect, unless there are facts of weight and substance that
were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case.[23]
Hence, finding no cogent reason to the contrary, their factual findings in this case are sustained.

Petitioners mainly argue that they should not be held liable for damages, considering that
respondent made a premature and unauthorized tapping of his electrical connection. In this
regard, they invoke the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands.
Moreover, petitioners allege that respondent is not entitled to moral damages in the absence of
evidence to show that the acts imputed against them caused respondent moral suffering.

The arguments of petitioners are untenable.

In this case, petitioners were found liable by both the RTC and CA for abuse of rights under
Article 19, in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code.

"Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties." In this regard, case law states that "[a] right, though by itself
legal because [it is] recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible."[24]

"Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not
the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an
actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21."[25] In Saudi
Arabian Airlines v. CA,[26] the Court explained the relation of Article 19 and Article 21 of the
Civil Code:
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. CA, this Court held that:

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions.
Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are
actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum.[27]
In Mata v. Agravante,[28] the Court pointed out that Article 21 of the Civil Code "refers to acts
contra bonos mores and has the following elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to
injure."[29]

In this case, records show that respondent had consistently pursued all reasonable efforts to
comply with the prescribed requirements for the installation of electrical connection at his
farmhouse. As part of his application for electrical service with BOHECO I, he attended a pre-
membership seminar wherein he duly paid the amount of P48.12 as membership fee. At the
seminar, he was advised to employ the services of a BOHECO I authorized electrician, which he
did by employing Albelda. As the CA pointed out, there were certain advantages to this course of
action, considering that: (a) the said electrician is familiar with the rules and regulations of
BOHECO I; (b) an inspection fee will not be charged if the wiring is done by him; and (c)
BOHECO I shall provide a 30-meter service drop wire, and electric meter, free of charge, upon
payment of the bill deposit.[30]
Eventually, Albelda informed respondent that he could only install the electrical connection in
respondent's farmhouse if the latter becomes a BAPA member and if he can obtain a certification
as such from BAPA Chairperson Raso. Again, respondent took no time in obtaining this
certification by instructing his farmhand to reach the aforesaid chairperson. Unfortunately, Raso
was unavailable despite the farmhand's diligent efforts. Respondent, who was then put into a
precarious situation, sought the advice of Albelda, the cooperative's authorized electrician, on
how to deal with the matter. Albelda then assured him that if he will proceed with the tapping of
his electrical line to that of BAPA, he would not be charged with pilferage of electricity and
would be billed accordingly. Relying in good faith on the authorized electrician's advice on the
matter, respondent then consented to the tapping but nonetheless, still instructed his farmhand to
secure the certification from Raso to ensure compliance with the requirements for proper
installation. Upon meeting with Raso, respondent, by his own volition, candidly brought to her
attention the tapping of BAPA's line and duly explained to her the situation. This
notwithstanding, Raso was quick to impute malicious actuations against respondent for
proceeding with the tapping and reported the matter to BOHECO I for disconnection.

Faced with this predicament, respondent and his wife went to the cooperative to report Raso's
actions. They were then attended by the receiving clerk, Lomarda, who told them that he would
conduct an ocular inspection of the farmhouse. In the course of trying to comply with the
requirements, both Raso and Lomarda gave respondent the roundabout by consistently assuring
him that they were settling the matter ("Sabut sabuton lang ni nato"). The following excerpt of
respondent's testimony during trial is instructive on this score:
Q. Now, did Mrs. Raso tell you while that controversy was between you during that time that
rather Mrs. Raso told you in visayan vernacular "Sabut saboton lang ni nato"? (sic)

A. Oh! Ye[s] (sic) she mentioned that p[hrase] (sic) which disturb me so much for 3 three (3)
times (sic), 1.) when I went together with my farm help I went to her house on October 18 her
parting words (sic) was don't worry you will not be disconnected "Sabut sa boton lang ni nato"
and the other two (2) was on November 5 when I again look (sic) her which I found her at the
purok center to ask for my certification again and her parting words is (sic) "Sabut saboton lang
ni nato" and then she told me to go (sic) Mr. Lomarda because Mr. Lomarda has the final say
whether she will give me my certification or not. And the 3rd, was again on the same date
November 5 already night time when Mr. Lomarda told me that he is going to inspect the house
on Monday so that I went back to Mrs. Raso to inform her that Mr. Lomarda is going to inspect
the house on Monday and again Mrs. Raso told me that "Sabut saboton lang ni nato."

Q. Now, after hearing that statement "Sabut saboton lang ni nato", what did you ask Mrs. Raso
what (sic) was that meaning of "Sabut saboton lang ni nato"?

A. I did not bother to ask her but in my mind it means money that Mrs. Raso together with Mr.
Lomarda is out to victimize me to please me (sic) "[pangkwartahan] ko" (sic) because of that
premature connection.[31]
In this regard, the CA aptly observed that "[c]onfronted with the crisis presented by [respondent],
it is only proper for [petitioners] to tell him what corrective or remedial measures must be done
to avoid the commission of any further infraction. Instead of doing so, x x x Raso made herself
unavailable, which delayed the issuance of the certification. For his part, x x x Lomarda failed to
immediately disclose the notice of disconnection to [respondent], under the pretext that he is yet
to conduct an ocular inspection on the subject farmhouse."[32]

Worse than their inaction and lack of forthrightness, petitioners even tried to extort from
respondent the amount of P1,792.00 in exchange for the issuance of a certification and for the
continued availment of their electrical services. However, respondent refused to accede to this
condition since there was no official issuance coming from BOHECO I itself. In fact, upon
reporting the matter to the cooperative, respondent, to his dismay, discovered that his electric
usage amounted to only P20.00. Indeed, as the CA ruled, "[b]y setting these conditions, it is
evident that [petitioners] were induced by an ill motive."

To further exacerbate the situation, petitioner Lomarda even caused a scene in the public's view
which made it appear that respondent was an unscrupulous violator and thereupon, proceeded to
disconnect his electricity that caused him embarrassment and humiliation. As the testimony of
respondent during trial shows:
Q. Now, Mr. witness to refresh your memory according to you on November 6, 2006 Mr. Ismale
(sic) Lomarda went to your house at Cambanac, Baclayon, Bohol what did Mr. Lomardo do
when he reached at (sic) your house?

A. It was in the afternoon of November 6 Mr. Lomarda bringing with him 2 Policemen (sic) they
were also bringing with them camera taking pictures on the post where the electrical line was
connected and there were many people around.

Q. Then after that what did Mr. Lomarda do?

A. Mr. Lomarda in hearing the window (sic) with all the people shouted that "kita mo ha"
"kita mo ha" in our vernacular, "kita mo ha" at the same time pointing to the post where
the electrical connection is made "kita mo ha" witness "ka ha" witness "ka ha" at the same
time taking pictures.

Q. So, after that what did Mr. Lomarda do?

A. Mr. Lomarda demanded to (sic) me an amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,750.00) (sic)
according to him as payment of an allege penalty so that I will not be disconnected.

Q. Did you give that amount?

A. No.

Q. Then considering that you did not give that amount One Thousand (P1,750.00) (sic) what did
Mr. Lomarda do?

A. Mr. Lomarda demanded or insisting (sic) that he is going to inspect the house and when I let
him in inside the house he refuse (sic) and told me to sign first his report before he will enter the
house.
Q. Did you sign the report?

A. I did not sign the report.

Q. Now considering that you did not sign the report, what did Mr. Lomarda do?

A. Mr. Lomarda instructed his line men because he was also bringing linemen to finally cut (sic).
Days after I ask Mrs. Raso whether she will allow the disconnection which Mrs. Raso answered
in the affirmative and after that Mr. Lomarda instructed his line man to finally cut (sic).

Q. And that was on November 6, 2006?

A. November 6, in the afternoon.

Q. Will (sic) Mrs. Raso present during the time when the line man of Mr. Lomarda cut your
electrical connection?

A. Yes. Mrs. Raso was also present because she wanted me to sign a promissory note that if
I have no cash to pay that P1,750.00 allege (sic) penalty then I should sign her promissory note
so that I will not also be disconnected.[33] (Emphases supplied)
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is clear that petitioners should be held liable for damages
under Article 19, in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code. While it appears that petitioners
were engaged in a legal act, i.e., exacting compliance with the requirements for the installation of
respondent's electricity in his farmhouse, the circumstances of this case show that the same was
conducted contrary to morals and good customs, and were in fact done with the intent to cause
injury to respondent. Petitioners did not only fail to apprise respondent of the proper procedure to
expedite compliance with the requirements, they also misled him to believe that everything can
be settled, extorted money from him when only a meager amount was due, and worse, publicly
humiliated him in front of many people which ended up in the disconnection of his electricity
altogether. To be sure, the clean hands doctrine - which was invoked by petitioners herein -
should not apply in their favor, considering that while respondent may have technically failed to
procure the required BAPA certification and proceeded with the tapping, the same was not due to
his lack of effort or intention in complying with the rules in good faith. As exhibited above, it
was, in fact, petitioners' own acts which made compliance with the rules impossible. Hence,
respondent was actually free from fault, negating the application of the clean hands doctrine, to
wit:[34]
Parties who do not come to court with clean hands cannot be allowed to profit from their own
wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the party seeking equity must be "free from fault, and he
must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing
vigilance on the part of the latter."[35]
That being said, the awards of damages in favor of respondent are therefore warranted. In this
case, both the RTC and the CA awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages, including
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in
the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses
that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.[36] In this case, the award
of actual damages in the amount of P451.65 was based on the evidence presented as found by
both the RTC and CA. Hence, finding no cogent reason to the contrary, and given that the same
was supported by receipts,[37] the said award is sustained.

However, the Court finds otherwise with respect to the awards of moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses (in the amounts of P200,000.00, P100,000.00,
P50,000.00, and P20,000.00, respectively) which appear to be excessive considering the
circumstances of this case. Notably, the amounts of moral and exemplary damages may be
discretionary upon the court depending on the attendant circumstances of the case.[38]

Under Article 2219[39] of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts
and actions referred to in Article 21 of the same Code. "[A]n award of moral damages must be
anchored on a clear showing that the party claiming the same actually experienced mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or similar injury."[40] In this
case, the aforementioned malicious acts, as proven through the evidence presented by
respondent, clearly caused moral suffering to the latter, for which petitioners should be made
liable. As intimated in one case,[41] although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of a person
are not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an
amount that would restore respondent to his moral status quo ante.[42] In this regard, the Court
finds it reasonable to award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, considering the meager
amount of actual damages awarded despite the public humiliation and distress suffered by
respondent throughout his ordeal.

Meanwhile, case law states that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. The award of exemplary damages is allowed by law as a warning to
the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of socially deleterious actions." In this
case, the Court finds the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 reasonable in
order to serve as a reminder against unscrupulous persons - as herein petitioners - who take
undue advantage of their positions to the detriment of the consuming public.

As regards attorney's fees and litigation costs, "Article 2208 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines states the policy that should guide the courts when awarding attorney's fees to a
litigant. As a general rule, the parties may stipulate the recovery of attorney's fees. In the absence
of such stipulation, this article restrictively enumerates the instances when these fees may be
recovered," to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded; x x x

In view of the award of exemplary damages, the Court finds it proper to award attorney's fees
and litigation costs but in the reduced amount of P25,000.00.
In fine, the Court holds that petitioners, as joint tortfeasors under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
are jointly and severally liable to pay respondent the following amounts: (a) P451.65 as actual
damages; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d)
attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P25,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the
Resolution dated May 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04480 are hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that petitioners Ismael G. Lomarda and Crispina
Raso are ordered to jointly and severally pay respondent Elmer Fudalan the following amounts:
(a) P451.65 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation, Petitioner vs Hon. Accredited

Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montaño and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation, Respondents.G.R. NO. 182836

Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their
unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
Issue:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

Ruling:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee
to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has
life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL

FACTS:

Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan-Andal were childhood friends. They lost contact with each other
for 17 years. Mario had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy before returning to the
Philippines in April 1995. The parties reconnected and eventually became a couple. Mario left
for Italy in July 1995. Barely two (2) months after he had left, he had quit his job and stayed in
the country.

Mario and Rosanna married on 16 December 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in
Poblacion, Makati City. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of
the parties. The family lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna's parents living in the
other half of the duplex.

According to Rosanna, Mario exhibited odd behaviors prior their wedding and during their
marriage. Mario had difficulty in managing his finances. Rosanna taught him to run Design and
Construction Matrix, the construction firm she had set up before she married. However, Mario
continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological
imbalance." He made numerous cash advances and purchases using supplementary credit card,
which resulted to the family’s financial losses and the closure of Design and Construction
Matrix. He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his
whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario
was also "hyper-active" late at night.

Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna when she gave birth to their child, Ma. Samantha. He left
her in the hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had
worn off. He only returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep. When Rosanna and Ma.
Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought
everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought
were out to hurt them. Further, during the times when Ma. Samantha was sick, Mario would
instead ignore the ill child.

Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit Mario for drug
rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and,
eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation. Mario remained confined there until 24 December
2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without completing his rehabilitation
program. Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's premature release from the rehabilitation
center. Since Mario's release, Rosanna and Mario had been separated and had not lived together.
Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to comply with
his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's drug use was the
manifestation of a grave personality disorder "deeply rooted within Mario's adaptive system."
She prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the sole and
absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex built on it.

To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Garcia, a physician-

psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations." As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic
antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. Mario's
narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical
antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality
disorder was grave and "deeply rooted" in his character. Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering
from personality disorders are "impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality"
because of "the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person suffering
from the disorder."

Mario contended that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. He prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to
her psychological incapacity, and that the properties they had acquired during their cohabitation
be divided equally between them. He also prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded
to him.

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage on the ground of Mario's psychological incapacity. It
awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the
Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including the
parcel of land on which it was built.

The Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the parties’
marriage to be valid and subsisting. It found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be
"unscientific and unreliable" since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. It ruled that
Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one
side."

Before the Supreme Court, Rosanna argued that psychological incapacity need not be grounded
on psychological illness, as this is allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being
a “liberal ground” for nullifying marriages. She cited cases where the Supreme Court held that
competent evidence, not necessarily expert opinion, may establish psychological incapacity, and
that what matters is the totality of the evidence presented. Rosanna added that psychological
incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her, incurability is
manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the psychologically
incapacitated spouse.

ISSUE:

Does psychological incapacity need to be medically or clinically identified?

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that psychological incapacity need not be medically or clinically
proven. In effect, the Court modified the doctrine enunciated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina (“Molina”). Considering the inconsistencies with which the doctrine laid down in
Molina has been applied, the Court took a more comprehensive but nuanced approach regarding
the proper interpretation and application of said doctrine.

Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts,
and d) clearly explained in the decision. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals (“Santos”), the Court
defined psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical) incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations. It involves the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. In the past, however, the Court has been inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in
psychological incapacity cases. In light of said inconsistencies, the Court now categorically
abandons the second Molina guideline. Now, psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must,
however, be proof of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Such personality
structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and comply with their marital
obligations. The proof required for this need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the incapacitated spouse.

With regard to the juridical antecedence requirement of the psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the incapacity must be characterised as incurable. However, the
Court acknowledges that psychological incapacity, not being an illness in a medical sense, is not
something to be cured. As such, the third Molina guideline is amended to mean incurability in a
legal sense, not a medical sense, Particularly, this means that the incapacity is so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s
respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the
union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

Considering the foregoing, the Court found Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations. Rosanna was able to discharge the burden of proof required to
nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of his incapacity was shown
through testimonies on Mario’s personality and how it formed primarily through his childhood
and adult experiences well before he married Rosanna. Dr. Garcia was also able to recount how
Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsiveness, lack of remorse, lack
of empath, and a sense of entitlement, behaviours which manifest his inherent psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.

While drug addiction is a ground for legal separation, it will not prevent the court from voiding a
marriage so long as it can be proven that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage. Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna
clearly and convincingly proved that Mario’s drug abuse was of sufficient durability that
antedates the marriage. His persistent failure to rehabilitate, even bringing his child into a room
where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his
obligations not only to his wife, but also to his child.

His failure to render mutual help and support was also clearly proven by his consistent failure to
find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by
Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his drug abuse.
CASE DIGEST: LUISITO G. PULIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. R. No.
220149. July 27, 2021

FACTS:

Pulido and Arcon were married on September 5, 1983 in a civil wedding at the Municipal Hall of
Rosario Cavite. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. Upon
confrontation, Arcon found out that Pulido has an affair with Baleda and they were married on
July 31, 1995.

In December 2007, Arcon filed bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda.

Pulido defended that both of his marriage was void ab initio. His marriage with Arcon is void
due to lack of marriage license, and his marriage to Baleda is also void due to lack of marriage
ceremony.

Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior marriage sometime in April
2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their marriage before the filing of the bigamy case.
The court even declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous on October 25, 2007.

The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda.

Appeals and motions of Pulido were likewise denied. The court ruled in reliance with the
provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code.

Meanwhile in 2015, the court in a civil case declared Arcon and Pulido's marriage null and void.
A decree of absolute nullity of their marriage was issued in 2016.

ISSUE:

Whether Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to establish the invalidity of a

void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case.

RULING:

No. The court in this case abandons its earlier rulings and hold that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior prior and subsequent marriages in
a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second
second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense,
irrespective of the time within which they are secured.

The court based the foregoing conclusion and justification on the following:

Retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage in criminal prosecutions for bigamy.

The court stressed out that the nullity of a void ab initio marriage, being inexistent under the eyes
of the law can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between parties at any time, whether before of after
death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any
judicial declaration of nullity. This requirement is necessary under Art. 40, where the law
treated a void ab initio marriage as valid for purposes of remarriage.

Thus, being inexistent from the beginning, the void first marriage does not qualifies nor satisfies
one of the essential elements of bigamy which requires the existence of a prior valid marriage.
Logically, there is no first marriage to begin with. As for the retroactive effect of a void ab initio
marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of nullity merely
confirms the inexistence of such marriage. This also explains why the second element of bigamy
which requires that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled is wanting in
the case of void ab initio prior marriage. The RPC provision regarding bigamy pertains to
contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still subsisting.

In the same vein, when the accused contracted a subsequent void ab initio marriage, which is
void other than it being bigamous, it has the effect of not having entered into a subsequent
marriage at all because the same is inexistent from the beginning. Thus, negates existence of one
of the elements of bigamy which requires that the accused contracts a second or subsequent
marriage. A subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the second marriage merely
confirms its inexistence.

In both instances, the accused may validly raised the defense of a void ab initio marriage without
a judicial declaration of nullity.

Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of absolute nullity for
purposes of remarriage but not as a defense in bigamy.

The Court clarifies that the requirement under Art. 40 (Final judgment requiring the previous
marriage void) need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. The word "solely" under
Art. 40 qualifies the "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" and not "for
purposes of remarriage".

In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances for
purposes other than remarriage. Nonetheless, other evidence, testimonial or documentary, may
also prove the absolute nullity of the previous marriage in the said instances. Hence, such
previous void marriage need not be proved solely by an earlier judgment of court declaring it
void. For purposes of remarriage, the only evidence to prove a void marriage is the final
judgment declaring its absolute nullity. In other cases, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be
proved by evidence other than such judicial declaration.
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 243722, 22 January 2020

Facts:

Cynthia Galapon (Cynthia) married Noh Shik Park (Park), a South Korean national. They got
married in the city of Manila. However, the marriage turned sour and they filed for a divorce
agreement in South Korea which was mutually agreed upon by the parties. The Cheongju local
court in South Korea confirmed the divorce decree. Thus, Cynthia filed for recognition of foreign
divorce decree in the Philippines which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) approved, thus the case
was set for hearing.

It was Abigail Galapon (Abigail), the sister of Cynthia who testified in court. Abigail identified
and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the contents thereof and her signature and averred
that Cynthia could not personally testify because the latter’s Korean visa expired upon her
divorce with Park. It was, however, made clear that Abigail has personal knowledge of the facts
alleged in the petition and claimed that Park intended to marry his former girlfriend, and Cynthia
was forced to agree with the divorce because Park made a threat to her life.

The RTC granted the petition which was however opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the opposition on the grounds that the venue was
improper and that the petition could not be given due course as it was not the foreign spouse who
obtained such decree.

Issue: Whether the Court of appeals erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree
obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals is incorrect. Under Article 26 of the family code “All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38Where a marriage between a Filipino Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
In the recent case of Manalo the Court extended the scope [of] Article 26 (2) and removed the
distinction between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instances it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

Pursuant to the majority in the Manalo case, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the
divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and
foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Hence, the divorce decree
obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia’s conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26 (2)
and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage
was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court
even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for
lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the
case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in
jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties
here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices
of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.