UP Law F2021 18 Lamsis v.

Dong-E
Civil Procedure Estoppel/Laches 2010 Del Castillo

SUMMARY
Petitioners occupied the subject property with the tolerance of respondent’s father then expanded their occupation
and sold portions thereof to the prejudice of the respondent. Petitioners argue that the RTC did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the case because as the IPRA was in effect at the time of the complaint, the NCIP is the
court with subject matter jurisdiction over the lot. The SC denied the petition on the ground that the existence of
laches will prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS

Respondent Margarita Dong-E asserts that her father allowed his in-laws to stay on a portion of the subject
property with their respective families. The latter were allowed to erect their houses, introduce improvements and
plant trees thereon. When said in-laws died, their children took possession of certain portions of the subject
property. The heirs of respondent’s father nevertheless tolerated the acts of their cousins. Upon the death of her
father, respondent and her siblings extrajudicially partitioned their father’s property among themselves and
allotted the subject property in the case at bar in favor of respondent. Respondent allegedly paid the realty tax and
occupied and improved the property, while at the same time, tolerating her cousins‘ occupation of portions of the
same lot. Petitioners then allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions
thereof. Respondent filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, Reconveyance and Damages
against petitioners who are the actual occupants of the subject property. The Complaint also sought to annul the
sales to third parties made by her cousins.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and gave credence to the survey plan of the subject property issued way
back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to respondent and her siblings all support her claim that she
and her predecessors-in-interest have all in possession of the property. The CA likewise held that respondent was
able to discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property.
RATIO

W/N the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court's
decision – NO
NO. Petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A
question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. "

Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only
questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari. The instant case does not present a compelling
reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent
had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners' claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by
the evidence, should be accorded great respect.

Even if petitioners' arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in
favor of respondent's father are welltaken, it will not suffice to defeat respondent's claim over the subject
property that were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial evidence.
In the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty
taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same.

The fact that respondent's documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that
she and her family never abandoned their right to the property and have continuously exercised rights of
ownership over the same.

Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription – NO

NO. Having made the admission that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof, the
petitioners cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of
repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by
petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly
repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do
not start the running of the period of prescription
Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
should take precedence over the reivindicatory action – NO
NO. The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a
registration proceeding. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership
upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial.

Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not
create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving
the any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit issue of ownership
must be threshed out in a separate suit . . . The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties
will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to
resolve the said issue.

Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication
of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. "For
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case." The third element is
missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the
ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the
reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia , respondent did not commit forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that
"forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other.
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted – NO
For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity 78 78 of the IPRA at the time that the complaint
was led in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes
involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples.

As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is
because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is
vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the
Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. In case
at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored.

At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never
raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of
the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.

When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court's lack
of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by
the cross-examination conducted by petitioners' lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had
lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity
of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus
 officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court's jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court's appreciation of the
evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom.

It is only before this Court, eight years after the ling of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted
a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of
the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate
courts — that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of
their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.