26. Mejia vs Pamaran G.R. No.

L-56741-42 April 15, 1988

AURORA MEJIA, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA, Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the
First Division SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Quiazon, De Guzman, Makalintal, Barot and Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the SANDIGANBAYAN of April 23, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 1988, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina
Meimban the sum of Pl,000.00 representing the money given to her; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 1989, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez hereby found guilty beyond is and reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph
(b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to Buffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar
Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money given to her.

Accused is further ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER AND IN EVENTUALLY
CONVICTING HER, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT IT HAS
NEITHER BEEN CREATED AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION NOR CONSTITUTED AS CONCEIVED BY THE DECREE FOR ITS CREATION;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN THE CASE AT BAR ARE VOID AB INITIO CONSIDERING THAT
THE DECREE CREATING IT PROVIDE FOR THE PROCEDURES THAT PARTAKES THE NATURE OF AN EX-POST FACTO LAW AND SUCH PROCEDURES
VIOLATE THE GUARANTY TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT DIFFERENT AND PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF APPEAL IS
PRESCRIBED;

3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS WHEN THE PRETENDED REQUEST
AND RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM THE COMPLAINING WITNESS WAS ALLEGEDLY IN CONSIDERATION OF "THE EARLY SETTING OF A MOTION TO
WITHDRAW COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION THEREON "WHEN SAID COMPLAINANT WAS NEVER A PARTY TO ANY
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT (Crim. Case No. 1988);

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED ON FATALLY DEFECTIVE INFORMATION AS WHEN SAID INFORMATION CHARGES THAT
PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY DEMANDED AND RECEIVED P500 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P1,000 Criminal Case
1988) AND WHEN THE INFORMATION CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY REQUESTED AND RECEIVED P1,000 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE
A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P500 (Crim Case No. 1989) (Annexes "B" and "C")

5. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT OF CONVICTION OF PETITIONER CONSIDERING
THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WAS MAINLY HEARSAY AND THE MOTIVES OF COMMENT COMPLAINANTS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED;

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IN HER CAPACITY AS BRANCH CLERK OF COURT NTERVENES IN SETTING CASES FOR HEARING AND
FORMULATES RESOLUTIONS THEREON;

7. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COULD DISREGARD ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
RECALL OF PETITIONER, AFTER EXHAUSTING CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND SUBJECTED HER TO ADDITIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION ON ALLEGED
ATTEMPT ON PETITIONER'S PART TO BRIBE PROSECUTOR CRISTINA PATERNO, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE IN CHIEF.

The findings of facts of the respondent court are as follows:

The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6) ejectment cases filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All were decided by the City Court of Manila
against the defendants, all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance of Manila where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided
over b the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro, docketed therein as follows: Civil Case No, L-22794 (Feliciano F. Endangan), Civil Case No. L-22795 (Josefina
Meimban).

Civil Case No. L-22796 (Teodorico Bontia), Civil Case No. L-22797 (Rolando Antillon), Civil Case No. L-22798 (Jose Mabalot), Civil Cam No. L-22799
(Vicente Villamor), On August 12, 1979, five (5) of the defendants-appellants, namely, Endangan (Case No. L-22794), Bontia (Case No. L-22796,
Antillon (Case No. L-22797), Mabalot (Case No. L-22798) and Villamor (Case No. L-22799) entered into a compromise agreement with the plaintiff,
Eusebio Lu whereby the appellants individually received from the appellee the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which the appellants agreed to vacate
the premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within sixty (60) days 3m the date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the
appellee shall have the authority to demolish the appellant's houses with costs thereof chargeable against them the compromise agree went was-
submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban, the defendants-appellant-in Case No. L-22795, did not join her co-defendants-appellees in entering into the
compromise agreement (Exh. "A"). Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the defendant-appellants was Atty. S. G. Doron., On August
22, 1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the
assistance of the CLAO regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to Mm. (Exh. "F-l"). As a consequence, Atty. Doron filed on

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August 30, 1979 his MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE as counsel for defendant-appellant Josefina Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795. (Exh.
"F"). In short, while the five (5) other defendants-appellants, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to settle with the plaintiff
through compromise agreement that they signed, Josefina Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case No. L-22795. These
backdrops are not disputed.

What transpired while the cases were pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila insofar as material to the prosecutions at bar, are matters
contested by conflicting evidence of the prosecution and the defense.

Josefina Meimban testified that she followed up her case in Branch XVII of the Court of First Instance of Manila and had occasion to talk to Danilo
Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was
instructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to
know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise
agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu a
brother of the plaintiff, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give Pl,000 each for a gift to
the Judge, to which she replied she would broach the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer
the case was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did. Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista,
daughter of defendant Jose Mabalot in Civil Case No. L-22798, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of defendant Vicente Villamor in Civil Case No. L-22799,
about the help offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed something. When she went to the court to deposit
her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable to the suggestion and she replied she had already told them and that they would
consider the matter.

On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano went to the City Hall and Atty. Espano filed his formal appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil
Case No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia again mentioned to Meimban the gift she was asking from the latter to be given to the Judge, and
added that if Meimban wanted to win the case and she wanted her help, they have to give to the Judge because she was the one making the decision.
She was not able to give any reply. She went home without telling Atty. Espano what Atty. Mejia had told her When she returned on August 30, 1979 to
deposit her rental, Atty. Mejia asked her why her companions were not yet moving when they had a chance of winning the case provided they returned
the money they received from the plaintiff under the compromise agreement. She replied she would tell them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and
Gloria Antonio about it, the two replied that if they could still win their cases by returning the money, she accompany them to Atty. Espano.

They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After knowing the purpose of their visit, Atty. Espano agreed to help Bautista and Antonio and prepared a
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Exh."B") Bautista and Antonio signed the motion for their fathers. The
three women Meimban Bautista and Antonio and Atty. Espano proceeded to the City Hall and filed the motion. From the court they went down to the
canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall where Atty. Espano left them to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia followed them to the canteen.
This time Atty. Mejia told Bautista she could help them provided they gave her P500 for expenses. Bautista and Antonio just kept silent. Atty. Espano
returned to the canteen and rejoined them. Atty. Mejia told Atty. Espano there was a chance of winning the Meimban case. Before leaving them, Atty.
Mejia told her Meimban to take care of her companions.

When she deposited her rentals on October 30, 1979, Atty. Mejia told her the Judge needed the money right away. She promised to give Pl,000 on
November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty. Espano and told him about it. At Atty. Espano's suggestion they agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at
10:00 a.m. on November 20 when the, would entrap Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the money with the assistance of her policeman friend assigned in the
office of the Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia Dizon from whom she borrowed P500 to complete the Pl,000 at about 11:00 a.m. but did not meet
Atty. Espano. At Atty. Mejia's instruction they waited for about an hour Sylvia Dizon seated outside in the corridor fronting the door of Atty. Mejia office.
Atty. Mejia asked her if she had brought the money, she replied she had and gave the P1,000 to Atty. Mejia. She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked
for Atty. Espano in the different sala.8 of the court. Not finding him, they went to his office. Atty. Espano got mad upon knowing that she had given the
money to Atty. Mejia and told her not to give anymore.

December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Motion in
short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their father (Exh- "C"). Meimban and Pilar Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that hearing.
Atty. Mejia told them to wait and that if an oppositor to the Motion would appear, she would accompany them to the sala of Judge Cui of Branch XXV
(the pair branch of Branch XXVI 1), where the Motion would be heard since Judge Alejandro of Branch XXVI was on leave. While they were waiting, Atty.
Mejia approached her Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought one-half (1/2) of the P1,000.00. She asked
Bautista and the latter replied she did not have anything as she thought it was Meimban who had the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told
her that if Bautista would have the money, just put it in an envelope. Bautista borrowed P500 from her, which was supposedly intended for the branch
Clerk of Court of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in an envelope and the two of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista
handed the envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it.

Pilar Bautista y Mabalot confirmed that her father, Jose Mabalot, had received P5,000.00 from the plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-22798 pursuant to the
compromise agreement that her father had signed; that while they were waiting for their house to be demolished Josefina Meimban told her they still
had hope of winning the case because she has been frequenting Branch XXVI and talking with Atty. Mejia who had promised to assist them; that Gloria
Antonio, the daughter of one of the other defendants, Vicente Villamor, convinced her that they try it; and that they asked Meimban to accompany them
to Atty. Espano of the CLAO on October 26, 1979. She testified further that Atty. Espano prepared the Motion at hers and Antonio's request which they
signed for their fathers (Exh. "B"). With Atty. Espano, Meimban and Antonio, they went to the court and Mod the motion with Atty. Mejia. They proceeded
to the canteen, and while there Atty. Espano left to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia arrived shortly after Atty. Espano had left. Atty. Mejia told
them if they wanted the resolution of the Motion expedited they each give Pl,000.00 for expenses. They did not say anything. When Atty. Espano
rejoined them, Atty. Mejia commended him for his memorandum and said it was well prepared and there was hope in the case. Atty. Mejia then left and
they went home after Meimban paid their bill which they shared among themselves. On December 6,1979, in the afternoon, she and Meimban went to
Branch XXVI to file a motion for postponement of the hearing of the Motion scheduled the next day, December 7,1979. Atty. Mejia told them to come
just the same on the following day despite their motion for postponement. So they did return on December 7, reaching the court at about 8:30 a.m. Atty.
Mejia told them to wait because oppositors to the Motion might appear. When no oppositor appeared, Atty. Mejia asked them to give even one-half of
the amount intended for expenses because the case was with the a of Judge Cui as Judge Alejandro was absent, and the money was intended for the
clerk of court of Judge Cui. She asked Meimban if she had money with her and it was from Meimban that she borrowed P500. At Meimban's suggestion
that they put the money in an envelope, they secured one near the GSIS building, put the P500 in it and returned to the office of Atty. Mejia to whom she
handed the envelope containing the money. Atty. Mejia received the envelope and placed it inside her desk drawer. A few days later, she received a
copy of an order dated December 10, 1979 signed by Judge Cui denying their Motion (Exh. "D"). She forthwith went to Atty. Mejia and asked her what
happened. Atty. Mejia answered that she go to Meimban and get the P500 because Meimban still lacked Pl,000, and that she also tell Mrs. Meimban to
see her (Atty. Mejia). She went to Meimban and told her what Atty. Mejia said. They went to Atty. Espano who told her not to give anything.

Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion confirmed that she loaned P500 to Josefina Meimban and went with her to the court on November 20, 1979 to verify if
Meimban really needed the money to give to Atty. Mejia. She was seated at the corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open,
and she saw Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer.

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 Atty. Modesto Espano y Rodriguez was with the lawyer assigned by the CLAO to assist Josefina Meimban in her case. He was with Meimban on August
22, 1979 when he filed his formal appearance in the case pending before Branch XXVI of the Court of First Instance. On the occasion, he saw Atty.
Mejia talk to Meimban. Later, on October 26, 1979, Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia was demanding money and gift to be given to the presiding judge
of Branch XXVI, of the Judge and that Atty. Mejia would reverse the decision of the City Court in the appealed case. it was also on that day, October 26,
1979, in his office at the CLAO that he met Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio for the first time accompanied by Meimban. Bautista and Antonio were also
seeking assistance from the CLAO in their desire to withdraw a compromise agreement that their fathers had signed and submitted to the court for
approval. From his interview of Bautista and Antonio, he gathered that Bautista's father, Jose Mabalot, and Antonio's father Vicente Villamor, were
defendants in the ejectment cases filed by Eusebio Lu and that their fathers were misled by one Endangan and Atty. Doron into signing the agreement.
When he asked the whereabouts of their fathers he was told that Vicente Villamor was in Cotabato and Jose Mabalot was an octogenarian. He also
gathered from Bautista and Antonio that they had decided to withdraw the compromise agreement because Atty. Mejia had told them that they had a
chance of winning the case by having the decision of the lower court reversed if they returned the P5,000 given by the plaintiff, as she was the one
preparing the decisions for Branch XXVI. He prepared the Motion (Exh. "B") and had it signed by Bautista for Jose Mabalot, and Antonio for Vicente
Villamor. That same afternoon of October 26, 1979, he filed the Motion in court with Meimban, Bautista and Antonio. Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia
wanted to talk to her at the canteen. He and his female companions went ahead to the canteen, but he left them there to have some papers xeroxed at
the ground floor of the City Hall. When he returned to the canteen, he saw Atty. Mejia talking to his women companions. He joined them. Atty. Mejia told
him that they could win the Meimban case because the decision of the lower court was against Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, and advised him to file a good
memorandum. Atty. Mejia also mentioned that there was a good chance of winning the Mabalot and Villamor cases provided the P5,000 each received
by the defendants was returned. He did not say anything since he had advised his clients already not to give Atty. Mejia anything. After leaving the
canteen and while they were still at the ground floor his clients told him that Atty. Mejia was demanding money from them for expenses for the Judge.
He reiterated his advise to them not to give any.

Testimony was also given regarding an alleged attempt of Atty. Mejia to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator who investigated the complaints that led to
the filing of the instant cases. Christina Corall-Paterna declared that she signed and submitted her recommendation to prosecute the accused for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the complaint of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista, and to drop the other complaints, on
August 27, 1980. On September 3, 1980, Atty. Mejia came to her to inquire (nangumusta) She replied she had already collated the evidence and
submitted her recommendation to Director Herrera. Atty. Mejia then placed something on her table wrapped in pink tissue paper and immediately stood
up and left without saying anything. She opened the wrapper and found an intricate gold chain with a pendant bearing an inscription of letter "C." Her
initial reaction was to return it but on second thought that she needed somebody to witness the returning of the jewelry, and it being almost 4:00 p.m.
and Atty. Mejia might not return to her office anymore, the waited till next morning and asked one of their employees, Dante Ramos, to return the gold
chain the first hour of September 4. Dante Ramos was able to return it.

Under the first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent court acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the guaranty of due process of law as it has
neither been created as mandated by the Constitution nor constituted as conceived by the decree for its creation. Petitioners stress that the creation of the
Sandiganbayan by Presidential Decree No. 1606 is an arrogation by the President of the power vested by the Constitution in the National Assembly.

In the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan  2 this Court categorically ruled on the issue when it held:

It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not
challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should the National Assembly the
1976 Amendments made clear come from the National Assembly that he as incumbent President" shall continue to exercise legislative powers until
martial law shall have been lifted. 3 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 4 decided in 1975. In
the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period
of Martial Law, ... . 5 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already eating in favor
of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law. 6

Under the second assigned error it is alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are and hence all proceedings taken against petitioner are
void ab initio being investigation violation of the Constitution.

It is further argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the
Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court only issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a
matter of right. Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Again, in Nuñez 7 this Court effectively disposed of this issue when it held:

2. Petitioner in memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from
J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration. 8 The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is
of the very essence of the Idea of law.9 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact eats "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning
that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut
into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very
least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. 10 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that
the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest. 11

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum that: 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates
petitioner's right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; — appeal likewise was
shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indicates are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering
both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court. 12 That is hardly convincing,
considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 13 requiring that it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class. 14 To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,
dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17,
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this
Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 15 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of rights included among which are the due process of law

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 and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public
services or utilities. 16 The scope of such a principle is not to be con stricted, It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.

4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto  provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the
allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted ordered efficacy wise ... 17 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the
lack of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami 18 decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and
binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: An ex post facto  law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the
legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5)
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 19 Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The lawful
protection to which an accused" has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided
for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v.
Vilo, 20 a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices there composing this
Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with
the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

5. x x x x

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four
and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and
thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 21 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice
of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with
crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in very concept of a fair
trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable however, which may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament We
are to keep the balance true. 22 What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 23 this
Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of
defense. 24 In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall
to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being
implied in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction. 25 The above
formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United
States 26 decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of
due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. 27

Under the third assigned error it is alleged that the information in Criminal Case No. 1988 states that the pretended request and receipt of money by petitioner from
companions t witness Josefina Meimban was in consideration of the early setting of the hearing of the motion to withdraw the compromise agreement and to secure
a favorable resolution thereof when in fact said complainant was never a party to any compromise agreement so that she could not be convicted of an offense not
alleged in the information.

Under the fourth arraigned error the petitioner alleges that she cannot be convicted on the two defective informations, the first of which (Crim. Case 1988) she
allegedly demanded and received P 500.00 which the respondent court found to be P1,000.00; and that in Criminal Case No. 1989 the information charged that the
petitioner requested and received P l,000.00 while the respondent court found that the amount received was P500.00 so petitioner pleads she cannot be convicted
on such defective informations. Under both informations petitioner is charged for violation of Section enumerates the corrupt practices of any public officer which are
declared unlawful as among others —

Sec. 3 (b). Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law.

The elements of the offense are that —

1. It must be committed by —

1) a public officer;

2) who requested and who received a gift, present, etc.;

3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of said public officer;

4) said public officer requested and/or received the gift, present, etc. in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; and

5) said officer has the right to intervene in such contract or transaction in his/her official capacity under the law.

The finding of the respondent court is that the petitioner demanded and received money from the persons involved in certain cases in Branch 26 of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila where the petitioner was the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. In the
case of the complainant Josefina Meimban although it is true that she did not enter into an amicable agreement regarding her case as erroneously alleged in the
information, nevertheless it has been shown, and as it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded to the request of petitioner for some money in consideration
of a promise that petitioner wig get a favorable judgment. In a prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present,
etc. is immaterial nor is it determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused or the penalty to be imposed. What is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his
official capacity.

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Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that there was an ulterior motive on the part of the complainants in testifying against her and that the prosecution
evidence is hearsay.

Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility of the witnesses. The rule is that the findings of facts of the respondent court are conclusive unless there are
some facts or circumstances that may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of the case. Petitioner has not successfully demonstrated any
cogent reason why this Court should depart from this rule.

Petitioner imputes that Meimban and Bautista testified against her as she refused to intercede in their behalf with the judge to secure a favorable action. The court is
not persuaded. Contrary to her pretension that prosecution witnesses were inmotivated in testifying against her. The Court finds that said complaining witnesses
would not impute the serious charges against petitioner were it not the truth. Moreover, the testimony of said complaining witnesses are corroborated by Atty.
Modesto Espano and Sylvia Dizon who are certainly disinterested witnesses. The bare denial of petitioner cannot prevail over such positive evidence of the
prosecution.

Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate resolutions thereof. The
branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other
matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed
confidence in her which appears to have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to
get a favorable resolution of their cases.

Under the seventh assigned error the recall of petitioner for further cross-examination on her attempt to bribe the Tanodbayan prosecutor is a matter within the sound
discretion of respondent court. Indeed the testimony of said prosecutor that petitioner tried to persuade her not to prosecute petitioner by giving her a gold chain with
pendant wrapped in tissue paper which said prosecutor returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of petitioner.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses charged against her has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her position as branch clerk of court by persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista to
deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00, respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable resolution of their cases in court.

The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the pillars of our society. Our courts are not spared by this plague. More often than not those in government who are
persuaded or tempted if not actively involved in graft and corruption are the court personnel who lead litigants to believe that they could get a favorable judgment or
action in their favor or are otherwise approached or persuaded to so help for a consideration. Worse still there are instances when the corruption reaches the level of
the judge which spells the doom of our quest for an honest and impartial administration of justice. Anyone involved in such corrupt exercise should be denounced.
This Court does not hesitate to apply the scalpel to cut off the roots of this cancer in the judicial system that can destroy the very purpose of its existence.

Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the lowest level must live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in the public
service. The general public should respect and support such imperative. No attempt to influence them one way or the other much less to bribe them should be made.
One cannot buy a bad case nor sell a good one. No amount of money can make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if one succeeds in so doing it would
certainly be uncovered and reversed on appeal. Justice will prevail.

This case should be an object lesson for those in the public service. All that we need to do is to go back to the too well known rule of conduct that honesty is the best
policy. Those who cannot live up to this criterion should get out of the government service. It is as simple as that.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

27. Marcos vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 126995 October 6, 1998

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PURISIMA, J.:

This scenic Philippine archipelago is a citadel of justice, due process and rule of law. Succinst and clear is the provision of the constitution of this great Republic that
every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. [Art. 111, Sec. 14(2)]. As held in People of the Philippines vs. Ellizabeth Ganguso y Decena (G.R.
No. 115430, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275):

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is
on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied
that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

So also, well settled, to the point of being elementary, is the doctrine that when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction. (People of the Philippines vs.
Eric F. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, November 4, 1992, 215 SCRA 364, 373 citing People vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350, 360 [1991]; People vs. Raquel, 265 SCRA
248; People vs. Aranda, 226 SCRA 562; People vs. Maongco, 230 SCRA 562; People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407).

Mindful of and guided by the aforecited constitutional and legal precepts, doctrines and principles prevailing in this jurisdiction, should petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration be granted?

Docketed as Criminal Case No. 17450 before the Sandiganbayan, the Information indicting Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. for a violation of Section 3(9) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, alleges:

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 That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro-Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand
Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease
Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippines General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under
terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled off to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, with Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, as Chairman and Justices Jose S. Balajadia and
Narciso T. Atienza, as members. On September 15, 1993, when the First Division failed to comply with the legal requirement of unanimity of its three members due
to the dissent of Justice Narciso T. Atienza, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and
designating Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. Del Rosario, as additional members.

On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Presiding Justice Garchitorena requesting that he be given fifteen (15) days to send in his Manifestation. However, on
the same day, September 21, 1993, when Justice Balajadia and Presiding Justice Garchitorena agreed with the opinion of Justice Del Rosario, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 293-93, dissolving the Special Division of Five, without waiting for Justice Amores' manifestation. Justice Garchitorena
considered the said request of Justice Amores as "pointless because of the agreement of Justice Balajadia and the undersigned to the conclusion reached by Justice
Atienza". Thus, on September 24, 1993, the now assailed decision was handed down by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Under the aforequoted Information charging accused Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. with a violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements of
the offense charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: 1] that the accused acted as a public officer; 2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into
by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

There is no dispute that sometime in the year 1984, the herein petitioner, Imelda R. Marcos, was Minister of Human Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the
Minister of Transportation and Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA).
Petitioner Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI).

On June 8, 1984, petitioner, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") by
virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7.340 square meters, at a monthly rental of P102,760.00 for a period of twenty-five (25) years.

On June 27, 1984, the PGHFI, represented by its Chairman Imelda R. Marcos, and Transnational Construction Corporation, represented by its President Ignacio B.
Gimenez, signed the Sublease Agreement (Exhibit "D"), wherein said lessee rented the same area of 7.340 square meters for P734,000.00 a month, for a period of
twenty-five (25) years.

For executing the aforesaid Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B"), petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were indicted in the said Information, for conspiring and confederating
with each other in entering into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

After trial, as earlier alluded to, the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. of the offense charged.

On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of this court came out with its decision affirming the judgment, as against petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in G.R. No. 126995, but
reversing the same judgment, as against Joe P. Dans, Jr., in G.R. No. 127073.

In affirming the judgment of conviction against petitioner, the Third Division found the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement, (Exhibit "B") unfair and
unreasonably low, upon a comparison with the rental rate in the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"), which contract petitioner subsequently signed on behalf of
PGHFI, with TNCC. Undaunted, the petitioner interposed the present Motion for Reconsideration.

The pivot of inquiry here is whether all the elements of the offense charged have been duly substantiated. As regards the first element, did petitioner Imelda R.
Marcos enter into the Lease Agreement marked Exhibit "B" as a public officer? As clearly stated on the face of the subject contract under scrutiny, it petitioner signed
the same in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI and not as Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio Chairman of LRTA. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who signed said
Contract, as ex-officio Vice Chairman of LRTA. Although petitioner was the ex-officio Chairman of LRTA, at the time, there is no evidence to show that she was
present when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement sued upon.

In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that petitioner did not sign subject Lease Agreement as a public officer,
within the contemplation of RA 3019 and, therefore, the first element of the offense charged is wanting.

It bears stressing, in this connection, that Jose P. Cans, Jr., the public officer who signed the said Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") for LRTA, was acquitted.

As regards the second element of the offense — that such Lease Agreement is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the respondent court
based its finding thereon against the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr., on a ratiocination that while the rental price under the Lease Agreement is only P102,760.00 a
month, the monthly rental rate under the Sub-lease Agreement is P734,000.00. After comparing the two rental rates aforementioned, the respondent court concluded
that the rental price of P102,760.00 a month is unfair, unreasonable and disadvantageous to the government.

But Exhibit "B" does not prove that the said contract entered into by petitioner is "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government." There is no
established standard by which Exhibit "B"'s rental provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or the entire government. Exhibit "B" standing alone does not
prove any offense. Neither does Exhibit "B" together with the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D") prove the offense charged.

At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the objective readers as to which (between the lease and sub-lease rental rates) is the fair and reasonable one,
considering the different circumstances as well as parties involved. It could happen that in both contracts, neither the LRTA nor the Government suffered any injury.
There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Verily, it is too obvious to require an extended disquisition that the only basis of the respondent court for condemning the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") as
"manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government" was a comparison of the rental rate in the Lease Agreement, with the very much higher rental price
under the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"). Certainly, such a comparison is purely speculative and violative of due process. The mere fact that the Sub-lease
Agreement provides a monthly rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per month under the Lease Agreement (Exhibit
"B") is very low, unreasonable and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. There are many factors to consider in the determination of what is a
reasonable rate of rental.

6
What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr., when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the rental rate therein   provided was based on a study conducted in
accordance with generally accepted rules of rental computation. On this score, Mr. Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., the real estate appraiser who testified in the case as an
expert witness and whose impartiality and competence were never impugned, assured the court that the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement under
scrutiny was fair and adequate. According to him, witness, the reasonable rental for subject property at the time of execution of Exhibit "B" was only P73,000.00 per
month.

That the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D") was for a very much higher rental rate of P734,000.00 a month is of no moment. This circumstance did not necessarily
render the monthly rental rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the lessor. Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the rental rate of
P102,760.00 per month was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Not even a single lease contract covering a property within the vicinity of the
said leased premises was offered in evidence The disparity between the rental price of the Lease Agreement and that of the Sublease Agreement is no evidence at
all to buttress the theory of the prosecution, "that the Lease Agreement in question is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government". "Gross" is a
comparative term. Before it can be considered "gross", there must be a standard by which the same is weighed and measured.

All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that there is a glaring absence of substantiation that the Lease Agreement under controversy is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, as theorized upon by the prosecution.

Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a month, did not result in any disadvantage to the government
because obviously, the rental income realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"), augmented the financial support for and improved the
management and operation of the Philippine General Hospital, which is, after all, a government hospital of the people and for the people.

Another sustainable ground for the granting of petitioner's motion for reconsideration is the failure and inability of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was present
when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement complained of. Albeit, petitioner was ex oficio chairman of the Board of
Directors of LRTA when the said Lease Agreement was entered into, there is no evidence whatsoever to show that she attended the board meeting of LRTA which
deliberated and acted upon subject Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B"). It is thus beyond cavil that petitioner signed the said Lease Agreement as Chairman of the PGH
Foundation, Inc., a private charitable foundation, and not as a public officer.

Neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for signing the same Lease Agreement.
Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner is only answerable for her own individual act.
Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit "B" as a Public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep Act
3019.

It beers repeating that apart from the Lease Agreement and Sub-lease Agreement marked Exhibits "B" and "D", respectively, the prosecution offered no other
evidence to prove the accusation at bar.

What makes petitioner's stance the more meritorious and impregnable is the patent violation of her right to due process, substantive and procedural, by the
respondent court. Records disclose that: (a) the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia
and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit the petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice Atienza was in favor of
exonerating petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452. Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict her in Criminal Case Nos. 17450,
17451, 17452 and 17453. As there was no unanimity of votes in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452; (b) on September 15, 1993, in accordance with Sec. 5 of P.D.
No. 1606, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five (5) justices, and naming thereto, Justices Augusto M.
Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario; (c) on September 21, 1993, Justice Amores sent a written request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena asking that he be given
fifteen (15) days to submit his Manifestation; (d) on the same day, September 21, 1993, however, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del
Rosario, after attending a hearing of the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives, lunched together in a Quezon City restaurant where they discussed
petitioner's cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, and Justices, Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452
and to convict her in the other cases; and (e) when the Justices returned to the official workplace of Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm.
Order No. 293-93 dissolving the Special Division.

Such prodedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its "decision" convicting petitioner for the following reasons, viz:

First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in its principal office  in the
Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it . . .." This rule reiterates Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, creating the Sandiganbayan.

Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. We take judicial notice of the procedure that cases in all courts are carefully
calendared and advance notices are given to judges and justices to enable them to study and prepare for deliberation. The calendaring cases cannot be the subject
of anybody's whims and caprices.

Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion
of the three justices came to light only when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her conviction by the resuscitated First Division. Presiding
Justice Garchitorena, in a paper entitled "Response," revealed for the first time the informal discussion of petitioner's cases at an unnamed restaurant in Quezon City.
There is no way to know how the discussion was conducted as it was not minuted.

Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases. In the case at bar a certain justice was present
when Presiding Justice Garchitorena, Justice Balajadia, and Justice del Rosario discussed petitioner's cases while taking their lunch in a Quezon City restaurant.

Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza
and Amores were members of the Special Division but were not present when petitioner's cases were discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. They ware
not notified of the informal, unscheduled meeting. In fact, Justice Amores had a pending request for 15 days to study petitioner's cases. In effect, Atienza and Amores
were disenfranchised. They were denied their right to vote for the conviction or acquittal of petitioner.

These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be tried by a collegial court. Under PD No. 1606, as amended, and pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan,
petitioner cannot be convicted except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether her cases are before a regular division of three (3) justices or a Special
Division of five (5) justices. But more important than the vote of three (3) justices is the process by which they arrive at their vote. It is indispensable that their vote be
preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the members of the division. Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative and could be
changed. It is only after all the justices have been heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in importance for experience shows
that an opinion that starts as a minority opinion could become the majority opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The right of the petitioner, therefore, is
the right to be heard by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.

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In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and
del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and
agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of justices Amores and del Rosario. It
may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the
petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based on an
unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws. For we cannot unreasonably suppose that Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Justices Balajadia and Atienza are bigots who will never change their opinions about the guilt of the petitioner despite a better opinion.

Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted opinion of Justice Amores. If it were an opinion for the acquittal of the petitioner, that opinion will have an added value
when petitioner appeals her conviction to this Court. Again, depending on its scholarship, that minority opinion could sway the opinion of this Court towards the
acquittal of petitioner.

Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for
violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law.

It is opined, however, that this case should be remanded to the respondent Sandiganbayan for re-decision by a Special Division of 5. As a general rule, a void
decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment does not
expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our courts.
Records reveal that petitioner was first indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in January 1992. More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from
over. To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures
"all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right expands the right of an
accused "to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial . . ." in criminal case guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. It has a broadening effect
because Section 16 covers the periods before, during and after trial whereas Section 14(2) covers only the trial period. 1 Heretofore, we have held that an accused
should be acquitted when his right to speedy trial has been violated. Thus, in the early 1936 case of People vs. Castañeda, et al., 63 Phil 480, 485, 486, a ponencia
of Mr. Justice Laurel, we held:

A strict regard for the constitutional rights of the accused would demand, therefore, that the case be remanded to the court below  for new
trial before an impartial judge. There are vital considerations, however, which in the opinion of this court render this step unnecessary. In the first
place, the Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17, guarantees to every accused person the right to a speedy trial. This criminal proceeding
has been dragging on for almost five (5) years now. The accused have twice appealed to this court for redress from the wrong that they have
suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least one of them, namely, Pedro Fernandez (alias Piro), had been confined in prison from July 20, 1932
to November 27, 1934 for inability to post the required bond of P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The Government should be the last to set
an example of delay and oppresson in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal
proceedings against the accused to come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law. (Conde vs. Rivera and
Unson, 45 Phil., 650).

We reiterated this rule in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, viz: 2

2. More specifically, this Court has consistently adhered to the view thatb a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial  amounts to
an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an accused
being twice put in jeopardy. The extensive opinion of Justice Castro in People vs. Obsania noted earlier made reference to four Philippine decisions.
People vs. Diaz, People vs. Abaño, People vs. Robles, and People vs. Cloribel. In all of the above case, this Court left no doubt that a dismissal of
the case, though at the instance of the defendant grounded on the disregard of his right to a speedy trial was tantamount to an acquittal. In People
vs. Diaz, it was shown that the case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or giving any explanation failed
to appear. In People vs. Abaño, the facts disclosed that there were three postponements. Thereafter, at the time the resumption of the trial was
scheduled, the complaining witness as in this case was absent, this Court held that respondent Judge was justified in dismissing the case upon
motion of the defense and that the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. People vs. Robles likewise presented a picture of witnesses for the prosecution not being available, with the lower court after
having transferred the hearings on several occasions denying the last plea for postponement and dismissing the case. Such order of dismissal,
accordirig to this Court "is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense." This is a summary of the Cloribel case as set forth in the above opinion of Justice Castro. "In Cloribel, the case dragged for three
years and eleven months, that is, from September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after
numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of
defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held, "that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a "dismissal" but an acquittal. For it was
entered upon the defendants" insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date
of trial." (Emphasis supplied)" There is no escaping the conclusion then that petitioner here has clearly made out a case of an acquittal arising from
the order of dismissal given in open court.

The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section should
therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.

There are other reasons why the case should not be remanded to the court a quo. Three justices of the Special Division, namely Justice Atienza, Balajadia and
Amores have already retired. Presiding Justice Garchitorena is still with the respondent court but his impartiality has been vigorously assailed by the petitioner. Mr.
Justice Francisco of the Third Division of this Court noted that Presiding Justice Garchitorena's undue interference in the examination of witness Cuervo relealed his
bias and prejudice against petitioner. 3 As Mr. Justice Francisco observed "the court questions were so numerous which as per petitioner Dans count totaled 179
compared to prosecutor Querubin's questions which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy, however, is that the court propounded leading, misleading, and baseless
hypothetical questions rolled into one."4 Mr. Justice Francisco's opinion was concurred by Mr. Justice Melo. Truly, even Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, Madam Justice
Romero and Mr. Justice Panganiban who voted to convict petitioner did not refute Mr. Justice Francisco's observations on the lack of impartiality of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. They disregarded Mr. Ramon F. Cuervo's testimony and based the conviction of petitioner purely on the documentary evidence submitted by the
People. Moreover, all the evidence in the case at bar are now before this Court and to avoid further delay, we can evaluate the evidence. In fact, the same evidence
has been passed upon by the Third Division of this Court in formulating its judgment of affirmance sought to be reconsidered. Certainly, it will be sheer rigmarole for
this Court to still remand the case for a Special Division of five of the Sandiganbayan to render another decision in the case, with respect to the herein petitioner.

I consider this opinion incomplete without quoting herein the following portion of the concurring and dissenting opinion of former Associate Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco dated January 29, 1998:

8
 Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the evident weakness of the prosecution's case and the procedural aberrations that marred the trial, it is
simply unsound and impossible to treat differently each petitioner who found themselves in one and the same situation. Indeed, our regained
democracy, creditably, is successfully bailing us out from the ruins of the authoritarian regime, and it expects that government efforts in going after
the plunderers of that dark past remain unrelenting and decisive. But let us not, in our anxiety to carry out this duty, for a moment forget that our
criminal justice system is not a popularity contest where freedom and punishment are determined merely by the fame or infamy of the litigants. "The
scales of justice", it has been aptly said,5 "must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark
and repellent his past." Culpability for crimes Must always take its bearing from evidence and universal precepts of due process — lest we sacrifice
in mocking shame once again the very liberties we are defending.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby GRANTED and petitioner Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of
the offense charged. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

28. People vs Herida G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY" and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO, accused,
JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY", accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61405, convicting appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe,
alias "Jun Tagay," of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated May 16, 1995, Julio Herida and Nonito Jamila, Jr., were charged by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City with murder, allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 14th day of May, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other persons
whose true names, identities and personal whereabouts have not yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of HERLITO DELARA 2 y VILLAS, by then and there mauling and stabbing him with the use of
knives and bolos, hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon said Herlito Delara serious and mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Herlito Delara.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On July 31, 1995, Herida and Jamila, Jr., were arraigned. They respectively pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 1âwphi1.nêt

The facts in this case are as follows: On May 14, 1995, the residents of Purok 4-B, Luzon Avenue, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City celebrated their fiesta. The affair
had been unremarkable until about 6:30 P.M. when several gunshots shattered the early evening calm. Prosecution witness Tomas Baniquid was preparing his
family's evening meal when he heard the shots. Shortly thereafter, he sensed a commotion right outside his house. Tomas peeped from his window and saw three
armed men ganging up on a person already prostate on the ground. Tomas could not immediately identify the prostate figure as the latter's shirt had been pulled over
his head. However, he recognized the three attackers as Edmund Tracilla, Edmund's brother-in-law who was known only as "Rene," and appellant Julio Herida. Rene
hacked the man on the ground several times with a bolo. Edmund also held a bladed weapon and repeatedly stabbed the prostate figure. Appellant bashed the chest
and head of the victim with a 4-inch concrete hollow block. Despite his injuries, the latter managed to fend off his attackers and remove the shirt that covered his
face. Tomas then recognized Herlito Delara. Delara rose and ran towards his house, which was 10 meters away. Edmund, Rene, and appellant pursued him. 4

Delara reached his house bloodied from all the wounds he received. His common-law spouse, Delina Duyon5 met him. He ordered her to close the door saying that
certain persons were trying to kill him. Delina was about to close the door when she saw Rene, Edmund, and appellant approaching, followed by a fourth person,
whom she later identified as Nonito Jamila, Jr. Nonito managed to insert his hands through the door and tried to pull Delara outside. Delina screamed for help. The
attackers retreated and subsequently left.6

Delara was brought to a hospital, but eventually died as a result of the wounds he sustained.

Dr. Maria Cristina B. Freyra, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Northern District Command Central Crime Laboratory, autopsied Delara's corpse.
She found that the victim had sustained twenty-three (23) injuries, namely: four (4) hack wounds, four (4) incise wounds, two (2) laceration wounds, two (2) stab
wounds, and ten (10) abrasions.7 She identified the hack wound on the right side of the head, the lacerated wound in the same area, and the stab wound on the left
chest as the fatal injuries.8

On the evening of May 14, 1995, Edmund, Nonito, and appellant were invited by barangay peace officers to shed light on the incident. Rene, who was not from the
neighborhood, was nowhere to be found. Edmund claimed that he had a wounded foot as a result of a bottle-throwing incident earlier that day and asked permission
to have it treated. It was granted but he went into hiding. 9 He and Rene were not criminally charged.

Both appellant and Nonito denied any participation in the killing of Delara. Nonito averred that he had known his co-accused only for five (5) months. At the time of
the incident, he was inside his house, while talking to appellant who was outside. Suddenly, Delara arrived, brandishing a revolver and shouting that he was going to
kill appellant. Nonito testified that he did not see Delara fire his gun, but claimed that the first shot almost hit him and his co-accused. Upon seeing Delara point his
gun at appellant, Nonito pulled the latter inside and closed the door.10

Appellant's testimony essentially corroborated Nonito's story. He declared that at the time of the incident, Nonito and he were having a conversation when the latter
suddenly pulled him inside the house. Once inside, Nonito allegedly told him that Delara was standing outside with a gun pointed at him. Appellant never saw the
victim approach or fires his pistol. Once inside, however, he heard Delara shout that he was going to kill somebody. After that appellant heard five (5) gunshots. 11 He
said that he had no quarrel with Delara at the time of the incident. He admitted, however, that Delara was angry at him because of a previous misunderstanding.
Delara had previously hired appellant to do carpentry work on the former's house. Appellant, however, did not complete the task as he had another contract and
recommended another carpenter who botched the job. This angered Delara.12 Delara's animosity resulted in his stabbing appellant. For this, he filed a complaint
against Delara.13 Appellant insists, however, that they had amicably settled their differences before the May 14th incident. 14

9
Jessie Suarez, the last defense witness, testified that at 6:00 P.M. on May 14, 1995, he was at the residence of a certain Junior Canis playing cards with him, Cris
Ong, and the two accused. Delara then approached the house of Canis, threatening to kill appellant. Delara was carrying a .38 caliber revolver. Delara then fired six
(6) times at appellant. All his shots missed appellant who was pulled into the house by Nonito, his co-accused. Delara then ran away, pursued by Edmund and
Rene.15

On September 20, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, (as) defined and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, there being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and further ordered to pay the heirs of Herlito Delara the amount of FORTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) as actual damages, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages and ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. As to the accused NONITO JAMILA y CANTO, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
MURDER, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused Nonito Jamila y Canto may now be released unless he is being held for some other legal cause.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant now assigns the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

1. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL ELEMENTS TO QUALIFY THE KILLING OF DECEASED DELARA INTO
MURDER WERE ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE PROSECUTION.

2. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT [WITH] HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY ACTING WITH OBVIOUS BIAS AND PREJUDICE DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DESPITE THE FACT THAT DELINA HERIDA IS NOT
THE PROPER OR OFFENDED PARTY.

In his first assigned error, appellant contends that there is neither treachery nor evident premeditation present in this case. He relies on People v. Escoto,  244 SCRA
87 (1995) where we held that the aggravating circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure the execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17 We agree with appellant that nowhere in
the assailed judgment is it shown how the trial court arrived at its conclusion that the killing of Delara was attended by treachery. In convicting appellant of murder
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court gave great weight to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid. The latter testified,
however, that he only peeped through the window some ten (10) minutes after the gunshots had ceased and after hearing a commotion outside his house. He saw
the three assailants, appellant included, ganging up on the victim who was already lying on the ground, but nonetheless doing his best to fend off the attack. Clearly,
when Baniquid looked outside, the tumult was already well in progress. There is absolutely no showing from his testimony how the attack commenced;
no indicia whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no chance to defend himself. In the absence of this information, treachery
cannot be established from the circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as clearly as the killing
itself.18 Where the attack was not treacherous, the number of aggressors would constitute abuse of superior strength. 19 Abuse of superior strength, therefore, qualifies
the killing as murder.20

In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the method of attack as deliberately and consciously adopted by the three
attackers. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.21 In the instant case, however, there is no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime.
Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed
before the plan was executed. Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual
mooring.

Appellant next claims that there is absolutely no showing that assailants conspired to kill Delara. He insists that the record does not show that he participated in the
planning, preparation, and killing of Delara. Appellant contends that, assuming without admitting, that he did bash the victim with a concrete hollow block, his acts
were spontaneous and independent of the attack with the bladed weapons of the other two assailants. He could only be liable for the abrasions caused by the blows
he delivered with a concrete hollow block, which were neither fatal nor the primary cause of death.

Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need
not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime. 22 It may be inferred from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime which point to a joint design, concerted action and commonality of sentiment or
interest.23 Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their
participation. In this case, the prosecution's evidence indubitably shows that appellant acted in concert with Edmund and Rene to kill Delara. First, while Rene and
Edmund were hacking and stabbing the victim, appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete hollow block. Evidently, appellant was performing overt acts,
which directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of the crime. Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and flee, all three attackers
pursued him. This is a transparent manifestation of their common sentiment to inflict harm and injury upon Delara. Clearly, the aforementioned acts point to a
common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial who inflicted the fatal blows. A conspirator, no
matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator of the crime.

On the second assigned error, appellant avers that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him. Appellant points out that over seventy percent (70%)
of the testimonies of the prosecution's material witnesses were elicited by the judge, while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to a large extent
conducted by the judge himself. He submits that under these circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial was violated.

The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial court did intensively question the witnesses. For instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution eyewitness
Tomas Baniquid, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from the judge. However, we note that the judge also intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When
appellant took the stand, 63 questions were added, with 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge. The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however, was
necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are generally
taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer, 24 the trial court had to ask many questions to
clarify important matters. The judge's behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a

10
boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and decide the results.25 Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence
and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are
overlooked by counsel.

On the third assigned error, appellant questions the award of damages in favor of the victim's common-law wife, since she is neither a legal heir of the victim nor the
offended party in this case.

A careful reading of the decretal portion of the assailed judgment will show, however, that no such award was made to Delina Duyon a.k.a. "Delina Delara." Rather,
the award of damages was made in favor of "the heirs of Herlito Delara."

To reiterate, prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid positively identified appellant as one of the three assailants who, acting in concert, assaulted and killed Herlito
Delara. Appellant has shown no reason why Baniquid, who has been his long-time neighbor, should falsely testify against him. Against such positive identification,
appellant's bare denial of any participation in the killing of Delara must fall.26 The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction even for murder.27 We find that the prosecution has successfully proven appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the award of damages to "the
heirs" of the victim is legally justified.1âwphi1.nêt

Some modifications in the award of damages, however, are necessary. The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim P40,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. Award for actual damages are given only to claims that are duly supported by receipts.28 In the present
case, the records show that the claims duly supported by receipts are the funeral services amounting to P18,000.00 29 and P1,380.00 representing the cost of
materials30 for the wooden crate used in shipping the remains of the victim to Occidental Mindoro for burial. All the other claimed expenses lack documentary proof.
The actual damages awarded must therefore be reduced to P19,380.00, as substantiated by the evidence. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof
that the aggrieved party is entitled thereto.31 Here, the fact that the heirs of Herlito Delara suffered mental anguish, nervous shock or serious anxiety was not
adequately shown. We must, therefore, delete the award of moral damages. The award of exemplary damages must likewise be struck down, since no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. 32 Finally, we note that the trial court did not grant an indemnity ex delicto which current jurisprudence sets at
P50,000. Hence, it is now in order to award such amount to the victim's heirs.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61405 finding appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe @
"Jun Tagay" guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Herlito Delara the amounts of P50,000 as
death indemnity and P19,380.00 as actual damages. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

29. People vs Hubert Webb G. R. No. 132577, Aug. 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 entitled "Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita
Tolentino, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, People of the Philippines and Lauro Vizconde" which set aside
the order of respondent judge therein denying herein respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb's request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and residents of the
United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be. 1âwphi1.nêt

The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, et al." presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.

During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition 1 praying that he be allowed
to take the testimonies of the following:

1.] Steven Bucher

Acting Chief, Records Services Branch

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

425 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington D.C. 20536

U.S.A.

2.] Debora Farmer

Records Operations, Office of Records

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

11
 Washington D.C.

U.S.A.

3.] Jaci Alston

Department of Motor Vehicles

Sacramento, California

U.S.A.

4.] Ami Smalley

Department of Motor Vehicles

Sacramento, California

U.S.A.

5.] John Pavlisin

210 South Glasell, City of Orange

California, 92666

U.S.A.

before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are
all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.

Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to
establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:

Sec. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may by used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead;
(2) that the witness is out of the province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in
the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used;

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the
part introduced and any party may introduce any other parts. (emphasis supplied).

The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of
respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only
provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does
not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction. 2

In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.3

A motion for reconsideration4 thereto on the grounds that: 1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions, and 2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the
1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines, was likewise denied by the trial court in an order dated July 25, 1997.5

Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari6 naming as respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, the People and private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399, respondent Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of
depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the
Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will
violate his constitutional right to due process.

Commenting7 on the petition, the People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well within the sphere of her judicial discretion and do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that if at all, they may be considered merely as errors of judgment which may be
corrected by appeal in due time because: a.] The motion failed to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.] The conditional
examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and c.] The examination of the witnesses must be done in open court.

12
In his Comment,8 private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition contending that:

1.] The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein respondent] Webb's motion to take testimony by oral
deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

a.] The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application in criminal
actions such as the case at bar.

b.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure only provides for conditional examination
of witnesses before trial but not during trial.

c.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction.

2.] The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition
considering that the proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary exhibits already admitted in evidence by the
public respondent.

On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division9 of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,10 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated 11 June 1997 (Annex "A" of the Petition) and 25 July 1997 (Annex "B" of
the Petition) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby ordered that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper
consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case maybe:

(a) Mr. Steven Bucher;

(b) Ms. Deborah Farmer;

(c) Mr. Jaci Alston;

(d) Ms. Ami Smalley; and

(e) Mr. John Pavlisin.

SO ORDERED.

From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant petition dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration for the
following reasons: 1.] The rule that the petitioner should first file a motion for reconsideration applies to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and there is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order11 such as the present appeal by certiorari; 2.] Section
4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for review on certiorari which indicates that "when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed" implies that petitioner
need not file a motion for reconsideration; 3.] The questions being raised before the Court are the same as those which were squarely raised before the Court of
Appeals;12 4.] The issues being raised here are purely legal;13 5.] There is an urgent need to resolve the issues considering that the trial of the accused in the criminal
case is about to end; and, 6.] The nature of this case requires a speedy and prompt disposition of the issues involved. 14

What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory orders and not a final Judgment. The respondent has filed his Comment 15 which We treat as an Answer. The
petitioner, in turn, filed a Reply.16 The petition is ripe for decision.

In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision of the Appellate Court, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious
and reversible error —

IN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

II

IN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINES WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES
RESIDE OR ARE OFFICIALLY STATIONED.

III

IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.

which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral
depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.

In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate Court's Fourth Division reasoned, inter alia, thus:

Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Thus, as the
Supreme Court has ruled in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General  and reiterated in subsequent cases:

. . . The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which give the opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers
of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of
the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most

13
 salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part
of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which the courts are always striving to
secure the litigants. It is designed as the as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means
by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on the other [,] the
administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. 17

In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take the
deposition of the witnesses for petitioner. While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rule of Court, which is found under the general
classification of the Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the other proceedings, provided the same is not contrary to the specific rules
provided therein. Indeed, the Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as a whole, and if the Supreme Court had compartmentalized the same into
four divisions, it was, as petitioner had claimed, for the purpose of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.

To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis-à-vis Section 1, Rule 23 would reveal no inconsistency so as
to exclude the application of the latter rule in criminal proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119 refers to the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the taking of deposition witnesses during trial. . . .

xxx     xxx     xxx

While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we find no reason for public respondent
to disallow the taking of the same in the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under the circumstances of the case. To disallow petitioner to
avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the opportunity to adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape
with homicide now pending before the public respondent and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively applied to civil actions, the taking of the deposition of petitioner's US-based witnesses should be
still allowed considering that the civil action has been impliedly instituted in the criminal action for rape with homicide. Since public respondent has
jurisdiction over the civil case to recover damages, she exercised full authority to employ all auxiliary writs, processes and other means to carry out the
jurisdiction conferred and [to] adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which includes the application of the rule on depositions pending action
under Rule 23 in the case pending before her.

Second. Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or country may be taken before a consular office of the Republic of the Philippines where the
deponent resides or is officially stationed.18 Section 5, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is thus clearly inapplicable in the instant case since the same relates
to the examination of witnesses under Section 4 thereof and not Section 1 of Rule 23. Consistent with the procedure provided [for] under Rule 23, the
deposition of the petitioner's witnesses, which include four (4) officials of the United States government, will be taken before a consular officer of the
Philippines where these witnesses reside or are officially stationed, as the case may be.

The denial of petitioner's right to present his witnesses, who are residing abroad, based on a very Shaky technical ground, is tantamount to depriving him
of his constitutional right to due process. This Court recognizes the impossibility of enforcing the right of petitioner to secure the attendance of the
proposed witnesses through compulsory process considering that they are beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts. Petitioner, however, is not without
any remedy and he correctly sought to secure the testimonies of his witness through the process of taking their depositions pending the trial of Criminal
Case No. 95-404 in the court below under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In any event the prosecution would have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses for accused Hubert Webb (petitioner herein) since they will be given the opportunity to cross-examine the deponents as in accordance with
Section 3 to 18 of Rule 132.19

Furthermore, no prejudice would be suffered in the taking of the depositions of petitioner's US-based witness(es). On the other hand, a denial of the same
would be prejudicial to petitioner-accused since he would be denied an opportunity to completely present his evidence, which strikes at the very core of
the due process guarantee of the Constitution. To reiterate, it is not the function of this Court to second-guess the trial court on its ruling on the
admissibility of the pieces of documentary evidence as well as the latter's witnesses,20 but it is definitely within this court's inherent power to scrutinize, as
it does in the case at bench, the acts of respondent judge and declare that she indeed committed grave abuse discretion in issuing the questioned Orders.

In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial of the deposition-taking amount to the denial of the constitutional right to present his evidence and for
the production of evidence in his behalf. The denial is not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to the
criminal proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of these witnesses by deposition it to put [a] premium on technicality at the expense
of the constitutional rights of the accused, which this court is not inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner is
bound to hinge heavily upon the testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public respondent not only to guarantee that accused is given a
reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to allow him a certain latitude in the presentation of his evidence, lest he may be so hampered
that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. Finally, even if respondent's contention is correct, it cannot be denied that
the case at bar includes the recovery of the civil liability of the accused, which normally is done through a civil case.

We disagree.

As defined, a deposition is —

The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony
issued by court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation
and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the
other party or of a witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the
court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript — word for word account — is made of the deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in
writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or interrogatories . . . 21

and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide
an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which
otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate
both preparation and trial.22 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not

14
during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice — particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the
court below — states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time
provided for filing a pre-trial motion.23

It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the
case may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the
aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.24

In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A
careful examination of Exhibits "218" and "219" readily shows that these are of the same species of documents which have been previously introduced and admitted
into evidence by the trial court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al.25 wherein We pointed out, among
others, "[t]hat respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility
have been cured though the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the merits"."26

Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit "218-A" which is a U.S. Department of State Certification issued by Joan C. Hampton, Assistant Authenticating Officer of the said
agency, for and in the name of Madeleine K. Albright, stating that the documents annexed thereto were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice as shown by seal
embossed thereon,27 with other exhibits previously offered as evidence reveals that they are of the same nature as Exhibits "42-H"28 and "42-M".29 The only difference
in the documents lies in the fact that Exhibit "218-A" was signed by Joan C. Hampton for and in behalf of the incumbent Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright
whereas, Exhibits "42-H" and "42-M" were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in behalf of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher. 30

A comparison of Exhibit "218-B"31 with the other documentary exhibits offered by respondent, likewise discloses that its contents are the same as Exhibits "42-I" 32 and
"42-N."33 The only difference in the three exhibits, which are actually standard issue certification forms issued by the U.S. Department of Justice with blanks to be
filled up, is that Exhibit "218-B" is dated February 5, 1997 and signed by one of the U.S. Attorney General's several Deputy Assistant Attorneys for Administration for
and in her behalf, while Exhibits "42-I" and "42-N" are both dated September 21, 1995 with another of the said deputies signing both documents.34

Still comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-F,"35 which is likewise a standard issue U.S. Department of Justice Certification Form, with other documents previously
introduced as evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits "39-D"36 and "42-C."37 The only differences in these documents are that Exhibit "218-F" is dated
October 13, 1995 and is signed by Debora A. Farmer while Exhibits "39-D" and "42-C" are both dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G. Christian, Jr.,
Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS.38

Still further scrutinizing and comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-G"39 which was also introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit "207-B"40 shows that
the document has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court an astounding seven (7) times, particularly as Exhibits "34-A", "35-F", "39-E",
"42-D", "42-P", "50" and "50-F."41 The only difference in these document is that they were printed on different dates. Specifically, Exhibits "218-G" as with Exhibits
"34-A", "35-F", "50", and "52-F" were printed out on October 26, 199542 whereas Exhibit "207-B" as with Exhibits "39-E", "42-D" and "42-F" were printed out on
August 31, 1995.43

In fact, the records show that respondent's: a.] application for Non-Commercial Driver's License; b.] Documentary records based on Clet's Database Response; c.]
Computer-generated thumb-print; d.] Documentary records based on still another Clet's Database Response, and e.] The Certification issued by one Frank Zolin,
Director of the State of California's Department of Motor Vehicles, were already introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits "66-J", "66-K", "66-H",
"66-I" and "66-L", respectively.44

It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only; serves to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from
the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but
exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of
the evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the
evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power
should be exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.)

Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case,
respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity
to present his side.45 It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much
as the accused.46 Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.47

The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.48 The deposition taking can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy
reasons.49 Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the
motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion ". . . implies such capricious,
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law."50

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There
must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. 51

To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy
for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

15
 In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long
as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.52

Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings would be
dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. If there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction may this Court
examine such matters further. It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464)
documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, we
sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United
States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American public officers and the
bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that
they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in
the Philippines on the specified dates.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to render
judgment therein accordingly.

30. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the
inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is
imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body
politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental
rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled
and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the
expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights
are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended
by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to
him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code,  all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

16
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused
in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of
RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 ( The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused
an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder
Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists
to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense.
On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The
Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to
so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to
be in harmony with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of
its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law
will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law
into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down
on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of
doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

17
 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner
is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and
benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF
THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS,
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof,
these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine  is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

18
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the
bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number
one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will
these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under
ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the
Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of
necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or
more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par.
(d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).
Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to
the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.

19
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved"
by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot
be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity,
is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
[only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if
ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.27

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more
imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the
Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate
and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners
posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of
their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of
the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

20
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness.
The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare
the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep.
Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will
prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of
public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information –
three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of
overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able
to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one
single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable
doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in
the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

21
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is
therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that
Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a
conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So,
there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by
applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4
is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of
the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of
this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the
case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the
statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence
sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further
the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that -

22
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not
apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated
like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law
(B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late
in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft
and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of
the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting
of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will
spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion
generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a
wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices,
shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

31. People vs Sta. Teresa G.R.No. 130663, March 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ANGELES STA. TERESA, Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In convicting an accused who has pleaded "guilty," the trial court should not be satisfied by his admission of guilt of the crime charged. By the same token, the
defense counsel is duty bound to defend his client, protect his rights and fulfill the stringent standard set by the Constitution and the Rules of Court on due process.
For the rank failure of both the trial court and the defense counsel to observe appellant’s right to due process, this Court cannot affirm his conviction. A remand to the
trial court is thus in order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the Decision 1 dated May 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, finding Angeles Sta. Teresa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his 12-year old daughter and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The decretal portion of said Decision is
worded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

23
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, and so holds, that the accused ANGELES STA. TERESA y PROTESTA is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of [r]ape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and for him to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00, as moral and
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of this suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED." 2

Upon a complaint filed by his daughter, Lorna Sta. Teresa, appellant was charged with rape on March 10, 1997, in an Information which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That sometime in the month of October, 1996, at Brgy. Soledad, Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter LORNA STA. TERESA, who is about 12 years old, taking advantage of her tender age and innocence,
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW." 3

When arraigned on May 7, 1997, appellant with the assistance of his counsel de oficio 4 pleaded "not guilty." 5 But after the prosecution presented its witnesses —
Dr. Maria Lorraine De Guzman, medico-legal officer, and the rape victim — appellant, on May 16, 1997, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed it to a plea of
"guilty." 6 He said that he "had no intention to commit such act at the time but because I was drunk, I was not on my right mind . . ." 7 He then asked that he be
pardoned for his deed. 8

After such manifestation, the prosecution decided to dispense with the presentation of other testimonial evidence and formally offered their exhibits to the trial court.
When asked for comment by the trial court, appellant’s counsel de oficio responded," [c]onsidering that the accused openly admits his guilt, I am not anymore in a
position to oppose the said formal offer of exhibits." 9

The trial court then admitted all the documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without any comment and/or objection from the defense counsel. It granted the
motion of appellant to change his plea to one of guilt. Thereafter, it re-read to the accused the complaint filed against him, interpreted it and explained it in a language
which he understood — all these with the assistance of his counsel de oficio.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The trial court then called appellant to the witness stand. There, he testified how the rape occurred. After testifying, he asked for pardon and, if not forthcoming, then
leniency because he was not in his right mind and senses when the rape incident occurred. 10

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarizes the evidence for the prosecution in this wise: 11

"One night in October 1996, appellant brought complainant, her [sic] daughter, in a hut belonging to his cousin in Barangay Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. While
she was sleeping, she was awakened when she felt that someone was removing her short pants and panties. She saw appellant. When he had disrobed her,
appellant also removed his clothes. Appellant inserted his penis into the vagina of complainant. Her private organ bled and she felt something slippery come out of
her organ.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Complainant narrated to her employer Marites Eugenio that she was raped by her own father. Eugenio accompanied complainant to the Paulino J. Garcia Memorial
Research and Medical Center, where she was examined by Dr. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman at about 2:20 p.m. of February 28, 1997. Dr. de Guzman examined
complainant and found in her organ, ‘multiple old healed laceration at 3, 5, 6, and 9 o’clock.’ The ‘vaginal opening admits 1, 2 fingers easily’." ( Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant’s version of the incident is as follows: 12

"1. The accused-appellant is a resident of Pasakaw, Camarines Sur. He has a wife by the name of Virgie Sta. Teresa. They have five children. The complainant is
the eldest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"2. Sometime in October 1996, Accused-appellant accompanied complainant to Nueva Ecija to be employed as helper in the house of Marites Eugenio.

"3. While in Nueva Ecija, the accused-appellant temporarily resided at the hut owned by accused-appellant’s cousin situated in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.

"4. One night sometime in October 1996, the accused-appellant got so drunk that he was not conscious of what he was doing. He did not recognize who he was with.
Out of instinct, he made advances to make love with the person he was with who happened to be his daughter. The complainant freely and voluntarily consented.
She was over twelve (12) years old at that time.

"5. The following day, the accused-appellant accompanied the complainant to the house of Marites Eugenio situated [at] Barangay Burgos, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
to be employed as helper."cralaw virtua1aw library

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court, after evaluating the prosecution evidence and considering appellant’s admission of the crime, convicted him of rape and sentenced him to death.
Wrote the trial judge: 13

"Therefore, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, this Court is morally convinced, and so holds, that there is not a
shred of doubt that the prosecution’s case was duly proven by direct evidence which taken collectively, in essence and in all respects led to the logical conclusion
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the complaint.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"It is [a] tough task imposing the death penalty, and this Presiding Judge finds it not an easy task to do so and is pained no end whenever the opportunity arises.
While it is true that humans should be compassionate of their fellows, the situation with judges, however, requires of them to be discriminating in this regard. For,
‘[w]hile compassion is, in itself a virtue, it cannot and should not replace justice under law, in this particular case, justice to the victim.’ It should be stressed here that
our present society has long since advanced from that dark age of man’s history where might and brute force had ruled supreme and absolute. Our present time is
now ruled by law and moral persuasions; where the greater interest of the greater number of people is held high in the balance of justice. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, this automatic review before us. 14

24
 Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits that the court a quo committed the following errors: 15

"I

The ‘plea of guilty’ made by the accused-appellant was qualified and conditional. Thus, the court a quo gravely erred in not entering a plea of not guilty for the
accused-appellant and in not affording the latter the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence in blatant violation of his right to due process.

"II

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the material inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the testimony of the private
complainant.

"III

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the fact that the testimony of the private complainant is contrary to the common
knowledge and experience of mankind.

"IV

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of complainant’s failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape[.]"

The Court’s Ruling

We find that the stringent constitutional standards impelled by due process have not been complied with in the court a quo, thus necessitating the remand of this
case for further proceedings.

First Issue:

Appellant’s Qualified and Conditional Plea

The imposition of the death penalty obligates this Court to review closely the judgment of conviction, not only on whether appellant committed the crime of rape
against his own minor daughter, but also whether his constitutional rights have been duly observed and protected before and during his trial.

As aforediscussed, appellant initially entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the victim and the medico-legal officer testified against him, his counsel de oficio
manifested that his client wanted to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty."cralaw virtua1aw library

The trial judge then conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of the change of plea and appellant’s full comprehension of its consequences. However, we believe
that the trial judge fell short of the exacting standards set forth in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As can be gleaned from this Rule, the trial court must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, first, conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea and the accused’s full comprehension of the consequences thereof; second, require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and third, ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

The trial court asserts that it has conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea of "guilty." We are not persuaded.

As explained in People v. Alicando, 16 a searching inquiry occurs when the plea of guilt is based on a free and informed judgment, focusing on the voluntariness of
the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences.

As shown in the records of the case, the trial court, after a brief exchange of remarks with appellant’s counsel de oficio, and finally with appellant himself, issued the
following Order dated May 16, 1997, or nine (9) days after the accused was initially arraigned, as follows: 17

"After the prosecution rested its case, the accused, instead of presenting defense evidence, through his counsel de oficio Atty. Angelito Adriano, manifested that he is
withdrawing his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"The Court granted said motion and the complaint was again read, interpreted and explained to the accused in a language which he speaks and with the assistance
of his counsel and he pleaded guilty and said plea was accordingly entered into the records.

"Furthermore, he was called to the witness stand and he testified that all he wants is for her [sic] daughter and the Court to pardon him and if the same is not
possible, that leniency be extended to him because he was only so drunk at the time of the incident and he was not then on his right mind and senses.

x       x       x"

We hold that the abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant’s improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster
performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a human
being. As exemplified in People v. Bermas: 18

". . . The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

"The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.
The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance
and not a simple perfunctory representation." 19

25
Using this standard, we believe that the defense counsel’s conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required of him as appellant’s attorney. Barely nine (9)
days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, his counsel de oficio made a manifestation in open court that his client is changing his plea to that of
"guilty." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty, we find Atty. Adriano’s performance as counsel de oficio utterly wanting. As a lawyer
sworn to uphold justice and the law, he had the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he appears
to be. This duty becomes more compelling if his client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life if he is convicted.

To buttress the lack of zeal shown in defending appellant, Atty. Adriano failed to appear during the promulgation of the assailed RTC Decision. In fact, the trial judge
appointed another counsel de oficio, Atty. Bayani Dalangin, for the purpose of promulgating the aforesaid Decision. 20

As the proceedings in the court a quo failed to observe the exacting standards of constitutional due process, we have no other choice but to remand the case to the
court a quo for further and appropriate proceedings conformably with what we have heretofore expressed. The other assigned errors committed by the Court a quo
will no longer be addressed because of the order of remand.

During the remand proceedings, the trial court, the prosecutors and the defense counsel would be well-advised to read and observe this Court’s pronouncements in,
among others, People v. Bello, 21 People v. Tizon, 22 People v. Nadera Jr., 23 People v. Abapo, 24 aside from People v. Durango 25 and People v. Bermas. 26

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 7411 is
remanded to it for further proceedings, with all deliberate speed, in accordance with this Decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

32. People vs Lomboy G.R. No. 129691, June 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE LOMBOY @ "JOSE," accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Acquittal is inevitable if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt. Conviction must rest on the moral certainty of appellant's guilt brought about by the totality of the prosecution's evidence.

The Case

Jose Lomboy appeals the February 14, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan (Branch 57), finding him guilty of (A)
frustrated murder, sentencing him to seven (7) years of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in Criminal Case No. SCC-
2014; and (B) illegal possession of explosive (hand grenade), imposing upon him "eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua."

Two separate Informations both dared March 26, 1993, were filed against appellant by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The first, 2 for frustrated murder,
reads:

That on or about December 25, 1992, at Barangay Angatel, [M]unicipality of Urbiztondo, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a [hand grenade] thereby hitting Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, inflicting upon him the
following injuries:

— Acute subaural hematoma, brain laceration shrapnel injury

the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of [m]urder as a consequence but, which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and is due to the timely and able medical
assistance afforded to Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 3

The second Information 4 charged appellant with illegal possession of explosive (hand grenade), allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about December 25, 1992, at Barangay Angatel, [M]unicipality of Urbiztondo, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control[,] [a hand grenade], without first securing the necessary permit and license to possess the same[,] which he used in the
commission of the crime of [f]rustrated [m]urder.

Contrary to P.D. 1866. 5

The appellant was arraigned on May 26, 1993, 6 and he pleaded 7 not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the two cases were heard jointly. 8 After trial, the lower
court promulgated the assailed Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the accused, JOSE LOMBOY, alias "Jose," is hereby found:

Under Criminal Case No. SCC-2014: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER herein charged, defined and
penalized under Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced, under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from [s]even (7) [y]ears of  prision mayor to [t]hirteen (13) [y]ears and [f]our (4) [m]onths
of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify Brgy. Cap't. Benjamin Pidlaoan in the amount of P300,000.00.

Under Criminal Case No. SCC-2015: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [i]llegal [p]ossession of [e]xplosive ([h]andgrenade)
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as herein charged, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

26
 imprisonment, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, of [e]ighteen (18) [y]ears and [e]ight (8) [m]onths of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. 10 (Emphasis in the original).

In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court. 11

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:

On December 25, 1992, about 1:00 o'clock a.m., private complainant Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, together with Barangay Kagawad
Marcelino C. Tapiador and Mardonio Tampico, were on their way home from a Christmas dance party of Barangay Angatel, Ubiztondo,
Pangasinan. While walking along the barangay road and about 8 meters from the house of Rodolfo Marcelo, they saw a man lying face down
by the roadside. When they were about 5 or 6 meters away, the man by the roadside directed a flashlight at them. Pidlaoan, in turn, flashed his
flashlight at the man who was wearing a maong jacket. They recognized the man to be appellant, a 27-year-old barangay mate of theirs.

Pidlaoan approached appellant and held the latter's left hand to help him get up. Appellant's right hand was noticeably on his stomach as if
holding something. After helping him up, Pidlaoan asked him why he was lying down by the road to which he did not answer. When asked as to
who his companion was, appellant replied that he was with Rodolfo Marcelo. Since the latter's house was just nearby, or only about 5 to 6
meters away, Pidlaoan stood by the left side of appellant and held him by the back collar of his jacket with his (Pidlaoan's) right hand, and
pulled him towards the direction of Marcelo's house. While near the front gate of Marcelo's house and while calling for Marcelo to come out,
Marcelo's young son who stood about 10 meters away from them, uttered "take care Barangay Captain because he has [a] grenade with him".

Suddenly, appellant managed to free himself from Pidlaoan's hold and moved about 3 meters backwards. He then got a grenade from inside
his jacket and held it on one hand, with the other hand removing the pin thereof with a pulling movement. While shouting "vulva of your mother,
we will all die", appellant threw the grenade in the direction of Pidlaoan and the same landed near him. Thereafter, there was an explosion and
thick smoke.

When Kagawad Tapiador, who was only about 5 meters away from appellant, recognized that what appellant was holding was a hand grenade,
he ducked with his face down.

When Tapiador and Tampico saw that Pidlaoan was seriously wounded as he could not even stand, they brought him to the clinic of Dr.
Serafino Padlan at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. He was later transferred to the Villaflor Doctor's Hospital in Dagupan City.

Upon receipt of a radio message about the explosion incident from Col. Ernesto Palisoc, SPO1 Tandoc and SPO2 Renato Solomon were
dispatched at about 7:00 A.M. to investigate. Upon learning that Pidlaoan was brought to the Padlan clinic, they rushed thereto. They, however,
were unable to speak with him as he was in critical condition having sustained a wound on his head. Thus, they instead proceeded to the
scene of the incident at Barangay Angatel where they were able to recover five (5) empty bullet shells of M-14 and M-16 armalite rifles; one (1)
hand grenade handle. 13 (citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

For his part, appellant submits the following as the fact of the case: 14

LAMBERTO  15 LOMBOY, brother-in-law 16 of accused-appellant testified that on December 25, 1992 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening
while inside his house at Barangay Angatel, Urbiztondo, his brother Jose Lomboy and Boy Ferrera dropped at his house and invited him to
attend a Christmas dance ball. He told them to go ahead and he will just follow them soon. He and Dominador Lomboy, another brother[,] left
the house at past 8:00 o'clock in the evening and proceeded to the Christmas party. While he was watching the party, he saw Brgy. Capt.
Pidlaoan [arrive] carrying a hand grenade hanging [from] the left pocket of his camouflage jacket[,] together with Mardonio Tampico[,] who was
carrying an M-16 rifle[,] and Marcelino Tapiador carrying an M-14 rifle. (emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

JOSE LOMBOY,  accused-appellant testified that on December 25, 1992, at around 1:00 o'clock early dawn, he was [in front] of the house of
his barkada, Rodolfo Marcelo conversing with him when he noticed some people walking along the road so he focused his flashlight at them.
He saw Brgy Capt. Pidlaoan together with his aide, Mardonio Tampico and Barangay Kagawad Marcelino Tapiador. They were carrying two (2)
long firearms and a [hand grenade] hanging [from] the pocket of Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan who approached him, held his collar and struck him in
the face, hitting his left cheekbone and on the head with the [use] of [the] hand grenade which was removed from his pocket. The trio mauled
and gang[ed]-up on him, and when the Barangay Captain loosened his hold on him he was able to run [towards] the back of Rodolfo Marcelo's
house planted with banana and coconut trees. They ran after him and kept on shooting but he was not hit because he ran in a zigzag manner.
Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan threw the [hand grenade] at him but when it exploded, the former was hit instead and got seriously injured. He went to his
aunt's house for fear that Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan will kill him and he stayed there for one (1) week until he was arrested by SPO1 Tandoc and
SPO2 Solomon accompanied by Cesar Pidlaoan, son of the victim who squeezed his neck. He was incarcerated at Urbiztondo Municipal jail
and on January 4, 1993, he was brought to Bolingit Hospital for medical treatment. 17 (emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court accepted the version of the prosecution as credible and rejected that the defense, ruling thus:

First, in view of the completely opposite claims of the prosecution and the defense as to who pulled the pin of, and threw, the [hand grenade],
the matter of motive has assumed a special importance in [unraveling] the mystery; and, on this issue, the accused claimed that, just before the
explosion of the [hand grenade], when he asked Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan why the latter was hitting him on the face and head with a [hand
grenade], said barangay captain purportedly replied, "Vulva of your mother, I'll surely kill you now because you are a family of thieves. . . . We
were not able to kill you on 3rd of January, I'll surely kill you now, you can't escape."[,] said accused explaining that the barangay captain was
referring to an alleged incident in the early dawn of January 3, 1992, when the house he, his mother and sister are living in was shot at,
although he did not know then who did the [alleged] shooting. The Court finds this story of the accused, besides being uncorroborated, not to
be worthy of belief for the following reasons:

27
 (a) It is merely based on the accused's conjecture that Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan had anything to do with the alleged shooting
up of accused's house on January 3, 1992, assuming this without any basis, to have actually happened;

(b) The presumption that Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan is a reasonable and responsible public official of his barangay is not
rebutted by the uncorroborated claim of the accused that by merely suspecting him and his family as "a family of thieves",
he would shoot up their house and would kill the accused right on the road in front of the house of the accused's barkada,
Rodolfo Marcelo;

(c) It is unnatural and contrary to logic that the barangay captain would confess to the crime of shooting up to the house
of the accused months prior the present incident before carrying out his alleged intention to kill the accused;

(d) In view of all the foregoing, the Court traces the ill-motive to kill the barangay captain to the accused who was
harboring the belief that it was the barangay captain who shot up the house where he (The accused) and his mother and
sister were then sleeping and who was purportedly accusing them of being "a family of thieves."

Second, it is established that two kinds of armalite rifles were fired [at] the scene of the crime, and it is claimed by the accused that he saw the
barangay captain's two companions to be carrying these firearms as they approached him, if it is really true that it was the intention of said
barangay captain to kill him, because he belonged to a family of thieves and he could not escape, the barangay captain and/or his companions
should have shot him with the armalite rifles, not the [hand grenade] just to kill one person putting to risk not only the target but the persons
nearby, including the thrower himself if thrown not far enough.

Third, well-established is the rule on evidence that flight is an evidence of guilt; and in the instant case, as the [hand grenade] exploded, the
accused ran away from the scene and proceeded to Malasiqui where he stayed in the house of his aunt, Leoning Gonzales, at Brgy. Lokeb
Norte, for about one (1) week until he was arrested thereat by Urbiztondo policemen accompanied by Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan's son, Cesar. . . . .

Fourth, the claim of the accused that he was being mauled by Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan and his companions when he was able to free himself from
the hold of the barangay captain, is belied by the very Medico-Legal Certificate and the testimony of Dr. Conrado H. Cuison, M.D. who
examined and treated him and who prepared said document, which the defense presented as evidence of his alleged injuries . . .18 (emphasis
in the original).

The Issues

Appellant submits that the court a quo  committed the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AS
CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-2014 DESPITE THE WEAKNESS AND INSUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
EXPLOSIVES AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-2015 DESPITE THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY. 19

The main issues to be resolved are the credibility of the prosecution's single eyewitness and the verity of his testimony.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Main Issue

Credibility of Prosecution's Lone Eyewitness

As a general rule, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses in a matter that particularly falls within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness on stand. For this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings and assessments of witnesses with great weight and even
finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. 20 We find, however, that the court a quo overlooked several
circumstances of weight and substance, which create reasonable doubt on the appellant's culpability.

Testimony Is Dubious

The trial court relied mainly on the testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness, 21 Barangay Kagawad Marcelino Tapiador. In light of the well-settled norm that the
testimony of a witness must conform with knowledge, observation and common experience of mankind, 22 the Court meticulously reviewed Tapiador's testimony and
concluded that his account was dubious.

First, Tapiador testified that about 1:00 a.m., while walking along the barangay road with Mariano Tampico and Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, they saw the
appellant lying face down on the road shoulder. Tapiador allegedly "sensed" that Jose Lomboy had "bad intentions," 23 but the former did not convey his feelings to
his companions. Nonetheless, Pidlaoan collared the appellant as if he had just committed a crime. 24 Tapiador narrated the events in this wise:

ATTY. SORIANO.
Q At about 1:00 o'clock on that December 25, 1992 in the morning, do you remember where you were, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you then, Mr. Witness at that time?
A We were walking towards another occasion, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that took place on that precise time and on that place, Mr. Witness?

28
 A Yes, sir.
Q What was that, Mr. Witness?
A While we were walking along the road, we saw a man lying with his face down along the shoulder of the road.
Q When you mentioned we were walking, to whom [we]re you referring to.
A Brgy. Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan and Mardonio Tampico, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q On that precise moment that you have seen as you mentioned a person lying down, what happened next if there is
any?
A The man lying down flashed his flashlight towards us and . . . Brgy. Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan . . . flashed his
flashlight towards him and then the Barangay Captain approached him.
Q You said you [saw] a person lying down, who is that person who is lying down?
A Jose Lomboy, sir.
Q Are you referring to the accused whom you have pointed earlier, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q After Brgy. Captain Pidlaoan made Jose Lomboy stand, what transpired next if there is any, Mr. Witness?
A He was asked what he was doing there and who was his companion.
Q To whom [was] question directed to Mr. Witness?
A Jose Lomboy, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Jose Lomboy if there is any, Mr. Witness?
A His companion was Rodolfo Marcelo, sir.
Q And what did the Brgy. Captain do if there is any, Mr. Witness after that?
A He collar[e]d Jose Lomboy and he accompanied him to the house of Rodolfo Marcelo.

xxx xxx xxx 25 (emphasis ours)

The improbabilities in the foregoing narration are readily apparent. It is unnatural for one to lie down near a road at one o' clock in the morning during the cold season
for no particular reason. Indeed, when asked on cross-examination whether the appellant appeared to be drunk or was doing anything illegal, the witness replied in
the negative. Moreover, if it was true that appellant intended to commit a crime, his actuations as described by the eyewitness spoke otherwise. If appellant had evil
designs that night, why did he point his flashlight towards his targets — Pidlaoan and his companions — thereby attracting their attention? Why did he lie face down
on the road in plain view of passersby? Instead, he should have positioned himself in an inconspicuous place and waited, unnoticed, for the right opportunity from a
safe distance to throw the grenade at the group.

Second, Tapiador stated categorically that he did not see any firearms or hear any gunshots during the incident. The pertinent part of his testimony is as follows:

ATTY. SAMSON
Q Is it not a fact that you and Brgy. Captain before the explosion were armed?
A None, sir.
COURT.
Q You were not on patrol duty then?
A No, sir, but we attended the Christmas Party.
Q Did you not attend the Christmas Party as security to maintain peace and order?
A No, sir.
ATTY. SAMSON.
Q You are a Brgy. Kagawad of Brgy. Angatel, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Just immediately after the explosion, did you not hear the firing of guns?
A None, sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied.).

The physical evidence on record controverted the foregoing assertions. Reports of what happened were transmitted over the radio as a shooting incident and not
merely as an explosion, as Tapiador would have us believe. The investigating officer, SPO1 Rodrigo Tandoc, testified: 27

Q. What was that radio message all about that was sent to your office by Col. Palisoc?
A. He informed our office that there was a shooting incident, sir.

Furthermore, Tandoc declared that he and his team recovered at the scene of the crime several bullet shells of M-16 and M-14 rifles, along with a grenade
shrapnel. 28 In fact, the Appellee's Brief admits that the two companions of Pidlaoan were armed with armalite rifles. 29

Third, Tapiador testified that the victim took the appellant to the front of Marcelo's house and that, by implication, the incident took place there. The witness said:

ATTY. SORIANO.
Q And what did the Brgy. Captain do if there is any, Mr. Witness after that?
A He collar[e]d Jose Lomboy and he accompanied him to the house of Rodolfo Marcelo.
Q What particular part of the house of Rodolfo Marcelo did Brgy. Captain take Jose Lomboy?
A Near the front of his house, sir. 30

This would necessarily mean that the grenade exploded at or near the front of Marcelo's house. According to the Appelle's Brief, the barangay captain collared the
accused and took him to that particular place; after the latter freed himself, he stepped backwards and "threw the grenade in the direction of Pidlaoan and the same
landed near him." 31 The eyewitness was categorical when he testified that the entire incident took place at or near the front of Marcelo's house.

But according to SPO1 Tandoc, the center of the explosion was located at the back portion of Marcelo's house where there were banana and coconut trees.

ATTY. R. SAMSON
Q You said that you have gathered evidence at the scene of the explosion. When you said you gathered, you and you
companions were the [ones] who personally gathered these evidences like the empty shells of M-16 and M-14 and the
handle of the grenade, is that not correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you personally gathered some of them?

29
 A Yes, sir.
Q Did you try to determine the center of the explosion of the hand grenade as duty investigator?
A Yes, sir.
Q From the center of the explosion of the hand grenade, is it near the trees like banana tree?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact also that a domesticated animal died because of that explosion of the hand grenade?
A I do not know if that animal died but it was hit, sir.
Q What domesticated animal was that?
A Carabao, sir.
Q And that domesticated animal was hit; that domesticated animal was found near the center of the explosion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you try also to find out the condition of the surroundings of the center of the explosion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact that near the center of the explosion you can find several banana trees as well as coconut [groves]?
A There were, sir.
Q And the center of the explosion is likewise near the house of Rodolfo Marcelo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And just at the back of the house of Rodolfo Marcelo there were coconut [groves] and banana plantations?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q A while ago you have stated that the center of the explosion was near the banana trees, how far is the center of the
explosion from the nearest banana tree? [I]s it less than a meter from the nearest banana tree, the center of explosion?
A More of or less 1 meter, sir. 32

The investigating officer was clear and certain in stating that the center of the blast was about a meter away from the nearest tree at the back of the house. Clearly,
the location of the grenade blast scuttles the theory of the prosecution, which is based entirely on the testimony of Tapiador. His story was that appellant was brought
by the victim to the front of the house; that Marcelo's son who was outside the house warned them of the grenade in appellant's possession; and that appellant
loosened the victim's grip on him, made three steps backward and threw the grenade at the victim. But the fact that the center of the explosion was at the back of the
house shows that this story was untrue.

It should also be emphasized that the lone eyewitness was unsure of the events that transpired after a child had allegedly warned them. During cross-examination,
said eyewitness faltered while answering several questions:

ATTY. SAMSON
Q After the boy uttered the words, he has a [hand grenade] and as you have demonstrated, Brgy. Captain pushed his
right hand backward as if he is removing something, did I get you right that when he removed his right hand backward as
if he is removing something, the right hand of Brgy. Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan was placed at the back collar of Jose
Lomboy loosened or detached?
COURT
You reform so that witness will .....
ATTY. SAMSON
Q You said that Jose Lomboy [swung] his right arm towards his back. When he swung his arms towards at the back,
what happened?
A He moved backward by around 3 steps.
Q And that was the very moment that he threw the hand grenade?
A He first talked, sir.
Q What did he say?
A "Vulva of your mother, we will all die."
Q And that was the distance of 3 steps backwards?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the very moment he threw the [hand grenade]?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Did you notice where the grenade came from?
A Inside his jacket, sir.
Q Will you please assure the Court that it was the right hand of Brgy. Captain which was holding the back collar of
Lomboy?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you are also sure that it was the right hand of Jose Lomboy which is swung backwards?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was the Brgy. Captain in relation to Jose Lomboy, as he was holding the back collar of Lomboy?
A He was besides Jose Lomboy sir.
Q The right side of Jose Lomboy?
A Left side, sir.
Q But you are pointing to your right side?
A He turned, sir.
Q So the Brgy. Captain was in the left side of Lomboy using his right hand, when he was holding the back collar of
Lomboy?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that time they were both facing the same direction?
A Yes, sir.
Q With that position, it was then that Lomboy swung his right hand?
A Witness demonstrating by swinging his right arm side[ways].
Q So, in other words, what he did was to hit the Brgy. Captain with his right elbow?
A I don 't know anymore, sir.
Q So he did not actually swing his right arm backwards as you claimed first because, what he did now is just to turn
around and swing his right elbow as if to hit the Brgy. Captain?
A Yes, of course, because he was loosening the [grip] of the Brgy. Captain.
Q So he used his right hand now in order to grip or did he swing the right arm?
A I could not tell anymore, sir, if he used his right hand in removing the grip of the brgy. Captain because of his position
with his elbow turning around. 33

30
 The Grenade Story

Most important, the prosecution failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the very crucial question identified by the trial court itself: Who "pulled the pin of, and threw,
the hand grenade that exploded?" 34 To this, the prosecution answered based on the testimony of Tapiador that (1) he saw appellant holding a grenade, and (2) a
child warned them that appellant had a grenade. Such answer cannot be given credence for several reasons.

One, Tapiador provided conflicting testimony on whether he saw the appellant holding a grenade. In his direct testimony, he stated:

ATTY. SORIANO
Q How about the accused Jose Lomboy, what was his reaction when there was a [caution] made by that alleged person?
A Jose Lomboy struggled and then he loosened himself [from] the Brgy. Captain and moved backward around 3 meters.
Q And on that, what happened next if any, Mr. Witness?
A He was already holding a grenade, the other hand with the grenade and the other hand with the pin with his two (2)
hands meeting each other.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. SORIANO
Q And how about you, what did you do when accused Jose Lomboy uttered those words "Baonina yon amin, onpatey tila
dia"?
A When I saw that it was a grenade the[n] I lay with my face down, sir. [sic]
Q By the was Mr. Witness, when the accused threw the [hand grenade] to the place of the Brgy. Captain, what is your
distance [from] the accused?
A Around 6 meters away, sir.
Q How do you know that it was a grenade that the accused was holding, Mr. Witness?
x x x           x x x          x x x
WITNESS
A Because we were illuminated by a light and I know that kind of grenade sir. 35

On cross-examination, however, he said that he could not see what appellant was holding. He testified thus:

ATTY. SAMSON
Q You want to convey to this court that after that boy uttered that Jose Lomboy had a [hand grenade], Brgy. Captain
[Pidlaoan] instead loosened his grip o[n] the . . . collar of Jose Lomboy?
ATTY. SORIANO
That was already answered several times in direct and cross, your Honor.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A No, sir, just after the boy uttered those words.
COURT
He [was not saying anything], he was just demonstrating. The witness demonstrated by raising his right arm and
swinging it backwards as if removing something from behind him.
ATTY. SAMSON
Q And of course Jose Lomboy was at that time not yet holding anything?
ATTY. SORIANO
Your Honor, what particular moment.
ATTY. SORIANO [sic]
On that very moment, your Honor.
COURT
Witness may answer as the question is explained on that very moment.
WITNESS
A I could not see what he was holding because, it was night time and although he was holding something since grenade
is very small, so even though the witness [sic] is demonstrating as if he was removing something then I could not see
anymore.
ATTY. SAMSON
Q You mean to say therefore that you were not illuminated by electric lights, because you said you can not recognize
him?
A There was a light, sir. 36

This conflict in the testimony of the eyewitness regarding an important factual detail belies the truthfulness of the prosecution account.

Two, Kagawad Tapiador testified that there was a child, who warned them of the fact that the appellant was armed with a hand grenade. On direct examination,
Tapiador narrated:

ATTY. SORIANO
Q At that precise time when they were in front or near the house of Rodolfo Marcelo, what transpired next if any, Mr.
Witness?
A Upon reaching in front of the house of Rodolfo Marcela, there was a child who uttered "take care Brgy. Captain
because he has a grenade with him".
Q And what is the distance of that person who mentioned the Barangay Captain, Mr. Witness?
A Around 10 meters away, sir. 37

On cross-examination, Tapiador identified the child as Rodolfo Marcelo's son. However, notwithstanding his claim that the place was illuminated by an electric bulb,
he was not able to describe the child on further questioning, viz.:

ATTY. SAMSON
Q Do you know that boy who [uttered]?
A He is the child of Rodolfo Marcelo, sir.
Q You know him personally?
A Only that night, sir.
Q But you did not mention his name in your affidavit, is that correct?

31
 A I don't know his name.
Q But you know that he is the son of Rodolfo Marcelo?
A Yes, sir, that's what I [said].
Q You mean to say that when that boy [uttered] the words, he was inside the house of Rodolfo Marcelo?
A No sir.
Q Where was he?
A He was on the ground, sir.
Q Around how old is that boy, if you know?
A I don 't know, sir.
Q Could you approximate the age of that boy by his look?
A No sir.
Q [How a]bout the height of that boy?
A Of course it is night time, sir, and something happened.
Q You mean to say because it's night time, you can not recognize him?
A No more, sir, because it was so sudden.
Q So in other words, you [did] not [recognize] him, you don't know if he is a boy or an old man?
A I saw that it is a boy but I could not recognize [him]. 38

Truth to tell, there was no child involved in the incident, because all the children of Rodolfo Marcelo were already asleep according to the testimony of SPO1 Rodrigo
Tandoc. 39 We note that the child was not presented in court. We have said that the failure to present a witness to establish one's thesis may imply that the
testimony would be adverse if presented. 40 It should be added here that Mardonio Tampico, the other companion who could have easily corroborated the account
given by Tapiador, was not presented either.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The Court notes that the trial court gave misplaced and erroneous emphasis on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. In its assailed Decision, the lower
court insisted that the ill motive imputed to Pidlaoan was "uncorroborated, not . . . worthy of belief." 41 Worse, it concluded in a rather cavalier manner that such
imputation suggested bad faith on the part of appellant. This was speculative and immaterial. Likewise, the court a quo manifested a wrong perspective in
erroneously focusing on the alleged failure of the appellant to prove that the victim and his companions mauled him.

After belaboring the perceived weakness in the assertions of the appellant, the trial court concluded that the prosecution's version was more credible. It held:

In the light of all the foregoing findings, the Court holds that the aforestated version of the prosecution is far more credible than that of the
accused, and that the prosecution's evidence is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused, Jose Lomboy, who pulled
the pin of[f], and threw, the [hand grenade] . . . . 42 (emphasis ours)

Well-entrenched is the doctrine that a finding of guilt must rest the on the prosecution evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the
defense. 43 The burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt rest upon the prosecution. 44 The lower court erred in relying on the alleged weakness
of the defense. To our mind, when the trial court said that the prosecution's version "was far more credible," what it actually meant was that the prosecution's version
was more probable. Verily, guilt cannot be shown by mere speculations or even probabilities, whether the offense be malum prohibitum  or malum in se. 45

Appellant's Flight

The lower court held that appellant's flight may be an indication of his guilt, but it did not explain why. 46 Evidently, it was unsure of the import and significance of
appellant's act. In People v. Cario, 47 we stressed that flight may indicate guilt in certain instances, but it cannot, by itself, prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, appellant departed from the scene of the incident, because he was afraid that the victim would kill him. 48 Furthermore, the lower court should have
considered the uncontroverted fact that the victim's son had choked the appellant while the latter was incarcerated, 49 a clear indication that the threat to appellant's
life was real.

Verity of Defense's Allegations

It is noteworthy that the pieces of physical evidence, which contradict the prosecution's account, support the story of appellant. He said that he was talking with some
friends at the house of Rodolfo Marcelo when some people approached them. He focused his flashlight and saw Barangay Captain Pidlaoan, Tapiador and Mardonio
Tampico. The three were carrying two rifles, while a hand grenade was hanging from Pidlaoan's pocket. The three mauled appellant, who thereafter ran towards the
back of Marcelo's house when he was able to free himself. The three fired their rifles at him; fortunately, he was not hit. It was then that Pidlaoan threw the grenade,
which exploded at the back of the house and blasted him instead.

The bullet shells found in the crime scene, as well as the initial report that what happened was a shooting incident, belie Tapiador's statement that he did not see any
firearms or hear any gunshots. On the other hand, they confirm appellant's theory that the barangay captain and his companions fired at him.

Finally, the fact that the center of the explosion was at the back of Marcelo's house discredits the prosecution's claim that appellant threw the grenade at the victim
who was standing in front of the house. At the same time, it supports the story of the appellant that the barangay captain threw the grenade at him while he was
running towards the back of the house.

Indubitably, the pieces of physical evidence present a scenario that completely negates the prosecution's account. Indeed, these established and uncontroverted
facts rebut the trial court's theory and affirm that of the appellant. Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." 50 Perforce, acquittal is inevitable. 51

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Jose Lomboy is hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully
held for another cause; and to inform this Court of his release or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

32
33. Monteverde vs People G.R. No. 139610, Aug. 12, 2002

AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the
offenders punished. However, this objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt
lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 29, 1999 Decision 1 and February 3, 2000 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 18768. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AUREA MONTEVERDE y RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Commercial Document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS of
Prision Correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the cost.

"She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive imprisonment suffered, pursuant to and as mandated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

"The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no pronouncement as to the same.

"The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled." 3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

This case originated from the Information dated February 4, 1993, signed by Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with the approval of then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. Charging petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the accusatory portion reads
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer, being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila with intent to defraud, and by taking
advantage of [her] official position and to liquidate the funds donated/granted by the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation submitted Sales Invoice No.
21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00 allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales invoice is falsified and later did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her personal use and benefit, to the damage of the Government
and which crime was committed in relation to her office." 4

During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, Petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte, 5 pleaded not guilty. 6 After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted
petitioner of the crime of estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s version of the facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that
capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount was spent for lighting,
cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement (Exhibits ‘1 to 1-A-3’) with copies of sales
invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.

"Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged Petitioner and Bella Evangelista,
then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.)
P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December 1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643
(Exhs. A, B and C)." 7

Version of the Defense

The foregoing account is reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Memorandum. 8 The petitioner did not submit her own Memorandum, but
merely adopted the position of the OSG which recommended her acquittal.

Version of the Sandiganbayan

The foregoing narration does not adequately explain the evidence. In fairness to the Sandiganbayan ("SBN" hereafter) which is being faulted with reversible errors by
petitioner and the OSG, we deem it prudent to quote the facts and the evidence it relied upon in its assailed Decision, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the People presented the following documentary evidence:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991 signed by Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose
Salvatierra;

2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four (4) complainants subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on September 8, 1991;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw

33
1ibrary

3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed by complainants Jose Salvatierra and Antonio Araza addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief
Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;

4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales Invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware.

5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981 listing only three (3) items;

6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;

7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as buyer and listing eleven items as articles purchased;

8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit E is not a genuine reproduction of the duplicate original;

9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991;

10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing Antonio Araza to verify the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated
January 17, 1991 in the sum of P13,565.00

as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.

"LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware since 1976, that Exhibit D-1 which is [a] duplicate copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated July 2,
1981 where the amount of purchase is only P157.00 is the invoice used by her firm in the conduct of its business; that Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she
executed a certification to that effect (Exhibit E-1) when required by a male person; that she does not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but the entries in Exhibit
D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her] sister-in-law Delia Co; that there are three copies of the sales invoice her business is issuing, and
the third copy or last copy is the one left in the store, and that the one who approached her and asked about Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered
that she did not issue Exhibit E she was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does not know accused Aurea Monteverde and that she had no delivery of
hardware materials to the Barangay on January 17, 1991 (TSN May 14, 1993).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of 2256 Malaya St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and that he secured a copy of Exhibits E and F from the
Barangay Treasurer; that he brought the same to the owner of the Sanford Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to whom he talked . . . in said store manifested that
said Exhibits E and F are not issued by the firm; and for which he requested Luz Co to issue a certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing that the receipts used by
the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints and [a] Joint-Affidavit together with Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and Jose Salvatierra, and charged the
accused before the Ombudsman; that the money involved in this case, are barangay funds because it was donated by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was
able to secure a copy from the PAGCOR evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was submitted to the Ombudsman; that the Barangay
Treasurer lent to him the receipts with the advice to verify it from the proprietor of [the] Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to him (Exhibit G); that
the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E and F was not used to buy electrical materials or lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post were donated by Councilor Rene
Jose (TSN March 18, 1994).

"EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED

"The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35 to 80 dealing with certificates of commendation in favor of the accused during her stint as Barangay
Chairman from 1991 to 1993 and even prior to her being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings (Exhibits 1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the
accused addressed to Alice Ll Reyes of the PAGCOR with attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales Invoices/Receipts from different
hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are pictures depicting a basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and Exhibits 18 to 32 are fifteen
(15) pictures depicting different alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over certificate/record of the Barangay properties signed by the incoming Barangay
Chairman with the third page submarked as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the counter-affidavit of the accused sworn to before a Notary Public on
September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr. and Joel Magbanua.

"Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose testimony is as follows: that he knows the accused to be the Chairman of Barangay 124 from
1991 up to 1992 while he was a Barangay Tanod in the said Barangay; that one project of the accused was the installation of lights or lighting the streets and
playgrounds in the Barangay; that in January 1991 materials were delivered to the house of the Barangay Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days thereafter,
he helped in the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical wirings, electrical tapes, bulbs, lamps and lamp covers, and it took them (he and the
husband of the accused) about three Sundays in doing so; that he executed a Joint-Affidavit together with one Joel Magbanua in connection with the incident (Exhibit
81) (TSN April 2, 1997).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to 1994; that in January 1991 she received donation or cash money in the amount of P44,800.00 from
PAGCOR which she used in Barangay projects like lighting, and cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the matter to PAGCOR and submitted [a] financial
statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A, 1-A-1); that when she purchased electrical and hardware items from Sanford Hardware she was issued a receipt (Exhibit 9) and
considering Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford Hardware issued two (2) receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, and claimed that with the meager amount involved, she is not going to sacrifice her good name and reputation; she then identified . . . several awards
she received (Exhibits 35 to 79); that she was the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she actually paid the same in cash for which she was
issued Exhibit 9 (Exhibit F and 9 contain the same items); that the receipt was issued in her name and the money was in her possession that was why it was she and
not the Barangay Treasurer who personally made the purchase; that the PAGCOR check was issued in her name and was directly given to her and so she was the
one who encashed the check accompanied by one of the councilors but she did not turn over the cash to the treasurer; that even after she came to know of the
existence of Exhibit E, she did not go to Sanford Hardware to inquire about the said document; that the original of the said exhibit was given to her but she submitted
it to PAGCOR. (TSN September 3, November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997)." 9

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The assailed Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have been charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.
However, there was no clear allegation in the Information that the falsification was a necessary means to commit the estafa. 10 Nevertheless, going along "with the
supposition" that a complex crime had been charged, the SBN held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is constrained to go with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime,
otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes — that of Estafa and that of Falsification of Commercial Document which is
not beneficial to her." 11

The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that funds had been misappropriated or converted. 12 Neither was there proof that
petitioner had been required to account for the money received. 13 Without these proofs, no conviction for estafa was possible. 14

34
However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent
for lighting materials for her barangay. According to the SBN, the falsification became very clear when the document was compared with another one purporting to be
a duplicate original presented by the prosecution. 15 While the prosecution did not present any proof evidencing that it was petitioner who had caused the
falsification, the SBN relied on the presumption that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, a person who is found in possession of a forged document, and who
uses it, is the forger. 16

Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, because there was no proof that she had taken
advantage of her position in committing the crime. 17 Instead, she was convicted of falsification under Article 172. 18

Hence, this Petition. 19

Issues

The OSG’s Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted, raised the following issues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed[;]chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[; and]

[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited from it." 20

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Nature of Complex Crimes

Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether
the Information had properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, "constrained to go along with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a
complex crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes — that of Estafa and that of Falsification of Commercial
Document which is not beneficial to her." 21

We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both
(or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). 23 Negatively put, there is no complex crime
when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others). 24

Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing
falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The alleged falsification happened after the money was spent and to explain how it was expended. Thus there is no complex crime since the falsification is not a
necessary means for committing the estafa (as charged) or malversation (as suggested by Sandiganbayan in its Order dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was
intended to conceal the estafa or malversation."25cralaw:red

Well-known is the principle that an information "must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." 26 When
more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information. 27

In the present case, the accused should have objected to the Information on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. For her failure to move to
quash the indictments, she is deemed to have waived her right to be tried for only one crime. 28 Furthermore, she did not object to the submission of evidence that
tended to prove the offenses charged in the Information — estafa and falsification. Verily, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information, but the accused fail to object to the defect before trial, the trial court may convict them of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on
them the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each. 29

On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a
commercial document. Having, in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be
evaluated based on its own merits, and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each particular offense.chanrob1es virtual law library

Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily
lead to an acquittal from the other (or others).

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the
trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.

We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead; to a declaration of
innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the
defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved. 30

Second Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Nature of Sales Invoice

The OSG agrees that the subject Sales Invoice is a public and/or a commercial document within the meaning of "falsification" as defined under the Revised Penal
Code.

Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the character of a public document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a
public officer duly authorized by law. 31 The OSP aptly explained this point as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . ., [I]f the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the preparation of which being in accordance with the rules and regulations issued

35
by the government, the falsification of that document, although it was a private document at the time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or official
document.

"Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales
Invoice is intended to be part of the public records and the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations. Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed
part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was submitted by petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability to PAGCOR." 32

Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. 33 This Court has previously characterized such documents in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order slips and invoices] are not always fully accomplished to contain all the necessary information describing
the whole business transaction. The sales clerks merely indicate a description and the price of each item sold without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in
the particular receipt or invoice, and without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt if businessmen and traders would
strive to make the receipts and invoices they issue complete, as far as practicable, in material particulars. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of
probative value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts. 34 ( Emphasis
supplied)chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Third Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Proof of Guilt

The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner with regard to the crime of falsification. A
determination of this question will necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented before the Sandiganbayan.

As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions of law. 35 However, this Court, in exceptional cases, has taken
cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues. This is especially true in cases in which a palpable error or a grave misapprehension of facts was
committed by the lower court. 36 Criminal cases elevated by public officials from the SBN deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases
brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in both instances.
Indeed, in a criminal case, a person’s life or liberty is at stake. 37

Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption that the possessor of a forged or falsified document who uses it is the author of the forgery or
falsification. The OSG concurs with her on this point. That is why it recommended that she be acquitted.

We agree. To our mind, the prosecution’s evidence is not sufficient to convict. As correctly observed by the OSG, the Decision of the SBN is based on the
assumption that there was only one set of sales invoices issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise, petitioner’s Exhibit 9 thus becomes obviously falsified
when compared with respondent’s Exhibit D-1. But on the premise that the two Exhibits are two different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful. The OSG is
correct in observing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify the customer’s copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to erase or cover with correction fluid
the spaces pertaining to the name of the customer, date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit price and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither
the appealed decision nor the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite opportunity of the prosecution to see the
original of Exh. 9. The only observation the respondent Court mentioned was with respect to the date: ‘[t]he superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too apparent to be
disregarded, and the alteration of the date has affected both the veracity and the effects of the said document.’ But the changing of the date was the easiest to
accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they affect wider space, would [have been] the name of the customer and the purchases. The total absence of any hint or
sign of alteration on these areas is revealing." 38

The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9 and D-1 is that there are two extant documents. Whether one is the original and the other is falsified
depends on the proof. This the prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution. 39 Further, it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information 40 We repeat that, in this case, it failed to discharge this duty. We quote with
approval the OSG’s disquisition on these two documents as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are two (2) sets of Sales Invoice No. 21568. While the form is identical in most respects, there are
three (3) telling differences: (1) the type set of the sales invoice numbers are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh. D-1 indicates the name of the printing press while no
such information is indicated anywhere in Exh. 9, and (3) the bottom right of Exh. D-1 states the BIR permit which does not appear in Exh. 9. Who could have printed
Exh. 9 is anybody’s guess. It is possible that petitioner or any person acting on her behalf had a printing company copy this particular Sanford Hardware invoice so
she could use it to liquidate the PAGCOR funds she received. However, it is equally possible that Sanford Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts,
one to reflect the real business transaction, the other one — a sanitized version — for the consumption of the BIR people. Not one of these possibilities has been
actually proven, but neither was their improbability established. 41 (Emphasis supplied)chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Indeed, the OSG points out that there are material differences between Exhibits 9 and D-1. These include: 1) the discrepancy in the "type set" or fonts used for the
sales invoice numbers in the two Sales Invoices; 2) the presence of the name of the printing press at the bottom left corner of Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit
9; and 3) the presence of the BIR permit in Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by petitioner or anyone acting on her
behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds. But it is equally possible, as the OSG points out, that Sanford Hardware caused the printing of two sets of receipts to serve
its own purposes. However, none of these possibilities was either actually proven or definitely ruled out by the prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that Exhibit 9 was falsified.

The SBN relied on the settled rule that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of — and who used, took advantage of or profited from
— a forged or falsified document is the author of the falsification and is therefore guilty of falsification.

To convict petitioner of falsification would mean that the prosecution was able to establish that Exhibit 9 was a falsified copy of an original document. But the rule
itself shows that it cannot be applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9 (Sales Invoice No. 21568) was not established beyond reasonable doubt to have been
forged or falsified. At the very least, it may be a second document that may or may not have been printed by petitioner herself.

Respondent claims that the original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as adverted to earlier, Exhibit 9 was not satisfactorily demonstrated to be a copy thereof. In other
words, Exhibit 9 being different from Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have presented an original document, of which Exhibit 9 is a falsified
copy.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The question is: who made this second document marked Exhibit 9? Petitioner consistently maintains that Exhibit 9 was issued to her by Sanford Hardware when
she purchased the items mentioned therein. On the other hand, the manager of Sanford Hardware denies having issued such document. Indeed, it is a time-honored
principle 42 that greater probative value is accorded to a positive than to a negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the
OSG:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [Petitioner] denied the accusation and insisted that she would not sacrifice her name and reputation for the meager amount involved. She submitted photographs

36
that the lighting of alleys in Barangay 124 was completed. There was positive testimony by Alfonso Cua, one of the persons who installed the articles listed in Sales
Invoice No. 21568. The prosecution failed to rebut these." 43 (Citations omitted)

One final point. The SBN held that the "accused refused to present the original of Exhibit 9," and that it would have been so "easy . . . to ask for a subpoena to direct .
. . the PAGCOR to produce the original copy, and yet the accused satisfied herself in presenting Exhibit 9 — a mere xerox copy of the supposed document." But, as
pointed out by the OSG in its Memorandum, 44 the original of Exhibit 9 was presented in court during the November 5, 1996 hearing after a subpoena duces tecum
had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel "confirmed that the . . . xerox copies are faithful reproductions of the original." 45

In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused. 46 Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never
sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution
presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long
standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right. 47

Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal conviction must come, not from its weakness, but from the strength of that for the prosecution. 48

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No pronouncement
as to costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

34. People vs Bato G.R. No. 113804, Jan. 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SERGIO BATO and ABRAHAM BATO, Accused, ABRAHAM BATO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral
certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state’s evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.chanrobles law library : red

The Case
This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 finding Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated July 7, 1989, Leyte Provincial Prosecutor Joventino P. Isidro charged the brothers Bato with murder allegedly committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 9th day of May, 1988 in the Municipality of Pastrana, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage
of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Ernesto Flores, Sr. with deadly weapons locally
known as ‘sundang’ which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon said Ernesto Flores, Sr. several wounds on the
different parts of his body which wounds caused his death." 2

Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library

On January 15, 1990, the accused were arraigned in the Waray dialect which they understood and spoke. Assisted by Counsel Benjamin Pore, both pleaded not
guilty. 3 After due trial, the trial court 4 rendered a decision, 5 the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds each of the accused Abraham and Sergio, both surnamed ‘Bato’ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. With the abolition of the capital punishment in the 1987 Constitution, the penalty of Murder should now be Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty imposable is in its medium period or from
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY TO TWENTY (20) YEARS.

"Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are each imposed the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased Ernesto Flores, Sr. in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the corresponding costs." 6

Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1994, the said Court promulgated the assailed Decision affirming their guilt and increasing the
penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of this Court’s rulings in People v. Benitez, Jr. 7 and People v. Muñoz. 8 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,
9 the appellate court, instead of entering judgment, certified the case to the Supreme Court in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, since the crime for which the appellants were charged, tried and convicted is Murder, the penalty provided for by law is reclusion perpetua, within the
power of the Supreme Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari (sec. 5-(2)-(d), Art. 8, 1987 Const.), this criminal case is hereby
certified to the Supreme Court. "10

In a Resolution dated June 29, 1994, this Court (First Division) informed the parties that they may file additional briefs. Conformably, the parties complied with said
Resolution within the extended period granted them. 11

On July 28, 1994, during the pendency of the appeal, Sergio Bato died at the Leyte Regional Prison due to cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to acute beriberi. 12
Death before a final judgment extinguishes both the criminal and the civil liability (ex delicto) of an accused. 13 Hence, this Decision pertains only to the appeal of
Abraham Bato.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Ernesto Flores Jr., 14 son of the victim, and Dr. Virisimo Opiniano 15 who conducted the autopsy. The
prosecution’s version of the facts was summarized by the solicitor general as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

37
"On May 9, 1988 at about three o’clock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going home from Barangay Tingib,
Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. While passing by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham and Sergio, both surnamed
Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters away from his father while
the latter joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied him (father) with his hands placed at the back. Later, he
saw appellants bring his father to somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants (tsn, 6-18-90,
pp. 3-10).

It was only the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the
previous afternoon. He immediately reported the incident to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tingib. The latter informed the police department about the incident.
Many policemen responded and the dead body of his father was brought to the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte (tsn, 6-18-0, pp. 10-
11).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

At the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Virisimo Opiniano, conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased Ernesto Flores,
Sr. He found that the deceased sustained five hacking and seven stab wounds. The cause of death is shock, secondary to a hacking and almost decapitating wound
(Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘B’)." 16

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial. They maintained that their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder was merely an
afterthought, necessitated by a dearth of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. They presented as witness Pfc. Benjamin Montanejos, 17 who affirmed that
the entry he made in the police blotter 18 did not mention the accused as suspects in the crime. He further testified that it was the barangay captain who reported the
incident to the police, contradicting Ernesto Jr. who claimed that he did so. 19

Ruling of the Trial and the Appellate Courts

The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness, Ernesto Jr., positively identified the accused who invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed how they tied
the hands of Ernesto Sr. before they took him away. That the police blotter failed to state the names of the assailants did not negate appellant’s participation in the
slaying. Further, the entry was based on the information relayed not by the witness himself but by the barangay chairman, who had not witnessed the incident. 20
The trial court further appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery.cralawnad

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court and further declared that the totality of the prosecution evidence "constitute[d] more than sufficient
incriminatory and inculpatory circumstances" to reach the conclusion that the appellants killed the victim. The appellate court declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Ernesto’s testimony is clear. He pointed to and positively identified Abraham Bato and Sergio Bato as the persons who invited his father to drink with them while he
and his father passed by Barangay Hibucawan. His father accepted the invitation and[,] with them for two hours[,] drank tuba at the house of Lescabo. All the while,
Ernesto sat there about two meters away from his father. He saw his father drunk, and, under that condition, also saw Abraham and Sergio tied [sic] his father’s hand
with a rope and placed [sic] them at the back, then they brought him away with them, to what direction, ‘I do not know because I ran as I was also afraid’ as ‘they
might bring me also.’ He learned of his father’s death on the following day, that they found him at the Binaha-an River, about 5 kilometers away from the house of
Paran Lescabo. Ernesto added on cross-examination that after his father was taken by the duo, he went homeward, arrived there at about 6.00 p.m., told the incident
to his mother, then they slept and that ‘it was only the following morning when they look [sic] for his father’; that he and his mother reported the incident to the
Barangay Captain of Tingib, and together with the barangay captain, they found his father dead at the Binaha-an River, and then they reported the incident to the
police authorities." 21

Like the trial court, the appellate court found that Ernesto Jr. "positively identified" the Bato brothers as the killers of his father and could not have been mistaken, as
he had known them long before the commission of the offense, a fact not rebutted by the defense.

The Court of Appeals further opined that it was a natural human behavior for Ernesto Jr. to get frightened and to wait for daybreak before looking for his father and
reporting the incident to the authorities. The appellate court noted that it was nighttime when Ernesto Jr. reached home, and that he did not know where to look for
his father.

Assignment of Errors

In their brief 22 before the Court of Appeals, the accused assigned the following errors: 23

"I. The lower court erred in finding that there was positive identification of the Accused-Appellants.

II. The lower court erred in finding that accused-appellants employed treachery in the commission of the offense."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his additional brief 24 submitted before this Court, Appellant Abraham Bato further contends that the appellate tribunal gravely erred in increasing to reclusion
perpetua the penalty imposed by the trial court.

This Court’s Ruling

Pursuant to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion perpetua are subject to a review de novo, this Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and
concluded, after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral
certainty that appellant is guilty.

Circumstantial Evidence Palpably Insufficient

The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased. True, in the absence of
direct proof, a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, 25 but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 26

Hence, it has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion, to the exclusion of any other, that the accused are guilty. The circumstances proved must be concordant with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. 27 As a corollary to the
constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 28

Prosecution’s Main

Evidence Circumstantial

Aside from the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination on the cadaver of the deceased, the only other witness for the prosecution was Ernesto Jr., who

38
testified mainly as follows: 29

"Q What happened since you said you were at Tingib at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 9, 1988?
A When we passed by Hibucawon, they called my father for a drink.
Q This Brgy. Hibucawon belongs to what municipality?
A Jaro, Leyte.

PROSECUTOR DAGANDAN:
Q You said that they called your father, who is this "they" you referred to?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q Where were Abraham Bato and Sergio Bato when they called your father?
A They were drinking in the house of Paran.
Q Do you know the real name of this Paran?
A I only know him as Paran.
Q What is his family name?
A Loscabo.
Q Where is this house of Paran Loscabo located?
A Barangay Hibucawon, Jaro, Leyte.
Q In what manner was your father called by Abe Bato and Sergio Bato?
A They called my father to a drink.
Q What did your father do?
A He approached Sergio Bato and Abe Bato, and he drank because he was offered to drink.
Q Where were you when your father was called by Sergio Bato and Abe Bato?
A I was near.

PROSECUTOR DAGANDAN:
Q Where were you when your father was called, at what distance were you to your father?
A About two (2) meters (from the witness stand).
Q Did you come to know if there were other persons present aside from your father and the two accused?
A Yes, but I do not know them.
Q Approximately, how many persons were present who were gathered?
A They were many persons.
Q Approximately, how many?
A More than ten (10).
Q Since you said you were near your father when you approached them, what did Abraham Bato and Sergio Bato got to do with your father when your father
approached them?
A They first offered my father a drink.
Q What drink was offered?
A Tuba.
Q Did your father accept the offer?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q For how long did he stay in that group?
A He stayed long.
Q How about you, where did you stay while your father was drinking?
A I was at a certain distance but I did not get near them.
Q At about what time did the drinking spree last?
A Two (2) hours.
Q After two hours, what happened, if any?
A When my father was already drank, they tied my father.
Q Who tied your father?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q With what object or material was your father tied?
A Rope.
Q How was your father tied with the rope?
A They tied him with a rope and both hands were placed at the back.
Q After that, what happened?
A They brought my father.
Q Who is this "they" who brought your father?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q How did you come to know that your father was brought somewhere?
A I saw them bringing my father.
Q To what directions was your father brought?
A I do not know because I ran away as I was afraid.
Q Immediately before you ran away, where was your father.
A They were bringing and holding my father.
Q You said you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A I was afraid because they might bring me also.
Q Did you come to know what happened to your father?
A I learned the following day that my father died because they brought him.

In sum, therefore, the witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the crime: (1) that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink;
(2) that after two hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away, and (3) that the following day, the body of the victim,
which sustained several hack and stab wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.

After a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we believe that appellant’s authorship of the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Lapses in the

Prosecution Evidence

Ernesto Jr. admitted that there was no enmity or bad blood between his father and the accused. He further asserted that there was no altercation during the drinking
spree. Likewise, he made no statement that the Bato brothers, at the time, carried any bladed weapon which could have been used in his father’s murder. Moreover,
he did not see where the appellants brought his father after they had tied his hands. More significantly, he failed to testify on how his father was killed, who killed him,
or even when he was killed. These lacunae in the prosecution account necessarily spawn doubts in the mind of a reasonable person. Because the appellants tied the

39
victim’s hands, can it be inferred that they intended to kill him, and actually killed him? Where did the accused take him? What happened between the time the
accused tied the victim and the following morning when his lifeless body was found? There is absolutely no evidence of what transpired during that interval. The
prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the accused must have killed the victim during such interregnum. But conjectures,
surmises and suspicions cannot take the place of evidence, particularly where — as in this case — contrary suspicions, surmises and queries can also be floated
and believed.chanrobles law library : red

It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of other people who were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. Instead, he ran home
and related the events to his mother. Oddly, he and his mother reacted not by reporting the matter to the police, or even just to their barangay chairman, their council
members or their neighbors. They simply slept the night away!

Notwithstanding the presence of other persons who were nearby when the appellants tied the hands of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other
witnesses to corroborate Ernesto Jr.’s testimony. As it was, his testimony was grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction. 30

Comparable Cases

In People v. Roluna, 31 the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for kidnapping with murder was based merely on the testimonies of two witnesses — one of whom
allegedly saw the appellant tie the hands of the victim before taking him away, and the other purportedly saw the victim walking with hands tied and the appellant
following him. Declaring that the said circumstances were insufficient to convict the appellant, this Court held that the "conviction of accused-appellant for the serious
crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. . . . [T]he evidence presented by the
prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death Moronia."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In People v. Argawanon, 32 appellant therein was charged and convicted of murder by the trial court. In acquitting the appellant, the Court
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Furthermore, if indeed the two (2) Castro brothers were watching the cockfight when the alleged four (4) persons attacked Pat. Castro, it is quite difficult to
comprehend that, considering that he (witness) was only six (6) meters away from his brother, nothing was done to him as he was able to run and hide. It seems out
of the ordinary that the assailants, allegedly, two (2) of them armed with .45 caliber pistols would let Jennis Castro (an eye witness to the killing) loose and not put
him out of the way. It is also quite unbelievable that despite his said distance, he (Jennis Castro) was able to identify the accused-appellant and was able to hear one
of the assailants shout . . .

In addition to the above extrajudicial statements of Jennis Castro, the trial court considered the following circumstantial evidence in convicting the appellant
Lambujon, to with: his presence at the house of one of the accused during the raid, the revolver of Pat. Castro which was allegedly found in accused-appellant’s
possession during the raid; positive testimony of Jennis Castro that the one who fired the second shot was the one wearing a blue T-shirt. We do not agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that the aforecited evidence are corroborative of Jennis Castro’s incriminating testimony against the Accused-Appellant. Circumstantial
evidence may be characterized as that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. This Court
cannot infer from said evidence, the identity of the victim’s assailant nor the actual participation of the appellant Lambujon in the crime charged." 33

In People v. Ragon, 34 there was no actual witness to the killing of a tricycle driver, but appellant therein, with two others, was identified as the last passenger of the
victim before the cadaver was found hours later. Relying on purely circumstantial evidence, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder. On appeal, this Court
acquitted him. Holding that there was no sufficient evidence to establish his actual participation in the killing, we concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, and cannot be plucked out and considered one strand at a
time independently of the others. If the picture does not point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction based thereon will
not weather judicial scrutiny. A painstaking review of the records of this case convinces us that the story pieced together by the trial court from the evidence of the
prosecution provides no moral certainty of appellant’s guilt. . . ." 35

Presumption of Innocence

Not Overturned

In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the
accused.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 36 Where the state fails to meet the
quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his
defense. 37 By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested in the prosecution. 38

In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Abraham Bato is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. His RELEASE from confinement is immediately ORDERED, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause. The director of prisons is DIRECTED to
inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

35. People vs Rivera G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, §10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the decision, 1 dated June 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua,
Pampanga, finding accused-appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera,
the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The information against accused-appellant charged—

That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

40
 and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latter’s will and without
her consent.

Contrary to law.2

When the information was read to him in the local dialect (Pampango) during his arraignment on September 30, 1997, accused-appellant, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,3 whereupon trial was held.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical
examination of complainant.

Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger sister, Zaira,4 was taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero Memorial
Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Complainant’s mother stayed with her sister in the hospital, but her father, herein accused-appellant, went back home to Santiago,
Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 o’clock in the evening of the same day, complainant was awakened as accused-appellant started kissing her and fondling her
breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to no avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty,
touched her private parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant told complainant not to tell anyone what had
happened or he would kill complainant’s mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened
because she was afraid of accused-appellant.

On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that she had been
raped by accused-appellant. For this reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical examination. She also executed a sworn statement before the police of
Lubao, Pampanga.5

Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a result of the rape committed against her by accused-appellant, but the pregnancy was aborted. 6 On cross-
examination, she said she was 13 years old at the time of her testimony, the second child in the family. She said that her parents were not on good terms with each
other and that she knew that her father had a mistress. Atty. Mangalindan, then defense counsel, questioned Erlanie about other supposed acts of molestation
committed by accused-appellant against her previous to the rape subject of the present case, but, upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the
question on the ground that it concerned matters not covered by her direct examination. 7

Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother, aunt, and a certain Nora Baluyut were present when she made her sworn statement before the police. She said that
her father raped her only once, sometime in March 1997. She could not remember the exact date when she was raped by accused-appellant, but she did remember
that the same took place in March as her sister, Zaira, was hospitalized at the time. When the rape occurred, her younger brother and sister were in their house
asleep. She did not tell her mother after the latter had returned home that she had been raped by accused-appellant because she was afraid of her father who had
threatened her. After the rape, accused-appellant would only come home on Sundays.8

Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie said that she gave her sworn statement before the police and that her answers to questions asked during her direct
examination were freely given without coaching by anyone. She could understand Tagalog, the language used in her sworn statement. She told the court that she
struggled against accused-appellant, kicking and pushing him, but she was overpowered by her father. At that time, Erlanie’s younger sister, Corazon, was lying
beside her, but Erlanie did not shout even when her father succeeded in penetrating her. Erlanie could not remember how long the sexual act took place, but she felt
something like urine come out of her father’s penis after he was finished with her. Erlanie testified that she was 12 years old when she was raped by her father. 9

On re-direct examination, when asked about the discrepancy between her testimony that her mother returned home only the day after the rape and her statement in
her affidavit that accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape, Erlanie replied that she made a mistake as the incident narrated in her affidavit referred to
a different occasion when no rape was committed against her by accused-appellant.10

The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta Pagtalunan, complainant’s aunt and the sister of complainant’s mother, Evangeline. Marietta corroborated
Erlanie’s testimony that the latter told her sometime in April 1997 that she had been raped by accused-appellant. Marietta said she took complainant to Dr. Barin,
who examined complainant.11

Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital. Her findings are as follows:

P.E. FINDINGS:

- No signs of external Physical Injuries

I.E. FINDINGS:

HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 o’clock

VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers with difficulty

UTERUS - not enlarged

LMP - March 3, 1997

Pregnancy Test (+)12

Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she examined complainant Erlanie Rivera and found that the victim had an injury in the hymen at the 3 o’clock position
which could possibly have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as a male organ. Dr. Barin testified that complainant Erlanie went back to see her on
May 2, 1997 because she suffered from vaginal bleeding indicative of a threatened abortion. She said that she found that complainant was then pregnant. Upon
examination of the patient at that time, Dr. Barin found that abortion had not yet taken place and prescribed medicines for the complainant. Erlanie was subjected to
another pregnancy test on May 13, 1997, but the result was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the vaginal bleeding suffered by complainant could have caused the
abortion of the fetus.13

Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence. Accused-appellant, his sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero
District Hospital, were presented as witnesses.

41
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed against him because his wife, Evangeline, had a paramour and
resented him because he hurt her. He explained that he saw his wife talking with another man in their house and beat her up on April 1, 1997 because he heard that
she had a lover. He also said that his wife was angry with him because he had a mistress who stayed in their house for three weeks. He further stated that his wife’s
relatives were likewise angry with him because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in his name. He said that
he was compelled to sign a waiver of his rights over the land owned by his parents-in-law. 14 The defense presented a letter to accused-appellant written by his wife,
who was asking him to sign a document so that she could attend to it before he got out of prison. 15

The defense also offered as evidence a document, designated as Waiver of Rights,16 signed by accused-appellant, in which he acknowledged that he was a tenant of
a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over the said landholding to the "SMPCI," recommending that a certain Ponciano Miguel be
given the land to work on the same. The document was identified by accused-appellant in open court. He said that Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of his wife and
that he signed the document because his wife’s relatives promised him that he would get out of prison after signing the document. 17

Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo, accused-appellant’s sister, who testified that in March 1997, accused-appellant lived with her family in
Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to help her husband operate a fishpond. She said that accused-appellant stayed in their house during the entire month of March, except
in March 19, 1997 when he stayed with their sister, Perla, in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan. 18

The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, who identified 19 a certification, dated April 29, 1999, in
which it was stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that hospital from March 1 to March 2, 1997. 20

On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For having violated Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is the father of the victim and absent any circumstance that could mitigate the commission thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.

In line with established jurisprudence, said accused is also ordered to indemnify the offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:

1. The lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the Accused-Appellant to due process and right to counsel;

2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence of the Accused-Appellant.22

I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-
examining Erlanie Rivera concerning the latter’s sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial court denied the motion made by
accused-appellant’s counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because of which the said counsel consequently
waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and
(d) the trial court’s decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted his memorandum.

Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights, not a
mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.23 Considering both the evidence and the law applicable to this case, we hold that accused-
appellant has been accorded his right to due process.

A. One basis for accused-appellant’s contention that he was denied due process is the refusal of the trial judge to allow Atty. Mangalindan’s questions concerning the
other alleged acts of molestation committed by accused-appellant against complainant. Accused-appellant argues that no legal ground exists for the trial court’s
ruling.

The transcript of stenographic notes concerning this incident shows the following:

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Q         You mentioned in your testimony that you were molested by your father since 1996.

COURT:

Are you referring to a chain of events because police station you are referring is something there are two places this girl testified that she was
raped, you referred to us Acts of Lasciviousness and she did not testified about that, that is another case with another Court, we are only trying
here a rape case that is only they you never mention. Only on the matters that she testified (sic).

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

But this is also related to the rape case your Honor because I will confront it with another form of a question.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Q         Prior to this incident, were you molested by your father?

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done by the accused is not a subject of the case at bar.

COURT:

42
 Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar which is a rape case.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

This is related to the incident because we are here your Honor to prove, we are trying to discredit her testimony. We will just direct our question
touching on the direct examination.

COURT:

Only on the matters that she only testified that is only thing you can cross-examine. Only matters testified which is only a rape case let us not
dwell the Court knows there are other cases Acts of Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at the proper Court otherwise if I will allow you
to ask questions on other matters specially I know you are pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness you are prolonging this case here (sic).

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

I am trying to discredit the witness as one where the credibility as witness here your Honor is very important. I stated before our main cross-
examination is the accused is not a plan in such case, although I do sympathize (sic). We would like to propound question that will discredit her
as witness and a complainant not with her testimony alone. Our center of cross-examination is to discredit her as complaining witness that is
why our question may not be limited to be accepted under the rule of cross-examination your Honor the cross-examination your Honor the
cross-examiner is not limited on the direct-testimony of the witness but he can propound questions which may petition or destroy the credibility
of the witness that is our view point (sic).

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit or to adopt our credibility of our witness, but it should be done in the proper way, not to ask
immaterial questions which are not related.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

The rule for cross-examination insofar as to destroy the credibility of the witness is not only limited to what the Honorable Fiscal we came
approach of so many cross-examinations goes allow your Honor under the rules of Court insofar as this case is related to the present case we
are trying, this is very related because even the witness I have transcript in my hand, testified not only the rape case your Honor she had
testified by direct-examination the preparatory acts before the testimony of rape that she was been molested early, finger of the father, this
were testified through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony it is not limited (sic).

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Prior to this incident were you molested by your father, obviously your Honor the question is not relevant.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Your Honor please I’m very disagreeable (sic), I have not with me the transcript but I have read that you [can] ask questions concerning the
rape case.

COURT:

A question referring to events prior to the complaint at bar.24

The trial court later issued an order, dated December 9, 1997, the pertinent parts of which provided:

After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for
Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private complainant did not testify on
that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued that although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the
sworn statement executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her direct examination and marked as Exhibit "C" for the prosecution, he is
at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject
matter of another case before another court.

The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness
and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."

The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. She may not therefore
be questioned on this matter because it is not connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the issue. To allow adverse party to cross-
examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and which the witness did not testify is improper.

Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse. On the
contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly burden the court with immaterial testimonies. 25

In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court gave accused-appellant’s counsel 20 days within which to elevate its ruling to the appellate court. 26 The
records reveal, however, that no such petition was filed by Atty. Mangalindan as regards this particular matter.

The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly disallowed accused-appellant’s counsel from questioning complainant as regards the other supposed acts
of lasciviousness contained in her sworn statement. On this point, Rule 132, §6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

43
 Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest, bias or the
reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.

The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the
witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.27 The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or
half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters
which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against
him.28

The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Thus,
in People v. Zheng Bai Hui,29 this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions propounded by the accused’s counsel on the ability of the
arresting officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu without a laboratory examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the officer’s authorship
of books on drug identity and analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.

In this case, accused-appellant’s counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly committed by accused-appellant
against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility. There was, however, no showing on his part how these questions had any bearing on complainant’s
credibility or on the truth of her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant into committing mistakes in her answers
during cross-examination that accused-appellant’s counsel could later use to possibly put complainant’s credibility, not to mention her character, in question.

Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to ask questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by complainant. He cites Rule 132,
§17 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides that:

When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject matter may be inquired
into by the other.

Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of complainant which the trial court did not allow. As the above provision states, this rule applies to parts of
"an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record" which is given in evidence.

Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with her direct examination on November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted the motion made by Atty. Anselmo
Mangalindan, accused-appellant’s private counsel, to postpone Erlanie Rivera’s cross-examination to allow him time to secure copies of the transcript of
stenographic notes of Erlanie’s testimony and thus enable him to fully question complainant.30 Erlanie was first cross-examined on December 2, 1997, but several
postponements, namely, on January 13, 1998,31 February 10, 1998,32 March 12, 1998,33 March 31, 1998,34 April 7, 1998,35 May 12, 1998,36 May 26, 1998,37 May 28,
1998,38 and June 11, 1998,39 on Erlanie’s cross-examination took place because of the failure of Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the said trial dates. Erlanie’s cross-
examination was continued on July 14, 1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-appellant’s counsel was thorough and covered various subjects,
such as the nature of the relationship between her parents, who were present during the execution of her sworn statement, whether the same had been executed by
her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by accused-appellant the reason for her delay in reporting the rape committed by accused-appellant, her understanding
of Tagalog, who were with her in the house at the time of the rape, the details surrounding the rape committed against her, and her age. It is evident that accused-
appellant and his counsel were given ample opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in order to test her truthfulness.

B. The record shows that because accused-appellant’s private counsel was not present when Dr. Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil was appointed by the trial court as
accused-appellant’s counsel de oficio for that particular hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the postponement of the witness’ cross-examination, but the trial court denied
his request because, on the one hand, accused-appellant was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very busy person, while, on the other hand, Atty. Bansil had
heard the testimony of the said witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not to cross-examine Dr. Barin. 40

Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the motion of Atty. Bansil for postponement because he was biased against him. Accused-appellant
claims that the counsel de oficio was not familiar with the facts of his case and was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr. Barin.

While the Constitution recognizes the accused’s right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services of a private counsel
is not absolute. For considering the State’s and the offended party’s right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a
private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason.41

The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo
Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. As this Court ruled in another case:

. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly
administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue as
scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to
represent him.42

Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barin’s testimony on direct examination was simple,
containing primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require considerable study and
extraordinary preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary to cross-examine
Dr. Barin.

Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, accused-appellant has not indicated what questions his counsel wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well
be that these questions do not exist at all and that the importance given by accused-appellant to counsel de oficio’s failure to cross-examine the witness is
exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the victim, together with the medical certificate, is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element of
rape.43 The primordial issue in this case remains to be whether the complainant’s testimony, not Dr. Barin’s, established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape.

C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judge’s questions propounded to him during his cross-examination as an indication of the latter’s partiality for the
prosecution.

We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful administration of
justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. 44 Our reading
of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and

44
not to establish his guilt. It is a judge’s prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth. 45 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals
certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. 46 As this Court held:

In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords
no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for
the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to
make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material
bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as
to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions
to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. . .47

D. We also find no merit in accused-appellant’s argument that he was denied due process considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against
him, which judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum.

The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the court’s findings on the credibility of
both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. What we said in the analogous case of People v. Mercado48 applies to
this case:

. . . A review of the trial court’s decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during the
trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is
not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a
case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants’
memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the
trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for
rendering his decision with due dispatch. . .

II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have
been guided by the following principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own merits
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.49

A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been
established that when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony
passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony.50

Considering complainant’s tender age, her shy demeanor, and manner of testifying in court, the trial court found Erlanie’s testimony to be straightforward, natural,
and convincing and accorded the same full faith and credit.51

Complainant told the court how she was awakened because accused-appellant kissed her and fondled her breasts. She narrated that she tried to resist accused-
appellant’s advances by pushing and kicking him, but the latter succeeded in ravishing her. She told of how her father threatened to kill her mother and her siblings if
she reported the incident. Despite the lengthy cross-examination of accused-appellant’s counsel, she remained firm and steadfast in her story of how she was raped
by her father. Her narration not only rings true and sincere but is consistent and unshaken on its material points. Complainant’s testimony is fully corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Barin who examined complainant shortly after she had been raped. She found complainant to have suffered a hymenal laceration at the 3
o’clock position which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object, such as a male organ.

Complainant’s failure to remember the date of the commission of the rape cannot be taken against her. The exact date when complainant was sexually abused is not
an essential element of the crime of rape.52 Nor does the fact that complainant was sleeping beside her sister when the rape occurred detract from her credibility. The
possibility of rape is not negated by the fact that the presence of even the whole family of the accused inside the same room produced the possibility of discovery.
For rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, for rapists respect neither time nor place for carrying out their evil designs. 53

In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any reason why this Court should disbelieve complainant’s testimony. Indeed, the gravity of filing a case for incestuous rape
is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It is against human experience for a girl to fabricate a story which would drag herself and
her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless it is the truth. More so when her charge could mean the execution of her own father, as in this case. 54

Accused-appellant’s counsel on cross-examination made much of the discrepancy between complainant’s sworn statement where she stated that accused-appellant
slept beside her mother after the rape55 and her testimony that her mother returned home from the hospital only the day after the rape took place. 56 It must be pointed
out, however, that discrepancies between a witness’ affidavit and his testimony in open court does not necessarily impair his credibility. Affidavits, which are taken ex
parte, are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. 57

Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with complainant’s mother after committing the rape of complainant is of no moment as it is a minor point that
does not reflect on the commission of the crime itself. The rule is that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor matters neither impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness’ honesty. Such inconsistencies may in fact strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness as
they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.58

Accused-appellant contends that complainant could not have been raped on March 1 or 2, 1997, the dates when her sister Zaira was hospitalized, because she had
her last menstrual period on March 3, 1998 and thus she could not have gotten pregnant as a result of the rape. He argues that a woman who had her monthly
period cannot be impregnated as a result of sexual intercourse five days before or five days after her last menstruation. 59

Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any legal or medical authority for his thesis, except what he claims to be common knowledge. On the other hand, we have
previously held that it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization inasmuch as more than two weeks is considered to be the life span of the spermatozoa in the
vaginal canal.60 Hence, even granting that complainant could not have been impregnated by accused-appellant during the period alleged by him, it remains possible
for complainant to have gotten pregnant afterwards. More importantly, it must be emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is, therefore,
totally immaterial to the question of accused-appellant’s guilt.61 In other words, accused-appellant being the cause of complainant’s pregnancy is a non-issue in the
prosecution of the crime of rape. What should not be lost sight of is the fact that complainant’s testimony constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of her without her consent, and such fully established the crime of rape.

45
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of complainant’s mother and her relatives for bringing charges against him. He claims that complainant’s mother
resented the fact that he used to beat her up out of jealousy and that he had several paramours in the past. He further asserts that his wife’s relatives were angry
with him because of the land which he caused to be registered in his name to the prejudice of the latter.

This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant makes it appear that complainant’s mother was responsible for the filing of this case against him. This is not so.
For that matter, his wife did not testify against him. It was his daughter, complainant, alone who denounced him in court.

Accused-appellant’s claim that the motivation for the filing of this case was the animosity of his wife’s relatives towards him caused by his land-grabbing of their land
is likewise without any basis. It may be that his wife’s relatives took advantage of his incarceration and made him sign his waiver of rights over the land. 62 But this
does not necessarily mean they conspired to persecute him. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant never claimed that the document which he signed (Exh. 3)
existed before the filing of the criminal complaint against him or that his wife’s relatives fabricated the charge against him because of his failure to sign the same.

Indeed, what accused-appellant’s defense cannot explain is the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant or the steadfastness she has exhibited in pursuing the
charge against her own father. It is doubtful that complainant would let herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in exchange for her honor and dignity. We
cannot believe that a young girl, like complainant, would invent a sordid tale of sexual abuse by accused-appellant unless it was the truth. 63 Where there is no
evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, her
testimony is trustworthy.64

Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the bare denial of accused-appellant cannot overcome the positive declarations of complainant.
Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the
testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters. 65

Accused-appellant’s sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-appellant lived with her family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other witness not related to
accused-appellant, however, was called to corroborate her claim. We have already held that the defense of alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the
accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is not improbable that these witnesses would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their loved
ones.66 Accused-appellant’s defense thus fails to convince this Court.

C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court is erroneous. It is settled that to justify the imposition
of the death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and her age must be alleged and proved.67 Thus, in People v. Javier,68 where the victim was alleged to be 16
years old at the time of the commission of the rapes, it was held:

. . . Although the victim’s age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the
victim’s age which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference
between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may
be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young-looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus,
it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is
indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of
cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an
accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.

A duly certified certificate of live birth showing complainant’s age, or some other official document on record, such as a school record, has been recognized as
competent evidence.69

In this case, although complainant’s minority has been alleged in the information, no independent evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the same.
Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the rape during direct examination; it was only during her cross-examination when she stated that she was 12
years old at the time she was raped by her father.70

Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any school record presented by the prosecution to prove the age of Erlanie at the time of the rape. Not even
her mother, whose testimony could have been sufficient to prove the age of complainant,71 testified in this case. What was relied upon by the trial court was that fact
that the age of the victim was undisputed by the defense.72 It also took judicial notice of the victim’s minority on account of her appearance.73

We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can only take judicial notice of the victim’s minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below.
Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving the victim’s age at the time of the rape and the absence of denial on the part of accused-appellant does not
excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.74 In a similar case, People v. Tundag,75 in which the trial court took judicial notice of the minority of the victim who
was alleged to be 13 years old, we ruled:

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As
required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally,
the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were
lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.

The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to complainant’s age, accused-appellant can be convicted only of simple rape, for which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 made by the trial court cannot be sustained. Such amount can only be awarded if the crime
of rape was effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. 76 Accordingly, the civil
indemnity awarded to complainant must be reduced to P50,000.00 in consonance with current rulings.77

The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant is correct. Moral damages is awarded in rape cases without need of showing that the
victim suffered from mental, physical, and psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require recital by the victim during trial. 78

In addition to the damages given by the trial court, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded in favor of complainant. Accused-
appellant being the father of complainant, such relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance warranting the award of exemplary damages.
In rapes committed by fathers against their daughters, such award may be imposed to serve as a deterrent to other parents similarly disposed to commit the same
crime.79

46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

36. Andrada vs People G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005

PETER ANDRADA, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Peter Andrada, petitioner, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 1997 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 15851 and its Resolution2 dated August 13, 1998.

In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged petitioner with frustrated murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack one ARSENIO
UGERIO on the head twice with a bolo thereby inflicting upon latter: hacking wound, head, resulting in 1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; 2) depressed comminuted
skull fracture, right parieto occipital with significant brain laceration; operation done; craniectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural
repair; debridement, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was
not consummated by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented
his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The hearing of the case ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 23, 1986, at around 11:30 in the evening, T/Sgt. Teodolfo Sumabong, of the defunct Philippine Constabulary
(PC), was resting in the PC barracks at Camp Dado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet when one Rommel Alcate called up requesting police assistance. Alcate claimed
that a group of persons was suspiciously roaming around his boarding house in Ferguson Street, Baguio City.

Sgt. Sumabong and two of his companions, Sgt. Gaces and Cpl. Arsenio Ugerio, went to Alcete’s boarding house, arriving there past midnight. However, according
to Alcate, the suspicious persons have left.

On their way back to the camp at around 1:15 in the morning, the group dropped by Morlow’s Restaurant, Bokawkan Street, Baguio City, for a snack. They ordered
coffee and sandwiches.

While they were waiting to be served, a woman passed by their table. While Cpl. Ugerio was talking to her, a man, later identified as Peter Andrada, herein petitioner,
approached the former and scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong, identifying himself as a PC non-commissioned officer, advised petitioner to pay his bill and go home as he
was apparently drunk.

Petitioner heeded Sgt. Sumabong’s advice for he paid his bill and left the restaurant with his companions. While Sgt. Sumabong was paying his bill, he heard Cpl.
Ugerio, seated about a meter away, moaning in pain. When Sgt. Sumabong turned around, he saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled on the floor. Petitioner was hacking him on
the head with a bolo. Sgt. Sumabong approached them but petitioner ran away, followed by a companion. Sgt. Sumabong chased them but to no avail.

Upon Sgt. Sumabong’s instruction, Sgt. Gaces brought Cpl. Ugerio, the victim, to the St. Louis University Hospital. Then Sgt. Sumabong reported the incident to the
police station at Camdas Road and thereafter proceeded to the hospital. When he returned to the police station, he learned that petitioner was arrested in a waiting
shed at the corner of Camdas Road and Magsaysay Avenue.

The arresting officers then brought petitioner back to the restaurant where they recovered the bolo used in hacking the victim. Witnesses to the incident were
interviewed by the police and they pointed to petitioner as the culprit.

Dr. Francisco Fernandez, a neuro-surgery consultant, found that the victim suffered two (2) major injuries. The first was a "scalping avulsion," around 5 centimeters
wide, i.e., the chopping off of a part of the victim’s skull. The second was a depressed fracture, about 6 centimeters wide, found on the right parieto occipital area of
the skull. Either wound, being fatal, would have caused the death of the victim had it not been for a timely medical treatment. After three (3) days, the victim was
transferred to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City. Because of the injuries he sustained, he has remained incapable to remember or recall visual stimuli or
information.

Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. His version is that he and one Romy Ramos were drinking beer
with a hospitality girl named "Liza" inside Morlow’s Restaurant, when three military men occupied the table next to them. They had pistols tucked in their waists.
Without any warning or provocation, two of the men, whom he identified as Cpl. Ugerio and Sgt. Sumabong, approached him, slapped his face several times and
pointed their guns to his head. They cursed him and threatened to summarily execute him because he was "so boastful." Cpl. Ugerio then "collared" him and dragged
him outside the restaurant, while Sgt. Sumabing followed. Fearful that he might be killed, petitioner pulled out his bolo, wrapped in a newspaper, from his waist and
swung it at the two military men. He did not see if he hit any of them. Then he ran to his house in Camdas Subdivision. He checked to see if his mother or
grandmother was at home so either of them could assist him in surrendering to the police. But neither was present. On his way to surrender to the police, he met his
mother accompanied by a policeman. They then proceeded to the police sub-station at Magsaysay Avenue where he surrendered.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which is quoted below, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused PETER ANDRADA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.

47
The Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 20 days as MINIMUM to 14 years, 10 months and 20 days as MAXIMUM; to
indemnify the sum of P3,000.00, representing part of the victim’s expenses for medical services and medicine, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT THE APPELLANT IS SENTENCED TO AN
INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECIONAL, AS MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY
(20) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS MAXIMUM.

SO ORDERED.5

The Court of Appeals, in modifying the imposable penalty, found that petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17
years, 9 months and 20 days old at the time of the incident.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated August 13, 1998.

Hence, the instant petition.

The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated; (2) whether his plea of self-defense is in order; (3) whether the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide; and (4) whether he is entitled to any mitigating circumstance, assuming he is guilty.

On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process. He contends that
his counsel:

1. Failed to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent of the crime charged;

2. Failed to present the medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim;

3. Did not notify him to attend the hearing when Sgt. Sumabong was cross-examined; and

4. Failed to submit a memorandum.

In sum, petitioner ascribes gross incompetence or gross negligence to his counsel.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to due process. Petitioner was represented by counsel of his
choice. If the latter’s performance and competence fell short of petitioner’s expectations, then he should not blame either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.

In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. 6

In the following cases, we held that there has been gross negligence or incompetence on the part of counsel for the accused, thus:

In US v. Gimenez,7 we remanded a criminal case for new trial when counsel for an accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty,
thus resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client.

In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals and People,8 we ordered a dismissed appeal from a conviction for estafa to be reinstated after it was shown that the failure to file the
appellant’s brief on time was due to sheer irresponsibility on the part of appellant’s counsel.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,9 we remanded the case for reception of evidence after counsel for the accused filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding
that his motion for leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to present his evidence.

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,10 we ordered a new trial after a showing that counsel for the accused abandoned her without explanation.

In People v. Bascuiguin,11 we held that the arraignment is not valid. The accused was not properly represented by counsel de officio since he merely conferred with
his client for a few minutes and advised him to plead guilty to the crime of rape with homicide.

None of the foregoing incidents is present in the instant case. Instead, records show that counsel for petitioner actively participated in the cross-examination of the
witnesses for the prosecution to test their credibility. At any rate, the fact that he did not choose to present other witnesses did not affect any of petitioner’s substantial
rights. Besides, said counsel might have valid reasons why he did not call to the witness stand those witnesses.

We note that petitioner was present during the hearing. If he believed that his counsel de parte was not competent, he could have secured the services of a new
counsel. He did not. Having decided to retain the services of his counsel during the entire proceedings, petitioner must be deemed bound by any mistake committed
by him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is inept, he should take action by discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and
thereupon blame his counsel for incompetence.12

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue
the case, unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case, do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence. 13

Having found that petitioner’s counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith, or so careless and negligent of his duties as to seriously prejudice the substantial
rights of petitioner or prevent him from putting up a proper defense, we hold that he is bound by the decisions of his counsel regarding the conduct of the case. 14

On the second issue, petitioner invokes self-defense. Hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of
himself. For in invoking self-defense, the accused admits killing or seriously wounding the victim and thus, has the burden to justify his act. 15 The requisites of self-

48
defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation of the part of the
person defending himself.16

We find that the petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at
the time he hacked the victim, the latter was still seated while he (petitioner) was behind him. Indeed, how could there be an unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim at that instance? Petitioner’s bare assertions that the victim slapped him, poked a handgun at him, and threatened to "salvage" him were not duly proved by
the evidence for the defense. Rather, the prosecution established that it was petitioner who unexpectedly attacked the victim from behind. Clearly, the aggressor was
petitioner. Since the first element of self-defense is not present here, such defense must fail.

On the third issue, petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty, he should only be convicted of frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. He insists that treachery
was not present. His hacking the victim was a "spur-of-the-moment" act prompted by self-preservation.

We are not persuaded. There is alevosia  when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any defense which the offended party might make. 17 We agree with
the lower courts that the petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that time, the victim was seated, having just finished a meal at a late hour. His
back was towards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked him twice on his head with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim
had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.

Considering that petitioner had performed all the acts of execution which would have resulted in the death of the victim, had it not been for timely medical assistance,
a cause not of the will of the petitioner, and considering further the presence of treachery, then, the crime committed is frustrated murder, not frustrated homicide.

On the fourth issue, petitioner insists that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated in his favor.

Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the
corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it
shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and
expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture.18 Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

Anent the modification of the penalty by the Court of Appeals, the same is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 1997 and its Resolution dated August 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15851 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

37. People vs Parazo G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PURISIMA, J.:

This case was docketed on November 27, 1995, upon the elevation for automatic review of Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, for rape and frustrated homicide,
from Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, which imposed on accused-appellant Marlon Parazo y Francisco the supreme penalty of
death.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

On May 14, 1997, this Court handed down a Decision, 1 affirming with modification subject Joint Decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, disposing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED with respect to Crim. Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon Parazo y
Francisco is found guilty of the crime of rape under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua.

The decision appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated homicide is MODIFIED in that the accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum penalty.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 29, 1997, appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the Court facts and circumstances, such as
the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.

On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved 2 to grant appellant’s Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration
pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for
examination by a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, or on January 19, 1999, to be precise, appellant was allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical
Center, with appropriate escorts, to undergo the necessary neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation and work-up. 3

In compliance with the said resolution of the Court, Dr. Rosa Mendoza, Senior Chief Staff Officer of the Supreme Court Clinic Services, submitted two (2)
Memorandum Reports, dated July 29, 1998 and March 5, 1999, respectively, on the mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation of
appellant.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On July 20, 1998, the appellant was examined, on the basis of which examination SC Medical Services Psychologist III Beatriz O. Cruz came out with the following
findings and general observation, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"GENERAL OBSERVATION AND TEST BEHAVIOR:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

49
 x       x       x
An encounter with this person revealed him to have an average physique and height, with fair complexion and somewhat curly hair. Throughout the testing session
he was in a pensive mood. Doubt and an agitated appearance was written all over his face particularly when he struggled to say something, but which ideas could
not get across. One security officer, Mr. Gutierrez, came to our aid and communicated to Mr. Parazo through sign language to comprehend and answer the question
being asked [what he was guilty of]. When he could not understand it, we wrote the question in tagalog in the paper and to our surprise he could not even read.
However thru some efforts made he was able to utter ‘rep’ [rape].

Another inmate whom they call ‘mayor’ [he is the leader of the group] and another close friend of Mr. Parazo where (sic) called in to provide help to the examiner.
And with difficulties being experienced by the undersigned in giving instructions in gestures, he was able to draw the geometric figures and a person, respectively.
Hand tremor was noticeable [Mr. Parazo is left handed]. With the help of mayor, an attempt was further made by the examiner to show him the ink blot test, counting
on the idea that the examiner might get something out of his responses to the task just like in the previous paper and pencil test. But our efforts proved futile at this
time. No amount of gestures could make him comprehend the instructions given. It was during this time that he was able to verbalize ‘dilam’ in high pitched, cracking
voice which the undersigned took for ‘di alam’ [I don’t know]. The examiner did not go further from this point hence, the termination of test
administration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

TESTS ADMINISTERED:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Good enough Figure Drawing Test

TESTS RESULT & DISCUSSION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The results of the paper and pencil test reveal that Mr. Parazo’s intelligence function based on the Goodenough is gauged on the Mild to Moderate degree of Mental
Retardation with an estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the other hand, is equivalent to 7 years and 9 months.

Further, signs of regressive features and distortion of the gestalt figures are manifested with strong indication of impulsive behavior. His inability to reproduce from
memory the same figures was noteworthy. His writing output is unsteady that gives an inkling of difficulty in the motor area.

The above clinical findings are typical reproduction of a person with history of neurological dysfunction as maybe true in the case of Mr. Parazo who is deaf. It cannot
be discounted also that his intellectual and psychological deficiencies are not only based on organic brain pathology but primarily on the basis of mental retardation
which impedes the effective use of whatever abilities he does have and which renders him psychologically incompetent to comprehend fully the significance of the
acts he commits." 4 (Emphasis ours)

In connection therewith, there was presented the Memorandum Report of July 29, 1998, stating thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Based on the foregoing, it appears that the problem of appellant Marlon Parazo is the severe hearing defect or deafness. The presence of an organic disorder
cannot be determined because of the latter’s inability to communicate. However, some degree of mental retardation was gathered with the use of ‘Paper and Pencil
Test." His mental age is seven (7) years and nine (9) months. His Intelligence Quotient (IQ) is 60.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

This mental retardation could be secondary to an inherent defect in the brain or secondary to the sensory deprivation [deafness], which connotes a substantial
limitation in intellectual and adaptive functioning." (Emphasis ours)

Appellant was then examined at the UP-PGH Medical Center, and the Memorandum Report of Dr. Rosa Mendoza, dated March 5, 1999, summarized the findings of
the UP-PGH Medical Center as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Quoted hereunder are the report on the test conducted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Ma. Luz S. Casimiro-Querubin, MD, DPBP, Psychiatrist, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine, College of Medicine and Philippine General Hospital,
Manila in her Psychiatric Assessment Report, stated that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘On the day of assessment, Mr. Parazo was seen sitting on the examining table. His hands were cuffed in front of him. He was feeding himself a sandwich. He was
appropriately groomed. He wore the orange bilibid prison uniform with denim jeans and rubber shoes. He appeared tired and fearful. His mood was generally anxious
and his affect was appropriate to the situation. When approached, Mr. Parazo would look down but would glance at the examiner after a few seconds. He was unable
to follow simple instructions initially and was able to do so only after much coaxing from those around him and repeated demonstrations of the task he was being
asked to do. He was unable to read. The only thing he could write is his name. Mr. Parazo was able to copy simple patters (sic) but could not participate in any verbal
assessment procedure. His thought content, thought process and flow of ideas could not be determined because of his inability to speak. ( Emphasis supplied). He
was able to maintain good eye contact. The client remained calm during the assessment procedure. It was evident that he felt insecure with the manipulative tasks
he was presented with. Initially, Mr. Parazo appeared resistant to the examiner but he eventually warmed.

Throughout the examination, Mr. Parazo sought for encouragement by looking at the examiner after each and every task. He worked quietly, exerted obvious efforts
to perform well and was visibly careful in trying not to commit mistakes. It was only when he was signaled that he could use both hands that Mr. Parazo did so. His
behavior was consistent throughout the period of the examination.cralawnad

The above behavioral description strongly supports the fact that Mr. Marlon Parazo is indeed hearing impaired and suffers from mental retardation. He is unable to
understand both written and spoken language, needs repetitive sign language instructions and demonstration to understand the task he was being asked to do.’

Meredith F. Castro, MA, Psychologist, PGH, Manila, on the other hand, supported the assessment findings of Dra. Ma. Luz C. Querubin and reported as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Psychological Evaluation Report Summary

x       x       x
Measure
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Rev. (WISC-R), Performance Scale. (This is a comprehensive test of intelligence that measures both verbal and non-verbal
aspects and is intended for children aged 6-16 years old and for adults suspected of mental deficiency. It is composed of two scales that can be administered
separately. Given the examinee’s sensory impairment and absence of speech, this present assessment used only the performance scale, which taps the non-verbal
intelligence).

x       x       x

Performance Prorated Scale Score: 23

Performance IQ: 65±9

50
Mean Test-Age: 8 years, 5 months

Impressions

Given his sensory impairment and limited educational background, M.P. Fared poorly in this intelligence test for children and has been assessed to be within mild
mental deficiency to borderline range of intellectual functioning.’

Charlotte M. Chiong, M.D., Otology, Neurotology, Neurotologic Skull Base Surgery, Diplomate, Philippine Board of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, PGH
certified that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘I examined Mr. Marlon Parazo, 28-year-old death convict last February 3, 1999. Brainstem auditory evoked response audiometry was done and with 2000 click
stimuli no wave responses were generated in the left suggestive of profound hearing loss in that ear. In the right ear there was a response 80 db click intensities
suggestive of a severe hearing loss. Puretone Audiometry was done and patient was also noted to have bilateral profound hearing loss. Speech Testing could not be
done due to severity of hearing loss. From my evaluation Mr. Marlon Parazo has a severe disability and could not possibly understand conversational speech without
powerful amplification such as a hearing aid.’ (Emphasis supplied)

For her part, Dr. Grace O. Orteza, MA, MD, FPNA, Section of Neurology, Department of Medicine, UP-PGH, Manila, in her Assessment stated that ‘. . . there are no
significant neurologic findings aside from the manifest deafness and muteness of patient.’

To corroborate the medical findings of the Medical Team from the Philippine General Hospital, we conducted an on-the-spot gathering of vital information’s on the
physical infirmities of Marlon Parazo to determine whether the same is congenital or acquired.

Mrs. Eufrocina ‘Zenaida’ Francisco, the mother of Marlon admitted that her son was born deaf and mute. Their day to day communications relied simply by a pat at
the back, a tap on the lap or sometimes by the very basic sign language that could best convey the message to him. He never had any formal education. Medical
intervention, according to her, never crossed her mind because of their poverty. If food, which is a very basic need is already a problem how much more with
medications.

The Barangay Chairman of Caimito, Palayan City, Mr. Antonio Sebastian, on the other hand, claims that he has known Marlon since childhood. In the locality he was
branded as ‘Pipi’ because of his inability to communicate. Nothing significant was noted in his childhood days. It was only when he was about his late teens that he
was involved in petty theft.

An interview with Mrs. Juliana Baltazar, a retired schoolteacher, likewise strengthened the fact that Marlon was deaf and mute. Marlon, according to her, never
actively participated in class though his enthusiasm to learn was present. He never completed a Grade I full school term, even on a ‘sit in basis’ since he and his
sister were forced to drop from the class during the harvest season to earn a living.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development, Field Office, Palayan City, on the other hand added the information that since 1975 Marlon was a beneficiary of
their projects relative to ‘Persons with Disability.’ During his early childhood, he was an active participant of their project. As he grew older however, he did not
anymore bother to visit their office.

Based on the collateral information’s (sic) gathered from persons who have known the patient since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-
PGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing
Loss, right ear; (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.

The American Association of Mental Deficiency and the Fourth Edition of Diagnostic and Statistical/Manual of Mental Disorder enumerated the Diagnostic Criteria for
Mental Retardation as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an I.Q. of approximately 70 or below on an individually administered I.Q. test.

2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or
her cultural group) in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety).

3. Onset before age of 18.

x       x       x
During the tympanovactic examination, the intense sound given to ear of the patient that is above the normal hearing threshold will elicit facial and neck contraction of
the muscle, which this patient (Marlon) did not manifest. Instead, he continued staring blatantly [blankly] at the roof of the room.

For her part, Dra. Querubin elucidated that given the physical infirmities coupled with mental retardation there is no way that Marlon can determine the propriety of
his actions. Perhaps, it would have been different if he had a formal education and given the opportunity to communicate effectively through the sign language. He,
however is in a situation where due to immense poverty never had a chance to improve his lot.

In conclusion, as per Resolution of the Court En Banc, the undersigned [Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D.] conducted hand in hand with Dr. Charlotte M. Chiong, in the
medical evaluation of Mr. Marlon Parazo, together with the panel of Medical Specialist of UP-PGH, the S.C. Medical Team and the lawyer representative from the
Office of the Court Administrator, it is our unanimous opinion that Mr. Marlon Parazo is deaf and mute with mental retardation mild."cralaw virtua1aw library

The affidavits 5 of Rev. Fr. Roberto A. Olaguer, the National Bilibid Prisons Chaplain, and Rev. Fr. Roy Rolando L. Cosca, S.J., Executive Director of Philippine
Jesuit Prison Service, state that appellant is a deaf-mute. The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is really a deaf-
mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only.

Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact that he was "helped and assisted by a person who has
been known to him since 1983", as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no
moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of
appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

As held in People v. Crisologo 6 :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and
who could also have communicated the accused’s own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair
trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him
denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was

51
determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake."cralaw virtua1aw library

All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court promulgated on May 14, 1997 is VACATED, the Joint Decision rendered by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Ecija in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168 is SET ASIDE; and appellant is hereby GRANTED a RE-ARRAIGNMENT and RE-TRIAL, with the assistance of counsel
and a competent sign language expert, before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

38. People vs Flores Jr. G.R. No. 128823, Dec. 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Accused-appellee, v. PEDRO FLORES , JR. y FLORES ALIAS "PESIONG", Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

An assault on sexual innocence can open a floodgate of emotions. This Court, however, cannot allow emotions to drown an accused’s right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

For automatic review before this Court is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant Pedro Flores Jr.
y Flores alias "Pesiong" guilty of two counts of rape of his then 11 year old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in each.

The complaints against accused-appellant filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Criminal Case No. U-9184:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 1

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for the crime of "RAPE", committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means, of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will.

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

Criminal Case No. U-9185:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 2

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS "PESYONG", committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with the
use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will.

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

Arraigned on February 10, 1997, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 3

Culled from the records of the case are the following facts established by the prosecution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On December 5, 1996, private complainant Filipina L. Flores (Filipina), 11 years old at the time, and her younger sister Catherine were left to the care of their father,
herein accused-appellant, at their family residence in Sitio Buenlag, Barangay Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, their mother Marcelina L. Flores having
departed for Singapore to work as an overseas contract worker.

After partaking of supper on the night of December 9, 1996, 4 accused-appellant asked Filipina to accompany him to the comfort room situated outside their house, 5
claiming that he was afraid of ghosts. 6 Albeit Filipina did not believe 7 him, she acquiesced because her mother had told her to always obey her father. 8

When accused-appellant came out of the comfort room, he ordered Filipina to remove her short pants, threatening her with death if she disobeyed, 9 and made her
lie down. 10 He then removed his short pants and brief and, against her will, he inserted his finger and later his penis into Filipina’s vagina 11 where she later felt hot
fluid. 12

Accused-appellant thereafter wiped Filipina’s vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if she reported what he did, directed her to put on her shorts, and they both
went home. The following morning, Filipina reported the incident to her "Inang Lorie" whose full name is Norielyn Antonio, the aunt of her mother, who told her that if
her father would sexually assault her again, he would have him detained.

Nineteen nights later or on December 28, 1996, as Filipina lay asleep in their house, she was awakened when accused-appellant touched her right foot. 13 Armed
with a knife 14 , Accused-appellant told her not to talk 15 and ordered her to remove her short pants and panty. She complied. Accused-appellant thereupon
removed his short pants and brief and went on top of her chest during which she tried to push him away but failed.

Accused-appellant then inserted his finger into Filipina’s vagina for some time, 16 wiped his hands, and then inserted his penis for a long time as he was sucking her
breast. Filipina felt accused appellant’s semen drop into her private organ where she noticed the presence of blood and a bit of whitish substance.

Accused-appellant later wiped her vagina with a towel. The following morning, private complainant again reported the matter to her grandaunt Norielyn, 17 and to her

52
playmate Carla Salvador. 18

On January 31, 1997, Filipina, accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle driver-neighbor, reported the matter to the Philippine National Police of Urdaneta
where she gave a statement. On the same day, she, still accompanied by Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical examination at the Don Amadeo J. Perez, Jr.
Memorial General Hospital the results of which are contained in a medical certificate 19 showing the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

- (-) Negative menarche

- Multiple deep healed lacerations all over the labia majora.

- Admits examining finger with ease.

- (+) sticky whitish discharge.

Dr. Jeanna B. Nebril, the examining physician, found the presence of "deep-healed lacerations all over the labia majora" 20 which deep-healed lacerations connote,
according to the doctor, the application of force, possibly two weeks before the examination.

Denying the accusations, Accused-appellant claimed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of December 9, 1996 for not attending school on the 6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for having received
money from her classmate, 21 was not in their house on the night of December 9, 1996 because she was in the house of Norielyn. Neither was she in their house on
the night of December 28, 1996 as she was at the house of his mother Margarita Flores 22 in Cafloresan.

Accused-appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his mother Margarita, and his teenaged children Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in his mother’s
house. It was also corroborated by another teenaged child, Jocelyn Flores, who was staying in the house of accused-appellant’s mother-in-law, Lourdes Lazo, also in
Barangay Nancamaliran West. 23 Jocelyn added that Filipina had intimated to her that she fabricated the rape charges because their maternal grandmother Lourdes
wanted their father, Accused-appellant, jailed as he begrudged him for having eloped with their mother, 24 and that Lourdes threatened her with abandonment or
detention in jail in case she defied, and promised to give her jewelry, shoes and dress if she agreed to carry out her desire.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced her to death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory
Rape, an offense defined and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1, Republic Act 7659 aggravated by
relationship, the Court sentences, PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9184 — to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; plus all the necessary penalties and costs.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9185 — to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus all the necessary penalties and costs.

Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong shall be committed immediately to the National Bilibid Prisons. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the
entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review of this Decision.

In view of the penalty of death imposed by the court a quo, the case is now before this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellant assigns as errors the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. THAT THE FILING OF THE CASE [AT BAR] WAS MOTIVATED BY SOME FACTORS OTHER THAN THE TRUTH AS TO ITS COMMISSION, AND SO THE
ACCUSED SHOULD BE ACQUITTED.

II. THAT THE COURT [A QUO] ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT AT THE
SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE, A DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME AND DESTROY THE TESTIMONY OF
THE COMPLAINANT THAT WOULD HAVE WARRANTED THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be
found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not.25cralaw:red

It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted complaints, that accused-appellant was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. This right has the following objectives: 26

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause;

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.

The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. 27 Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its
objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. 28 For an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. 29

The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape under Article 335 30 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (which restored the
death penalty for heinous crimes effective December 31, 1993) which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man and a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal code.

53
31 Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with the private
complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such allegation was made.

The allegation that accused-appellant did "sexually abuse" Filipina does not suffice. In the recent case of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao 32 , this Court ruled that
"although the prosecution has proved that [the therein private complainant] Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal
knowledge." 33 Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse. 34 The allegation in the instant criminal complaints that
accused-appellant "sexually abuse[d]" the private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with
the private complainant.

This Court is not unaware of the rule in case there is a variance between allegation and proof as etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. 35

The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape,
"sexual abuse" not being an essential element or ingredient thereof.

Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the
charge is the actual recital of facts 36 in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the complaint or
information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged 37 , the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense. 38

And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), 39 accused-
appellant cannot be held liable. Section 5 of said Act provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to engage such child in prostitution.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 3815, for rape or lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
and

(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place or of the sauna, disco, bar,
resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to
said establishment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases 40 , issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610,
defines "sexual abuse" by inclusion as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct or 2) the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. ( Emphasis supplied)

From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in the criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that
the complaint must contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase "sexual abuse" is not used under R.A. No. 7610
as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate offense. Above-quoted Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be alleged in the complaint or
information to hold an accused liable, none of which is reflected, in the complaints at bar charging Accused-Appellant.

The case of People v. Cruz 41 is instructive. There the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has
debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied)

Finding the above-quoted information void, this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which
charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), "either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which among the numerous sections or
subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by Accused-Appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense, or any special or
aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

54
Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statue, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her
or committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of
law, not facts. The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (Emphasis & underscoring supplied)

As held by this Court in the above-case of Cruz, the allegation in the information that the therein accused-appellant sexually abused the therein private complainant
by either raping or committing acts of lasciviousness on her "is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under Section 8 [of Rule 110],
for these are conclusions of law, not facts." Nothing less can be said of the criminal complaints in the cases at bar. They are void for being violative of the accused-
appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

This Court thus takes this occasion to remind public prosecutors of their crucial role in crafting criminal complaints and information. For all efforts may be rendered
futile and justice may be denied by a failure to state "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense" as exemplified by the present case.

The foregoing disquisition leaves it unnecessary to dwell on accused-appellant’s assigned errors or of other errors including failure to allege relationship in the first
complaint, and lack of proof of minority in both cases.

WHEREFORE, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. U-9184 and U-9185 are hereby declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional right of accused-
appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong," for Rape to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the cases against him are
hereby DISMISSED.

The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform
the Court accordingly within 10 days from notice.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123094           January 31, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUISITO PAGLINAWAN, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:

This in an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, finding accused-appellant guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P10,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as indemnity.

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1989, at 9:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Lingayao, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and fire with an Armalite M16 Rifle, the house of Segundino Senados, Sr. inflicting
mortal wounds to Jerry Senados, a seven (7) year old child of Segundino Senados, Sr. and Millianita Senados, who was sleeping thereat at that time and
which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW : Article 248, Revised Penal Code.

Five witnesses were presented for the prosecution: the spouses Segundino and Millianita Senados, the parents of the victim, PO3 Bernabe Pedregosa, Paquito
Garcia, and Sgt. Romeo Minerva.

Segundino and Millianita Senados  testified that on March 20, 1989, at around 9:30 in the evening, they were in their house in Lingayao, Las Nieves, Agusan del
Norte, with their eight children. They were on the second story of their house, lying on the floor about to sleep. The second floor was lit by a 10-watt fluorescent bulb.
There were no partitions nor beds. Suddenly, they heard a gunshot which struck the light source, throwing the entire room in darkness. After about five minutes, four
bursts of gunfire directed at their house followed. These were made at short intervals, each burst lasting for about five minutes. Segundino told his wife and children
to lie on their stomachs. Millianita said that while the firing continued, she called on the assailants to stop. When she touched one of her children, she felt blood on
one of them. She also felt blood on her right foot.

When the firing finally stopped, Segundino and Millianita went towards one side of their house and peeped through a hole on the wall. They saw accused-appellant
armed with an M16 Armalite rifle looking at their house. The couple said that they saw the face of accused-appellant clearly and recognized him because there was
light from a 50-watt incandescent bulb on the ground floor of their house. After about two minutes, accused-appellant left.

When Segundino checked on the members of his family, he found his wife and his child Junior Senados injured, while another child, Jerry Senados, was dead. With
the help of Nestor Patombon and other neighbors, Segundino was able to take his wife Millianita and child Junior to the hospital. Patombon was the detachment
commander of the Civilian Home Defense Force Unit (CHDFU) and a member of the 23rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

On March 27, 1989, seven days after the incident, Segundino went to the police station and executed an affidavit identifying accused-appellant as the assailant. He
said that earlier, on March 23, 1989, he had gone to the police station to give to the chief of police a statement, although this was not reduced into writing. Segundino
and Millianita said they wanted to give information to the police and no one else, and did not think of telling Patombon anything about what they knew. Moreover,
Segundino said, he was more concerned about the safety of his family. On the other hand, Millianita said that did not then point to accused-appellant as the assailant
for fear that he might flee before the police could make an arrest.2

Sgt. Romeo Minerva  and PO3 Bernabe Pedregosa, station commander and member, respectively, of the Las Nieves police station, testified that, on March 24, 1989,
at around 3:00 in the afternoon, they went to the town proper of Lingayao to investigate the strafing incident in the evening of March 20, 1989. 1âwphi1.nêt

55
Sgt. Romeo Minerva testified that, based on information furnished by Segundino Senados the day before, he and Pedregosa looked for accused-appellant on March
24, 1989. They found accused-appellant in front of the house of Patombon and questioned him about the incident on March 20, 1989. Sgt. Minerva said that
accused-appellant refused to talk in a public place but said he was willing to do so in his house. Accordingly, they proceeded to accused-appellant's house, about 50
meters away, where the latter allegedly confessed to the crime and said that he did it because of a land conflict with the Senados family. 3

PO3 Pedregosa, on the other hand, testified that he went with Sgt. Minerva to Lingayao in response to a report made by the barangay captain of Lingayao that a
strafing incident took place days earlier. He said he did not know who the suspect was, but when he and Sgt. Minerva passed by the house of Patombon and asked
the people around about accused-appellant,4 the latter approached them and then and there confessed that he was the one who strafed the house of the
Senadoses.5

Both witnesses said they left accused-appellant and did not arrest him because they did not have any warrant for his arrest.

Paquito Garcia, a resident of Lingayao, testified that, on the night of March 20, 1989, he was in the house of a certain Esther Precioso in Barangay Lingayao when he
heard gunshots. While he was walking home, he met one Cipriana Osinaga who asked him where the sound of gunshots came from. He answered that it seemed to
have come from the direction of the Agusan River. While passing by the house of Francisco Olor, the latter also asked him where the gunshots came from, to which
Garcia gave the same answer. About two minutes later, Garcia said he saw accused-appellant under the house of Francisco Olor. Accused-appellant was holding an
M16 Armalite rifle. The house of Francisco Olor had a high flooring with no walls under it. Garcia said accused-appellant appeared agitated. When asked where the
gunshots could have come from, accused-appellant answered that they might have come from the direction of the Agusan River. Garcia quoted accused-appellant as
saying that he was on alert because he was marked for liquidation by the NPA. Garcia further testified that he had seen accused-appellant on previous occasions
carrying an armalite rifle although he could not say the exact occasions.6

The defense presented two witnesses: Nestor Patombon and accused-appellant Luisito Paglinawan.

Nestor Patombon  was the detachment commander of the CHDFU in Las Nieves and a member of the 23rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. He testified that
on March 20, 1989, at around 9:00 in the evening, while he was watching television in his house, he heard gunshots a which lasted for about five to seven minutes.
When he went out of his house to investigate, he saw five members of his unit, including accused-appellant. After a while, one of the Senados children arrived asking
for help because their house had been fired upon. Patombon said he and his men then proceeded to the house of the Senadoses about 300 to 400 meters away.
Upon arrival there, he asked Segundino Senados if he had seen the person who had shot at their house, but Segundino did not, know because it was dark.
Patombon said he went inside the house and saw Jerry Senados dead and Millianita Senados wounded. He and his men then took the injured to the hospital.
Patombon testified that the Senadoses never pointed to accused-appellant as the culprit.

Accused-appellant Luisito Paglinawan, on the other hand, testified that he was a member of the CHDFU in Lingayao, under Sgt. Nestor Patombon. In the evening of
March 20, 1989, at around 9:30 p.m., he was sleeping in his house when he was awakened by the sound of gunfire. So, bringing with him his carbine, he went to the
CHDF detachment half a kilometer away where his commander, Sgt. Nestor Patombon, and the other members of his unit were. They went to the place of the
Senadoses and found Jerry Senados dead and Junior Senados and his mother Millianita Senados wounded. The injured victims were taken to the hospital in
Patombon's jeepney.

Accused-appellant confirmed that he was questioned by two policemen for five minutes on March 24, 1989, but he denied he never admitted that he committed the
crime. He also denied being involved in any land conflict with the Senados family.

Several days after this incident, but before he was charged in court, accused-appellant went to Siquijor. After six months, he returned to Lingayao and it was then he
was arrested.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Luisito Paglinawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder charged in the information and imposes
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime except treachery
which qualified the offense to murder.

The accused is ordered to pay the Spouses Segundino and Millianita Senados compensatory damages in the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,00.00) Pesos
representing burial expenses. In addition, the accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jerry Senados the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Court dated August 30, 1990 (People vs. Yeban).

The accused is entitled to the full benefits of his preventive imprisonment conformably with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He shall
serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Panabo, Davao del Norte.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial:

I. THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT THE
DEFENSE HAD PERSISTENTLY CLAIMED THAT THE FAILURE OF SPOUSES SEGONDINO AND MILLIANITA SENADOS TO REPORT FOR MANY
DAYS THAT APPELLANT WAS THE ASSAILANT OF THEIR SON AND HAD SHOT MILLIANITA SENADOS' FOOT SHATTERED WHATEVER
CREDENCE CAN BE GIVEN TO HER TESTIMONY ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED BY THE SENADOS SPOUSES WHO THEY
SAID STAYED FOR SOMETIME AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AFTER THE LAST BURST OF GUNFIRE EVEN AS THE ASSAILANT HAD EARLIER
SHOT A LIGHT BULB PRECISELY TO PREVENT BEING IDENTIFIED.

III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT ON
THE BASIS OF THE VOICE OF SEGUNDINO SENADOS DURING HIS TESTIMONY THAT, ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL COURT, EXUDED WITH
CONFIDENCE EVEN AS IN THE SAME JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, IT ALREADY RULED THAT THE PURPORTED CONFESSION OF
APPELLANT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT ALLUDED MOTIVE TO KILL THE SENADOS DESPITE THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE CONCLUSION WAS DRAWN.

56
 V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

First. Accused-appellant points out that the Senados spouses did not immediately point to him as the culprit but only did so seven days after the incident. He argues
that this fact is fatal to the case of the prosecution, because it casts doubt on his identification as the assailant.

The contention is without merit.

It is settled that the delay of a witness in revealing the identity of the perpetrator of a felony does not affect his credibility if such delay is adequately explained. 8 In the
case at bar, Segundino Senados had good reason for not telling Patombon that he had seen accused-appellant holding an M16 Armalite shortly after the strafing of
their house.

Accused-appellant was a member of the CHDFU under Sgt. Patombon. Considering this circumstance, the Senados spouses, in their desire to save their family,
could have decided to keep mum about what they know until such time that they saw the police. The immediate concern of Segundino and Millianita Senados after
the strafing of their house was their safety and that of their children. One child had already died, and it was understandable that they were concerned that no further
lives would be lost. At the same time, they needed the help of Sgt. Patombon, because he had a vehicle which they could use to transport the injured to the hospital.
So, they had of necessity to ask him for help. There is thus nothing strange in their decision not to tell him the identity of the suspect.

Segundino testified thus:9

Q While he was in your house with his men, you talked with each other you and Sgt. Patombon, is it not?

A Yes, we talked.

Q You told him that it was the accused in this case who shot your house?

A No, sir, I did not tell him.

Q Why did not you tell him when he was the first authority that you saw?

A I have forgotten about it because my first reaction was to save may family .

Q You wanted too seek justice, is it not?

A Yes, of course.

Q That was your thoughts also when Sgt. Patombon went to your house, is it not?

A What was on my mind at that time, because I was confused, was to save my family and to bring the injured to the hospital, I did not think about justice
yet.

Q According to you Sgt. Patombon was the detachment commander of the CHDF Unit in Lingayao. Did he not ask you who shot at your house?

A No, he did not ask.

Q When he went to your house and stayed there for 5 minutes did he ask you who shot your house?

A He was just silent, sir.

Q Okay, did he ask you why you went to his house and asked for help?

A No, he did not ask.

Q How did he know that you would be requesting for the use of his jeep?

A I told him about the shooting and he was aware of it because of the gunfires.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q The fact that according to you it was the accused who shot your wife wounding her on the foot, that hurt your feelings, is it not Mr. Senados?

A Yes, very much.

Q And despite all these hurts and anguish that you feel, you never told the very first authority what you saw that it was the accused who was the person
who shot your wife and son, is it not?

A All I can is that, at that time I was not able to tell them because I was concerned with my family and in bringing them to the hospital in Tungao.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q As you saw one of your children died and buried, you feel hurt and anguish, and as you saw your wife languishing in the hospital you also feel hurt and
anguish. Now, who was the very first military officer whom you told about the incident?

57
 A I did not tell anything to any military, it was the police whom I told. I have never confided to the military.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q Let us now be certain because you might have forgotten the events at that time. The first time you reported to Sgt. Minerva, the Station Commander of
Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte, was only on the 27th day of March, 1989, is that right?

A I went there twice. It was on the second visit in Las Nieves when my affidavit was taken.

Q When you reported for the first time to the police station of Las Nieves when was that?

A Less than a week after the incident happened.

Q Would you say on the 5th day after March 20, 1989?

A I am not sure but what I am sure of is that on the second visit on the 27th, the affidavit was taken.

Q The first time you reported to the police station, did you tell Sgt. Minerva that it was the accused who shot at your house killing your son and wounding
your wife?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes, sir, I am sure.

Q Are you sure that it was Sgt. Minerva to whom you made the report?

A Yes sir, I am sure.

In the same manner, Millianita Senados testified:10

Q According to you wanted to bring Paglinawan to justice because your son died and you were injured, and you were also afraid, so you wanted to tell first
the military or police official who the author of the crime was, is it not?

A Yes, Sir, we went to Minerva.

Q Are you referring to the chief of police?

A Yes.

Q Did you tell Minerva that the person who shot at you and your son as well as your house was Paglinawan?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you tell him?

A When we were already there in Tungao and when my big toe was already healed, that's the time I told him.

Q How many days after the incident?

A About two (2) weeks after.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q Do you know that there was a member of the 23rd Army Battalion by the name of Nestor Patombon residing near your house?

A Ernesto Patombon.

Q But he was a member of the 23rd Army Battalion based in Lingayao, is it not?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You knew him to be an army officer, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, it was Nestor or Ernesto Patombon whom you asked that you be transported to the Tungao Hospital, is it not?

A Yes, Sir, because I requested his vehicle.

xxx     xxx     xxx

58
 Q You knew Patombon to be an army officer and that your son was already dead and you were wounded, you were angry and you were afraid, did you
tell him who shot you and killed your son?

A We did not tell anything to Patombon because we were in a hurry then to the hospital and besides it is in our minds that we will tell the incident to the
chief of police.

Q You told nobody other than Patombon that it was Paglinawan who shot your son before you went to the police?

A Nobody.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q Listen carefully, don't smile because your son died, you were injured, you were angry and you wanted that this people be brought to justice, did you not
tell Patombon who is a military officer that it was Paglinawan who shot you and your son?

A I did not tell Patombon. I reserved it to the chief of police because we intended to file a complainant against Paglinawan .

Q There were other people within the vicinity when you took a ride on that jeep, is it not?

A Yes.

Q You did not tell anyone of them that it was Paglinawan who shot your son and shot you, is that correct?

A I did not tell anybody because I am afraid that this Paglinawan might flee away. I just reserved to tell that to the chief of police.

Q But Patombon is an army official why were you afraid that Paglinawan would escape?

A I only intended to tell this incident to the chief of police, Minerva.

Q As an express of your grief because your son died, did it not occur to your mind to tell just anyone that Paglinawan shot your son?

A At that time, I will never tell anyone because Paglinawan might escape.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q Who were on that jeep aside from you and your son?

A My cousin was with me.

Q Could you give us the name of your cousin?

A Antonio Ranuco, my cousin, my son Junior together with my husband and the driver whose name I do not know.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q Your cousin, Antonio Ranuco, was not in your house when it was shot at, is that correct?

A Yes, Sir, he was on the road.

Q You did not even tell your own cousin, Antonio Ranuco, that it was Paglinawan who shot at you and your son?

A I did not for fear that he might reveal that information to others and Paglinawan may succeed in escaping .

Thus, the Senados spouses were justified in not pointing accused-appellant to Patombon. Moreover, there was no considerable delay in reporting the incident to the
police. Segundino went to Sgt. Minerva three days after the incident to identify accused-appellant as the suspect. This was confirmed by Sgt. Minerva himself and
that was the reason they looked for accused-appellant on March 21, 1989. The police officers acted on the lead furnished by Segundino. Accused-appellant himself
admits that the two policemen questioned him on that day.

Second. Accused-appellant points to the fact that the assailant shot the 10-watt bulb on the second floor of the Senados house so that he would not be seen. If this
were so, there was no reason he did not also shoot the incandescent bulb on the first floor.

There is no evidence to show that the assailant purposely shot the bulb on the second story of the house as to prevent his recognition. For aught that we know, the
bulb was hit because the house war strafed. The purpose of the culprit was to kill the occupants of the house. It was only incidentally that the bulb also got hit.

Indeed, accused-appellant was positively identified as the culprit by the Senados spouses. The trial court correctly relied on the testimony of the Senados spouses
that they saw accused-appellant in the premises of their house at the night of the incident. As the trial court said:

Situated on an elevated position on the second floor of their 2-storey house, with the 10-watt fluorescent lamp put off after having been hit by the first shot,
Segundino and Millianita Senados, in the darkened room, have better means and opportunity of vision to see outside the house. The 50-watt
incandescent lamp on the first floor provided the illumination of the premises where the assailant was standing. Let it be noted with significance, that
accused Luisito Paglinawan is the husband of the niece of complainant Millianita Ranuco Senados. The offended party and the accused live in the same
barangay and practically see each other often. Undoubtedly, accused Luisito Paglinawan an is known to Millianita and her husband. . . . Their testimony
was natural and the recollection of the horrible experience they have undergone appeared to have been effaced from their memory as they recounted
them with conviction and determination as if the gate of recall was pried open.

59
It is established that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court, as well as the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are binding on us except when there
are facts and circumstances of weight and influence overlooked by the lower court which could alter the result. 11 This case does not fall under the exception.

Moreover, there was motive for accused-appellant to commit the crime. As Millianita Senados testified:

His motive is that the land that was the share of my brother Vicente was sold to Florencio Bajao. Then I redeemed the property from Florencio Bajao and
in the case before Branch 1, the Court ruled that I should be the one to till his land. Thus, I took possession of the land depriving the father of the accused
Evidejo Paglinawan from tilling the land as well as his father-in-law, Francisco Olor, from continuing their work on that land.

Third. Accused-appellant went to Siquijor and did not return to Barangay Lingayao until six months later and it was only then that he was finally arrested. It is now
claimed that he went to Siquijor to claim his father's share in the land of his grandparents. This explanation is unsubstantiated. Moreover, his claim is doubtful
because the fact is that his father was still alive.

The inescapable conclusion is that he fled to Siquijor after he was questioned by the police. Hence, the rule that the flight of an accused is evidence of his guilt fully
applies.12

Fourth. The claim of the defense that members of the New People's Army (NPA) could have committed the crime lacks basis. The supposed "notice" from the NPA,
written on a brown cardboard which was found in the premises of the Senados house claiming responsibility for what happened and warning the Senadoses to leave
the place, cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant.

On the other hand, we think the trial court correctly rejected the admissibility of the alleged confession of accused-appellant to Sgt. Minerva and PO3 Pedrogosa.
This extrajudicial confession was taken without observing the proper procedure under Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution. It is, therefore inadmissible.

Fifth. The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstances of treachery and rejected the allegation of evident premeditation. For as held:

[U]nder the facts of this case based on the evidence the prosecution presented, the Senados couple was not in a position to defend themselves as the
assailant struck at a time when the occupants of the house have already retired, leaving in the wake of his attack a 6-year old boy dead and his mother
wounded on the left foot. Undoubtedly, there is treachery when the assailant crept up to his victims who were unaware of the impending damage to their
life and limb. The crime committed is murder.1âwphi1.nêt

xxx     xxx     xxx

To authorize a finding of premeditation, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the accused that he has definitely resolved to commit the
offense; that he has from then cooly and dispassionately reflected both on the means of carrying his resolution into execution and on the consequences of
his designs; and that an appreciable length of time has elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the
accomplishment of the proposed crime. Definitely, the prosecution has not adduced proof to satisfy the requirements establishing this qualifying
circumstance of premeditation. Mere presumptions and inferences are insufficient.13

Finally, it is noteworthy that the information filed in this case is only for the murder of Jerry Senados. Though the prosecution established in the testimony of its
witnesses that Millianita Senados and Junior Senados were injured, the court hold accused-appellant liable for said injuries since he was not properly charged
therefor. The Constitution is clear that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 14 Hence, a person cannot be
convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged, otherwise, he would be denied the due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102485 May 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LUIS TAMPAL, DOMINGO PADUMON, ARSENIO PADUMON, SAMUEL PADUMON, and HON. WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondents.

PABLITO SUCO, DARIO SUCO, and GAVINO CADLING, (At Large).

PUNO, J.:

As significant as the right of an accused to speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws and who constitute a threat to the
tranquility of the community. We hold that when the postponements of the trial of an accused have not reached the point of oppression, the State's right to prosecute
should not be curtailed.

In an Information,1 dated August 17 1990, LUIS TAMPAL, DOMINGO PADUMON, ARSENIO PADUMON, SAMUEL PADUMON, PABLITO SUCO, DARIO SUCO
and GALVINO CADLING were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte  (Branch XI) with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and Multiple
Physical Serious Injuries." The case was docketed as Criminal case No. S-1902 and raffled to respondent Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge.

Only private respondents Luis Tampal, Samuel Padumon, Arsenio Padumon and Domingo Padumon, were arrested.2 The others remained at large.

60
Upon arraignment on May 17, 1991, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.3 The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991. On said date,
however, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero mover for postponement on the ground that he failed to contact his material witnesses. The case was
reset to September 20, 1991 without any objection from the defense counsel.4

The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and
dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute.5

The prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal claiming, inter alia, that the Provincial Prosecutor's Office was closed on said date. It was
alleged that September 20 is a legal holiday for Muslims, the same being the birthday of Prophet Mohammad SAW. Despite the explanation, the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the respondent judge in an Order dated October 4, 1991.6 The Order reads:

On September 20, 1991, (this) Court issued an order of (sic) the following tenor:

IT appears on the record that this case has been filed on August 24, 1990; the arraignment was done on May 17, 1991;
trial was held an July 26, 1991.

WHEN this case was called for today's trial, prosecuting (sic) prosecutor failed to appear despite of (sic) due notice. As
such, for its failure to prosecute, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

LET them be released immediately from custody unless held on other legal cause.

COSTS de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

WHAT was the effect of the said order? Did it amount to an acquittal as would bar a reinstatement of the instant case by reason of double
jeopardy? The answer would be in the AFFIRMATIVE.

To start with, the authority of the Court to dismiss a case for failure of prosecution to appear cannot be denied. The authority and extent of the
Court's power in that regard is clearly recited in Section 3, Rule 17 of the New Rules of Court. The rule reads:

Sec. 3. Failure to prosecute. — When plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable  length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the Court, the action may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion. The dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise provided by the Court.

IT should be observed that under the aforequoted rule, the authority of the court is broad and definite. It grants to the Court the power to
dismiss even upon its own motion. (Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., vs. Ramos, 88 Phil 94). Moreover, it reposes in the trial Court the
discretion to so dismiss or not. (People vs. Cloribel, 11 SCRA 809).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, (the) motion (for reconsideration) at bar is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In the present petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General contends that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when he dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute despite the fact that the public prosecutor's absence was for a valid cause. He also claims that
since the dismissal of the case is void, the case may be reinstated without placing the private respondents in double jeopardy.

In his comment, respondent judge justifies the dismissal of Criminal Case No. S-1902 on the rights of the accused to speedy trial7 and against double jeopardy.8

The petition is impressed with merit.

In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. They should
balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who violate its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. 9

In the petition at bench, the records show that on March 11, 1991, the Office on Muslim Affairs, Region IX, Zamboanga City, thru Regional Director Hadji Salih I.
Hayre, issued a Memorandum Circular in connection with CSC Resolution No. 81-1277, dated November 18, 1981. (re: Request for Recognition of Muslim Holidays
in areas outside the Autonomous Regions), 10 thus:

Pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 291 dated September 12, 1973, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322 dated
October 26, 1973, the request for authority to excuse from office Muslim-Filipinos who are working with local or the national government in
areas throughout the Philippines outside of the autonomous regions, is hereby approved in the manner herein provided:

1. During the: For CY 1991

x x x           x x x          x x x

3) Mauluddin Nabi (Birthday

of Prophet Mohammad SAW) Sept. 20

Muslims are free from office work the whole day of these holidays without being marked absent.

x x x           x x x          x x x

61
 4. In Regions 9 and 12, as authorized by the President, offices and/or agencies of the National and
Local governments are closed during the above-mentioned Muslim Legal Holidays, therefore,
Muslims and non-Muslims are all excused from work.

It is apparent that the public prosecutor's failure to attend the September 20, 1991 hearing was due to his good faith and belief that said date was a Muslin Legal
Holiday. To be sure, the prosecutor could not be faulted for not working on that day since the Provincial Prosecutor's Office was closed pursuant to the aforequoted
memorandum circular.

In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified  postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. We
reiterate our ruling in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan: 11

. . . The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used
to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, and such factors as length of delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion
of his right and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.

Criminal Case No. S-1902 was only postponed twice and for a period of less than two months. The first postponement was without any objection from the private
respondents. The second postponement was due to a valid cause.

The facts in field in no way indicate that the prosecution of private respondents in Criminal Case No. S-1902 had been unjustly delayed  by the prosecution, hence,
the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case .The settled rule is that the right to speedy trial
allows reasonable  continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution of its day in court. 12 Thus, we held in People vs. Navarro, 13:

A trial court may not arbitrarily  deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal
and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense
charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced
thereby. (emphasis supplied)

Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in the first. 14 Legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 15

It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases, 16 we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. 17

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The respondent judge's September 20, 1991 Order of dismissal and the October 4, 1991 Order
denying the motion for reconsideration of the prosecution, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the court or origin for further proceedings. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159098             October 27, 2006

SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of RTC, Br. 64, Tarlac City, CITY PROSECUTOR ALIPIO C. YUMUL and PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORP., respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Challenged in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62103 which affirmed the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City2 denying the motion to quash the Information in Criminal Case Nos. 6512-94.

Based on a confidential information that petitioner Henry Uy had been engaged in manufacturing, delivering, and selling "fake" Marca Piña soy sauce, 3 Orlando S.
Bundoc, Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), applied for a search warrant 4 for unfair competition which was granted on
February 14, 1994. When the search warrant was implemented on even date, Atty. Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Tarlac, seized fifty-five (55) bottles of label Marca Piña soy sauce.5

62
Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tarlac City on March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with violation of
Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the Revised Penal Code.6

On November 8, 1994, private respondent Piñakamasarap Corporation moved to amend the criminal charge by including Henry's spouse, petitioner Rosario Uy. 7 The
court granted the motion in its Order dated November 15, 1994 and admitted the amended criminal complaint which reads:

The undersigned, LUIS E. GONZALES, Comptroller of PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION of 583 Sta. Veronica St., Novaliches, Quezon City, and by
authority of the said corporation, under oath accuses HENRY UY, ROSARIO GUTIERREZ UY and a certain JOHN DOE of Violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about February 14, 1994, and for sometimes (sic) prior thereto, in Municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippines, the said Rosario G. Uy accused,
being then the owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subdivision, San Vicente, Tarlac, Tarlac, and her co-
accused, husband, HENRY UY, and a certain John Doe, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire and confederate together and
help one another engaged in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general and the consuming public in general
and PIÑAKAMASARAP Corporation, the manufacturer and bottler of soy sauce under the name "MARCA PIÑA," a [trademark] duly registered with the
Philippine Patent Office and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Piña" which is a bastard version of the
trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing
to the public that said products to be the products of Piñakamasarap Corporation which is not true, thereby inducing the public to believe that the above-
mentioned soy sauce sold or offered for sale by said accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce manufactured by PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION, and of inferior quality to the damage and prejudice of the Piñakamasarap Corporation.

Contrary to law.

Tarlac, Tarlac, November 8, 1994.8

After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found probable cause to indict petitioners. 9 On January 30, 1995, the court issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioners.10 They were released after posting a cash bond on February 1, 1995.11 On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned, assisted by counsel,
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.12 Petitioners, through counsel, waived the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial was set on November 27,
1995.13

However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In the meantime, in October 1996, this Court
issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96 providing, inter alia, that the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended, thus:

VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, VIOLATIONS OF ART. 188 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE (SUBSTITUTING AND ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS), ART. 189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION
OF ORIGIN, AND FALSE DESCRIPTION), P.D. NO. 49 (PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS), P.D. NO. 87 (AN ACT CREATING
THE VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD), R.A. NO. 165, AS AMENDED (THE PATENT LAW), AND R.A. NO. 166, AS AMENDED (THE TRADEMARK
LAW) SHALL BE TRIED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED RAFFLE SCHEME
EXCEPT THOSE COVERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95 DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995, IN WHICH CASE, THE DESIGNATED REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS SHALL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS THEREIN.

CONSIDERING THAT JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED IS NOW
CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THE DESIGNATION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS IN CITIES UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95 IS DELETED AND WITHDRAWN.

Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the trial. Gloria P. Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration (BFAD),
testified on August 25, 1997. In the meantime, Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code were amended by R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code. Two years thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy, supervisor of Piñakamasarap Corporation, testified on August 30, 1999.

On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence.14 In the meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to withdraw his
appearance as counsel for petitioners;15 the court had granted the motion on October 25, 1999;16 and the new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro and Associates, had
entered its appearance on November 24, 1999.17

On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence of the prosecution except Exhibit "E" which was rejected by the court, and Exhibits "I"
and "J" which were withdrawn.18 The prosecution rested its case.

On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. 19 The court granted the motion. In their
demurrer,20 petitioners argued that a judgment of acquittal is proper since no sufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty
of the offense charged. The prosecution was not able to establish that they gave their goods the general appearance of another manufacturer or dealer and that they
had the intent to defraud the public or Piñakamasarap Corporation. Moreover, under both R.A. No. 166, as amended, and its repealing law, R.A. No. 8293, the RTC
had jurisdiction over the crime charged; hence, the amended complaint should be quashed.

The prosecution opposed the demurrer to evidence, contending that it had presented proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of petitioners for the crime charged.
The prosecution maintained that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged in the light of the imposable penalty for
unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.21

In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,22 the court held that there was prima facie evidence which, if unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to warrant the
conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC was vested by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and decide charges for violation of
R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the court denied the demurrer to evidence and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Br. 63, Tarlac City. 23 On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City Prosecutor to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation and to file the necessary Information if he found probable cause against petitioners.

The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC in its May 16, 2000 Resolution that there was a prima facie case against
petitioners.24 He filed an Information in the RTC on July 18, 2000 for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 25 The Information reads:

63
 That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometime prior thereto, at Tarlac City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the
owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and
defrauding the public in general and the PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name "MARCA PIÑA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured
by them with the brand name "Marca Piña," which is a version of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the
contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce
sold or offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce, to the damage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.26

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,27 alleging that their rights to due process and speedy trial had been violated. Other than the notice of hearing sent
by the court, they never received a subpoena which required them to submit their evidence during a preliminary investigation. Petitioners further averred that certain
delays in the trial are permissible, especially when such delays are due to uncontrollable circumstances or by accident. In this case, the inordinate delay was
obviously brought by the lackadaisical attitude taken by the prosecutor in prosecuting the case. Petitioners pointed out that there was already a delay of six (6) long
years from the time the initial complaint was filed, and that they had already been prejudiced. Their life, liberty and property, not to mention their reputation, have
been at risk as there has been no determination of the issue of whether or not to indict them. Thus, the case should be dismissed in order to free them from further
capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics of the prosecution. Indeed, their right to a speedy trial is part of due process, both of which are guaranteed by no less than
the fundamental law itself. They insisted that they should not be made to unjustly await the prosecution of the charges against them.

In opposition, the City Prosecutor clarified that subpoenas were sent to the parties during the preliminary investigation. In fact, petitioner Henry Uy appeared and
submitted the case for resolution without submitting additional evidence. Also, the proceedings in the MTC were not part of preliminary investigation but the trial on
the merits.28

On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion to quash.29 The court ruled that:

While there must have been a protracted trial since the case was originally filed before the Municipal Trial Court, a period of about six (6) years, as the
accused contends, nevertheless the delay if any, is partly attributable to the accused. [They] allowed the prosecution to rest the evidence in chief before
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Had the accused immediately raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, this case could have been filed anew before
the RTC. The accused allowed themselves to be arraigned without raising the issue of jurisdiction. In fact, the prosecution [had] rested its evidence in
chief.

The parties may[,] however[,] stipulate in the pre-trial that all the proceedings taken before the Municipal Trial Court are automatically reproduced and are
considered part of the prosecution's evidence, so that the trial will now be with respect to the reception of defense evidence. 30

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order31 which the trial court denied.32 At the same time, the court granted the oral motion of the prosecution to
amend the Information to reflect in its caption that the law violated by the accused is R.A. No. 8293 and not Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. On October 12,
2000, the City Prosecutor filed an amended Information. The inculpatory portion reads:

That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometimes prior thereto, at Tarlac City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the
owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in Violation of Sec. 168 of R.A. No. 8293 with the intention of
deceiving and defrauding the public in general and the PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name "MARCA PIÑA," and sell or offer for sale soy
sauce manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Piña," which is a version of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation
and substituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe
that the soy sauce sold or offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce, to the damage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.33

Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,34 on the sole ground that respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to quash based on violation of their right to a speedy trial. They claimed that there was no active
effort on their part to delay the case as they merely attended the scheduled hearings and participated in the preliminary investigation. On the contrary, it is the
prosecution that has the unmitigated obligation to immediately file the Information with the proper court. The public prosecutor is supposedly knowledgeable of the
existing laws and jurisprudence since his office has the delicate task of prosecuting cases in behalf of the State. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, he is the
officer responsible for the direction and control of criminal prosecutions. In the case at bar, the public prosecutor failed in his bounden duty by neglecting to file the
case in the court of competent jurisdiction. The prosecution could not advance a single reason to justify the procedural error and instead pointed its accusing finger to
petitioners who are just ordinary citizens. Their failure to call the attention of the prosecution is neither acquiescence nor consent on their part. While their former
lawyer was obviously lackluster in their defense, the act of the counsel should not deprive them of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. For petitioners, the
prosecution's blunder in procedure and ignorance of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh whatever minimal participation, if any, they had in the protracted
proceedings.

On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.35 The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders dated September 8, 2000 and October 9,
2000 of the public respondent are hereby DISMISSED.36

In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays" (Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, 76); "or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried." ( Binay v.
Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 93)

In the instant case, aside from the fact that it took almost six years for the prosecution to complete the presentation of its evidence, petitioners failed to
show that the delay, if ever there is any, was caused solely by the prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that the proceedings before the Municipal
Trial Court was attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution or that unjustified postponements of the trial were
asked for and secured by the prosecution to the prejudice of the petitioners. The fact alone that the prosecution had consumed six (6) years to complete
its presentation of evidence, without any allegation or proof that the prosecution has caused unreasonable delays or that the proceeding was attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, to Our minds is not sufficient for the application upon the petitioners of their Constitutional right to speedy

64
 trial. "A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the Constitutional guarantee of the right
to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." ( Binay v. Sandiganbayan,
supra, p. 93). In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present, for Our perusal, the circumstances attending the trial of their case before the Municipal Trial
Court.

The only controversy of the instant case lies in the fact that the Municipal Trial Court which heard the case has no jurisdiction over the said case. While it
may be conceded that the prosecution erred in not filing the information against the petitioners to a proper court, still, petitioners are not blameless in this
regard. Petitioners, through their counsel, had actively participated in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioners had to wait for almost
six (6) years to elapse before they brought to the attention of the Municipal Trial Court that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case against the petitioners.
Petitioners have, by reason of their participation in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court and also by reason of their silence and inaction,
allowed the Municipal Trial Court to proceed with a case for six (6) years despite absence of jurisdiction of such court to hear the case. We cannot allow
the petitioners to reap from their acts or omissions. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other." (Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, 364)

"The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical means for escaping trial." (Esguerra v. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., 95
Phil. 609, 611-612) "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the
State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. ( Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655, 667)37

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied.38

Petitioners sought relief from this Court on a petition for review, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE COURT A QUO'S DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH, BASED ON VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL (SEC. 16, ART. 3, 1987 CONSTITUTION).39

Petitioners reiterate their arguments in the CA to support the present petition. They aver that:

In this case, the prosecution took six (6) long and grueling years before it filed an Information with a competent court, despite the fact that jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts over trademark cases remained unchanged since the birth of the Trademark Law. Surely, this inordinate delay can be
considered a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay" which is constitutionally impermissible in this jurisdiction pursuant to the right of the accused to
speedy trial.

Indeed, petitioners have been prejudiced. Their lives, liberty and property, not to mention their reputation have all been put at risk for so long.

The public prosecutor failed to explain the reason for the delay. Truth to tell, even at this last stage, the public prosecutor chooses to remain silent why it
had unjustifiably taken him too long to file this case before a competent court. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals deliberately ignored this glaring flaw
committed by the public prosecutor and instead focused on petitioners' alleged negligence in not raising the issue of jurisdiction earlier. It further ruled that
due to this fact, petitioners are thus not entirely blameless for the delay of the trial.

Truth to tell, these findings of the Court of Appeals are palpably erroneous.

Firstly, it is elementary that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. This is because no amount of waiver can
confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense for which such jurisdiction has not been conferred by law in the first place.

Secondly, even assuming that petitioners failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction earlier, still, they could not be estopped from invoking their right to speedy
trial. The delay to be considered "partly attributable" to the accused (which could work against him in invoking the right to speedy trial) presupposes an
active effort of the defendant to delay the case (Manabat v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295). There is no violation of the right to speedy trial where the delay is
imputable to the accused (Solis v. Agloro, 63 SCRA 370). Here, it was the prosecution that had the unmitigated obligation to file the Information with the
correct court, within a reasonable time. It did not. Such blunder was fatal to its cause.

To emphasize, petitioners need not even call the attention of the prosecution that it had failed to file the case with the proper court, contrary to the opinion
of the Court of Appeals. x x x40

xxxx

Although petitioners agree with the Court of Appeals that mere mathematical reckoning of time would not be sufficient for the application of the right to
speedy trial, still, the public prosecutor's blunder should already be considered "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" warranting the dismissal of the
case.

Indeed, to condone the public prosecutor's manner of having directed this case, just like what the Court of Appeals did, might give rise to a disturbing
precedent where the constitutional right of the accused could very well be set aside to justify the mishandling of the prosecution by officers of the State. 41

Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of
the said Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated:

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial, once commenced, shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It
may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar
at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for
a shorter period of trial.

65
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if
the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be deducted.

The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a
miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.

In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.42

Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and impartial trial.
"Speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.43 In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should
be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 44 Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice45 as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum. 46

Apart from the constitutional provision and Section 115, Section 1(i) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:

The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered by this Administrative Order shall be immediately commenced and shall continue
from day to day to be terminated as far as practicable within sixty (60) days from initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from date of submission for decision.

More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo47 was promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver,48 began adopting the "balancing test" to
determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. As this test necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3)
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. 49 None of these elements, however, is either a necessary
or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must
still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.50

A. Length of the Delay

The length of delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism." Until there is some delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to inquire into the
other three factors. Nevertheless, due to the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.51

B. Reason for the Delay

Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused have the burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the
Information on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial.52 They must demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive;
or is caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for and secured; or that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried.53 On the other hand, the prosecution is required to present evidence establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed to the ordinary
processes of justice, and that petitioners suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary delay. 54

The records bear out the contention of petitioners that there had been a considerable delay in the trial in the MTC. Upon motion/agreement of petitioners and the
prosecution, or because of the joint absences, the trial of the case was delayed for more than 11 months.55 In its own instance, the MTC also reset some of the trial
dates in order to correct mistakes in scheduling or because the witnesses were not duly notified,56 thus, delaying the trial of the case for an additional seven months.
Even petitioners contributed to the delay of more than five months – they or their former counsel were either absent or moved for postponements to attend another
pending case or due to health concerns.57 The delay of about 21 months, covering 15 re-settings, can be attributed to the prosecution. However, except in five
instances, when the trial was reset because the private prosecutor had to attend to some professional 58 and personal matters,59 the delays were brought about
because of the recent engagement of legal service,60 absence of the public prosecutor,61 and unavailability of documents62 and witnesses.63

Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the trial of the case. It took the prosecution more than four years to rest its
case after presenting only three witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner and the trial court been assiduous in avoiding any inordinate delay in the trial, the
prosecution could have rested its case much earlier. The court even failed to order the absent counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify their absences or cite
them for contempt. The speedy trial mandated by the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is as much the responsibility of the prosecution, the
trial court and petitioners to the extent that the trial is inordinately delayed, and to that extent the interest of justice is prejudiced.

The case before the RTC should not be dismissed simply because the public prosecution did not move for the dismissal of the case in the MTC based on A.O. No.
104-96 declaring that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases under Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure of the MTC to motu proprio
dismiss the case on that ground. The City Prosecutor then believed in good faith, albeit erroneously, that under R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129, the
MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged.

The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss the case motu proprio should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute criminal
offenses and, more importantly, defeat the right of the offended party to redress for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners do not attribute to the prosecution or to the
MTC any malice aforethought or conscious disregard of their right to a speedy trial; nor have substantially proven the same by clear and convincing evidence. Hence,
absent showing of bad faith or gross negligence, delay caused by the lapse of the prosecution is not in itself violative of the right to a speedy trial.

Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the prosecution justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighed heavily against the prosecution. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with defendant. 64

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,65 the Court had carefully balanced the societal interest in the case, which involved the so-called "tax credit certificates scam," and the
need to give substance to the defendants' constitutional rights. In said suit, we upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Special Fourth Division) that the dismissal
of the cases was too drastic, precipitate and unwarranted. While the Court recognized that defendants were prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the

66
cases and the submission of a complete report by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to the Sandiganbayan, we underscored that the State should not be
prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor. "An overzealous or
precipitate dismissal of a case may enable defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people
accused of crimes by granting them immunization because of legal error."66

The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.67 Here, the Court noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for the
State when he rested the case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the accused did not even
sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, we ruled:

As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o erroneously put premium on the right
to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically result in the dismissal of the case for the
State. There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a
dangerous precedent which enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly tried, thereby infringing the interest of the
society.68

Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate
in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair
opportunity to present their side.69 For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases. 70 In essence, the right to a
speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.71 Thus, as succinctly decreed in State v. McTague:72

The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one
that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has 'gone to sleep at the switch'
while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but are for the benefit of
defendants who claim their protection. They are a shield, and they 'must not be left hanging on the wall of the armory.' It is for the protection of personal
rights, not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice.

Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not pass without admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court
and the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the constitutional rights of the accused.
Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and the
prosecution are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to a
speedy trial is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable. 73

C. Petitioners' Assertion of the Right

The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to claim the right
will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a speedy trial.74

Except in only one instance in this case,75 the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners, through counsel, have bothered to raise their objection to the
several re-setting of the trial dates. This is not unexpected since, as already shown, the reasons for the delay are not in themselves totally inexcusable or
unreasonable. Moreover, petitioners actively participated in the trial when the prosecution presented its evidence, as they scrutinized the documentary evidence and
cross-examined the witnesses. Until the filing of the motion to quash in the RTC, they never contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor timely challenged the
pendency of the case in the MTC.

While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings, such defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
Otherwise, active participation in the trial would estop a party from later challenging such want of jurisdiction. 76

In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a case would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the
same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not
positively asserted.77 A party's silence may amount to laches.78 The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain.
R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. 79 The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on
record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege.

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' untiring argument that, being "ordinary citizens," they should not be made to suffer from the "lackluster" performance of
their former counsel who failed to recognize the MTC's want of jurisdiction. Too often we have held that a client is bound by the acts, mistakes or negligence of his
counsel.80 This is, as it should be, since a counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of
the client.81 If the rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.82 It would enable every party to render inutile an adverse order or decision through the simple
expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of the counsel.83 Every shortcoming of a counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another
counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.84 Proceedings would then
be indefinite, tentative and at times, subject to reopening by the simple subterfuge of replacing counsel. 85

While the rule admits of certain exceptions,86 we find none present in this case. Other than his obvious failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim undeniably
represented the cause of his clients in the MTC proceedings. Interestingly, their new counsel, wittingly or unwittingly, raised the issue of jurisdiction only four months
after it entered its appearance,87 thus, adding to the delay.

D. Prejudice to the Petitioners

In the Barker case,88 the different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that
prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (1) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious
is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay,
the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not
always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. 89 After all, arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the
defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public
obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends.90

67
Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing petitioners to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction caused them any prejudice tantamount
to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this case were not subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or otherwise, thus eliminating the first
Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.

As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, there is no showing that petitioners suffered undue pressures in this respect. Mere reference to a
general asseveration that their "life, liberty and property, not to mention reputation" have been prejudiced is not enough. There must be conclusive factual basis, as
this Court cannot rely on pure speculation or guesswork. Surely, a pending criminal case may cause trepidation but, as stressed in Barker, the standard here is
minimization, not necessarily elimination of the natural consequences of an indictment. While this is not to be brushed off lightly, it is not by itself sufficient to support
a claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial.

There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied with any specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may become
unavailable because of the delays in this case. To repeat, the claim of impairment of defense because of delay must be specific and not by mere conjecture. Vague
assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to claim that particular evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy trial claim.

As neither the specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any others have been brought to the Court's attention, we are constrained to dismiss petitioners'
claim. The passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation of liberty or impairment of the ability to properly defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of
prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by
the due process clause and the statutes of limitations.91

In several cases where it is manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes has been denied, this Court has not faltered to
accord the so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial.92 In this case, however, there appears no persuasive,
much less compelling, ground to allow the same relief for absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay was unreasonable or arbitrary and was seasonably
objected to by petitioners.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2003 Decision and July 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, is directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case with all reasonable
and judicious dispatch consistent with the right of petitioners to a speedy trial. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.       June 29, 2001

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.

VITUG, J.:

The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover
the event via  live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.

On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas  (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our
history."2 The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice   and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice  Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis:

"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it
cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.

"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.

"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the
administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on
the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."4

Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The
resolution read:

"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have
not had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely.

68
 "While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the
current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United States prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from
the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment.
To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings
are formulated.

"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper
reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom.

"In Estes vs. Texas. the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process
rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the
impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:

"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or
become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of court influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only
increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are
human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense. 1âwphi1.nêt

'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.'

"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the
courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality
imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.

"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering
further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial
means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings.
No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis,
to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings
for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."

Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in the quest for truth. 5 Recent history
exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect
of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes
during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II.

The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial.6

When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence7 tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased
witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an
object of public's attention9 and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence 10 but only by evidence and argument given in open
court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.

Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute
endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on." 11

Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact,
nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony
of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 12 It might
be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. 13

To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the
calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create.14 The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually
erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now. 15

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public
to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who
shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. 16

69
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless,
within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process 17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing
the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."18

This Court, in the instance19 already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas,20 the United States Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as
an inherent denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:

"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be
televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every
juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x.

"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast
audience is Simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone
speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render
witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.

"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the
accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided attention. x x x

"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental if not physical-harassment, resembling a
police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him -sometimes the difference between life and death -dispassionately,
freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a
city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."

In his concurring opinion in Estes,  Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the
detached atmosphere that should always surround the judicial process.21

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of
Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at
stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio
coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be
acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few
grandstanding lawyers.

It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions
seeking a declaration of mistrial on account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's  action either allowing or disallowing live media coverage of the court
proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.

En passant,  the minority would view the ponencia  as having modified the case law on the matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing
resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23 rd October resolution, it confirmed, in
disallowing live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the
subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (therefore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."

But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?

In Nebraska Press Association vs, Stewart,22 the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or
admissions made by the accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper; Inc., vs, Virginia,23 the trial judge closed the
courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials
were historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,24 the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the press
and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses.

Justice Steward, in Chandler vs. Florida,25 where two police officers charged with burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the
ground that the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the
physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere
presence of cameras and recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused." 26

Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings.

The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that
these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still
divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow
us to turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation of
justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.

Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable
controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. 27 A trial is not a free trade of ideas, Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth
in a courtroom.28

The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and
apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.1

70
G.R. No. 143561      June 6, 2001
JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13363 entitled People v. Jonathan Cariaga,
promulgated on April 24, 1995 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11,2 which convicted petitioner Jonathan Cariaga of the crime
of Qualified Theft.

In an amended Information3 dated October 3, 1989, petitioner was charged with qualified theft as follows:

"That sometime during the period from October, 1988 to January, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., Davao City, and as such has access to the said
company, with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away electrical equipment, supplies and materials totaling P7,038.96 belonging to Davao Light & Power
Company, to the damage and prejudice of the said company, in the aforesaid amount of P7,038.96.

Contrary to law."

The factual background of this case as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals is as follows:

"Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed at the time of the incident in question and for sometime prior thereto as Systems Analyst of the Davao Light & Power
Company, Inc. (DLPC), whose duty was to devise systems, procedures or controls to promote efficiency, prevent losses due to waste, pilferage or theft of
company property, etc., received reports that some private electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated
a covert operation with the following objectives: (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being stolen, the frequency of the thefts, who were perpetrating
the thefts; and (2) `catch' at least one (1) DLPC employee that may be involved.

In October, 1988, he sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San Pedro Patrol Station, Davao METRODISCOM. He
also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation and a Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) member, as his undercover agent under the
pseudonym 'Canuto Duran', an 'electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.'

'Canuto Duran' struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, at the Miguel Store, situated in front of the DLPC office along
Ponciano Reyes (now Bangoy) Street, Davao City. He told Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials to be brought to Diwalwal, a gold
panning area in Monkayo, Davao (formerly Davao del Norte).

Ricardo offered to supply 'Canuto Duran' with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same. 'Canuto' purchased
small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy.

On November 17, 1988, Ricardo introduced 'Canuto' to Jonathan at Miguel Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of DLPC Service
Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'. 'Canuto' inquired from Jonathan if he could supply him with two (2) 15 KVA transformers. Jonathan replied
that he could for P16,000. 'Canuto' placed an order for the transformers. The deal did not materialize, however, as 'Canuto's' boss (Miguel Aboitiz) who
would provide the funds happened to be out of town. Jonathan appeared piqued. To appease him, 'Canuto' assured him that they shall continue their
'business' relationship. Not long after, he placed an order for a lightning arrester. Ricardo, Jonathan and 'Canuto' agreed to meet at the corner of Jacinto
and Arellano Streets.

Jonathan got DLPC Truck 'S-143' which was inside the DLPC Compound at Ponciano Reyes Street and drove it to the designated meeting place, leaving
'Canuto' and Ricardo at Miguel Store. After a while, Ricardo and 'Canuto' followed. On the way, 'Canuto gave Ricardo P1,800. At the meeting place,
Ricardo gave the money to Jonathan, after which the latter got a lightning arrester (Exh. M) from his truck's toolbox and handed it to Ricardo, who, in turn
gave it to 'Canuto'.

On January 23, 1989, Ricardo accompanied 'Canuto' to Jonathan's house at Doña Pilar Village, Sasa, Davao City, to get a roll of Electrical Wire No. 2
(300 meters long) valued P5,010 (Exh. J) and 2 lightning arresters with cutout, valued P1,185.75 each, or P2,371.50 for both (Exhs. I and I-1) from
Jonathan. 'Canuto' paid P2,500.00 only for the items. He gave the money to Ricardo; Ricardo, in turn, gave it to Jonathan.

Siton's undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt. Villasis' team 'apprehended' 'Canuto' and turned him over,
including the electrical wires that he previously purchased from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. The team was unable to arrest
Ricardo as he had already left when the team arrived at his house. 'Canuto Duran' 'confessed' in order to persuade Ricardo – and the others who were
involved – to likewise come out with the truth. Thus, when Ricardo and Sergio Jamero appeared at the San Pedro Patrol Station on the invitation of the
police, they confessed to their crimes (Exhs. A and G, respectively).

Ricardo revealed that he acted as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and 'Canuto Duran' on November 27, 1988 and again on January 23, 1989;
that the items that 'Canuto Duran' bought from Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC properties.

Jamero also confessed that Ricardo was his fence in disposing of DLPC electrical materials that he pilfered but the items were not sold to 'Canuto Duran'
but to someone else.

The recitals of Ricardo and Jamero in their sworn statements are substantially corroborated by entries in the Daily Record of Events (blotter) of the San
Pedro Patrol Station (Exhs. B, B-1; C, C-1; D, D-1; E, E-1; and F, F-1).

The accused was also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station but, according to Sgt. Villasis, he refused to give a statement.

The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife,
Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain (Exhs. Y, Y-1).

Acting on the extrajudicial confessions of the suspects, the reports of Siton to the police and the bust, the team under Sgt. Villasis recovered the following
items:

71
 1. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Valve Type V (Exh. "I");

2. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Valve Type (Exh. "I-1");

3. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Thorex Type (unmarked);

4. 1 pc. Fuse Cut-out S&C Brand with Bracket (unmarked);

5. 1 pc. Fuse Cut-out with Fuse Holder, AB Chance (Exh. "M");

6. 1 roll (330 meters) Aluminum Wire No. 8 (Exh. "K");

7. 1 roll (300 meters) Aluminum Wire No. 2 (Exh. "J");

8. 1 roll (36 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 6; ) One of these

9. 1 roll (74 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 8; ) rolls is

10. 1 roll (41 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 2; ) marked Exh.

11. 1 set bracket for cut-out. ) "AA"

Sgt. Villasis testified that Exh. "U" and Exh. "AA" were the wires recovered from Siton during the bust while the rest, particularly Exhs. "I" and "I-1" "J" and
"M" were recovered at Roselo Toledo's house where Siton ("Canuto Duran") brought them; x x x."4

According to the trial court, "the prosecution's evidence considered as a whole is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions of
Ricardo Cariaga (Exhs. A; O,O-1) implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton's testimony and the police records (Exhs. D to
F-2, inclusive) are formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused."

In due course, the trial court on November 18, 1991, rendered judgment, the decretal portion reading:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft, qualified by grave abuse of confidence, under Article
310, in relation to Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged, aggravated by the use of motor vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) Years, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY, of prision mayor, as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; and to pay the costs.

No civil indemnity is awarded to DLPC, the private complainant, as the items stolen were recovered. The return to DLPC of all the items recovered by the
police is ordered.

SO ORDERED."5

On appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed on April 24, 1995, the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly considered by
the trial court as this was annexed as part of DLPC's position paper submitted to the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. RAB-11-05-00308-89, a
complaint filed by the accused for illegal dismissal, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals likewise upheld the credibility of Siton's testimony which corroborated that of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors:

"I The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the
fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement is not admissible under
Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of said rule, to wit:

a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;

b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost amounting to death and the prosecution must exhaust all available remedies to secure
the presence of its witnesses at the trial;

c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature.

II. The appellate court erred in holding that the lone testimony of the prosecution's alleged eyewitness who is a paid witness and whose testimony was
admittedly corrected or revised on the witness stand and which materially and significantly varies with his previous sworn statement on very vital and
pivotal details is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

III.The appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the reasonable doubt engendered by the exculpatory statements of the superiors of the accused in
favor of the latter."6

In his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible. The prosecution
presented in evidence as Exh. P-2, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement which was attached as Annex "8-A" to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by
Jonathan Cariaga against the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court admitted the same in evidence despite the timely objection of the defense counsel; and the
Court of Appeals upheld the admission thereof citing as basis, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:

72
 SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the
previous testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:

f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him;

In Toledo, Jr. vs. People,7 this Court emphasized that "the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of
court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of
evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional
right of an accused person "to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. Court of Appeals,8 it was ruled that "'unable to testify' or for that matter
'unavailability', does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost
amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses."

The threshold question then is the admissibility of the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by
Jonathan Cariaga against it for illegal dismissal.

The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this
witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, 9 and previously, his wife informed
the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as
one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.

It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, "mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove
inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest."10 In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy
available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga
should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule.

In his second assignment of error, petitioner assails the testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Siton alias "Canuto Duran", the undercover agent, as not credible
because it is allegedly inconsistent in very material and pivotal details from the sworn statement he made at the police station and that he is admitted by the
prosecution to be a paid witness. According to petitioner, Siton's testimony was overhauled and corrected to meet the crisis created by eyewitness Ricardo Cariaga's
non-appearance in court. Petitioner argues further that Siton had thousands of reasons to vary or exaggerate or pervert the truth in his testimony because he
admitted that he was given by DLPC through Mr. Aboitiz, a 15 KVA transformer worth P15,000.00 to P18, 000.00 and he also admitted on cross-examination that
"after the hearing he (Mr. Aboitiz) will hire me as an employee or that he will give me privilege."

He alleges that Siton never mentioned in his sworn statement that he bought anything directly from petitioner and only stated that the latter was around when he
bought some wires and lightning arresters from Bondying and Bebing Tumali, and then claimed on the witness stand that he had direct dealings with petitioner. Siton
also failed to state in his sworn statement that he went to the house of petitioner to purchase DLPC materials; and he mentioned therein that the arrangement was
that the materials will be delivered three days after payment, but in his testimony, the materials were delivered upon payment.

As we have so frequently ruled, the trial judge who sees and hears witnesses testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the degree of
credit which should be accorded their testimonies.11 Next, the rule has also always been that the contradictions between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his
testimony on the witness stand do not always militate against the witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial notice that affidavits, which are usually
taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.12 Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open
court as the latter is subject to the test of cross examination. 13

We have carefully gone over the records and evidence in this case and we are persuaded that Siton's testimony in court deserves credence. We further find the
same sufficient for conviction. Siton was consistent and straightforward in his testimony and had not been shaken by the lengthy and exhaustive cross-examination
by the defense counsel. Having thoroughly convinced the trial and appellate courts as well as this Court of the truth of his testimony, we do not see how he could
have fabricated the entire story. The fact that he stated on direct examination that he "corrected" his statement and that he was offered compensation for his
undercover work does not necessarily discredit him. There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an
affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial. It appears that he was paid for his services rendered as an undercover
agent and not for purposes of concocting a story and imputing a crime as that made out in the information. Similarly, the alleged inaccuracies in the testimony of
Siton in open court relating to such minute details as whether the petitioner's house was two-stories high and located in a corner are too negligible to consider.

Finally, we reject petitioner's claim that the testimonies of three witnesses for the prosecution, namely, Sauro, Saligan and Aboitiz, engendered reasonable doubt
sufficient to exculpate him. He points out that "Rodolfo Sauro, gang crew supervisor of petitioner testified that he has not reported any missing materials in the truck
driven by the petitioner; that Luis Aboitiz testified that he asked Estelito Saligan to conduct investigation if there were materials missing `but the latter came out with
the report that he could not find any missing materials'; and that Estelito Saligan, head of Materials Management Department of the DLPC confirmed on cross-
examination that there were no properties lost or missing."

However, a more accurate reading of the testimonies of the said witnesses reveals that Rodolfo Sauro14 testified that petitioner is permanently assigned as driver to
the S-143 truck; that he is in charge of all the equipment and supplies stored in the truck; that there were always reserve materials kept in the truck for emergency
operations during the night and that he trusted him that these materials were being used for emergencies. 15 He also testified that he took Jonathan's word that the
reserve materials were used for emergencies because he found him trustworthy.16 On the other hand, Engr. Estelito Saligan was recalled to the witness stand to
clarify Mr. Aboitiz's statement that "he was ordered to make inventories and that he did not find any missing." He clarified that he only inventoried the materials inside
the warehouse which are within his jurisdiction, but he did not conduct inventory of materials or properties already in the possession of the operations department 17 of
which petitioner belonged to. In sum, nothing in the cited testimonies confirm petitioner's insistence that there were no stolen electrical supplies and materials from
DLPC.

In fine, we are satisfied that the participation of the petitioner in the commission of the crime at bar was well established by the testimony of witness Siton. In the
determination of the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of witnesses but their credibility and the nature and quality of their testimonies. 18 It is
axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered and the testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable
doubt, is sufficient to convict. The inadmissibility of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement as discussed above will not exculpate him.

73
The defense, verily, anchors itself on the bare denial of petitioner of the specific acts imputed by the prosecution against him. Certainly, this negative assertion
cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the prosecution witness, Florencio Siton alias "Canuto Duran" describing in sufficient detail the active participation
of petitioner in the commission of the crime charged. As aptly observed by the trial court:

"The accused's defense consisted of a general denial; that the items alleged by the prosecution as having been pilfered from DLPC were available in any
store selling electrical supplies. Despite having been positively pointed to as the person who sold small electrical wires, lightning arresters and a roll of
Electrical Wire No. 2 that were pilfered from DLPC to "Canuto Duran" (Siton), thru Ricardo Cariaga, he did not categorically deny the imputation: he
merely declared that he did not know Siton (he did not say that he did not know "Canuto Duran") nor did he say that he did not sell anything to "Canuto
Duran" thru Ricardo Cariaga. As a rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted by anyone, should control the decision of the court (Ko
Tieck vs. People, L-48535-36, Dec. 21, 1991)."

We note that the information alleged that petitioner was an employee of DLPC; that he had access to the electrical supplies of said company; and that with grave
abuse of confidence, he stole electrical materials belonging to DLPC. The prosecution established that petitioner who was permanently assigned as driver of Truck
"S-143" had charge of all the DLPC equipment and supplies kept in his vehicle, including lightning arresters, cut-out and wires, which were generally used for the
installation of transformers and power lines; and specifically stored therein for emergency operations at night when the stockroom is closed. While the mere
circumstance that the petitioner is an employee or laborer of DLPC does not suffice to create the relation of confidence and intimacy that the law requires to
designate the crime as qualified theft, it has been held that access to the place where the taking took place or access to the stolen items changes the complexion of
the crime committed to that of qualified theft.19 Thus, theft by a truck driver who takes the load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of qualified theft 20as was
proven in this case. The trial court correctly considered petitioner's use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime as a generic aggravating circumstance thus
raising the penalty to its maximum.21 While the aggravating circumstance of "by means of motor vehicle" was not alleged in the information, there is evidence that the
same was employed to facilitate the commission of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even if not alleged. 22 The theft could not have been
effected without the aid of the motor vehicle,23 as proven by the prosecution, the service truck was used in storing and then transporting the stolen electrical materials
to the place where they were sold.1âwphi1.nêt

We now come to the correctness of the penalty imposed. The trial court meted on petitioner an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day, of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since the value
of the electrical materials is P7,038.96, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods in accordance with
Article 309, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.24 However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,25 the crime of qualified theft is punished by the
penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two (2) degrees
higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal  in its minimum period which is ten
(10) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Considering there is one generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the correct penalty is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor  as
minimum to thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal  as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to EIGHT (8)
years, EIGHT (8) months and ONE (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum to THIRTEEN (13) years, ONE (1) month and ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88684 March 20, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR LACBANES, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

For selling marijuana, accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act. He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. 1 In his appeal before this Court, he assails his
conviction on the ground that entrapment was never clearly established by the prosecution's evidence.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of PFC Ricardo Rosales, a member of the Narcotics Section of the Tacloban Police Station who testified that his command
received information that accused-appellant had been peddling marijuana cigarettes in Tacloban City. A buy-bust operation was then set up after conducting
surveillance on the accused-appellant. At around 4:15 p.m. of October 3, 1986 at the corner of Burgos and Tarcela Streets, Tacloban City, their confidential agent
informed PFC Rosales and his team, composed of Patrolmen Arpon and Buena, Sgt. Madriaga and Lt. Saranza, that the former made contact with accused-
appellant. Thereafter, the team deployed themselves in the area in such a way as to see clearly the transaction.

According to PFC Rosales, after the conversation of their confidential agent with accused-appellant, the former handed the latter two P5.00 bills with serial numbers
MU80883 and MU840129. In return, the latter handed sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes to the former. Thereupon, the team approached accused-appellant,
introduced themselves as members of the Narcotics Section and arrested him. They found the two P5.00 bills in his possession and recovered three sticks of
suspected marijuana cigarettes. Accused-appellant was brought to the police station where upon investigation, he allegedly admitted that the marijuana in his
possession was for sale and that a friend of his named Francing was the source of the prohibited drug. The witness testified that they informed accused-appellant
about his constitutional rights before the investigation and that the latter understood them. However, they allegedly forgot to put down in writing accused-appellant's
admission of guilt.2

The only other witness for the prosecution was Lt. Liza Madeja-Sabong, a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, who affirmed her own findings and declared
in Chemistry Report No. NB-134-86 3 that the three suspected marijuana cigarettes were positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug. 4

Accused-appellant flatly denied selling the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He testified that on said date, he was asleep in his house from two o'clock until past
four o'clock in the afternoon. He was awakened by his father who told him that a certain Lieutenant Boy Saranza, together with Patrolmen Arpon and Buena, would
like to take him to the police station to answer some questions. He denied knowing PFC Rosales and stated that the latter was not with the arresting group.

At the police station, when asked if he knew the whereabouts of one Cresencio de la Cruz, he answered in the negative. He also testified that the investigators forced
him to affix his signature on a piece of paper, the contents of which he did not know at the time but which turned out to be a receipt for property seized. The said
receipt showed that the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the two marked P5.00 bills were seized from his possession. He claimed that the policemen filed this
case against him when he could not give any information about NPAs.

74
He asserted that he had never been charged or convicted of any crime and that he was also a confidential agent of the Regional Security Unit, as well as a barangay
tanod.5

Another witness, Cpl. Felix Dacut, corroborated accused-appellant's claim that he was a confidential agent or a civilian informer of the Regional Security Unit. 6 Capt.
Manuel Abuda of the INP, Tacloban City, likewise testified that he knows the accused-appellant to be of good moral character and that the latter was used in the past
as an agent both in buy-bust and sell-bust operations.7

On the issue of credibility, Judge Pedro S. Espina held that as between the positive identification and assertion of the arresting officers and the mere unsubstantiated
denial by the accused-appellant, the former is more worthy of credence. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence weightier inasmuch as the arresting officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their public functions which has not been rebutted by the defense. Coupled with the presumption is the lack
of any proof of improper motives on their part.

The trial court also found the defense' s version of the incident inherently incredible stating it was hard to believe that accused-appellant, a barangay tanod and a
confidential agent of the military who reached second year high school, would readily sign a blank sheet of paper presented to him by the authorities without any
protest or objection. Neither did accused-appellant's introduction of evidence of good character convince the trial court of his innocence as he was unable to
overcome the evidence for the prosecution.8

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that the failure of the prosecution to present the confidential informant-turned poseur-buyer is a violation of his
constitutional right to know the witnesses against him and meet them in court. He also contended that since the testimony of PFC Rosales revolves around the
confidential informant who cannot corroborate the same, said testimony would be plain hearsay and unworthy of credence. Therefore, the prosecution failed to
establish clearly the fact of entrapment. Moreover, the defense pointed out that although PFC Rosales, the prosecution's star witness, was within earshot, he did not
testify as to the conversation between the confidential informant and the accused-appellant.

This Court is not persuaded. PFC Rosales did testify that he saw the poseur-buyer and accused-appellant exchange the two P5.00 bills and the three marijuana
sticks. 9 The P5.00 bills were presented as evidence 10 and a photocopy of the same, the faithful reproduction of which was admitted by the defense, was likewise
proffered in the trial court. 11 The three sticks of marijuana cigarettes were also presented before the trial court and identified by PFC Rosales as the ones recovered
from the poseur-buyer. 12 This Court held in People v. Vocente 13 that:

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction whereby as in this case,
the accused handed over the tea bag of marijuana upon the agreement with the poseur-buyer to exchange it for money. . . . What is important
is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the contents were presented as evidence in court . Proof of
the transaction suffices. The identity of the tea bag of marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti was established before the court.
(Emphasis supplied)

In other words, accused-appellant was caught in flagranti delicto. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and indispensable is the
submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer. 14

There was no need to present the poseur-buyer as PFC Rosales witnessed the whole transaction where the marked money was exchanged for three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes. The settled rule is that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive to
impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full credit. 15 This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony
would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. 16

Accused-appellant, on his part, merely denied that he sold the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. If he tried to use alibi as defense, he should have presented his
father in court to corroborate his version that he was in the latter's house when he was apprehended.

Accused-appellant, through his statements implied that he was a victim of a "frameup." However, . . . like alibi, frameup is a defense that has been invariably viewed
by the Court with disfavor as it is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear and
convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of "frameup" which, unfortunately, are inexistent here. 17

Accused-appellant's claim of a "frameup" is not credible as he gave conflicting motives of the police authorities therefor. In his direct examination, he claimed that he
was framed up by the policemen because he did not supply them with information regarding NPAs. 18 In the cross-examination conducted by the prosecution,
however, he alleged that the policemen were retaliating against him for working for the Regional Security Unit instead of for them. 19 Such failure on the part of the
accused-appellant to muster convincing proof of a frameup lends credence to the version of the prosecution.

In People v. Velasco, 20 this Court held that in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against
appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect, must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed. Time and again, this Court
has ruled that the findings of the lower court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court. 21

The accused-appellant tried to argue on his behalf that no surveillance was conducted before the buy-bust operation. In People v. Ganguso, 22 it has been held that
prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by
their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the
buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca, 23 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.

Additionally, accused-appellant alleged that the marked money was not presented as proof before the trial court. Contrary to said submission, however, the marked
money was presented as proof during the direct examination of PFC Rosales. 24 The defense even admitted that the photocopy of the marked money was a faithful
reproduction of the ones found in the person of accused-
appellant. 25 Nonetheless, this Court held that the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of
the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. 26

This Court cannot, however, accept as evidence the receipt for property seized purportedly signed by accused-appellant as proof that the three sticks of marijuana
cigarettes, as well as the two P5.00 bills, were seized from him, for the prosecution failed to prove that he was assisted by counsel at the time. Neither does this
Court condone such practice for this is tantamount to an extra-judicial confession for the commission of the offense.

75
In People v. Ang Chun Kit, 27 this Court held that "conforme to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since
merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for
the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel."

This Court also declared in People v. De Las Marinas, 28 that it is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipt. Undoubtedly,
this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent. Here he was, in effect, made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of
his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.

Nevertheless, while said receipt of property seized is inadmissible in evidence, it was sufficiently established by the categorical and positive assertions of witnesses
as shown in the records, that indeed accused-appellant committed the offense of selling the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes.

Accordingly, this Court finds accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended. Under the said
provision, the penalty should have been reclusion perpetua to death and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. With the passage of R.A. 7659,
particularly Sec. 13 amending Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425, the penalty to be imposed shall now depend on the quantity. Since the offense was committed in 1986, the
quantity of prohibited drugs involved was immaterial. Inasmuch as the amendatory provisions are, however, favorable to accused-appellant, they should be given
retroactive effect.

Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective on December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this
court in the case of People v. Simon 29 and People v. De
Lara, 30 if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the
range of prision correccional (from six [6] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) to reclusion temporal depending upon the quantity of marijuana involved.

As in People v. De Lara, 31 there was no evidence of the weight of the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes seized in the case at bar. Nevertheless, adhering to the
doctrine in the earlier case, this Court resolved the doubt in favor of accused-appellant and concluded that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not
less than 250 but not more than 499 grams. Hence, the maximum imposable penalty should be prision mayor and the minimum, prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years
and Two (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Since accused-appellant has already served ten years, two months and seventeen days, which is beyond the maximum penalty imposed for his offense, he is hereby
ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128280      April 4, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALICIA A. CHUA, accused-appellant.

PARDO, J.:

Accused Alicia Chua has appealed from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch V finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of estafa sentencing her to various penalties
therefor.

On October 05, 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr. of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila an information 2 against accused Alicia A.
Chua reading as follows:

Crim. Case No. 93-127418:

"That in or about and during the period comprised between October 29, 1992 and January 19, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons,
namely: DOMINGO F. TERCENIO, MARTIN B. BERMEJO, EVANGELINE F. GAVINA, DANTE F. BALUIS, EDUARD V. ESTILLER, EDGAR
B. ABONAL, VIOLETA F. REGALADO, GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE and LONITO F. BALUIS, without first having secured the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor.

"Contrary to law."3

On the same date, the same prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila nine (9) other informations against the accused for estafa:

Crim. Case No. 93-127419:

"The undersigned accuses ALICIA A. CHUA of the crime of estafa, committed as follows: That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said DOMINGO F.
TERCENIO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof and by-means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely to obtain as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent
to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."4

Crim. Case No. 93-127420:

76
 "That on or about November 21, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud MARTIN B. BERMEJO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/they/she made to said MARTIN B. BERMEJO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
MARTIN BERMEJO in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said MARTIN B. BERMEJO to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said MARTIN B. BERMEJO in the aforesaid amount of
P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."5

Crim. Case No. 93-127421:

"That on or about November 6, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud EVANGELINE F. GAVINA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/they/she made to said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ EVANGELINE F. GAVINA and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits induced and succeeded in inducing said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to give and
deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EVANGELINE P. GAVINA in the aforesaid
amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.1âwphi1.nêt

"CONTRARY TO LAW."6

Crim. Case No. 93-127422:

"That on or about December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud DANTE F. BALUIS in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation
which he/they/she made to said DANTE F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ DANTE F. BALUIS
in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said DANTE F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P11,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P11,000.00 which amount once in her
possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said DANTE G. BALUIS in the aforesaid amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."7

Crim. Case No. 93-127423:

"That on or about November 24, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud EDUARD V. ESTILLER in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/she/they made to said EDUARD V. ESTILLER to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
EDUARD V.' ESTILLER in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said EDUARD V. ESTILLER to give and
deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDUARD V. ESTILLER, in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."8

Crim. Case No. 93-127424:

"That on or about December 11, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and therein wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud EDGAR B. ABONAL in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/she/they made to said EDGAR B. ABONAL to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
EDGAR B. ABONAL in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGAR B. ABONAL to give and deliver,
as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDGAR B. ABONAL in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."9

Crim. Case No. 93-127425:

"That on or about, December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud VIOLETA F. REGALADO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/she/they made to said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ VIOLETA F. REGALADO in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet
the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to give and

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 deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said VIOLETA F. REGALADO in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.

"Contrary to law."10

Crim. Case No. 93-127426:

"That on or about January 19, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he/she/they made to said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet
the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to give and
deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in the aforesaid
amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."11

Crim. Case No. 93-127427:

"That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud LONITO F. BALUIS in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation
which he/she/they made to said LONITO F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ LONITO F.
BALUIS in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said LONITO F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said LONITO F. BALUIS in the aforesaid amount P15,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."12

On November 8, 1993, the trial court arraigned the accused. She pleaded not guilty to each case.13 Trial ensued. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

The facts are as follows:

In September 1992, accused. Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan. 14 The message was written in Chinese characters
except for the names of To-ong Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were
needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message.15

In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement
fee of P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical certificates. 16 On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with private complainant
Lonito Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for which they were issued
a receipt bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua's signature.17

Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio
became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised
that she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not anymore locate accused Chua. 18

Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private complainants. After requiring each complainant to pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to
secure NBI clearances and to undergo medical examinations, she would go in hiding.

In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) about accused Chua's activities. The POEA issued a certification that
accused Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment. 19

On October 3, 1995, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion 20 of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Alicia A. Chua is hereby found:

"1) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale in Criminal Case No. 93-127418 and is therefore
sentenced to serve a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;

"2) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127419 and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of Prision Mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the
complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"3) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127420 and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the
complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

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 "4) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127421 and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the
complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"5) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127422 and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor maximum, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to
pay the complainant the sum of P11,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"6) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127423 and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum, as maximum and to pay
the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"7) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127425 and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay
the complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"8) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127426 and is therefore sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of
four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the
complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;

"9) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127427 and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the
complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid.

"As earlier stated, Criminal Case No. 93-127424 is dismissed for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence.

"SO ORDERED.

"Manila, September 20, 1995.

"(Sgd.) ZEUS C. ABROGAR

"Judge."

Hence, this appeal.21

In her brief, accused-appellant anchors her defense on the approval of her application for a license to recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her
a genuine holder of authority. She also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process. 22

On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was a non-licensee and had no authority to recruit anyone for overseas employment, and that she
failed to proffer any compelling reason to justify her request for the production of POEA records. 23

We find the appeal devoid of merit.

Appellant interposes the defense that the approval of her application for a service contractor's authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a retroactive effect as to
make all her previous recruitment activities valid. However, this issue was not raised in the trial court. She cannot now be allowed to raise it for the first time on
appeal without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.24

The records show that the license was not issued due to her failure to comply with post-licensing requirements. 25 It is the issuance of the license which makes the
holder thereof authorized to perform recruitment activities. The law specifically provides that "every license shall be valid for at least two (2) years from the date of
issuance unless sooner cancelled or revoked by the Secretary.26

Appellant herself admitted that she had no authority to recruit private complainants. thus:

ATTY. MONTERO (to witness):

Q:       Now what was the reply of Harmony Electronics Company when you questioned them about the use of your company?

A:       They wrote back to me and they told me that "never mind, we only need Cenon To-ong and Domingo Tersenio." But I told them that I am not in the
position to employ these people because I am not a licensed agency for that matter and they said that "I would just send you an authority and show this to
the pertaining government agency who could at least send these two people."

Q:       So what did you do after that?

A:       I told them to send me something if I can do the way out of it, I will ask anybody from my colleagues to do the hiring of these people.

Q:       Did you ask anybody from your colleagues to do the hiring of these two?

A:       I did but Alcamojar was not also licensed.

Q:       So what happened after that?

A:       I told Cenon because Cenon is much better to understand that, he looked for one company who could just or whom I can transfer the authority that
the Harmony Electronics would be sending me, so I will just transfer the authority to any agency who could send them back to Taiwan. 27

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Appellant cannot now claim that she was a genuine holder of authority from the Secretary of Labor and Employment to recruit factory workers for Harmony
Electronics Company based in Taiwan.

As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to compulsory process, we find the same to be without merit.

The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in one's behalf. 28 By
analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez29 which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant
must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will
be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.

In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated
February 3, 1994,30 as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then. 31

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision in toto, with costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140285             September 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (15th Division) and WILFRED N. CHIOK, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution 1 dated September 20, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340, entitled "Wilfred N. Chiok, petitioner, v. Hon. Marietta Legazpi, People of the Philippines, and Rufina
Chua, respondents."

The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:

Sometime in 1989, Rufina Chua met respondent Wilfred Chiok. He represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He then
encouraged Rufina to invest her money in stocks, requesting her to designate him as her stockbroker. On respondent's prodding, she agreed.

For several years, respondent acted as Rufina's stockbroker. She made a profit out of their transactions, prompting her to trust respondent in handling her stock
investments.

In 1995, respondent encouraged Rufina to purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her earning. Hence, in June 1995, she entrusted to him the amount
of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited the amount of P7,100,000.00 in respondent's account. With respect to the
remaining P2,463,900.00, she personally gave it to him. Thereupon, he told her to wait for one week. A week elapsed, but she did not hear from him. Upon her
inquiry, he advised her to wait for another week, but still there was no news from him. Finally, when she was able to contact him, he admitted that he spent the
money. At any rate, he issued two checks as payment but when she deposited them in the drawee bank, they were dishonored for insufficient funds.

In a letter dated October 25, 1995, Rufina demanded payment from respondent, but this remained unheeded.

Upon inquiry, Rufina came to know that respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. Immediately, she caused
the filing of an information for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 109927.

During the arraignment, respondent, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty and posted bail. Trial ensued.

Respondent denied the charge against him. He testified that he was not an employee of Bernard Securities, Inc.; that he buys and sells U.S. dollars and that Rufina
used to buy dollars from him; that what actually existed between them was an unregistered partnership; and that he received the amount of P9,563,900.00 as her
investment in their partnership.

After the presentation of the parties' evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. However, respondent and his counsel failed to
appear on said date. The promulgation was re-set to February 1, 1999.

On February 1, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. During the promulgation of the judgment, respondent and his counsel failed to appear despite
notice. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail on the ground that there is an indication that respondent might flee or commit another
crime.

On May 28, 1999, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting the prosecution's motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt of this order within which to surrender before this
Court, otherwise his arrest will be ordered.

SO ORDERED.

On June 18, 1999, respondent interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309.

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The following day or on June 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with Very Urgent Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction assailing the trial court's May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
53340.

Meanwhile, or on June 25, 1999, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against respondent for the reason that "he has not surrendered despite the lapse of the
given period (five days) as provided in the Omnibus Order dated May 28, 1999." The said warrant was returned unserved because he could not be found at his given
address.

Going back to CA-G.R. SP No. 53340, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the trial court's Omnibus Order.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated September 20, 1999, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that
the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the
probability of flight by respondent during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. The People of the Philippines, petitioner, contends that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the appellate court committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution of September 20,
1999.

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered its assailed Resolution of September 20, 1999 directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.

The trial court correctly cancelled respondent's bail because of his failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment despite notice. He violated the condition of
his bail that he must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules.2 Simply stated, he jumped bail. As such, his arrest, as ordered
by the trial court, is proper.3 This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides in part, thus:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. x x x

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. x x x

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Underscoring supplied)

The last paragraph of Section 6 quoted above authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of respondent's failure to appear despite notice. It bears
stressing that the rule authorizing promulgation in absentia  is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping
bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.4

Here, respondent tried in vain to subvert the judicial process by not appearing during the promulgation of judgment. Thus, he lost his remedies against the judgment.
In fact, he cannot challenge successfully the cancellation of his bail by the trial court. The Court of Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the arrest of respondent. Its
declaration that respondent might flee or commit another crime is conjectural utterly lacks merit. Respondent already demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The challenged Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340 directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent is REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92415             May 14, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX MAGUMNANG, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Paterno Aquino for defendants-appellants.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Highway robbery with homicide is a heinous offense. It is condemnable enough for a person to commit robbery by way of a holdup but if in the process human life is
taken, the criminal act is certainly detestable. No less than the death penalty provided by law should be meted out if we are to contain the proliferation of this odious
offense. Unfortunately, unless Congress and Malacañang act accordingly to consider by law this class of crimes as heinous offenses, the Courts must have to
comply with the constitutional injunction against the imposition of the supreme penalty.

The facts are accurately related by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City as follows:

It appears from the Evidence that Adolfo Quiambao is a businessman selling textile materials. He has a stall in the Hilltop Market in Baguio where he sells
his goods. But sometimes on weekends, he goes to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to sell his goods.

On September 19, 1987 at about 3:00 to 4:00 A.M., he went to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet using his Ford Fiera with his driver Felizardo Galvez and a
certain Jimmy Jetwani (a bombay), where he sold his goods in the afternoon until at night and so, stayed overnight thereat.

The next day, at about 7:00 A.M. of September 20, 1987, after breakfast, Adolfo Quiambao, his driver Felizardo Galvez, and Jimmy Jetwani proceeded to
Mankayan, Benguet. This time four Muslims rode with them, namely: Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang Aliman Bara-akal, and a certain Anwar Hadji Edris.

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Incidentally, Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang had previously rode once with Adolfo Quiambao in the latter's vehicle sometime September 13, 1987
while Anwar Hadji Edris (alias Randy) was known to Adolfo Quiambao for sometime already. They arrived in Mankayan at about 8:00 A.M. They stayed 4
hours in Mankayan to sell goods and collect from customers.

At about 12:00 noon of the same day of September 20, 1987, they, the same passengers previously, started from Mankayan going back to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, with one passenger added, Simeon Calama. At Abatan, Adolfo Quiambao collected amounts from his customers for about an hour.

At about 1:00 to 2:00 P.M. on September 20,1987, Adolfo Quiambao proceeded on his way back to Baguio They were 10 in all who rode in his Ford Fiera,
namely: (1) his driver Felizardo Galvez; (2) Jimmy Jetwani; (3) Simeon Calama, a son of his customer in Mankayan; (4) Rene Salonga, a friend with whom
he stayed in Abatan when he started his business; (5) Eduardo Lopez, a co-vendor who sells also goods in Abatan; (6) Omar Mapalao; (7) Rex
Magumnang; (8) Aliman Bara-akal; (9) Anwar Hadji Edris; and (10) Adolfo Quiambao himself.

On the way, they stopped at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet at about 3:00 P.M. where Jimmy Jetwani and Adolfo Quiambao collected their credits for less
than an hour.

From there, they proceeded to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet where they stopped at about 5:00 P.M. for Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani to collect their
credits. At Sayangan, too, they ate in a restaurant.

It was about 6:00 P.M. already when they left Sayangan to proceed to Baguio. But when they left Sayangan, Adolfo Quiambao noticed that there were
now 5 Muslims with apparently Gumanak Ompa joining them making them 11 passengers in all in his Ford Fiera.

On the way back to Baguio, after about an hour of driving, one of the passengers stopped the vehicle in order to urinate. So they all alighted to urinate. At
this point, Adolfo Quiambao took over driving telling his driver Felizardo Galvez to rest.

After about 30 minutes of driving from the time Adolfo Quiambao took over, one of the Muslims stopped the vehicle at Km. 24, Caliking Atok, Benguet, in
order to urinate. And so again they stopped with the Muslims alighting to urinate.

Thereafter, when Adolfo Quiambao was about to start the vehicle to proceed to Baguio, while waiting for the Muslims to board, Omar Mapalao went to the
left side of the vehicle near the driver's seat, pointed a gun (Exh. G) at Adolfo Quiambao and announced "This is a holdup." Another Muslim went to the
other side of the front seat while another Muslim went to the back to guard the back door of the Ford Fiera. And Gumanak Ompa and Rex Magumnang,
each armed with a knife, went inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives on the passengers. Forthwith, Omar Mapalao, while point the gun,
ordered all passengers in front to go inside the back of the vehicle. Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani complied. But as Adolfo Quiambao went inside
the back of the vehicle, he heard arguing outside and noticed a rumble and a commotion by the left side of the vehicle involving his driver, Felizardo
Galvez, and the Muslims. As a consequence, the driver Galvez was injured. Adolfo Quiambao pleaded that they are willing to give their money and
valuables provided they (the Muslims) will not harm them. Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa, while poking their knives on the passengers, divested
Adolfo Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jimmy Jetwani of P14,000.00, and Simeon Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, watch and clothes.

After divesting the passengers of their money, Rex Magumnang went to the driver's seat to start the vehicle but could not and so he called for Adolfo
Quiambao to start it. But Adolfo Quiambao, too, could not start the vehicle. Angered, Omar Mapalao started counting 1 to 3 threatening to shoot
Quiambao if the vehicle would not start. Adolfo Quimbao pleaded that he was not the driver and so called for Felizardo Galvez, despite the latter being
injured, to start the vehicle. After Galvez was able to start the engine, immediately Rex Magumnang went by the side of the driver, Galvez, and took hold
of the steering wheel while ordering the latter to step on the accelerator and proceed to the direction of the left side of the road towards the precipice
(bangin) indicating an intention to have the vehicle driven to the precipice. It was at this point when Galvez struggled and fought with Rex Magumnang for
control of the steering wheel as it was being directed to the ravine. It was good Galvez was able to step on the brakes on time to prevent it from falling into
the precipice It was then that Rex Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife on Galvez with the latter jerking saying "aray" in pain. At this point, too, the
passengers panicked and jumped out of the vehicle scampering in different directions for safety. Adolfo Quiambao jumped out into the ground first and
when he saw Mapalao pointing a gun at him he jumped into the precipice thinking it was better than to be shot at and in doing so hurt himself. The driver
Galvez fell to the ravine upon being stabbed. Jimmy Jetwani jumped out of the vehicle and ran to the mountains without looking back. Simeon Calama
and Eduardo Lopez and Rene Salonga, too, jumped out and sought safety on the road.

Meantime, a vegetable truck passed by and immediately Aliman Bara-akal boarded the same on the front seat with the driver. Eduardo Lopez also ran
after the same truck and boarded it at the back. Not far behind the first vegetable truck was another vegetable truck following it. Simeon Calama stopped it
asking for help but Omar Mapalao, with gun in his hand, prevented him. And so the second vegetable truck went on but before it could fully pass by,
Simeon Calama took the chance of boarding it when Omar Mapalao's attention was diverted.

Thus, the two vegetable trucks proceeded on their way till they stopped at the toll gate at Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Immediately, Simeon Calama and
Eduardo Lopez alighted and reported to the Police Station near the toll gate that they were help up and that one of the Muslims who held them up was in
the first truck parked near the toll gate. Aliman Bara-akal was, thus, arrested by the Tublay Police and the amount of P4,015.00 was recovered from him
when frisked at the Police Station.

Meanwhile, at the crime scene, the 3 Muslims left thereat, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa, fled to the mountains leaving their
victims and avoided the road so as not to be seen.

It is not clear on record where Anwar Hadji Edris (alias Randy) went after the holdup but in any case he eluded arrest.

After the Muslims have left, Adolfo Quiambao went up to the road level and by then saw also his driver Galvez wounded lying in the precipice

Thereafter, another vegetable truck passed by, and Adolfo Quiambao asked the driver to help them bring his wounded driver, Felizardo Galvez, from the
ravine. Thus, Galvez was brought up to the road and placed inside the Ford Fiera. The vegetable truck driver helped in starting the Ford Fiera. And from
there, they proceeded immediately to the Benguet Hospital at La Trinidad, Benguet, but when there was no doctor, they brought Galvez to the Baguio
General Hospital.

At the Baguio General Hospital, efforts to save the life of Felizardo Galvez proved futile as the next morning he died of his stab wounds.

Dr. Wi submitted an Autopsy Report (Exh. A) as follows:

I. STAB WOUNDS:

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 1. Right Mid-clavicular area, 7th Intercostal Space, penetrating with round edges, 0.5 x 0.5 cm.

2. Left Lumbar area, level 11th Intercostal Space, penetrating, with clean cut edges, 1.9 cm.

3. Anterior-superior right pre-auricular area, with clean cut edges, 3.5 cm., and 2 cm. deep.

4. Right Mid-clavicular area level 2nd rib, non penetrating, 3 x 0.7 cm., and 2 cm. deep.

5. Left anterior Deltoid area, 9.5 cm. (extended Surgically).

6. Posterior leaf of the left Diaphragm 3 cm. with hemorrhages around the wound.

7. Through and through, Right lower lobe of the Lung, 0.5 x 0.5 cm. with round edges.

II. INCISED WOUNDS:

1. Right lateral neck, superficial, 2 cm.

2. Left supraclavicular to left submandibular area, superficial, 12.5 cm.

3. Left upper arm, lateral area, 2 cm. and 2 mm. deep.

Dr. Wi also, submitted a sketch of the human body showing the stab wounds sustained in the body of Felizardo Galvez (Exh. B and Exh. C) and the Death
Certificate (Exh. D) showing the cause of death as Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Multiple Stab wounds at the right anterior superior and auricular
area, right anterior chest, left deltoid area, left lumbar area, posterior with laceration of the right lower lobe of the lung, etc.

Adolfo Quiambao was also treated of his injuries as shown in his Medical Certificate (Exh. E).

Subsequently, the Tublay Police were able to locate and apprehend on September 21, 1987 at Sto. Niño Tublay, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and
Gumanak Ompa.

Also, Jimmy Jetwani, who fled to the mountains at the scene of the incident was found and rescued the next morning after the holdup.

In a confrontation at the Tublay Police Station on September 22, 1987, Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama positively identified the four
(4) Muslims in custody, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Gumanak Ompa and Aliman Bara-akal as among those who held them up at the Halsema
Road (mountain trail), Km. 24, Caliking, Atok, Benguet.

Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama gave their statements (Exhs. F, M and N) to the police.

At the Tublay Police Station, too, the gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5) and the knife (Exh. G-6) used in the holdup
were recovered from the possession of Gumanak Ompa.

Finally, the policemen who apprehended Aliman Bara-akal at the toll gate executed a joint affidavit (Exhs. O and P) and the policemen who apprehended
Mapalao, Ompa and Magumnang at Sto. Niño Tublay, executed a joint affidavit (Exh. R).1

In due course, an amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and
Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532, which was allegedly committed on
September 20, 1987 at Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet.

Upon arraignment, accused Omar Mapalao, Gumanak Ompa, Rex Magumnang and Aliman Bara-akal, assisted by their counsel pleaded not guilty.

Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested and remained at large. On March 17, 1988, accused Aliman Bara-akal died in jail during the trial so the case was
dismissed as to him on April 4, 1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after being positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama
during the trial, escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General Hospital, so the trial in absentia continued
as to him.

After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990 convicting the accused of the offense charged as follows—

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Omar Mapalao y Dianalan, Gumanak Ompa, and Rex Magumnang guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
by direct participation, of the offense of Robbery with Homicide in a Highway in violation of PD 532, as charged, and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of deceased Felizardo Galvez the sum of Sixty Thousand
(P60,000.00) Pesos for his death; to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Adolfo Quiambao the sum of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00)
Pesos; Jimmy Jetwani the sum of Fourteen Thousand (P14,000.00) Pesos; and Simeon Calama, the sum of Three Thousand Seven Hundred (P3,700.00)
Pesos as actual damages, all indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused Omar Mapalao and Gumanak Ompa being detention prisoners are entitled to 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code in the service of their sentence.

The gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5), and the knife (Exh. G-6) being instruments of the crime are hereby declared
forfeited and confiscated in favor of the State.

SO ORDERED.2

Not so satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang appealed the decision to this Court alleging the following errors:

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 I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER SIGNIFICANT EXCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS IN THE CRIME CHARGED AND SENTENCING
THEM TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF FROM 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND 1 DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO
20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.3

Parenthetically, the appeal of appellant Rex Magumnang should be struck down. After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from confinement and had not
been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated.

Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.

The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the
judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be
afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in
court.

To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused,
who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or
counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or
is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.

By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.

In Gimenez vs. Nazareno,4 this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this wise—

First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the
arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private
respondent did in this case.

But the question is this—was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer
this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but
continues until the case is terminated.

To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the
law.

Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are
present; (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is
unjustified.

In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22,
1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is
evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent
escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.

The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only.

Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until
the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow
the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained:

. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings
against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not
continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence
cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is
the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that came should not go unpunished.

84
 The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is
untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure
to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a
right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.

Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:

. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of winch he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he
shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. . . .

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his
own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

Now to the appeal of appellant Omar Mapalao.

The main thrust of his appeal is a denial of his complicity. While he admitted to be among the passengers of the vehicle on that fateful day and to be present during
the holdup, he alleged that he did not participate at all in the commission of the crime and that he did not know anything about its commission as in fact he left with
Magumnang after the alleged holdup. He also asserted that the prosecution witnesses could not have identified him in view of the darkness of the night then. He said
that when they were apprehended by the police no firearm or money was found in his possession.

The Court finds that the appeal is devoid of merit.

The evidence shows very clearly that on the date of the holdup the appellant was already a passenger in the vehicle of Adolfo Quiambao since 7:00 A.M. of
September 20, 1987 which was driven by Felizardo Galvez, with Jimmy Jetwani, Quiambao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris and Calama.
They were together the whole day up to the evening in going to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet and in the afternoon of the same day they were also together on the way
back to Baguio from Abatan until the holdup occurred in the early evening of the same day at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok, Benguet. The Muslims stopped the vehicle to
urinate at said place. Appellant went to the left side of the vehicle near the driver's seat and pointed a gun at Quiambao and announced "this is a holdup." A Muslim
went to the other side of the front sea while another Muslim went to the back to stand guard. Gumanak Ompa and Rex Magumnang, each armed with a knife, went
inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives at the passengers. Appellant while pointing the gun ordered the passengers to go to the back of the vehicle
so Quiambao and Jetwani complied. After Quiambao went to the back of the vehicle he noticed a commotion near the left side of the vehicle involving his driver
Galvez and the Muslims. Galvez was harmed. Quiambao pleaded that they are willing to give their money and valuables provided the Muslims will not harm them.
Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa divested Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jetwani of P14,000.00 and Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, a watch and clothes while
poking their knives at them.

Magumnang lied to start the vehicle but as he could not he called Quiambao to start it but the latter also failed. Angered, the appellant started counting 1 to 3
threatening to shoot Quiambao if the vehicle did not start. Quiambao called Galvez who was able to start the engine. Magumnang went by the side of Galvez and
took the steering wheel and drove towards the precipice Galvez struggled and fought with Magumnang for control of the steering wheel as it was directed to the
ravine. Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife at Galvez. The passengers panicked and jumped and ran away in different directions. Mapalao, Magumnang and
Ompa fled to the mountains.

From the foregoing evidence of the prosecution there can be no question as to the participation of the appellant. 1âwphi1 in the robbery holdup. He was positively
identified by witnesses who were together with the appellant from the morning up to the evening of the same day in the Ford Fiera. Quiambao categorically testified
that it was the appellant who was holding the gun with two hands ordered them to give their cash collections and personal belongings to them.5 Jimmy Jetwani
corroborated Quiambao's testimony in that it was the appellant who ordered them at gunpoint to get down from the vehicle and to go to the back and to give their
money to them. Although it was already dark there was a light inside the vehicle.6

On cross-examination Jetwani stuck to his identification of the appellant as one of the culprits as he saw not only his face but the gun he used by the side of the door
facing him and Quiambao.7 Another prosecution witness, Simeon Calama, also identified appellant as the one who pointed a gun at them in front. He stated he is
familiar with his voice as during the journey they were joking with each other.8

The identification of the culprits in offenses of this nature is vital and decisive. 1âwphi1 In this case the identification was made by eyewitnesses who were together
with the appellant practically the whole day in the same vehicle, and who themselves are the victims of the holdup staged by the appellant with his other co-accused.
Although it was already dark there was light in the vehicle. Moreover, there were no other persons in the vicinity at the time of the holdup except the appellant, his co-
accused and the victims.

Contrary to the claim of appellant that he is innocent as he did not escape together with Edris who was allegedly the principal player in the holdup, the fact remains
that the appellant escaped to the mountains together with his co-accused Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa. Their escape is evidence of their guilt.

As the Court observed at the opening paragraph of this decision, robbery attended by homicide or murder is certainly a heinous offense, more so when in this case it
is committed in the highway. There is hardly any justification for the court to share the leniency of the trial court by imposing only the life imprisonment as penalty.
The circumstances of the commission of the offense do not justify at all or require any killing or injury to be inflicted on any of the victims. The appellant and his
confederates were all armed while the victims were not. They were at their mercy. None of them attempted to fight back or to resist. They gave all their valuables and
personal belongings. All they were pleading for was that their lives be spared. It fell on deaf ears. It was a senseless killing for no valid reason. The appellant and his
confederates deserve the supreme penalty of death and no less.

But as the Court said, this is not possible under the Constitution.

Our peace and order situation today is very volatile. We have experienced several attempted coups and we are warned of other possible coups. Our peace and order
problem is a continuing one. The division in our society is obvious and gaping. Our country is suffering from the economic depression caused not only by the recent
calamities that visited us which were compounded by the Gulf War. Thus, measures should be undertaken in order to minimize if not entirely prevent serious crimes
against life, chastity and of property resulting in the wanton taking of human life. Our hope is for a lasting peace and order in our society. A law must now be enacted
defining what are the heinous offenses punishable with the death penalty. We should not tarry too long.

85
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000.]

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO
MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and
THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it
warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the
prosecution as of the defense.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of
the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court.

Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present 1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer
Margaret Viviene Carmona.

Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, 2 but
the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. 3 It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy
of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further
inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3,
1986. 4

On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus 5 with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail,
the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, 6 the Second Division of this Court resolved —

". . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case
among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994
at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN
of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y
Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his
duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized
representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time of hearing." chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order 7 dismissing the case on
the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the
proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed Decision 8 affirming the decision of the trial court with the
modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original
records.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of merit, 9 petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors
of law: 10

I WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
PETITIONER’S CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.

COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS
FOR HIS INCARCERATION.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 11
and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner
further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that" [i]t is not the
fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those
records."cralaw virtua1aw library

In its Comment, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain
petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz.,
his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is
not authorized. Petitioner’s remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

86
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. 13 It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined
and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. 14 Consequently, the writ may also be availed
of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner’s claim is anchored
on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.

Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves
as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay" .

In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that —16

"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the
respondents, it appears clear and indubitable that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in
Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. . . . In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in
open Court by a personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay) . . ." (Emphasis supplied)chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary

Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993, 17 petitioner himself stated that —

"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;

2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (Emphasis supplied)

3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;

4. That whether the de officio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the
decision was promulgated.

5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau
of Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"

Petitioner’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, 18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as his
conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129," [a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.

The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 19 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People’s Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, 20 issued by the National Library, containing a short
news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to
"hearsay evidence, twice removed" 21 and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, 22 unless offered for
a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the
tenor of the news therein stated.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege
and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. 23 If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return
is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law,
the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be
considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts."cralaw virtua1aw library

Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioner’ s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court which provides that —

"SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), Accused was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid
Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful,
subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment
or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s release." chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents
and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its

87
judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. 24 Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by
habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction. 25 Thus, petitioner’s invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes
case, we granted the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that" [i]t does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly
established by a competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the
mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, 26 the
general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in
accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. 27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending
cases or finished cases. 28 There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights
and obligations finally adjudicated. 29

Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense." 30 Petitioner’s invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is
misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and
therefore" [t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any
legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of
Firearm, 31 the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139255. November 24, 2003.]

RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, Petitioner, v. HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, Respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 267, in Special Proceedings No. 10948 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner.chanrob1es virtual law library

The Antecedents

SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police (PNP) filed an application with the RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, for the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles listed therein at No. 17-21
Apple Street, Hensonville Homes, Balibago, Angeles City, and the seizure thereof for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. 2 Judge Bernardita G. Erum
granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 97-29 on November 29, 1997. 3 The search was conducted on the said date; articles were seized and the
petitioner and Bueta were apprehended and detained. Among the articles found in the possession of the petitioner was U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued on June
2, 1983 by the U.S. Embassy in Manila to and in the name of Raymond Michael Jackson, born on October 17, 1951 in South Dakota; and U.S. Passport No.
085238399 issued on August 15, 1996 by the New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana to and under the name of Steven Bernard Bator, born on August 20, 1949 in
Detroit, Michigan. 4

Another application for a search warrant was filed by SPO3 Pedro B. Barsana, Jr. with the RTC of Makati City for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code
for the search of the premises at No. 5518 Second Floor, Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner Pasay Road), Makati City under the contract of Raymond
Jackson a.k.a. Allen Miller and Bernard Bator and for the seizure of the articles described therein. Acting on the application on November 28, 1997, Judge Pedro N.
Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued Search Warrant No. 97-029. 5

On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-2078 was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City against the petitioner and
Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. 6

When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the United States Embassy in the
Philippines advised the Department of Justice on December 10, 1997 that the said passports had been cancelled. 7 Summary deportation proceedings were initiated
at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner docketed as SDO No. BOC 97-46. On December 11, 1997, the Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order ordering the summary deportation of the petitioner to his country of origin and directing the Chief of Civil Security Unit to
implement the order within three days from notice thereof, subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures — Office Memorandum No. ELM-97-
013. 8 In the meantime, the name of the petitioner was included in the blacklist of the CID. 9

Aside from the aforementioned criminal cases, other criminal cases were filed against Jackson with the RTC as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Criminal Case No. The Accused In What Court Cases

are Pending

1. 98-1155 Raymond Michael Jackson Makati RTC —

alias Allen Miller Branch 133

2. 98-903 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC —

Branch 135

3. 97-202 Raymond M. Jackson QC RTC —

a.k.a. Allen Miller and Branch 83

Jaime Bueta

4. 98-1152 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC —

88
Branch 135 10

On December 7, 1997, the Quezon City RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 97-202 after posting a P6,000 bail. 11

On September 18, 1998, the Makati RTC issued an order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 directing the CID to hold the departure of the petitioner from the Philippines
in view of the pending criminal cases against him. 12 On September 28, 1998, the Makati RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 98-1152
after he posted bail in the amount of P40,000. 13

On October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CID for the reconsideration of the BOC Order dated December 11, 1997 directing his
deportation. 14 He alleged inter alia that: (a) he was married to Lily Morales by whom he had two children: Cristina Jackson and Judaline Jackson; (b) his status was
converted into that of a permanent resident on September 30, 1987 under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act, as amended with Official Passport No. 3121487; (c)
his deportation from the Philippines would deprive him of the opportunity to defend himself in the criminal cases pending against him. He appended to his motion a
copy of his marriage contract with Lily Morales and their children’s birth certificates. On October 14, 1998, the CID issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 15

The petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which as of December 15, 1998 had not yet
been resolved, 16 pending the issuance of clearances from the NBI and PNP, travel documents and an airplane ticket.

On May 18, 1999, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the Anti-Fraud Unit in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, issued a certification that U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued to
and under the name of "Raymond Michael Jackson" and No. 085238399 issued to Steven Bernard Bator had been cancelled because the persons appearing in the
photographs affixed in the said passports did not match those appearing in the photographs affixed in the original applications for the issuance of the same. 17 The
CID issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 on May 21, 1999 for the petitioner’s arrest for being an undesirable alien under Section 37(a), paragraph 9 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, 18 based on the hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 and the certification of Vice Consul Tedd
Archabal. The petitioner was arrested by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia of the Foreign Intelligence and Liaison Office, PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, who turned him over to the CID on the said date. 19

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same
date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at
8:30 a.m.; (b) ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to whom the case would be raffled to conduct a hearing of the petition, to render judgment and to serve a copy of its
decision within two days from its promulgation. 20

In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the respondents alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on the basis of the
summary deportation order issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997 and of the hold departure order of the Makati RTC in Criminal Case No. 98-1155; the
petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by him. 21 On July
15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus. 22

The petitioner assails the decision of the RTC and prays for the reversal thereof, contending that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. RODRIGUEZ CANNOT ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST SINCE ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE THE SAME.

B. ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT RODRIGUEZ CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST, SUCH CAN ONLY BE ISSUED TO ENFORCE A FINAL
ORDER OF DEPORTATION; HOWEVER, IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION.

C. PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED. 23

The petitioner avers that under Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution, only judges are vested with authority to issue warrants for the arrest of persons,
including aliens. Even if it is assumed that the Commissioner of the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest, this is limited only to those cases where a final
order of deportation had already been issued by the BOC, and only for the purpose of implementing the said order. According to the petitioner, the order of
deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1999 is illegal; hence, null and void. The petitioner was not apprised of any specific charges filed against him with
the CID and was not heard on the said charges as required by law before the order was issued. The petitioner asserts that there was no probable cause for his arrest
by the CID and that the respondents even violated the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of Justice dated June 7, 1999. 24 The petitioner cited the ruling of the
Court in Lao Gi v. CA 25 to fortify his petition.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID is authorized under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to
issue warrants for the arrest of aliens on the CID’s finding of the existence of a ground for deportation. The petitioner cannot feign lack of due process because he
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the BOC denied on October 14, 1998.
When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued on May 21, 1999 to effect the arrest of the petitioner, it was on the basis of a final and executory order of deportation.
The RTC, for its part, held that (a) the petition was premature because the petitioner’s petition with the CID to lift the summary order of deportation had not yet been
resolved by the BOC of the CID; (b) the petition for habeas corpus was inappropriate because the petitioner was validly detained under a mission order issued by the
Commissioner based on the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997; (c) the petitioner is estopped from assailing his arrest and detention by
the CID.

The petition is dismissed.

Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that "except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test
the right under which he is detained. 26 Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged
authorized:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. 27

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening
events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. 28

89
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process
where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effects of such process. 29

Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in
pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be
considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.

In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Parañaque City,
under Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated December 11, 1997 which had become final and executory. The
BOC found, after due proceedings, that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Records show that on 10 December 1997, Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the Department of Justice that the U.S. passports
which were confiscated from the abovenamed respondent when he was arrested by PNP operatives in Angeles City on 30 November 1997 and purportedly issued to
Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to have been tampered. As a consequence, said passports were cancelled by the U.S.
Embassy.

In Schonemann v. Commissioner Santiago, Et Al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an
alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the summary deportation of NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL
JACKSON @ STEVEN BERNARD BATOR to his country of origin subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum Order
No. ELM-97-013.

The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is hereby ordered to implement this Order within three (03) days from receipt hereof.

Include respondent’s name on the Blacklist.

Give respondent a copy hereof. 30

The information relayed by U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene to the DOJ on December 10, 1997 was reiterated by U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal in his
certification forwarded to the DOJ on May 18, 1999, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CERTIFICATION

I, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the United States hereby certify that United States Passport Number Z4613110 issued June 2, 1983 at the U.S. Embassy, Manila in
the name of RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, born October 17, 1951 at South Dakota is a genuine United States Government document that has been altered and
photosubstituted.

I also certify that United States Passport Number 085238399 issued August 15, 1996 at the New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana, in the name of STEVEN
BERNARD BATOR, born August 20, 1949 at Detroit, Michigan, is a genuine United States Government document that has been altered and photosubstituted, as
well.

I further certify that a comparison of photographs affixed to U.S. Passports Number Z4613110 and 085238399 — which were seized by Philippine National Police
officers on or about November 29, 1997 from a man claiming to be Raymond Michael Jackson — and photographs affixed to the original applications for passports
number Z4613110 and 085238399 in the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator on file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC,
revealed that these are not/not the same people. 31

The petitioner’s arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to Section 37(a)(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which respectively
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 45. (d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false,
or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact;

x       x       x

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

x       x       x

(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Forty-five and Forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him:
...

In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 32 this Court held that such documents from a foreign embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports held by their national on
the ground that the said passports were tampered with; hence, cancelled were sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the
Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of the petitioner’s contention that his passport could not have been cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as
he was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show that the Philippine government was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.

Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese government belie the petitioner’s submission that there was no evidence to prove the
findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily, these documents constitute sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the landmark
case Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco," [t]he mere fact that a citizen or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to
his government, and his government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally request his return." 33

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in the CID and insist on being deprived by the BOC of his right to due process as prescribed for in
Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

90
(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion with the CID for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC. The petitioner
did not allege therein that he was not informed of the charges against him. In fact, the petitioner did not even rebut the claim of the U.S. Vice Consul that the passport
he was carrying was tampered and had been already cancelled. Neither did he allege that he requested for the reinstatement of his passport with the United States
Embassy. Despite the finality of the deportation order of the BOC, it still entertained the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration but denied the same on its findings that
there were inconsistencies in his sworn statement and the documents he presented in support of his motion, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order of 12 (sic) December 1997. Likewise, the same had long become final and executory.

Furthermore, the grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are irrelevant. The alleged marriage of respondent to a Filipina, a certain Lily Morales, with whom
respondent allegedly begot two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, and the supposed conversion of respondent’s status to permanent
resident on 30 September 1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA No. 613, as amended), does not change the fact that the two (2) US passports
purportedly issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator which were used by respondent, were tampered and subsequently cancelled by the U.S.
Embassy. Respondent already lost the privilege to remain in the country (Schonemann v. Comm. Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989).

It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn statement of respondent conducted by Special Prosecutor Henry B. Tubban on 5 December 1997
with the documents attached in the motion. Hereunder are the said inconsistencies:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

1. Annex "A" of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract between the respondent and one Lily H. Morales showing Manila City Hall as the place of marriage and
which was held on 6 September 1984.

In the Sworn Statement, the respondent claimed to have entered the country for the first time only in 1988 (p. 1 of sworn statement), that he married a certain Lily
Morales sometime in 1989 in Angeles City (p. 2 of sworn statement).

2. The motion stated that out of the union of the respondent with Ms. Morales, two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, were born. In
the sworn statement of the respondent, he stated that they have five (5) children.

In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex "A" of motion), it was stated that Ms. Morales is 17 years of age, a minor. However, below the personal circumstances of
the respondent and Mrs. Morales is a statement in bold letters that "BOTH PARTIES ARE OF LEGAL AGES."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing creates a serious doubt on the allegations in the motion and on the authenticity of the documents attached thereto. With more reason that the motion
should be denied. 34

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary
documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was
under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID. 35

The present as clearly as the petitioner’s petition to lift the order of deportation was as yet unresolved by the BOC when he filed the petition for habeas corpus.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145851. November 22, 2001

ABELARDO B. LICAROS, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The unreasonable delay of more than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the part of the accused and despite his earnest effort to have his case
decided, violates the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not only during the
trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted for decision.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to compel the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to dismiss Criminal Case
No. 6672 against herein petitioner, who is charged as an accessory.

The Facts

Undisputed by the special prosecutor 2 and the Sandiganbayan 3 are the material facts as narrated by petitioner in this wise:

4.1 On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the amount of P19,731,320.00.

4.2 In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to herein petitioner), one of the principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks
a substantial portion of the stolen money to the Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had its offices, of which herein petitioner was
then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr., then
Chairman of the Bank and father of herein petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept
secret; that Governor Licaros left for the United States on May 28, 1982 for his periodic medical check-up, so left to his son, herein petitioner, to attend to the
proposed deposit.

4.3 Even the prosecution admits in their Reply Memorandum that from the evidence presented, that in the evening of June 8, 1982, herein petitioner attempted to
report the incident to General Fabian Ver but he could not get in touch with him because the latter was then out of the country; that it was only the following day, June

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9, 1982, when herein petitioner was able to arrange a meeting with then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson, and
Central Bank Chief Security Officer, Rogelio Navarete, to report his suspicion that the money being deposited by Modesto Licaros may have been stolen money.
With the report or information supplied by herein petitioner, then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI Director Jolly Bugarin and soon after the meeting, the NBI,
Metrocom and [the] CB security guards joined forces for the recovery of the money and the apprehension of the principal accused.

4.4 All the aforesaid Central Bank officials executed sworn statements and testified for herein petitioner, particularly CB Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB Senior Deputy
Governor Gabriel Singson and CB Director of [the] Security and Transport Department Rogelio Navarette, and were one in saying that it was the report of herein
petitioner to the authorities that broke the case on 9 June 1982 and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and the arrest of all the
principal accused.

4.5 On July 6, 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor) filed an Information for robbery with the Sandiganbayan docketed as
Crim. Case No. 6672 against two groups of accused:

Principals:

(1) Modesto Licaros y Lacson, [P]rivate [I]ndividual

(2) Leo Flores y Manlangit, CB [S]ecurity [G]uard

(3) Ramon Dolor y Ponce, CB Assistant Regional Cashier

(4) Glicerio Balansin y Elaurza, CB Security [G]uard

(5) Rolando Quejada y Redequillo, Private Individual

(6) Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres, Private Individual

(7) Mario Lopez Vito y Dayungan, Private Individual

(8) Rogelio De la Cruz y Bodegon, Private Individual

Accessory After the Fact:

(1) Abelardo B. Licaros, Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Home Savings Bank and Trust Co. (HSBTC), Private Individual.

The Tanodbayan did not adopt the recommendation of the NBI that Abelardo B. Licaros be charged as principal apparently because no one of those whose
statements were taken including the above principal accused ever testified that he participated in the planning or execution of the robbery so that he could be held
also in the conspiracy as alleged by the NBI.

4.6 On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended Information naming the same persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as
an accessory, together with private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros. De la Cruz died on November 6, 1987 as per manifestation by his counsel dated and filed on
November 17, 1987.

4.7 On November 29, 1982, the accused were arraigned including herein petitioner, who interposed the plea of not guilty.

4.8 On January 7, 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Discharge of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness which was granted
in a Resolution dated February 11, 1983. The Supreme Court, however, on petition for certiorari filed by accused Flores, Modesto Licaros and Lopez Vito, annulled
the discharge because it ruled that the Sandiganbayan should have deferred its resolution on the motion to discharge until after the prosecution has presented all its
other evidence.

4.9 At the close of its evidence, or on July 23, 1984, the prosecution filed a second motion for discharge of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness but the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 13, 1984 denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does not furnish any cue or suggestion on what
petitioner will testify in the event he is discharged and placed on the stand as state witness.

4.10 Meanwhile, as of March 8, 1983, the prosecution has presented ten (10) witnesses. Among those who testified were NBI Agents Victor Bessat and Apollo Sayo,
who took and identified the sworn statements of accused Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Rogelio de la Cruz, Mario Lopez Vito and Modesto Licaros; M/Sgt Raynero
Galarosa, who took and identified the sworn statement of accused Pio Flores and the sworn supplemental statement of accused Glicerio Balansin; Sgt. Eliseo
Rioveros, who took and identified the sworn statement of accused Glicerus Balansin; and CIS Agent Maria Corazon Pantorial, who took the sworn statement of
accused Rolando Quejada. None of these witnesses, nor any of the principal accused who executed the sworn statements implicated herein petitioner to the crime of
robbery directly or indirectly.

4.11 On September 17, 1984, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. In a Resolution dated October 1, 1984, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
evidence covered by said formal offer and the prosecution [was] considered to have rested its case.

4.12 In a Resolution dated June 25, 1985, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions motion to reopen the case to allow its witness Lamberto Zuniga to testify on
the conspiracy and to identify a sworn statement given before the NBI on June 15, 1982. Having been established that petitioner was not part of the conspiracy, the
testimony had no materiality nor relevance to the case insofar as petitioner is concerned.

4.13 On January 14, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion for Separate Trial contending that the prosecution already closed its evidence and that his defense is separate
and distinct from the other accused, he having been charged only as accessory. The [Motion] was granted in an Order dated January 17, 1986.

4.14 Thereafter, herein petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. Aside from his testimony and that of his late father, former Central Bank Governor
Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioner presented the top officials of the Central Bank namely then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Senior Deputy Governor
Gabriel C. Singson, then Central Bank Security and Transport Dept. Chief Rogelio M. Navarette who identified their sworn statements taken before the investigators
and who testified that it was the petitioners report on June 9, 1982 that broke the case and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and
the apprehension of the principal accused.

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4.15 On August 8, 1986, petitioner filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On August 14, 1986, petitioner filed his Memorandum praying that judgment be rendered
acquitting him of the offense charged.

4.16 In a Resolution dated August 26, 1986, the Sandiganbayan, through Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the EDSA
revolution), admitted all the exhibits covered by said Formal Offer of Exhibits at the same time, ordering the prosecution to file its Reply Memorandum, thereafter the
case was deemed submitted for decision.

4.17 On September 26, 1986, the prosecution filed its Reply Memorandum. Petitioner also filed his Reply Memorandum on September 29, 1986 praying that
judgment be rendered acquitting him of the offense charged.

4.18 In a Resolution dated October 8, 1986 copy of which was received by petitioner on October 15, 1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the decision of the case
regarding herein petitioner until after the submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused.

4.19 Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 1986, but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated December 16, 1986 and promulgated on
January 6, 1987 denied the same, the dispositive portion of which read(s):

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by accused Abelardo B. Licaros is denied.

The decision as to the accusation against him will be rendered together with the accusation against the other accused without relating the evidence separately
presented at the separate proceeding held for the separate sets of accused one way or the other.

4.20 As admitted by the prosecution in its Comment on the Omnibus Motion dated March 31, 2000, the case was submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.

4.21 As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision.

4.22 The Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision even while the proceedings involving herein petitioner as an accessory in a separate trial were terminated as
early as October 8, 1986, while those against all the principal accused were deemed submit[t]ed for decision on June 20, 1990.

4.23 As early as October 16, 1986, herein petitioner already invoked his constitutional right to speedy justice when he filed a Motion on said date praying for, among
other things, that the Sandiganbayan reconsider its Resolution dated October 8, 1986 deferring the decision of the case against herein petitioner until after the
submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused and that a judgment of acquittal be rendered.

4.24 The Honorable Sandiganbayan has not also rendered a resolution on herein petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss filed on March 23, 2000 which was deemed
submitted for resolution on May 5, 2000, the last pleading having been filed on said date. In the said Omnibus Motion, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case
insofar as it involves herein petitioner for violation of his constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case. Sad to say, even this motion to dismiss has not been
acted upon.

4.25 On 15 August 2000, herein petitioner filed his Motion to Resolve. This was followed by Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on September 21, 2000.

4.26 Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision.
Hence, this petition.4

The Issues

Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the decision for more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed submitted for Decision is
tantamount to gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority.

The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the Decision for more than ten (10) years violated herein petitioners constitutional right to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the case.

Recent Decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court mandate the immediate dismissal of the case against herein petitioner.5cräläwvirtualibräry

In brief, the main issue is whether petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been violated. We shall also discuss, as a side issue, the
propriety of mandamus as a remedy under the circumstances in this case.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. 6

Main Issue: The Right to a Speedy Disposition

On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was deemed submitted for the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken by the anti-graft
court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the violation of his right to a speedy disposition. Unfortunately, even this
Motion has not been ruled upon by public respondent.

Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case from the time it is deemed submitted for decision.
Considering that the subject criminal case was submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the case

93
within the period prescribed by law. Even if we were to consider the period provided under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12 months from
the submission of the case for decision, the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform its mandated duty to render a decision on the case within the
period prescribed by law. Clearly then, the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long
expired. 7cräläwvirtualibräry

Even more important than the above periods within which the decision should have been rendered is the right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition of
ones case before any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body. 8 This constitutionally guaranteed right finds greater significance in a criminal case before a court
of justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of justice for the accused altogether. Indeed, the aphorism justice delayed is justice denied is by no
means a trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice.

Indubitably, there has been a transgression of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither that
court nor the special prosecutor contradicted his allegation of a ten-year delay in the disposition of his case. The special prosecutor in its Comment 9 even openly
admitted the date when the case had been deemed submitted for decision, as well as respondent courts failure to act on it despite petitioners several Motions to
resolve the case. The special prosecutor stated as follows:

With the termination of presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the principal accused in this case, the same was deemed submitted for decision on June 20,
1990.

Alleging violation by respondent court of his right to speedy disposition of the case, petitioner on March 23, 2000 filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. His motion was
deemed submitted for resolution by the respondent court on May 5, 2000.

On August 15, 2000, petitioner filed before the respondent court a Motion to Resolve and a month thereafter a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution. No decision
has yet been rendered by respondent court. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

For its part, the Sandiganbayan candidly admitted that the said criminal case had not been ruled upon all this time, because it was one of those cases that got
buried 11 in the archives during reorganization in that court. Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorenas explanation (contained in his Comment) is quoted in full
hereunder:

1. The factual narrative by the petitioner in the instant matter is substantially correct;

2. Indeed, originally petitioner Licaros had filed a Motion for Resolution of his portion of the case after he submitted his evidence separately;

3. Eventually, the instant case was submitted for decision;

4. Indeed, it would have been ripe to resolve the instant case including that portion which pertained to petitioner Licaros;

5. The matter was duly assigned for drafting of the decision (not the undersigned).

6. Sometime in 1995, a draft of the Decision was submitted for consideration by the other justices of the Division;

7. In the meantime, movements took place in the composition of the justices who constituted the First Division later.

8. In 1997, the entire Court was re-organized with the addition of two (2) new Divisions and six (6) new justices;

9. At this time, the cases in the Sandiganbayan, whether in progress or submitted were re-distributed from the original Divisions to which they had been raffled to the
new Divisions;

10. The instant case remained with this Division;

11. While the burden of each Division has considerably lightened, the new justices had to undergo an orientation in this Court;

12. Not all cases were immediately re-assigned to the different members. The instant case was one of them;

13. Then, this Court relocated to its present premises which required not only packing and crating the records but the problem of not being able to unpack them very
easily due to the absence of an adequate number of shelves and cabinets available;

14. Due to the difficulty in funds, the Philippine Estate Authority which was supposed to have provided new furniture including shelves and cabinets out of the
payments made to it, was unable to do so;

15. To this date, the three original Divisions do not have all the needed shelves and many records remain in cardboard boxes both in chambers and in the offices of
the Division Clerk of Court. (In the library and in the Archives, the boxes for books and old records remained unopened.);

16. In all this, the instant matter was one of those that got buried;

17. Significantly, when the records of this case were returned to the undersigned, the records of this case were not logged in the record book through some oversight
of his staff which the undersigned cannot explain so that it did not appear in the tracking process of the records of this office;

18. At this time, work is being done on the case for the preparation and finalization of the decision which the undersigned has taken upon himself.

19. Insofar as this Division is concerned, the responsibility for this situation belongs exclusively to the undersigned, both in his capacity as chairman and as Presiding
Justice;

The undersigned respectfully reiterates: there is indeed fault and the fault is exclusively that of the undersigned - for which the undersigned begs for the kindness of
this Honorable Court and humbly submits to its wisdom and judgment.12cräläwvirtualibräry

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Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 13 Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman  14and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 15  petitioner claims that he is entitled to a dismissal of
the criminal case against him. An unreasonable delay of three years in the disposition of a case violates the accuseds constitutional rights, as the Court explained
in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:

Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.16cräläwvirtualibräry

Because of an inordinate delay of more than six years in the disposition of Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, the High Court ordered its dismissal, as follows:

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving
the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutional guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him,
thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan x x x. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

More recently, in Roque et. al. v. Office of the Ombudsman,  the Court dismissed the criminal cases against petitioner therein, on the following explanation:

Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints
before him. More important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted
to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took
almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaint.18cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, the special prosecutor contends that the above-cited rulings of the Court should not apply to the present case, because what was involved in
those cases was a delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) with respect to the holding of a
preliminary investigation. He argues that the case against herein petitioner has already been proven by the ombudsman with the filing of the corresponding
Information before respondent court. Moreover, the prosecution has already fully discharged its mandated duty to present evidence against the accused. In other
words, the special prosecutor is of the view that the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of his case is not violated when the prosecution aspect of the case has
already been duly performed.

We cannot accept the special prosecutors limited and constrained interpretation of the constitutionally enshrined right to a speedy disposition of cases. It must be
understood that in the ordinary course of a criminal proceeding, a court is responsible for the ultimate disposition of the case. This is true irrespective of the
prosecutions punctual performance of its duty. Hence, notwithstanding the filing of the information, the presentation of evidence and the completion of the trial proper,
the eventual disposition of the case will still depend largely on the timely rendition of judgment by a court. And where it does not act promptly on the adjudication of a
case before it and within the period prescribed by law, the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced as when the prosecution is
prolonged or deferred indefinitely. Accordingly, with all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be looked upon with care and caution
when that case has already been submitted to the court for decision.

In Abadia v. Court of Appeals, 19 the Court had the occasion to rule on the nature and the extent as well as the broader protection afforded by the constitutional right
to the speedy disposition of a case, as compared with the right to a speedy trial. Thus, it ratiocinated as follows:

The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations
which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens, x x x and covers the periods before, during and after the trial,  affording broader
protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.20 (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held that a breach of the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case may have consequential effects, but it is not enough that there be some
procrastination in the proceedings. In order to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established that the proceedings have unquestionably been marred
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 21cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case before us, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of more than ten years after it was submitted for decision involves
more than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings. From the explanation given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle slumber,
allegedly due to reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics and facilities for case records. Had it not been for the filing of this Petition for Mandamus,
petitioner would not have seen any development in his case, much less the eventual disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now, with only
respondent courts assurance that at this time work is being done on the case for the preparation and finalization of the decision. 22cräläwvirtualibräry

In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court denied a Petition seeking to dismiss a criminal case grounded on an alleged violation of the accuseds right to a speedy
disposition. However, the accused in the said case was deemed to have slept on his rights by not asserting them at the earliest possible opportunity. The Court
explained its ruling in this wise:

In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled
from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to
follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the
new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioners absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the
accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.

xxx

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when respondent trial judge reset the case
for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right - a situation amounting to laches - had the respondent judge not taken the
initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case, The matter could have taken a
different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed
signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or
a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe the stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of
such right. 24cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant Petition, however, the accused had been assertively and assiduously invoking his right to a speedy disposition even before the case was submitted for
decision on June 20, 1990. 25 In fact, he has already filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, 26 a Motion to Resolve 27and a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution, 28 all
of which have fallen on deaf ears in the Sandiganbayan. Thus, in the light of the foregoing circumstances, he cannot be said to have slept on his rights, much less
waived the assertion thereof. Quite the contrary, he has been persistent in his demand for the eventual disposition of the criminal case against him.

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Indeed, petitioner has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which was deemed submitted for decision more than ten years ago. And though such
failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended by respondent court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused just as much vexation and oppression,
in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Hence, his reliance on the aforementioned cases for the dismissal of the criminal case against
him may be sustained, not so much on the basis of the right to a speedy trial, but on the right to a speedy disposition of his case, which is of broader and more
appropriate application under the circumstances.

In Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, 29 penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a speedy
disposition has been violated, as follows:

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.30cräläwvirtualibräry

As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed since the subject case has been deemed submitted for decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to
petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor undertaken any procedural device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been continuously
pushing for the resolution of his case even during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it is undeniable that such delay has caused much prejudice, distress
and anxiety to herein petitioner, whose career as bank executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved criminal prosecution,
virtually hanging like a Damocles sword over his head for more than a decade. We need not stress the consequences and problems inherent in this pending litigation
and/or criminal prosecution which include the prospects of unrealized business transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a
besmirched reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact due to his being a senior executive of
the bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified under the circumstances
and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above-cited case.

Procedural Issue: Mandamus as an Appropriate Remedy

Mandamus  is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by
the Constitution. 31 To reiterate, the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law. Correlatively, it is the
bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution, to speedily dispose of the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by
the Constitution, expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 32cräläwvirtualibräry

Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a discretionary duty. 33 More specifically, persons or public officials may be
directed to act with or to exercise discretion, but not as to how that discretion should be exercised. However, our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions in this
matter. Thus, it has been held that in a case where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, the writ may be issued to
control precisely the exercise of such discretion. 34cräläwvirtualibräry

As discussed above, the Sandiganbayans inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case.
Such undue delay can be characterized as no less than a grave abuse of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of petitioner. In view of these
circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and will justify this Courts action of substituting the discretion of respondent with that of its own.

In the very recent case Lopez Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman et al., 35 the Court deemed it appropriate to dismiss directly the criminal suit before the Sandiganbayan
in the interest of the speedy disposition thereof. Thus, it ruled as follows:

x x x [T]his Court applying the ruling in the Roque case, citing Tatad, likewise resolves to directly dismiss the informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner in the interest of the speedy disposition of case x x x.

We find that the circumstances obtaining in the action cited above are similar to those in the instant Petition and thus warrant the same course of action; namely,
dismissal of the case against herein petitioner. However, no administrative sanction against respondent court or its members can be meted out in the present
proceedings. Due process requires that before such penalty can be imposed, the proper administrative proceedings must be conducted, as in fact one is already
being undertaken in AM No. 00-8-05-SC entitled Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following
circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by reason of this long delay;
(3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4) he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5) he
did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any
valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted that the case was one of those that got buried during its reorganization, and (7) petitioner was merely
charged as an accessory after the fact.

For too long, petitioner has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the ultimate resolution of his case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is completely
attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his constitutional right to speedy
disposition and to grant him speedy justice.

WHEREFORE , the Petition is hereby GRANTED and, as against petitioner, Criminal Case No. 6672 pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165975               September 13, 2007

PAYAKAN G. TILENDO, Petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order assails the 13 January 2004 Resolution 2 and the 14 October 2004 Order3 of
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in Case No. OMB-M-C-02-0632-K. The Ombudsman found probable cause against Payakan G. Tilendo (Tilendo) for

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malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The Facts

In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College (CCSPC).

In 1996, the CCSPC had an appropriation of ₱6 million for the construction of its Agriculture Building and Science Academic Building. 4 The Department of Budget
and Management Regional Office in Cotabato City released ₱5.7 million to the CCSPC, after deducting the 5% reserve. Out of this amount, ₱3,496,797 was
allocated for the construction of the Agriculture Building. The release of this amount to CCSPC was evidenced by the following Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA): (a)
₱237,500 per NCA dated 23 January 1996; (b) ₱702,640 per NCA dated 3 June 1996; (c) ₱763,477 per NCA dated 19 September 1996; and (d) ₱1,793,180 per
NCA dated 4 October 1996.

In December 1998, the "Concerned Faculty Members" of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.

The complaint basically alleged that Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was President of the CCSPC, using government funds for personal purposes.
The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building. The complaint
pertinently reads:

3. Sometime in the late part of 1995, the decades-old academic main building was demolished on instruction of Dr. Tilendo. Coincidentally, an allotment of
₱6,000,000.00 was released by the Department of Budget and Management for the construction of an agricultural building in the college satellite campus at
Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. x x x There are no engineering designs, plans and bill of materials. The contractor, Mr. Mohammad Oliver Uka, who is his
nephew was so obedient to Dr. Tilendo that he blindly obeyed his instructions.

Instead of utilizing the allotment for putting-up the agricultural building, he only instructed Mr. Uka to buy steel bars, cement, sand and gravel and hollow blocks.
Other materials like lumber. G.I. sheets were taken from the scrap materials of the demolished academic school building. x x x This illegal act was in connivance with
his nephew-contractor MR. MOHAMMAD OLIVER "BOY" UKA who is subservient to all the wishes and decisions of his uncle Dr. Tilendo. We believe that only an
actual inspection of the building can prove the truth. He and his Budget Officer MR. PASTOR T. TAGURA has (sic) many ways to conceal facts and justify their
actions. Any document that will show an implementation of the project is a mere fabrication in cahoots with other government officials to cover-up his anomalous
activities and enrich himself while in office.

The conversion of [Tilendo’s] 2-door apartment into a 3-storey building took place while the agricultural building is being constructed. Truckloads of construction
materials were delivered from the Pigcawayan Hardware in the Poblacion Pigcawayan, Cotabato and other hardware in Cotabato City to two (2) destinations – his
house in Pigcawayan and the house of his 3rd wife, MS. SAMSIA IBRAHIM.5

On 2 February 1999, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao) forwarded the anonymous complaint, docketed as CPL-
MIN-99-003, to the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (Ministry of Education) for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.

The Ministry of Education transmitted the complaint to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the CCSPC to decide on who should conduct the investigation.

In a letter dated 19 March 1999, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman Angel C. Alcala instructed CHED Region XII Director, Dr. Carmen V. Dormitorio
(Dormitorio), to form and head a committee, together with two other members, which would investigate on the complaints against Tilendo, among others.

On 28 June 1999, the two investigating members of Dormitorio’s committee reported that it was the Commission on Audit (COA) which could determine whether the
government funds were properly used or misused. The CHED alleged that it had neither the authority to examine the CCSPC’s records nor the technical knowledge
of government accounting and auditing procedures.

The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-
finding investigation.

Subsequently, the NBI subpoenaed Tilendo several times and informed him of the complaints against him. 6 Tilendo, through counsel, requested for several
extensions of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It was only on 22 October 1999 that he filed his counter-affidavit. 7

On 10 March 2000, the NBI filed a Report on the investigation confirming that, despite the ₱10,080,000 three-year allocation for the construction of the Agriculture
Building, only ₱300,000 was actually used for this construction project. Further, only scrap materials from the old Administrative Building were used. The pertinent
portions of the report read:

Investigation conducted disclosed that the construction of Agricultural Building a[t] Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao has an appropriation of ₱10,800,000.00
in three years broken down as follows, i.e., in 1996 GAA ₱6,000,000.00, in 1997 GAA ₱1,080,000.00 and in 1998 GAA ₱3,000,000.00. Witnesses alleged that the
project was constructed without the necessary Engineering Designs, Plans and Programs of Work. Most of the materials used were scrap materials of the
demolished Old Administrative Building at CCSPC Campus, Cotabato City and the estimated amount spent for the said project did not exceed ₱300,000.00. The
said allegations were corroborated by the COA Special Audit finding conducted on September 1996. The same COA report further states that the balance was used
in the construction of the Science Building and the Makeshift Building at Main Campus. However, the realignment of such funds do not have the AUTHORITY from
the DBM. Inspection conducted by the NBI Investigators disclosed that the project at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao was not completed and some of the
materials used were indeed scrap.8

xxxx

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

xxx

The alleged Program of Works prepared by ENGR. HASANADDIN S. MAMA, designated Project Engineer of CCSPC in 1996 per directive of [Tilendo] did not jibe or
correspond to the ₱6 million appropriation of the said project without mentioning the additional budget of the project in 1997 and 1998, as what was prepared was
only ₱1.05 million budget only.

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The Counter-Affidavit of President Payakan G. Tilendo did not fully explain the ₱6 million budget of the Construction of Agricultural Building at Rebuken Sultan,
Kudarat, Maguindanao which is the subject of this investigation, rather it pertains to the Construction of Extension (4th Floor) of Academic Building in the amount of
₱1,865,000.00. x x x

The admission of [Tilendo] in his Counter-Affidavit that the project had been completed in accordance with the funds duly allocated thereto, and in consonance with
the government bidding procedures, Accounting and Auditing regulations and all other legal documents are devoid of merit considering that the documents submitted
showed that it did not respond to the questioned project.

The attached publication of the Invitation to Bid dated February 27 to March 1, 1997 which is published one year after the project or the Construction of the
Agricultural Building at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao was started sometime in April 1996. The alleged publication seems to be that of the Construction of
the Extension of Academic Building. In the instant case, NO AUTHORITY FOR THE REALIGNMENT OF FUNDS FROM DBM was given to the CCSPC
Management.9

On 26 April 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report charging Tilendo, Samaon A. Ebrahim, Wilhelmina B. Monte de Ramos, and Abdulla
Oliver Uka with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC.

In January 2003, Tilendo filed his counter-affidavit,10 alleging, among others, that the "dragging of the case for more than three years in preliminary investigation
stage without his fault is violative of his right to speedy disposition of cases." Tilendo also denied the allegations against him, insisting that the complaint was aimed
purely at harassing him. Tilendo claimed that the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building was completed using the funds allocated for it, and following
government bidding procedures and auditing regulations.

In its Resolution dated 13 January 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao disposed of the complaint, as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to believe that the crime of Malversation and Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were
committed and that respondent DR. PAYAKAN G. TILENDO is probably guilty thereof. Consequently, let the herein attached Informations be filed with the proper
court.

Further, the charges against respondents SAMAON A. EBRAHIM, WHILHELMINA B. MONTE DE RAMOS, ABDULLA OLIVER UKA, and NESTOR VILLARIN are
hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

Lastly, the National Bureau of Investigation is hereby directed to forward to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original copy of their report, subject matter of the
instant case, together with its annexes.

SO RESOLVED.11

Tilendo moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in its Order dated 14 October 2004.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

The Ombudsman found that since Tilendo received the ₱3,496,797 appropriated and released to the CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture Building, Tilendo,
as head of the CCSPC, is accountable for this amount. Tilendo, however, failed to account for the fund.

The Ombudsman found several lapses in the disbursement of the funds making it impossible for Tilendo to liquidate the amount. First, the construction of the
Agriculture Building was haphazardly done. Second, there was no bidding for the construction project as required by law. Third, scrap materials were used in the
construction. Fourth, there was no showing when the construction was completed and whether the construction was according to the alleged plans. Finally, the funds
for the construction of the Agriculture Building were used for another building within the CCSPC main campus. However, Tilendo failed to show the actual amount
used for the construction of this other building.

The Ombudsman also found that Tilendo’s acts caused undue injury to the government through bad faith. The amount released for the construction of the Agriculture
Building could not be liquidated and was presumed to have been lost due to Tilendo’s misappropriation. The use of scrap materials for the construction of a
supposedly new building, while it might bring savings to the government, was actually hazardous to the lives of those who would use the building.

The Issues

Tilendo seeks the reversal of the assailed resolutions on the following grounds:

1. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disregarding his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases.

2. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against him for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. 12

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

On Tilendo’s right to speedy disposition of cases

Tilendo contends that the cases against him dragged for more than three years in preliminary investigation phase without his fault. The anonymous letters addressed
to the Ombudsman were dated 4 and 28 December 1998. The Ombudsman referred the matter to the NBI which required Tilendo to file his counter-affidavit, which
he did only on 22 October 1999. Nothing was heard from the NBI or the Ombudsman until January 2003 when the Ombudsman directed Tilendo to submit his

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counter-affidavit to the various criminal charges against him. According to Tilendo, the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates his
right to speedy disposition of cases.

The right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is enshrined in the Constitution. Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." This right, however, is considered violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are absent in this case. 13

The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. 14 A simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined.15 In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors
must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
by the delay.16

In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a
complaint against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary investigation did not
automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman. 17

Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and
administrative complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly states that "upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be: (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the proper government
office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; or (e) referred for administrative
adjudication; or (f) subjected to a preliminary investigation."

Significantly, the Court held in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,18 that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be
conducted by the Ombudsman.

In this case, after the fact-finding investigation, the NBI reported its findings to the Ombudsman and consequently filed a complaint against Tilendo for various
criminal charges. If we consider the fact-finding investigation conducted by the NBI as part of the preliminary investigation stage, then the NBI served a conflicting
role. The NBI acted as the investigating body on the charges against Tilendo, and thereafter, acted as the complainant against Tilendo. This is absurd. What the NBI
clearly did, in accordance with Section 2(d) of Rule II of AO 7, was to analyze the facts and gather evidence which could either exonerate or further implicate Tilendo
in the offenses charged.

Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct preliminary investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman,
to wit:

1) Ombudsman Investigators;

2) Special Prosecuting Officers;

3) Deputized Prosecutors;

4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.

Even assuming there was delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to have slept on his right to a speedy disposition of cases. From
22 October 1999, when he submitted to the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December 2002. It seems
that Tilendo was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him. He did not take any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the matter. Tilendo’s inaction gives the impression that he did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it was impliedly with his
acquiescence.19 He did not make any overt act like, for instance, filing a motion for early resolution. He asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases only when
the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao required him to file his counter-affidavit to the NBI complaint.

Tilendo’s contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases must fail. There was no unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the resolution
of the complaints against him in the preliminary investigation phase.

On the finding of probable cause for the offenses charged

The Ombudsman conducts preliminary investigations in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions in Section 4, Rule II of
AO 7.

A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.20 Stated differently, during the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor, or the
Ombudsman in this case, determines whether there is probable cause to hold the respondent for trial. 1âwphi1

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."21

In this case, the Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Article 217 of the RPC states:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer: x x x

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:

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SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause to accord respect to the discretion granted to the Ombudsman and
for reasons of practicality. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the Ombudsman’s findings in preliminary investigations. 22 An exception to
this rule is where the Ombudsman abused his discretion by ignoring clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused
his right to substantive and procedural due process.23 Here, no such conduct can be imputed on the Ombudsman. Thus, we apply the rule.

The Ombudsman found that Tilendo failed to account for the subject funds. According to the Ombudsman, it would even be an impossibility to account for the funds
due to the various lapses in its disbursement. The Ombudsman cited the haphazard construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence of any bidding required by
law, the usage of scrap materials, the failure to show the completion date of the building, and the failure to show the actual amount spent for the construction of
another building within the CCSPC main campus.

Tilendo’s claims of non-receipt of the subject funds, as well as his good faith in the transfer of the Agriculture Building to the main campus, constitute evidentiary
matters that must be ventilated in a full-blown trial and not during the preliminary investigation. The presence or absence of the elements of the crimes, which are by
their nature evidentiary and defense matters, can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. What is presented is evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.24

Whether Tilendo, as a public officer, had custody or control of the funds allocated for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building, and whether he
misappropriated the same are matters requiring an examination of the parties’ evidence, which are not found in the case records and which can be properly threshed
out during the trial.

Based on the records, Tilendo, as President of the CCSPC, after being asked to liquidate the amount released to the CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture
Building, failed to account for the funds. Thus, the presumption that he misused or misappropriated the funds arises, resulting to the finding of probable cause for
malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. On the other hand, the haphazard construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence of any bidding for its construction,
the usage of scrap materials for the construction of a school building in CCSPC, and the lack of engineering plans clearly demonstrate undue injury to the
government. These circumstances support the finding of probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Whether there was bad faith on Tilendo’s part is a
different matter which necessarily is subject to proof.

Further, nowhere in the records did Tilendo sufficiently rebut the Ombudsman’s findings or clearly explain what actually happened to the construction project. Tilendo
admits that there was no construction of the Agriculture Building in Rebuken in 1996. Instead, a school building was constructed using funds from the CCSPC’s
MOOE, which construction project used scrap materials taken from the demolished main building. 25 He also claims that the construction of the Agriculture Building
had to be transferred due to the peace and order problem in the original site. During the fact-finding investigation, Tilendo submitted an "Invitation to Bid" which was
published in the 23 February-1 March 1997 issue of The Mindanao Newscast,26 but there was no evidence that a bidding was held on the scheduled dates. He also
presented documents pertaining to the construction of the Academic Building and a make-shift building, not the Agriculture Building, such as (1) a "Notice of Award"
to Esperanza Gold Construction for the extension (4th floor) of the Academic Building in the amount of ₱1,865,000;27 (2) a list of materials and labor requirements
with their corresponding value;28 and (3) floor plans.29 Instead of showing completion of the Agriculture Building, Tilendo introduced an "Inspection/Evaluation Report"
dated 30 April 1999 referring to the 54.71% accomplishment of the construction of a two-storey Main Library Building inside the CCSPC Campus worth more than
₱5.2 million and whose contractor was "FFJJ Construction."30

Tilendo insists that he merely exercised administrative supervision and points to the CCSPC treasury as the recipient of the funds and to the foreman, engineers, and
workers as the ones who made the expenses for the construction. Apparently, Tilendo is suggesting that these personnel were responsible for the misuse or
misappropriation of the funds. However, Tilendo miserably failed to substantiate his allegations. He did not even attempt to mention names to clear his own name.
Tilendo seems contented with alleging that these personnel "made the liquidations of the amounts they spent for the construction."31 Aside from this bare allegation,
Tilendo did not introduce any convincing evidence that he had no participation whatsoever with the unsatisfactory construction of the Agriculture Building and the
apparent wastage or diversion of the public funds.

Thus, we sustain the finding of probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

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