RD File 2

Case 3:22-cv-00396-KHJ-MTP Document 14 Filed 08/16/22 Page 1 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC. PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22cv396-KHJ-MTP
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
The settlement conference scheduled for August 26, 2022 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 6C,
United States Courthouse, 501 E. Court Street, Jackson, Mississippi will be held under the
following terms and conditions.
1. PRIOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED. The settlement
conference is not a vehicle to facilitate the commencement of settlement negotiations. By not
later than August 22, 2022, the parties must have exchanged at least one written settlement
demand and one written settlement offer. The parties must employ these discussions with the
intent that the case actually be settled, if possible, without court participation. In other words,
the parties and their counsel have an affirmative, good faith duty to take settlement discussions
as far as reasonably possible without the assistance of the court.
2. INDIVIDUALS WITH FULL AUTHORITY. Counsel, the parties, and
representatives with full settlement authority must be present.
3. CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT STATEMENTS. The court directs the parties
to submit a confidential written memorandum by August 22, 2022 via e-mail
(parker_chambers@mssd.uscourts.gov). The memorandum shall set forth the following: (a) the
relevant positions of the parties concerning factual issues, issues of law, and damages along with
a candid assessment of those positions; (b) the settlement negotiation history of the case,
including a recitation of the specific demands and offers that have been conveyed; (c) the names
and positions of the individuals who will be attending the settlement conference; and (d) possible
settlement figures. It will not suffice for a party to simply mention that it is prepared to negotiate
in good faith. The memo should include a settlement amount or range for which the party is
agreeable to settle. The memo should not exceed five (5) pages in length. The memo will not be
made a part of the case file or shared with any other party. Any party who fails to submit the
required memoranda may be subject to sanctions.
4. PRESENTATIONS AT SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. The attorneys must be
prepared to give, if requested by the magistrate judge, a brief presentation (five minutes or less),
similar to an opening statement, outlining the factual and legal strengths of their case. The
parties also may be permitted, if they wish, to make brief statements. The judge will then hold
separate, confidential caucuses with each party.
5. CONFIDENTIALITY. The purpose of the settlement conference is to effectuate
settlement of the case if possible, but the settlement conference will be conducted in such a
manner as not to prejudice any party in the event settlement is not reached. All matters
communicated to the settlement conference judge in confidence will be kept confidential by the
judge, and will not be disclosed to any other party.
6. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AND EXPENSES. If a party appears at the settlement
conference without having complied with the requirements of this order, then the court may
cancel the settlement conference and assess against the noncomplying party, attorney, or both,
reasonable fees and expenses incurred by other parties in attending the settlement conference, as
well as any expenses incurred by the court in attending the settlement conference.
SO ORDERED on this 16th day of August, 2022.
s/ Michael T. Parker
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION
VS. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-00396-KHJ-MTP
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT
THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON,

MISSISSIPPI INTERVENOR
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON,

MISSISSIPPI’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF
LAW (DOCS. 009)
COMES now Richard’s Disposal Inc., (“RDI”), and files this, its Response and
Opposition to the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi’s Motion to Intervene and Supporting
Memorandum of Law (Doc. 009). RDI, in support of its Response and Opposition, shows the
following:
1. The City of Jackson is a statutorily recognized governmental entity that can sue
and be sued under Miss. Code §21-17-1(1) and the City of Jackson is
represented by the Jackson City Attorney Office, which has filed an answer on
behalf of Defendant City of Jackson. The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi
(“CC”) is one branch of the City of Jackson, and its interests are represented by
the Jackson City Attorney Office, which has filed an Answer (Doc. 10) herein.
2. CC’s Motion (Docs 009) to Intervene neither identifies nor attaches any valid
Order of the City of Jackson authorizing it to file a Motion to Intervene.
3. CC is not a statutory governmental entity, separate and distinct from the City of
Jackson.
Page 1 of 4
4. CC has no authority to superintend control of the officers and affairs of the
municipality (City of Jackson). Therefore CC, as the legislative branch, is not
authorized to control litigation by or against the City of Jackson.
5. Herein, RDI and the City of Jackson, Mississippi, are the only real parties in
interest in the above-styled and number cause.
6. No federal statute gives the CC an unconditional right to intervene in the above-
styled and numbered cause.
7. CC does not have a conditional right to intervene granted by any federal statute.
8. CC does not have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of this action and is not sign situated that disposal of the action may as a
practical matter in pair on pied CC’s ability to protect its interest.
9. CC does not have a claim of defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact.
10. The claim of RDI herein is not based on a statute or executive order administered
by CC.
11. The claim of RDI herein is not based on the validity of a contract.
12. The claim of RDI herein is based on Miss. Code Ann. §31-7-57(2)
13. The claim of RDI herein is not based on any regulation, order, requirement, or
agreement issued or made under a statute or executive order administered by CC.
14. CC’s Motion (Doc. 009) contains violations of L. U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2).
15. CC’s Motion (Doc. 009) does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P 26(c)
16. Plaintiff incorporates by reference its Memorandum of Law in Support of its
Opposition to CC’s Motion to Intervene (Docs. 009) which is being filed
simultaneously with this Response In Opposition.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Richard Disposal Inc. prays that the Court enters an order
overruling and denying the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi’s Motion to Intervene and
Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 009).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
RICHARD’S DISPOSAL INC.
BY:/s/ John L. Walker

JOHN L. WALKER MSB (#6883)
GLORIA J. GREEN (MSB#4989)
WALKER GROUP, PC
1410 LIVINGSTON RD, SUITE A
P.O. BOX 22849
JACKSON, MS 39225-2849
PHONE (601) 948-4589
FAX: (601) 354-2507
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I electronically filed the above document with the Clerk of the Court using
the Court's electronic filing system, which sent notification of the filing to all attorneys of record.
This the 12th day of August 2022.
/s/ John L. Walker

JOHN L. WALKER
Page 4 of 4

FOR THE SOUTHER DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
VS. CAUSE NO. : 3 :22-CV-00396-KHJ-MTP

ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, and CROSSCLAIM of INTERVENOR

THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
COMES NOW Intervenor The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, Mississippi (“The
City Council”), specially appearing at this time out of an abundance of caution, pending a ruling
from this Court on its Motion to Intervene [ECF Doc. #8], and files this, its Answer and
Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint [ECF Doc. #1] filed by Plaintiff in this matter and its
Crossclaim against the Mayor of Jackson Chokwe A. Lumumba. In support thereof, The City
Council would show this Court the following, to-wit:
ANSWER
Regarding the first, unnumbered paragraph of the Complaint, Defendant The City
Council of Jackson, Mississippi denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief it seeks; additionally,
it is specifically denied that
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

1. The City Council is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of
paragraph 1, to the extent a response from The City Council is required, the
allegations are admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.
4. Admitted.
FACTS
5. Admitted.
6. Regarding the allegations contained in paragraph 6, it is admitted that the City entered
into an agreement with a prior vendor as shown in Exhibit B to the Complaint, but it
is denied that the City entered into the proposed agreement attached as Exhibit C to
the Complaint.
7. The allegations contained in paragraph 7 do not appear to be directed at The City
Council; thus, no response from The City Council is required. To the extent a
response from The City Council is required, all allegations in paragraph 7 are
admitted; however, it is denied that the Mayor had the legal authority to submit a
Notice to Proceed and request it be returned and executed by Richard’s.
admitted; however, it is denied that the Mayor had the legal authority to submit a
Notice to Proceed and request it be returned and executed by Richard’s.
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admitted.
admitted; however, it is denied that the Mayor had the legal authority to send the
letter.
11. It is admitted that the City Council, as alleged in paragraph 11 of the Complaint, did
not approve the proposed Order submitted by the Mayor attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit F.
12. Admitted.
13. Admitted.
14. Admitted.
15. The allegations contained in paragraph 15 are admitted except for the allegation that
the City Council issued any directive to the Mayor or City or RDI for RDI to begin
collecting garbage, which is specifically denied.
16. It is admitted RDI submitted two invoices, but it is denied that those two invoices are
for “agreed-upon fair market value of its services.”
17. It is admitted RDI submitted two invoices, but it is denied that those two invoices are
for “agreed-upon fair market value of its services.”
18. Denied.
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19. Admitted.
20. Denied.
21. Denied.
CAUSES OF ACTION
QUANTUM MERUIT
22. In response to paragraph 22, The City Council reincorporates into its response to
Causes of Action – Quantum Meruit of the Complaint all statements and information
already contained in this Answer in paragraphs 1-21, above.
23. Denied.
24. Admitted.
25. Admitted.
denied.
denied.
28. Denied as stated.
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denied.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
30. In response to paragraph 30, The City Council reincorporates into its response to
Causes of Action - Unjust Enrichment of the Complaint all statements and
information already contained in this Answer in paragraphs 1-29, above.
denied; it is denied the City of Jackson requested those services from the Plaintiff.
32. Admitted.
33. The allegations contained in paragraph 33 are admitted except for the allegation that
the City of Jackson had given its express authorization and approval, which is
specifically denied.
34. Admitted.
35. Admitted.
36. Denied as stated; it is specifically denied that Jackson requested RDI’s services.
37. Denied.
38. Denied.
39. Denied.
DAMAGES
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40. In response to paragraph 40, This Defendant reincorporates into its response to
Damages of the Complaint all statements and information already contained in this
Answer in paragraphs 1-40, above.
41. Denied.
42. Denied.
43. Denied as stated; it is specifically denied that RDI is entitled to attorney’s fees.
44. In response to the last, unnumbered paragraph of the Complaint which begins,
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,” The City Council denies Plaintiff is
entitled to any other relief, general and specific, based upon the pleadings and
averments contained therein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The City Council never approved any contract from Plaintiff RDI. “[P]ublic boards
speak only through their minutes and that their acts are evidenced solely by entries on their
minutes.” Singing River MOB, LLC v. Jackson Cnty., Nos. 2019-IA-01630-SCT, 2019-IA-
01653-SCT, 2021 Miss. LEXIS 324, at *13 (Nov. 18, 2021) (quoting KPMG, LLP v. Singing
River Health Sys., 283 So. 3d 662, 669 (Miss. 2018)).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff RDI bore the responsibility of having the existence of the contract spread upon
the City’s meeting minutes. “[I]t is the responsibility of the entity contracting with the Board
itself, to ensure that the contract is legal and properly recorded on the minutes of the board.” Id.
(quoting KPMG and Wellness, Inc., 178 So. 3d at 1291).
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The damages and injuries alleged by the Plaintiff are the result in whole or in part of the
actions or inactions of the Plaintiff and/or other parties, not The City Council, and to whom The
City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, has no legal relationship. The actions of such parties are
superseding, intervening causes of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action or a claim as to each Defendant upon which
relief can be granted and should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages and is accordingly barred from recovery to the
extent of the failure to mitigate.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The claims asserted by the Plaintiff against Intervenor The City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi, are time-barred because of the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Intervenor The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi hereby gives notice that it intends to
rely upon such other and further defenses which may be available or become apparent during
discovery in this civil action and reserves the right to amend its answer to assert any such
defenses.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
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Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. The Plaintiff
proceeded to perform under an alleged contract which the Plaintiff knew or should have known
was not a valid agreement which was ever adopted or approved by a majority of the City
Council.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The City Council denies each and every allegation of the Complaint [MEC #1] by which
the Plaintiff seeks relief or otherwise seeks to impose liability upon it and denies that it is guilty
of any actionable conduct.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Intervenor The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi pleads all affirmative defenses
which may apply to this action, including, accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, duress, estoppel, fraud, illegality, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, waiver and any other matters constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any individual Defendants who are members of the City Council are entitled to
sovereign and/or qualified immunity, as well as legislative immunity, from Plaintiff’s claims
against them and specifically assert the rights, defenses, privileges and immunities available to
them under applicable State and Federal Law. Those Defendants invoke and assert all right and
privileges and immunities available unto them as set forth in the United States Constitution
and/or Mississippi Constitution and/or supporting and interpreted Federal or State Common Law.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
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The Defendants, at all times complained of herein, acted in good faith without malice,
without reckless disregard, without injurious intent, without evil motive, without deliberate
indifference, and without any intent to cause harm, and the Defendant is not guilty of any
tortious conduct or omission. The actions taken by the Defendant were taken in good faith
reliance upon existing law and facts.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The City Council denies each and every allegation of the Complaint [MEC #1] by which
the Plaintiff seeks relief or otherwise seeks to impose liability upon it and denies that it is guilty
of any actionable conduct.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Additionally, and alternatively, any damages, loss, deprivation to the Plaintiff, if any, are
not proximately caused by any official action, practice or custom of the City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi or any of its officers. Plaintiff’s alleged loss, damage, or deprivation is not the
proximate result of the execution of any official government policy custom or practice attributed
to the City of Jackson. The policies and procedures of the City of Jackson, Mississippi are
consistent and clearly within established law.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant invoke and assert all protections, defenses and limitations under the
doctrine of discretionary-function immunity.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant reserves the right to amend their answer and defenses and plead any
additional defenses which may become apparent following the completion of additional
discovery and/or other investigation.

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CROSSCLAIM
COMES NOW the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g)
(2021) and files this its Crossclaim against the Mayor of Jackson Chokwe A. Lumumba.
1. The Mayor of Jackson, Mississippi, Chokwe A. Lumumba (“Mayor” or “Cross-
Defendant”) submitted a Notice to Proceed, as pleaded by RDI and confessed by the
City of Jackson in its Answer [ECF Doc. #10].
2. Cross-Claimant the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, never requested or
obligated RDI to collect garbage, and did not issue any Notice to Proceed or authorize
the issuance of any Notice to Proceed.
3. Despite having been presented with proposed contracts or proposed orders approving
contracts on multiple occasions, the City Council at no time adopted or approved by
majority vote any contract as required by applicable state law and Jackson’s Code of
Ordinances in § 2-66. Thus, those proposed contracts or orders resulted in a no vote
or a negative vote.
4. The Mayor attempted on several occasions to veto those matters which ended in a no
vote or a negative vote, but had no legal authority to do so. The matter proceeded to
litigation in the Chancery Court of Hinds County in Cause No. 22-571 where the
court there ruled in favor of the City Council on July 15, 2022, and entered a
declaratory judgment that the Mayor had no legal authority to veto a negative vote.
5. Also, in another matter between the Mayor and the City Council in the Hinds County
Chancery Court, Cause No. 22-281, the special chancellor there ruled that, regardless
of a declared emergency, the sole authority rests with the City Council to approve or
disapprove any proposed contracts by a simple majority vote:
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But whether a contract for solid waste disposal is negotiated through the RFP
process or pursuant to Section 33-15-17(b)’s emergency authority, the contract is
not valid, binding, or enforceable unless approved by the Council.
...
Whether a contract binding the City of Jackson for solid waste disposal is
negotiated through the RFP process or pursuant to emergency authority under Miss
Code Section 33-15-17(b), the contract is not a binding contract that is enforceable
against the City of Jackson unless and until it has been properly approved by the
Council.
Order, Lumumba v. City Council, Hinds County Chancery Court, No. 22-281, 3, 6 [MEC Doc.
#60] (April 1, 2022).
6. The Plaintiff RDI proceeded to perform under an alleged contract which the
Plaintiff knew or should have known was not a valid agreement which was ever
adopted or approved by a majority of the City Council.
7. Thus, all damages complained of resulted from the actions of both RDI and the
actions of the Cross-Defendant the Mayor.
8. The Mayor’s actions resulted in the monetary loss to the Plaintiff, and the Mayor
should be responsible for making the Plaintiff whole.
9. Further, upon information and belief, there was an agreement between two or more
persons, those being the Mayor and RDI, to accomplish a lawful purpose unlawfully;
the Mayor performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and damages to
the City Council are a proximate result. Thus, the Cross-Defendant the Mayor
committed Civil Conspiracy resulting in the damage claimed by the Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi, specially appearing at this time out of an abundance of caution, pending a ruling
from this Court on its Motion to Intervene [ECF Doc. #8], respectfully requests that this
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Court deny all claims for relief to the extent that those claims are brought against the
Intervening Defendant the City Council.
IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED respectfully that this Court grant the City Council’s
Crossclaim against the Mayor as his actions resulted in the monetary loss to the Plaintiff and
as the Mayor should be responsible for making the Plaintiff whole. It is further respectfully
requested that this Court find that the Mayor committed Civil Conspiracy which resulted in
the damage claimed by the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted, this the 5th day of August, 2022.

MISSISSIPPI
By: Mills, Scanlon, Dye & Pittman
By: __/s/ John P. Scanlon_________________
By: Deshun T. Martin
By: __/s/ Deshun Martin_________________
OF COUNSEL:
Jerry L. Mills, Esq. [MSB #3324]

John P. Scanlon, Esq. [MSB #101943]
Zachary L. Giddy, Esq. [MSB #106297]
MILLS, SCANLON, DYE & PITTMAN
800 Avery Blvd. North, Suite 101
Ridgeland, MS 39157
Telephone: (601)957-2600
Facsimile: (601)957-7440
jmills@millsscanlon.com
jscanlon@millsscanlon.com
zgiddy@millsscanlon.com
DESHUN T. MARTIN, MSB# 101526
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MARTIN AND MARTIN, P.A.

Attorneys & Counselors
228 East Capitol Street
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Telephone: (601) 355-0955
Facsimile: (601) 355-0957
Email: DTMartin@4MartinsAtLaw.com
Independent Special Counsel for Intervening Defendant The City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi, Mississippi
I, John P. Scanlon, one of the attorneys for Intervenor The City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi, do hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of this Court using the CM/ECF, which sent notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
This the 5th day of August, 2022.
_/s/ John P. Scanlon______

John P. Scanlon
_/s/ Deshun Martin______

Deshun Martin
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION
RICHARDS DISPOSAL, INC. PLAINTIFF
V. CAUSE NO.: 3:22-cv-396-KHJ-MTP
CITY OF JACKSON’S ANSWER

AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
COMES NOW, the City of Jackson, Mississippi (herein after “the City”) by and
through counsel, and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other
applicable authority, submits this Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint
filed against her in the above-styled cause and states as follows:
Without waiving any of the defenses stated herein, the Defendant responds to the
allegations contained in the Complaint, paragraph by paragraph, as follows:
The first unnumbered paragraph appears introductory in nature, and therefore
does not require a response. To the extent that this introductory, unnumbered
paragraph seeks to impose liability on the City, however, the City would deny the same
and demand strict proof thereof.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. The City admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the Complaint.
4. The City admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the

1
Complaint.
FACTS
6. The City admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint
in part, the February 17, 2022 Emergency Agreement was executed by the Mayor and
RDI, however the determination of whether the Agreement was “entered into” is
disputed.
9. The City admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint
in part, the City does not have sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of
oral statements contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint and therefore denies the
same.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
13. The City admits that the City Council did not override the Mayor’s veto
and filed legal action against the Mayor. The City avers that the City Council’s pleading
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction speaks for itself.
14. The City admits that the City Council filed a second legal proceeding
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against the Mayor. The City avers that the City Council’s Complaint speaks for itself.
15. The City admits that RDI began solid waste collection on April 1, 2022 and
continues to do so. The City denies, as worded, the remaining allegations contained in
Paragraph 15 of the Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
18. The City admits that RDI’s invoice for payment was placed on the claims
docket. The City denies, as worded, the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 18
of the Complaint.
19. The City admits that RDI’s invoice was pulled from the May 24, 2022
Claims Docket and admits that it approved seventy-one (claims). The City denies, as
worded, the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint. The City
avers that the May 24, 2022 Minutes speak for themselves.
20. The City avers that the statement of law contained in this allegation speaks
for itself; however, the City denies, as worded, the remaining allegations contained in
21. The City denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 of the
Complaint.
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CAUSES OF ACTION
QUANTUM MERIUT
22. The allegations contained in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint do not appear
to be directed to the City, however, if a response is required, the City denies the allegations
contained in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint.
23. The City admits that RDI performed solid waste collection services for the
City of Jackson. The City denies, as worded, the remaining allegations contained in
Complaint.
Complaint.
26. The City denies, as worded, the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of
the Complaint.
Complaint.
28. The City avers that the statutory law cited in Paragraph 28 of the
Complaint speaks for itself.
Complaint.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
to be directed to the City, however, if a response is required, it denies the allegations

4
31. The City admits that RDI provided solid waste collection services to its
citizens. The City denies, as worded, the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph
31 of the Complaint.
32. The City does not have enough information to admit or deny the
allegations contained in Paragraph 32 of the Complaint and therefore denies the same.
the Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
the Complaint.
the Complaint as these allegations state a legal conclusion.
Complaint.
Complaint.
DAMAGES
to be directed to the City, however, if a response is required, it denies the allegations

5
41. The City avers that the statutory law cited in Paragraph 41 of the Complaint
speaks for itself, and denies this allegation to the extent that it states a legal conclusion.
42. The City avers that the statutory law cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint speaks for
itself; however, the City denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 42 of
the Complaint.
43. The City avers that the statutory law cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint speaks for
itself; however, the City denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 43 of
the Complaint.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The City denies that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the request contained in the
unnumbered paragraph of the Complaint under the heading PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
AND NOW, having fully and completely answered the Complaint and allegations
filed against it, Defendant pleads as follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
I.
The Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II.
The Plaintiff failed to fully and properly comply with the notice requirements as
set forth in MISS. CODE ANN. Section 11-46-11 (1972), as amended, and this Court is
without jurisdiction over this matter.
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III.
To the extent that the Plaintiff alleges any claims that may fall under the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act, the City is immune from suit pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-46-1, et seq. (as amended).
IV.
The Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against this Defendant, pursuant
to MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9.
V.
At all times and as to all matter material to the Complaint, this Defendant acted
reasonably and in accordance with the law and did not breach any duty which may have
been owed to Plaintiff.
VI.
At all material times, herein, the Defendant and its employees, agents, and
servants, at all times relevant hereto, used the degree of care required of them under law
and are not liable in damages to the Plaintiff.
VII.
The Plaintiff has a duty to use reasonable care to mitigate damages, if any. Any
damages which could have been mitigated through the use of reasonable care are not
recoverable.
VIII.
Any injury, damage, or deprivation alleged or suffered by the Plaintiff was the
result of the Plaintiff’s failure to act reasonably to avoid or mitigate such injury, damage
or deprivation.
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IX.
The actions or inactions on the part of the Plaintiff were the sole, proximate and
only cause of the incident complained of and the alleged damages sustained by the
Plaintiff, if any. That in the alternative, the actions or inactions on the part of the Plaintiff
amounted to an intervening cause and as such, constitutes the sole, proximate cause and
only cause of the incident complained of and the damages sustained by the Plaintiff if any.
X.
If the actions or inactions on the part of the Plaintiff were not the sole, proximate
and only cause of the incident complained of and the alleged damages sustained by the
Plaintiff, if any, the actions or inactions on the part of the Plaintiff caused and contributed
to the incident complained of and the damages sustained by the Plaintiff, if any, and any
damages which the Plaintiff would otherwise be entitled must be reduced in degree and
to the proportion that the action or inaction of the Plaintiff caused or contributed to the
incident.
XI.
This Defendant asserts any and all other defenses available to it under MISS.
CODE ANN. § 85-5-7.
XII.
The Plaintiff’s damages, if any, were proximately caused and are a result of a
superseding and/or intervening cause for which this Defendant cannot be held liable and
for which recovery cannot be had against this Defendant.
XIII.
Under the facts and circumstances of this action, this Defendant cannot be held
8
liable for punitive damages.
XIV.
An award of compensatory damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest,
attorneys’ fees, costs of suit and for such other and further relief against this Defendant is
statutorily barred and/or not warranted in this case.
XV.
This individual Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, discretionary
immunity, sovereign immunity and/or any other applicable immunity.
XVI.
The Defendant hereby invokes the defenses of expiration of the statute of
limitation(s), waiver, laches, and ripeness, lack of mutual assent, lack of consideration,
lack of definitive terms and lack of contract.
XVII.
The Defendant hereby gives notice that it intends to rely upon such other and
further defenses which may become available or apparent during discovery in this civil
action and reserves the right to amend is answer to assert any such defenses.
Respectfully submitted this the 4th day of August, 2022
THE CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
BY: /s/ Claire Barker_________________

Claire Barker, MSB # 101312
Special Assistant to the City Attorney
9
OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

Post Office Box 2779
Jackson, Mississippi 39207-2779
Office: 601-960-1799
Facsimile: 601-960-1756
The undersigned certifies that she has this day transmitted via electronic mail
through ECF electronic filing a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to all
attorneys of record.
So certified, this the 4th day of August, 2022
/s/ Claire Barker ______________

CLAIRE BARKER
10

FOR THE SOUTHER DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
VS. CAUSE NO.: 3 :22-CV-00396-KHJ-MTP

THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI’S

MOTION TO INTERVENE AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
COMES NOW The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, (“The City Council”), by and
through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure Rule 24, and files this
its Motion to Intervene and Supporting Memorandum of Law, and in support thereof would show
this Court the following, to-wit:
INTRODUCTION
The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi respectfully submits this Motion to Intervene and
Supporting Memorandum of Law in this action filed by Richard’s Disposal, Inc. against the City
of Jackson, Mississippi. The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi moves pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 24 to intervene as a right, or alternatively, by permission, so that it may defend
its position in this action and the interests of the City Council.
FACTS
The City of Jackson, Mississippi operates under the Mayor-Council form of government
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-1 et seq. In this form of government, the City Council is
charged with the duty of making appropriations for payment of claims against the City. In this
case, substantial controversy has raged for several months over the role of Richard’s Disposal,
Inc., the Plaintiff in this case. The Mayor has generally supported the hiring of Richard’s. To this
point in time, he has not been able to get the required approval of the City Council to enter into a
contract with Richard’s. Substantial litigation has occurred in state courts.1
In the latest case2 to be decided, the Mayor sought to veto the negative action of the City
Council in refusing to approve the contract with Richard’s. This matter has been decided by the
Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi in favor of the City
Council;3 however, there is currently a pending motion filed by the Mayor pursuant to Rules 52
and 59 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure in that case.
The City Council is concerned that the official position of the City of Jackson will be to
find some method for payment of this claim. However, under Mississippi law, the City Council is
prohibited from making such payment. The City Council is concerned that, if not permitted to
intervene, the City, under the direction of the Mayor, will obligate the City to a claim which it
cannot pay under state law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, SHOULD BE GRANTED

INTERVENTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
1
The prior litigation involving this issue is: Chokwe A. Lumumba, In His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of
Jackson v. The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi; In the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, First Judicial
District; Cause No. 25CI1:22-cv-00194-EFP; Chokwe A. Lumumba, in his official capacity as Mayor of Jackson, MS v.
The City Council of Jackson, MS, Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc., Intervenor, Waste Disposal Services, Inc.,
Intervenor, Richard’s Disposal, Inc. Intervenor; In the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, First Judicial
District; Cause No. 25CH1:22-cv-00281; The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi v. Chokwe A. Lumumba, In His
Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Jackson; In the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, First Judicial
District; Cause No. 25CH1:22-cv-00571
2
Cause No. 25CH1:22-cv-00571
3
See Final Judgment (Exhibit A).
2
An applicant may intervene as a matter of right if: (1) the application is timely; (2) the
applicant has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action;
(3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not
adequately represented by existing parties. Brown v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46617, 2021 WL 949679 (E.D. La. 2021). The burden of establishing the right to intervene
is on the movant, but “Rule 24 is to be liberally construed.” Texas v. United States, 805 F. 3d 653,
656 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F. 3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014). “Federal courts
should allow intervention where no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be attained.”
Id. at 657 (citing Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F. 3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994). The City Council of
Jackson, Mississippi is entitled to intervene because its intervention is timely, it has an interest that
may be impaired by this litigation, and no other defendant can adequately represent the City
Council’s interest.
A. The City Council’s Motion to Intervene is timely.
“[T]he question whether an application for intervention is timely is largely committed to
the discretion of the district court, and its determination will not be overturned on appeal unless an
abuse of discretion is shown.” Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F. 2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977).
There are four factors when determining timeliness: (1) the length of time during which the would-
be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he
petitioned for leave to intervene, (2) the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the
litigation may suffer as a result of the would-be intervenor’s failure to apply for intervention as
soon as he actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case, (3) the extent
of the prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if his petition for leave to intervene is
3
denied, and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a
determination that application is timely. Id. at 264-67. The City Council’s Motion to Intervene is
timely. This case it at its earliest stage and intervention will not prejudice any other parties because
this case is far from final disposition.
B. The City Council has an interest in the contract that is the subject of this action
and disposition of this action will impair the Council’s interests.
“To demonstrate an interest relating to the property or subject matter of the litigation
sufficient to support intervention of right, the applicant must have a direct, substantial, legally
protectable interest in the proceedings.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F. 3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir.
1996) (internal citations omitted). The intervenor must have a stake in the matter that is beyond a
generalized preference that the case come out a certain way and must seek to intervene for more
than ideological, economic, or precedential reasons. DeOtte v. Nevada, 20 F. 4th 1055, 1068 (5th
Cir. 2021). Additionally, the applicant must also establish that disposition of the action may impair
or impede its ability to protect its interests. LULAC v. City of Boerne, 659 F. 3d 421, 435 (5th Cir.
2011).
The City Council has a legally protected interest to enforce existing state law that would
not allow them to make payment to Richard’s Disposal, Inc., without a valid contract spread upon
its minutes. It is well established Mississippi law that “public boards speak only through their
minutes and that their acts are evidenced solely by entries on their minutes.” Singing River MOB,
LLC v. Jackson Cty., 2021 Miss. LEXIS 324 *13, 2021 WL 5371237 (Miss. 2021) (citing KPMG,
LLP v. Singing River Health Systems, 283 So. 3d 662, 669 (Miss. 2018). Further, the entity
contracting with the public board has the responsibility to “ensure that the contract is legal and
properly recorded on the minutes of the board.” Id. at *15 (quoting KPMG, 283 So. 3d at 670).
4
“A public board cannot act without evidencing its acts upon its minutes.” Id. at *16 (quoting
Wellness, Inc. v. Pearl River Cty. Hosp., 178 So. 3d 1287, 1290 (Miss. 2015). The City Council
has an interest to ensure that existing state law is followed, and without a valid contract spread
upon its minutes, the City Council was unable to make payments to Richard’s Disposal.
Further, if not allowed to intervene in this action, the City Council’s ability to adequately
defend its position may be impaired. There are competing positions between the Mayor and the
City Council, as evidenced by legal disputes in the Circuit and Chancery Courts of Hinds County,
Mississippi, that could impair the City Council’s interest in this dispute if it is not allowed to
intervene and defend its position in this action.
C. The competing positions of the Mayor and the City Council do not allow the
current parties to this suit to adequately represent the interests of the City
Council.
The applicant bears the burden of showing that representation would be inadequate,
however, the burden is minimal. Entergy Gulf States La., L.L.C. v. United States EPA, 817 F. 3d
198, 203 (5th Cir. 2016). The applicant does not have to show that representation by current parties
will be, for certain, inadequate, it need only be shown that representation might be inadequate. Id.
There are two presumptions of adequate representation that the applicant must overcome: (1) when
one party is a representative of the absentee by law, and (2) when the would-be intervenor has the
same ultimate objective as a party to the suit. Id. Under the second presumption, the applicant for
intervention must show adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part of the existing
party. Id. (quoting Edwards, 78 F. 3d at 1005).
Because of the opposing positions between the Mayor and the City Council, the named
defendant, the City of Jackson, is not situated to adequately represent the interest of the City
5
Council. For the reasons stated above, the current parties are unable to adequately represent the
interests of the City Council.
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE CITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE GRANTED

PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
In the alternative, the City Council should be permitted to intervene in this matter pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Permissive intervention should be granted if the applicant:(1) makes a
timely application, (2) has a separate claim or defense that has a common question of law or fact
with the main action, and (3) does not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of original parties. Id.
Permissive intervention is within the sound discretion of the district court, and in that discretion,
the court must consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
original parties’ rights. Slaughter v. Dobbs, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252966 *4 (S. D. Miss. 2021).
The City Council’s motion is timely because this case is still at its earliest stage. Further,
the City Council’s defense as to the validity of the contract with Richard’s Disposal shares a
common question of law or fact with the main action. Lastly, this motion will not unduly delay or
prejudice the rights of the original parties. As stated above, this case is still at its earliest stage, so
allowing the City Council to intervene will not cause undue delay or prejudice the rights of the
original parties because this case is far from final disposition. In the alternative, for the reasons
above, this Court should grant the City Council permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, The City Council respectfully request that the Court grant its
motion for intervention as of right under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), or, in the alternative
grant its motion for permissive intervention under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
6
Respectfully submitted, this the 29th day of July, 2022.

MISSISSIPPI
By: Mills, Scanlon, Dye & Pittman
By: __/s/ John P. Scanlon_________________
By: Martin and Martin, PA
By: __/s/ Deshun T. Martin_________________
OF COUNSEL:
Jerry L. Mills, Esq. [MSB #3324]

John P. Scanlon, Esq. [MSB #101943]
Zachary L. Giddy, Esq. [MSB #106297]
MILLS, SCANLON, DYE & PITTMAN
800 Avery Blvd. North, Suite 101
Ridgeland, MS 39157
Telephone: (601)957-2600
Facsimile: (601)957-7440
jmills@millsscanlon.com
jscanlon@millsscanlon.com
zgiddy@millsscanlon.com
DESHUN T. MARTIN, MSB# 101526

MARTIN AND MARTIN, P.A.
Attorneys & Counselors
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Telephone: (601) 355-0955
Facsimile: (601) 355-0957
Email: DTMartin@4MartinsAtLaw.com
Independent Special Counsel for Intervenor The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi,
Mississippi
7
I, John P. Scanlon, one of the attorneys for Intervenor The City Council of Jackson,
Mississippi, do hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of this Court using the CM/ECF, which sent notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
This the 29th day of July, 2022.
_/s/ John P. Scanlon______

John P. Scanlon
8

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Case 3:22-cv-00396-KHJ-MTP Document 14 Filed 08/16/22 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC. PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22cv396-KHJ-MTP

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

following terms and conditions.

1. PRIOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED. The settlement

conference is not a vehicle to facilitate the commencement of settlement negotiations. By not

as far as reasonably possible without the assistance of the court.

2. INDIVIDUALS WITH FULL AUTHORITY. Counsel, the parties, and

representatives with full settlement authority must be present.

3. CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT STATEMENTS. The court directs the parties

to submit a confidential written memorandum by August 22, 2022 via e-mail

required memoranda may be subject to sanctions.

4. PRESENTATIONS AT SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. The attorneys must be

separate, confidential caucuses with each party.

5. CONFIDENTIALITY. The purpose of the settlement conference is to effectuate

judge, and will not be disclosed to any other party.

6. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AND EXPENSES. If a party appears at the settlement

SO ORDERED on this 16th day of August, 2022.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN

RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC. PLAINTIFF

VS. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-00396-KHJ-MTP

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT

THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON,

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON,

behalf of Defendant City of Jackson. The City Council of Jackson, Mississippi

Order of the City of Jackson authorizing it to file a Motion to Intervene.

4. CC has no authority to superintend control of the officers and affairs of the

municipality (City of Jackson). Therefore CC, as the legislative branch, is not

authorized to control litigation by or against the City of Jackson.

interest in the above-styled and number cause.

6. No federal statute gives the CC an unconditional right to intervene in the above-

styled and numbered cause.

practical matter in pair on pied CC’s ability to protect its interest.

question of law or fact.

agreement issued or made under a statute or executive order administered by CC.

14. CC’s Motion (Doc. 009) contains violations of L. U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2).

Opposition to CC’s Motion to Intervene (Docs. 009) which is being filed

simultaneously with this Response In Opposition.

Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 009).

RICHARD’S DISPOSAL INC.

BY:/s/ John L. Walker

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

This the 12th day of August 2022.

/s/ John L. Walker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC. PLAINTIFF

VS. CAUSE NO. : 3 :22-CV-00396-KHJ-MTP

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT

THE CITY COUNCIL OF JACKSON,

ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, and CROSSCLAIM of INTERVENOR

Council would show this Court the following, to-wit:

it is specifically denied that

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

allegations are admitted.

7. The allegations contained in paragraph 7 do not appear to be directed at The City

Notice to Proceed and request it be returned and executed by Richard’s.

By: /s/ John P. Scanlon_______________

By: /s/ Deshun Martin_______________