RULE 119 - TRIAL

157. Bernardo v. People and F.T. Ylang-Ylang Marketing Corporation

          520 SCRA 332, G.R. No. 166980, April 4, 2007, Carpio Morales, J. 
          Rule 119: Trial in Absentia
    
FACTS:
Carmelo Bernardo was charged with six (6) counts of violation of BP 22 for issuing six
postdated checks to FT Ylang-Ylang, and the same were dishonored due to closed account. He
was arraigned, but failed to appear during the pre-trial conference despite notice; thus, the
court issued a warrant of arrest and set the case for trial in absentia. After the prosecution
presented its first witness, he filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest,
and a Motion to Quash. Trial court lifted the warrant of arrest in view of Bernardo’s
appearance, however, he failed to appear at the next trial date despite notice, drawing the trial
court to proceed with his trial in absentia and issue warrant of arrest against him. Thereafter,
the court promulgated judgement in absentia and found Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. 22 in all the cases. 
Bernardo asserted that he was denied due process of law when his case was tried in
absentia.

ISSUE:  Whether the trial and promulgation of judgement were valid notwithstanding done in
absentia. 

RULING:
Yes. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are that the accused has already been
arraigned, that he has been duly notified of the trial, and that his failure to appear is
unjustifiable as provided for in Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In this case,
Bernardo’s absence was considered a waiver of his right to be present at trial, and the trial
court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against him, and to
render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for his re-appearance or re-arrest. He was
also deemed to have waived his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses.
As for the promulgation of judgment in absentia, in case the accused fails to appear at
the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be
made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.

MFGEnriquez

158. HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art 318 of RPC before MTC Manila. They
pleaded not guilty, trial dates were postponed due to the unavailability of private complainant Li
Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia.
The Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was
being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Petitioners opposed. MTC granted said Motion; denied ensuing MR. Petitioners, filed a Rule 65
before RTC Manila
RTC granted the petition; declared the MTC Order null and void; denied ensuing Motion for
Reconsideration
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with
respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness
against him face to face.
Prosecution, elevated to CA. CA reversed RTC
No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-
taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would
still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely
objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or through the
consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.

ISSUES:
         WON allowing the deposition of private complainant tantamount to a violation of     
petitioners’ rights to public trial and to confront the witnesses face to face? 

HELD: YES
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It
cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a
prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused
of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered
Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.13 This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and
most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.14 It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use
of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination
of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling
in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly states that –
o "x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of
both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a
foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by
the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf
of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place
than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting
the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be
interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at
the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the
taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.18
(Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that –
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in
order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the
general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both
civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine
consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an
unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case
of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant
case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." 
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused
to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right
to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides as follows:

159. Salvanera v. People 

G.R. No. 143093   May 21, 2007 PUNO, C.J.:
 
FACTS:
Rimberto Salvanera, Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix were charged with
conspiracy of murder; Salvanera as the mastermind. The prosecution moved for the
discharge of Abutin and Tampelix from the information to serve as State witnesses. 
However, the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion.
Thereafter, the prosecution appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for discharge, as the
testimonies of accused Abutin and Tampelix are essential to establish that Salvenera
masterminded the murder.  The CA ruled in favor of the prosecution. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
 Whether the CA committed serious error when it ruled that the “substantial
corroboration” requirement under Sec. 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court was satisfied
by the prosecution.

RULING:
No.  The CA did not commit an error in its judgment. In the discharge of an
accused, in order that he may be a State witness, the following condition must be
present, namely:

1. Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
2. The motion for discharged is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
3. The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
State witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
4. The accused gives his consent to be a State witness; and,
5. The trial court is satisfied that:
a.) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused;
b.) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
c.) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d.) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
e.) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
 
Moreover, the corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to
consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witness.
The rule on conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by
any other method. Here, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.

160. People v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013
Rule 119 (Trial): Section 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness)
 
 
FACTS:
·       Mercado was the President of JAM Liner, Inc. and other respondents, Belicena, Andutan
Jr., De Vera, and Diala, who were Department of Finance officials formerly assigned at
its DOF One-Stop Shop charged before the Sandiganbayan with violations of Section 3
of R.A. 3019 and two counts of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
·       Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate that
allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop, Mercado applied with the
DOJ for immunity as state witness under its witness protection program. 
·       The first information alleged that DOF officials approved and issued in 1996 Tax Credit
Certificate for P7,350,444.00 in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. for domestic capital equipment
although it did not qualify for such tax credit. The second Information alleged that they
 illegally issued in 1996 Tax Credit Certificate for P4,410,265.50 in favor of the same
company covering its purchase of six Mitsubishi buses.
·       Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Ombudsman,
citing the DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably on the motion, the
Ombudsman executed an Immunity Agreement with Mercado. The agreement provided
that, in consideration for granting him immunity from suit, Mercado would produce all
relevant documents in his possession and testify against the accused in all the cases,
criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. Accordingly, on the same date, the
Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado from the information involving him.
·       But subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the Ombudsman’s
motion because the motion failed to establish the conditions required under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an accused as a state witness. 
 
ISSUE: WON the prosecution complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of accused Mercado as a state witness
 
Ruling:
 
Yes. In this case, the Sandiganbayan held that Mercado’s testimony is not absolutely
necessary because the state has other direct evidence that may prove the offenses charged. It
held that Mercardo’s testimony, in large part, would only help identify numerous documents and
disclose matters that are essentially already contained in such documents.
 
But the records, particularly Mercado’s consolidated affidavit, show that his
testimony if true could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led to the
preparation and issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates. Indeed, nobody appears to
be in a better position to testify on this than he, as president of JAM Liner, Inc., the
company to which those certificates were issued.
 
The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado was part of prosecutorial discretion
in the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the successful
prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation of the Rules, this determination
should be given great weight by our courts. 
 
The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those conditions. Perforce,
the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the considerations presented by
the prosecuting officer. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the
course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the
crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for
the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested, as to the availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is the most guilty one; and the like, the judge
must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting
officer. 
 
What is more, the criminal informations in these cases charge respondents with having
conspired in approving and issuing the fraudulent tax credit certificates. One rule of wisdom is
that where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so
he can testify against the others. Who else outside the conspiracy can testify about the goings-
on that took place among the accused involved in the conspiracy to defraud the government in
this case? No one can underestimate Mercado’s testimony since he alone can provide a
detailed picture of the fraudulent scheme that went into the approval and issuance of the
tax credit certificates. The documents can show the irregularities but not the detailed
events that led to their issuance. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Mercado’s
testimony can fill in the gaps in the evidence.
 
Respondents further contend that Mercado should not be granted immunity because he
also benefited from the unlawful transactions. But the immunity granted to Mercado does not
blot out the fact that he committed the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher social
value in eliciting information from him rather than in engaging in his prosecution.
 
 
161. ASISTIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
Demurrer to evidence 
FACTS:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative
Code. 
The prosecution sought to prove that the accused had entered into an exclusive
dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., for the sale of softdrink products
at the same school. The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the
financial reports of the Cooperative. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola,
including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by
Asistio, the audit committee found that Asistio defrauded the Cooperative and its members for
3 years. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, Asistio failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board
Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against her.
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits
ensued. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to
dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among
other matters, that the RTC of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as
the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for
which she can be held criminally liable. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: 
WON the dismissal of the charge against the accused on demurrer to evidence amounts
to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable?
RULING:
NO. The dismissal of the charge by RTC does not amount to an acquittal. The demurrer
to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested
its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal
of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so
would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC
did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of Asistio’s guilt or innocence
based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the RTC Order of
dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

162. GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT 
G.R. Nos.195011-19 September 30, 2013 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Demurrer to Evidence

FACTS: 
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was PCGG Consultant on detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also the coordinator of the Technical Working Group
composed of officers and employees of government financing institutions to examine and study the
reports and recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all
government financing institutions. Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans
granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
In 1972, the PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of credit was
to be secured by the following collaterals: a) a second mortgage on a lot with improvements, machinery
and equipment; b) machinery and equipment to be imported under the subject letter of credit; and c)
assignment of US$0.50 per pair of shoes of ISI’s export sales. It was further subjected to the several
conditions. ISI was then further extended subsequent loan accommodations. The Committee found that
the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having been secured
with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste.
As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
dated 20 March 1996, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. Hence, the corresponding eighteen (18) Informations against petitioner and his co-accused
for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The
eighteen (18) Informations correspond to the nine (9) loan accommodations granted to ISI, each loan
being the subject of two informations alleging violations of both paragraphs of Section 3 of Rep. Act No.
3019.
Thus, herein petitioner was charged with nine counts of violation of Section 3(e),7 and another
nine counts of violation of Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26314, the cases involved the purported
granting of behest loans by the government’s Philippine National Bank (PNB) to Integrated Shoes, Inc.
(ISI), in various amounts and on different dates as above-enumerated.
 Some of the accused passed away, hence the dismissal of the case against them. Nonetheless,
trial ensued with respect to the remaining cases. Prosecution presented their testimonial evidence and
documentary evidence. After the presentation of its testimonial and documentary evidence, the
prosecution rested its case and filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits. The respondent court admitted in toto
the State’s documentary exhibits.
Petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence anchored on the following grounds: (1)
lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts with PNB contained provisions that
are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could
not be characterized as behest loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI
increased its capitalization; and (4) assuming the loans are behest loans, petitioner could not be held
liable for lack of any participation. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrer.

ISSUE: 
WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Demurrer to
Evidence arguing that in petitioner’s case, not all the elements under Section 3(g) exist to hold petitioner
liable?

RULING: 
No. The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution presented sufficient or competent evidence
to establish the three material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019. First, although petitioner is a private
person, he was shown to have connived with his co-accused. Second, ISI and PNB entered into several
loan transactions and credit accommodations. Finally, the loan transactions proved disadvantageous to
the government.
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence. At the outset, we emphasize that “the resolution of a demurrer to evidence
should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be
disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately
decide whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice.
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to
Evidence. We agree with the PCGG’s observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion after a
careful and deliberate examination and assessment of all the evidence submitted. A closer scrutiny of
the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. It was only after a careful analysis
of the facts and evidence presented did the respondent court lay down its findings and conclusions.

163. People vs. Tolentino

G.R. no: 176385             February 26, 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Demurrer to Evidence
FACTS:
On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of
Frustrated Murder were filed before the RTC against appellants, together with accused Jimmy
Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. During the arraignment on 13 July 1998, appellants, with the
assistance of counsel de parte, entered their respective pleas of not guilty.Accused Jimmy and
Arnel Trinidad remained at large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the merits of the three criminal
cases ensued.
On 13 April 2000, appellants through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence, without
leave of court. In an order dated 17 May 2000, the RTC denied the demurrer and submitted the
case for decision pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. On
31 May 2000, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the order denying their
Demurrer to Evidence be recalled and that they be allowed to present evidence. The RTC
denied the said motion. Unfazed, appellants filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. This
Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated 2 December 2002, which became final and
executory on 5 February 2003. As a result, the case was submitted for decision without any
evidence proffered by the defense.
On 10 December 2004, appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that
"errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial." Appellants argued that in the interest of justice and equity, they
should be given the opportunity to testify in their favor considering that they are meted out by
the RTC the supreme penalty of death.
In an Order dated 15 December 2004, the RTC denied appellants’ motion for new trial
ratiocinating that the error of appellants’ counsel during the trial does not amount to error of
law or irregularity which constitutes a valid ground for the granting of a motion for new trial. It
appears that appellants no longer questioned the denial of their motion for new trial.
The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court.
Thereafter, this Court ordered the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals conformably with
the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.
ISSUE:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO
PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that when
an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed
with prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
 court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right
to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves
for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so
in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to
present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions
for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then
claim the right to present its evidence. Thus, when the trial court disallowed the appellants to
present evidence on their behalf, it properly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change this
rule. As stressed by this Court:
The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial
results in the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on
record. Considering that the governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental
component of criminal procedure, respondent judge had the obligation to observe the
same, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant
concessions to the accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The rule is clear
that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this case, the accused, who failed to
ask for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence in his behalf.
 

Rizzle A. Reyes
164. People vs Sandiganbayan
GR 164577
                             
FACTS:
 Respondents were charged for having violated Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 During the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness. Consequently, instead of
presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their respective motions for leave to
file their demurrer to evidence and alleged that the witness had no personal knowledge
of the transaction and thus it’s a hearsay and that the prosecution failed to prove that
there was an overpricing.
 SB granted the motion of the respondents on the ground that that there being want of
substantial evidence to support an administrative charge, there could be no sufficient
evidence to warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
             WON an appeal can be made
RULING: 
No. The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of
the accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that
the court’s action is attended with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right
of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated.

RULE 120 -  JUDGEMENT

165. PEOPLE vs. JOVEN DE GRANO

G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009 Peralta, J.
Rule 120, Section 6; Rule if accused fails to appear in the promulgation of judgment
FACTS:
An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the
RTC Branch 6 of Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao
Lacaba, together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were still at-large. Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty. Since one of
the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the time the crime was
committed, Senior State Prosecutor Barrios moved that the venue be transferred to any RTC in
Manila. After transfer, the RTC in Manila found Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Lacaba guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The case against Leonides and
Leonardo were sent to the files or archived cases, to be revived as soon as they were
apprehended. 
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other
respondents. The absent accused, through counsel, filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration
praying the decision be set aside. In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the
accused jointly moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao,
were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost
their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.
However, the RTC modified its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and
downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court have no authority to take cognizance of the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, considering the absence of the other accused at the promulgation of
judgment?
RULING:
 Yes. When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba
was present. Subsequently, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence,
Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In
blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents at
large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the
accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings: […] (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear
by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: [...] If the
judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of
judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once
an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he
loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus, Joven, Armando, and
Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the
source of an acquittal.
PADUA 
166. Marino Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 185960
GR No. 185960 January 25, 2012 Villarama, Jr., J.
Promulgation of judgment; instances of promulgation of judgment in absentia
FACTS: 
 Petitioner, Marino Icdang, is the Regional Director of the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City. 
 COA through their Special Audit Team conducted a comprehensive audit on the 1996
funds for livelihood projects of the OSCC RXII. The audit team noted in their report that
Icdang was granted cash advances which remained unliquidated. It was discovered that
Icdang had shortage of P219,392.75 out of P920,933 released in Sept 1996 to their
office intended to cover the implementation of various socio-economic projects for the
cultural communities of the region. However, it was discovered that it was never
implemented.
 Icdang was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. SB’s Second Division rendered its decision convicting
petitioner of malversation and acquitting him from violation R.A. 3019.
 Icdang filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that he be given another chance to
present his evidence, stating that his inability to attend the trial were due to financial
constraints such that even when some of the scheduled hearings were sometimes held
in Davao and Cebu City, he still failed to attend the same. However, SB denied the
motion as the decision has become final and executory. Hence, the petition. 
 Icdang claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist
him during the promulgation of the judgement. He faults the SB for proceeding with the
promulgation despite the petitioner not the being assisted by his counsel, and being
layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. 
ISSUE: WON the presence of counsel is needed for the promulgation of judgement to be valid. 
RULING: No. In reference to Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
there is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the
judgement of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his
counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgement would not affect the
validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was
prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.
It is worth mentioning that Icdang never raised issue on the fact that his counsel was not
around during the promulgation of the judgement in his motion for reconsideration which
merely prayed for reopening of the case to enable him to present liquidation documents and
receipts, citing financial constraints as the reason for his failure to attend the scheduled
hearings. Before the Court he now submits that the gross negligence of his counsel deprived
him of the opportunity to present defense evidence. 
Omar
167. Loida Javier v. Pepito Gonzales
G.R. No. 193150                                   Date: January 23, 2017                           Ponente: Sereno, J.
Legal Doctrine: Criminal precept that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in absentia and gives the accused the
opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to the latter or
the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final
FACTS:
 Respondent Pepito Gonzales was charged before the RTC of Aurora with frustrated
murder and multiple attempted murder for allegedly throwing a grenade in the house of
one Leonardo Hermenigildo while the latter and his companions Rufino Concepcion and
a few others were staying. The victims were injured by the explosion but the accused
did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
multiple murder as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries sustained by said Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus
Macatiag were not necessarily mortal.
 Gonzales filed for a motion for bail which the RTC granted.
 The case was reassigned to the RTC of Palayan City. Trial on the merits ensued.
 On the date the promulgation of the case was to be held, Gonzales failed to appear.  On
the same date, a warrant of arrest was issued and the bond forfeited in view of the
nonappearance of the accused, who was deemed to have jumped bail.
 A notice of hearing was issued but Gonzales still failed to appear without justification. In
lieu of Gonzales’ counsel, Atty. Benitez was appointed counsel de officio. The RTC of
Palayan rendered its decision finding Gonzales guilty of the complex crime
of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER and MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER and is
hereby sentenced to a single indivisible penalty of DEATH.
 The case was elevated to the CA for automatic review in view of the death penalty. In
less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, Gonzales filed an
omnibus motion to set aside the ruling of the RTC of Palayan alleging that he had not
been notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by
counsel; and that the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him.
 The trial court granted Gonzales’ motion and set aside the judgment of conviction. 
 By 2006, Petitioner Loida Javier discovered that the RTC had rendered a Decision dated
31 October 2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges. Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for Certiorari
ruling that the RTC of Palayan’s trial in absentia was valid considering that Gonzales’
former counsel had already withdrawn his representation, as such, Gonzales had no
knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled.
ISSUE: 
 W/N the RTC judgment in convicting Gonzales in absentia was valid. 
RULING: 
 YES.  The Supreme Court concluded that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in absentia and gives the
 accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice
to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.
 Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on
15 December 2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 2005 documents the presence
of his counsel during the hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is
notice to client.
 During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent did not
appear despite notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial
court should have immediately promulgated its Decision. The promulgation of
judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court. 
 If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the
promulgation of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a
repetition of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by
the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. The only
essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the
criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.

Digested by: Maadil, Jedimir A.