AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-01

COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

6 September 2019
 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION TO COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Last Updated: 6 September 2019

Counterair operations doctrine is constantly evolving. It should guide us to effectively

organize and employ counterair capabilities against peer and near-peer competitors. As
we continuously improve our airpower capabilities and capacities in air, space, and
cyberspace, our ability to improve counterair operations and incorporate new concepts
and technologies will identify new best practices in counterair doctrine.

Control of the air provides the joint force with freedom of action while reducing
vulnerability to enemy air and missile attacks. Peer and near-peer competitors have and
are developing advanced aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide
vehicles, and sophisticated air and missile defenses. Examples of these developments
include Russian Sukhoi-57 and Chinese Chengdu J-20 fifth generation fighters, Russian
Iskander and Chinese DF-26 ballistic missiles, and Russian S-400 and Chinese HQ-9
air and missile defense systems. Iran and North Korea have significant and constantly
improving ballistic missile forces protected by integrated air defense systems. These
capabilities, supported by peer and near-peer cyberspace and space advancements,
present growing challenges to the joint force’s ability to achieve control of the air. The
Air Force brings resources, capabilities, and experience to the joint force to help
achieve that control.

Clearly defined domains help identify the conditions and capabilities under which
systems and personnel conduct operations, but do not mandate or imply command
relationships. The air domain is “the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface,
extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible.” 1

Control of the air is normally one of the first priorities of the joint force. This is especially
important whenever the enemy is capable of threatening friendly forces from the air or
inhibiting a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to conduct operations. The counterair
mission integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain the JFC’s
desired degrees of control of the air and of protection by neutralizing or destroying
enemy aircraft and missiles before, during, and after launch. Counterair operations help
ensure freedom to maneuver, freedom to attack, and freedom from attack.

1 Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

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Counterair is directed at enemy forces that directly or indirectly challenge control of the
air. These forces may include but are not limited to: aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
ballistic missiles, airfields, fuel, command and control facilities, and network links.
Airmen integrate capabilities from all components to conduct intensive and continuous
counterair operations aimed at gaining varying degrees of control of the air at the time
and place of their choosing.

Joint doctrine provides broad guidance for countering air and missile threats (see JP 3-
01, Countering Air and Missile Threats), but does not describe the full spectrum of
control of the air, as this publication does.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS
Last Updated: 6 September 2019

The counterair mission integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and
maintain a desired degree of control of the air and of protection by neutralizing or
destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, along with threats to air operations from other
domains. Counterair operations are conducted across all domains and determine the
level or degree of control of the air. Control of the air describes a level of influence
in the air domain relative to that of an adversary, and is typically categorized as
parity, superiority, or supremacy. The degree of control lies within a spectrum that
can be enjoyed by any combatant. This can range from a parity (or neutral) situation,
where neither adversary can claim control over the other, to air superiority, to air
supremacy over an entire operational area, all depending upon the situation and the
joint force commander’s (JFC’s) concept of operations. The figure, “Control of the Air
Continuum,” defines the degrees of operational area control and illustrates their
relationship. The desired degree of control of the air is typically at least air superiority to
enable the successful execution of joint operations such as strategic attack, interdiction,
and close air support. In a peer or near-peer conflict, air superiority may not be able to
be achieved in all places or at all times.

Normally, counterair operations are classified as offensive or defensive. However,

airpower’s inherent flexibility allows missions and aircraft to shift from defensive to
offensive (or vice versa) to adapt to changing conditions in the operational environment.
Counterair operations can be conducted across the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels of war by any component or element of the joint force. Operations may be
conducted over and in enemy, friendly, and international airspace, land, and waters; as
well as in space and cyberspace. They range from seeking out and destroying the
enemy’s aircraft (manned and unmanned) and missiles (air-to-air, surface-to-air, cruise,
and ballistic), through measures designed to minimize the effectiveness of those
systems, to countering efforts to contest control of the air through use of other domains
such as space and cyberspace. The JFC’s objectives and desired effects determine
when, where, and how these operations are conducted to gain the desired degree of
control of the air.

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 Control of the Air Continuum

 Air parity. Air parity is described as a condition in which no force has control of
the air. This represents a situation in which both friendly and adversary land,
maritime, and air operations may encounter significant interference by the opposing
force. Parity is not a standoff, nor does it mean aerial maneuver or ballistic missile
operations have halted. On the contrary, parity may be typified by fleeting, intensely
contested battles at critical points during an operation with maximum effort exerted
between combatants in their attempt to achieve some level of favorable control.

 Air superiority. Air superiority is that degree of control of the air by one force
that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference from air and missile threats (Joint Publication [JP] 3-01,
Countering Air and Missile Threats). Air superiority may be localized in space
(horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.

 Air supremacy. Air supremacy is that degree of control of the air wherein the
opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the operational
area using air and missile threats (JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats).
Air supremacy may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or
it may be broad and enduring. This is the highest level of control of the air that air
forces can pursue. Air supremacy may be difficult to achieve in a peer or near-peer
conflict.

Control of the air hinges on preventing prohibitive or effective interference to friendly

forces in the air domain from enemy forces, which would prevent friendly forces from
creating their desired effects. Air supremacy prevents effective interference, which does

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not mean no interference exists, but any attempted interference can be easily countered
or should be so negligible as to have little or no effect on operations. While air
supremacy is most desirable, it may not be operationally feasible. Air superiority, even
local or mission-specific, may provide sufficient freedom of action to create desired
effects. Therefore, commanders should determine the minimum level of control of the
air required to accomplish their mission and assign an appropriate level of effort to
achieve it.

So What Is...Parity, Superiority, or Supremacy?

It Depends…

In modern warfare, parity is often not

recognized at the moment it exists. It is more
easily identified when viewed in a historical
context as the point in time just prior to when
momentum swung to favor one combat force
over another. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM)
batteries in the Sinai desert were employed so
effectively that the Israeli Air Force—an
otherwise extremely effective force—could not
accomplish its mission with traditional tactics of
air interdiction or suppression of enemy air
defenses, the Egyptian air force was similarly
unable to interfere with Israeli maneuver
creating an Air Parity situation.

Both air and ground force maneuvering

essentially came to a halt for a 48 hour period.
The stalemate—the period of air parity—was
not broken until the Israelis changed tactics by
using direct infantry attacks on the Egyptian
SAM system, an example of integrating
capabilities of the full joint force into counterair
operations. Those attacks swung the
momentum back to the Israeli side by allowing
their Air Force to regain control of the air
domain, and eventually assert air superiority
across the entire front.

By war’s end, the Israeli Air Force was virtually

unchallenged in the sky, and had therefore
established air supremacy.
—Various Sources

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The continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increases the
importance of control of the air. Several nations have advanced air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles capable of delivering WMD. In addition, the electromagnetic
warfare 2 capabilities of some potential adversaries have advanced to near parity with, or
in some cases exceeded, those of the United States. This may enable aircraft capable
of delivering WMD to penetrate friendly air defenses. Mobile missiles, cruise missiles,
and unmanned aircraft systems pose a significant threat to friendly forces and
populations. The ability to locate and destroy these systems prior to launch remains a
challenge for effective counterair operations.

Like other air, space, and cyberspace operations, counterair is fundamentally effects
based. This means that counterair operations are designed, planned, executed,
assessed, and adapted in order to influence or change system behavior to achieve
desired outcomes. Effective counterair operations should be part of a larger, coherent
plan that logically ties the overall operation’s end state to all objectives and effects and
tasks. This plan should guide execution and the means of gaining feedback; measuring
success must be planned for and evaluated throughout and after execution. This
approach should consider all potential instruments of power and all available means to
achieve desired effects, and must consider the entire operational environment. The
operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences
that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander
(JP 3-0, Joint Operations). Non-military instruments of national power may not seem
relevant to counterair operations, but they can be decisively important in certain
circumstances, as when diplomatic efforts permit or deny basing or overflight rights that
critically impact counterair efforts. Conversely, counterair capability can help deter
hostile adversary action by providing a credible military threat to enemy maneuver and
freedom to attack.

In an effects-based framework, effects fall into two broad categories: direct effects, or
those immediate outcomes created by “blue” (friendly) actions, and indirect effects,
higher-order effects created upon “red” (adversary) or “gray” (neutral) actors within the
operational environment. The counterair framework, illustrated in the figure “The
Counterair Framework,” shows typical “blue” actions taken to create effects in support of
counterair operations.

Counterair is the foundational framework at the theater level. It describes a number of

different tasks or missions, each of which is described below. Note that in many cases
the distinctions between the categories may blur. For example, an attack on an enemy
SAM site may be considered an attack operation or suppression of enemy air defenses
(SEAD). The finer distinctions do not substantially change the way operations are

2 Air Force language has evolved from using the term “electronic warfare” (and related terms such as
“electronic attack” to refer now to “electromagnetic warfare”. The legacy term, “electronic,” speaks to
actions to attack and protect the electronic circuits associated with radios and radars. With expanded use
of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., infrared applications, lasers, microwave and satellite
communications, computers) the broader term “electromagnetic” is more technically accurate. This
evolution also anticipates a similar change in joint doctrine. For more information, see AFDP 3-51,
Electromagnetic Warfare and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

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conducted, but may help Airmen to understand the elements of offensive counterair
(OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA).

The Counterair Framework

(Based on JP 3-01)

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

Different types of OCA operations are used to achieve specific counterair effects.
Tasked units normally have decentralized execution authority and are given significant
latitude in the detailed planning and coordination of the tasks. OCA efforts should be
properly planned for, directed, and integrated with other offensive operations. OCA
operations, in addition to supporting operations against adversary air and missile
targets, support missions such as strategic attack, air interdiction, and close air support.

 Attack operations. Attack operations are intended to destroy, disrupt, or degrade

counterair targets on the ground and may be accomplished through kinetic or non-
kinetic actions. These missions are directed against enemy air and missile threats,
their command and control, and their support infrastructure (e.g., airfields, launch
sites, launchers, fuel, supplies, and runways). The main goal is to prevent enemy
employment of air and missile capabilities.

 Suppression of enemy air defenses. Activity to neutralize, destroy, or degrade

enemy surface-based air defenses by destructive or disruptive means. SEAD
requirements may vary according to mission requirements, system capabilities, and
threat complexity. SEAD planners should coordinate with intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) operators to ensure collection and exploitation

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 opportunities are considered prior to destroying or disrupting emitters. SEAD
operations fall into three categories:

 Area of responsibility / joint operating area (JOA) air defense system

suppression: Operations conducted against specific enemy air defense
systems to destroy, disrupt, or degrade their effectiveness. It targets high-
payoff air defense assets, resulting in the greatest degradation of the enemy's
total system and enabling effective friendly operations.

 Localized suppression: Operations normally confined to geographical areas

associated with specific ground targets or friendly transit routes, contributing to
local air superiority.

 Opportune suppression: Usually unplanned, including aircrew self-defense

and attack against targets of opportunity. The joint force commander (JFC) or
joint force air component commander (JFACC) normally establishes specific
rules of engagement (ROE) to permit airborne assets the ability to conduct
opportune suppression.

 Fighter escort. Fighter escort provides dedicated protection sorties by air-to-air

capable fighters in support of other offensive air and air support operations over
enemy territory or in a DCA role to protect aircraft such as high-value airborne
assets (HVAAs).

 Fighter sweep. An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy
enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area. Normally, fighter
sweeps are conducted in order to achieve local or joint operations area air
superiority. The need for fighter sweep missions versus attack operations will
depend on the air and missile threat and JFC or JFACC objectives.

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
Several types of DCA tasks also help to provide a permissive environment for friendly
air action.

 Active air and missile defense (AMD). Active AMD is direct defensive action taken
to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile
threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes actions to counter enemy
manned and unmanned aircraft, aerodynamic missiles (cruise, air-to-surface, & air-
to-air), and ballistic missiles.

 Air Defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft and

aerodynamic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. It
includes the use of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery,
electromagnetic warfare (including directed energy), multiple sensors, and other
available weapons or capabilities.

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  Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Defensive measures designed to destroy
attacking enemy ballistic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of
such attacks. Integration of BMD systems will allow for a defense in depth, with
the potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success.

These actions are closely integrated to form essential DCA capabilities, but may involve
different defensive weapon systems or tactics, techniques and procedures.

 Passive air and missile defense. Passive AMD includes all measures, other than
active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. It consists of several categories of activities.
Passive AMD measures are considered the same for air and missile threats, with
one exception: detection and warning of ballistic missile attack is normally provided
by supporting assets from outside the theater / JOA in concert with deployed
command and control systems and sensors. These are briefly summarized in the
section on execution considerations for passive defense:

 Detection and warning.

 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defenses.

 Camouflage, concealment, and deception (including passive countermeasures

designed to reduce electronic and infrared signatures, and low-observable
[stealth] technology).

 Hardening.

 Reconstitution.

 Dispersion.

 Redundancy.

 Mobility.

The list of potential counterair effects is endless and will vary from operation to
operation. Nonetheless, there are certain considerations applicable to planning,
executing, and assessing counterair effects, which are detailed in the following sections.

INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (IAMD)

IAMD is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the

homeland and United States national interests, protect the joint force, and enable
freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to create adverse effects from their
air and missile capabilities. IAMD is an approach to counter some but not all air and
missile threats.

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At the theater level, IAMD combines OCA attack operations and DCA operations to
achieve the joint force commander’s desired effects. Within the IAMD approach, OCA
attack operations are commanded by the JFACC and DCA is commanded by the area
air defense commander (AADC). The JFACC is responsible for integration between the
offensive and defensive counterair components of IAMD. It is important to note that the
OCA attack operations component of IAMD will not be planned and executed in
isolation but rather be part of a wider offensive effort against a variety of enemy targets.
Additionally, OCA attack operations include missions contributing to air superiority (e.g.,
attacks on enemy fighter airfields) which are not part of the IAMD approach.

At the tactical level, IAMD includes counter rocket, artillery, and mortar activities. These
tactical level activities are the responsibility of the ground commander to execute; not
the JFACC or AADC. Beyond the theater level, IAMD supports global missile defense,
homeland defense, and global strike.

For further information on IAMD, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

The relationship between counterair and the IAMD approach is illustrated in the figure
below.

The Relationship between Counterair

and Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(Based on JP 3-01)

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Last Updated: 6 September 2019

Effective counterair operations require a reliable command and control (C2) capability.
C2 assets should be capable of exchanging information rapidly with other Services,
components, and multinational partners. The information flow supports the chain of
command and should be as complete, secure, and near real-time as possible.

Centralized control and decentralized execution (CC/DE) remains a fundamental tenet

of airpower; advances in technology have not changed this.3 C2 systems are tailored
to support this tenet. Centralized control is exercised from the appropriate command
level while permitting decentralized execution of counterair operations. Decentralized
execution means that the lowest echelon possible is given responsibility for
determining mission requirements and achieving mission success. The capabilities of
modern communication and near-real-time display technologies, however, make
centralized execution—such as direct control of missions from outside the cockpit—
possible. During several recent operations, senior commanders have attempted a
degree of control approaching centralized execution. Such command arrangements
may not be effective in a fully stressed, dynamic combat environment and so are
seldom, if ever, appropriate for counterair operations—especially offensive counterair.
The loss of situational awareness and tactical flexibility entailed by centralized
execution of counterair missions may often degrade mission effectiveness. Future
conflicts involving operations in a contested, degraded, or operationally limited
environment further emphasize the importance of CC/DE.

3The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution is called “mission command” in joint
doctrine and is based upon mission-type orders. For a discussion of the relationship between mission
command and CC/DE, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

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 The six months of major combat in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in
Afghanistan saw not only centralized planning, but also a degree of
centralized execution that was unique in the US experience… [Technology]
allowed sensor-to-shooter links to be shortened, in some cases, from hours
to minutes. It also, however, resulted in an oversubscribed target-approval
process that lengthened rather than compressed the kill chain. As a result,
the human factor became the main constraint impeding more effective time-
critical targeting…

This unprecedentedly [sic] close connectivity, however, cut both ways.

Although it was helpful—and even essential—up to a point, it also often
resulted in gridlock, in that it encouraged higher-level leaders and their staffs
to try to micromanage the fighting. Senior leaders often intervened at the
tactical level not because circumstances required it, but simply because they
could. As a result, fast-moving targets sometimes were allowed to get away.

Another consequence of our expanded global connectivity was that ‘reach-

back,’ a desirable capability when used with discrimination, metamorphosed
into ‘reach-forward’ as rear headquarters sought information from US Central
Command’s forward-deployed combined air and space operations center
(CAOC) and then used that information to try to influence events from the
rear….
―Benjamin S. Lambeth
by permission, excerpted from Air Power Against Terror:
America’s Conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Nonetheless, the nature of global communication virtually guarantees a degree of

political sensitivity and operational visibility completely alien to the generation of Airmen
who fought before the US involvement in Vietnam. Air Force forces cannot expect to

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operate in a completely unconstrained environment. Rules of engagement (ROE) are
“directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and
limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered” (JP 3-84, Legal Support). Effective
operations require the establishment and promulgation of easily understood ROE. ROE
are established to convey the intent and guidance of national leadership and senior
military commanders with respect to the use of force. They reflect legal constraints and
political imperatives that may impact an operation’s overall end state and may thus
place restrictions on use of force, engagement authority, etc. ROE and special
instructions constrain (compel) and restrain (prohibit) certain military actions. Though
restrictive, these measures do not constitute centralized execution. Effective ROE
should unambiguously communicate the commander’s intent without being so restrictive
that it prevents mission success.

Observations from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM:

…the [Predator] images also caused headaches

for the commander of regular US forces in
Afghanistan who was overseeing the operation.
Throughout the battles in the Shah-i-Kot region,
command personnel at higher levels, and
operating in other locations, relayed numerous
questions and much advice to the commander in
the field in an attempt to contribute to the
management of unfolding battle.
…the episode reveals the powerful influence that live
pictures from the battle zone can have on the ability
of the on-site commander to determine and execute
a successful battle plan. The last thing the US field
commanders need is an over-complicated chain of
command, with officers thousands of miles away
from the scene of battle providing armchair advice on
the basis of pictures rolling across a television
screen.
— Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of
Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and
Force Transformation

Centralized execution may lengthen the friendly decision cycle and the dynamic
targeting process (the “kill chain”), but the sensitivity of certain end-state conditions may

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require C2 arrangements that approach centralized execution in rare cases. When this
happens, operations should revert to CC/DE as soon as practicable.

There has been a tendency for ROE to become more restrictive as the level of hostilities
has diminished in the concluding phases of recent conflicts. This tendency can result in
ROE that, in effect, drive operational plans toward centralized execution. The majority of
conflicts will involve phases or operations where military expediency will be deemed
less important than political considerations. However, such “overly centralized” ROE
can be contrary to the natural function of air forces. They can lead to a collective
mindset whereby Airmen begin to rely on ever-increasing levels of oversight and
approval, and potentially lead to situations where Airmen hesitate to act, waiting on
higher level approval, rather than take initiative. As such, if within their decision-making
ability, commanders should be careful not to create ROE so restrictive that they place
friendly forces at unnecessary risk or at an operational disadvantage. This could be a
pitfall in a peer or near-peer, contested environment. However, once published, all
Airmen have an obligation to follow the ROE.

In any case, while restrictive ROE may exist, centralized execution of counterair
operations is much rarer than in the conduct of other operations such as strategic attack
or nuclear operations. For example, during Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, there were
many restrictions on use of deadly force against Iraqi air defense facilities, but there
was very little interference in how individual missions were flown in support of the
operation. Airmen at the tactical level had the latitude to execute in a decentralized
manner.

For more information on ROE, see AFDP 3-84, Legal Support to Operations.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL ROLES

Last Updated: 6 September 2019

Airmen should expect most counterair operations to be joint and combined efforts.
Therefore, it is essential Airmen understand the counterair capabilities of other
components of the joint force and participating allies and how to integrate those
capabilities with those of the US Air Force.

Although assets capable of performing counterair missions are assigned to different

components, the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the
supported commander for counterair operations. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally
include planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force
commander’s (JFC) priorities and guidance. Additional responsibilities include air and
missile defense (AMD), airspace control, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. As such, the JFACC is normally appointed to the roles of
area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority (ACA). Assigning
responsibility and authority to coordinate and integrate airspace control and counterair
operations to one air commander greatly enhances the effort to gain and maintain
control of the air.

The Commander, Air Force Forces as Joint Force Air Component

Commander

The JFC normally designates the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) as the
JFACC, or in case of combined operations, the combined force air component
commander (CFACC). For the rest of this publication, it will be assumed the
COMAFFOR is also the JFACC / CFACC and the air operations center (AOC) is the
joint / combined AOC. For further information, see AFDP 3-30, Command and Control.

Area Air Defense Commander

The AADC is responsible for integrating the entire AMD effort and should be the
component commander with the command and control (C2) capability to plan,
execute, and assess AMD with other air operations. Splitting the assets among
multiple commanders reduces their effectiveness. Any attempt to separate ballistic
missile defense (BMD) from the overall AMD structure has the potential to seriously
degrade
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the overall AMD effort and increase the risk of friendly fire among multi-layered AMD
assets. To facilitate AMD, the AADC establishes an integrated air defense system
(IADS). The friendly IADS is a robust integration of the Services’ AMD capabilities and
comprises sensors, weapons, C2 systems, and personnel.

With the support of the Service or functional component commanders, the AADC
develops, integrates, and distributes the area air defense plan (AADP). This plan should
be closely integrated with the airspace control plan (ACP). Planners should strive to
create a reliable and consistent common operational picture (i.e., a fused and correlated
air, ground, maritime, space, and cyberspace picture) available to all supporting C2
facilities. The AADP should arrange a layered, overlapping defense to allow for multiple
engagement opportunities, contain detailed weapons control and engagement
procedures, and specify coordination measures required for AMD. A detailed
description of the AADP is available in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(AFTTP) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile
Defense.

One of the most critical responsibilities of the AADC is to provide guidance and
articulate procedures for combat identification (CID). CID is defined in Joint Publication
(JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support, as “the process of attaining an accurate characterization
of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement
decision.” AFDP 3-60, Targeting, depicts three levels of CID. The first level identifies
the track or entity as friendly, foe, or neutral. The second level identifies platform type,
while the third level attempts to determine the target’s intent. Accurate and timely
identification enhances real-time tactical decisions by allowing timely, beyond-visual-
range engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles while conserving resources and
reducing the risk to friendly forces. CID information may be obtained from various land-,
air-, and space-based systems, along with coordination measures documented in the
ACP or the airspace control order (ACO). To be most effective, this CID “system of
systems” requires effective guidance from the AADC and a common data link
architecture with the goal of near-real-time information sharing among platforms. To
avoid a single point of failure, no one node acts as an exclusive conduit of all CID
information. Electronic methods, which provide the most rapid and reliable means of
identification, are normally used when available. Visual and procedural means of
identification are not as practical but may be required in some situations. Some
individual weapons systems retain an autonomous CID capability. For details on CID,
see AFTTP 3-2.31.

Airspace Control Authority

The airspace control authority (ACA) is responsible for airspace control and for
coordinating the use of the airspace. Normally, the JFC will designate the JFACC as the
ACA. The ACA develops policies and procedures for airspace control and for the
coordination required among components within the theater. The ACA establishes an
airspace control system for the JFC, integrates that system with host nations, and
coordinates user requirements. The ACA develops these procedures into an ACP and,

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after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the theater. The ACP is then
implemented through the ACO. The ACO is an order that provides the details of the
approved requests for coordination measures. While the ACP provides general
guidance for control of the airspace, the ACO implements specific control procedures
for established time periods. It is published either as part of the air tasking order (ATO)
or as a separate document. The ACO may include airspace coordinating measures, fire
support coordinating measures, and air defense measures such as minimum risk
routes, combat air patrols, fire support coordination lines, fighter engagement zones,
and missile engagement zones. A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide the
flexibility needed within the airspace control system to rapidly employ forces. For more
information see AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control, and AFTTP 3-2.78, Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS

Last Updated: 6 September 2019

The commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), in the role of joint force air component
commander (JFACC) uses the following command and control (C2) resources to
conduct and support counterair operations:

THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

The theater air control system (TACS) provides the JFACC with an overarching means
of commanding and controlling counterair operations. It includes the personnel,
procedures, and equipment, such as the air operations center (AOC), necessary to
plan, direct, control, and assess air operations and to coordinate those operations with
other components. It is composed of units that facilitate centralized control and
decentralized execution of air operations. The TACS can be tailored to support
contingencies of any size across the range of military operations. TACS elements may
be employed in garrison, deployed for contingencies, or deployed to augment theater-
specific systems. When the TACS is combined with other Service or functional
components’ C2 elements (such as the Army air-ground system, the Navy tactical air
control system, the Marine Corps air command and control system, or the special
operations air ground system) it becomes the theater air-ground system (TAGS).

The TACS is divided into ground and airborne elements, based on the environment in
which they operate, not on the portion of the operations for which they provide C2. For
a more detailed examination of each element of the TACS, see AFDP 3-52, Airspace
Control; Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, Vol. 26, Theater
Air Control System; and AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System.

19
 Air Operations Center
(Notional)

Air Support Control and AWACS

Operations Reporting
Center (ASOC) Center (CRC)
JSTARS

ISR Systems

Subunits Subunits Other TACS or joint /

coalition units (incl.
ground- & sea-based
assets)

Control Key:
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
Coordination ISR: Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JSTARS: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
TACS: Theater air control system

Notional Theater Air Control System

Air Operations Center

The AOC is the senior element of the TACS and is the principal air operations weapons
system with which combat air operations are designed, planned, directed, controlled,
and assessed. Additionally, the AOC coordinates air operations with other Services and
components. The AOC disseminates tasking orders; executes and directs execution of
daily air, space, and cyberspace operations; provides rapid reaction to immediate
situations by exercising positive control of friendly forces; and provides the capability to
conduct dynamic targeting. When the COMAFFOR is appointed JFACC, then the AOC
becomes the core of the joint AOC. Within the AOC, the airspace control management
team integrates the use of airspace in the theater. It provides the current air and surface
situation using data from many sources and is responsible to the airspace control
authority (ACA) for developing airspace control procedures through the airspace control
plan (ACP) and coordinating airspace control activities. The AOC ensures that the ACP

20
is compatible with current operational requirements and capabilities and relies on the
ACP to ensure missions are de-conflicted.

The AOC may perform certain airspace management and airspace control functions
directly or delegate them to the control and reporting center (CRC) or other tactical C2
agencies. Among the roles that the AOC may perform directly include data link
management among all components and participating nations (vital for combat
identification and air battle management) and management of the overall air defense
effort. The AOC may also perform C2 liaison, mission control, combat search and
rescue (CSAR) assistance, threat warning, and coordination of air defense artillery and
friendly artillery fire unless delegated to the CRC, ASOC, or other tactical C2 elements.

TACS Ground Elements

Control and Reporting Center. As part of the TACS ground element, the CRC is the
airspace control and surveillance radar facility directly subordinate to the AOC. It
provides theater mission control through employment of C2 elements of the TACS. The
CRC is assigned an airspace control sector by the Airspace Control Authority and
manages the functions of all deployed Air Force surface radars within that sector.

The CRC’s primary mission is to provide airspace management and airspace control,
including aircraft detection, tracking, and identification. The CRC also issues scramble
or airborne orders, performs data link management functions, and manages air and
missile defense activities within its sector. Additionally, the CRC provides C2 liaison,
mission control, CSAR support, aircraft threat warning, and coordinates air defense
artillery through a collocated Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer. The CRC may
further delegate control of surveillance areas to subordinate radar units or Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft within its sector for optimum sensor and
radio coverage, and air battle management.

Within the TACS, the CRC communicates up to the AOC, down to subordinate units,
and laterally to other TACS, joint, and coalition units to ensure defensive assets are
employed in mutually supporting roles within its assigned sector. The CRC directs
fighter aircraft, air defense artillery, and other counterair assets. The CRC, when
assigned the regional air defense commander (RADC) or sector air defense
commander (SADC) role, normally establishes operating procedures for initial
assignment of airborne targets to air defense artillery and fighters. All air and missile
defense elements coordinate continuously to eliminate duplication of effort and ensure
adequate commitment of assigned weapons against threats. The area air defense
commander (AADC) may delegate engagement authority to the CRC as part of RADC
or SADC responsibilities. Given a constrained combat identification (CID) environment,
the CRC may be the lowest tactical level with engagement authority for enemy air and
missile threats.

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). As part of the TACS ground element, the
ASOC is the functional air component responsible for planning, coordinating, controlling,

21
and executing air operations that directly support ground combat forces. The ASOC can
affect the counterair battle through coordination for suppression of enemy air defense
(SEAD) missions, management of some airspace control measures, close air support,
and others. The ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon and
coordinates operations with the permanently assigned tactical air control party, Army
fires cell, and the AOC.

TACS Airborne Elements

Airborne Warning and Control System. The AWACS provides the TACS with a
flexible and capable airborne radar platform. It provides battle management, command
and control, and is normally among the first systems to arrive in theater during
contingency operations. Through voice and data connectivity, AWACS issues threat
warnings, directs aircraft on counterair missions, manages air refueling, provides a
common tactical picture, and coordinates CSAR efforts. AWACS can detect and identify
hostile airborne and surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats and assign weapon systems to
engage enemy targets.

AWACS may carry an airborne battle staff or airborne command element (ACE)
authorized to redirect forces under the authority of the JFACC and AADC. When
employed with an ACE, AWACS can scramble and divert aircraft conducting counterair
operations and recommend changes in air defense warning conditions. The AWACS
can perform many, but not all, CRC functions.

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). The JSTARS is a long-
range, airborne sensor system that provides real-time radar surveillance information on
moving and stationary surface targets via secure data links to air and surface
commanders. JSTARS can play an important role in the effort to gain control of the air.
When combined with other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
sensors, JSTARS contributes to the commander’s overall situational awareness by
identifying and locating such targets as SAM missiles, launchers, and radars and
antiaircraft artillery sites, among others. The system has expanded into an integral part
of the TACS. JSTARS provides updates on enemy force disposition and performs
limited battle management functions, which may be important in managing the offensive
counterair (OCA) effort. JSTARS information builds situational awareness for the JFC
and JFACC to direct air operations, update target information, and provide real-time
dynamic targeting.

22
 AWACS, JSTARS, and RIVET JOINT provide C2
and ISR information to the TACS and other users

ISR SYSTEMS

Although not specifically part of the TACS, spaced-based and airborne ISR systems
(both manned and unmanned) are key enablers of counterair operations (e.g., SEAD).
For example, RIVET JOINT (an airborne signals intelligence collection and reporting
platform) can provide near-real-time assessment of hostile airborne, land, and sea-
based electronic emitters via secure communications directly to the AOC and aircraft
conducting OCA operations. In addition, the U-2, MQ-9 (Reaper), and RQ-4 (Global
Hawk) provide near-real-time streaming video and still images of enemy air and missile
defense systems (e.g., surface-to-air missile sites) to help determine status for attacking
OCA assets.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Last Updated: 6 September 2019

Counterair planning may be conducted at every echelon of command and across the
range of military operations. Counterair planning should take into account the
capabilities of all the Services, joint force components, interagency, and multinational
partners. Counterair planning is conducted using the joint planning process for air. For
details on this process, see AFDP 3-0, Operations and Planning and Joint Publication
(JP) 3-30, Joint Air Operations. During joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (JIPOE), planners should determine the adversary’s active and passive
counterair capabilities, as well as their intent to contest control of the air with those
capabilities, if possible. JIPOE’s main focus is to provide intelligence designed to help
the JFC discern the adversary’s probable intent and most likely future course of action
(COA). This, in turn, should inform the joint force air component commander’s
(JFACC’s) and joint force commander’s (JFC’s) decision-making efforts during mission
analysis and COA development. For more information on JIPOE see JP 2-01.3, Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

Normally, the JFACC’s first priority should be to define the level of control of the
air needed to achieve the JFC’s objectives and what level of risk they are willing
to accept to achieve it. Once defined, the JFACC should identify the current level of
control of the air (parity, superiority, or supremacy) and what actions are needed to
reach the desired level of control to include space and cyberspace operations. For
further discussion on risk, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
(CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis, Enclosure C, Chairman’s Risk Assessment and
Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3, Combat Aircraft
Fundamentals Integrated Planning & Employment (IPE). This guidance will drive the
priorities for joint air operations center planners. The JFACC should inform the JFC as to
which level of control of the air is realistically achievable given current capabilities and
allocation of assets.

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

Offensive counterair (OCA) may be the highest payoff air component mission when the
enemy has the capability to significantly threaten friendly forces with air and missile
assets. Given finite resources, the JFACC should judiciously allocate them in order to
meet the JFC’s objectives. Successful OCA results in greater freedom from attack,

24
enabling increased freedom of action, and freeing assets for other operations against
the enemy. In other words, the initial investment in OCA operations to achieve the
desired level of control of the air may pay significant dividends toward overall mission
accomplishment. Determining which enemy capabilities hinder control of the air is
fundamental to successful OCA operations. For instance, it may not be necessary to
completely destroy a given capability, but only temporarily degrade it in order to achieve
desired effects. The latter may require much less effort, thereby freeing up assets for
other missions. This type of analysis may vary from one operation to another but often
results in an effective set of target priorities and an efficient use of assets to achieve the
desired effects.

Offensive Counterair Example

To gain control of the air, friendly forces
must counter enemy air and missile threats
not only to assure full force protection, but
also to enable full flexibility to conduct
parallel operations across the operational
environment. The flexibility of air power may
tempt commanders to divert it to other tasks;
this must be guarded against. The air
component commander assists the theater
commander in achieving control of the air as
a prelude to subsequent theater operations.
Relaxing pressure on the enemy’s air forces
may allow them to gain air superiority with
disastrous results. For example, Hitler’s
decision during World War II to divert the
Luftwaffe from direct attack of the Royal Air
Force (RAF) to the bombing of cities allowed
the RAF breathing space it desperately
needed to reconstitute and eventually win
the Battle of Britain.

What the Luftwaffe failed to do was to destroy

the fighter squadrons of the Royal Air Force,
which were, indeed, stronger at the end of the
battle than at the beginning.

―Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C.T. Dowding

Fighter Command, Royal Air Force

The nature of airpower is such that offensive combat power can frequently be “massed”
by distributing forces. In fact, the most effective OCA efforts may be achieved as part of

25
a broader, parallel attack on the adversary as a system-of-systems with all available
assets, to include cyberspace and space capabilities. For instance, attacking electrical
power and isolating national military leadership may aid the operation’s overall OCA
effort while also helping achieve other objectives. However, as with other operations,
care must be taken not to dilute the OCA effort to the point where it is ineffective.
Concentration of effort in the context of space and time will ensure that direct effects
allowing access are balanced with indirect effects that degrade the overall enemy
system over time. If the OCA effort is spread too thin, the JFACC risks losing the
initiative and the benefits of airpower’s offensive nature. When considering counterair
assets available, it is important to give full consideration to the assets and capabilities of
other components.

Planners should utilize intelligence to determine the adversaries’ capabilities and expect
at a minimum that adversaries will have at least a rudimentary integrated air defense
system (IADS), consisting of both active and passive defenses, even if they do not
possess any significant offensive air potential. IADS range from coordinated fire from
small-caliber antiaircraft artillery, man-portable air defense system missiles and small
arms fires (which may, nonetheless, employ sophisticated passive measures such as
camouflage and concealment), to complex, integrated, and highly redundant systems.
In all cases, strategists and planners should develop means of neutralizing these
systems, or negating their effectiveness, in order to create a permissive air environment
at desired places and times. In the case of the more complex IADS, attacking the larger
enemy system in parallel (versus concentrating on the IADS alone) will likely be more
effective and may yield cascading failures within the IADS, as systems it relies upon
also fail. Ironically, more rudimentary or “primitive” defense systems may be harder to
defeat because they are more distributed and easily concealed (or otherwise protected),
and may be rendered ineffective only by imposing operating restrictions on friendly
forces (since such defense systems are typically short-ranged).

The following considerations are important for determining OCA targeting priorities and
methods:

 Threat. The threat posed by specific enemy capabilities (aircraft, theater missiles,
etc.) includes an assessment of the urgency or the need to counter that threat. A
weapon of mass destruction-capable missile launcher would normally merit diversion
of assets from a less immediate threat, such as a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site.

 Direct effects. First-order results of actions with no intervening effects between

action and outcome. These are usually immediate, physical, and readily
recognizable (e.g., weapon employment results). These are important in determining
whether friendly tasks were accomplished. Planning for them must also consider
such factors as collateral damage potential and rules of engagement restrictions.

 Indirect effects. Second, third, or higher-order effects created through intermediate

effects or causal linkages following causal actions. These may be physical,
psychological, functional, or systemic in nature. They may be created in a

26
 cumulative, cascading, sequential, or parallel manner. They are often delayed and
typically are more difficult to recognize and assess than direct effects.
Understanding these and the causal linkages between them may be vital for
achieving objectives.

 Forces available. The forces available are assessed against the number, types,
and priority of targets that can be attacked. Sufficient and capable forces should be
provided to ensure the desired results are obtained.

 Time available and time required. Time constraints are integral to prioritization and
planning. The time allowed to achieve the direct and indirect effects as well as the
duration required of those effects will influence the number and type of forces
required.

 Risk. Risk calculation involves weighing the risk to friendly forces against expected
gains from target attack. Risk calculation should also consider the risks entailed in
not taking planned actions. Different objectives and circumstances drive different
acceptable levels of risk.

 Measures and indicators. These are the essential component parts of assessment;
the means of evaluating progress toward creating effects and achieving objectives.
They should be determined during planning.

The types of resources available to perform OCA tasks are only “tools” in a planner’s
“toolkit.” Desired effects should drive planning efforts and there may be many ways to
impose a particular effect. The means may be chosen based on a number of criteria,
including desired higher-order indirect effects. For example, there are multiple ways to
suppress a SAM site. One may simply jam its communications and radars if short term
local suppression is needed or if resources needed to create the intended effects are
not available. One may destroy or degrade the operations center that controls the site,
forcing the enemy to autonomous operations that often present less of a threat to
friendly forces. One may destroy the site outright if its autonomous operation represents
a sufficient threat to friendly operations. Planners and commanders should choose
means carefully in order to satisfy requirements relating to the timing and tempo of
operations, persistence of threats, and “opportunity costs” of using OCA assets for other
purposes.

Planning for OCA usually takes place in the AOC as part of the joint planning process
for air. In early stages of planning, the JFACC, along with the AOC’s strategy and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) divisions, will determine objectives,
desired effects, and relative priorities. Planners in the strategy, combat plans, and ISR
divisions will determine enemy systems, capabilities, and assets that can be used to
contest control of the air. Combat plans and combat operations personnel will use this
information to match desired effects to targets provided by the ISR division, and match
targets with friendly forces to create tactical tasks. Planners should develop a prioritized
target list before hostilities begin, continually updating it once the battle rhythm is

27
established based on current intelligence and progress of the operation. Planners
should also build procedures to handle higher priority re-taskings, such as diversions to
strike JFC-designated time-sensitive targets (TSTs), which for counterair, may be such
targets as enemy ballistic missiles or the most modern SAMs that represent significant
threats to friendly air operations. Planners must be able to rapidly re-task OCA missions
in order to take appropriate action against TSTs and similar fleeting, emerging, or
higher-priority OCA targets. For example, it may be necessary to pull a flight of aircraft
off of attacking an enemy aircraft fuel facility to strike (or monitor) a probable ballistic
missile launch site that is of higher priority to the JFACC and JFC. A frequently used
best practice is to designate on-call aircraft with appropriate weapons loads to loiter,
awaiting the call to strike a fleeting target, then striking a pre-planned OCA (or other)
target if no call comes. Against fixed, often highly defended, targets deep within enemy
territory, OCA planners should place great emphasis on detailed, accurate, and timely
intelligence, target analysis, time-over-target deconfliction, active and passive defenses
available to the enemy, and rules of engagement (ROE). Mission planners at the unit
level should study these thoroughly to avoid friendly fire and mission interference, and
enhance mission effectiveness. In addition, OCA planners should consider multi-domain
solutions (such as use of cyberspace capabilities) to achieve OCA objectives against
fixed, highly defended targets deep within enemy territory as a way to minimize risk to
friendly forces.

The following considerations are important for OCA planning at the AOC and unit
mission planning levels. For more information on integrated planning considerations,
see AFTTP 3-3, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals Integrated Planning & Employment
(IPE).

 Enemy threat, location, and capabilities. The enemy threat to air operations
needs proper consideration in the planning, positioning, and timing of OCA mission
details. Specific threats to the OCA effort (aircraft, missiles, antiaircraft artillery,
electromagnetic attack4) may require substantial emphasis be placed on their
disruption prior to striking intended targets.

 Friendly command and control (C2) capabilities. Theater C2 assets such as

Airborne Warning and Control System and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System, are tasked by numerous units and agencies. As such, OCA planners should
not assume that complete C2 capabilities will be available for every OCA mission. In
all cases, C2 instructions should be carefully monitored, because this is the avenue
through which higher-priority re-tasking will come.

4 Air Force language has evolved from using the term “electronic warfare” (and related terms such as
“electronic attack” to refer now to “electromagnetic warfare”. The legacy term, “electronic,” speaks to
actions to attack and protect the electronic circuits associated with radios and radars. With expanded use
of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., infrared applications, lasers, microwave and satellite
communications, computers) the broader term “electromagnetic” is more technically accurate. This
evolution also anticipates a similar change in joint doctrine. For more information, see AFDP 3-51,
Electromagnetic Warfare and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

28
 Rules of engagement and related special instructions (SPINS) found in tasking
orders, as well as rules for use of force, (often used in situations such as homeland
defense and civil support missions) are directives, issued by competent military
authority, that must be followed for any mission that falls under that particular
operation. ROE and SPINS may critically affect how missions are performed. All
levels, from the JFACC down to individual aircrews, should understand the ROE that
apply to the accomplishment of their missions and include both the ROE and SPINS
in mission planning.

 Weaponeering. Assigning the correct weapons and platforms to target sets is critical
to achieve the desired effects. Accurate weaponeering increases the chances of
achieving desired effects.

 Deconfliction. The sheer number of airborne assets—manned, unmanned, and

ballistic—demands that planners deconflict to protect friendly forces from
unnecessary risk. Deconfliction must also be conducted for non-kinetic effects
supporting counterair missions to ensure desired effects are provided and to mitigate
unintended consequences.

 Environmental conditions. The significance of environmental conditions on

counterair cannot be overstated. Weather can limit sensor or seeker sensitivity and
ultimately limit the planner’s munitions selection. Likewise, varying terrain can be a
challenge to pilots or offer refuge to an adversary. Terrain will often limit munitions
selection. Planners should address the need for sufficient counterair assets to offset
the loss of capability and desired effects due to environmental factors.

 Distance, timing, and refueling. Counterair assets typically require refueling

support for sustained presence. Refueling coordination requires constant
management by planners, and details need to be stated in ATO SPINS. See AFDP
3-36, Air Mobility Operations, for more detail on refueling considerations.

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

While OCA seeks to affect enemy counterair systems close to the enemy location, DCA
seeks to affect those same systems closer to friendly locations. In some cases, DCA
may also be the only allowed means of countering air and missile threats due to
constraints imposed by the political situation. Effective OCA greatly reduces the DCA
requirement, freeing assets for more offensive operations, but some degree of DCA is
normally necessary in every operation. DCA operations defend friendly lines of
communication, protect friendly forces and assets by denying the enemy the freedom to
carry out offensive attacks from the air, and provide a secure area from which all
elements of the joint force can operate effectively. DCA operations can be conducted in
conjunction with or independent of OCA operations and generally fall into one of two
categories: Active air and missile defense (AMD) or passive AMD.

29
Just as in OCA operations, DCA planners prioritize which assets and capabilities to
defend. This is commonly done by a critical asset list (CAL) and/or a defended asset list
(DAL). For additional information, see AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense. Planners at all levels identify enemy
targets and capabilities to defend against, while matching available forces against the
threat. They use many of the same OCA planning considerations. Planners determine
which mission-critical assets and capabilities to protect, which will vary from operation to
operation.

An emerging threat to airbase operations arises from the proliferation of low, slow, and
small unmanned aircraft (UA). These UA pose a unique challenge to conventional DCA
capabilities. As capabilities are developed to counter this threat, integration with existing
DCA C2 systems must be a priority. Countering this threat is a shared responsibility
between DCA operations and airbase defense. For further information, see AFTTP
3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense.

Active Air and Missile Defense

Active AMD involves defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and
assets. Active AMD consists of both air defense (AD) and ballistic missile defense
(BMD) and is conducted using the area air defense commander-established friendly
IADS which is a mix of the Services’ weapon and sensor systems, supported by secure
and highly responsive C2 systems, to find, fix, track, target, and destroy or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile airborne threats. The IADS is unique to each operations area
and contributes to defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that
increase the probability for success. Active AMD targets include any air and missile
threat that negatively impacts friendly operations.

Integrated employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air defense systems, along with

multi-domain detection, tracking and warning capabilities, through coordinated
detection, identification, engagement, and assessment of enemy forces is necessary to
defeat enemy attacks and protect friendly forces. Planners should keep in mind the
complexities of airspace control in a DCA environment. Airspace control in an active
AMD environment is extremely difficult and becoming more complicated with the
proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems. Rapid, reliable, and secure means of
identification are critical to the survival of friendly aircraft and to facilitate an effective
defense against enemy air and missile attacks.

The effective execution of AMD via an IADS requires the ability to quickly detect a
potential air or missile threat, identify it, track and target it, and attack it. DCA
engagements may occur inside friendly airspace, requiring deconfliction between
friendly assets, such as fighters and SAMs. To facilitate engagements, continuous
surveillance and reporting of real time and near-real-time target track data is required.
To maximize damage to the enemy force, the engagement process is continuous
throughout the threat’s approach, entry into, and departure from the friendly operational

30
area. Target track production is a sequential process that begins with the surveillance
function.

Effective surveillance and track identification depends upon fusing all-source sensor
data (ground, air, sea, and space-based sensors) into an accurate common tactical
picture. As a track is detected, it is identified and labeled; this information is then
disseminated as rapidly as possible via datalink, voice, and text as applicable. The track
data provided should be sufficiently detailed and timely to permit the C2 system to
evaluate the track, determine its threat, and designate the appropriate AMD asset for
engagement if required. The optimum employment of DCA forces involves the earliest
possible discrimination of friend from foe to maximize engagement opportunities.
To prevent friendly fire, great caution should be exercised when employing
autonomous combat identification in DCA operations. If no IADS is established,
procedural means should be used to permit the safe passage of friendly aircraft while
still allowing for the use of available AMD weapons. Since many AMD assets are owned
by different Services and coalition partners, standardized integration, coordination, and
airspace control procedures are required to enable or enhance the capabilities of the
various systems.

Passive Air and Missile Defense

Unlike active AMD, passive AMD does not involve the employment of lethal weapons.
Passive AMD provides individual and collective protection for friendly forces and critical
assets and is the responsibility of every commander in the joint force. It includes
measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the
consequences of attack aircraft and missiles. Passive AMD is similar for air and ballistic
missile threats, with the exception of detection and warning times. Passive AMD
measures are designed to provide protection for friendly forces and assets by
complicating the enemy’s identification, surveillance, and targeting processes and by
countering the enemy’s planned effects.

The first step of passive AMD is to hide valuable assets from the enemy or to
encourage the enemy to attack decoys. Like active AMD, thorough passive AMD should
include layered defense in depth. Passive measures can work concurrently to achieve
this goal. Measures to reduce enemy targeting effectiveness include mobility; deception;
electromagnetic warfare; camouflage, concealment, and deception; hardening;
reconstitution; dispersal; and electronic and infrared countermeasures.

When planning passive AMD there are four principal considerations (JP 3-01,
Countering Air and Missile Threats):

 Detection and Warning Systems and Procedures. Timely detection and warning
of air and missile threats provide reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or
take appropriate action. Reliable and redundant connectivity for communications
and sensor systems is vital for accurate and timely warning. Warning methods

31
 and procedures should be established, disseminated, and rehearsed down to
the unit level to be effective.

 Reduction of Enemy Targeting Effectiveness. Certain measures may be taken to

reduce the effectiveness of enemy targeting and attacks, to include mobility,
deception, electromagnetic warfare, and operations security.

 Reducing Vulnerability. There are four measures that may enable friendly assets
to survive enemy attacks by reducing their vulnerability: hardening; redundancy;
dispersal; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.

 Recovery and Reconstitution. Following an air or missile attack, units should be

restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission
requirements and available resources.

Passive AMD is often an additional means of defense should active AMD efforts fail.

For details on planning considerations for Active and Passive AMD, see AFTTP 3-2.31,
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense.

AIR REFUELING

Air refueling is an essential enabler of counterair operations. Many air assets that
perform the counterair mission have relatively short on-station times or operate from
bases far removed from their intended targets. These assets rely on air refueling to
extend range, on-station time, tactical flexibility, and persistence. Strategists and
planners should build needed refueling support into the air component’s planning
products. Refueling coordination requires constant management during both planning
and execution.

Advanced adversary capabilities may require refueling aircraft to operate in airspace

contested by naval, surface, and air threats. This airspace is determined by the needs
of the receiver aircraft, enemy threat capabilities, risk analysis and acceptance levels,
and political boundary consideration.

The effectiveness of air refueling in counterair operations relies on sound planning,

execution, and integration with the joint force. Fuel planning is determined by receiver
requirements, tanker fuel capacity available, and refueling booms or refueling drogues
available to refuel aircraft. Planners must appropriately match compatible refueling
aircraft configurations to Air Force, Navy, Marine, or coalition forces. Fuel and
boom/drogue requirements vary between OCA and DCA. The nature of OCA allows for
more predictable fuel planning but will require more tankers to provide fuel
simultaneously prior to an OCA push. Refueling support to DCA operations may require
fewer tankers but the fuel planning and execution is more dynamic.

32
Complete refueling planning goes beyond fuel and compatibility requirements and must
include: a robust command and control (C2) plan; sufficient battlespace situational
awareness; expedient threat notification; and detailed retrograde planning.

For more information on air refueling, see AFDP 3-36, Air Mobility Operations.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is defined as “an activity that

synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of sensors, assets, and
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and
future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.” ISR
consists of separate elements but requires treatment as an integrated whole in order to
provide optimized support to counterair operations throughout each phase of the
targeting cycle. Effective counterair operations planning and execution require timely,
reliable, and accurate ISR from air, surface, and space-based sensors that contribute to
warning, situational awareness, targeting, and assessment. Finally, ISR is needed to
identify and attack or exploit emerging targets that pose a substantial threat to friendly
operations. Timely target detection, development, geolocation, weapon selection,
mission planning, and assessment all depend on integrated collection and analysis.
Effective integration of ISR assets is often as crucial to successful counterair
operations as are traditional lethal effects.

Without accurate, well-defined enemy intelligence mission data (IMD), friendly forces
operate under increased risk. Robust IMD planning includes the development,
production, and sharing of information including, but not limited to: signatures,
electromagnetic warfare integrated reprogramming, order of battle, and system
characteristics and performance. Additionally, planning and direction; collection;
processing and exploitation; analysis, prediction and production; and situational
awareness dissemination and relay, contribute directly to a more robust ISR picture,
thereby providing friendly forces with greater opportunity to counter adversary
capabilities. ISR may also provide important indications concerning how an adversary
may use their own counterair capability. An example might be how enemy operators are
trained and what tactics they employ. Further, while ISR cannot read the mind of the
enemy commander, it can provide valuable clues as to the enemy commander’s intent.
Other component intelligence resources can provide valuable information concerning air
operations within their areas of operations.

Strategy Division targeteers use ISR products, to include target system analysis (TSA)
products, to continuously update TSA assessment and to develop the objectives, tasks,
and measures of effectiveness which form the foundation of the combat assessment
process. Likewise, targeteers also provide combat assessment inputs (contributing to
battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, and mission assessment), feeding
the ATO cycle.

For further details on ISR systems and requirements, see AFDP 2-0, Global Integrated
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
Last Updated: 6 September 2019

During the ongoing battle rhythm, weapon systems are matched to specific targets to
carry out tasks. The types of air assets employed and the target sets affected differ
between offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA).

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

The following are some of the resources and capabilities used to conduct OCA:

 Aircraft. Fighter and bomber aircraft provide the bulk of the weapon systems for
OCA operations. Other types of aircraft and weapon systems are often critical
enablers of counterair operations. Unmanned aircraft systems may be used in
counterair operations to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR); communication relay; deception; jamming; harassment; or destruction of
enemy forces and air defense systems when the situation allows.

 Missiles. These weapons include surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air

missiles, as well as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles. These weapon
systems may eliminate or reduce the risk of harm to friendly forces by destroying
enemy systems in the air and on the ground.

 Missile Warning Sensors. A combination of air-, space-, and ground-based

sensors may be used to provide missile launch detection and missile tracking
functions. These systems provide tactical missile warning and attack assessment
information to operation commanded centers.

 Special operations forces. Special operations forces (SOF) can conduct direct
action missions, special reconnaissance, and provide terminal guidance for attacks
against valuable enemy targets. Planners in the air operations center (AOC)
coordinate with the special operations liaison element (SOLE) to coordinate the use
of special operations assets in support of the counterair mission. If not using SOF as
part of the OCA plan, planners should still coordinate with the SOLE to ensure OCA
operations are deconflicted from SOF personnel.

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 Surface fire support. Artillery and naval surface fire support may be employed in
OCA operations. AOC planners should coordinate the use of these fires with the
army and navy liaison elements early in the planning process.

 Command and control systems. Command and control (C2) systems enhance
OCA operations by providing early warning, intelligence, identification, and targeting
data, as well as C2 of friendly forces.

 Electromagnetic warfare (EW).5 EW assets are frequently used to suppress enemy

C2, integrated air defense systems (IADS), and other significant military use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. See AFDP 3-51, Electromagnetic Warfare and
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for detailed discussion of all aspects of EW.

 Cyberspace operations. Cyberspace operations can enhance joint operations and

in some cases reduce the demand for sorties. Many OCA targets such as C2,
theater missiles and support infrastructure, and airfields or operating bases can be
affected by cyberspace operations. Some of these techniques may be able to affect
targets that are inaccessible by other means. Authorities to use cyberspace effects,
rules of engagement, availability of access, and time available to generate a desired
effect are some considerations planners should address.

 ISR systems. ISR systems and resources provide intelligence, surveillance,

reconnaissance, deception, and other effects against enemy forces and air defense
systems. These activities include the use of air, space, cyberspace, and ground
assets.

 Surface Forces. The ability to destroy, damage, secure, and occupy key OCA and
DCA targets (such as surface-to-air missile [SAM] sites) can achieve vital counterair
effects.

OCA target sets are those which directly or indirectly challenge control of the air. Ideally,
OCA concentrates on degrading the capabilities of these targets as close to their source
as possible. The following are representative OCA target sets, and do not reflect the full
spectrum of potential OCA employment:

 Aircraft. This category includes enemy fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned

aircraft. Precision weapons with penetration capabilities may be combined with
timely intelligence to destroy aircraft on the ground, to include those in hardened
shelters.

5 Air Force language has evolved from using the term “electronic warfare” (and related terms such as
“electronic attack” to refer now to “electromagnetic warfare”. The legacy term, “electronic,” speaks to
actions to attack and protect the electronic circuits associated with radios and radars. With expanded use
of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., infrared applications, lasers, microwave and satellite
communications, computers) the broader term “electromagnetic” is more technically accurate. This
evolution also anticipates a similar change in joint doctrine. For more information, see AFDP 3-51,
Electromagnetic Warfare and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

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 Airfields and operating bases. Damaging runways or taxiways may prevent use of
an airfield for short periods. Destruction of support facilities—hangars, shelters,
maintenance facilities, fuels—may degrade the enemy’s ability to generate aircraft
sorties over a longer period of time.

 Air defense systems. Disruption or destruction of enemy IADS and the personnel
who control, maintain, and operate them may render those systems ineffective
against friendly forces.

 C2 systems. C2 systems are critical to the effective employment of forces and

integration of IADS and should be given a high priority during OCA targeting.
Intelligence-gathering, warning, and control systems, including ground-controlled
intercept, early warning, acquisition, and other sensors, together with their
supporting facilities, form integral parts of an IADS. Destruction or nonlethal
disruption of such systems may substantially reduce the enemy’s capability to
detect, react, and bring forces to bear against friendly forces.

 EW capabilities. Early and persistent efforts should be aimed at defeating enemy

EW capabilities that could otherwise create devastating effects on friendly systems.

 Missiles and support infrastructure. Destruction of ballistic, cruise, and air-to-

surface missiles, launch platforms, support facilities, and infrastructure greatly limits
effective missile attacks against friendly forces or territory. OCA operations seek to
destroy or disable these missiles pre-launch due to the increased resources required
to engage them post-launch.

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

Layering mutually supporting defensive capabilities helps absorb and progressively

weaken enemy attacks. The following are some of the resources and capabilities used
to conduct DCA:

 Fighter aircraft. Fighter aircraft use combat air patrols to ensure rapid reaction to
enemy attacks and may be positioned well ahead of forces being protected. These
fighters have the objective of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft and/or
missiles before they can reach their intended targets.

 High-value airborne assets (HVAA). HVAA are airborne national assets which are
so important that the loss of even one could seriously impact United States
warfighting capabilities or provide the enemy with significant propaganda value.
These assets can provide unique capabilities such as surveillance, early warning,
and electromagnetic attack, while tankers extend the range and sortie duration of
other assets.

 Surface-to-air weapons. Effective integration of surface-to-air weapons into the

DCA plan requires a reliable link with air operations and a reliable identification

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 process. All available surface-to-air assets in the theater of operations should be
incorporated into the DCA plan and are subject to the integrated procedures, ROE,
and weapons control measures directed by the area air defense commander
(AADC). The AADC should be granted the necessary authority to deconflict and
control engagements and to exercise real time battle management when required.

Active air and missile defense (AMD)

With respect to DCA, it is better to speak in terms of types of missions assigned rather
than types of targets, since these will be fleeting and will differ from situation to
situation. Units employed to create AMD effects usually have decentralized execution
authority within the IADS and the necessary latitude in the detailed planning and
coordination of assigned DCA tasks. The following types of missions are most closely
associated with active AMD:

 Area Defense. Area defense missions are conducted for the defense of a broad
area. There can be more localized applications of area defense when friendly assets
are dispersed over a large geographical area with defined threat boundaries.

 Point Defense. Point defense missions are conducted for the protection of a limited
area, normally in defense of the vital elements of friendly forces and installations.

 Self-Defense. Self-defense is conducted by friendly forces to defend themselves

against direct attack or threat of attack through the use of organic weapons and
systems. Inherent to all ROE and weapon control procedures is the right of self-
defense

 HVAA Protection. HVAA protection may use fighter aircraft, surface, and naval fires
to protect critical airborne assets.

Passive air and missile defense

Passive AMD entails the following types of actions:

 Detection and warning systems. Timely detection and warning of air and missile
threats provide maximum reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or take
other appropriate action against enemy attacks. Missile warning is especially vital to
friendly forces considering the compressed timelines for detection and warning of
missiles.

 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defensive elements.

CBRN elements are made up of contamination avoidance, protection, and
contamination control. Contamination avoidance measures include covering critical
assets, remaining inside facilities during attacks, detecting and identifying
contaminated areas, and avoiding those areas. Protection includes such things as
collective protection facilities and individual protective equipment. Contamination

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 control is standard disease prevention and control measures, contaminated waste
management, and decontamination procedures. For further details on CBRN
defense, see AFDP 3-40, Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Operations.

 Camouflage, concealment, and deception. Signature reduction measures that can

“hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets or target systems. These
measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings.
These measures may be coupled with deception measures to further complicate
chances of effective enemy attacks. Camouflage, concealment, and deception
includes passive countermeasures designed to reduce electronic and infrared
signatures. Electronic and infrared countermeasures are measures possessed by
individual aircraft or systems that typically attempt to defeat enemy weapons during
their track or guidance phase. Onboard systems are often a prerequisite for aircraft
to conduct missions.

 Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect against
hostile attacks: physical, electromagnetic pulse, and transient radiation. Hardening
actions are usually accomplished during peacetime, but may continue throughout
operations.

 Reconstitution. This capability provides for the rapid repair of damage resulting
from enemy attacks and the return of damaged units to a desired level of combat
readiness. Reconstitution includes the ability to repair valuable assets such as
airfields, communications, warning and surveillance systems, and to restore
essential services such as power, water, and fuel supplies.

 Dispersion. Dispersion complicates the enemy’s ability to locate and target friendly
assets by spreading them out and bringing them together in concentration only at
the time and place of our choosing. Combined with mobility and deception,
dispersion increases uncertainty as to whether a location is occupied or will remain
occupied. It forces the enemy to search more locations, requiring more resources
and time.

 Redundancy. Duplication of critical capabilities keeps vital systems functioning even

when critical nodes are destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includes dual,
contingency, or back-up capabilities which can assume primary mission functions, in
whole or in part, upon failure or degradation of the primary system.

 Mobility. Mobility is the capability to easily move from one location to another and is
facilitated by keeping a small footprint. Frequent movement of units, inside the
enemy’s decision cycle, can be of critical importance. Mobility reduces vulnerability
and increases survivability of friendly assets by complicating enemy surveillance,
reconnaissance, and targeting.

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For details on Active and Passive AMD execution, see Air Force Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Air and Missile Defense.

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 AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP)
3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

ASSESSMENT
Last Updated: 6 September 2019

Assessment is a continual process which encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects

and gauge progress toward accomplishment of tasks, effects, and objectives. It also
helps evaluate requirements for future action, helping answer two questions: “Are we
doing things right?” and “Are we doing the right things?” In an effects-based construct, it
is not possible to think about actions and their effects without considering how creation
of those effects should be measured. Assessment applies as much to the conduct of
counterair operations as to any other air, space, or cyberspace function. In fact,
assessment may be more tangible and immediate in the case of counterair operations:
if an enemy site shoots at friendly aircraft, it may warrant immediate dynamic targeting
or at least inclusion on the next tasking cycle’s list for deliberate targeting. Assessment
is performed by personnel in the strategy; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR); and combat operations divisions in the air operations center
(AOC).

INDICATORS
Indicators are used to evaluate progress of an operation. These may be either
quantitative or qualitative in nature. All of these should be determined and linked to
friendly tasks and desired effects during planning. At all levels of assessment, planners
should choose criteria that describe or establish when actions have been accomplished,
desired effects have been created, and objectives have been achieved. There are two
types of indicators commonly used:

 Measures of performance (MOPs): Objective or quantitative measures assigned to

the actions of a task and against which a task’s accomplishment, in operations or
missions terms, is assessed. At the tactical level, MOPs are generally related to
weapons effects on individual targets. Operational level tasks and MOPs are
typically broader and system-based (e.g., the number of surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites neutralized versus number of SAM sites operational). MOPs help answer the
question, “Are we doing things right?” or “Was the action taken?” or “Was the task
completed to standard?”

 Measures of effectiveness (MOEs): Quantitative or qualitative measures assigned

to an intended effect (direct or indirect), against which the effect’s creation is directly

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 assessed. Some of these may be direct forms of measurement, such as first-hand
observation of an early warning radar’s destruction; some may be more
circumstantial or indirect, such as signals intelligence reports of no emissions from
the radar site. MOEs help answer the question, “Are we doing the right things to
create the effects or changes in the conditions of the OE that we desire?”

Assessing the degree of friendly control of the air is challenging. The inherent
characteristics of airpower—speed, range and flexibility—apply to enemy air and missile
threats as well, which makes assessment of enemy actions and intent more difficult. As
previously stated, the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) first priority is
to determine the level of control of the air needed to achieve the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) objectives. All subsequent planning and assessment is based on
this determination. A thorough understanding of the enemy system and its components
should logically drive the development of friendly objectives, effects and tasks. The key
to effective assessment is to develop indicators at the same time as the objectives,
effects, and tasks they measure—not after the fact. Indicators should be either directly
observable, or something that can be reliably inferred from other data.

Task performance is typically the easiest to measure. At the tactical level MOPs feed
combat assessment: Was the mission flown? Were weapons released as intended? Did
they create the weapons effects anticipated? Within the AOC, the ISR division’s
analysis, correlation, and fusion cell uses these tactical data to determine the status of
enemy air systems (operational status of airfields, enemy sorties flown, and SAM sites
destroyed) and feeds this data to the operational assessment team (OAT) within the
strategy division. Operational level tasks (e.g., neutralize enemy SAM systems) are also
measured by MOPs and provide a big-picture report to the JFACC on task performance.

Measuring effects in the counterair fight may seem daunting, but the very purpose of
counterair operations provides some guidance: counterair is conducted to ensure
freedom to maneuver, freedom to attack, and freedom from attack. The effects
associated with counterair can be related to these three items. It is possible to measure,
directly, the number of successful friendly and enemy air attacks as well as the number
of missions (or friendly operations) affected by enemy air activity. The desired effects
will also be based on the level of control of the air required (as determined by the
JFACC). Regardless of which effects are desired, or how they are measured, one
important point must be understood: task performance and effect performance must be
measured (and reported) independently.

Measuring task and effect performance separately provides the clearest picture of
progress towards achieving the objective. The expected outcome of these indicators is
a rough alignment between task, effect, and objective performance. Since tasks were
designed to create effects—and desired effects lead to the achievement of objectives—
this makes sense. When the levels of performance in task, effect and objective do not
align it may have a profound effect on future actions in the offensive counterair (OCA) or
defensive counterair (DCA) effort. For example, if a large number of enemy airfields are
assessed as degraded due to runway damage (high task performance), but the enemy

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continues to generate a large number of sorties (low effect performance) then the OCA
plan needs to be examined. How does the enemy continue to generate sorties? Are
they rapidly repairing the runways? Have they relocated to other airfields or highway
strips? Perhaps airfield runways are not a critical node of the enemy system after all—
and the focus should shift to targeting fuel or munitions storage. These are questions
that never would have revealed themselves if task performance was the sole
determinant of success in the objective.

Even more revealing is a high level of effect performance, accompanied by low task
performance. To use the example above, suppose that only a few enemy airfields have
been targeted, but the enemy air force does not generate a single sortie. The enemy is
clearly capable of flying, but for some reason (as yet unknown) does not fly. Future
actions, in this case, will depend on the amount of risk the JFACC is willing to accept. If
the acceptable level of risk is low—enemy airfields will continue to be attacked until the
enemy’s potential sortie count is very low. In effect: the task performance will “catch up”
to the effect performance and the risk of attack from enemy aircraft will be very low.
Conversely, if the JFACC is willing to accept a higher risk, efforts may shift away from
airfields to other components of the enemy IADS—or to different objectives entirely.

OCA and DCA performance may be measured separately, or they may be combined
depending on the course of action selected. In many cases, desired effects for control of
the air are applicable to both DCA and OCA. For example: OCA efforts to shut down
enemy sortie production can have a positive impact on the DCA effort since fewer
enemy aircraft will be available to challenge friendly air defenses. Conversely,
successful enemy air attacks on friendly airfields (due to unsuccessful DCA efforts) will
have a negative impact on friendly sortie generation—affecting both DCA and OCA (and
other mission types as well.)

Effective assessment is a key feature of the effects-based approach to operations, and

if done correctly should generate as many questions as answers. Warfare is a clash
between living, thinking systems which react to one another in often unexpected ways.
By measuring friendly actions (tasks) and changes in the enemy system (effects)
separately, critical review of actions and effects becomes possible. The questions: why
are my actions not producing results? Why is the enemy behaving in this manner? What
changes should be made to the plan – and why? These are exactly the questions and
answers the JFACC needs to effectively prosecute the JFC’s objectives.

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