1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 11.04.2018

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM

CONTEMPT PETITION No.377 of 2018

M.Santhi ... Petitioner

Vs.
1.Mr.Pradeed Yadav, I.A.S,
Secretary to Government,
School Education (HSE-1) Department,
Fort St.George,
Chennai-9.

2.Mr.Elangovan,
Director of School Education,
College Road,
Chennai-6. ...Respondents

Prayer: The Contempt Petition filed under Section 11 of Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971, to punish respondents for the willful disobedience of

the orders passed by this Hon'ble High Court made in W.P.No.7450 of

2007 dated 31.08.2009.

For Petitioner : Mr.V.Elangovan

For Respondents : Mr.M.Perumal

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Government Advocate
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ORDER

The present Contempt Petition is moved against the order

dated 31.08.2009 passed in W.P.No.7450 of 2007.

2.This Court passed an order on 31.08.2009 and extracted

paragraph 9 of the order:

“9.Taking note of the aforesaid submission of the

petitioner, the writ petition is disposed of, with the following
observations. While dismissing the writ petition, I make it
clear that the dismissal of writ petition will not come in the
way of writ petitioner from making any representation to the
Government seeking similar treatment like other persons and
in such an event, the first respondent is directed to pass
orders on such representation on merits in accordance with
law.”

3.This Court has not actually considered the merits raised in

the writ petition. It is categorically spelt out that the writ petition is

dismissed. However, while dismissing the writ petition, the Court made

it clear that the dismissal of the writ petition will not come in the way of

writ petitioner for making any representation to the Government and

the representation shall be considered by the respondents. Even there

is no time limit was prescribed for consideration of the representation if

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any submitted by the writ petitioner. However, in respect of the merits

raised in the writ petition, the same was dismissed by the Court. Such

being the factum of the case, the writ petitioner has moved the present

Contempt Petition on the ground that he made a representation and the

same is not disposed of.

4.The preliminary point to be considered in this contempt

petition is that the order in W.P.No.7450 of 2007 was passed on

31.08.2009, and the present contempt petition is filed on 11.01.2018,

after a lapse of about nine years from the date of passing of the order.

Even as per the typed set of papers filed along with the contempt

petition, the writ petitioner has sent representation to the 2nd

respondent on 03.02.2015, 02.09.2015 and 17.11.2016, after a lapse of

about six years from the date of passing of the order of this Court. In

these circumstances, the present contempt petition cannot be

entertained, in view of the period of limitation of one year, prescribed

under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the legal

principles in the matter of entertaining the contempt petition with

reference to the Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as well

as Article 215 of the Constitution of India was adjudicated in contempt

petition No.2539 of 2014 dated 05.12.2017 and the relevant paragraphs

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are extracted hereunder:

“5. Thus, this Court has to examine the

maintainability of the contempt application in relation to
the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 provides limitation for actions for contempt “
No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt,
either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of
a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

6. Thus, it is clear that a limitation is

prescribed for filing a contempt application against an
order passed by the Court and one year period is
prescribed from the date of cause of action arose. In the
case on hand, the cause of action arose in August 2009
and the contempt application was filed on 15.07.2014.
Thus, there is a delay of about 5 years even in filing the
present contempt application.

7. Next question to be considered in this

regard is that, whether this Court can invoke Article 215
of Constitution of India for entertaining the contempt
application beyond the period of one year.

8. Article 215 of the Constitution of India

provides that High Courts to be Courts of record '' Every
High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all
the powers of such a Court including the power to punish
for contempt of itself.”

http://www.judis.nic.in 9. Thus, the Constitution provides powers to

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the High Court to punish for contempt itself. No doubt,

such a power is granted for the effective implementations
of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court. However, this
Court has to consider, whether such a power can be
exercised beyond the period of limitation prescribed
under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971,
and under what circumstances.

10. The general principle of law in this regard

is that whenever there is a Special Act enacted in respect
of limitation, the powers conferred under the Constitution
as well as the Special Act to be read cogently and
harmoniously. Harmonious reading of these provisions,
no doubt, the High Courts are empowered to exercise
the power of contempt as the High Court is the Court
of record. However, such power can be exercised only
with reference to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act. This will not mean that, the High Courts cannot
exercise the powers of contempt beyond the limitation
period of one year. The powers of contempt beyond the
limitation period can be exercised only on exceptional
circumstances, and sparingly. The powers conferred
under the Constitution in normal circumstances are to be
exercised only with reference to the Special Act viz., the
Contempt of Courts Act. Only in extraordinary
circumstances; the High Courts can go beyond the period
of one year and exercise the powers of Contempt under
Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The practice
prevailing now is that, irrespective of the period limitation
prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, the contempt applications are filed in a routine
manner by stating that no limitation is applicable in
respect of the contempt applications filed before the High
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Courts. Such a concept is not in accordance with the

legal principles settled in this regard.

11. With regard to Contempt of Court, In

Morris v. Crown Office, [ (1970) 1 All ER 1079 at
1081 LORD DENNING wrote that

“Of all the places where law and order must

be maintained, it is here in these Courts. The Courts of
Justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those
who strike at it, strike at the very foundations of our
society.”
“To maintain Law and Order, the Judges
have, and must have, power at once to deal with those
who offend against it”
“ It is a great power – a power instantly to
imprison a person without trial – but it is a necessary
power”

12. In the case of Balogh v. St. Albans

Crown Court, [(1975) 1 Q.B. 73 (C.A) ], a person
named Balogh planned to put a cylinder of a substance
called 'laughing gas' as the inlet to the ventilating system
and release the gas into the Court, but was caught. In
the Court of first instance, Balogh grossly insulted a
Judge after six months of sentence was imposed. LORD
DENNING observed that
' But I find nothing to tell us what is meant
by “ committed in the face of the court”. It has never
been defined. Its meaning is, I think, to be ascertained
from the practice of the judges over the centuries. It was
never confined to conduct which a judge saw with his
own eyes. It covered all contempts for which a judge of
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his own motion could punish a man on the spot. So

“contempt in the face of the court” is the same thing as
“contempt which the court can punish of its own motion”.
It really means “contempt in the cognizance of the
court”.
He further reviewed a number of cases and
gave instances of contempt in the face of court, throwing
a missile at the judge, disrupting a trial, refusing to
answer a proper question, threatening the witness away
from the Court house after giving evidence, an employer
threatening an employee if he responded to a summons
to attend court for jury duty.

13. In the famous case of R v.

Metropolitan Police Commissioner [ ( 1968) 2 QB
150 : ( 1968) 2 ER 319) ], a person Criticised the
Court of Appeal in an Article in a magazine. The criticism
was in bad taste, wrong and based on erroneous facts.
LORD DENNING observed that
“ Let me say at once that we will never use
this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity.
That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to
suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear
criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far
more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of
speech itself. It is the right of every man, in Parliament
or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make
fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of
public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully
with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say
that we are mistaken, and our decision is erroneous
whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would
ask is that those who criticise us will remember that from
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the nature of our office, we cannot reply to this criticism.

We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into
political controversy. We must rely on our own conduct
itself to be its own vindication.”

14. There are only two issues which are

material, one is the date of commission of alleged
contempt and the other is the actual initiation of
proceedings for contempt. In Golcha Advertising
Agency v. The State of Maharashtra [(1990) 2
Bom CR 262 (Bom) at pp. 263,265], the Court
observed that no intervening event or order stops the
running of time specified in this section. Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 talks about the limitation
period within which the actions have to be taken. It
enumerates that the limitation period is a period of one
year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to
have been committed.

15. Article 215 of the Constitution of India

empowers every High Court to punish contempt of Court
subordinate to it, but Contempt of Courts Act lays down
how that power is to be exercised. Article 215 and
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act have to be read
together. The Hon’ble Apex Court has emphasized that
Section 20 applies to civil and criminal contempts and
would also apply to the contempt committed on the face
of High Court or the Supreme Court or even Subordinate
Courts. Where there is a limitation for initiation of
proceedings of contempt under Section 20 of the Act, the
Rules of Code provide that no notice shall be issued if
more than one year has lapsed from the alleged act of
contempt.
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16. In the case of State of Kerala v.

P.K.Ramchandranan (Civil Appeal No. 2485 of
2005) (Ker.). the Court observed that the Court has no
power to extend the period of limitation as it would
otherwise defeat the provision of law. The natural
corollary of this would be that after the period, as
prescribed by Section 20 of the Act, lapses, the
jurisdiction of the Court automatically evaporates and
Court loses jurisdiction under the said Act.

17. In the case of Ruksana Begum,Km v.

B.P.Varma, 1990 AII L.J.341, which is held that the
contempt proceedings having been initiated after a lapse
of more than one year from that date were held as
barred under Section 20 where suo motu contempt was
registered after nearly 4-1/2 years, after violation of
undertaking given to Court, held not maintainable even
in the case of O.P.Sreedhara Menon v. K.Amarnath
Shetty, 2013 Cr.L.J.1684.

18. In the case of Dineshbhai A. Parekh v.

Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel
Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Guj. 19 at p.199, the Court
held that the pendency of a contempt petition for more
than one year after the alleged act of contempt and no
notice having been issued even thereafter would not
enable this Court to continue to keep the petition
pending indefinitely. The jurisdiction of the Court is that
the Court shall not initiate any proceedings for contempt
either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiration of a period of one year from the date on which
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contempt is alleged to have been committed.

19. The Supreme Court of India held in this

regard that the proper construction to be placed on
Section 20 must be that the action initiated either by
filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo
moto, within a period of one year from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been committed. No
doubt, the High Court is not powerless even when the
period of one year is expired from the date of alleged
violation of Court's order, the Courts can exercise its
inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India. However, such powers ought to be exercised only
on exceptional circumstances, more so to mitigate the
gross in justice if any occurred and the inherent powers
ought to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine
manner. The High Courts cannot make the limitation
period prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt
Courts Act illusory. The limitation prescribed under
Section 20 is to be scrupulously followed in all cases and
the provisions as to be read harmoniously along with
Article 215 of the Constitution of India. One step further
this Court has to emphasize that the Contempt of Courts
Act is a Special Act and the same will prevail in respect of
filing of the contempt application under the very same
Act. The general powers conferred under the Constitution
has to be read along with the provisions of the contempt
of Courts Act. The Act is to be construed as the
procedure for initiating contempt contemplated, by virtue
of the powers conferred under the constitution.

20. The purpose of law of contempt is to

protect the machinery of justice and the interests of the
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public in order to protect these dual interests,

unwarranted interference with administration of justice
must be prevented. The power to punish for contempt is
conferred on Courts for two reasons. Firstly, that the
Courts may be armed with the power to enforce their
orders, Secondly, they may be able to punish obstruction
to the administration of justice. To ensure these
objective, there are also constitutional provisions dealing
with contempt of Courts, apart from Contempt of Courts
Act. Under Article 215 of the Constitution of India a Court
of record is a Court , the records of which are admitted
to be evidentiary value and not to be questioned when
produced before any Court. Such a Court enjoys a power
to punish for contempt as its inherent jurisdiction. The
impression created by the Court is that even if Article 129
and 215 were not there in Constitution the contempt
powers of Courts of record would have been preserved.
However the High Courts have to exercise his powers
keeping in mind Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act.

21. In the case of Pallav Seth v. Custodian

and Others [(2001) 7 SCC 549], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
“Firstly, a contempt proceedings can be
initiated by two modes, either the Court can initiate the
contempt proceedings on its own (suo moto), or
otherwise. The word otherwise has been interpreted to
mean that the initiation would have to be done by a
party by filing an application. Therefore, the Supreme
Court was of the opinion that the proper construction to
be placed on Section 20 of the Act must be that action
must be initiated, either by filing of an application, or by
a Court issuing notice suo moto within a period of one
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year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to

have been committed.

Secondly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not

find that Section 20 of the Act either stultifies or
abrogates the power bestowed upon the Apex Court
under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution of
India.
Thirdly, since Section 20 of the Act is a
special law prescribing a period of limitation, different
from the limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act,
which happens to be the general law, the special law
would naturally override and take precedent over the
Limitation Act- the general law. Thus while exercising the
power of contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution
of India it has to be exercised in consonance with Section
20 of the Act.
Fourthly, the word to initiate a proceeding
would mean the filing of a petition, The said word does
not mean the taking of cognizance by a Court, as was
held in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K.Mittal
[(2000) 3 SCC 171]”

22. Thus, obviously the power bestowed

upon this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India would have to be exercised, while keeping in mind
the limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Contempt
of Courts Act. Therefore, the contention raised by the
learned counsel with regard to lack of applicability of the
limitation upon a power bestowed by Article 215 of the
Constitution of India is unacceptable.

23. In the case of [Hiralal Dixit v. State of

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U.P., AIR 1954 SC 743] it is held that power to be

sparingly exercised but where public interest demands it,
the Court will not shrink from exercising it.

24. In the case of [Subrata Kundu v.

Kshiti Goswami, AIR 2010 Cal 44] it is held that
High Court has jurisdiction under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India to initiate contempt proceedings but
this has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. The Supreme Court in the said case by
necessary implication held that the said Act 1971 is the
procedure prescribed by law and the provision for
limitation in the said Act has to be made applicable.

25. In the case of A.Paul Pandi v.

A.Karthik [Contempt Petition No.3147 of 2014
Dated 21.11.2014] this Court held that when there is
a specific law enacted by the legislature, namely the
Contempt of Court Act, 1971, which contemplates a
period of limitation under Section 20 of the Act, the said
provisions should be read harmoniously and proceedings
under the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 should be
initiated within a period of one year of alleged contempt,
as envisaged in Section 20 of the Act. In the said case,
the learned Judge of this Court lay down the said
principles based on the ratio lay down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Pallav Sheth v.
Custodian, cited Supra.

26. In the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of MAHESHWAR PERI v. HIGH COURT OF
JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD thro. Registrar
General, reported in 2016 (6) scale 425, dealt with
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the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, His Lordship Justice

Kurian Joseph J., while speaking for the Bench held as
follows:

“8.The main contention advanced by the

learned counsel for the appellants is that the
High Court, having initiated action only after four years
of the alleged contempt, the whole proceedings are
barred by Section 20 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(herein after referred to as 'the Act') which has
prescribed the period of limitation of one year for
initiating any proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or
otherwise. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:

“20. Limitation for actions for

contempt.- No court shall initiate any proceedings of
contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after
the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

9. Learned counsel appearing for the

High Court , however contends that being an action
initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India and since the genesis of the
initiation of the contempt is the application dated
18.11.2008 field by Mr.Manoj Kumar Srivastava and
Mr.Veer Singh, Advocates, and since the High Court had
considered the application within one year and had taken
action by issuing notice, though after six years, it is
within time.

10. Our attention is invited to a three Judge

Bench decision of this Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian
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and Others and particular to paragraph -39 and 40.

Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows:

“39. In the case of criminal contempt of a

subordinate court , the High Court may take action on a
reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a
motion made by the Advocate -General or the Law
Officer of the Central Government in the case of a Union
Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably
commence on an application being field by a person
whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-
General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the
High Court. Proceedings for civil contempt normally
commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the
notice of the Court the wilful disobedience of any
Judgement, decree, order etc. which could amount to the
commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is
drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a
person filing an application in that behalf. In other words,
unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the
proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
would normally commence with the filing of an
application drawing the attention of the Court to the
contempt having been committed,. When the judicial
procedure requires an application being filed either
before the court or consent being sought by a person
from the Advocate -General or a law Officer, it must
logically follow that proceeding for contempt are initiated
when the applications are made.

40. In other words the beginning of the

action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal
contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the
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proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action

taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or
punishment thereafter are only steps following or
succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil
contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of
the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”

11.We are afraid, the contentions advanced

by the learned Counsel for the appellants cannot be
appreciated. Be it an action initiated for contempt under
Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme
Court or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by
the High Court , it is now settled law that the prosecution
procedure should be in consonance with the Act, as held
by this Court is Pallav Sheth case (supra)
12.And thus, the dispute boils down to the
question of limitation only.

13. Under the Act, the action for contempt is

taken by only two courts, either the Supreme Court or
the High Court. The procedure is prescribed under
Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in

other cases.- (1) In the case of a criminal contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its
own motion or on a motion made by-

(a) the Advocate-General , or

(b) any other person, with the consent in
writing to (sic of ) the Advocate -General, or
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(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union

territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with
the consent in writing of such Law Officer.

(2). In the case of any criminal contempt of a

subordinate Court, the High Court may take action on a
reference made to it by subordinate Court or on a mote
made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this
behalf.

(3). Every motion or reference made under this section

shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is
alleged to be guilty.

Explanation – In this section, the expression “Advocate

-General” means-
(a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the
Attorney-General or the Solicitor General;
(b) in relation to the High Court, the
Advocate -General of the State or any of the States for
which the High Court has been established;
(c) in relation to the Court of a Judicial
Commissioner, such law officer as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf.”

14.Criminal Contempt of Court subordinate to

High Court can be initiated either suo motu or on a
motion made by the Advocate-General. The suo motu
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action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the

subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra) , it has
been held that the reference is the starting point of the
process of initiation of the action for contempt. That is
why in paragraph-39, which we have extracted above, it
has been clearly held that... “unless a Court was to take
suo motu action, the proceeding under The Contempt of
Courts Act,19671 would normally commence with the
filing of an application drawing the attention of the court
to the contempt having been committed. “The
application is the motion provided under Section 15 of
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by
any person other than Advocate-General, can be made
only with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General.
In other words, any other application made by a person
without the consent of the Advocate-General, is not an
application in the eyes of law'
15. This aspect has been succinctly discussed
and subtly distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav
Sheth case (supra ).To quote paragraph -44:

“44. Action for contempt is divisible into two

categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court
and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own
motion. The mode of initiation in each case would
necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu
proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by
issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be
by a partly filing an application, In our opinion, therefore,
the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must
be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an
application or by the court issuing notice suo motu,
within a period of one year form the date on which the
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contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in

the case of Prakash Kakubhai Rangwala Vs.
Nyayalaya Karmachari Anne Nayayadish Hitkari
Sangh and Another, reported in (2011) 14
Supreme Court Cases 762 held as follows :

7.These facts would, therefore, indicate and

establish that the decision of initiation of proceedings
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was taken on
3.12.2009 when notice was issued and, therefore, it is
established from the records that the aforesaid suo motu
issuance of notice for the offence of contempt on
3.12.2009 is within the period of limitation of one year.

8. Even otherwise, we may appropriately

refer to the decision of this Court in Pallav Sheth v.
Custodian wherein this Court, after referring to a decision
in Om Prakash Jaiswal case held that : ( SCC p. 570, para
42)

“ 42. .... If the interpretation of Section 20

put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean
that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the
High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has
been committed the High Court would become powerless
to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an
application before the subordinate court or the High
Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on
its own motion or the filing of an application before an
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Advocate General for permission to initiate contempt

proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for the
purpose of Section 20, then such an interpretation would
not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to
punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the
Constitution.”

It was also held that such an interpretation of

Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers
of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised
by the Constitution.”

28. First of all, the facts of the above said

case is that the suo motu issuance of notice for the
offence of contempt was initiated within a period of
limitation of one year. Secondly, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court referred the decision in the case of Pallav Seth v.
Custodian and Others [ (2001) 7 SCC 549 ].
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborately
discussed all these circumstances. The ultimate
interpretation would be that the limitation prescribed
under Section 20 has to be read harmoniously along with
Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

29. The High Court's cannot invoke the

powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, in
all the cases by entertaining the contempt application
beyond the period of one year, so as to dilute or
eradicate the law prescribed under Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. All contempt applications
ought to be filed within the period of limitation
prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
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Act, 1971. The High Court on exceptional circumstances,

on arriving a conclusion that a gross injustice to the
society or the case is of public importance, then the
inherent powers provided under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India, can be exercised without reference
to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. A litigant
may come out with an interpretation that an injustice is
caused to all the orders or judgements passed by the
High Courts. Such a general proposition, as advanced by
the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner deserves
no merit consideration. No doubt, the litigants approach
the Court to get justice, that does not mean that all the
contempt applications have to be entertained after a
period of one year prescribed under Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Generalisation in this
regard can never be encouraged. What exactly the
circumstances warranting interference under Article 215
of the Constitution of India has to be decided judiciously
and applying the peculiar facts and circumstances
prevailing in each and every case. General application in
this regard is certainly impermissible and Courts have to
interpret these provisions in a pragmatic way than in a
general manner. In other words, the principles of
constructive interpretation is to be adopted while
interpreting the period of limitation under Section 20 of
the Contempt of Courts Act as well as Article 215 of the
Constitution of India. Thus, this Court is not inclined to
consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner by citing the above
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court”.

5.In view of the discussions made in the afore mentioned

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paragraphs, this Court is of an opinion that the present contempt

petition is hit by the provision of the limitation contemplated under the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

6.Accordingly, the contempt petition stands dismissed.

11.04.2018

KP

Index:Yes

Internet:Yes

Speaking Order

To

1.Mr.Pradeed Yadav, I.A.S,

Secretary to Government,
School Education (HSE-1) Department,
Fort St.George,
Chennai-9.

2.Mr.Elangovan,
Director of School Education,
College Road,
Chennai-6.

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 23

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM., J.

KP

Cont.P.No.377 of 2018

11.04.2018

http://www.judis.nic.in