G.R. No.

97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ISABELO PUNO y

GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. chanrobles virtual law library

Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants

committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by
the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple
robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
claimed by the defense. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were
charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following
manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then
private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and
carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of
extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.  1
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On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,  2appellants went to trial which ultimately
resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty
of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO

and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed
on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail
term of reclusion perpetua. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual
damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.  3 chanrobles virtual law library

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense
proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. 4 chanrobles virtual law library

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following
counter-statement of facts in the People's brief  5which adopted the established
findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the
transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13,
1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,

Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as
her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno,
who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in
Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop.
He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take
his place (Id., pp. 8-9). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into
the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car
turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and
went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her
(Id., p. 10).
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Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag
and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and
was taken (Id., pp. 11-14). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed
to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St.,
Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile,
Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly
storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as
he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and
one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id.,
pp. 17-23). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her,
jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and,
after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors
van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on
the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn
too (Id., pp. 23-26). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p.

27).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash
Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp.
10-13) 6 chanrobles virtual law library

As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at
North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even
slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had
gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores,
San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They
thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.  8Much later, when he took
the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by
explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.  9 chanrobles virtual law library

On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three
theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The
trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not
be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the

determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same
holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his
motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable
aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or
essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether
a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter
absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
offenses. 10Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was
not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the
offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime
would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11 chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts
against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants,
without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno,
as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for
funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic)
Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your
(sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic),
because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12 chanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they

had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient
respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14and consistently
reiterated thereafter, 15it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking
away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but
for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable
for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto,
but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:

Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the
P7,000.00 to your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit. chanrobles virtual law library

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic)
being handed to you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks. chanrobles virtual law library

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not
allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and
the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we
will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde. chanrobles virtual law library

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is
(sic) already given you the checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we
reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended
by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will
already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in

the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from
the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money,
price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or
persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17It can hardly be assumed that
when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun
point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with
or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely
amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery
or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code,
we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No.
532.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation
in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more
money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta
Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the
way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her
at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three
checks. . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is
that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion
the penalty is reclusion perpetua. 18 chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the
repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19Such opinion and complementary submission
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the
legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532
is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers
(ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20 chanrobles virtual law library

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to

put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a
band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a
gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the
early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery
was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed. 21 chanrobles virtual law library

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more
than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation
is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent
means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are
shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery
is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band
of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by
a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band
"sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22(Emphasis supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery.

If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery
in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23The martial law legislator,
in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary.
This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since
it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the
decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law. 24 chanrobles virtual law library

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or

brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements

are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another,
thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the
economic and social progress of the people: chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage

which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries;
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WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular

person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of
"stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act
would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished
in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a
band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands
if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this
we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of
depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific,
intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532,
in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code
and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25 chanrobles virtual law library

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that
the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from
what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements
which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways
would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof.
Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he
who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the
milder form of liability in case of doubt.
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If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be
the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not
be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line
of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial
court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to
avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or
moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who
happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of
the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972? 27And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter
of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded
along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the
accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard
the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28 chanrobles virtual law library

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural
course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation
envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we
have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by
appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery

defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as
shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community
of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of
abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no
mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation
having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of

appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them
with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is
necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30For the
former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof
shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus
lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that
there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of
the things subject of the robbery. 31 chanrobles virtual law library

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed

against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication,
clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately
termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation.
It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does
not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery
through intimidation of persons. 32 chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y
Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of
Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M.
Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages, with costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.