UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

CANDACE MCGHEE and CHASITY )

BAILEY, individually, and on behalf of all)
others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. _______________________
)
GRAINGER COUNTY, Tennessee ) Jury of Twelve Demanded
a governmental entity, )
JAMES HARVILLE, Sheriff of Grainger )
County, Tennessee, Individually, )
CHRIS HARVILLE, Jail Administrator of )
Grainger County, Tennessee, Individually, )
TRAVIS HANK DAVIS, Individually, and )
LEONARD DALTON, Individually, )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL RIGHTS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

______________________________________________________________________________

Lance K. Baker, Esq., Tn. Bar #: 032945 Matthew B. Evans, Esq.

THE BAKER LAW FIRM EVANS & BEIER, LLP
550 Main Street, Suite 600 818 W. 1st N. St.
Knoxville, TN 37902 Morristown, TN 37914
Tel: 865.200.4117 Tel: 423.587.2800
Email: lance@lbakerlawfirm.com Email: mbevanslaw@gmail.com

F. Clinton Little, Esq.

109 N. Northshore Dr., Suite 401
Knoxville, TN 37919
Tel: 865.622.4628
Email: clinton@knoxvilleattorney.law

Counsel for Plaintiff

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. NATURE OF ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

III. PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

A. Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Plaintiffs' Backgrounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

B. Officer Davis's Background and Hiring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

C. Officer Davis's Begins Making Sexually Aggressive Comments . . . . 13

D. Officer Davis Demands That Plaintiffs and/or Other Inmates

Strip Naked or Engage in Various Sex-Acts While He Watches
and Masturbates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

E. The "Forced Sex Shows" Were Overt and Frequent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

F. Plaintiffs Futile Complaints and Requests for a New Cell . . . . . . . . . 16

G. Officer Davis is Terminated on April 24, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

H. Plaintiffs Viewed Officer Davis as "Untouchable" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

I. Officer Davis's Open and Notorious "Forced Sex Shows"

Continued for Months Without Investigation or Abatement . . . . . . . 19

J. Plaintiffs' Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

K. Circumstances Require Discovery to Permit the Plaintiffs to

More Precisely Allege Their Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

V. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Count One – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments) – Based Upon Sexual Abuse,
Coercion, and Intimidation (Against Officer Davis,
Individually) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Count Two – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Fourth Amendment) – Based
Upon Right to Privacy (Against Officer Davis, Individually)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Count Three – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments) – Failure to Supervise (Against Grainger
County, Sheriff Harville, Individually, and Jail
Administrator Harville, Individually) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Count Four – Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of

Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Eighth Amendment) –
Failure to Protect Female Inmates from Officer Sexual
Abuse and Misconduct (Against Sheriff Harville,
Individually, Jail Administrator Harville, Individually, and
Officers Dalton and Davis, Individually) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Count Five – Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of

Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (under the Eighth
Amendment) – Monell Claim: Policy, Custom, or Practice of
Cross-Gender Supervision and Failure to Protect Female
Inmates from Male Officer Sexual Abuse (Against Grainger
County) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Count Six – Common Law Invasion of Privacy (Against

Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Individually, and Officer
Davis, Individually) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Count Seven – Negligence (Against Grainger County and All

Defendants, Individually). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(Against Officer Davis, Individually) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

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VIII. JURY DEMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

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 COME Candace McGhee (“McGhee”) and Chasity Bailey (“Bailey”) (together,

“Plaintiffs”), individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and file this

Class Action Complaint against Defendants, seeking compensatory and punitive

damages, attorneys’s fees, and costs.

I. NATURE OF ACTION

A society that allows female prisoners to live each day in

constant fear of being sexually abused is guilty of the most
heinous form of barbarism. Nevertheless, sexual abuse of
female prisoners by prison guards is a rampant phenomenon
that the law has thus far proved impotent to stop.
Cross-gender supervision policies exacerbate the problem by
placing women in situations in which they have no escape
from their attackers.1

1. This is a civil rights class action for compensatory and punitive damages

brought by Plaintiffs against Grainger County, Tennessee (“Grainger County”);

Grainger County Sheriff James Harville, individually (“Sheriff Harville”); Grainger

County Jail Administrator, Chris Harville, individually (“Jail Administrator Harville”);

and Grainger County Corrections Officers Travis Hank Davis, individually (“Officer

Davis”) and Leonard Dalton, individually (“Officer Dalton”) (collectively, “Defendants”),

for violations of their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

of the United States Constitution, as well as Tennessee common and statutory law.

1
Flyn L. Flesher, Cross-Gender Supervision in Prison and the Constitutional
Right of Prisoners to Remain Free from Rape, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 841,
844, 866 (“In addition to being degrading, cross-gender supervision in women's
prisons greatly increases the frequency of sexual abuse against female prisoners.”)

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 2. Plaintiffs’ complaint centers upon Officer Davis’s months-long practice of

sexually abusing, coercing, and intimidating multiple female inmates of the Grainger

County Jail, including the Plaintiffs, by unlawfully exploiting them for his personal

sexual pleasure and gratification, forcing Plaintiffs and other female inmates to strip

naked and either engage in forced-sex acts or witness them.

3. At least for the period beginning February 2021, and likely earlier, and

ending on approximately April 18, 2021, Officer Davis repeatedly forced female

inmates, including the Plaintiffs, to strip naked for him or perform various sex acts on

each other while he watched and masturbated within the confines of the control room

of the Grainger County Jail, i.e., “the Bubble.” These “sex shows” occurred inside the

cells of the female inmate pod, with Officer Davis routinely orchestrating, announcing,

and then directing the “sex shows” via the Jail’s intercom or loud-speaker system.

4. In the process, Officer Davis used and abused his position as a corrections

officer to flagrantly violate the constitutional rights of innumerable female inmates,

including the Plaintiffs. Having complained to other corrections officers, including

Officer Dalton, about Officer Davis’s sexual abuse, and having requested transfer to

another cell away from the Bubble, Plaintiffs’ complaints were ignored and their

requests were denied, leading them to perceive that Officer Davis was “untouchable.”

5. Officer Davis’s abuse of the Plaintiffs was overt and frequent – occurring

on approximately thirty (30) or more occasions from February 11, 2021 to April 18,

2021. Due to the overtness and frequency of the “forced sex shows,” the general female

inmate population's knowledge of them, and Plaintiffs’ complaints and requests, the

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“sex shows” were hardly a secret in the Jail. Facts, logic, and common sense all suggest

that Officer Davis’s operation was known to Jail officials, and if it was not, it should

have been. Yet, Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville failed to investigate,

discipline, question or stop Officer Davis’s horrific sexual abuse and degradation of

female inmates until approximately April 24, 2021, when he was eventually fired.

6. Officer Davis’s months-long pattern of sexual misconduct, coercion, and

intimidation unveiled system-wide failures at the Grainger County Jail in protecting

the safety, security, and privacy rights of female inmates, including the Plaintiffs, who

were incarcerated at the Jail from February-April 2021.2

7. By law, Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville were responsible

for the conduct and supervision of corrections officers, and, in this case, failed to

properly supervise Officer Davis. Plaintiffs and other female inmates should have been

safe in the custody of Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Jail Administrator Harville,

and Officers Dalton and Davis. Having accepted Plaintiffs into the Jail as inmates,

however, each of those Defendants decidedly abandoned them, and other female

inmates, allowing them to be repeatedly oppressed, sexually abused, coerced, and

intimidated for months by Officer Davis.

8. Officer Davis’s months-long reign of terror at the Grainger County Jail

was largely made possible and enabled by Grainger County’s own policy, custom, or

2
The Jail was completed in and began operating in November 2005. The Jail
houses both male and female inmates, and includes pre-trial detainees and
convicted offenders. The Jail has a maximum occupance of 78 male inmates and 22
female inmates, with an annual operating budget in excess of $1,100,000.00.

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practice allowing cross-gender supervision of inmates in the Jail’s female pod.

Specifically, Grainger County routinely placed a single male corrections officer –

including Officer Davis – alone in the female pod to supervise inmates,

notwithstanding the known, substantial, and serious danger of potential sexual abuse.

9. Grainger County’s wanton indifference to the safety of female inmates

violated the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches,

their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and

their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily privacy and freedom from bodily

intrusion, among other violations of law. Together, these rights guarantee female

inmates the right to remain free from repeated sexual abuse, coercion, and

intimidation or degradation by their captors. Furthermore, these rights were clearly

established prior to the time of Officer Davis’s challenged actions, and no reasonable

corrections officer could have believed otherwise.

10. This oppression, sexual abuse, coercion, and intimidation were the

foreseeable result of policies, customs, or practices of wanton indifference to inmate

safety, i.e., cross-gender supervision whereby a single male officer kept watch over the

Jail’s female inmates; failing to promulgate sufficient safety or security protocols or

procedures to adequately monitor and protect the dozens of inmates housed in the

Jail’s female pod; persistent under-staffing of officers designated to supervise inmates

in the female pod; and the grossly inadequate supervision of corrections officers by Jail

officials.

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 11. As a result of Defendants’ violations of law – i.e., Officer Davis’s

oppression, sexual abuse, misconduct, intrusions of privacy, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress; Sheriff Harville’s and Jail Administrator Harville’s failure to

supervise Officer Davis; Defendants’ failures to protect female inmates and negligence;

and Grainger County’s wantonly indifferent policy, custom, or practice of allowing a

single male corrections officer to alone supervise female inmates – Plaintiffs and other

female inmates suffered and continue to suffer from debilitating psychological trauma,

permanent and catastrophic psychological injuries, severe emotional distress,

permanent physical ailments associated with psychological injuries, pain, humiliation,

loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of quality of life.

12. By this action, Plaintiffs bring the following claims:

Count One – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, under the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments – Based Upon Sexual Abuse,
Coercion, and Intimidation (Against Officer Davis,
Individually);

Count Two – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, under the Fourth Amendment
– Based Upon the Right to Privacy (Against Officer Davis,
Individually);

Count Three – Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments – Based Upon Failure to
Supervise (Against Grainger County, Sheriff Harville,
Individually, and Jail Administrator Harville, Individually);

Count Four – Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of

Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, under the Eighth
Amendment – Based Upon Based Upon Failure to Protect
Female Inmates from Male Officer Sexual Abuse, Coercion,

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 and Intimidation (Against Sheriff Harville, Individually,
Jail Administrator Harville, Individually, and Officers
Dalton and Davis, Individually);

Count Five – Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of

Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, under the Eighth
Amendment – Policy, Custom, or Practice of Cross-Gender
Supervision and Failure to Protect Female Inmates from
Male Officer Sexual Abuse (Against Grainger County);

Count Six – Common Law Invasion of Privacy (Against

Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Individually, and Officer
Davis, Individually);

Count Seven – Negligence (Against Grainger County and All

Defendants, Individually); and

Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(Against Officer Davis, Individually).

13. Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages, as well as

attorneys’ fees, costs, expenses, and all other available and appropriate relief.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14. This action is brought to redress alleged deprivations of constitutional

rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution, and for violations of Tennessee

statutory and common law. Original jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343.

15. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over any claims brought

under Tennessee law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367, as such claims are so related to

claims in the action that fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court as to form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.

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 16. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as all incidents,

events, and occurrences giving rise to the action occurred in Grainger County, within

the Northeastern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee.

III. PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

17. At all times material, Candace McGhee and Chasity Bailey (“Plaintiffs”)

were citizens and residents of Grainger County and convicted prisoners incarcerated

at the Grainger County Jail.

B. Defendants

18. Grainger County, Tennessee (“Grainger County” or “the County”) is a

governmental entity and political subdivision of the State of Tennessee, duly organized.

The County, as a local government, is a public entity, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). The population of Grainger County is just under

25,000 people. The County, upon information and belief, is a recipient of federal

financial assistance as required under 29 U.S.C. § 794.

19. Grainger County owns, operates, and maintains the Grainger County

Detention Facility (“Grainger County Jail” or “the Jail”) and employs all persons

working there. The Jail is located at 270 Justice Center Drive, Rutledge, Tennessee

37861. The County is responsible for, among other things, providing adequate funding

for the operation of the Jail, including staffing the Jail adequately and funding training

for the Sheriff, deputies, corrections officers, and other employees.

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 20. By law, the Jail is operated by the County Sheriff, currently James

Harville, who has the statutory duty to take charge and custody of all inmates housed

therein, and who may appoint jailers, for whose actions he is civilly liable, under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 41-4-101. The County may be served through its chief executive officer,

County Mayor Mike Byrd, at the Grainger County Courthouse, 8095 Rutledge Pike,

Suite 100, Rutledge TN 37861.

21. The County possessed the power and authority to adopt policies and

prescribe rules, regulations, and practices affecting all facets of the training,

supervision, control, employment, assignment and removal of individual members of

the Grainger County Sheriff’s Office (“GCSO”), and to assure that said actions, policies,

rules, regulations, practices and procedures of the GCSO and its employees comply

with the laws and constitutions of the United States and the State of Tennessee.

22. The County and GCSO are answerable for the safekeeping of persons in

their custody and responsible for all matters relating to the selection, supervision,

promotion, training, and discipline of employees, including uniformed and non-

uniformed employees.

23. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Sheriff James Harville (“Sheriff

Harville”) was the duly-elected Sheriff of Grainger County, statutorily responsible for

the screening, hiring, firing, training and the supervision of GCSO personnel; and

responsible for the safety and welfare of those inmates in his custody. Specifically,

Sheriff Harville was responsible for operating the Jail and overseeing operations. That

responsibility included, but was not limited to, supervising corrections officers, who

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served at his will in their respective duties at the Jail, and providing adequate staffing

at the Jail.

24. Sheriff Harville’s employment duties and responsibilities placed him in

charge and control of the Jail. He was also in charge of all GCSO employees and the

development and implementation of all procedures and policies related to their

employment. Sheriff Harville was responsible for employee training, supervision, and

conduct; enforcement of the regulations of the GCSO and the Jail; verifying that

employees were adhering to the official policies and procedures and the regulations of

the GCSO and the Jail; ensuring the review of and response to formal and informal

complaints and grievances; knowing what was actually occurring in the GCSO and the

Jail; ensuring that the personnel of the Jail were obeying the laws of the State of

Tennessee and of the United States while they were on Jail property and to take

appropriate corrective action when needed; and to ensure the safety, health and

welfare of employees, inmates, and visitors to the Jail, including protecting their civil

rights.

25. Sheriff Harville is sued in his individual capacity and as principal on his

official bond. In addition to acting under color of law, Sheriff Harville is also a

“policymaker” within the meaning of that term, as applied by the Supreme Court in

Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 479 U.S. 469 (1986), and as the official head of a

“public entity” providing services, programs, or activities. Sheriff Harville is, upon

information and belief, a citizen and resident of Grainger County and may be served

with process at the GCSO, 270 Justice Center Dr., # 105, Rutledge, TN 37861.

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 26. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant, Chris Harville (“Jail

Administrator Harville”), was employed by the GCSO as Jail Administrator, a position

to which he was appointed by Sheriff Harville. He acted with the authority invested

in him by virtue of employment with the County, and is a state actor under § 1983. As

a supervisor at the Jail, Jail Administrator Harville’s responsibilities included, but

were not limited to, providing sufficient training to Jail employees, including

corrections officers, and creating and implementing adequate polices and procedures

to ensure that inmates were safe. At all relevant times, he was jointly responsible with

Sheriff Harville for the management of the Jail and supervision of Jail employees.

27. Jail Administrator Harville is sued in his individual capacity and as

principal on his official bond. He was operating under color of law. Jail Administrator

Harville is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of Grainger County and

may be served with process at the GCSO, 270 Justice Center Dr., # 105, Rutledge, TN

37861.

28. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant, Corrections Officer

Travis Hank Davis, individually (“Officer Davis”), was employed by the GCSO as a

corrections officer. He is sued in his individual capacity and as principal on his official

bond. He was operating under color of law. Officer Davis is, upon information and

belief, a citizen and resident of Grainger County and may be served with process at:

GCSO, 270 Justice Center Dr., # 105, Rutledge, TN 37861.

29. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant, Corrections Officer

Leonard Dalton, individually (“Officer Dalton”), was employed by the GCSO as a

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corrections officer. He is sued in his individual capacity and as principal on his official

bond. He was operating under color of law. Officer Dalton is, upon information and

belief, a citizen and resident of Grainger County and may be served with process at:

GCSO, 270 Justice Center Dr., # 105, Rutledge, TN 37861.

30. Various other persons or entities not made Defendants in this lawsuit,

including but not limited to other Grainger County officials or GCSO employees, have

participated with Defendants in the violations asserted in this Complaint and have

performed acts and made statements in furtherance thereof.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Plaintiffs’ Backgrounds

31. Plaintiff, Candace McGhee, was arrested on a probation violation on

January 29, 2021, and booked in the Granger County Jail. McGhee pled guilty in the

Circuit Court for Grainger County and was sentenced to serve 270 days, on February

9, 2021. See State of Tennessee v. Candace Danielle McGhee, Nos. 5380, 5938 (Cir. Ct.

Grainger Cty. Feb. 9, 2021).

32. Plaintiff, Chasity Bailey, was arrested on a capias, issued by Judge O.

Duane Slone, of the Circuit Court for Grainger County on February 11, 2021, for

violating her probation by allegedly failing a drug screen, and incarcerated in the

Grainger County Jail.

33. By February 11, 2021, both Plaintiffs were inmates in the only female pod

of the Grainger County Jail.

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 B. Officer Davis’s Background and Hiring

34. Prior to becoming a corrections officer at the Grainger County Jail on May

4, 2020, Travis Hank Davis (“Officer Davis”) was a dump-truck driver, hauling dirt and

rocks for a living. He quit that job to spend more time at home. For months, after being

hired by Sheriff Harville, Officer Davis oppressed, sexually abused, coerced,

intimidated, and/or terrorized female inmates at the Grainger County Jail through

flagrant criminal acts, including official oppression, and violations of their

constitutional rights, all of which were and should have been obvious to Grainger

County, the Sheriff, and the Jail Administrator, as well as other corrections officers

who worked in the Jail’s female pod.

35. Plaintiffs Candace McGhee and Chasity Bailey attended the same high

school as Officer Davis, at the same time. However, although Officer Davis had

occasionally sent Bailey “Facebook messages,” asking her if she wanted to “hang out.”

Neither McGhee nor Bailey knew Officer Davis well or considered him a “friend.”

36. As a corrections officer, Officer Davis mostly worked the day-shift at the

Jail, starting at 7:00 a.m. and working until 7:00 p.m. Significantly, from at least

February 11, 2021 until April 18, 2021, he worked in the female pod, where the

Plaintiffs were housed.

37. The vast majority of the actions of Officer Davis of which the Plaintiffs

complain occurred while Officer Davis was working day-shifts. Specifically, from

February 11, 2021 to March 6, 2021, Officer Davis worked thirteen (13) day-shifts (7:00

a.m. – 7:00 p.m.) and one night-shift (7:00 p.m. – 7:00 a.m.); from March 7, 2021 to

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April 3, 2021, Officer Davis worked fourteen (14) day-shifts; and from April 4, 2021 to

April 24, 2021, Officer Davis worked five day-shifts and three night-shifts.

C. Officer Davis’s Begins Making Sexually Aggressive Comments.

38. For the first few days of their incarceration, the Plaintiffs had no

complaints about Officer Davis’s conduct. Initially, Officer Davis brought the Plaintiffs

lighters for their cigarettes. As time passed, however, he became increasingly verbally

sexually-aggressive toward the Plaintiffs, routinely directing vulgarities at them. For

example, he remarked that he pictured their faces instead of his wife’s when he and

his wife were having sexual relations the night before, or asked them to describe their

breasts and genitalia. Ultimately, Officer Davis began using his position of authority

to make various sexual demands of the Plaintiffs.

39. In or about the first week of March 2021, just a few weeks after the

Plaintiffs were first incarcerated in the Jail, they were moved to Female Isolation Cell

#2 (“FI-2") and became cell-mates. Notably, FI-2 was directly in front of the Jail’s

control room, known as “the bubble,” where corrections officers kept watch over the

inmates housed in the female pod.

40. From “the bubble,” corrections officers control the movement of inmates

and guards from different parts of the Jail. This is done by operating the switchboard

in the control room, which opens and shuts cell-doors and entry and exit doors in

various parts of the Jail. Corrections officers in the control room also use a

loudspeaker or intercom system to accommodate inmates’ constitutionally-guaranteed

rights, including showers, recreation, and access to legal counsel. Access to the control

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room also allows corrections officers to monitor the goings-on in various parts of the

facility through video monitors, radios, and audio monitors.

41. Beginning in February and early March 2021, Officer Davis began

speaking to the Plaintiffs via the control room’s intercom or loud-speaker system,

making remarks about “how big their tits” were, asking them to describe the “color of

their nipples,” and to describe their “pussy” to him. Significantly, when Officer Davis

spoke on the intercom, every other female inmate housed in the pod – and presumably

other corrections officers who passed through there – could also hear what he was

saying, although his comments were directed toward the Plaintiffs.

42. Officer Davis repeatedly made nasty and vulgar comments to one or both

of the Plaintiffs. For example, in March 2021, the Plaintiffs asked him to let them out

of their cell so they could go over to the male’s side of the Jail and get tobacco. Officer

Davis said, “no, if I can’t fuck you, nobody can.”

D. Officer Davis Demands That Plaintiffs and/or Other

Inmates Strip Naked or Engage in Various Sex-Acts While
He Watches and Masturbates.

43. Soon, Officer Davis began to demand that Plaintiffs and other female

inmates housed with them in FI-2 and elsewhere engage in sex acts while he watched

from the control room and masturbated. For example, in or about March 2021, Officer

Davis directed another female inmate, Tasha Singleton, also housed in FI-2 with the

Plaintiffs, to perform oral sex on Plaintiff Chasity Bailey while he watched and

masturbated in the control room. To coerce the women to strip or engage in sex acts

alone or with each other, Officer Davis used his position of authority and the inmates

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plight to intimidate the inmates, and occasionally “bribed” them with tobacco or

lighters.

44. In March 2021, the Plaintiffs found themselves moved to another cell,

Cell # 5. Melissa Kennedy, another inmate, was housed in Cell #8. Kennedy happened

to be the girlfriend of Plaintiff, Candace McGhee. Around this time, Officer Davis

began regularly “popping” Cell #8’s door-lock open and directing Kennedy to go into

Cell #5 to have sexual relations with McGhee. Because Officer Davis’s line- of-sight

to Cell #5 was impeded, he stacked milk-crates up on the control room floor and stood

on top of them to optimize his view, as he watched and masturbated. The stacked milk

crates prompted other officers to be suspicious, according to the Plaintiffs.

45. Over and over again, for months, Officer Davis directed the Plaintiffs and

other female inmates to perform various sex acts, while he watched and masturbated

from the Bubble, frequently directing the Plaintiffs and other female inmates to move

around in the cell(s), in order to give him a better view.

46. On at least one occasion, Officer Davis told Plaintiff Chasity Bailey to

move to Cell #8 to smoke a cigarette, and he directed Kennedy to move from Cell #8

to Cell #5 to have sex with Plaintiff Candace McGhee. After Kennedy and McGhee had

finished, Officer Davis sent Bailey to Cell #5 to have sex with McGhee, all while

Officer Davis watched and pleasured himself while standing on his stack of milk-

crates in the Bubble.

47. Other female inmates in the pod were forced to participate in these “sex

shows” or at least witness them. For example, inmates Wendy Brown and Tasha Holt,

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housed next to the Plaintiffs in Cell #6, heard Officer Davis’s voice on the

intercom/loud-speaker as he made vulgar comments and instructed the Plaintiffs and

other female inmates to engage in various sex acts while he watched from the Jail’s

control room.

48. On other occasions, Officer Davis ordered inmates, including Wendy

Brown, to strip naked for him as he watched and masturbated.

E. The “Forced Sex Shows” Were Overt and Frequent.

49. The “sex shows” orchestrated and directed by Officer Davis were hardly

a secret, as inmates in the female pod regularly heard Officer Davis making the

demands on the intercom to watch female inmates have sex and witnessed, or at least

heard, the “sex shows” going on from their own cells. Other corrections officers came

into the female pod periodically and, upon information and belief, heard or witnessed

the “sex shows.” If they did not, they would certainly have heard about them from one

or more of the dozens of female inmates who were privy to and/or participated in

them. According to Plaintiffs, Officer Davis demanded that they perform various “sex

acts” together or with other female inmates on approximately thirty (30) occasions

from February 11, 2021 to April 18, 2021.

F. Plaintiffs Futile Complaints and Requests for a New Cell

50. And it wasn’t as if the Plaintiffs didn’t complain about Officer Davis’s

actions. In fact, in or around March 2021, they complained directly to Officer Leonard

Dalton about Officer Davis’s actions, even asking him to let them talk to a civil rights

lawyer to get help. In response, Officer Dalton shrugged off their complaints about

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Officer Davis’s actions and told them to contact an attorney on their own time.

51. On another occasion, after Plaintiffs sought to be transferred from Cell

#5 to Cell #3 to move away from the control room, Jail Administrator Harville initially

failed to take their request seriously, then denied it, implying that the Plaintiffs were

trouble-makers.

52. Specifically, on April 6, 2021, Plaintiff Bailey completed a “residence

request report,” asking if the Plaintiffs could be moved out of Cell #5 (“can we please

be moved out of cell 5?”). Jail Administrator Harville responded, “we,” apparently

asking to whom else Bailey was referring. On April 7, 2021, Bailey responded: “Me

and Candace – We have been good.” On April 10, 2021, Bailey asked again, "Can me

and Candace please move out of Cell 5 to Cell 3?” Finally, on April 15, 2021, Jail

Administrator Harville responded, “How good have you been?” and stated, “not at this

time, how many times have you asked this question?”

53. After having their complaint to Officer Dalton disregarded and their

multiple requests to move denied, the Plaintiffs rightly believed it was futile to

complain again against Officer Davis.

G. Officer Davis is Terminated on April 24, 2021.

54. Eventually, toward the end of April 2021, two Grainger County Sheriff’s

Office detectives, Leon Spoon and Colby Nicely, came to the Jail to speak to the

Plaintiffs separately, about a pending investigation concerning Officer Davis.

55. Within twenty-four (24) hours of speaking to the detectives, Plaintiff

Bailey was transferred from the Grainger County Jail to the Claiborne County Jail,

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without explanation.

56. On April 24, 2021, Sheriff Harville terminated Officer Davis for violating

the Code of Ethics, for officer misconduct, and for abusing his position, among other

reasons. As of April 12, 2021, there is an “open criminal investigation” regarding

Officer Davis’s conduct.

H. Plaintiffs Viewed Officer Davis as “Untouchable”

57. During all times relevant, Officer Davis engaged in this unwanted

conduct with the Plaintiffs and other female inmates and subjected them to the

degradation of being forced to hear and watch as he demanded “sex shows” for his

personal pleasure. Officer Davis used his position as a corrections officer as a form of

intimidation against the Plaintiffs and other female inmates to keep them from

reporting his unwanted and unlawful sexual misconduct. Upon information and belief,

when female inmates informed him that it was particularly distressing to comply with

or witness this debauchery and unwanted sexual behavior, Officer Davis intimidated

them with negative repercussions and implied that he would create problems during

their incarceration.

58. Simply put, Officer Davis's ability to get away with such a horrific abuse

of his power, while flagrantly violating the constitutional rights of female inmates, led

the female inmates to believe that Officer Davis was “untouchable,” and that they

would suffer retaliation or other harm if they were to report Officer Davis's actions.

From their perspective, Plaintiffs had complained about Officer Davis's misconduct

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and even requested cell-transfers; yet, nothing was done to reign in, much less to stop

Officer Davis. If Officer Davis’s colleagues and supervisors at the Jail knew about his

sexual misconduct and did nothing, further complaining would be futile.

I. Officer Davis’s Open and Notorious “Forced Sex Shows”

Continued for Months Without Investigation or Abatement.

59. Meanwhile, Officer Davis continued to subject Plaintiffs and other female

inmates to his unwanted demands for “sex shows,” sexual taunts, teasing, and other

acts without reprieve for months, including February, March, and April 2021, until

the end of April 2021, when he fortunately disappeared.

60. Officer Davis’s rampant abuse of female inmates was so open, overt, and

frequent to the point that other Jail personnel, including the Sheriff, Jail

Administrator, and other corrections officers, either knew, suspected, or should have

known or suspected that Officer Davis was sexually abusing or mistreating female

inmates.

61. Officer Davis made these “sex show” demands on the Plaintiffs alone on

approximately thirty (30) occasions from February 11, 2021 to April 18, 2021, making

his demands from the confines of the Bubble via the Jail's intercom or loudspeaker

system. It is hardly reasonable to believe Officer Davis had not engaged in these

abuses prior to February 2021.

62. Even if Jail officials had their heads in-the-sand about investigating

Officer Davis’s sexual misconduct, because Plaintiffs had complained about Officer

Davis’s actions to other corrections officers, and requested other cells, it is highly

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unlikely that Jail Administrator Harville, or even Sheriff Harville, was not privy to

Officer Davis’s actions as early as February or March 2021.

63. Despite all of the open, overt, and frequent indicators that Officer Davis

was preying on vulnerable female inmates from at least February 2021 to April 18,

2021, Officer Davis was left unchecked until April 24, 2021 to inflict innumerable

sexual abuses on the Plaintiffs and countless other female inmates. Grainger County,

the Sheriff, and the Jail Administrator all failed to investigate, discipline, question or

stop Officer Davis’s sexual abuses of female inmates until approximately April 24,

2021, when he was fired.

J. Plaintiffs’ Injuries

64. As a result of Officer Davis’s abuse, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to

suffer from debilitating psychological trauma, permanent and catastrophic

psychological injuries, severe emotional distress, permanent physical ailments

associated with psychological injuries, pain, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and

loss of quality of life.

K. Circumstances Require Discovery to Permit the Plaintiffs

to More Precisely Allege Their Claims.

65. Plaintiffs were compelled to file this Complaint without the benefit of

information available only to the Defendants. More precise allegations might have

been made if the County had more fully responded to Plaintiffs’ multiple public

records requests. Plaintiffs’ attorney has made multiple public records requests,

seeking information regarding Officer Davis’s conduct. However, Grainger County has

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only partially complied with those requests, pointing to a “pending investigation”

concerning Officer Davis, stating “while the Grainger County has preserved video,

statement and reports relating to this matter, those materials cannot be produced at

this time.”

66. Accordingly, certain of the allegations in this Complaint have been made

upon information and belief, albeit after a full investigation. Consequently, more

detailed and precise allegations cannot be made at this time, including details

concerning any investigation by the Sheriff’s Office or the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (“TBI”).

V. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

67. Grainger County has waived immunity for negligence of the county and

county employees, misconduct of deputies acting under color of law, and for the

negligence of deputies or employees of the GCSO or the County, as set out in Tenn.

Code Ann. §29-20-305, and for intentional acts or misconduct done by deputies under

color of law, as set out in Tenn. Code Ann. §8-8-302.

68. There is no immunity for individuals for criminal conduct, or conduct

which is willful or malicious.

VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

69. Plaintiffs bring their claims both individually and on behalf of a proposed

class of female inmates incarcerated at the Jail from May 4, 2020 to April 24, 2021,

under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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 70. Class Definition. Plaintiff proposes the following Class, subject to

modification by the Court, as required:

All inmates who – from any date beginning on May 4, 2020,

to any date up to April 24, 2021 – were incarcerated in the
female pod of the Grainger County Jail and were subjected
to sexual abuse, coercion, or intimidation by Officer Travis
Hank Davis.3

71. Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). As defined, the proposed class is

sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members of the class is impracticable and

unfeasible. Upon information and belief, dozens of female inmates were incarcerated

at the Jail. It is estimated that well over one hundred (100) female inmates were

incarcerated in the Jail during the class period, as defined. Class members are easily

identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by

Defendants.

72. Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). There are questions of law and

fact common to the Class, including, but not limited to:

a. whether Class members were oppressed, sexually

abused, sexually coerced, sexually intimidated, or
otherwise harmed by Officer Davis;

b. whether Class members constitutional or common law

privacy rights were violated by Officer Davis’s actions;

c. whether the County, Sheriff, and/or Jail Administrator

failed to sufficiently supervise or control Officer Davis in

3
All such inmates incarcerated in the Jail were at a substantial risk of serious
harm due to Grainger County’s employment of Officer Davis as a corrections officer
supervising female inmates at the Jail from May 20, 2020 until his termination on
April 24, 2021.

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 his employment as a corrections officer; and

d. whether the County, Sheriff, Jail Administrator, and/or

Officers Dalton and Davis failed to protect female inmates
from Officer Davis’s oppression, sexual abuse, coercion,
intimidation, or other harm;

e. whether the County’s policy, custom, or practice of cross-

gender supervision of female inmates whereby a single
male corrections officer alone supervised inmates in the
Jail’s female pod violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution right against cruel and unusual
punishment;

f. whether the Defendants breached their duties owed to

Class members; and

d. whether the Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional

distress on Class members.

73. Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The claims of the named Plaintiffs

are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed class. Plaintiffs were inmates

in the Grainger County Jail during the class period and were subjected to oppression,

sexual abuse, coercion, or intimidation by Officer Davis. Thus, the claims of the

Plaintiffs and all other members of the class arise out of a common course of conduct

and/or policies in violation of the constitution or law, as alleged herein.

74. Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are members of the Class

and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of all proposed Class

members because they have no disabling conflict(s) of interest antagonistic to those

of the other Class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and

experienced in complex, class action, and/or civil rights litigation.

75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact predominate

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over any questions affecting only the individual members of the Class. The wrongs

alleged against the Defendants are common to each and every member of the Class.

A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this

controversy. Furthermore, class-wide damages are essential to induce the County to

comply with federal law in the future. The interest of Class members in individually

controlling the prosecution of separate claims against the Defendants is small and

management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than

those presented in many class claims.

VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Under Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments

– Based Upon Sexual Abuse, Coercion, and Intimidation –

(Against Officer Davis)

76. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

77. Jail sexual abuse can violate the Constitution. Officer Davis’s pattern of

oppression, sexual abuse, coercion, and intimidation of the Plaintiffs and other female

inmates at the Grainger County Jail violated their rights under the Fourth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

78. Sexual abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as a distasteful blight on the

prison system, offends our most basic principles of just punishment. It invades the

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most basic of dignity interests: to be treated as a human being. Such abuse is simply

not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

Fourth Amendment

79. As part of his “forced sex shows,” Officer Davis demanded that Plaintiffs

and other female inmates under his supervision and control remove their clothing and

expose their naked bodies to him, including their bare breasts and vaginal area, all

in contravention to their Fourth Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable search

and seizure. He then demanded and directed them to engage in a variety of sex acts,

as he watched from the Bubble and masturbated.

80. Officer Davis’s intrusion of the Plaintiffs’ privacy rights was severe.

Using his authority as a corrections officer, Officer Davis coerced Plaintiffs and other

inmates to fully disrobe and expose their naked bodies not only to him, but to any

other inmate who a vantage point to view Officer Davis’s “forced sex shows.”

81. Obviously, there was no legitimate penalogical interest for Officer Davis

to make his demands on the Plaintiffs to strip naked and engage in sex acts with each

other and others female inmates.

Eighth Amendment

82. Even a single act of sexual abuse may violate the Eighth Amendment if

it is entirely gratuitous and devoid of penalogical purpose.

83. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power

of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,”

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nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). In this Circuit, the Eighth Amendment “must draw its

meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing

society.” Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1227 (6th Cir. 1987). Thus, courts should

interpret the Eighth Amendment “in a flexible and dynamic manner.” Id.

84. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has

acknowledged that “Federal courts have long held that sexual abuse is sufficiently

serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. . . . This is true whether the sexual abuse

is perpetrated by other inmates or by guards.” Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty., 915 F.3d

1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2019). For example, violations have been found when a male

inmate alleged that corrections officers “forced him to perform sexually provocative

acts” during a strip search conducted in the presence of female guards; when a

corrections officer forced an inmate to perform a drunken striptease; and when a male

inmate alleged that female guards regularly watched him shower for extended periods

of time.

85. The court in Rafferty found an Eighth Amendment violation when a

prison official sexually harassed a prisoner by repeatedly demanding that the prisoner

expose herself and masturbate while the official watched. The court noted that, in

light of the coercive dynamic of the relationship between prison staff and prisoners,

such demands amount to sexual abuse. Id. at 1096.

86. Here, Officer Davis acted maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm, and to arouse or gratify himself or humiliate Plaintiffs and

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his other female inmate victims. As previously alleged, there is no penalogical

justification for a male guard to coerce a female inmate to strip naked for the purpose

of allowing the guard to masturbate. Nor is there such a justification for a male officer

to coerce female inmates to engage in various sex acts with each other for his personal

pleasure. These demands are tantamount to sexual abuse.

87. In light of this well-established precedent, Officer Davis’s repeated

demands that the Plaintiffs and other female inmates strip and engage in variety of

sex acts in their cells while he watched and masturbated are sufficiently serious to

implicate the Eighth Amendment under settled case law from the Supreme Court, this

Circuit, and numerous other courts of appeals.

88. Officer Davis’s sexual abuse of the Plaintiffs was not isolated or brief, as

Plaintiffs allege that he demanded that one or the other or both of them engage in

various sex acts on approximately thirty (30) occasions between February 11, 2021

and April 18, 2021, when he disappeared from the Jail.

89. That Officer Davis never physically touched the Plaintiffs or other female

inmates makes no difference to his culpability. Thirty-five (35) years ago, the Sixth

Circuit held that sexual abuse of inmates can violate the Eighth Amendment even in

the absence of physical touching by a corrections officer.4 Furthermore, the abuse

alleged to have occurred in this case did not merely consist of vulgarities,5 but entailed

4
Other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion with respect to
homophobic epithets, ribald comments, and a forced striptease.
5
The Sixth Circuit has held that ongoing, coercive verbal harassment may
rise to sexual abuse that violates the Eighth Amendment, noting that, in light of the

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coerced sexual acts by multiple female inmates. The fact that Officer Davis effectuated

this sexual abuse by demanding the Plaintiffs and other female inmates to strip naked

or engage in sex acts with each other, rather than by touching the female inmates

himself, does not alter the fact that Plaintiffs and other female inmates were

repeatedly required to engage in various sex acts against their will.

90. Besides, as inmates, the Plaintiffs were unable to consent to the

unwanted acts Officer Davis perpetrated upon them or to avoid witnessing the

unwanted acts he perpetrated upon others, as the power dynamics between inmates

and guards make it difficult to discern consent from coercion. The Sixth Circuit has

acknowledged the coercive nature of sexual relations in the prison environment, and

that when a prisoner alleges sexual abuse by a prison guard, the prisoner is entitled

to a rebuttable presumption that the conduct was not consensual.

91. Beyond this, the Plaintiffs did not consent to Officer Davis’s demands,

as they were intimidated into complying, first, by their plight as incarcerated

prisoners, and then, by Officer Davis’s position of authority. And it isn’t as if they

didn’t complain about Officer Davis’s actions. They did so. However, their complaints

fell on deaf ears.

92. When Officer Davis made his sexual demands toward the Plaintiffs in

early 2021, it was clearly established that sexual abuse of inmates could be

sufficiently severe to implicate the Eighth Amendment even in the absence of physical

coercive dynamic of the relationship between prison staff and prisoners, such
demands amount to sexual abuse.

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touching by a guard. Based on the settled precedent that existed in 2021, a reasonable

officer should have known that making repeated sexual demands of an inmate could

violate the Eighth Amendment. See Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1097.

Fourteenth Amendment

93. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects

the right of female inmates to remain free from “unjustified intrusions on personal

security,” including “freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.” For the reasons

previously described, Officer Davis’s repeated sexual abuse, coercion, and intimidation

of the Plaintiffs violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from such

bodily intrusions, restraints, and punishments.

94. The violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by Officer Davis directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe

emotional suffering and mental anguish, despair, and hopelessness. Plaintiffs’ seek

compensatory damages for their injuries.

95. Furthermore, Officer Davis’s conduct was also willful, wanton, malicious,

and done with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ federally-protected rights, justifying

an award of punitive damages so as to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct and

to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.

96. Plaintiffs sue Officer Davis for violating their constitutional rights, and

seek any and all damages allowable, attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

costs, and discretionary costs.

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 COUNT TWO

Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

– Based Upon the Right to Privacy –

(Against Officer Davis)

97. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

98. Officer Davis's actions, as described herein, violated Plaintiffs’ and other

female inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights to bodily privacy. The

Supreme Court has long interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include an implicit

right to privacy.

99. Plaintiffs, and other female inmates, were forced or otherwise coerced by

Officer Davis to involuntarily strip naked,6 not for any penalogical purpose, but for his

own sexual gratification.

6
Most people “have a special sense of privacy in their genitals, and
involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the other sex may be
especially demeaning and humiliating. When not reasonably necessary, that sort of
degradation is not to be visited upon those confined in our prisons.” Lee v. Downs,
641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981); see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th
Cir. 1963) (“We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked
body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from view of strangers, and
particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect
and personal dignity.”).

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 100. Plaintiffs and other female inmates had a right to privacy and bodily

integrity under the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, rights

that specifically protected them against unreasonable and unwanted exposure of their

naked or partially bodies to Officer Davis or any other member of the opposite sex.

101. In unreasonably and unjustifiably forcing Plaintiffs and other female

inmates to expose their naked bodies and genitalia to him, Officer Davis violated

Plaintiffs’ clearly established privacy rights.

102. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, “a convicted prisoner maintains some

reasonable expectations of privacy while in prison . . . even though those privacy

rights may be less than those enjoyed by non-prisoners.” Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963

F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1992). Any intrusion on an inmate’s right to privacy is valid if

it “reasonably relates to legitimate penalogical interests.” Here, coercing Plaintiffs

and other female inmates to unnecessarily expose their naked bodies, to engage in sex

and sex-related acts with other inmates, was not reasonably related to any legitimate

penalogical interest.7

103. The Fourth Amendment protects prisoners from searches or seizures that

7
Being coerced to strip naked is a particularly severe intrusion on the right to
privacy. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (W.D.
Mich. 2000). Even a strip search, by its very nature, is an extreme intrusion upon
personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual. It is a
practice that the Supreme Court says has given it “pause,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 558 (1979), since “[u]ndergoing such an inspection is undoubtedly humiliating
and deeply offensive to many . . . .” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2012).

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go beyond legitimate penalogical interests. Plaintiffs and other female inmates, had

a well-established right not to be forced or otherwise coerced into stripping naked,

much less compelled to engage in sex-acts by themselves or with other inmates within

full view of Officer Davis, for his personal gratification.

104. The location of the coerced sex-acts further amplified the privacy

intrusions in this case, because Plaintiffs were coerced into stripping and engaging in

sex acts inside a cell viewable by others.8

105. Obviously, no exigent circumstances existed that might possibly have

justified Officer Davis to coerce Plaintiffs to strip naked and engage in sex acts for his

personal pleasure.

106. Being made to expose oneself to a member of the opposite sex and

strangers would be highly intrusive to any ordinary person.

107. A reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position should have known that

his conduct, as described, violated Plaintiffs’ privacy rights. Officer Davis’s

unreasonable, coerced exposure of Plaintiffs’ naked body violated their clearly

established right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Stoudemire v.

Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2013).

108. At the time of Officer Davis’s violation of Plaintiffs’ privacy rights, it was

also clearly established that conducting strip searches that would expose the subject’s

8
Officer Davis announced his instructions to the Plaintiffs and other female
inmates via an intercom system that could be heard by other inmates – only
exacerbating the number of people paying attention to what was going on in the
cell.

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naked body to members of the opposite sex and other strangers violates the Fourth

Amendment’s guarantee to privacy, absent special circumstances not present here.

Officer Davis did much more than conduct strip searches. By coercing Plaintiffs to

expose their naked bodies and genitals to himself and others, Officer Davis

intentionally intruded upon Plaintiffs’ constitutionally-protected bodily solitude and

seclusion.

109. The violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments privacy

rights by Officer Davis directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer injuries.

As a result, Plaintiffs have suffered damages, including, but not limited to, severe

emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, and emotional distress.

110. Furthermore, Officer Davis’s conduct was also willful, wanton, malicious,

and done with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ federally-protected rights, justifying

an award of punitive damages so as to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct and

to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.

111. Plaintiffs sue Officer Davis for violating their constitutional right to

privacy, and seek any and all damages allowable, including punitive damages, as well

as attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, costs, and discretionary costs.

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 COUNT THREE

Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Under Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

– Based Upon Failure to Supervise –

(Against Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Individually,

and Jail Administrator Harville, Individually)

112. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

113. Sheriff Harville has final authority and makes policy for the GCSO in

establishing and implementing policies and/or procedures with respect to the care and

custody of female inmates in the Grainger County Jail. Jail Administrator Harville

is directly responsible for the supervision of corrections officers in the Jail and, upon

information and belief, designating and scheduling which officers work in the female

pod.

114. Here, the unconstitutional consequences of failing to supervise Officer

Davis is so patently obvious that the County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator

Harville are all liable under § 1983. The oppression, sexual abuse, coercion, and

intimidation by Officer Davis occurred mostly during his day-shifts and continued

from at least February 2021 through April 2021. As described above, the “forced sex

shows” orchestrated and directed by Officer Davis were not secret, as most if not all

of the female inmates were forced to participate in them, witness them, or at least

hear them or hear about them.

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 115. Plaintiffs also complained about Officer Davis’s abuse to at least one

other corrections officer (Officer Dalton) to no avail. Presumably, if he was properly

trained, Officer Dalton informed his supervisors, including Sheriff Harville and Jail

Administrator Harville, about the complaint. Yet, the oppression, abuse, coercion,

intimidation and “forced sex shows” continued for approximately another month,

meaning that neither the Sheriff nor his Jail Administrator interceded to stop Officer

Davis.

116. Beyond even this, in early April 2021, the Plaintiffs requested to be

moved to another cell to get away from Officer Davis’s sight-line. Jail Administrator

Harville made light of their request before denying it outright.

117. Myriad facts – e.g., Officer Davis’s sexual abuses; the fact that they

continued for months; that most, if not all, of the female inmates knew about or were

even coerced into participating in the “forced sex shows”; the fact that other

corrections officers were likely aware of Officer Davis’s abuses; and that Jail officials

had mocked and rejected requests for the Plaintiffs to move to another cell –

demonstrate such obvious and egregious supervisory deficiencies to make the County’s

supervisory policies, customs, or practices constitutionally defective.

118. Here, Officer Davis rightly believed that his sexual misconduct would not

be properly monitored or corrected by supervisory officers. Grainger County’s failure

to supervise correctional officers was the moving force behind Officer Davis’s months-

long perpetration of sexual abuses and invasion of Plaintiffs’ privacy rights. As

supervisory officials, Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville were well aware

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that failing to sufficiently supervise male corrections officers working alone in the

female-inmate pod was a serious and substantial risk, endangering female inmates.

119. As a direct and proximate result of these supervisory failures, Plaintiffs

suffered damages, including severe humiliation and emotional distress.

120. Plaintiffs sue Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Individually, and Jail

Administrator Harville, Individually, for violating their constitutional rights, and seek

any and all damages allowable, as well as attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1988, costs, and discretionary costs.

COUNT FOUR

Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Under Eighth Amendment

– Based Upon Failure to Protect Female Inmates from

Male Officer Sexual Abuse, Coercion, and Intimidation –

(Against Sheriff Harville, Jail Administrator Harville,

and Officers Dalton and Davis)

121. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the above allegations as if fully set

forth herein.

122. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person has a federal cause of action for money

damages against an individual acting under color of state law who deprives another

of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and

federal laws. Here, the Defendants were acting under color of state law.

123. From the moment of Plaintiffs’ incarceration, the County, Sheriff

Harville, Jail Administrator Harville, and Officers Davis and Dalton owed them a

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duty of care to protect them from harm. A special relationship existed between

Plaintiffs and those Defendants, which gave rise to that duty. Defendants breached

that duty by failing to protect the Plaintiffs and other female inmates.

124. At the time of Officer Davis’s abuses and violations, the law was clearly

established that Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the safety of inmates from a

serious risk of harm was a constitutional violation.

125. Plaintiffs were incarcerated under conditions that posed a substantial

risk of harm to their safety and well-being. Defendants knew or should have known

of this risk, yet they failed to abate this risk, or to even mitigate it.

126. Each of the Defendants – knowing that the Plaintiffs had complained

about Officer Davis’s oppression, sexual abuse, coercion, intimidation, and “forced sex

shows,” knowing that Plaintiffs had sought to be moved to another cell to get away

from Officer Davis’s sight-line, or knowing that Officer Davis engaged in these abuses

because it was not a secret among inmates in the female pod (and likely not a secret

to other corrections officers as well) – had an opportunity to help the Plaintiffs and

stop Officer Davis’s atrocities. These facts, and others described herein, indicate that

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ substantial risk of serious harm.

127. Specifically, Defendants Sheriff Harville, Jail Administrator Harville,

Officer Dalton, and other Jail employees failed to respond to the Plaintiffs’ complaints

about Officer Davis’s unwanted sexual misconduct in a proper and timely fashion,

thereby displaying a deliberate indifference to the safety and well-being of the

Plaintiffs and other female inmates.

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 128. Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville allowed Officer Davis's

behavior to continue despite having options to station a female corrections officer in

the female pod or to adopt other alternatives options, such as having two corrections

officers instead of one monitor the female pod or monitoring via video surveillance.

Although Plaintiffs and other female inmates complained about Officer Davis's

unwanted behavior, Sheriff Harville, Jail Administrator Harville, and other Jail

employees chose to ignore the behavior and/or failed to report or stop Officer Davis.

129. It is the duty of corrections officers to inform the Jail Administrator or

the Sheriff of inmate-safety or security complaints, particularly where they involve

sexual abuse, coercion, or intimidation by a corrections officer on female inmates. If

Officer Dalton had been sufficiently trained, he would have relayed the Plaintiffs'

complaints about Officer Davis’s misconduct to the Jail Administrator and/or the

Sheriff, meaning the latter would have been privy to the abuses. Nevertheless, Officer

Davis continued to victimize the Plaintiffs and other female inmates for months.

130. As supervisory officials, Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville

were well aware that the failure to adequately supervise a male corrections officer

stationed alone in an all-female pod would result in increased instances of sexual

abuse or assault, coercion, or intimidation. Nevertheless, they created a substantial

risk of harm to Plaintiff and other inmates by adopting or implementing policies,

customs, or practices that deprived Plaintiffs of their right to be free from sexual

abuse, i.e., cross-gender supervision of female inmates by stationing a male corrections

officer alone in the female pod.

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 131. Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville knew of and inexplicably

disregarded the substantial risk to Plaintiffs’ health or safety. As described above, the

substantial risk of male guard attacks or abuse on female inmates is longstanding,

pervasive, and well-documented in U.S. Jails. Nevertheless, the risks were so obvious

that they had to have been known. Neither official took action to respond reasonably

to the risk and station a female corrections officer in the female pod or video

surveillance.

132. If Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville had scheduled a

female corrections officer or video surveillance or even two male corrections officers

in the female pod, it is very likely that the Plaintiffs and other female inmates would

not have been sexually abused.

133. As a direct and proximate result of Sheriff Harville’s, Jail Administrator

Harville’s, and Officers Dalton’s and Davis’s failures to protect the Plaintiffs and other

female inmates, the Plaintiffs suffered damages, including severe humiliation and

emotional distress.

134. Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Harville, Individually, Jail Administrator Harville,

Individually, and Officers Dalton and Davis, Individually, for violating their

constitutional rights, and seek any and all damages allowable, as well as attorney’s

fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, costs, and discretionary costs.

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 COUNT FIVE

Violation of Civil Rights Laws under Color of Law,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Under Eighth Amendment

– Monell Claim: Policy, Custom, or Practice of Cross-Gender Supervision

and Failure to Protect Female Inmates from Male Officer Sexual Abuse –

(Against Grainger County)

135. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the above allegations as if fully set

forth herein.

Cross-Gender Supervision

136. Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator Harville

promulgated a policy, custom and/or practice of using cross-gender supervision of

female inmates at the Grainger County Jail whereby they scheduled male corrections

officers to work alone in the female pod of the Jail. This policy, custom, or practice was

the moving force behind Officer Davis’s sexual abuse, coercion, and intimidation of the

Plaintiffs and their injuries.

137. Cross-gender supervision of female inmates is often degrading and

dangerous. However, the practice passes constitutional muster if it is reasonably

related to legitimate penalogical concerns.

138. Data reveals that sexual assault is virtually a part of everyday life in

women’s prisons.9 Although women comprise only 7% of the state prison population,

9
See Amnesty International, "Not Part of My Sentence": Violations of the
Human Rights of Women in Custody 51-52 (1999), available at http://web.amnesty
.org/library/Indexeng AMR510011999; Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 1 59,

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46% of sexual abuse victims in state prisons are women.10 Cross-gender supervision

policies lead to an increase in the frequency of sexual abuse against female inmates.11

139. Sexual abuse of female prisoners by male corrections officers has long

been a problem in the United States. Multiple international laws and treaties prohibit

cross-gender supervision, as cross-gender supervision can have particularly

traumatizing effects on female prisoners. Various studies have estimated that 40% to

88% of female prisoners have histories of sexual or physical abuse.12 Notably, female

prisoners with a history of sexual abuse are often more fearful of male corrections

officers13 and become more vulnerable to sexual abuse while incarcerated.14

140. While the proposition that all men would inevitably sexually assault

female inmates if given the chance is clearly false, leaving male corrections officers

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.2 (Jan. 4, 1999).

10
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 210333, Sexual Violence
Reported By Correctional Authorities, 2004, at 8 (2005), available at
http://www.ojpusdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/svrca04.pdf (collecting data on prison rape
pursuant to Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (Supp. IV
2005)).
11
Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S.
State Prisons 1 (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Usl.htm.
12
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of
Sexual Abuse, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 751, 753 (2005).
13
See id. at 754.
14
Amy Laderberg, Note, “The ‘Dirty Little Secret’ Why Class Actions Have
Emerged as the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the
Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse,” 40
Wm. & Marl. Rev. 323, 338-39 (1998).

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alone with female inmates is sufficiently dangerous to have put Grainger County,

Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator Harville on-notice that such a practice posed

a substantial risk to female inmates. Reliable studies have addressed this causal link

and have reached the conclusion that the risk is severe. Indeed, cross-gender

supervision policies that allow male corrections officers to supervise female inmates

lead inevitably (or at least are a substantial factor that leads to) the rape or sexual

abuse of female inmates. Even where cross-gender supervision policies are not

violative of prisoners’ rights to remain free from sexual assault by corrections officers,

such policies create an atmosphere tolerant of such violations.

141. Official policy usually exists in the form of written statements,

ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice

that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy. Prior to the sexual abuses perpetrated by Officer Davis, the County

had developed and maintained a defacto policy, custom, or practice exhibiting

deliberate indifference to the deprivation of safety to female inmates, which ultimately

caused violations of Plaintiffs’ civil rights.

142. Yet, the most serious deficiency of Grainger County’s policy, custom, or

practice is not that the Sheriff uses cross-gender supervision, but that he stations a

single male corrections officer alone in the female pod to supervise female inmates

for part or all of an entire twelve-hour shift.

143. Here, cross-gender supervision of female inmates by a single male

corrections officer greatly impinged on female inmates’ constitutional rights, as it is

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not reasonably-related to any legitimate penalogical interest. In view of the

substantial and serious risks of staffing the female pod of the Jail with a lone male

corrections officer, as well as the available alternatives, e.g., putting one or more

female officers in the female pod to work alone, adding a female officer to the female

pod to work alongside male corrections officers, or using a female officer along with

heightened video surveillance), there is no valid, rational connection between the

policy, custom, or practice and a legitimate governmental interest.

144. Along with adopting and implementing such a constitutionally-deficient

policy, custom, or practice, by also failing to adopt a policy or practice geared toward

the prevention of sexual abuse on female inmates by male corrections officers,

Grainger County has – by omission – established a practice of perpetuating sexual

misconduct and violations of the bodily integrity of the female inmates at the Jail. As

a result of Grainger County’s, Sheriff Harville’s, and Jail Administrator Harville’s

"blind-eye" policy in which Officer Davis’s sexual misconduct was permitted to occur

over a period of several months, female inmates experienced repeated acts of sexual

abuse, coercion, invasions of their privacy, and a loss of dignity, safety and physical

and emotional well-being at the hands of Officer Davis, who had power and influence

authority over them.

145. By failing to adopt, maintain, or enforce policies to prevent sexual abuse

on female inmates by male corrections officers when they are in the female pod alone

supervising female inmates, Grainger County has deprived the Plaintiffs of their right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.

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 146. A governmental entity may be held liable based upon its officers’

deliberate indifference to and violation of any citizen's constitutional rights where a

custom, policy, or procedure of the municipality is found to be the proximate cause of

the constitutional violation.

147. Grainger County’s policies, customs, and practices, as described above,

allowed Officer Davis’s sexually deviant behavior to continue unabated such that it

rises to the level of deliberate indifference. By this, Grainger County's failure to stop

Officer Davis from perpetrating sexual abuse, coercion, and intimidation evolved into

its own custom, practice, or policy. By doing so, Grainger County made it perfectly

permissible for Officer Davis (or other Jail employees) to coerce or abuse female

inmates for their own sexual pleasure.

148. For all of these reasons, the County has abdicated its governmental

responsibilities to provide a safe and secure incarceration environment to inmates.

149. The customs, practices and policies set forth above directly and

proximately caused Plaintiffs’ substantial psychological and physical pain, emotional

distress, humiliation, and embarrassment, which affect and will continue to have an

effect on them well into the future.

150. Plaintiffs sue Grainger County for violating their constitutional rights,

as described above, and seek any and all damages allowable, as well as attorney’s fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, costs, and discretionary costs.

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 COUNT SIX

COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY

(Against Officer Davis, Individually)

151. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

152. Even as convicted inmates in the Jail, Plaintiffs had a reasonable

expectation of privacy.

153. Officer Davis coerced and intimidated the Plaintiffs and other female

inmates into stripping naked or demanding that they engage in sex acts with other

female inmates, as he watched and masturbated in the control room.

154. Plaintiffs did not authorize or give their consent to the unwarranted

invasion of their individual privacy.

155. Officer Davis’s intrusion into Plaintiffs’ privacy was intentional.

156. Officer Davis’s intentional intrusion into the Plaintiffs’ privacy was

severe and highly insulting, as the average person would find the exposure of their

naked8bodies to be extraordinarily offensive. The scope of the exposure was

substantially heightened when the Plaintiffs and other inmates were forced to have

sex with other female inmates, as Officer Davis watched and masturbated, and as

other inmates observed as well.

157. Officer Davis’s intentional intrusion on Plaintiffs’ privacy rights would

cause a person of ordinary sensibilities to suffer mentally, to be shamed, and to be

humiliated.

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 158. Plaintiffs were outraged and suffered mental suffering, shame, and

humiliation, entitling Plaintiffs to an award of compensatory and punitive damages.

COUNT SEVEN

NEGLIGENCE

(Against Grainger County, Sheriff Harville, Individually,

Jail Administrator Harville, Individually, and Officers Davis
and Dalton, Individually)

159. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

160. Defendants owed a duty to the Plaintiffs to use due care in fulfilling their

duties and to ensure their conduct conformed to applicable laws, policies, procedures,

and generally accepted law enforcement standards. Defendants had a duty to

Plaintiffs to act with ordinary care and prudence so as not to cause Plaintiffs harm or

injury.

161. The County has a statutory and constitutional duty to maintain the Jail

to secure the safe custody, health, and comfort of inmates housed therein. Tenn. Code

Ann. §§ 5-7-104 and 106. Sheriff Harville and Jail Administrator Harville were also

obligated by law – and had the requisite authority – to protect persons confined to the

Jail.

162. The County is legally liable for the non-negligent acts or failures to act

of County deputies under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302, including instances of gross

negligence. It is also liable for the negligence of persons it employs, including Sheriff

Harville, Jail Administrator Harville, Officers Dalton and Davis, and any other

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employee at the Jail under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205.

163. Sheriff Harville is responsible for the acts and omissions of corrections

officers, including their performance or failure to perform the tasks and duties that

he is statutorily obligated to perform. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4-101.

164. As described above, Defendants breached their duties of due care and

were negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, willful, and wanton in all of the foregoing

particulars.

The County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator Harville

165. Grainger County had a duty to act with reasonable care in regard to the

exercise of its duties as operator of a correctional facility and in the treatment of

Plaintiffs as female inmates in its care, custody, and control. Grainger County also

had a duty to act with reasonable care in regard to the exercise of Officer Davis’s

duties as a corrections officer and to observe and monitor the Plaintiffs while they

were incarcerated.

166. By neglecting its duties to observe and monitor Plaintiffs and its

employee, Officer Davis, Grainger County directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs

to suffer serious and humiliating injuries.

167. The County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator Harville were on

notice that cross-gender supervision of inmates at the Jail’s female pod by a single

male corrections officer put Plaintiffs and other female inmates at a serious and

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substantial risk of sexual abuse, coercion, or intimidation. Yet, they made no changes

to Jail policies to require that female corrections officers be added or video

surveillance be used to supervise female inmates.

168. The County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail Administrator Harville also had

actual or constructive knowledge that Officer Davis was using his position of authority

as a corrections officer to oppress, sexually abuse, coerce, or intimidate Plaintiffs and

other inmates he supervised in the female pod.

169. First, Officer Davis’s sexual misconduct was not a secret within the Jail,

as most of the inmates in the female pod either participated in Officer Davis’s “forced

sex shows” or witnessed them by either watching and listening to the shows or by

listening to Officer Davis as he directed the shows. It is, therefore, likely that other

corrections officers, as well as Jail officials, were aware of the abuse.

170. Second, Plaintiffs complained about Officer Davis’s sexual misconduct

to other corrections officers, including Officer Dalton. If Officer Dalton was properly

trained and supervised by Jail officials, he would likely have informed them about the

Plaintiffs’ complaint.

171. Third, Plaintiffs also made multiple requests to be moved to another cell

to get away from Officer Davis’s line-of-sight as he worked in the Jail’s control room.

Those requests were made on the Jail’s administrative system to Jail Administrator

Harville, who initially mocked the request before denying it.

172. As a result of all this, the County, Sheriff Harville, and Jail

Administrator Harville breached their duties to Plaintiffs and other female inmates

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to observe, monitor, and/or protect them and keep them safe, particularly from

corrections officers designated to watch over and supervise them. By their actions or

omissions, Plaintiffs and other female inmates were put at serious risk of sexual

abuse.

Officer Dalton

173. For his part, Officer Dalton was informed by Plaintiffs about Officer

Davis’s sexual misconduct, but appears to have done nothing about it. If he did, Jail

officials ignored the complaint, at least until April 24, 2021, when Officer Davis was

terminated.

174. On information and belief, Officer Dalton knew, based upon his exposure

to female inmates who were privy to the “sex shows,” that Plaintiffs and other female

inmates were at risk of being sexually abused by Officer Davis.

175. By the foregoing acts or omissions, Officer Dalton breached his duty to

monitor or protect the Plaintiffs and other inmates.

Officer Davis

176. Officer Davis was grossly derelict in his official duties by endangering

and injuring the Plaintiffs and other female inmates by his ongoing sexual abuse,

coercion, and intimidation.

177. By acting and failing to act, the County, Sheriff Harville, Jail

Administrator Harville, and Officers Dalton and Davis breached their duties to protect

Plaintiffs and other female inmates, and/or acted in reckless disregard of the

foreseeable risk that they would be sexually abused.

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 178. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conduct, as alleged

above, and other undiscovered negligent conduct, Plaintiffs and other female inmates

were caused to suffer severe humiliation and emotional distress, including

psychological trauma, entitling Plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages.

COUNT EIGHT

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(Against Officer Davis, Individually)

179. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are hereby

incorporated by reference, as if set forth verbatim.

180. The actions alleged above against Officer Davis were outrageous and

utterly intolerable in a civilized society, and were done with a reckless disregard of the

probability of causing emotional distress to the Plaintiffs and other female inmates.

181. Officer Davis’s conduct was perpetrated with the intent to inflict, or with

reckless disregard of the probability of inflicting, mental anguish on Plaintiffs and

other female inmates.

182. Officer Davis knew, or should have known, that his conduct would result

in serious injuries and severe emotional distress to Plaintiffs and other female

inmates, and that his conduct was perpetrated with the intent to inflict, or with

reckless disregard of the probability of inflicting, mental anguish, and severe

emotional distress upon Plaintiffs and other female inmates. Plaintiffs have suffered

nightmares, severe headaches, stress and anxiety, unwanted memories of the trauma,

avoidance of situations that bring back memories of the trauma, heightened reactions,

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depression, irritability, hyper-vigilance, exaggerated-startle response, loss of sleep,

fear of sleep, difficulty concentrating, and live their lives in fear of authority figures

and of being sexually abused.

183. The wrongful acts of Officer Davis were willful, oppressive, intentional

and malicious; therefore, punitive damages should be assessed against him in an

amount deemed sufficient to punish and deter him and others in similar positions of

authority from engaging in similar conduct in the future.

184. The aforementioned acts were done knowingly, intentionally, and

maliciously, for the purpose of oppression and inflicting injury upon Plaintiffs and

other female inmates, and in reckless, wanton and callous disregard of their safety,

security, and civil rights.

VIII. JURY DEMAND

185. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a

trial by jury of all of the claims asserted in this Complaint so triable.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray:

A. That Defendants be served with a copy of this Complaint and be required

to answer;

B. This action may proceed as a class action, with Plaintiffs as the

designated Class representatives and Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel;

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 C. That the Court find that Defendants have committed violations of the

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

the statutory and common law violations of Tennessee law, as alleged herein;

D. That Plaintiffs and the Class, which encompasses female inmates housed

in the Grainger County Jail from May 2020 until April 2022, recover compensatory

damages sustained by them in the sum of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00), as

provided by federal and Tennessee law, and that a judgment in their favor be entered

against the Defendants in an appropriate amount as shown at trial;

E. That alternatively, Plaintiffs and Class be awarded such damages as will

fully compensate them for all injuries proximately caused by Defendants’ actions and

that a judgment in their favor be entered;

F. That Plaintiffs and Class be awarded punitive damages in the sum of Ten

Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00), or such other amount sufficient to deter Defendants

from engaging in similar conduct in the future;

G. Alternatively, that the individual Plaintiffs be awarded Five-Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) each, or such damages, including compensatory and

punitive damages, as are warranted for their injuries.

H. That Plaintiffs and the Class have and recover costs for this suit,

including reasonable attorneys’ fees and discretionary costs, as provided by law; and

I. That Plaintiffs and the Class be awarded post-judgment interest as

permitted by common law or applicable statute and such other or further relief as may

be just and proper.

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 Respectfully submitted, this 12th day of April, 2022.

/s/ Lance K. Baker

Lance K. Baker, Tenn. Bar #: 032945
THE BAKER LAW FIRM
550 Main Street, Suite 600
Knoxville, TN 37902
Tel: (865) 200-4117
Fax: (865) 437-3370
lance@lbakerlawfirm.com

F. Clinton Little
109 N. Northshore Dr., Suite 401
Knoxville, TN 37919
T: 865.622.4628
F: 865.315.7086
clinton@knoxvilleattorney.law

Matthew B. Evans
Evans & Beier, LLP
818 W. 1st N. St.
Morristown, TN 37914
T: 423.587.2800
F: 423.587.2804
mbevanslaw@gmail.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

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