Pentagon Report
Pentagon Report
Evaluation Report
               1
2021 On-Site Installation Evaluation Report
                     2
Table of Contents
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................... 4
Background ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Results from Part 1 Sites ................................................................................................................................. 16
Results from Part 2 Sites ................................................................................................................................. 22
Recommendations........................................................................................................................................... 27
Appendix A: Site Selection Methodology ......................................................................................................... 31
Appendix B: Integrated Prevention Metric Development, Validation, and Scoring ............................................ 39
Appendix C: Part 1 Site-Specific Findings........................................................................................................ 58
Appendix D: Part 2 Site-Specific Findings...................................................................................................... 229
Appendix E: Acronyms List ............................................................................................................................ 311
                                                                                 3
Executive Summary
On February 26, 2021, Secretary of Defense Austin directed On-Site Installation Evaluations (OSIEs) at select
installations. OSIEs focus on an installation’s prevention capabilities and ability to effectively address risk for
sexual assault, harassment, and suicide. They were designed to provide early detection of risk factors so
leaders can take corrective actions and enhance prevention.1 OSIEs aim to provide insights on risk and
protective factors on the ground, what works, what does not, how the Department can improve efforts more
comprehensively, and support efforts to implement the approved recommendations of the Independent Review
Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC). An additional purpose of the inaugural OSIEs was to pilot
a process and metrics to establish an enduring installation evaluation capability that can be replicated in
subsequent evaluations.
Methods:
Based on the results from a force-wide climate survey in 2021, 20 sites with high risk or protective percentile
scores were selected for OSIEs. Of these, 13 OSIEs were completed July through September 2021 (hereafter
referred to as Part 1). Seven site visits were delayed due to mission requirements of the units of interest and
were subsequently completed November 2021 through January 2022 (hereafter referred to as Part 2). Within
each installation, the units with the highest risk or protective percentile scores on the installation were
evaluated, in addition to the helping agencies2 and prevention personnel that supported these units.
On-site evaluations verified installation self-assessed compliance with sexual assault, sexual harassment, and
integrated violence prevention policy and prevention best practice. In addition, evaluations assessed
prevention capabilities of installations and units of interest.
This report summarizes findings and recommendations for the 20 sites that completed OSIEs:
Part 1 Sites:
       Army Reserve Center, Fraser, MI
       Dyess Air Force Base
       Fort Bliss
       Fort Custer (National Guard)
       Fort Polk
       Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
       Laughlin Air Force Base
       Naval Station Norfolk
       Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs
       Marine Corps Air Station Miramar
       Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
       Marine Corps Base Hawaii
       Vandenberg Space Force Base
Part 2 Sites:
       Kentucky National Guard
       Naval Station Rota, Spain
       U.S. Army Garrison Ansbach (Urlas Training Area), Germany
1 As used in this report, the term “leaders” is defined by DoDI 6400.09: “A Service member or DoD civilian personnel in a
professional position of leadership.
2 As used in this report, the term “helping agencies” refers to agencies responsive to needs of the military community.
                                                            4
      U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer), Germany
      U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks), Germany
      U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Kaiserslautern), Germany
      U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne), Germany
Part 1 Findings:
OSIE teams identified unique needs and strengths at Part 1 OSIE sites; however, sites had common gaps in
prevention capabilities and compliance, which culminated in the following findings:
      At the ground level, there is a pervasive misunderstanding of what prevention is, how to do it, and what
       it takes to do it well. The lack of understanding manifests itself distinctly and at different levels.
      Self-assessment is an invalid method to assess prevention capabilities until prevention competence
       increases among prevention personnel and leaders at the command and installation level.
      Policy compliance does not necessarily translate into policy and program effectiveness.
      Assessments of prevention capabilities found deficiencies across all sites and all assessed areas, with
       the most significant gaps in prioritization and quality implementation of prevention efforts.
      Although leaders have a genuine desire to prevent harmful behaviors, they are not accurately
       identifying and addressing the needs of the most at-risk groups or accurately perceiving the level of
       support they are providing for violence prevention.
      Integrated prevention and coordinated services are needed.
Part 2 Findings:
Of the 20 OSIEs, Part 2 sites evidenced the most positive climate (Kentucky National Guard) and the most
areas of concern (U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites and Naval Station Rota). For example, at Kentucky
National Guard, OSIE teams found a cohesive environment, motivation to improve prevention, and a positive
work environment. Soldier wellbeing was found to be a part of the mission. As a result, the following findings
and recommendations are site-specific:
      At Naval Station Rota, OSIE teams found that mission requirements were prioritized above and at the
       expense of the Sailors’ wellbeing. This finding was consistently reported across personnel, settings,
       and helping agencies.
      At Naval Station Rota and U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites, OSIE teams found that the
       geographically dispersed leadership and support services created challenges for leadership
       accountability and access to resources.
      A primary focus of the OSIEs was on the prevention capabilities of the sites. In assessing these
       capabilities, teams found that the climate of the organization served as an inhibitor or enabler for
       prevention of sexual assault, harassment, and suicide.
Characteristics of Promising Sites:
OSIEs assessed two installations with high protective percentile scores, as well as units with high protective
percentile scores that were located in two installations with overall high risk percentile scores. Through these
assessments, OSIE teams identified the following characteristics that distinguished promising sites:
      Accurate Understanding
           Leaders accurately perceived the needs of the most at-risk Service members.
           Service members believed their leaders understood and were concerned about their needs,
              such as challenges with childcare and housing.
      Transparency
                                                        5
            Prevention personnel and leaders self-identified gaps in prevention capabilities and policy
             compliance.
      Shared Values
           Leaders throughout the chain of command communicated and reinforced that Service members’
             wellbeing was part of the mission.
Recommendations:
OSIE recommendations for Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OSD) and
the Military Departments and Services support policy improvement. Recommendations for these OSIE sites
are offered to address identified gaps in compliance and prevention capabilities. Of note, OSIE findings
underscore many of the approved recommendations of the Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual
Assault in the Military. Therefore, continuing to implement approved IRC recommendations in many cases will
address OSIE findings. Additionally, findings will allow the Department to tailor the tools and resources being
implemented. Pertinent IRC recommendations are not restated.
Recommendations for Part 1 are:
      OSD should revise and develop policies that support a dedicated primary prevention workforce and
       institutionalize OSIEs to ensure enterprise-wide policy compliance and program evaluation.
      The Military Departments and the National Guard Bureau in coordination with the Departments of the
       Army and Air Force, should issue prevention policies and conduct reassessments of OSIE compliance.
      Installation leaders at Part 1 OSIE sites should:
            Enhance authentic engagement and responsiveness to military community’s needs by
                establishing a data-sharing forum to share prevention-related data across the military
                community.
            Reinforce healthy climates by establishing methods to incentivize behaviors that contribute to a
                healthy climate; hold subordinate leaders appropriately accountable for behaviors that do not.
            Define local prevention system though local policy, instruction, or order, to establish clear roles,
                resourcing, expectations for collaboration, and training for prevention personnel and leaders.
            Enhance military community engagement and help-seeking by developing a plan to identify and
                address Service member and DoD civilian employee resistance to violence prevention efforts
                and/or challenges accessing support.
Recommendations for Part 2 are:
      OSD should address gaps in support to Service members and guidance to commands/units following
       suicide attempts or ideation. A gap in enterprise-wide guidance and supporting resources exists
       regarding how to support a Service member after a suicide attempt or ideation. This lack of guidance
       and resources may be exacerbated in OCONUS and remote locations.
      OSD should conduct follow-up visits to selected sites in U.S. Army Garrison Germany to assess
       implementation of approved recommendations and identified areas of concern.
      U.S. Army Garrison Germany should improve harassment prevention and response and define the
       local prevention system though local policy, instruction, or order, to establish clear roles, resourcing,
       expectations for collaboration, and training for prevention personnel and leaders.
      Department of Navy (DON) should improve communication and reassess resourcing and requirements
       for the destroyer squadron supporting Naval Station Rota and make adjustments that enable the ships
       to prioritize the Sailors’ wellbeing both at sea and in port.
OSD will track execution of implementation and report progress in quarterly climate reports.
                                                       6
Background
After a decade of steady progress in addressing sexual assault in the military, Department of Defense (DoD)
data over the past two years highlighted persistent challenges across areas of violence and climate throughout
the force. In response to these data, DoD promulgated significant changes in prevention strategies. The Report
of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee3 highlighted the importance of these updated strategies and
underscored the need to assess the whole military community across harmful behaviors such as substance
use, domestic abuse, and suicide, rather than assessing sexual assault and harassment in isolation. The
report’s findings, subsequently reinforced by the work of the Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual
Assault in the Military, highlighted five points of failure that warranted Department-wide action.
As outlined in Figure 1, these findings included the Department’s lack of:
       Visibility of policy compliance and program implementation at the local level, which impedes
        comprehensive oversight;
       Priority for early detection of risk, which keeps the Department in a reactive stance towards
        interpersonal and self-directed violence;
       Leaders and prevention personnel who understand prevention and as a result are prepared to
        proactively address climate factors that give rise to violence;
       Effective implementation of prevention activities that meaningfully engage the military community; and
       A feedback mechanism to improve policies and programs based on lessons learned and best practices
        at the ground level.
To remedy these oversight issues and ensure a broad base understanding and compliance with Department
policies, on February 26, 2021, Secretary of Defense Austin directed three immediate actions to address
sexual assault and harassment in the military. These actions address the points of failure highlighted by the
Fort Hood report, function in concert with the approved IRC recommendations, and provide the Department a
springboard to close the gap between Departmental policy and execution on the ground.
3Fort Hood Independent Review Committee. (2020). Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.
https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf
                                                         7
These actions included a broad policy compliance check, the assessment and development of prevention
capabilities at each installation, and an effort to enhance the Department’s command climate efforts. This last
requirement included the use of a redesigned command climate survey (Defense Organizational Climate
Survey 5.0 [DEOCS]), with specific metrics to gauge risk and protective factors aligned with healthy/unhealthy
climates, which will be used to inform quarterly command climate updates to leadership and On-Site
Installation Evaluations (OSIEs) at select installations.
OSIEs and quarterly command climate reporting are designed to provide early detection of risk factors so
leaders can take corrective actions and enhance prevention. OSIEs aim to provide insights on risk and
protective factors on the ground, what works, what does not, and how the DoD can improve efforts more
comprehensively. OSIEs focus on an installation’s prevention capabilities and the ability to effectively address
risk for sexual assault, harassment, and suicide.
In 2021, 20 sites were selected for OSIEs. Of these, 13 OSIEs were completed July through September 2021
(hereafter referred to as Part 1). Seven site visits were delayed due to mission requirements (e.g., support of
Afghan refugees) and subsequently completed November 2021 through January 2022 (hereafter referred to as
Part 2). Within each installation, the units with the highest risk or protective factor scores on the installation
were evaluated, in addition to the helping agencies and prevention personnel that supported these units.
Based on findings from the OSIEs, this report will provide an overview of the methodology used for site
selection and on-site evaluation, a summary of findings, and recommendations. As outlined in the OSIE
Framework, OSIEs also function as a feedback loop to improve Department-level policies and programs based
on findings on the ground. Therefore, some actions will be unique to each installation assessed and some will
support policy improvements at the DoD, Military Department, and Service levels.
Methodology
 The focus of the OSIEs is on integrated, primary prevention for the military community. These
 definitions guided the methods used to identify sites and develop metrics.
 Primary           Stopping harmful acts before they occur. Can be implemented for an entire group or
 Prevention        population without regard to risk (universal primary prevention) or can be implemented for
                   individuals, groups, or a population that is at risk (selected primary prevention).
                   Primary prevention activities can target:
                   1. Influencers, such as leaders who set a climate and shape norms, but may not be
                   present when harmful acts occur;
                                                        8
                    2. Bystanders, who may be present when harmful acts occur;
                    3. Individuals, who may commit harmful acts; or,
                    4. Individuals who may be affected by harmful acts.
    Integrated      Taking action to decrease harmful behaviors and lessen the chances of these behaviors
    Prevention      negatively impacting readiness and retention in a way that:
                    1. Incorporates values of inclusivity, connectedness, dignity and respect (access, equity,
                        rights, and participation)—including the elevation of service member and family
                        member voice—to inform plans, processes, and trainings;
                    2. Recognizes and adjusts plans, processes, and trainings to consider and be responsive
                        to climate issues and populations that have been disproportionately impacted by
                        harmful acts;
                    3. Intentionally seeks to align and find common operating principles across prevention
                        efforts and offices (e.g., equal opportunity, suicide, sexual assault); and,
                    4. Incorporates multiple lines of effort across individual, interpersonal, organizational
                        ecological levels.
    Military        All individuals (e.g., Service members, DoD civilian employees, dependents) who live and
    Community       work together in the same geographic area, such as a DoD installation.
                    Military community exists based on relationships and the potential to interact with one
                    another regardless of Service affiliation and chain of command.
The goal of this first round of OSIEs was to pilot a process and metrics to establish an enduring installation
evaluation capability that can be replicated in subsequent evaluations conducted by the OSD. Thus, there were
two parts to this effort: site identification and on-site evaluation.
4 In a February 2018 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) memorandum, the Office of
People Analytics (OPA), Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA) was charged to revitalize and modernize the
DEOCS. The redesign included three action areas; 1) build a new survey administration system; 2) redesign the survey
content; and 3) build a unit commander dashboard for displaying DEOCS results. OPA employed a data-driven process to
redesign the DEOCS, guided by the understanding that DEOCS should serve as a tool for commanders to provide reliable
and actionable information on risk and protective factors that allow them to take immediate steps to improve the climate in
their unit. The updated DEOCS 5.0 launched on January 4, 2021 and measures 19 risk and protective factors.
                                                            9
                                 Table 1: Risk and Protective Factors from DEOCS 5.0
In total, 962,194 respondents across 10,032 units and 1,367 installations completed DEOCS from January
through June 2021. To assess the climate of military communities, using DEOCS data collected at the unit
level, OSD analysts aggregated to the installation level using mapping provided by the Services. OSD then
categorized installations within Service branch according to their protective percentile score and risk percentile
score. Using these protective and risk percentile scores, OSD identified military installations that were outliers
in terms of risk and protective factors for further evaluation.
For the 2021 OSIEs, OSD selected 18 sites with high risk percentile scores and two sites with high protective
percentile scores. Reserve Component sites were overrepresented among locations with high protective
percentile scores, so two promising and one high risk Reserve Component sites were selected for OSIEs.
For Active Component sites, OSD selected the three installations with the highest risk percentile scores for
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Because the Space Force is a small Service and installations had
moderate, but not high, risk percentiles, one Space Force installation was selected for participation. In two
cases (Navy and Air Force) one of the top three installations selected for site visits had COVID-related travel
restrictions that prevented OSIEs from being conducted. In those cases, the information was shared with the
Military Service to determine what additional action was needed. OSD then selected four additional
installations for site visits that were in the highest percentiles for the Total Force.
The following 13 sites were evaluated July through September 2021 and are included as Part 1:
      Army Reserve Center, Fraser, MI
      Dyess Air Force Base
      Fort Bliss
      Fort Custer (National Guard)
      Fort Polk
      Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
      Laughlin Air Force Base
      Naval Station Norfolk
      Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs
                                                         10
      Marine Corps Air Station Miramar
      Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
      Marine Corps Base Hawaii
      Vandenberg Space Force Base
Due to operational requirements of the units of interest, the following seven sites were evaluated November
2021 through January 2022 and are included as Part 2:
      Kentucky National Guard
      Naval Station Rota, Spain
      US Army Garrison Ansbach (Urlas Training Area), Germany
      US Army Garrison Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer), Germany
      US Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks), Germany
      US Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Kaiserslautern), Germany
      US Army Garrison Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne), Germany
On-Site Evaluation
The purpose of the site visits was to determine, using standardized metrics, if the installation’s prevention
capabilities were ready and able to address the risk detected on the DEOCS. Where site visits determined that
the installation’s prevention capabilities were ready and able, the evaluations highlighted actions that could be
replicated elsewhere, and where the installation’s prevention capabilities were not ready and able, this report
offers recommendations for concrete actions that can be taken to strengthen prevention activities to reduce
risk and enhance protective factors.
The scope of the site visits were the units within each installation that had the highest risk or protective
percentile scores on the DEOCS as well as the helping agencies and leadership, typically at the installation
level or within a higher-level command, that supported those units’ prevention and response efforts. At large
sites, site visits assessed only a small portion of the total military community. At small sites, site visits may
have included the majority of the military community.
Each four-day OSIE was led by multi-disciplinary evaluation teams, which included an OSD O-6/GS-15 (or
higher) team lead and staff from OSD policy offices (including the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office [SAPRO], the Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion [ODEI], and the Violence Prevention Cell [VPC]),
with support from RAND personnel, who collected data for new prevention metrics.
                                                                  Team Lead
                                                                    (OSD)
                                              Compliance                       Prevention
                                              Verification                     Capability
                                                             11
Compliance Assessment Methods:
Each policy office developed and applied specific methods to assess the accuracy of the site’s self-assessed
compliance with existing policy guidance.
SAPRO assessment of DoDI 6495.02, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures” and
PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, Revisions to Monthly Case Management Group Meetings for Adult Sexual
Assault Cases, dated November 13, 2019. The purpose of the SAPRO assessment was two-fold: (1)
Determine if the responses provided in the self-assessment align with responses provided to on-site interviews
and supporting documents submitted for the requests for information; (2) Determine policy compliance with
Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response policies and memos (DoDI 6495.02 Vol 1
and USD(P&R) Memorandum, Revisions to Monthly Case Management Group Meetings for Adult Sexual
Assault Cases). There were four categories of alignment and compliance:
      Victim Assistance: Encompasses activities conducted by Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
       (SAPR) personnel and the Commander aimed at ensuring the victim is aware of and has access to all
       SAPR procedures, resources, and services.
      Reporting: Ensures that Service members are aware of reporting options and that all installation
       personnel are aware that the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) or SAPR Victim Advocate
       (VA) should be notified. This includes victim preference (or declination) to participate in the prosecution
       or investigation of subject, this includes both military and civilian legal systems.
      Program/Policy: Describes general SAPR program, such as Case Management Group, confidentiality,
       retention of DD Form 2910 (Victim Reporting Preference Statement), and SARC main duties.
      Training: Ensures SAPR required training is being presented in accordance with SAPR policies,
       including retaliation/reprisal. Also responsibility to track individual attendance at required training.
To conduct the validation, self-assessment questions were sent to OSIE sites, which included questions
addressing Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs in these four categories. The self-
assessments were validated through on-site interviews and checklist/document reviews.
On-site interviews were mostly conducted face-to-face, while stakeholders who were not on-site were
interviewed via teleconference. If no self-assessment was submitted, a validation was not performed, but there
was a review of interview questions and documents. Acceptable documentation provided demonstrative
support to responses.
Validation was determined by calculating overall and key category alignment and policy compliance by cross-
walking responses to self-assessment questions with responses to interview questions and requested
documents. Alignment was scored in the following way: 0 = No alignment, 1 = Partial alignment, and 2 =
Complete alignment. Policy compliance was validated by cross-referencing responses and requested
documents with DoDI 6495.02 and OUSD (P&R) Memorandum, "Revisions to the Monthly Case Management
Group Meetings for Adult Sexual Assault Cases", November 13, 2019. Compliance was scored in the following
way: 0 = No compliance, 1 = Partial compliance, and 2 = Full compliance. The overall average and key
category scores were computed by determining the numerical total and dividing by the number of main
questions.
ODEI assessment of sexual harassment requirements in DoDI 1020.03, “Harassment Prevention and
Response in the Armed Forces”. To develop methods for the validation of the sexual harassment requirements
in DoDI 1020.03, ODEI identified specific elements in DoDI 1020.03 for the sites to provide a self-assessment.
During the site visits, for any area on the self-assessment that was identified as non-compliant, the ODEI
representative would discuss the site’s barriers to compliance and explore possible resolutions.
                                                       12
In addition to the self-assessment, ODEI used a questionnaire during the site visits to probe further into the
elements on the self-assessment, as well as discuss other practices or procedures that the site was or was not
using. This questionnaire also explored what the site was doing for prevention activities.
To develop a compliance score, ODEI relied on the self-assessment unless during the interview something
came up that indicated their self-assessment might not be accurate. For example, if they indicated on the self-
assessment that the required trainings were occurring, but during the interview someone mentioned that they
had not been trained in five years, ODEI representatives revisited the requirement with the interviewee to
determine whether or not the requirement was met.
VPC assessment of DoDI 6400.09, “DoD Policy on Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and
Prohibited Abuse or Harm” compliance checklist and Prevention Plan of Action (PPOA) self-assessment. To
develop the methods for the validation of the Prevention Plan of Action self-assessment and the compliance
checklist for DoDI 6400.09, the VPC reviewed Military Department and National Guard Bureau submissions for
the Secretary of Defense Immediate Action 1. These reports found that most installations were not fully aligned
or in full compliance with the prevention requirements as outlined in Department guidance. The reports also
suggested that prevention self-assessment scores may be inflated. Given these findings, the VPC determined
to focus the validation effort on evaluating whether or not the prevention self-assessments were accurate
(“confidence in self-assessment”) rather than assessing compliance, as the Service reports already suggested
significant gaps in compliance.
To determine level of confidence in the prevention self-assessments, the VPC selected a sample of items from
each tool. Based on the Immediate Action 1 finding that most sites would be early in their prevention
capabilities, VPC selected items that represented foundational prevention capabilities: prevention personnel,
leadership, collaboration, quality implementation, and evaluation of prevention activities. VPC developed,
piloted, and refined interview questions to assess these areas.
During site visits, VPC representatives gathered information during interviews with prevention personnel,
leaders, and other staff. VPC representatives then completed worksheets that captured their assessment of
the validity of the site self-assessment. An independent rater from the OSD (P&R) Office of Force Resiliency
then reviewed the notes and assessment to make a final determination, identify strengths, gaps, and actions.
Integrated Prevention Assessment Methods:
OSD, in collaboration with RAND, identified nine dimensions to guide the assessment of prevention capabilities
for the OSIEs. These dimensions were identified by an analysis of the focus areas not covered by existing DoD
compliance checklists and DoD assessment tools to enforce relevant prevention policies and the OSIE
framework described in Figure 1.
OSD prioritized three domains of focus for the development of new metrics:
      Healthy & Protective Environment: Research shows that command climates can positively or
       negatively impact behaviors such as sexual assault and harassment
    Integrated Prevention: Effective prevention targets a mix of risk and protective factors that are both
       common across problem areas as well as unique to specific harmful behaviors
    Stakeholder Engagement: Outcomes can be improved when multiple stakeholders have genuine
       involvement in prevention activities
Three additional domains were added from the OSIE framework:
      Priority: Higher-level leadership sets the tone and sustains consistent focus on harmful behaviors
      Preparation: Prevention personnel and intermediate leadership are equipped with the ability, and exist
       within a structure, that incentivizes and supports addressing harmful behaviors
                                                      13
                Implementation: Approach aligns with best practices and is done well (i.e., with high quality)
Crossing the three domains from OSIE framework (columns in Figure 3) with the three aforementioned
domains (i.e., focus area) in existing compliance checklists and assessment tools (rows in Figure 3) yielded a
matrix of nine dimensions to be included in the assessment.
                                      Leaders prioritize
                       ENVIRONMENT
                       PREVENTION
                       INTEGRATED
                                      Leaders prioritize
                                                                 the resources and                  engaged in prevention
                                          engaging
                                                             requisite KSAs to engage              activities across multiple
                                        stakeholders.
                                                              stakeholders effectively.                planning stages.
                                                                  14
Other Data Sources
To provide additional context for the findings, available installation-level 2018-2020 data for each OSIE site
were compiled and are summarized in the site profiles (Appendix C and D). Specifically, these additional data
describe the location and illustrate whether the OSIE sites (selected based on their 2021 DEOCS scores) also
had been identified as high risk or promising based on other DoD data. If not previously detected, either for risk
or promise, identification for the OSIE may indicate either a new climate issue or may suggest that the DEOCS
is assessing climate issues in ways not detected by other DoD data sources. Given the focus of the OSIEs on
interpersonal and self-directed violence prevention, the following data sources were included in site profiles
(Appendix C and D), when available:
Sexual Assault Reporting Data
Reports of sexual assault are tracked by SAPRO in the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID)
and are presented for each FY and installation selected for an OSIE site visit. Notably, reports are grouped by
the location where a victim made a report, which is not necessarily the location where the incident occurred. An
alleged incident of sexual assault may have occurred elsewhere, including the civilian sector and/or prior to
entering military Service.
Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Risk Data
Using data from the 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members and administrative
personnel data, the Office of People Analytics (OPA) estimated sexual assault and sexual harassment
prevalence rates for installations and ships with more than 50 Service members, and then grouped locations
into risk categories, from lowest risk to highest risk. Using these analyses, the estimated prevalence rates of
sexual assault and sexual harassment for men and women at each OSIE site are presented.
Sexual Harassment Complaint Data
The Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (ODEI) collects data on the number of formal, informal, or
anonymous complaints of sexual harassment received at the installations of interest during the FY. Formal
complaints are submitted in writing and are determined to warrant an investigation. Informal complaints are
allegations, made either orally or in writing, that is not submitted as a formal complaint, and are resolved at the
lowest level. Anonymous complaints are allegations received by a commanding officer from an unknown or
unidentified source.
Suicide Attempts and Completion Data
Data on suicide attempts and deaths are tracked by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner and compiled by the
Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO). The number of suicide deaths are presented by calendar year, and
are grouped into installations based on the unit information of the Service member. Location reflects where the
deceased Service member’s unit is assigned and not the location of death.
Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence Case Data
To support the Family Advocacy Program, the Defense Manpower Data Center tracks data on incidents that
meet the Department of Defense definition for “domestic abuse,” which is domestic violence or a pattern of
behavior resulting in emotional/psychological abuse, economic control, and/or interference with personal liberty
that is directed toward a person who is a current or former spouse; a person with whom the abuser shares a
child in common; or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common
domicile. Incidents reported at the installations selected for OSIE site visits during the FY are included.
                                                        15
Results from Part 1 Sites
Sites Identified
The following table summarizes the sites identified by OSIEs, the risk and protective percentile score for each
installation, and the units of interest that participated in the OSIE. Units of interest are the units within the
installation that had the highest risk or protective percentile scores among units assigned to each installation.
In most cases, compliance assessments involved installation-level assets that supported the units of interest
as well as other units on the installation; whereas, the integrated prevention assessment is based primarily on
the units of interest, which likely represents the areas of greatest concern and need within the military
community.
                            Table 2: DEOCS Scores for Identified Units at Part 1 Installations
                                 Risk          Protective
    Part 1 Installations      Percentile       Percentile                          Units of Interest
                                Score            Score
 Fort Custer (National            95               8          1463d Transportation Company
 Guard)
 Naval Support Activity            94              10         Nuclear Power Training Unit
 Saratoga Springs
 Fort Polk                         93               7           B Company, 710th Brigade Support Battalion
                                                                D Company, 710th Brigade Support Battalion
                                                                A Troop, 3d Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment
                                                                B Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment
 Fort Bliss                        92               4           H Company, 501st Brigade Support Battalion
                                                                A Battery, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment
                                                                A Company, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment
                                                                153d Quartermaster Company
                                                                745th Medical Detachment (promising unit)
                                                                3d Battalion, 410th Engineer Regiment, Brigade Engineer
                                                                 Battalion (promising unit)
                                                                1st Battalion, 360th Infantry Regiment, Brigade Maneuver
                                                                 Battalion (promising unit)
 Naval Station Norfolk             84              16           USS New York
                                                                USS Gravely
                                                                USS James E. Williams
 Marine Corps Base Hawaii          80              18           Headquarters, 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division
 Joint Base Elmendorf-             77              17           B Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment
 Richardson                                                     241st Quartermaster Company
                                                                C Company, 725th Brigade Support Battalion
                                                                C Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment
 Marine Corps Air Station          77              20           Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314
 Miramar                                                        Marine Wing Support Squadron 373
 Laughlin Air Force Base           76              30           47th Security Forces Squadron
 Marine Corps Base Camp            75              22           Security Battalion
 Pendleton                                                      Combat Logistics Battalion 15, 1st Marine Logistics
                                                                 Group
                                                                15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
 Dyess Air Force Base              67              19           317th Maintenance Group
                                                                7th Maintenance Group
                                                                7th Operations Group (promising unit)
                                                            16
 Vandenberg Space Force           39             50       30th Healthcare Operations Squadron
 Base                                                     30th Comptroller Squadron
 Army Reserve, Fraser, MI          5             96       Detachment 3, EUCOM Joint Analysis Center (promising
                                                           unit)
Findings
Table 4 below provides an overview of the OSIE findings by site. Across the Part 1 OSIEs, one cross-cutting
foundational finding is reflected in the other themes.
      At the ground level, there is a pervasive misunderstanding of what prevention is, how to do it,
       and what it takes to do it well. The lack of understanding manifests itself distinctly and at different
       levels.
Leaders do not understand prevention enough to ensure that there are enough personnel and time devoted to
it. They also cannot effectively hold subordinates accountable because they do not know how prevention is
operationalized. Among personnel selecting and implementing prevention, the lack of understanding is
manifested in choice of prevention activities that are suboptimal and an absence of program evaluation.
Among the end users of prevention – the military community – Service members and DoD civilian employees
have become resistant to participating in activities because they are repetitive and unengaging. True evidence-
based prevention would not only convey better information and develop skills, but such approaches are
engaging by design.
Importantly, although some pockets of prevention capabilities were identified, the demand was greater than
these leaders and personnel could support and too few pockets of these capabilities existed to create a
collective effort that could affect change at a unit or installation level.
The following reflect additional findings related to compliance and prevention capabilities:
      Self-assessment is an invalid method to assess prevention capabilities until prevention
       competence increases among prevention personnel and leaders at the command and
       installation level.
OSIEs found an inverse association between prevention capability and self-assessed prevention compliance
and quality. At promising sites and sites that had a dedicated prevention workforce, self-ratings were
accurately low; whereas, at sites with no prevention staff, self-ratings were inaccurately high. Therefore, a key,
initial step towards building prevention capability is having personnel and leaders at the ground level equipped
and empowered to identify areas for improvement.
      Policy compliance does not necessarily translate into policy and program effectiveness.
       Although OSIEs identified many areas of compliance, assessment of prevention capabilities found
       significant gaps. The disparate findings across assessments reinforces that compliance does not
       translate into prevention effectiveness.
Taken together, compliance assessments suggest response requirements for sexual assault and sexual
harassment are largely met but prevention requirements are not. Assessing effectiveness of sexual assault
policies would go beyond compliance and evaluation of SARC and SAPR VA initial and subsequent victim
encounter competencies, and instead more holistically determine effectiveness of the system.
      Assessments of prevention capabilities found deficiencies across all sites and all assessed
       areas, with the most significant gaps in prioritization and quality implementation.
Organizational factors played a key role in implementation of prevention and response programs. High stress,
high operational tempo, limited time, and multiple vacancies were noted in several OSIE sites, which limited
                                                        17
quality implementation of prevention and response programs. In most sites, sexual assault and harassment
personnel are charged with prevention, but they have limited time and training to lead prevention efforts.
      Although leaders have a genuine desire to prevent harmful behaviors, they are not accurately
       identifying and addressing the needs of the most at-risk groups or accurately perceiving the
       level of support they are providing for violence prevention.
OSIEs found a disconnect between the understanding and priorities of leaders and the most at-risk groups
(e.g., female Service members, junior enlisted). For example, leaders underestimated the effect that
challenges with basic needs (e.g., childcare, quality housing) had on perceptions of healthy climate. Within an
at-risk site, the difference between at-risk and promising units was the unit leaders’ concern and understanding
of these needs.
OSIEs also found differences in the support leaders believed they were providing to prevention and objective
(priority metrics) and subjective (prevention personnel) assessments of that support. This was likely due to
leaders’ understanding of prevention as noted in the foundational finding.
      Integrated prevention and coordinated services are needed.
In many cases the “military community” is not defined by geographic area but by chain of command, typically in
non-deployed status; this leaves gaps and seams in sites with complex organizational structures for prevention
and response policies and programs among Service members, and DoD civilian employees who live and work
in the same community but are not in the same chain of command. This is further complicated when the
leaders who have responsibility for the installation do not have authority to influence all of it, which creates
uncoordinated and non-cohesive prevention, confusing avenues for help-seeking, and seams for response.
Similarly, a Service-centric view of climate lacks visibility when a unit from another Service negatively
influences the military community’s climate or when a unit from a Service with a healthy climate is attached to
an installation with units experiencing unhealthy climates. Even within installations with non-complex
organizational structures, stove pipes among helping agencies create confusing avenues for help-seeking and
challenge integrated prevention planning, implementation, and evaluation.
Specific characteristics of the environment (e.g., remote location, onboard ship) presented unique challenges
for help-seeking, including when local resources were not acceptable or sufficient for Service members or
there were limited alternatives, which could lead to feelings of being trapped and hopeless.
                                                      18
Table 3: OSIE Part 1 Site Findings by Area
                   19
Table 4: Part 1 Site Prevention Capability – Prioritization
                            20
Table 5: Part 1 Site Prevention Capability – Preparation
                          21
                                Table 6: Part 1 Site Prevention Capability – Effectiveness
                                  Risk          Protective
    Part 2 Installations       Percentile       Percentile                          Units of Interest
                                 Score            Score
 USAG Ansbach (Urlas               96               2          5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment
 Training Area)
                                                             22
 USAG Rheinland-Pfalz             93            14        240th Quartermaster Company
 (Smith Barracks)
 USAG Bavaria (Hohenfels-         92             7        527th Military Police Company
 Grafenwhoer)
 Naval Station Rota               91            10        USS Roosevelt
                                                          USS Porter
                                                          USS Ross
                                                          USS Arleigh Burke
 USAG Stuttgart (Panzer           86            13        554th Military Policy Company
 Kaserne)                                                 Forward Support Company, 1st Special Forces Battalion,
                                                           10th Special Forces Group
 USAG Rheinland-Pfalz             75            12        66th Transportation Company
 (Kaiserslautern)
 Kentucky National Guard          15            98        A Battery, 1st Battalion, 623d Field Artillery Regiment
 (Tompkinsville, KY)                                       (promising unit)
Findings
The OSIEs summarized in this report included units of interest at six OCONUS sites and one promising site. Of
the 20 sites visits, these sites evidenced the most positive climate (Kentucky National Guard) and the most
areas of concern (U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites and Naval Station Rota). Indicators of positive climate in
Kentucky National Guard included a cohesive environment, motivation to improve prevention, and a positive
work environment. The OSIE team observed that Soldiers came first. The Kentucky National Guard leadership
throughout the organization felt Soldier wellbeing was part of the mission, not an adjacent effort that was
secondary. Indicators of concern in Germany and Naval Station Rota included evidence that command
climates tolerated harmful behaviors and an inability to access resources due to mission requirements or
geographic dispersion of services.
      Mission at the expense of people. At Naval Station Rota, OSIE teams found that mission
       requirements were prioritized above and at the expense of the Sailors’ wellbeing. This finding was
       consistently reported across personnel, settings, and helping agencies. Sailors reported experiencing
       bullying, mental health issues, sexual harassment, and relationship problems for which they could not
       seek help due to mission requirements.
Given climate challenges observed during the initial Naval Station Rota OSIE, OSD suggested the Navy
conduct a follow-on visit. Within two weeks of this suggestion, a Navy team, led by a Flag Officer, was on-site
to better understand the identified challenges. To ensure transparency and accountability, the Navy requested
participation from the Department of Navy and OSD subject matter experts.
Navy’s two follow-on visits resulted in recommendations to address training, manpower, accountability, and
resourcing concerns. Department of Navy leadership provided additional recommendations aimed at
developing leaders with the needed skills for fostering healthy climates and cultures.
Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy recently visited Naval Station Rota and held roundtable discussions with
Sailors and Marines afloat and ashore to gain further insight into the challenges facing Forward Deployed
Naval Forces. The biggest threat factor is an extremely high operational tempo that must be addressed with
additional capacity in theater.
OSD also identified problems upstream that were contributing to the problems on the ships. Specifically, site
visitors found an imbalance between what leaders are requiring and what support they are providing and
resourcing. The ships were responding to this imbalance in different ways as identified by the site visit teams.
This issue was exacerbated by poor communication between the destroyer squadron and the ships. As a
                                                       23
result, the OSIE teams directed its recommendations to Department of Navy and the destroyer squadron rather
than to Naval Station Rota and the units of interest.
      Remote location challenges accountability and access to resources. At Naval Station Rota and
       the U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites, OSIE teams found that the geographically dispersed leadership
       and support services created challenges for appropriate leadership accountability and access to
       resources.
In many cases, Service members reported individuals who were contributing to toxic climates and harassment;
but, these leaders were not held appropriately accountable for their actions and in some cases were promoted.
In U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites, OSIE teams found that this resulted in localized harassment, particularly
of the most at-risk Service members; however, these Soldiers had few options to seek help due to their
geographical isolation and lack of immediate oversight of these problematic leaders. In other U.S. Army
Garrison Germany sites, the lack of resources led to suboptimal suicide prevention practices that may have
been perceived as a last resort to keep Soldiers safe but created substantial distress to the unit who observed
and endured these practices. As a result of these findings, OSD requested a follow-up visit, in partnership with
Department of Army, to Ansbach, Bavaria, and Stuttgart to assess implementation of the OSIE
recommendations and reassess areas of concern.
      Climate as an enabler or inhibitor of prevention capabilities. A primary focus of the OSIEs was on
       the prevention capabilities of the sites. In assessing these capabilities, teams found that the climate of
       the organization served as an inhibitor or enabler for prevention of sexual assault, harassment, and
       suicide.
As in the first 13 OSIEs, prevention capabilities in the 7 additional sites were assessed to be low, with multiple
areas for improvement and growth. The positive workplace climate, motivation for prevention, and spirit of
innovation identified at the Kentucky National Guard suggested the organization was ready and willing to make
changes to improve prevention efforts. The unhealthy climate at Naval Station Rota and across U.S. Army
Garrison Germany sites suggested even with additional prevention supports, forward movement would be
limited without also addressing the climate in which the health and wellbeing of the Sailors and Soldiers was
not prioritized.
                                                       24
       Table 8: OSIE Part 2 Site Findings by Area
                            25
                               Table 10: Part 2 Site Prevention Capability – Preparation
                                                          26
      Accurate Understanding: Leaders accurately perceived the needs of the most at-risk Service members.
       Service members believed their leaders understood and were concerned about their needs, such as
       challenges with childcare and housing.
      Transparency: Prevention personnel and leaders self-identified gaps in prevention capabilities and
       policy compliance.
      Shared Values: Leaders throughout the chain of command communicated and reinforced that Service
       members’ wellbeing was part of the mission.
In addition to these characteristics, OSIE teams identified some early, but promising practices (e.g., Operation
Iron Clad at Fort Bliss), pockets of prevention expertise, and many collaborative forums that could be
leveraged to build prevention capabilities. Where possible, these promising efforts are highlighted in the site
profiles in Appendix C and D.
Lessons Learned
In addition to these key findings, the following lessons learned will be incorporated into future site visits. The
Department has taken action in each of these areas.
      More preparation time for the selected sites (optimally six to eight weeks) and support from the Military
       Department, Service, or National Guard Bureau for logistics, such as a Service liaison (not from the
       office or program being evaluated) serving on the OSIE team, would have enhanced the quality of the
       data collected and decreased the disruption that the site visits created.
      The volume of requested information was overwhelming to many sites, took a substantial amount of
       time to collect, and in some cases did not contribute meaningfully to the assessment.
      Refining climate assessments by establishing benchmarks for the DEOCS, re-assessing factor scoring,
       and using multiple data sources to identify sites will enhance confidence that identified sites are truly
       hot spots and bright spots that require evaluation.
      DoD environment is fluid and requires agile prevention and oversight methods that can function
       optimally in this environment.
      On-site assessment of sexual assault and sexual harassment policy and program effectiveness is
       needed.
      OSD must outline the full OSIE process and feedback mechanisms. As part of the pilot process, OSD
       identified multiple areas in the process that could be strengthened with additional guidance. In
       particular, communication and coordination around critical issues identified, follow-on visits, and the
       feedback loop to senior leaders for recommended actions and findings.
      OSIEs require on-site assessment. Due to the rising COVID rates in the U.S. and Europe in January
       2022 and the potential impact to the health of the sites and site visitors, as well as the associated
       logistical challenges (e.g., OSIE teams would require COVID testing every 72 hours while in Germany),
       OSD leaders decided to conduct a virtual pilot of the OSIEs with Germany sites. While the teams
       collected important information, they faced substantial technological challenges, lacked the opportunity
       to experience and assess the context and setting of the sites directly, and believed the level of candor
       of the focus group attendees was thwarted due to the virtual format.
Recommendations
The 2021 OSIEs assessed three points of failure in the OSIE Framework (Figure 1) – priority, preparation,
and implementation. The OSIE Framework also highlights the need for findings on the ground to lead to
improvements in data, policy, and programs at the strategic levels of the Department. As such, OSIE
                                                         27
recommendations for OSD and the Military Departments and Services support policy improvement and
address identified gaps in compliance, priority, preparation, and implementation.
It is critical to note that OSIE findings underscore approved IRC recommendations (e.g., establishing a
dedicated prevention workforce, leadership competencies, tools to get pulse of climate between DEOCS, no
wrong door, enhanced SARC/SAPR VA competencies, and response system improvements). As such,
continuing to implement approved IRC recommendations in many cases will address OSIE findings. For
parsimony, this report does not restate IRC recommendations pertinent to OSIE findings. The recommended
action for OSIE site-specific findings are outlined in Appendix C and D.
For OSD:
      Revise and develop policies to support a dedicated primary prevention workforce. Dedicated
       prevention professionals will continue to work with all violence prevention stakeholders, but should be
       empowered and equipped through policy to lead these efforts for the entire military community. To
       support implementation of approved IRC recommendations 2.1 and 2.2, the Prevention Collaboration
       Forum should develop policy that outlines roles, responsibilities, and competencies for prevention
       personnel and leaders. Newly developed policy should underscore that the dedicated primary
       prevention workforce plans, coordinates, and evaluates prevention efforts for the entire military
       community (e.g., Service members, DoD civilians, dependents) as all contribute to an organization’s
       climate.
      Institutionalize OSIEs. OSIEs provided OSD visibility of program and policy compliance and quality.
       OSD should conduct OSIEs on a biennial basis using the updated OSIE dashboard to guide site
       selection. USD(P&R) should develop OSIE guidance with standardized metrics and preparation for site
       visitors so methods can be replicated across site visits. OSIE guidance should incorporate lessons
       learned from this pilot, measures of accountability to track and evaluate implementation of OSIE
       recommendations, and processes to coordinate with and not duplicate other oversight efforts such as
       compliance inspections.
      OSD should address gaps in support to Service members and guidance to commands/units
       following suicide attempts or ideation. A gap in enterprise-wide guidance and supporting resources
       exists regarding how to support a Service member after a suicide attempt or ideation. This lack of
       guidance and resources may be exacerbated in OCONUS and remote locations.
      OSD should conduct follow-up visits to assess implementation of recommendations: No later
       than Fall 2022, in collaboration with Department of Army, the OSIE team should assess implementation
       and impact of recommendations to address areas of concern in U.S. Army Garrison Germany sites.
                                                      28
     Enhance authentic engagement and responsiveness to military community’s needs. The
      cornerstone of an integrated approach is a comprehensive prevention plan executed and evaluated by
      leaders and prevention stakeholders. As an initial step towards this plan, establish a data-sharing
      forum, such as a new or existing working group, to share prevention-related data across the military
      community.
          o The forum should establish methods to understand the needs of the military community, to
               include the perspectives of specific at-risk groups (e.g., female Service members, junior
               enlisted, junior leaders) and their needs (e.g., childcare, housing).
          o The forum should develop processes to share data among DoD agencies providing support to
               at-risk groups, host and tenant organizations, losing/gaining units in deployed status, and other
               DoD organizations to enhance leaders’ visibility of climate issues to enable proactive action and
               prevention planning.
          o Leaders should reinforce and hold subordinates and relevant DoD agencies accountable for
               communication, collaboration, and sharing prevention-related data and information.
     Reinforce healthy climates. Establish methods to incentivize behaviors that contribute to a healthy
      climate (e.g., regularly checking in with Service members about stress and basic needs) and hold
      subordinate leaders appropriately accountable for behaviors that do not contribute to a healthy climate.
      Develop a plan that documents the methods and how they will be tracked and evaluated (e.g.,
      incorporated into performance evaluation feedback sessions).
     Define the local prevention system. Though local policy, instruction, or order, establish clear roles,
      resourcing, expectations for collaboration, and training for prevention personnel and leaders as it
      pertains to primary prevention of interpersonal and self-directed violence. This effort should be inclusive
      of the military community and may require coordination and collaboration across different commands or
      Services.
     Enhance military community engagement and help-seeking. Develop a plan to identify and address
      Service member and DoD civilian employee resistance to violence prevention efforts and/or challenges
      accessing support.
     Address compliance deficiencies. Address sexual assault and harassment compliance gaps
      identified and report back on what actions were taken.
                                                      29
      DON should align resourcing and requirements for Naval Station Rota: DON should reassess
       resourcing and requirements for the destroyer squadron supporting Naval Station Rota and make
       adjustments that enable the ships to prioritize the Sailors’ wellbeing both at sea and in port.
      DON should improve communication for Naval Station Rota: DON should identify, pilot, and
       evaluate a leadership initiative to improve communication between the destroyer squadron supporting
       Naval Station Rota and the subordinate commands. Plans should also be developed to increase
       communication between the destroyer squadron and Naval Station Rota leadership to ensure best
       access to prevention personnel and services.
      Address compliance deficiencies. Address sexual assault and harassment compliance gaps
       identified and report back on what actions were taken.
USD(P&R) will track execution of implementation and report progress in the quarterly climate reports to the
Deputy’s Workforce Council.
                                                      30
Appendix A: Site Selection Methodology
Background
Secretary of Defense Austin issued the Memorandum, “Immediate Actions to Counter Sexual Assault and
Harassment and the Establishment of a 90-Day Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
Military,” February 26, 2021, which directed immediate actions to address sexual assault and harassment.
Immediate Action 2 directed the USD(P&R) to conduct on-site installation evaluations and to provide quarterly
command climate updates.
To support identification of installations for the 2021 evaluations, USD(P&R) directed a force-wide Defense
Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) to be completed by June 2021. The DEOCS was selected as the
primary data source for the 2021 installation evaluations because it serves as the most timely and sensitive
Department of Defense (DoD)-wide measure of command climate and because other relevant data, such as
the Workplace Gender Relations Surveys and Status of Forces Surveys, were delayed due to COVID, which
precluded timely data from those data sources being included in the 2021 OSIE.
DEOCS 5.0 is comprised of 19 factors, nine of which depict risk factors and 10 of which depict protective
factors for readiness detracting behaviors, such as sexual assault, harassment, and suicide. However, for the
purposes of this analysis, transformational leadership ratings, passive leadership ratings, and toxic leadership
ratings are treated as separate factors for the unit/organization leader, commander, and the Senior Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO), if applicable. As a result, this analysis includes 22 total factors5: 11 risk and 11
protective (see page 6).
Data Transfer
All DEOCS data files are produced through an automated process. Each time data files are transferred to other
systems, files are validated by confirming that record counts match; in addition, individual values are compared
to the original file for select number of registrations. All variables are verified to ensure they are transferred
properly and contain valid values.
Data Ingestion and Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
The Department ingested DEOCS 5.0 data into Advana across four data file transfers: January-March data
was comprised of 237,104 survey respondents, April data was comprised of 482,745 respondents, May-June
8th data was comprised of 211,794 respondents, and June 9-30th was comprised of 30,551 respondents. In
total, the Department received DEOCS 5.0 surveys from 962,194 respondents across 10,032 units and 1,367
installations. Table A1 shows the total survey counts by component and Service branch.
Table A1: DEOCS 5.0 Survey Respondents, by Component and Branch, January-June 2021
5 As of May 2021, Workplace Hostility factor scores have been removed from unit/organization reports while the DEOCS
team evaluates the most appropriate method to report results for this factor. Therefore, to align with unit/organization
reports, this factor score has also been removed from the OSIE dashboard. However, this factor score is still included in
the computation of Installation Risk Percentile Scores to ensure all DEOCS risk factors contribute to the composite metric.
                                                            31
          Marine Corps                                        88,051                     16,783                 104,834
          National Guard                                           --                   151,053                 151,053
          Space Force                                          2,730                         --                   2,730
          Coast Guard                                          9,670                       246                    9,916
          Joint Service                                            --                        --                  17,601
          DoD                                                      --                        --                  55,247
          Total                                              637,775                    245,062                 962,194
          Note: Active Duty and Reserve counts may not sum to Total.
Matching Units with Installations. Using data collected from the Services and Department-level unit and
property databases, the Department matched 9,243 out of 10,032 units with their respective installations for a
match rate of 92%.
Installations for On-Site Evaluation
The Department employed a multi-measure approach in identifying military installations that are outliers in
terms of risk and protective factors. The identified locations were selected for an on-site evaluation (methods
for selecting the on-site installations are described on page 11 above).
Installation Protective and Risk Percentile Scores. Using DEOCS 5.0 data collected at the unit level, the
Department aggregated to the installation level using mappings provided by the Services. The Department
then categorized installations within each Service according to their Protective Percentile Score and Risk
Percentile Score.6 This was useful for reducing the total number of installations in each Service into more
manageable groupings for closer inspection.
Computing Percentile Scores. The Department calculated Protective and Risk Percentile Scores in four
steps. To help illustrate this computational process, Table A2 presents an example of anonymized Installation
X with survey results from the 399 respondents across five units (three Army and two Air Force).
                                                                                                   Number of
                      Unit Name                 Component                   Service
                                                                                                  Respondents
             Unit A                                 Active                  Air Force                   189
             Unit B                                 Active                  Air Force                   105
             Unit C                                Reserve                   Army                        57
             Unit D                                Reserve                   Army                        27
             Unit E                                Reserve                   Army                        21
Total 399
6Protective and Risk Percentile Scores were strongly negatively correlated across installations (r = -0.85). This result was
expected given that higher Protective Percentile Scores correspond to more positive outcomes and less negative
outcomes, and lower Risk Percentile Scores correspond to less positive outcomes and more negative outcomes.
                                                                       32
Step 1: The Department computed an average unit score for each factor, ranging from -1 to 1, by weighting
the proportion of responses in each category. Specifically, each negative category for a protective factor is
assigned a value of -1 (e.g., non-cohesive organization, low connectedness, etc.), each neutral category is
assigned a value of 0 (e.g., neutral, moderate, etc.), and each positive category is assigned a value of 1 (e.g.,
cohesive organization, high connectedness, etc.). For risk factor scores, the Department uses the opposite
coding structure: each negative category is assigned a value of 1 (e.g., frequent binge drinking, passive NCO
leadership etc.), each neutral category is assigned a value of 0 (e.g., some binge drinking, neutral, etc.), and
each positive category is assigned a value of -1 (e.g., no binge drinking, non-passive leadership, etc.).7
Installation X (Example): One hundred eighty-nine respondents completed the survey in Unit A, the most of
any of the five units at Installation X. For the factor Cohesion, this unit had a non-cohesive score of 12.2%, a
neutrally cohesive score of 14.9%, and a cohesive score of 72.9%. As a result, the composite Cohesion factor
score for Unit A is 0.61 (-1* .122 + 0*.149 + 1*.729 = 0.61). The Department repeated this calculation for all
Protective and Risk factors for this unit as shown below in Table A3.
                            Table A3: Factor Score Calculation for Unit A at Installation X (Example)
Protective Factors
Risk Factors
7 For factors with only two response categories, each positive category is assigned a value of 3 (e.g., no presence of
racially harassing behaviors, no presence of sexist behaviors) and each negative category is assigned a value of 1 (e.g.,
presence of racially harassing behaviors, presence of sexist behaviors).
                                                               33
        Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO)                                   2.0%             30.7%             67.3%                    -0.65
        Racially Harassing Behaviors                                   19.0%                  --           81.0%                    -0.62
        Sexist Behaviors                                                6.3%                  --           93.7%                    -0.87
        Sexually Harassing Behaviors                                   24.9%                  --           75.1%                    -0.50
        Workplace Hostility                                            88.4%                  --           11.6%                    0.77
        Note: Stress, Racially Harassing Behaviors, Sexist Behaviors, Sexually Harassing Behaviors, and Workplace Hostility do not have
        neutral categories. Factor Scores range from -1 to 1. ‘A’ response is favorable for Protective factors and unfavorable for Risk
        factors; ‘B’ response is neutral; ‘C’ response is unfavorable for Protective factors and favorable for Risk factors.
Step 2: Next, the Department weights and aggregates all unit-level factor scores to the installation-level
according to the number of DEOCS respondents in each unit.8 This process ensures that the responses of
each survey taker in an installation (regardless of unit) are allocated equal weight in the calculation of the
overall factor score of the installation.
Installation X (Example): As shown in Table A4, nine times as many Service members in Unit A completed
the DEOCS 5.0 as compared with Unit E (n=21). As a result, the factor score for Unit A was weighted nine
times as heavily as Unit E. Because of the way scores happen to be distributed across units, the unweighted
and weighted factor scores for Cohesion are equivalent (0.72). However, for Alcohol Impairing Memory, the
weighted factor score is considerably lower than the unweighted score (-0.94 vs. -0.87).
                              Table A4: Unit Weights for Cohesion Factor at Installation X (Example)
Cohesion
8Specifically, we weight each of an installation’s factor scores by the number of respondents per factor per unit. As such,
unit weights could vary slightly for different factors if slightly greater or fewer respondents in a unit completed the items
comprising each factor.
                                                                       34
      Installation X Alcohol Impairing Memory
                                                      -0.87                               1.00           -0.94
      Factor Score
Step 3: After computing scores for each of the factors across all the installations, the Department computes
percentile scores by comparing an installation’s score on a given factor to the factor scores of all other
installations. We standardize installation scores before averaging across factors because the DEOCS factors
have very different factor score distributions. For example, only 2% report (SD = 2%) “frequent memory loss
due to alcohol” whereas 83% report a “presence of workplace hostility” (SD = 11%). Thus, converting to
percentiles ensures that no risk or protective factor disproportionally contributes to the protective and risk
composite measures.
Installation X (Example): There are 1,367 installations with Cohesion factor score data. Of this total, there are
887 installations with Cohesion factor scores lower than Installation X’s score of 0.72, and 479 installations
with Cohesion factor scores greater than 0.72. Thus, Installation X ranks in the 65th percentile on Cohesion.
Similarly, for Alcohol Impairing Memory, there are 259 installations with factor scores lower than Installation X’s
score of -0.94, and 1,107 installations with Alcohol Impairing Memory factor scores greater than -0.94. As
such, Installation X ranks in the 19th percentile on Alcohol Impairing Memory. The Department repeated this
ranking calculation for all protective and risk factors, so that each installation has a percentile score on each
factor (see Table A5).
       Table A5: Converting from Factor Scores to Protective and Risk Percentile Scores for Installation X (Example)
Protective Factors
Risk Factors
                                                              35
       Passive Leadership (Commander)                                1,367                     -0.66                     49
       Passive Leadership (Senior NCO)                               1,356                     -0.68                     49
       Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)                       1,367                     -0.73                     27
       Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO)                                 1,356                     -0.65                     32
       Racially Harassing Behaviors                                  1,367                     -0.64                     44
       Sexist Behaviors                                              1,367                     -0.89                     26
       Sexually Harassing Behaviors                                  1,367                     -0.44                     58
       Workplace Hostility                                           1,367                     0.68                      61
       Risk Percentile Score                                                                                             39
       Note: Because not all units contain senior non-commissioned officers (NCO), these factors on the DEOCS were omitted for some
       installations.
Step 4: Finally, the Department computes a Protective Percentile Score for each installation by calculating the
average score (equally weighted) across the 11 protective factors percentiles. Similarly, the Department
computes a Risk Percentile Score for each installation by calculating the average score across the 11 risk
factors percentiles. Thus, both Protective and Risk Percentile Scores can range from 0 to 100.
Installation X (Example): As shown in Table A5, Installation X’s 11 Protective percentiles scores are
averaged to create the Protective Percentile Score of 61. Likewise, Installation X’s 11 Risk percentiles scores
are averaged to create the Risk Percentile Score of 39.
Further Analysis. Once installations have been identified according to their Protective and Risk Percentile
Scores, a more granular evaluation approach can be undertaken. This includes 1) examining individual factors
comprising the percentiles to determine whether some installations score especially low or high on a few
protective or risk factors; 2) considering the distribution of Protective and Risk Percentile Scores across units to
determine the potential influence of unit-level microclimates; and 3) analyzing demographic differences (e.g.,
men vs. women, non-Hispanic White vs. minority, enlisted vs. officer, etc.) across factors.
Suppression Rules
To protect the anonymity of survey respondents, data from units with fewer than 16 total respondents and units
with fewer than five respondents for any given factor are not included in this analysis. In addition, installations
with fewer than 16 respondents in a demographic group are suppressed from data visualizations. However,
data suppressed at the unit-level are included in the calculation of installation-level Protective and Risk
Percentile Scores by combining these results with the results of other units at the same installation. This level
of aggregation addresses concerns regarding small sample size and therefore any concerns regarding
anonymity.
Background on DEOCS 5.0
The redesigned DEOCS 5.0 assesses 19 protective and risk factors that can impact a unit/organization’s
climate and ability to achieve its mission.
Protective Factors are attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with positive outcomes for organizations or
units. Higher favorable scores on protective factors are linked to a higher likelihood of positive outcomes, such
as improved performance or readiness and higher retention, and are also linked to a lower likelihood of
negative outcomes, such as suicide, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. The DEOCS 5.0 identifies 10
                                                                    36
Protective Factors. However, for the purposes of this analysis, transformational leadership ratings for the
unit/organization leader and the Senior NCO, if applicable, are treated as two separate factors.
      Cohesion assesses whether individuals in a workplace care about each other, share the same goals,
       and work together effectively. Cohesive organizations are linked to improved readiness and retention,
       and a lower likelihood of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and suicide.
      Connectedness measures perceptions of closeness to a group and satisfaction with one’s relationship
       to others in the group. Higher connectedness is linked to a lower likelihood of suicidal ideation and
       improved readiness and retention.
      Engagement & Commitment measures one’s vigor, dedication, and absorption in work and
       commitment to the job and organization. Higher levels of engagement and commitment are linked to
       higher levels of readiness, performance, and retention, and a lower likelihood of suicide.
      Fairness is the perception that organizational policies, practices, and procedures, both formal and
       informal, regarding information sharing, job opportunities, promotions, and discipline are based on
       merit, inclusion, equality, and respect. Fair organizations are linked to higher retention and readiness
       and lower levels of racial and ethnic discrimination and harassment and sexual harassment.
      Inclusion indicates whether organization members feel valued and respected by their peers and
       leadership, and if they feel involved in decision-making and information-sharing. Inclusive organizations
       are linked to lower rates of discrimination and higher readiness and retention.
      Morale measures whether organizations or units complete tasks with enthusiasm and confidence in the
       mission. Organizations with high morale are linked to improved readiness, higher retention, and a lower
       likelihood of sexual assault.
      Safe Storage for Lethal Means measures how often one keeps objects that can be used to hurt
       themselves or others, such as firearms and medication, safely stored in their living space. Keeping
       lethal means safely stored more often is linked to a lower likelihood of suicide.
      Work-Life Balance measures one’s perception that the demands of their work and personal life are
       compatible. A work-life balance is linked to higher retention, improved readiness, and a lower likelihood
       of suicidal ideation.
      Leadership Support is the perception of support for individual goals (including career goals),
       perceptions about leadership communication, and trust in leadership. Respondents rate their immediate
       supervisor on this factor. Organizations with supportive leaders are linked to improved readiness,
       higher retention, and a lower likelihood of suicidal ideation, sexual assault, and sexual harassment.
      Transformational Leadership is a leadership style that inspires staff by providing motivation and
       meaning to their work, giving attention to individuals’ unique needs, and directing their focus to higher
       goals, such as those of the mission. Respondents rate their unit/organization leader and their Senior
       NCO, if applicable, on this factor. Organizations with transformational leaders are linked to improved
       job performance, job satisfaction scores, and leadership satisfaction scores.
Risk Factors are attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with negative outcomes for organizations or
units. Higher unfavorable scores on risk factors are linked to a higher likelihood of negative outcomes, such as
suicide, sexual harassment, and sexual assault and are also linked to a lower likelihood of positive outcomes,
such as higher performance, readiness, and retention. The DEOCS 5.0 identifies nine Risk Factors. However,
for the purposes of this analysis, passive leadership ratings and toxic leadership ratings for the
unit/organization leader and the Senior NCO, if applicable, were treated as separate factors.
      Alcohol Impairing Memory measures how often, during the last 12 months, one was unable to
       remember what happened the night before due to drinking alcohol. Frequent memory loss due to
       alcohol is linked to a higher likelihood of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and suicide.
                                                       37
      Binge Drinking measures how often one consumes four or more drinks (for females) and five or more
       drinks (for males) on one occasion. Frequent binge drinking is linked to a higher likelihood of sexual
       assault, sexual harassment, and suicide.
      Stress measures the feeling of emotional strain or pressure. Higher levels of stress are linked to higher
       likelihood of suicide and suicidal ideation, and lower levels of readiness and retention.
      Passive Leadership is a leadership style that avoids and neglects mistakes or problems until they can
       no longer be ignored. Respondents rate their unit/organization leader and their Senior NCO, if
       applicable, on this factor. Organizations with passive leaders are linked to lower levels of readiness and
       retention and a higher likelihood of sexual harassment.
      Toxic Leadership behaviors include disregard for subordinate input, defiance of logic or predictability,
       and self-promoting tendencies. Respondents rate their immediate supervisor and their Senior NCO, if
       applicable, on this factor. Organizations with toxic leaders are linked to lower organizational
       commitment, lower retention, and higher likelihood of sexual assault and suicide.
      Racially Harassing Behaviors describe unwelcome or offensive experiences of organization members
       based on their race or ethnicity. The presence of racially harassing behaviors in organizations is linked
       to higher rates of policy-defined racial/ethnic harassment, sexual assault, and suicide, as well as lower
       levels of readiness and retention.
      Sexually Harassing Behaviors assesses the presence of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
       sexual favors, and offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature. The presence of sexually
       harassing behaviors in organizations is linked to a higher likelihood of legally-defined sexual
       harassment (in which the behaviors are sufficiently persistent and severe), gender discrimination,
       sexual assault, racial/ethnic harassment/discrimination, suicide, and lower levels of readiness.
      Sexist Behaviors describe situations where someone is mistreated or excluded based on their sex or
       gender. The presence of sexist behaviors in organizations is linked to higher rates of policy-defined
       gender discrimination (in which the experiences harmed or limited their career) and sexual assault and
       harassment, as well as lower levels of readiness and retention.
      Workplace Hostility measures the presence of aggressive behaviors directed at another individual
       while at work. This aggression includes physical intimidation, verbal intimidation, spreading rumors or
       negative comments about a person to undermine their status, and persistent criticism of work or effort.
       Organizations with workplace hostility are linked to lower performance, lower levels of readiness, and a
       higher likelihood of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and racial/ethnic discrimination.
For more information on the DEOCS 5.0, see https://www.defenseculture.mil/Assessment-to-Solutions/A2S-
Home/
                                                      38
Appendix B: Integrated Prevention Metric Development, Validation,
and Scoring
Based on an analysis of the requirements in DoDI 6400.09 and the elements of the On-Site Installation
Evaluation (OSIE) Framework (priority, preparation, and implementation), the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)), in coordination with RAND, developed nine new
metrics to assess prevention capabilities associated with specific focus areas in DoDI 6400.09: Healthy and
protective environments, integrated prevention, and stakeholder engagement.9
                      Table B1: Nine Dimensions Targeted for the On-Site Installation Evaluation
                                                               OSIE FRAMEWORK
                                     PRIORITY                    PREPARATION                  IMPLEMENTATION
                                         1                              4                             7
                                Leaders prioritize             Leaders have the          Leaders employ practices
            HEALTHY &
            PROTECTIVE
                              fostering a protective         requisite knowledge,           known to support a
            ENVIRONMENT       environment by their          skills, abilities (KSAs)      protective environment
                                   actions and             and access to training to
                                communications.             develop those KSAs.
                                        2                             5                                8
                                Leaders prioritize         Leaders and prevention            Prevention activities
    Focus   INTEGRATED         prevention activities.        personnel have the           target risk and protective
    Areas   PREVENTION                                     requisite KSAs to carry         factors across multiple
                                                               out prevention              negative behaviors and
                                                                successfully.                     evaluated.
                                         3                              6                             9
                               Leaders prioritize           Prevention personnel             Stakeholders are
            STAKEHOLDER      engaging stakeholders.        have the resources and          genuinely engaged in
            ENGAGEMENT                                        requisite KSAs to             prevention activities
                                                            engage stakeholders           across multiple planning
                                                                 effectively.                     stages.
These areas are referred to as core dimensions. Given the breadth of these nine dimensions, each one was
divided into multiple subdimensions, which are narrower in focus. These subdimensions were worded as
positive statements (e.g., Leaders consistently deter negative behaviors) so they would represent a high-
quality standard to which installations should aspire. Under each subdimension are even narrower “data
elements.” An overall score for each of the nine dimensions starts at the data element level. Each data
element, also worded as a positive standard to achieve, is judged to be either “present” or “absent” by
considering multiple data sources collected at the site. A scoring rubric was created so that a certain number
of data elements rated as “present” are needed for the subdimension to be considered “present.” The number
of data elements varies for each subdimension and thus the number of “present” data elements needed also
varies by subdimension. Figure B1 shows an example for Core Dimensions 1 (Healthy & Protective
Environment – Priority) and its subdimensions. This dimension has five subdimensions and the two data
9Information collection for these metrics were approved by Office of Management and Budget (OMB Control Number
0704-0610).
                                                          39
elements are shown for Subdimension 1.2. In the scoring rubric, both data elements (1.2.1 and 1.2.2) need to
be rated as present for Subdimension 1.2 to be present.
Figure B1. Example of the Link between Data Elements, Subdimensions, and Core Dimensions
Once it is determined which subdimensions are present and absent, then a Maturity Score is used to
determine the final score for the Core Dimension. Table B2 below shows the Maturity Scoring for each Core
Dimension. Although a six-point scale is used to reflect the range of maturity, the exact makeup of the scoring
rubric for each core dimension varies by the number of subdimensions. Typically, the highest level of maturity
not only has all the subdimensions present, but also an additional requirement for a more robust presence of
those subdimensions.
Background on Maturity Scoring
RAND developed a structured maturity scoring system tailored to each core dimension. In its simplest form, a
maturity model is a set of characteristics, attributes, indicators, or patterns that represent progression and
achievement in a particular domain or discipline. The artifacts that make up the model are typically agreed
upon by the domain or discipline and are validated through application and iterative recalibration. A maturity
model allows an organization or industry to have its practices, processes, and methods evaluated against a
clear set of artifacts that establish a benchmark. These artifacts typically represent best practice and may
incorporate standards or other codes of practice that are important in a particular domain or discipline. By
having the ability to benchmark, organizations can use maturity models to determine their current level of
achievement or capability and then apply these models over time to drive improvement. However, when used
in a broader sense, maturity models can also help organizations benchmark their performance against other
organizations in their domain or industry, and help an industry determine how well it is performing by
examining the achievement or capability of its member organizations. Architecturally, maturity models
typically have “levels” along an evolutionary scale that defines measurable transitions from one level to
another. The corresponding attributes define each level; in other words, if an organization demonstrates
these attributes, it is said to have achieved both that level and the capabilities that the level represents.
Having measurable transition states between the levels enables an organization to use the scaling to:
      Define its current state;
      Determine its future, more “mature” state; and
                                                        40
        Identify the attributes it must attain to reach that future state
RAND tailored the general maturity approach, developing a specific scoring method for each individual
dimension (see Table B2). Thus, rather than one overall, generic scoring system, the maturity approach
focused on the specifics of each dimension. This approach was based on an assessment process OSD and
RAND used in a Department of Defense project rating the sexual assault prevention capabilities of U.S.
Military Service Academies (Acosta et al., In Review).
In general, for each dimension, a higher maturity rating indicated a greater number of subdimensions that
were rated as present (which were driven by the number of data elements present). For example, there are
five subdimensions for Dimension 1 (Healthy & Protective Environment – Priority). A site could achieve a
Maturity Score of 2 by having any three subdimensions present. This scoring method was chosen because it
assigns a higher score for more subdimensions present, while also allowing sites to express their level of
maturity in different ways. For many of the dimensions, to obtain the highest score, a site needs to show
consistent evidence that the subdimensions (and their underlying data elements) have been maintained over
the past two years despite competing priorities.
As implemented, the maturity model can serve three purposes: it will allow DoD and others to understand the
current capabilities of the sites, it may help sites identify ways to strengthen their prevention efforts, and it
may permit comparison, both within and across sites.
                         Table B2: Link between Data Elements, Subdimensions, and Maturity Scoring
                                                                                    Subdimensions
        Dimension Maturity Scoring                (total # of data elements needed to rate Subdimension as ‘present’/total # data
                                                                                     elements)
1. Healthy & Protective Environment – Priority
Maturity Score:                                   1.1. Consistently emphasize the importance of a healthy protective environment
                                                       (3/4)
5-Present in all 5 and consistent evidence that   1.2. Consistently deters negative behaviors (2/2)
presence has been maintained over the past        1.3. Leaders hold subordinates accountable for timely action (2/2)
two years despite competing priorities            1.4. Leaders reinforce positive behaviors (1/1)
4-Present in all 5 subdimensions                  1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors (1/1)
                                                                  41
Maturity Score:                                   3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform
                                                       priorities (1/1)
5-Present in 3 out of 3 subdimensions,
including support from the data call, and         3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement (1/1)
consistent evidence that presence has been
maintained over time despite competing            3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for
priorities                                             stakeholder engagement (2/2)
1-Present in 1 out of 5 subdimensions 5.4. Collaborative structure exists to support integrated primary prevention (2/2)
0-None are Present                                5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained
                                                       over time (2/2)
                                                  **This data element is scored via a survey = overall mean score above 3.0 for the
                                                      eight leader survey items
6. Stakeholder Engagement - Preparation
Maturity Score:                                   6.1. Leaders have the knowledge and skills needed to conduct stakeholder
                                                       engagement**
5-Present in all 4 subdimensions and mean of
8.1 OR 8.2 is greater than 4                      6.2. Prevention personnel are dedicated, knowledgeable and skilled in conducting
                                                       stakeholder engagement^^
4-Present in all 4 subdimensions
                                                  6.3. Stakeholders are knowledgeable about prevention (2/2)
3-Present in 3 out of 4 subdimensions
                                                  6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement (1/1)
2-Present in 2 out of 4 subdimensions
                                                  **This data element is scored via a survey = overall mean score above 3.0 for the
1-Present in 1 out of 4 subdimensions                 four leader survey items
0-None are Present                                ^^ This data element is scored via a survey = overall mean score above 3.0 for the
                                                      six prevention survey items
                                                                  42
7. Healthy & Protective Environment – Implementation
Maturity Score:                                 7.1. Subordinates and peers are referred to appropriate resources when at-risk for
                                                     harmful behaviors (2/2)
5-Present in all 5 subdimensions                7.2. Leaders clearly communicate expectations for benchmarks, roles, and
4-Present in 4 of the 5 subdimensions                responsibilities for improving/maintaining protective environments to
                                                     subordinates (2/3)
3-Present in 3 out of 5 subdimensions           7.3. Leaders proactively monitor the stress levels of subordinates (2/2)
2-Present in 2 out of 5 subdimensions           7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a
                                                     consistent manner (e.g., through standard operating procedure) (2/2)
1-Present in 1 out of 5 subdimensions           7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized (1/1)
0-None are Present
8. Integrated Prevention - Implementation
Maturity Score:                                 8.1. Prevention approach is integrated (use common messages, consistent
                                                     collaboration, common operating procedures) (3/4)
5-Present in all 5 subdimensions
                                                8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive (3/4)
4-Present in 4 of the 5 subdimensions
                                                8.3. Prevention approach is evaluated (3/3)
3-Present in 3 out of 5 subdimensions
                                                8.4. Prevention approach is continuously improved (2/2)
2-Present in 2 out of 5 subdimensions
                                                8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed (2/3)
1-Present in 1 out of 5 subdimensions
0-None are Present
9. Stakeholder Engagement - Implementation
Maturity Score:                                 9.1 Level of collaboration
Score based on the following scale:
       NONE (0): Feedback from
        stakeholders is neither sought nor
        used by leaders or prevention
        personnel.
       INFORM (1): Leaders and prevention
        personnel share information in a
        variety of ways with key stakeholder
        groups (“We will keep you informed”).
        No effort is made to get input.
       INVOLVE (2): Leaders and
        prevention personnel seek input from
        stakeholders AFTER decisions are
        made.
       PARTICIPATE (3): Leaders and
        prevention personnel see input
        BEFORE decisions are made.
       COLLABORATE (4): Leaders and
        prevention personnel work with
        stakeholders to jointly frame the
        problem and the solutions. Leaders
        and prevention personnel regularly
        circle back with stakeholders to
        update them on progress
Subdimensions
Core dimensions were designed to be broad categories. In contrast, subdimensions were designed to address
narrower topics. Striking a balance between breadth and parsimony, there are 3 to 5 subdimensions in each
core dimension, except for Core Dimension 9 (Stakeholder Engagement-Implementation), which has one
                                                                43
subdimension. Subdimensions were chosen for their theoretical connection to the dimension, their support in
the research literature, and their focus on a narrower aspect of the core dimension. Below is a summary of the
subdimensions used to assess each of the nine core dimensions and relevant references supporting their
inclusion.
Subdimensions for Dimension 1: Healthy & Protective Environment-Priority
This dimension contains five subdimensions that aim to assess the extent to which leaders prioritize a healthy
and protective environment and sets the tone to sustain a focus on a protective environment.
                    Subdimensions                                              References
 1.1   Leaders consistently emphasize the                   Crittendon & Hope, 2017, pp.18-21; Hoover,
       importance of a healthy protective environment       Randolph, Elig, & Klein, 2001, pp. 31-33;
                                                            Ratcliff, Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-
                                                            Rodríguez, 2018, pp. 4-18
 1.2   Leaders consistently deter negative behaviors        Cook, Jones, Lipari, & Lancaster, 2005; Ratcliff,
                                                            Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-Rodríguez,
                                                            2018, pp. 4-16
 1.3   Leaders hold subordinates accountable for            Jones & Bullis, 2003, pp. 24-25
       timely action
 1.4   Leaders reinforce positive behaviors                 Jones & Bullis, 2003, pp. 21-40
 1.5   Leaders role model positive behaviors                Ratcliff, Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-
                                                            Rodríguez, 2018, pp.2
                    Subdimensions                                              References
 2.1   Leaders see integrated primary prevention as a       Noonan et al., 2009; Kreuter, Lezin, & Young,
       consistent and enduring priority and                 2000; McCartan, Kemshall, & Tabachnick, 2015;
       communicate it to subordinates                       Campbell & Wasco, 2005; Patton, 2010
 2.2   Leaders hold prevention staff accountable for        Thompson, Taplin, McAfee, Mandelson, &
       sustained integrated prevention                      Smith, 1995; Nation et al., 2003; McIntosh, Filter,
                                                            Bennett, Ryan, & Sugai, 2010
 2.3   Leaders reinforce best practice prevention           Kratochwill, Volpiansky, Clements, & Ball, 2007;
       processes (sufficient dose, theory-based,            Hawkins, Shapiro, & Fagan, 2010; Mihalic &
       evaluated, trained deliverers, interactive           Irwin, 2003; McDonald, Charlesworth, &
       content)                                             Graham, 2015; Murnieks, Allen, & Ferrante,
                                                            2011
 2.4   Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to    DeGue et al., 2012; Brubaker, 2009; Provost &
       prevention                                           Fawcett, 2013; Mandinach, 2012; Sable, Danis,
                                                            Mauzy, & Gallagher, 2006
                                                       44
Subdimensions for Dimension 3: Stakeholder Engagement-Priority
This dimension contains three subdimensions that aim to assess the extent to which leaders prioritize
stakeholder engagement and sets the tone to sustain a focus on stakeholder engagement to inform primary
prevention.
                   Subdimensions                                                References
 3.1   Leaders and prevention personnel use                 Ahmed & Palermo, 2010; Dills, Fowler, & Payne,
       stakeholder engagement to inform priorities          2016; Goodman et al., 2017; Hood et al., 2010
 3.2   Leader communications stress the importance          Ahmed & Palermo, 2010; Jolibert & Wesselink,
       of stakeholder engagement                            2012
 3.3   Leaders and prevention staff provide positive        Hood et al., 2010
       reinforcement for stakeholder engagement
                    Subdimensions                                               References
 4.1    Leaders are knowledgeable about and skilled at       Cook, Jones, Lipari, & Lancaster, 2005, pp. 9-10
        building a protective environment
 4.2    Established or systematic processes/structure        Crittendon & Hope, 2017, pp. 20-29
        support a protective environment
 4.3    Leaders and subordinates maintain sufficient         Ratcliff, Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-
        connections                                          Rodríguez, 2018, pp. 4 & 17
 4.4    Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and          Hoover, Randolph, Elig, & Klein, 2001, pp. 32-33
        behaviors and consider them in performance
        evaluations
                    Subdimensions                                                References
 5.1    Prevention personnel receive ongoing and             Kratochwill, Volpiansky, Clements, & Ball, 2007;
        systematic training and professional                 Hawkins, Shapiro, & Fagan, 2010; Mihalic &
        development to continually improve their             Irwin, 2003; McDonald, Charlesworth, & Graham,
        approach to integrated prevention                    2015; Murnieks, Allen, & Ferrante, 2011
 5.2    Leaders are knowledgeable and skilled at             Kratochwill, Volpiansky, Clements, & Ball, 2007;
        primary prevention                                   Hawkins, Shapiro, & Fagan, 2010; Mihalic &
                                                       45
                                                              Irwin, 2003; McDonald, Charlesworth, & Graham,
                                                              2015; Murnieks, Allen, & Ferrante, 2011
 5.3    Prevention personnel are dedicated,                   Kratochwill, Volpiansky, Clements, & Ball, 2007;
        knowledgeable and skilled in primary prevention       Hawkins, Shapiro, & Fagan, 2010; Mihalic &
                                                              Irwin, 2003; McDonald, Charlesworth, & Graham,
                                                              2015; Murnieks, Allen, & Ferrante, 2011
 5.4    Collaborative structure exists to support             DeGue et al., 2012; Brubaker, 2009; Provost &
        integrated primary prevention                         Fawcett, 2013; Mandinach, 2012; Sable, Danis,
                                                              Mauzy, & Gallagher, 2006
 5.5    Continuity of prevention staff and effective          Dills, Fowler, & Payne, 2016; Wandersman &
        prevention activities are maintained over time        Florin, 2003; Lundgren & Amin, 2015; Bond &
                                                              Hauf, 2004; McMahon, Postmus, & Koenick,
                                                              2011
                    Subdimensions                                                References
 6.1   Leaders have the skills and knowledge needed           SAMHSA, 2021
       to conduct stakeholder engagement
 6.2   Prevention staff are dedicated, knowledgeable          Scaccia et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2015;
       and skilled in conducting stakeholder                  SAMHSA, 2021
       engagement
                    Subdimensions                                                 References
 7.1    Subordinates and peers are referred to                Crittendon & Hope, 2017, pp.18-21
        appropriate resources when at-risk for harmful
        behaviors
                                                         46
 7.2    Leaders clearly communicate expectations for           Ratcliff, Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-
        benchmarks, roles, and responsibilities for            Rodríguez, 2018, pp.4-16, 18
        improving/maintaining protective environments
        to subordinates
 7.3    Leaders proactively monitor the stress level of        Hoover, Randolph, Elig, &. Klein, 2001, pp. 4
        subordinates
 7.4    Leaders and service members are held                   Cook, Jones, Lipari, & Lancaster, 2005
        accountable for harmful behaviors in a                 Ratcliff, Key-Roberts, Simmons, & Jiménez-
        consistent manner (e.g., through standard              Rodríguez, 2018
        operating procedure)
 7.5    Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized             Jones & Bullis, 2003, pp. 21-40
                     Subdimensions                                                 References
 8.1    Prevention approach is integrated (use common           Gidycz, Wyatt, Galbreath, Axelrad, & McCone,
        messages, consistent collaboration, common              2018
        operating procedures)
 8.2    Prevention approach is comprehensive                    Brofenbrenner, 1992, 2005; Casey & Lindhorst,
                                                                2009; Banyard, Eckstein, & Moynihan, 2010;
                                                                Prochaska & Prochaska, 2011; Vladutiu, Martin,
                                                                & Macy, 2011
 8.3    Prevention approach is evaluated                        Chinman et al., 2016; 2018; Francisco, Paine, &
                                                                Fawcett, 1993
 8.4    Prevention approach is continuously improved            Chinman et al., 2016; 2018; Francisco, Paine, &
                                                                Fawcett, 1993
 8.5    Resistance to the prevention approach is                Nation et al., 2003; Rich, Utley, Janke, &
        monitored and addressed                                 Moldoveanu, 2010
                          Subdimensions                                                 References
 9.1   Level of collaboration ranging from none, to inform (sharing     International Association for Public
       information, lowest level) to collaborate (sharing decision      Participation, 2021
       making and implementation, highest level)
                                                          47
Data elements
Data elements are the most narrowly constructed component to the scoring rubric. Each data element
represents one aspect of the subdimension to which they are connected. They are intended to be rated as
either present or absent. Multiple data sources were used to score each data element as present or absent,
including:
       Discussions and interviews with various service members at each site
       Surveys of competencies to conduct high quality prevention administered to prevention personnel and
        leadership
       Table-top exercise in which prevention personnel respond to a hypothetical scenario to assess their
        coordination
       Data call of various prevention activities and documentation of prevention workforce
Facilitated Group Discussions and Interviews
At each site’s three-day visit, discussions and interviews were held with five categories of service members
including:
   1. Installation commander and command team;
   2. Leaders (O4-O5; O6; E7-E9);
   3. Subordinates and Stakeholders (O1-O3; E1-E4; E5-E6);
   4. Prevention Personnel (community/support services personnel; Chaplains; Sexual Assault Response
      Coordinators and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates; Mental and Physical
      Health Professionals);
   5. Prevention Support (Family Readiness Group/Key Spouse personnel; Family Advocacy Program
      personnel; Military Equal Opportunity [MEO] and Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] personnel; and
      Inspector General [IG] and law enforcement).
 To guide these discussions, seven different discussion protocols were developed, all linked to specific data
elements, subdimensions, and core dimensions. While overlapping, each discussion protocol emphasized
different subdimensions. Different service members were asked somewhat different questions based on their
rank and job function. In addition, there were more questions to be asked than there was time available at the
site visits, thus certain questions were specifically allocated to certain service member groups. For example, as
shown in Table B3, the discussion protocols that targeted Installation Command focused on priorities. These
questions were chosen because of commanders’ role in establishing priorities. E1-E4 Service members were
allocated questions about priorities, but to assess their perceptions of commander priorities from the lower
ranks. Service members who are prevention personnel were specifically asked questions from the three core
dimensions involving Integrated Prevention, whereas prevention support personnel were asked questions
about the Healthy & Protective Environment and Stakeholder Engagement dimensions. Another factor in
determining which questions a Service member received was assigning different ranks a label of “leader” or
“stakeholder and subordinate.” This somewhat artificial designation was made with the realization that most
Service members are both a leader and a subordinate to someone and that there were more questions that
need to be answered than there was time available from any one Service member.
                        Table B3: Link between Service Members and the Nine Core Dimensions
                                                        48
 Discussion               Priorit   Prep    Imp2      Priority        Prep1    Imp2        Priority   Prep1   Imp2
                                    1
 Protocol Service          y (1)      (4)    (7)        (2)            (5)      (8)          (3)       (6)     (9)
 Members Groups
 Installation Command
 Commanding                  x                           x                       x
 general and
 command team
 Stakeholder and Subordinates
 E1-E4                       x                           x                                     x
 E1-E4                                x        x                        x        x                      x      x
 E5-E6                                x        x                        x        x                      x      x
 O1-O3                       x                           x                                     x
 Leaders
 E7-E9                                x        x                        x        x                      x      x
 O4-O5                       x                           x                                     x
 O6                          x                           x                                     x
 Prevention Personnel
 Community Support                                                      x
 Services
 Chaplains                                                              x
 Sexual assault                                                         x
 response
 coordinators, victim
 advocates,
 Mental and Physical                                                    x
 Health
 Professionals/
 Prevention Support
 MEO and EEO staff                   x                                                                 x
 FRG/SFRG/FRP/                       x                                                                 x
 Key Spouse staff
 Family Advocacy                     x                                                                 x
 Program staff
 Law Enforcement/IG                  x                                                                 x
Note: Colored cells with Xs show the nine core dimensions that each Service member was asked about.
                                                                 49
sexual assault response). Prevention practitioners responsible for implementing sexual assault prevention
must possess certain core competencies, or knowledge and skills essential for job performance, in order to
achieve optimal outcomes. These competencies include those needed for any primary prevention effort in
addition to those specific to sexual assault prevention. An existing assessment tool, which was designed for
injury and violence prevention practitioners, was tailored to reflect sexual assault prevention-specific
competencies as informed by the literature (O’Neil, Acosta, Chinman, Tharp, Fortson, In Review). The criterion
validity of the newly tailored measure was tested with 33 individuals who had varying levels of expertise with
sexual assault prevention. These individuals were categorized into three groups based on self-rated sexual
assault prevention expertise (low, medium or high) in order to assess group differences. As expected, the high
expertise group rated higher knowledge in all the competencies than the medium and low expertise groups.
For this project, two versions of this survey were developed. The first targeted any service member who has a
role in prevention (called prevention personnel and prevention support, see Table B3). This survey was
identical to the one developed by O’Neil et al. The second survey was intended for Service members identified
as leaders. For this survey, items were revised to emphasize responsibilities that focused on oversight, priority
setting, and consumption of prevention evaluation data. In both surveys, items were statements of various
competencies and respondents were asked to rate themselves on a Likert scale of how much knowledge they
had of that competency, from 1=No Knowledge to 5=Extensive Knowledge. For example, military and civilian
unit and installation leaders were asked if they, “Understand the policies on prevention topics, including
integrated primary prevention, harassment, sexual assault, substance abuse, suicide, self-harm, etc.”
Prevention personnel and supports were asked whether they could “Define prevention and describe the
associated core concepts such as primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.” The former question
emphasizes knowledge at a higher level; the latter emphasizes more detailed knowledge.
The leaders survey is split into three sections: 1) Healthy & Protective Environment (11 items), 2) Integrated
Prevention (eight items), and 3) Stakeholder Engagement (four items). Each section’s items are averaged
together to form scores that were used in scoring various subdimensions (see Appendix A). The prevention
personnel and support survey has two sections: 1) Integrated Prevention (18 items), and 2) Stakeholder
Engagement (six items). Similar to the leader survey, the items in these sections were averaged together into a
section score that was used to determine various subdimensions (see Appendix 1).
Table-top Exercise
Table-top exercises have been used for many years to test communities’ emergency preparedness and
response capabilities (Agboola, McCarthy, Biddinger, 2013; Chandra et al., 2015; Frahm et al., 2014; Klima et
al., 2012). This type of exercise was adapted to determine where strengths and weaknesses may lie with
respect to integrated prevention planning and capacity at each site. Just like in emergency preparedness
where the exercise brings together individuals from multiple agencies that have a roll (e.g., FEMA, local fire
and police departments), the benefit of this data collection mechanism is that it reveals how individuals would
conduct their work, especially with regard to coordination between partners, in real time. The exercise targets
four areas known to be critical for effective prevention, especially in military settings: partnerships, stakeholder
engagement, use of data to inform and evaluate prevention activities, and communication up and down the
chain of command.
At each site visit, about one-and-a-half to two hours is set aside for the exercise. All prevention personnel,
along with MEO and EEO personnel, are invited to attend. A hypothetical scenario is presented that involves a
series of incidents involving fighting, alcohol use, and a sexual assault. Then the attendees are asked to
respond as if the scenario had happened at their site. A sample question in each of the four focus areas are
below:
                                                         50
      Partnerships - What are you going to do to help to prevent future similar situations from occurring, if
       anything? Who are you going to work with?
      Stakeholder Engagement - What other groups, personnel, or others should be considered?
      Use of Data – Did you have any relevant data or information to base your decisions about needed
       prevention actions/next steps? How would you continue to monitor the situation moving forward?
      Communication - How/who will you communicate with the chains of command at the two units? At what
       point, if at all, will you engage the installation commander? What level of priority would future
       prevention efforts like this be given?
All the questions from this exercise are linked to specific data elements (see Appendix A).
Data Call
Each site was sent three data collection forms ahead of the site visit asking about specific prevention
information, including:
   1. Flagship prevention effort – Initially developed for use with the Military Service Academies (Acosta et
      al., Under Review), each site is asked to identify one effort that is particularly important and provide the
      following details:
           o Content Area (e.g., sexual assault, alcohol)
           o Target population (i.e., who and how many are exposed to the effort)
           o Level of evidence rating using Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) levels of
              evidence
           o Timeline of past and future implementation
           o Dosage (i.e., duration, frequency, and amount) of the effort for the target population
           o Reach of the effort (i.e., how many people)
           o Process evaluation details and results, if any
           o Outcome evaluation details and results, if any
           o Quality improvement activities (i.e., use data to make improvements to the program), if any
   2. Prevention workforce – Each site is asked to provide the number of personnel authorized to and
      assigned to support one of five areas (Integrated Primary Prevention, Suicide, Sexual Harassment,
      Sexual Assault, Domestic Abuse, Child Abuse, or Problematic Sexual Behavior in Children and Youth).
      Sites are also asked for the percent of these personnel that are dedicated full-time to the mission area,
      and for some information on training and professional development for these personnel.
   3. Evaluation and integration questions – Each site was asked a series of questions about any evaluations
      that had been completed on prevention efforts and about any actions taken specifically to integrate
      prevention activities.
Data Collection Process
OSD set up a three-day site visit for each site. The Data Call forms are sent about two weeks ahead to the site
and then returned to the OSIE team. The target population for the assessments is the command team, enlisted
and officers from the units of risk identified by the DEOCS, and prevention personnel and supports. The site
visit involves a series of discussion groups, interviews, and a Tabletop exercise with the categories of service
members listed in Table B3. For the enlisted and officers in the Stakeholder and Subordinates and Leaders
categories from Table B3, groups are held for each rank category, split by gender given the sensitivity of the
subject matter. At a subset of sites, there are also units that scored positively on the DEOCS, indicating that
members in those units were receiving some level of protection from harmful behaviors. At those sites, a
separate set of enlisted and officer discussions are held for the risk and protection units.
                                                       51
Each site was visited by a team ranging from four to eight team members. For each discussion group or
interview, there was a minimum of two team members present—one who asked the questions and another to
take detailed notes. For the Tabletop exercise, there were often one to two team members asking questions,
one to two notetakers, and another writing key information on a whiteboard in real time.
                                                        52
OSIE team members received a full day training on how to collect the data and how to score the data
elements. Trainers provided multiple examples and provided the above guidance. In addition, a hypothetical
military installation was presented, and all attendees were required to score each data element. While there is
some subjectivity inherent in rating these data elements, the use of a consensus process across multiple team
members helps ensure the information is reliable and accurate.
References
Acosta J, Chinman M, Tharp A, Baker J, Flaspohler P, Fortson B, Kerr A, Lamont A, Meyer A, Smucker S,
Wargel K, Wandersman A. How to assess an organization’s alignment with best practices for organizational
sexual assault prevention. Preventive Medicine Reports.
Agboola F, McCarthy T, Biddinger PD. Impact of emergency preparedness exercise on performance. J Public
Health Manag Pract. 2013;19(suppl 2):S77-S83. doi:10.1097/PHH.0b013e31828ecd84.
Ahmed, S. M., & Palermo, A. G. S. (2010). Community engagement in research: frameworks for education and
peer review. American journal of public health, 100(8), 1380-1387.
Ayuso, S., Rodríguez, M. A., García-Castro, R., & Ariño, M. A. (2014). Maximizing stakeholders’ interests: An
empirical analysis of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. Business & society, 53(3), 414-439.
Banyard, V. L., Eckstein, R. P., & Moynihan, M. M. (2010). Sexual violence prevention: The role of stages of
change. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 25(1), 111-135.
Batorowicz, B. & Shepherd, T.A. (2008). Measuring the quality of transdisciplinary teams, Journal of
Interprofessional Care, 22: 612-620.
Bernoff, J., & Schadler, T. (2010). Empowered: unleash your employees, energize your customers, transform
your business. Harvard Business Press.
Bond, L. A., & Hauf, A. M. C. (2004). Taking stock and putting stock in primary prevention: Characteristics of
effective programs. Journal of Primary Prevention, 24(3), 199-221.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1992). Ecological systems theory. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (2005). Ecological systems theory (1992, pp. 106-173).
Bronfenbrenner (Ed.), Making human beings human: Bioecological perspectives on human development.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd.
Brubaker, S. J. (2009). Sexual assault prevalence, reporting and policies: Comparing college and university
campuses and military service academies. Security Journal, 22(1), 56-72.
Campbell, R., & Wasco, S. M. (2005). Understanding rape and sexual assault: 20 years of progress and future
directions. Journal of interpersonal violence, 20(1), 127-131.
Cartmill, C., Soklaridis, S., & Cassidy, J. (2011). Transdisciplinary teamwork: the experience of clinicians at a
functional restoration program, Journal of Occupational Rehabilitation, 21: 1-8.
Casey, E. A., & Lindhorst, T. P. (2009). Toward a multi-level, ecological approach to the primary prevention of
sexual assault: Prevention in peer and community contexts. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 10(2), 91-114.
Center for the Army Profession and Leadership, Building and Maintaining a Positive Climate Handbook, July
2020.
                                                        53
Chandra, A., Williams, M., Lopez, C., Tang, J., Eisenman, D., & Magana, A. (2015). Developing a Tabletop
Exercise to Test Community Resilience: Lessons from the Los Angeles County Community Disaster Resilience
Project. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 9(5), 484-488. doi:10.1017/dmp.2015.99
Chinman M, Acosta J, Ebener P, Malone PS, Slaughter M (2016). Can implementation-support help
community-based settings better deliver evidence-based sexual health promotion programs: A randomized trial
of Getting To Outcomes®. Implementation Science, 11, 78.
Chinman M, Ebener P, Malone PS, Cannon J, D’Amico E, Acosta, J. (2018). Testing implementation support
for evidence-based programs in community settings: A replication cluster-randomized trial of Getting To
Outcomes®. Implementation Science, 13, 131.
Cook, Paul J., Allen M. Jones, Rachel N Lipari, & Anita R. Lancaster, Service academy 2005 sexual
harassment and assault survey, 2005, Defense Manpower Data Center, Arlington, VA: Survey and Program
Evaluation Division.
Crittendon, David, & Richard Oliver Hope, An Assessment of FY2016 Locally Developed Questions from the
DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey: Recommendations and Potential Implications, No. 10-17, 2017,
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.
DeGue, S., Holt, M. K., Massetti, G. M., Matjasko, J. L., Tharp, A. T., & Valle, L. A. (2012). Looking ahead
toward community-level strategies to prevent sexual violence. Journal of Women's Health, 21(1), 1-3.
Dills, J., Fowler, D., & Payne, G. (2016). Sexual violence on campus: Strategies for prevention. National
Center for Injury Prevention and Control (U.S.). Division of Violence Prevention.
Desai, Vinit M., Collaborative stakeholder engagement: An integration between theories of organizational
legitimacy and learning, Academy of Management Journal, 61, 2018, 220-244.
Dyer, J.A. (2003). Multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary: educational models and nursing
education, Nursing Education Perspectives, 24: 186-188.
Frahm KA, Gardner PJ, Brown LM, et al. Community-based disaster coalition training. J Public Health Manag
Pract. 2014;20(suppl 5):S111-S117. doi:10.1097/phh.0000000000000058.
Francisco, V. T., Paine, A., & Fawcett, S. B. (1993). A methodology for monitoring and evaluating community
health coalitions. Health Education Research: Theory and Practice, 8, 403-416.
García-Moreno, C., Zimmerman, C., Morris-Gehring, A., Heise, L., Amin, A., Abrahams, N., ... & Watts, C.
(2015). Addressing violence against women: a call to action. The Lancet, 385(9978), 1685-1695.
Gidycz, Christine A., Joel Wyatt, Nathan W. Galbreath, Stephen H. Axelrad, and Dave R. McCone, Sexual
assault prevention in the military: Key issues and recommendations, Military Psychology, 30.3, 2018, 240-251.
Goodman, M. S., Thompson, V. L. S., Arroyo Johnson, C., Gennarelli, R., Drake, B. F., Bajwa, P., ... & Bowen,
D. (2017). Evaluating community engagement in research: quantitative measure development. Journal of
community psychology, 45(1), 17-32.
Hawkins, J. D., Shapiro, V. B., & Fagan, A. A. (2010). Disseminating effective community prevention practices:
Opportunities for social work education. Research on social work practice, 20(5), 518-527.
Hood, N. E., Brewer, T., Jackson, R., & Wewers, M. E. (2010). Survey of community engagement in NIH‐
funded research. Clinical and translational science, 3(1), 19-22.
                                                        54
Hoover, Elizabeth C., Jacquelyn S. Randolph, Timothy W. Elig, & Pamela M. Klein, Overview of the 2000
Military Exit Survey, No.2 2001-001, 2001, Defense Manpower Data Center, Arlington, VA: Survey and
Program Evaluation Division.
International Association for Public Participation. (2018). Spectrum of Public Participation. Available online at:
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/pillars/Spectrum_8.5x11_Print.pdf
Jolibert, C., & Wesselink, A. (2012). Research impacts and impact on research in biodiversity conservation:
The influence of stakeholder engagement. Environmental Science & Policy, 22, 100-111.
Jonas, Julia M., Julian Boha, David Sörhammar, & Kathrin M. Moeslein, Stakeholder engagement in intra-and
inter-organizational innovation, Journal of Service Management, 2018.
Jones, Steven M., & Craig Bullis, Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic
Imperative, 2003, United States Army War Colleges, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
King, G., Strachan, D., Tucker, M., Duwyn, B., Desserud, S., & Shillington M. (2009). The application of a
transdisciplinary model for early intervention services, Infants and Young Children, 22: 211-223.
Klima DA, Seiler SH, Peterson JB, et al. Full-scale regional exercises: closing the gaps in disaster
preparedness. J Trauma Acute Care Surg.2012;73(3):592-597; discussion 597-598. doi:
10.1097/TA.0b013e318265cbb2.
Kratochwill, T. R., Volpiansky, P., Clements, M., & Ball, C. (2007). Professional Development in Implementing
and Sustaining Multitier Prevention Models: Implications for Response to Intervention. School Psychology
Review, 36(4).
Kreuter, M.W., Lezin, N.A., & Young, L.A. (2000). Evaluating community-based collaborative mechanisms:
Implications for practitioners. Health Promotion Practice, 1, 49-63.
Krug, E. G., Mercy, J. A., Dahlberg, L. L., & Zwi, A. B. (2002). The world report on violence and health. The
Lancet, 360(9339), 1083-1088.
Kujala, Johanna & Sybille Sachs, The Practice of Stakeholder Engagement (Chapter 14), The Cambridge
Handbook of Stakeholder Theory, 2019, 227.
Lipnack, J., & Stamps, J. (1997). Virtual teams: Reaching across space, time, and organizations with
technology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Lis, Andrzej, The Manifestations of Positive Leadership Strategies in the Doctrinal Assumptions of the U.S.
Army Leadership Concept, Journal of Corporate Responsibility and Leadership, 2.51 51, 2016.
Lundgren, R., & Amin, A. (2015). Addressing intimate partner violence and sexual violence among
adolescents: emerging evidence of effectiveness. Journal of Adolescent Health, 56(1), S42-S50.
Mandinach, E. B. (2012). A perfect time for data use: Using data-driven decision making to inform practice.
Educational Psychologist, 47(2), 71-85.
Matthews, Miriam, Andrew R. Morral, Terry L. Schell, Matthew Cefalu, Joshua Snoke, and R.J. Briggs,
Organizational Characteristics Associated with Sexual Assault Risk in the U.S. Marine Corps, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, PR-A434-1, 2020.
McIntosh, K., Filter, K. J., Bennett, J. L., Ryan, C., & Sugai, G. (2010). Principles of sustainable prevention:
Designing scale‐ up of school‐ wide positive behavior support to promote durable systems. Psychology in the
Schools, 47(1), 5-21.
                                                        55
McCartan, K. F., Kemshall, H., & Tabachnick, J. (2015). The construction of community understandings of
sexual violence: Rethinking public, practitioner and policy discourses. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 21(1),
100-116.
McDonald, P., Charlesworth, S., & Graham, T. (2015). Developing a framework of effective prevention and
response strategies in workplace sexual harassment. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 53(1), 41-58.
McMahon, S., Postmus, J. L., & Koenick, R. A. (2011). Conceptualizing the engaging bystander approach to
sexual violence prevention on college campuses. Journal of College Student Development, 52(1), 115-130.
Mihalic, S. F., & Irwin, K. (2003). Blueprints for violence prevention: From research to real-world settings—
factors influencing the successful replication of model programs. Youth violence and juvenile justice, 1(4), 307-
329.
Morral, Andrew R., Terry L. Schell, Matthew Cefalu, Jessica Hwang, and Andrew Gelman, Sexual Assault and
Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military: Volume 5. Estimates for Installation- and Command-Level Risk of
Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-870/7-OSD, 2018. As of February 4, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z7.html
Murnieks, C. Y., Allen, S. T., & Ferrante, C. J. (2011). Combating the effects of turnover: Military lessons
learned from project teams rebuilding Iraq. Business Horizons, 54(5), 481-491.
Nation, M., Crusto, C., Wandersman, A., Kumpfer, K. L., Seybolt, D., Morrissey-Kane, E., & Davino, K. (2003).
What works in prevention: Principles of effective prevention programs. American psychologist, 58(6-7), 449.
Noonan, R. K., Emshoff, J. G., Mooss, A., Armstrong, M., Weinberg, J., & Ball, B. (2009). Adoption, adaptation,
and fidelity of implementation of sexual violence prevention programs. Health Promotion Practice, 10(1_suppl),
59S-70S.
O’Neill A, Acosta J, Chinman M, Tharp AL, Fortson B. (In Review). Development and Pilot Test of the
Competency Assessment for Sexual Assault Prevention Practitioners. Health Education and Behavior.
Patton, M. Q. (2010). Developmental evaluation: Applying complexity concepts to enhance innovation and use.
Guilford Press.
Powell, A., Watson, J., Staley, P., Patrick, S., Horn, M., Fetzer, L., ... & Verma, S. (2015). Blending Learning:
The Evolution of Online and Face-to-Face Education from 2008-2015. Promising Practices in Blended and
Online Learning Series. International association for K-12 online learning.
Prochaska, J. J., & Prochaska, J. O. (2011). A review of multiple health behavior change interventions for
primary prevention. American journal of lifestyle medicine, 5(3), 208-221.
Provost, F., & Fawcett, T. (2013). Data science and its relationship to big data and data-driven decision
making. Big data, 1(1), 51-59.
Ratcliff, Nathaniel J., Melinda Key-Roberts, Mathias J. Simmons, and Miliani Jiménez-Rodríguez, Inclusive
Leadership Survey Item Development, No. 2018-03, 2018, Consortium of Universities, Washington DC.
Rich, Marc D., Ebony A. Utley, Kelly Janke, and Minodora Moldoveanu, I'd rather be doing something else:
male resistance to rape prevention programs, The Journal of Men’s Studies 18, 2010, 268-288.
Rosenfield, P.L. (1992). The potential of transdisciplinary research for sustaining and extending linkages
between the health and social sciences. Social Science and Medicine, 35: 1343-1357.
                                                        56
Sable, M. R., Danis, F., Mauzy, D. L., & Gallagher, S. K. (2006). Barriers to reporting sexual assault for women
and men: Perspectives of college students. Journal of American College Health, 55(3), 157-162.
Sadler, Anne G., Douglas R. Lindsay, Samuel T. Hunter, and David V. Day. The Impact of Leadership on
Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the Military, Military Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 3, May 2018, pp. 252-
263. As of May 4, 2021: \https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08995605.2017.1422948
Scaccia JP, Cook BS, Lamont A, Wandersman A, Castellow J, Katz J, & Beidas RS. (2015). A practical
implementation science heuristic for organizational readiness: R = MC2. Journal of community psychology, 43,
4, 484–501.
Stepans, M.B., Thompson, C.L. & Buchanan, M.L. (2002). The role of the nurse on a transdisciplinary early
intervention assessment team, Public Health Nursing, 19: 238-245.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2021). Prevention Core Competencies.
Publication No. PEP20-03-08-001. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration.
Thompson, R. S., Taplin, S. H., McAfee, T. A., Mandelson, M. T., & Smith, A. E. (1995). Primary and
secondary prevention services in clinical practice: twenty years' experience in development, implementation,
and evaluation. Jama, 273(14), 1130-1135.
Vladutiu, C. J., Martin, S. L., & Macy, R. J. (2011). College-or university-based sexual assault prevention
programs: A review of program outcomes, characteristics, and recommendations. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse,
12(2), 67-86.
Wandersman, A., & Florin, P. (2003). Community interventions and effective prevention. American
Psychologist, 58(6-7), 441.
                                                      57
Appendix C: Part 1 Site-Specific Findings
Fort Bliss (El Paso, TX) ................................................................................................................................... 58
Fort Custer (Augusta, MI) ................................................................................................................................ 72
Fort Polk (Leesville, LA)................................................................................................................................... 85
U.S. Army Reserve Center (Fraser, MI) ........................................................................................................... 98
Naval Station Norfolk (Norfolk, VA) ................................................................................................................ 111
Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs (Saratoga Springs, NY) .................................................................. 124
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton (San Diego, CA) .................................................................................. 138
Marine Corps Base Hawaii (Kaneohe Bay, HI) .............................................................................................. 151
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar (San Diego, CA) ....................................................................................... 164
Dyess Air Force Base (Abilene, TX) .............................................................................................................. 177
Laughlin Air Force Base (Del Rio, TX) ........................................................................................................... 190
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Anchorage, AK) ...................................................................................... 203
Vandenberg Space Force Base (Santa Maria, CA)........................................................................................ 216
10 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
11 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
12 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
                                                                             58
       Estimated Sexual Harassment Risk13            Women        27.9%             -              -
       Number of Formal Complaints of Sexual Harassment             13             10             10
       Number of Informal Complaints of Sexual Harassment            6             23             24
       Number of Anonymous Complaints of Sexual Harassment           0              0              0
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD (P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD (P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
13
                                                       59
60
Compliance areas that require attention
All Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) personnel should be fully proficient in all aspects of the
DoD Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program. In addition, all SAPR personnel, programs, and resourcing
should be regularly assessed for effectiveness and updates should be provided to leadership at quarterly Case
Management Group reviews, in accordance with DoDI 6495.02.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                       61
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Fort Bliss prevent Service members from harming themselves or others? The
figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations prevention capability were
consistently present at the installation.
                                                     62
63
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                         Dimension 1: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                    64
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                   65
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                   66
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  67
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                  68
                                    Dimension 7: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  69
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                   71
Fort Custer (Augusta, MI)
Fort Custer, located in August, MI, has a population of approximately 1,200. As a National Guard site, not all
data on harmful behaviors was available at the OSD level for Fort Custer, but data on sexual harassment
complaints are presented below.
                                     Table C2: Fort Custer Harmful Behaviors Summary
14 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
15 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
16 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
17 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                             72
Compliance areas that require attention
Fort Custer should regularly conduct needs assessments to identify solutions for personnel shortages and
transitions. The State SARC is retiring in October 2021, and no replacement has been identified yet. The
SAPR VA will be the only personnel with Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID) access when the
SARC retires.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the State was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                    73
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The State did not complete a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 or a self-assessment of their
sexual assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. As a result, the OSIE team could not conduct a separate on-site assessment of the
same areas, and there are no ratings in the figure below, which is intended to show the OSIE team’s level of
confidence in the State’s self-assessment, based on the extent to which the State’s self-assessment aligned
with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site assessment. However, strengths and areas for improvement are
noted in the figure below.
                                                        74
Assessing State Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Fort Custer prevent Service members from harming themselves or others?
The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect States’ prevention capability were
consistently present at the State.
                                                      75
76
Detailed Data Used to Score the State Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each State across nine sub-dimensions, making
binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either    if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                                                    77
1.4.1. Leaders reward or recognize appropriate behavior that supports positive norms in a timely manner (e.g., bystander
behaviors, proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and
principles)
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                   78
                                            Dimension 12: Stakeholder Engagement – Priority
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                  79
4.3.2. Leaders provide mentorship to provide advice and support the professional development of their subordinates (e.g.,
through regular meetings)
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  80
5.4. Collaborative structure exists to support integrated primary prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
                                                                  81
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
                                                                   82
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the State (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                   84
Fort Polk (Leesville, LA)
Fort Polk, located in Leesville, LA, has a population of approximately 10,000. An addendum to the 2018 WGRA
found that Fort Polk has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment for both men
and women, as compared to the overall DoD population, but higher estimated risk of sexual harassment for
men. Fort Polk also has fewer reports of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment than the overall
DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                                            Table C3: Fort Polk Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
18 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
19 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
20 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
21 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                        85
Compliance areas that require attention
Fort Polk should regularly conduct a resource needs assessment to identify solutions for personnel shortages
and transitions, such as having enough billets or billets not being filled.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                     86
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       87
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Fort Polk prevent Service members from harming themselves or others? The
figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations prevention capability were
consistently present at the installation.
                                                     88
89
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked in Table C4 with either      if met or   if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 19: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                    90
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                  92
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                   93
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                  94
                                    Dimension 25: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                   95
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                   97
U.S. Army Reserve Center (Fraser, MI)
U.S. Army Reserve Center, located in Fraser, MI, has a population of approximately 1,200. As a Reserve site,
not all data on harmful behaviors was available, but data on sexual harassment complaints is presented below.
                        Table C4: U.S. Army Reserve Center (Fraser, MI) Harmful Behaviors Summary
22 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
23 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
24 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
25 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                             98
Compliance areas that require attention
The OSIE team was unable to fully assess the Army Reserve Training Center because they have not provided
their self-assessment or documents in response to SAPR’s request for information. Additionally, the OSIE
team is re-engaging with on-site leads to schedule interviews (e.g., Case Management Group Chair, Lead
SAPR VA).
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                     99
Compliance areas that require attention
The Equal Opportunity Leader (EOL) at the Army Reserve Center has not received the requisite training, and
is not involved in assessing the survey results for Equal Opportunity-related topics. In addition, there is no
system for tracking complaints, which means there is no historical data available and no tracking of repeat
alleged offenders. Finally, there is no formal tracking system of Service members who receive training, so
there is no way to identify if some Service members are skipping the training altogether.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of their sexual assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership,
staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted
a separate on-site assessment of the same areas. The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of
confidence in the installations self-assessment, based on the extent to which the installations self-assessment
aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site assessment. A self-assessment of compliance with DoDI
6400.09 was not completed by the installation, thus the OSIE team’s confidence in this self-assessment could
not be rated (as noted in the figure below).
                                                       100
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help the Army Reserve Center prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                      101
102
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 28: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   103
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 105
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  106
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 107
                                    Dimension 34: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  108
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                      109
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  110
Naval Station Norfolk (Norfolk, VA)
Naval Station Norfolk, located in Norfolk, VA, has a population of just over 37,000. An addendum to the 2018
WGRA found that Naval Station Norfolk has higher than average prevalence of sexual harassment for both
men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. The additional WGRA analysis also found that
while the installation had an equivalent average prevalence of sexual assault for men, it has lower than
average prevalence of sexual assault for women, as compared to the overall DoD population. This estimate
does not include the ships assigned to the Naval Station. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is
summarized in the table below.
                                Table C5: Naval Station Norfolk Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
26 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
27 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
28 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
29 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                            111
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
                                                    112
113
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       114
115
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 37: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   116
1.4.1. Leaders reward or recognize appropriate behavior that supports positive norms in a timely manner (e.g., bystander
behaviors, proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and
principles)
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                  117
                                            Dimension 39: Stakeholder Engagement – Priority
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 118
4.3.2. Leaders provide mentorship to provide advice and support the professional development of their subordinates (e.g.,
through regular meetings)
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                 119
5.4. Collaborative structure exists to support integrated primary prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
                                                                 120
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
                                                                  121
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  123
Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs (Saratoga Springs, NY)
Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs, located in Saratoga Springs, NY, has a population of just over 300.
An addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs has higher than average
prevalence of sexual harassment for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. The
additional WGRA analysis also found that while the installation has higher than average prevalence of sexual
assault for women, it has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault for men, as compared to the overall
DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                            Table C6: Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs Harmful Behaviors
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
30 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
31 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
32 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
33 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                            124
Compliance areas that require attention
The OSIE team could not fully assess Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs due to the recent turnover of
staff and leadership. However, the new command team indicated a commitment to rebuilding the SAPR
program by November 2021. A temporary SARC and SAPR VA have been appointed to assist victims.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                    125
126
Compliance areas that require attention
The compliance areas that require attention arose from the Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, the unit of
interested located at Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs. The Command Managed Equal Opportunity
(CMEO) had not received Department Equal Opportunity Management Institute training and did not know the
chain of command of the office. There was improper and incomplete data collection in the office, although the
CMEO is attempting to implement a better tracking and reporting process.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       127
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs prevent Service members from
harming themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect
installations prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                    128
129
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 46: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   130
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 132
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  133
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 134
                                    Dimension 52: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  135
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  137
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton (San Diego, CA)
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, located in San Diego, CA, has a population of just over 46,000. An
addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton has higher than average
prevalence of sexual assault for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. The
additional WGRA analysis also found that while the installation has higher than average prevalence of sexual
harassment for women, it has lower than average prevalence of sexual harassment for men, as compared to
the overall DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                            Table C7: Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
34 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
35 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
36 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
37 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       138
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
                                                    139
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       140
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                    141
142
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 55: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   143
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 145
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  146
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 147
                                    Dimension 61: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  148
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                      149
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  150
Marine Corps Base Hawaii (Kaneohe Bay, HI)
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, located in Kaneohe Bay, HI, has a population of just over 9,000. An addendum to
the 2018 WGRA found that Marine Corps Base Hawaii has higher than average prevalence of sexual assault
for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. The additional WGRA analysis also
found that while the installation has higher than average prevalence of sexual harassment for women, it has
lower than average prevalence of sexual harassment for men, as compared to the overall DoD population.
Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                                  Table C8: Marine Corps Base Hawaii Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
38 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
39 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
40 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
41 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       151
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
                                                    152
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       153
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Marine Corps Base Hawaii prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                      154
155
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 64: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   156
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 158
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  159
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 160
                                    Dimension 70: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  161
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                      162
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  163
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar (San Diego, CA)
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, located in San Diego, CA, has a population of just over 13,000. An
addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Marine Corps Air Station Miramar has higher than average
prevalence of sexual assault for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. The
additional WGRA analysis also found that while the installation has higher than average prevalence of sexual
harassment for women, it has lower than average prevalence of sexual harassment for men, as compared to
the overall DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                              Table C9: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
42 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
43 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
44 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
45 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       164
Compliance areas that require attention
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar should ensure that all SAPR personnel are fully proficient in all aspects of
the DoD Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) program. In additional, the installation should regularly assess
installation SAPR personnel, programs, and resourcing for effectiveness and provide updates to leadership at
quarterly Case Management Group reviews, in accordance with DoDI 6495.02.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                     165
Compliance areas that require attention
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar should increase the amount of training that Equal Opportunity
Representatives receive. In addition, the installation requires more personnel and resources for their Equal
Opportunity program. One Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) for a population of 15,000 is not adequate.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       166
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Marine Corps Air Station Miramar prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                      167
168
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 73: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   169
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 171
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  172
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 173
                                    Dimension 79: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  174
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  176
Dyess Air Force Base (Abilene, TX)
Dyess Air Force Base, located in Abilene, TX, has a population of approximately 5,000. An addendum to the
2018 WGRA found that Dyess Air Force Base has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault and sexual
harassment for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. Available data related to
other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                                    Table C10: Dyess Air Force Base Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
46 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
47 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
48 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
49 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       177
Compliance areas that require attention
Dyess Air Force Base should clarify roles and responsibilities for sexual assault prevention training, and
regularly conduct resource needs assessments to identify solutions for personnel shortages and transitions.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                     178
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       179
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Dyess Air Force Base prevent Service members from harming themselves or
others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations prevention
capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                   180
181
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 82: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   182
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 184
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  185
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 186
                                    Dimension 88: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  187
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                      188
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  189
Laughlin Air Force Base (Del Rio, TX)
Laughlin Air Force Base, located in Del Rio, TX, has a population of approximately 2,500. The 2018 WGRA
found that Laughlin Air Force Base has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault and sexual
harassment for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population. Laughlin Air Force Base
also has fewer suicides, reports of sexual assault, and complaints of sexual harassment than the overall DoD
population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                                   Table C11: Laughlin Air Force Base Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
50 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
51 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
52 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
53 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       190
Compliance areas that require attention
Laughlin Air Force Base should increase the awareness of available and authorized off-base facilities.
Additionally, Laughlin Air Force Base did not provide policy documentation to the OSIE team.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                     191
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       192
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Laughlin Air Force Base prevent Service members from harming themselves
or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations prevention
capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                    193
194
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 91: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   195
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                 197
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                  198
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 199
                                    Dimension 97: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                  200
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                      201
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  202
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Anchorage, AK)
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, located in Anchorage, AK, has a population of approximately 22,000. An
addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson has lower than average
prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment for both men and women, as compared to the overall
DoD population. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson also has fewer reports of sexual assault and complaints of
sexual harassment than the overall DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is
summarized in the table below.
                             Table C12: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
54 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
55 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
56 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
57 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                       203
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
                                                    204
Compliance areas that require attention
It was unclear if Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson’s sexual harassment training had been reviewed and
approved by Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, as required by DoDI 1020.03.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                       205
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                      206
207
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 100: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                   208
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                  210
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                 211
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                 212
                                   Dimension 106: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                 213
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                  215
Vandenberg Space Force Base (Santa Maria, CA)
Vandenberg Space Force Base, located in Santa Maria, CA, has a population of approximately 4,000. An
addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Vandenberg Space Force Base (then Vandenberg Air Force Base)
has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment for both men and women, as
compared to the overall DoD population. Vandenberg Space Force Base also has fewer suicides, reports of
sexual assault, and complaints of sexual harassment than the overall DoD population. Available data related to
other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                           Table C13: Vandenberg Space Force Base Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 TPDO USD(P&R) Memo
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memo, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim assistance,
program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed the
installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
58 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
59 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
60 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
61 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                      217
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              218
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Vandenberg Space Force Base prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                                                                            219
220
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions, making binary
ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish whether various sub-
dimensions were met (marked in Table C4 with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                              Dimension 109: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                             221
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                         222
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                                                                                     223
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
                                                                                                                                     224
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                                                                                         225
7.1. Subordinates and peers are referred to appropriate resources when at-risk for harmful behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.1.1. Leaders are consistently identifying, referring to relevant available programs (e.g., substance use programs, FAP,
mental health treatment, financial literacy education and counseling), and continuing to monitor subordinates that are
displaying harmful behaviors (e.g., by requesting data regarding substance use or incidents within the unit, by visiting the
barracks of Service members)
7.1.2. Peers are consistently identifying and referring peers that are displaying harmful behaviors to relevant available
programs
7.2. Leaders clearly communicate expectations for benchmarks, roles, and responsibilities for improving/maintaining
protective environments to subordinates =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements (one has to be the third bullet “..subordinates are aware of
relevant benchmarks..”)
7.2.1. Leaders clearly communicate specific benchmarks or target goals for improving/maintaining protective environments
7.2.2. Leaders clearly delineate roles and responsibilities for improving/maintaining protective environments for
subordinates
7.2.3. Subordinates are aware of relevant benchmarks and their roles and responsibilities (if any) for improving/maintaining
protective environments
7.3. Leaders proactively monitor the stress levels of subordinates =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.3.1. Leaders check in regularly with subordinates about their stress levels.
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
                                                                                                                               226
                                                   Dimension 116: Integrated Prevention – Implementation
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                                                                                        227
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                               Dimension 117: Stakeholder Engagement - Implementation
                                                                                                                             228
Appendix D: Part 2 Site-Specific Findings
Naval Station Rota (Spain) .............................................................................................................................229
Kentucky National Guard (Tompkinsville, KY) ................................................................................................243
United States Army Garrison Ansbach (Urlas Training Area), Germany .........................................................256
United States Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks/Kaiserslautern), Germany.............................270
United States Army Garrison Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer), Germany....................................................284
United States Army Garrison Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne), Germany ..............................................................298
62 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
63 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
64 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
65 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
66 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                                                                     229
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
                                                                                                              230
Compliance areas that require attention
Naval Station Rota should publicize SAPR policies around reporting, confidentiality and retaliation/ostracism
etc. In addition, SARCs should provide more information to assist commanders to manage trends and
characteristics of sexual assault crimes at the Military Service-level and mitigate the risk factors.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                                                                            231
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              232
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Naval Station Rota prevent Service members from harming themselves or
others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect installations prevention
capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                                                                         233
234
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 118: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                   235
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                   236
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                                                                               237
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                                                                               238
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                                                                                   239
                                   Dimension 124: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                                                                                 240
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                                                                       242
Kentucky National Guard (Tompkinsville, KY)
Kentucky National Guard, located in Tompkinsville, KY, has a population of just over 70.67 As a National Guard
site, not all data on harmful behaviors was available at the OSD level for Kentucky National Guard, but data on
sexual harassment complaints are presented below.
                              Table D2: Kentucky National Guard Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the state is complying with sexual assault, sexual
harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the state was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and the
November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas.
67 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
68 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
69 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
70 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
71 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                                         243
Compliance areas that require attention
Kentucky National Guard should conduct resource needs assessments to identify solutions for tracking victims
and training requirements and publicize policies addressing retaliation and ostracism.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the State was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                                                                         244
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The State did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              245
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help Kentucky National Guard prevent Service members from harming
themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect states’
prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                                                                          246
247
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 127: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                   248
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                   249
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
                                                                                                                               250
4.3.3. Leaders regularly give out information about resources available (e.g., mental health care, child care) to
subordinates to reduce stress and make their life better
4.3.4. Subordinates feel comfortable coming to leaders with concerns about their own or others negative behaviors (e.g.,
bullying, substance use, marital problems, financial problems)
4.4 Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors and consider them in performance evaluations =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
4.4.1. Leaders monitor climate-related efforts and behaviors of subordinates and peers
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                                                                               251
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
                                                                                                                                   252
                                   Dimension 133: Healthy and Protective Environment – Implementation
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
                                                                                                                                 253
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                                                                       255
United States Army Garrison Ansbach (Urlas Training Area), Germany
United States Army Garrison (USAG) Ansbach (Urlas Training Area), located in Germany, has a population of
approximately 500.72 Not all data on harmful behaviors was available at the OSD level for USAG Ansbach, but
data on deaths by suicide, substantiated domestic abuse incidents, and sexual assault reports are presented
below.
                        Table D3: USAG Ansbach (Urlas Training Area) Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas. There were major findings in Strengths
72 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
73 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
74 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
75 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
76 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                                         256
to Leverage and Areas for Improvement that cut across all Germany sites indicated in the table below. Site
specific summaries are found below the table.
                                                                                                                257
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              258
Assessing Installation Prevention Capability
What prevention capabilities help USAG Ansbach (Urlas Training Area) prevent Service members from
harming themselves or others? The figures below depict the extent to which nine dimensions that reflect
installations prevention capability were consistently present at the installation.
                                                                                                          259
260
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 136: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                   261
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                   262
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                                                                                264
5.4. Collaborative structure exists to support integrated primary prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite
turnover of prevention personnel
                                                                                                                                 265
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
                                                                                                                                 266
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                                                                               267
8.3.3. Prevention personnel and leaders look across prevention program evaluations to assess the effectiveness of the overall
prevention approach
8.4. Prevention approach is continuously improved =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
8.4.1. Leaders and practitioners review evaluations and feedback and use this feedback to improve integrated primary
prevention programming over time
8.4.2. Leaders and prevention personnel de-implement ineffective prevention programs
8.5. Resistance to the prevention approach is monitored and addressed =
Consistent evidence supporting 2 out of 3 of these statements
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                                                                                       268
269
United States Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks/Kaiserslautern),
Germany
United States Army Garrison (USAG) Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks/Kaiserslautern), located in Germany,
has a population of approximately 9,200.78 An addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that USAG Rheinland-Pfalz
has lower than average prevalence of sexual assault for both men and women, as compared to the overall
DoD population. The additional WGRA analysis also found that USAG Rheinland-Pfalz also has lower than
average risk of sexual harassment for both men and women, as compared to the overall DoD population.
Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                               Table D4: USAG Rheinland-Pfalz Harmful Behaviors Summary
                                                     Kaiserslautern
                                 Measure                                   2018            2019            2020
        Number of Deaths by Suicide79                                        0               0               0
        Number of Substantiated Domestic Abuse Incidents80                  30              31              24
        Number of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual Assault                    17               9               8
        Number of Restricted Reports of Sexual Assault                       1               9               2
        Estimated Sexual Assault Prevalence              Men               0.5%              -               -
        Rate81                                         Women               4.0%              -               -
                                                         Men               5.3%              -               -
        Estimated Sexual Harassment Risk82
                                                       Women              18.5%              -               -
        Number of Formal Complaints of Sexual Harassment                     0               3               9
        Number of Informal Complaints of Sexual Harassment                   0               0               5
        Number of Anonymous Complaints of Sexual Harassment                  5               0               0
                                                     Smith Barracks
                                Measure                                    2018            2019            2020
        Number of Deaths by Suicide83                                        0               0                *
        Number of Substantiated Domestic Abuse Incidents84                  19              22               16
        Number of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual Assault                    16              19               31
        Number of Restricted Reports of Sexual Assault                       3               5                3
78 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
79 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
80 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
81 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
82 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
84 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
                                                                                                                         270
       Estimated Sexual Assault Prevalence            Men           0.6%            -              -
       Rate85                                        Women          4.5%            -              -
                                                      Men           5.6%            -              -
       Estimated Sexual Harassment Risk86
                                                     Women         20.3%            -              -
       Number of Formal Complaints of Sexual Harassment               0             3              9
       Number of Informal Complaints of Sexual Harassment             0             0              5
       Number of Anonymous Complaints of Sexual Harassment            5             0              0
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas. There were major findings in Strengths
to Leverage and Areas for Improvement that cut across all Germany sites indicated in the table below. Site
specific summaries are found below the table.
85 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
86 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                              271
272
Compliance areas that require attention
USAG Rheinland-Pfalz (Smith Barracks/Kaiserslautern) should regularly conduct resource needs assessments
to identify solutions for workload management, and should regularly assess installation SAPR program
personnel, programs, and resourcing. They should also conduct HRRT training, publicize retaliation and
reprisal policies and procedures, victim notification, and conduct specialized training explaining how to handle
retaliation.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
                                                                                                              273
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                                274
275
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked in Table C4 with either      if met or   if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 145: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                   276
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                   277
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
                                                                                                                               279
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
                                                                                                                               281
                                             Dimension 152: Integrated Prevention – Implementation
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                                                                                  282
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                                                                       283
United States Army Garrison Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer), Germany
United States Army Garrison (USAG) Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer), located in Germany, has a population
of just over 2,500.87 An addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that USAG Bavaria has lower than average
prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment for men, as compared to the overall DoD population.
USAG Bavaria also has fewer reports of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment than the overall
DoD population. Available data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                       Table D6: USAG Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer) Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
87 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
88 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
89 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
90 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
91 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                                         284
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas. There were major findings in Strengths
to Leverage and Areas for Improvement that cut across all Germany sites indicated in the table below. Site
specific summaries are found below the table.
                                                                                                       285
Compliance areas that require attention
USAG Bavaria (Hohenfels-Grafenwhoer) should regularly conduct resource needs assessments to identify
solutions for workload management, and should regularly assess installation SAPR program personnel,
programs, and resourcing. In addition, they should publicize SAPR policies addressing improper disclosure,
victim’s choice to decline participation in investigation, retaliation and ostracism, and ensure proper keeping of
DD 2910s.
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                                                                               286
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              287
288
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions,
making binary ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish
whether various sub-dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or  if NOT met).
                                        Dimension 154: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                   289
1.3.2. Leaders hold subordinates responsible for referring Service members to needed treatment (e.g., for substance use,
suicide) in a timely way when an issue has been identified
1.4. Leaders reinforce positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.4.1. Leaders reward or recognize appropriate behavior that supports positive norms in a timely manner (e.g., bystander
behaviors, proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and
principles)
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
                                                                                                                                   290
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
                                                                                                                                292
5.3. Prevention personnel are dedicated, knowledgeable and skilled in primary prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
                                                                                                                              Unable
5.3.1. Prevention personnel have appropriate KSAs to address continuum of harm in the integrated prevention approach =
                                                                                                                                to
Consistent evidence for this data element = An overall mean score above 3.0 for the eighteen prevention survey items
                                                                                                                              assess
5.3.2. Sufficient number of positions for prevention workforce allocated and hired to ensure integrated primary prevention
approach consistent with addressing harmful behaviors =
Consistent evidence for this data element is derived from the onsite discussions and data call.
5.4. Collaborative structure exists to support integrated primary prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite
turnover of prevention personnel
                                                                                                                                 293
                                                                                                                               Unable
6.2. Prevention personnel are dedicated, knowledgeable and skilled in conducting stakeholder engagement =
                                                                                                                                 to
An overall mean score above 3.0 for the six prevention survey items
                                                                                                                               assess
                                                                                                                               Unable
6.2.1. Prevention personnel have appropriate KSAs to conduct stakeholder engagement                                              to
                                                                                                                               assess
6.3. Stakeholders are knowledgeable about prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
6.3.1. Stakeholders can identify risk and protective factors contributing to unhealthy behaviors and violence
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                                                                               295
8.2.3. Targets across career lifecycle
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                                                                                                                       296
o   PARTICIPATE (3): Leaders and prevention personnel see input BEFORE decisions are made.
o   COLLABORATE (4): Leaders and prevention personnel work with stakeholders to jointly frame the
    problem and the solutions. Leaders and prevention personnel regularly circle back with stakeholders to
    update them on progress
                                                                                                             297
United States Army Garrison Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne), Germany
United States Army Garrison (USAG) Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne), located in Germany, has a population of just
over 7,000.93 An addendum to the 2018 WGRA found that Panzer Kaserne has lower than average prevalence
of sexual assault and risk of sexual harassment for men, as compared to the overall DoD population. Available
data related to other harmful behaviors is summarized in the table below.
                          Table D6: USAG Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne) Harmful Behaviors Summary
Evaluation Findings
Assessing Policy Compliance
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the installation is complying with sexual assault,
sexual harassment and integrated violence prevention policy guidance, as well as strengths and areas for
improvement for each policy area.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (DoDI 6495.02) and November 2019 PTDO USD(P&R)
Memorandum
The first figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 6495.02 and
the November 2019 TPDO USD(P&R) Memorandum, overall and for four key program areas (i.e., victim
assistance, program/policy, training, reporting). Both installation personnel and DoD team members assessed
the installation compliance separately. The second figure demonstrates the extent to which these two separate
assessments agreed, overall and for the same four key program areas. There were major findings in Strengths
93 Estimated site population is derived from the population of the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) that fall under a given
site, as represented on the OSIE Dashboard.
94 Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) data is organized by calendar year. Additionally, death by suicide counts at
the installation level are derived from unit information (open text field) after identifying Assigned Duty Unit State and UIC
Location State by DSPO staff based on information available from the Military Mortality Database (MMDB). This is not a
verified method, but allows DSPO to provide a count estimate.
95 Family Advocacy Program (FAP) data is organized by calendar year.
96 Cells colored red indicate a prevalence estimate higher than the DoD-wide estimate, blue indicate a prevalence
estimate equivalent to the DoD-wide estimate, and green indicate a prevalence estimate lower than the DoD-wide
estimate. OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 6.2% of DoD women experience sexual assault, and 0.7% of
DoD men experience sexual assault.
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA_Overview_Report_0.pdf.
97 OPA’s 2018 WGRA estimated that on average, 24.2% of DoD women experience sexual harassment, and 6.3% of DoD
                                                                                                                         298
to Leverage and Areas for Improvement that cut across all Germany sites indicated in the table below. Site
specific summaries are found below the table.
                                                                                                             299
Compliance areas that require attention
USAG Stuttgart (Panzer Kaserne) should regularly conduct resource needs assessments to identify solutions
for workload management, and should regularly assess installation SAPR program personnel, programs, and
resourcing. In addition, they should conduct HRRT training and publicize policies addressing improper
disclosure, victim preference regarding whether the offense should be prosecuted by court-martial or in a
civilian court, including specifying who may conduct a safety assessment, procedures for victim notification of
case status, and conduct an ongoing assessment of the consistency and effectiveness of the SAPR program.
Furthermore, SARCs should provide information to assist installation commanders to manage trends and
characteristics of sexual assault crimes at the Military Service-level and mitigate the risk factors that may be
present within the associated environment (e.g., the necessity for better lighting in the showers or latrines and
in the surrounding area).
Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces (DoDI 1020.03)
The figure below demonstrates the extent to which the installation was compliant with DoDI 1020.03.
                                                                                                              300
Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm (DoDI 6400.09) and the Prevention
Plan of Action
The installation did a self-assessment of compliance with DoDI 6400.09 and a self-assessment of their sexual
assault prevention infrastructure (e.g., leadership, staffing) based on the infrastructure outlined in the
Prevention Plan of Action. The OSIE team then conducted a separate on-site assessment of the same areas.
The figure below demonstrates the OSIE team’s level of confidence in the installations self-assessment, based
on the extent to which the installations self-assessment aligned with the findings of the OSIE team’s on-site
assessment.
                                                                                                              301
302
Detailed Data Used to Score the Installation Prevention Capability
The tables that follow describe the scoring for each metric. RAND teams scored each installation across nine sub-dimensions, making binary
ratings on a series of data elements (marked with either if met or if NOT met), which were combined to establish whether various sub-
dimensions were met (marked with either       if met or   if NOT met).
                                              Dimension 163: Healthy and Protective Environment – Priority
                                                                                                                                             303
1.5. Leaders role model positive behaviors =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
1.5.1. Leaders are observed modeling appropriate behaviors, such as addressing problematic behaviors or demonstrating
a commitment to diversity and inclusion
2.1.2. Subordinate leaders can identify ways that leaders prioritize integrated primary prevention
2.2. Leaders hold prevention personnel accountable for sustained integrated prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.2.1. Leaders keeps track/follows through to ensure that planned prevention strategies occur (e.g., alcohol prevention
programming, lethal means training)
2.2.2. Leaders holds prevention personnel responsible for collaborating across prevention areas (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.3. Leaders reinforce best practice prevention processes (i.e., sufficient dose, theory-based, evaluated, trained deliverers,
interactive content) =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.3.1. Leaders reward or recognize best practice prevention processes (e.g., through public praise, mentioned in
performance evaluations)
2.3.2. Leaders reward or recognize collaborative efforts that cut across multiple areas of prevention (e.g., alcohol and drug
prevention, suicide prevention)
2.4. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation related to prevention =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
2.4.1. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation for monitoring and improving prevention activities
2.4.2. Leaders prioritize data and evaluation results for informing crosscutting prevention planning and decision making
                                                                                                                                         304
3.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder engagement to inform priorities =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.1.1. Leaders and prevention personnel use stakeholder input to inform setting priorities and/or changing direction of
priorities
3.2. Leader communications stress the importance of stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
3.2.1. Messages and communications from leaders consistently stress importance of including stakeholders in priority
setting
3.3. Leaders and prevention personnel provide positive reinforcement for stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
3.3.1. Leaders/prevention personnel show appreciation for stakeholder investment of time and effort in prevention efforts
3.3.2. Leaders/prevention personnel give credit to stakeholders and others for their contributions to prevention
4.4.2. Leaders address these climate-related efforts and behaviors within performance evaluation criteria for Service
members
5.4.1. A team devoted to integrated prevention exists to include: diverse leaders and personnel from multiple offices with
consistent mechanisms to ensure productive meetings
                                                                                                                                     306
5.4.2. Team has clearly delineated each member's and the full team’s responsibilities, including ongoing meetings and
preparation for integrated primary prevention.
5.5. Continuity of prevention staff and effective prevention activities are maintained over time =
Consistent evidence supporting both these statements
5.5.1. Effective mechanisms exist to ensure prevention positions are transitioned seamlessly and that large gaps in billets
or positions being filled do not occur
5.5.2. Effective mechanisms (e.g., continuity plans) exist to ensure prevention activities remain consistent, despite turnover
of prevention personnel
6.3.2. Stakeholders identify how these factors are addressed in prevention efforts
6.4. Sufficient resources exist to conduct stakeholder engagement =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
6.4.1. Prevention personnel have access to sufficient resources to engage with stakeholders
7.3.2. Leaders communicate that it is okay to seek help to cope with stress.
7.4. Leaders and Service members are held accountable for harmful behaviors in a consistent manner (e.g., through
standard operating procedure) =
Consistent evidence supporting both of these statements
7.4.1. Leaders are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals to
services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.4.2. Service members are held accountable for taking action to improve/maintain protective environments (e.g., referrals
to services made, appropriate disciplinary action taken, lethal means secured)
7.5. Positive behaviors are rewarded/recognized =
Consistent evidence supporting this statement
7.5.1. Service members’ appropriate behaviors (i.e., behaviors that promote positive norms like bystander behaviors,
proper handling of harassment/assault reports; demonstrating strong diversity and inclusion behaviors and principles) are
recognized or rewarded, informally or formally, in a timely manner
                                                                                                                               308
                                                   Dimension 170: Integrated Prevention – Implementation
8.1.4. Different prevention offices are working together regularly to tackle harmful behaviors
8.2. Prevention approach is comprehensive =
Consistent evidence supporting 3 out of 4 of these statements
8.2.1. Targets multiple risk and protective factors that drive harmful behaviors at the installation (e.g., lethal means)
                                                                                                                                        309
8.5.1. Mechanisms exist to measure and track buy-in and resistance among Service members
8.5.2. Prevention personnel follow up when resistance is noted and adapt their approach as is appropriate.
8.5.3. Concerns that may lead to Service member resistance are addressed
                                               Dimension 171: Stakeholder Engagement - Implementation
                                                                                                                             310
Appendix E: Acronyms List
CG          Commanding General
                                                                   Appendix E:
CMEO        Command Managed Equal Opportunity                       Acronyms
CRT         Command Resiliency Team                                    List
DEOCS       Defense Organizational Climate Survey
DHRA        Defense Human Resources Activity
DoD         Department of Defense
DSAID       Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database
DSPO        Defense Suicide Prevention Office
EEO         Equal Employment Opportunity
EOA         Equal Opportunity Advisor
EOL         Equal Opportunity Leader
FAP         Family Advocacy Program
FY          Fiscal Year
IG          Inspector General
KSA         Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes
MEO         Military Equal Opportunity
MMDB        Military Mortality Database
NCO         Non-Commissioned Officer
NGB         National Guard Bureau
ODEI        Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
OPA         Office of People Analytics
OSD         Office of Secretary of Defense
OSIE        On-Site Installation Evaluation
PTDO        Performing the Duties of
SAPR        Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
SAPRO       Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
SARC        Sexual Assault Response Coordinator
TDA         Temporary Duty Assignment
USAG        United States Army Garrison
USD (P&R)   Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
VA          Victim Advocate
VPC         Violence Prevention Cell
311