The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013, 74–97

Personhood: An essential characteristic of

the human species

FREDERICK J. WHITE
Institutional Ethics Committee, Willis-Knighton Health System, Shreveport, LA, USA

This essay postulates that human social order recognizes the personhood of human beings within
two competing constructs—an existential construct that personhood is a state of being inherent and
essential to the human species, and a relational construct that personhood is a conditional state of
value defined by society. These competing constructs establish personhood in both individual and
interpersonal contexts. Within the individual context existential personhood may be posited as a
distinctly human state within the natural order, intrinsic to human life, and independent of the
status of the human being. In the interpersonal context the existential construct holds that
personhood is not a creation of the society, is not a right, and may not be altered or removed by
human fiat. Relational theory presents contra assertions in these two contexts. The Christian view
is taken as a particular case of existential personhood. Argu- ments concerning the nature of human
personhood are metaphysical and consist of philosophical beliefs which may be properly asserted in
either construct. The interpersonal context of personhood lends itself to comparative analysis of the
empirical results associated with both the existential and the relational constructs. This essay
provides an overview analysis of the existential and relational constructs of personhood in the
interpersonal context and finds a broad range of results that are manifestly superior under
existential theory. Such empiricism supports a normative conclusion that the good rests in the
existential construction of human personhood, and gives credence to a claim of truth that personhood
is an essential characteristic of the human species and is not a conditional state dependent upon
circum- stance, perception, cognition, or societal dictum.

Keywords: personhood, existential, relational, human species

“What is man, that thou art mindful of rightly said in Scripture to be made ‘after
him?”1 With these words, the Psalmist God’s image”’ (Augustine ca. 397/2002).
poses a transcendent question. It is a ques- And yet it is not just the Christian who
tion raising wonder that God gives of the recognizes the transcendent nature of
Divine mind to humanity, and a question humanity. The secular mind has also found
recognizing in humanity a wondrous essen- in humanity that which extends beyond the
tial nature. What is it of a human being physical. Plato argued that “when the
that could draw the mind of God? And person has died, his soul exists” (Plato ca.
what is it of human nature that could reflect 380 B.C./1999), and in that argument
the Divine? For the Christian, the answer
found man as “having a share of the divine
has always been the imago Dei—that which
attributes” (Plato ca. 387 B.C./2005).
Augustine defined as “that principle within
For the Christian, the notion that
us by which we are like God, and which
something reflective of the divine exists in
is

© Catholic Medical Association 2013 DOI 10.1179/0024363912Z.00000000010

Manuscript received 00 Month 0000,
accepted 00 Month 0000, revised 00 0000
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 75

all of humanity is foundational to human provides an overview analysis of the exis-

personhood. Personhood manifests the tential and relational constructs of
unity of the spiritual and the corporeal in personhood in the interpersonal context
human existence, and thereby is an essen- and finds a broad range of results that are
tial characteristic of the human species. manifestly superior under existential
Personhood gives to the human individual theory. Such empiricism supports a nor-
a universal worth and an exceptional mative conclusion that the good rests in
standing. And in the transcendent nature the existential construction of human per-
of personhood we find the inalienable sub- sonhood, and gives credence to a claim of
stance of human rights and the genesis of truth that personhood is an essential
society and law. characteristic of the human species and is
But the Christian view of human per- not a conditional state dependent upon
sonhood has been increasingly questioned circumstance, perception, cognition, or
in our time, as has been the notion that societal dictum.
any theory of personhood may be superior
to others. This essay postulates that
human social order recognizes the person- AN EXAMINATION OF PERSONHOOD IN
hood of human beings within two THE INDIVIDUAL CONTEXT
competing constructs—an existential con-
struct that personhood is a state of being What is it that makes a human being
inherent and essential to the human human? And what is it that defines a
species, and a relational construct that human being as a person? These questions,
per- sonhood is a conditional state of value and the corollary interplay between quali-
defined by the society. These competing ties of humanity and qualities of
constructs establish personhood in both personhood, challenge us to reflect on the
the individual and interpersonal contexts. most basic aspects of our existence.
Within the individual context existential
personhood may be posited as a distinctly
human state within the natural order, PERSONHOOD AS A DISTINCTLY HUMAN
intrinsic to human life, and independent STATE WITHIN THE NATURAL ORDER
of the status of the human being. In the
interpersonal context the existential con- The postulate that personhood is a dis-
struct holds that personhood is not a tinctly human state within the natural
creation of the society, is not a right, and order is basically an assertion of human
may not be altered or removed by human exceptionalism. However, for many in our
fiat. The relational construct presents time, the controlling dogma of human
contra assertions in these two contexts. existence rests upon the notion that
The Christian view is taken as a particular humanity is nothing more than a highly
case of existential personhood. developed animal state. The idea of the
Arguments concerning the nature of human species as relatively indistinct from
human personhood are metaphysical and other animals predates modern thought by
consist of philosophical beliefs which may millennia. In an early expression of natur-
be properly asserted in either construct. 2 alistic thought, Pliny the Elder described
The interpersonal context of personhood man as animal in being, though he viewed
lends itself to comparative analysis of the man as “the animal destined to rule all
empirical results of both the existential others.”3 Pliny spoke of man compara-
and the relational constructs. This essay tively, being the least of the animals in the
76 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

frailties of birth and early development, individuals, and an expression of higher

though perhaps superior by virtue of self- intellectual powers, such as the ability to
awareness.4 Even so, Pliny believed that recall past experiences with the ability to
both man and other animals were the generalize them to future events, all
result of some creative force.5 refined by the naturally selective processes
The concept of man solely as an animal of evolution (Darwin 1874, 697–700).
form derived by indifferent acts of the Finally, Darwin held that the nearly uni-
laws of nature reached a later expression versal conviction of mankind in the
in the nineteenth century thought of existence of a powerful Deity was merely
Charles Darwin. Citing trans-species a further development in the evolution of
similarities in embryologic development, morally relevant social and cognitive beha-
in anatomic structure and function, and in viors. The construct of a Deity allowed
the geologic record, Darwin (1874, 694) man to transform those behaviors into
concluded that ‘man is the co-descendant customs extending beyond the confines of
with other mammals of a common a given social context, thus becoming
progenitor’. Adopting an expressly ‘habitual convictions controlled by reason’
naturalistic expla- nation for human (Darwin 1874, 700). The construct of the
existence as a part of the animal world, Divine as a manifestation of social evol-
Darwin (1874, 693–694, ution minimized the relevance of an
695) stated that immortal soul and dismissed as invalid the
the great principle of evolution stands up observation that ‘the belief in God has
clear and firm, when these groups of facts often been advanced as not only the great-
are considered in connection with est but the most complete of all
others…. He who is not content to look distinctions between man and the lower
like a savage, at the phenomena of nature animals’ Darwin (1874).7 For Darwin,
as disconnected, cannot any longer humanity, as characterized by morality and
believe that man is the work of a separate personhood, required no divine principle,
act of creation…. nor imago Dei, but only the relentless
Through the means just specified, aided force of natural selection.8
perhaps by others as yet undiscovered, So, then, do we humans exist only as an
man has been raised to his present state. exalted mammalian phenomenon, driven
to our current state by the invisible power
However, Darwin (1874, 696) went
of natural selection? Certainly many think
further than classical naturalism. Of
not. Plato found intelligence to be the
mankind he held that ‘the high standard
obvious distinctive between man and
of our intellectual powers and moral dis-
animal. As Grube (1958) noted, Plato
position’ also reflected evolutionary
found intelligence as “the most divine
advancement. The former, Darwin (1874,
thing in man, the most essentially human
696–697) stated, could easily be explained
because [it is] the only part of himself
as a natural refinement of the mental
which he does not share with the animal
powers of higher animals. The latter,
kingdom….”9
moral, nature of man Darwin (1874, 697)
Aristotle also found man, though
admitted as “a more interesting problem.”6
animal in nature, still distinct from other
Nonetheless, he construed the moral
animals. Randall (1960, 68) noted that
nature of man to be founded in a combi-
Aristotle held physiology to be common
nation of the expression of social instincts
to all living things, and sensing and
common to lower animals, such as an
responding to stimuli as common to man
enjoyment of the company of other
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 77

and animals.10 However, Aristotle held But it is what follows from rationality
the nous as distinctive to man, being “the that makes humans distinctive in the
power of responding to universals and natural order. St. Thomas was careful to
meanings, the power of acting with delib- construe the capacities of animals to the
eration, with conscious forethought, or sensitive soul, with no per se operation of
acting rationally” Randall (1960, 68).11 In its own and no subsistence (Aquinas ca.
the Metaphysics, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C./ 1274/1952).13 As for man, the Inter-
2008) held that among animals “endowed national Theological Commission has
with sense” humans were distinct in that written that for St. Thomas ‘the image of
“the human race exists by means of art God is realized principally in an act of
also and the powers of reasoning”. contemplation in the intellect’ (Inter-
St. Thomas Aquinas combined these three national Theological Commission 2009).
functions—nutritive, sensory, and rational Lee and George (2008) note that it is the
— into his unitary construct of humanity, free choice and moral agency that flow
with rationality forming the distinctive from human rationality that are distinctive
nature of the human person (Kretzmann of humans.14 Pope Benedict XVI has said
and Stump 1998). And it was here that that the specific distinction between
St. Thomas found company with human beings and animals is that God
St. Augustine in holding this distinctive has made humans “capable of thinking
rationality as the central virtue of the and praying.”15 Here then we find some-
imago Dei (O’Callaghan 200712 ). thing divinely distinctive. Human beings,
And yet it is that rationality per se is not unlike even the most highly developed
sufficient to establish the essence of per- animals, have the capacity to relate to
sonhood, or for the Christian, the imago God, to understand a moral code, and to
Dei. In his exploration of human identity, choose to live by it.
Kavanaugh (2001) has written that ‘if non- As Berry (2007) points out, the divine
human animals…are discovered to have image distinguishing humans from other
reflexive consciousness, and thereby animals transcends naturalism, and “is not
embo- died self-consciousness, they would a genetic or anatomical trait.” As Berry
be persons—even if not of the human writes, it is as if at some point God in a
variety…’. The members of the Great Ape specific act of creation transformed Homo
Project have advocated for the personhood sapiens to Homo divinus, “biologically
of certain species of apes, maintaining that unchanged but spiritually distinct.”
the chimpanzee, the gorilla, and the oran- Even Darwin in later years felt that the
gutan “have mental capacities and an existence of the world as a function of
emotional life sufficient to justify natural processes was not incompatible
inclusion within the community of equals” with the transcendental, and that the
(Cava- lieri et al. 1994). Admitting the rationality of humans implied the possi-
controversial nature of animal language bility of a higher entity subsuming the
studies, nonetheless language and rational natural order. As Darwin observed,
thought may be more reflective of the
Another source of conviction in the exist-
natural order than supposed in prior eras.
ence of God, connected with the reason
And if animals have some form of rational and not with the feelings, impresses me
thought, then a conception of human as having much more weight. This
exceptionalism and of human personhood follows from the extreme difficulty or
based in solely in rationality would need rather impossibility of conceiving this
re-examination. immense and wonderful universe,
78 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

including man with his capacity of

holds that personhood is solely a behavior-
looking far backwards and far into futur-
ity, as the result of blind chance or al characteristic based on physiologic
necessity. When thus reflecting I feel processes and is in no way intrinsic to
compelled to look to a First Cause having human life. As a biologic iteration of the
an intelligent mind in some degree analo- philosophic principles of reductionism, the
gous to that of man; and I deserve to be belief that we are merely complex physio-
called a Theist…. logic machines—both in our existence and
in our actions—is now gaining as a cul-
I cannot pretend to throw the least light
on such abstruse problems. The mystery tural norm. The human being is held to
of the beginning of all things is insoluble be a strictly physical entity in the totality
by us; and I for one must be content to of its existence—an expression of its
remain an Agnostic (Darwin 1887/2005). genome and a product of its ongoing bio-
chemistry. Here, there is nothing intrinsic
Here Darwin not only recognized a or transcendent to human personhood,
central limitation of his theory, but also and nothing distinctive about a human
the constraint placed on its extrapolation being. Human existence has no true meta-
by the Kantian distinction between the a physical basis, and cannot survive physical
priori judgments of conceptual philosophy death.
and the a posteriori conclusions of empiri- Venturing beyond the older prop-
cal science.16 And herein we find a final ositions that humanity may be reduced to
point concerning the human state—that a a naturalistically derived higher animal
broad application of the divide between form, these modern arguments seek to
the work of conceptual philosophy and strip away any metaphysical residual of
empiric science places the naturalistic personhood. Building on the classic ato-
arguments of the Darwinians in proper mistic tradition of Democritus and
perspective. The Darwinian arguments are modifying the teachings of Cartesian
relevant as to the origin of species, but are dualism,17 these modern thinkers dismiss
simply not determinative as to whether the concept of the person as a unity of
there is or was an Originator. Although body and soul as espoused by St. Thomas
empiric evidence may be relevant to Aquinas, and propose that all of human
species development, such evidence has existence, both the physical and the meta-
no bearing on the non-testable concept of physical, may be reduced to the actions of
a First Cause. Naturalism does not have the physical substrate of the body at
standing to conclusively refute the various levels of function. Arguing to ‘put
doctrine of imago Dei, nor to defeat the consciousness back in the brain’, Searle
assertion, founded in human (2007) has maintained that conscious
exceptionalism, that personhood is a phenomena are concrete, non-abstract,
distinctly human state within the natural and exist within the brain in space and
order. time as a function of neuronal activity.
Sir Francis Crick (1995) has explicitly
taken the argument beyond consciousness
PERSONHOOD AS INTRINSIC TO HUMAN to a frank rejection of the concept of an
LIFE innate soul. He began his recent examin-
ation of the human soul with what he
A more recent argument against a distinc- termed as “the Astonishing Hypothesis,”
tive nature of human personhood in stating that
general and the imago Dei in particular
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 79

“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your can be neither apprehended nor realized
memories and your ambitions, your sense to any extent at all. Without soul the
of personal identity and free will, are in physical world on the other hand could
fact no more than the behavior of a vast not even exist.
assembly of nerve cells and their associ-
ated molecules (p. 3).
St. Thomas Aquinas succinctly stated that
“it belongs to the notion of man to be
He goes on to say that “a modern neu-
composed of soul, flesh, and bones.”20
robiologist sees no need for the religious
St. Thomas found the soul to be “the first
concept of a soul to explain the behavior
principle of life of those things which
of humans and other animals” (p. 6).
Modern neurobiological reductionists live.”21 He held that the soul has progress-
simply dismiss the soul as archaic, irrele- ive expression, such that in man “the
vant, and unnecessary. Personhood is for sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the
the neurobiologist a purely material and nutritive soul are numerically one soul.”22
natural phenomenon. While “the body is necessary for the action
of the intellect,” he also held it as true that
Is personhood, then, a dependent
“the intellectual principle which we call
expression of the biologic state of human
the mind or the intellect has an operation
life, and not an intrinsic foundation of
per se apart from the body.”23 And of the
that life? Are we simply maintained by the
qualities of the intellect, he found it to be
sprightly contortions of atoms within the
both “incorporeal and subsistent.”24
cohabitations of our genes? Again, many
think not. Swinburne (1998) notes that “in more
Platonic and Christian teachings assert modern times, the view that humans have
that the human person is a unity of the souls has always been understood as the
separable entities of body and soul, and view that humans have an essential part,
that that the soul is intrinsic to human separable from the body as depicted by
life. For Plato it was clear that the essence Plato and Aquinas.” Finding human intel-
of a human being transcends its physical lectual capacity inseparable from the life
substrate, both in physical life and after force, associated with but divisible from
death. When Socrates was asked how he the body, and persisting after death, Plato
should be buried, Plato reported his reply and Aquinas recognized in the human
as, “However you wish, provided you individual a distinctive nature. In that dis-
catch me.”18 Socrates went on to say, tinction the personhood of the human
“When I drink the poison, I shall no individual is intrinsic to human life and is
longer remain with you, but shall go off uniquely transcendent within the natural
and depart for some happy state of the order. Plato and Aquinas would find the
blessed….”19 Grube (1958, 149) held that Astonishing Hypothesis to be just that—
for Plato the function of the soul is “the and would reject it as a clear inversion of
fusion of the intelligible with the physical.” truth and reality.
Grube (1958) described this Platonic con- Bennett and Hacker (2003, 399–408)
struct of the soul further: have recently argued that the application
of a modified Cartesian dualism, and
It alone can apprehend the universal, it subsequently of reductionism, to the
alone can initiate the harmonious and physiologic studies of neuroscience marks
rhythmical motions that are life. The the beginning of a mistaken intrusion of
Forms do not depend, it is true, upon it philosophy into the field. They maintain
for their existence, but without it they that neuroscience should properly be
80 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

confined to that which it can empirically especially of pleasure and pain, and the
measure and study.25 Echoing Kant (and concernment that accompanies it, it will
Darwin), they argue that, “No neuroscien- be hard to know wherein to place personal
tific discoveries can solve any of the identity” (Locke, 1849). In our time,
conceptual problems that are the proper Swinburne (1986, 161, 177) has addressed
province of philosophy, any more than the this question, finding that “conscious
empirical discoveries of physicists can persons consist of body and soul”, that
prove mathematical theorems” (Bennett personal identity is “constituted by same-
and Hacker, 2003, 407). Understanding ness of soul”, and that “persons continue
this, any deterministic assault of biologic to exist while asleep” because the sleeping
reductionism upon the assertion that per- body “will again by normal processes give
sonhood is intrinsic to human life, or rise to a conscious life, or can be caused to
upon the doctrine of the imago Dei, is give rise to a conscious life….” Swinburne
simply inconclusive. (1986, 179) noted that under certain cir-
So, that which makes a human being cumstances, such as those of a comatose
human, and that which defines an individ- patient, this construction could allow a
ual human being as a person, remains person and his soul to cease to exist and
subject to competing arguments of philos- then come to exist again.
ophy and belief. It is thus proper to assert Dennett (1981, 268–269) has proposed
that nature evidences human personhood that personhood, though “an intuitively
as not only distinct within the natural invulnerable notion,” is a state consisting
order, but also intrinsic to human life.
of both a metaphysical and a moral
element, and is subject to several
necessary conditions. Among the
PERSONHOOD AS INDEPENDENT OF THE conditions he applies to personhood are
STATUS OF A HUMAN BEING rationality, con- sciousness, the attitude or
stance taken by society, capacity for
Even among those who accept personhood reciprocity, capability for verbal
as a distinctly human state within the communication, and a self- consciousness
natural order, and intrinsic to human life, (Dennett 1981, 269–271).26 Dennett
there is argument as to whether person- observes that, in application of necessary
hood remains a conditional expression of conditions to personhood,
human existence. Does a human being
exist as a person sui generis, by the simple we recognize conditions that exempt
virtue of being human? Or does person- human beings from personhood, or at
hood follow after the human condition, least some very important elements of
existing as a disparate state among humans personhood. For instance, infant human
—more fully expressed in some than beings, mentally defective human beings,
others, and perhaps not existing in others and human beings declared insane by
at all? licensed psychiatrists are denied person-
hood, or at any rate crucial elements of
John Locke accepted the concept of
personhood (Dennett 1981, 267).
soul, but viewed personhood of the indi-
vidual as a distinct state, closely tied to This conditional concept of person-
consciousness—“Socrates asleep, and hood, defined by society, allows a
Socrates awake, is not the same person…. relativistic application of human rights
For if we take wholly away all conscious- which reverberates through human life
ness of our actions and sensations, from beginning to end. Absent an absolute
and inviolable attachment of personhood
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 81

to the human condition, the status of separable because it is the last; nor,
many humans becomes questionable. because it is a small one, must it be
Discussing conditional personhood as regarded as susceptible of dissolution.
pertaining to end-of-life issues, the Hon-
orable Barry Schaller (2008), an Associate Lee and George (2008) have come to a
Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, similar conclusion. They note that “if the
noted that such questions were central to moral status-conferring attribute varies in
the recent case of Terri Schiavo. degrees,” then “it will follow that some
humans will possess the attribute in ques-
The case of Terri Schiavo…raised a tion in a higher degree than other
virtual cascade of questions that concern humans, with the result that not all
the state of American society and culture. humans will be equal in fundamental
What is the nature of personhood and moral worth, that is, dignity” (p. 85).
when does it end? What level of respect
Conditional personhood is flawed in its
and, with it, autonomy accompanies an
individual into old age or incapacity?
argument that a lesser expression alters the
very state of personhood. It is as if one
As the human body deteriorates, does argued that the dim light of a candle is a
personhood devolve? Is an ill or dying different light (or is not light at all) due to
human being accorded less status as a the existence of the light of the sun. Light
person than others? Such propositions is light suapte natura in whatever
directly question whether personhood is a expression it is found, and so is human
conditional state rather than an innate personhood in its expression.
characteristic of human beings. If person- Similar questions at the beginning of
hood can end before life ends, then life have been highly controversial in our
human nature becomes a fragile culture, but date to antiquity. The Pytha-
expression of self-awareness, and is not a goreans expressly believed that the embryo
robust and inalienable foundation of was a living being, ensouled from the
human rights and culture. moment of conception, and that ensouled
The Apostle Paul directly addressed the human life, as divine in part, was to be
transcendence of human personhood by inherently respected and protected until
teaching that personal identity survives natural death.28 Similar teachings regard-
physical death, stating that “we are confi- ing the beginning of life were proffered in
dent, I say, and willing rather to be absent the early Christian church by Tertullian
from the body, and to be present with the and Gregory of Nyssa, finding in the
Lord.”27 Speaking of the end of life, Ter- embryo human dignity not only by virtue
tullian held that human personhood was of ensoulment but also by virtue of respect
not removed in impending death but for the more fully developed human being
rather limited in its fullest expression. Ter- yet to come.29
tullian (ca. 209/1903) held that Levine (1988) recently reflected on
similar points as they pertain to the social
when death is a lingering one, the soul implications of the beginning of life:
abandons its position in the way in which
itself is abandoned. And yet it is not by As we consider how we ought to treat the
this process severed in fractions: it is human fetus or embryo, the most con-
slowly drawn out; and whilst thus structive questions are: When does a
extracted, it causes the last remnant to developing human begin to acquire the
seem to be but a part of itself. No entitlements of membership in the moral
portion, however, must be deemed (human) community? When does it
82 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

begin to count as one of us? When

personhood is simply founded in differ-
should it become enfranchised by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United ences in belief and is not subject to any
States Constitution? These are metaphys- support in empiricism.
ical questions, and, thus, are not The assertion that personhood is inde-
susceptible to resolution using the devices pendent of the status of the human being
of ethics. Practical answers, if any, will thereby forms a third principle for under-
issue from the political process (p. 300). standing personhood in the individual
context. Along with personhood as a dis-
It is of profound importance to recognize tinctly human state within the natural
that the relation of personhood to the status order, and personhood as intrinsic to
of the individual human being at any stage human life, these three conceptual foun-
of life is essentially a metaphysical concern. dations proffer an understanding of
For thereby, just as the prior questions of personhood as an essential of the existence
personhood as a distinctly human state of the human individual. For the Chris-
within the natural order and personhood as tian, these principles rest on and evidence
intrinsic to human life, so also questions the imago Dei, and for the greater society
relating personhood to the status of the they form a basis for understanding per-
individual human are subject to competing sonhood in the interpersonal context.
philosophies, beliefs, and assertions.
In our time, Pope John Paul II preached
to the world of the innate value and dignity
AN EXAMINATION OF PERSONHOOD IN
of human life at all times and in all states.
THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT
As Coughlin (2003) has noted, “The belief
that each human being possesses a meta-
How do human beings recognize others as
physical value simply in the fact of his or
individuals? And how does a human com-
her existence remains at the root of John
munity relate to individuals as humans
Paul II’s indefatigueable defense of human
and as persons? These questions are
dignity.” John Paul II (1995) stated in
rooted in the metaphysical concepts of the
Evangelium Vitae that “Man has been given
human as an individual, but have profound
a sublime dignity, based on the intimate
practical importance in all aspects of
bond which unites him to his Creator: in
human life. From such primary appli-
man there shines forth a reflection of God
cations as the recognition of human rights
himself.” And John Paul II (1998) held
to such practical applications as daily
firmly that this dignity was unconditionally
decisions in health care, personhood forms
innate and essential to the human existence,
the fundamental basis of the human com-
teaching that “the sacredness of the human
munity. And, unlike personhood in the
person cannot be obliterated, no matter
individual context, the application of con-
how often it is devalued and violated,
cepts of personhood in the interpersonal,
because it has its unshakeable foundation in
or social, context is subject to empiric
God as Creator and Father.”
observation. Competing metaphysical con-
So, the assertion of personhood as inde- cepts of the personhood of individuals will
pendent of the status of the human being have differing concrete practical appli-
is a rational and metaphysical argument, cations and associated results, and will
and an entirely proper proposal, even for lend themselves to comparative analysis.
those who cannot ground their approach This analysis begins with two fundamental
in the Christian tradition. Any attempt to assertions: that personhood is a distinctly
dismiss the imago Dei as inconsistent with human state within the natural order,
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 83

intrinsic to human life, and independent depths of our being, it continues here
of the status of the human being—an slowly, and almost right up to our own
assertion of existential personhood—and the time, to be built upon….” Karl Marx
antithetical position that personhood is a (1875, 1998) used a relational construct of
conditional state dependent upon circum- personhood as foundational to his
stance, perception, cognition, or societal thought, stating that “the essence of man
dictum—an assertion of relational person- is no abstraction inherent in each separate
hood. In existential thought, characteristics individual. In its reality it is the ensemble
of human personhood are innate and are (aggregate) of social relations.”
to be discovered. For relational theorists, The construct that the individual is
the characteristics of human personhood indistinct from the greater society and that
are to be defined by the society. personhood is a relational state within
society—being granted by society on
terms agreed upon by the group—has
PERSONHOOD IS NOT A CREATION OF observable and measurable associated
THE SOCIETY results. This construct allows the person to
be respected and valued by society in a
Existential personhood places certain subjective and variable ethic. It allows
demands upon a society. It calls upon a political structures, even those founded in
society to recognize the dignity and worth democratic principles, to produce
of the individual by reason of the life of the decidedly anti- democratic results—
individual. It places the dignity and worth establishing distinc- tions among persons
of the individual above the collective power by fiat and validating arbitrary class
of the society, as a superior virtue and it hierarchies. And in so doing, the relational
demands prima facie a societal rejection of construct undermines justice and corrupts
the relational construct of personhood. its application.
Certainly many have argued against The relational construct found an early
such demands of the existential construc- expression in Aristotle’s views on slavery.
tion. Lindsay (1935/1992) maintained Aristotle held that some persons possess
that Plato would assert ‘the distinction certain natural characteristics—a childlike
between what man is in himself and what demeanor, for example—that make them
he is in society’ as “invalid and unreal”. slaves by nature (Rist 1982). And he held
Cooley (1902/2009, 37) similarly spoke, that other individuals are masters by virtue
holding that ‘“society” and “individuals” do of being a certain type of person by
not denote separable phenomena, but are nature, and not by virtue of knowledge or
simply collective and distributive aspects skill (Schofield 1999). The society is, in
of the same thing’. Others more expressly Aristotelian thought, acting properly and
believe that society maintains a “super intuitively in establishing slavery based
organic” role, holding power to actually upon these differences. A more recent
determine what constitutes a valid expression of this application of relational
person.30 Mauss (1985) proposed that the personhood was found in the nineteenth
concept of self had “slowly evolved” century United States Supreme Court
through a succession of forms in different ruling in Dred Scott v. Sanford, explicitly
societies. Mauss (1985, 20) said of the affirming the ability of a “dominant race”
notion of the person that “far from exist- to grant rights to “a subordinate and
ing as the primordial innate idea, clearly inferior class of beings.”31
engraved since Adam in the innermost The concept that the powerful members
of a society may declare a class of
84 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

individuals to be an “inferior class of eliminate the Jews, Goldhagen (1997) has

beings” bereft of constitutional rights and noted that at the essence of the German
privileges demonstrates a relational con- policies was the objective to “turn the Jews
struct of personhood in political into ‘socially dead’ beings…and, once they
application. Here, an ostensibly demo- were, to treat them as such.”
cratic society turns to its fundamental Analyzing the roots of genocide under
conception of persons as the explicit basis the Khmer Rouge, Alexander Laban
for political subjugation of individuals. Hinton noted that dehumanization was a
Socialism and communism both rest central strategy:
on a similar subjugation of the individual,
but subjugated to the state as opposed to Genocidal regimes manufacture differ-
some superior class of persons. In Marxist ence in a number of important and
social structures, there is no conception of interrelated ways…. First, genocidal
existential personhood. There is no recog- regimes construct, essentialize, and
nition of the existence and authority of propagate sociopolitical categories, crys-
God, nor of the imago Dei of persons. As tallizing what are normally more
complex, fluid, and contextually variable
Marx said, a “higher phase of Communist
forms of identity.
society” would exist “after the enslaving
subordination of the individual to the …Genocidal perpetrators often manufac-
division of labor, and…after labor has ture difference by transforming their
become not only a means of life but life’s victims into caricatures of these dehuma-
prime want…” (Marx 1875/2008). In nizing images (Hinton 2005).
Warning to the West, Aleksandr Solzhenit-
It is important to note that this dehu-
syn struck directly at the ends derived
manization permissively builds upon a
from the relativistic origins of communism
foundation of relational personhood, here
and its arbitrary class structures when he
expressed as a social norm of
noted that ‘Communism considers moral-
“contextually variable forms of identity”
ity to be relative, to be a class matter.
(Hinton 2005).
Depending on circumstances and the pol-
Compare these results with those of
itical situation, any act, including murder,
existential personhood. That portion of
even the killing of hundreds of thousands,
the concept of existential personhood
could be good or bad. It all depends upon
which is manifested by an immortal soul
class ideology’ (Solzhenitsyn 1976).32
was held as a virtue of the individual at
Genocide finds origin in relational per-
the conclusion of the Republic:
sonhood, seizing class ideology and
turning it upon entire populations. Hitler But if you will listen to me, and believe
(1925/2010) held that “in this world that the soul is immortal and able to
everything that is not of sound racial stock endure all evil and all good, we shall
is like chaff.” Nazi genocide found its always hold to the upper road, and in
nascent expression in the sterilization law every way follow justice and wisdom
of 1933, directed toward the mentally and (Plato ca. 380 B.C./1992).34
physically disabled as a population con- Though viewing personhood of the
sidered to be inferior and excluded from individual as tied to consciousness, John
German society (Friedlander 1995).33 Locke nonetheless held that “all men by
Once the walls of personhood were brea- nature are equal” (Locke 1821). From this
ched, the Final Solution quickly followed. assertion, and its corollary concept of
In evaluating the Nazi program to natural freedom, he developed arguments
regarding the derivation of government
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 85

from the consent of the governed and freedom. A relational construct of person-
regarding the limitation of slavery.35 hood allows supremacy of the society, the
But the fullest expression of existential subjection of individuals to unjustly
personhood is in the teachings of the promoted relativistic societal definitions
Christian church. Here, in profoundly and demands, and arbitrary imperilment of
absolute declarations, we find that “being the worth and well-being of persons. This
in the image of God the human individual empirical analysis, at least in the context
possesses the dignity of a person, who is of the practical rationality of natural law
not just something, but someone”36 and theory, finds manifestly superior results
that “social justice can be obtained only in associated with the application of an exis-
respecting the transcendent dignity of tential construct of personhood, and
man. The person represents the ultimate supports the conclusion that the good rests
end of society, which is ordered to him.”37 in the existential assertion that personhood
Herein we find powerful applications of is not a creation of society.42
the imago Dei. In A.D. 1435 Pope
Eugene IV unequivocally condemned the
slavery of “persons” taken by “advantage PERSONHOOD IS NOT A RIGHT
of their simplicity” with penalty of
excommu- nication.38 In our time Pope Existential personhood exalts human
John Paul II criticized the minimization rights, but it does not exalt them in the
of the human person by socialism. He highest. A close corollary to the prior con-
held that “social- ism considers the clusion that personhood is not a creation
individual person simply as an element, a of society is the understanding that per-
molecule within the social organism, so sonhood is not defined by or dependent
that the good of the indivi- dual is upon the conceptualization of rights.
completely subordinated to the Existential personhood views rights as
functioning of the socio-economic mech- possessions of the individual and not as
anism.”39 He then exposed the relativistic properties which define the individual.
underpinnings of socialism, holding that Some rights are intrinsic to the human
‘the denial of God deprives the person of condition, such as the right to maintain
his foundation, and consequently leads to and defend life, and others are created and
a reorganization of the social order dispensed by the society, such as the pol-
without reference to the person’s dignity itical right to speak freely. But none,
and responsibility’.40 And as to the relati- either singly or in combination, are consti-
vistic evils of genocide, John Paul II, tutive of personhood.
citing “fraternal sentiments, rooted in Relational theory allows for an individ-
faith” from the teachings of St. Paul, ual right to personhood, and thereby
stated that “the church firmly condemns rejects the existential proposition of the
all forms of genocide as well as the racist person, though probably with good inten-
theories that have inspired and claimed to tions. In discussing human rights in the
justify them.”41 context of the European Social Charter,
So, a comparative analysis finds that an Heringa (1998), Dean of the Maastricht
existential construct of personhood places Faculty of Law, referred to “the right to
demands upon the society, requiring it to personhood and the equality principle” as
respect the essential dignity of the human “mixed rights: liberty as well as social
individual as a person, to recognize the right.” Others have construed a right to
equality of individuals in creation, and to personhood in Articles 1 and 2 of the
thereby promote the causes of justice and
86 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of for the fetus was ‘the potentiality of
Germany (Heldrich and Rehm 2001). human life’.46
In the United States, the concept of a By contrast, the argument for existential
right to personhood has not been well personhood and against a specific right to
propounded. Even in Roe v. Wade, the personhood is probably most clearly and
issue for all concerned was whether the expressly made in distinctions drawn in
fetus is a person, not whether the fetus has the Declaration of Independence of the
a right to personhood. United States of America.
The appellee and certain amici argue that We hold these truths to be self-evident,
the fetus is a “person” within the language that all men are created equal, that they
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amend- are endowed by their Creator with certain
ment. In support of this, they outline at unalienable Rights, that among these are
length and in detail the well-known facts Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
of fetal development. If this suggestion of ness.—That to secure these rights,
personhood is established, the appellant’s Governments are instituted among Men,
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ deriving their just powers from the
right to life would then be guaranteed consent of the governed… (United States
specifically by the Amendment. The 1776/1911).
appellant conceded as much on reargu-
ment. On the other hand, the appellee Herein we find an existential testament
conceded on reargument that no case that ‘all men are created equal’ and an
could be cited that holds that a fetus is a acknowledgment that all individuals
person within the meaning of the Four- possess by endowment inalienable rights
teenth Amendment.43 by virtue of the fact of human existence.
Justice Blackmun explicitly noted that Existential personhood is clearly mani-
fested in this testament by the expression
“the Constitution does not define “person”
of its demand for equality. And person-
in so many words.”44 Roe finally turned on
hood is distinguished in concept in the
fetal development and not on personhood.
text by its separation from the subsequent
Justice Blackmun held that the State
delineation and discussion of rights.
has legitimate interests in protecting both To be ‘created equal’ is a state of being.
the pregnant woman’s health and the This state of equality in creation trans-
potentiality of human life, each of which cends the concept of rights and cannot be
interests grows and reaches a “compel- constrained as a right belonging to a
ling” point at various stages of the human being. Acknowledgement of this
woman’s approach to term.45
in forms of government is a political rec-
In Roe, the fetus gained no recognition ognition of one of the principles of the
of personhood, and the rights of the fetus imago Dei. And the recognition that
were not recognized or established. Its inalienable rights of humans endow due to
interests were held to grow with fetal equality in creation is further support to
development, such that those interests the conclusion that the good rests in the
progressively express in rough concert existential construct of personhood.
with the ability of the fetus to survive. The
pol- itical rights of personhood seem to PERSONHOOD IS INVIOLABLE
vest with viability. While avoiding
confusion over a right to personhood, the A final expression of existential person-
closest that Justice Blackmun came to an hood is the observation that personhood is
identity
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 87

inviolable. That personhood is not a cre- fault of his own he is deprived of the
ation of the society, but rather an means of livelihood.49
expression of the imago Dei, demands that
It is generally accepted today that the
personhood be held as sacred by individ- common good is best safeguarded when
uals, the society, and the state. Persons personal rights and duties are guaranteed.
created in equality, whose human rights The chief concern of civil authorities
vest not on societal distinctions but in must therefore be to ensure that these
existence as individuals, may not have rights are recognized, respected, co-
their rights arbitrarily violated. The Uni- ordinated, defended, and promoted, and
versal Declaration of Human Rights that each individual is enabled to perform
recognizes that human rights are possessed his duties more easily. For “to safeguard
by ‘all human beings’ by virtue of birth, the inviolable rights of the human person,
and that no distinction among human and to facilitate the per- formance of his
duties, is the principal duty of every
beings may remove those rights.47
public authority”.50
The cause of justice demands that the
weak and the strong, the greatest and the Those who deny these truths have in our
least, the healthy and the dying, all enjoy time advocated for abortion, infanticide,
the same benefit of the respect and dignity and euthanasia, as well as an economically
of persons. As Pope John XXIII taught: utilitarian basis for the provision of health
Any well-regulated and productive care. These arguments all share a rational
associ- ation of men in society demands basis in the relational construct of person-
the acceptance of one fundamental hood. Peter Singer has endorsed a relational
principle: that each individual man is construction of human personhood. Singer
truly a person. His is a nature, that is, (1994, 180) notes that
endowed with intelligence and free will.
As such he has rights and duties, which we often use “person” as if it meant the
together flow as a direct consequence same as “human being.” In recent discus-
from his nature. These rights and duties sions in bioethics, however, “person” is
are universal and inviolable, and therefore now often used to mean a being with
altogether inalienable.48 certain characteristics, such as rationality
and self-awareness.
This, perhaps more than any other
concept discussed thus far, has daily prac- Here we see human society choosing which
tical importance. John XXIII asserted that among the many characteristics common
personhood, by virtue of its attendant to human beings will define “persons.”
inviolable rights, placed both fundamental Though the characteristics themselves may
and derivative demands upon society: be quite fundamental, the very distinction
drawn by their variability among human
But first We must speak of man’s rights. individuals, and the social valuation of that
Man has the right to live. He has the variation, founds a relational ethic.
right to bodily integrity and to the means Singer (1994, 182) builds upon this
necessary for the proper development of
relational foundation, expanding it to
life, particularly food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, rest, and, finally, the
practical social utility. Here Singer finds
necess- ary social services. In common ground with existential theorists
consequence, he has the right to be looked in recognizing the importance of the con-
after in the event of illhealth; disability struction of personhood adopted by a
stemming from his work; widowhood; old society. Singer notes that “the term
age; enforced unemployment; or ‘person’ is no mere descriptive label.
whenever through no
88 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

It carries with it a certain moral standing.” to ration and allocate health care. Discuss-
Singer recognizes that such a moral stand- ing the cost-utility concept of the quality
ing may empower the society with adjusted life year (QALY), Michael Lock-
actionable authority. He bluntly states that wood placed personhood in a subjectively
the fact that a being is a human being, variable utilitarian ethic, noting that
in the sense of a member of the species
Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the
The concept of a QALY is…in one sense
wrongness of killing it; it is, rather,
only a framework, requiring to be fleshed
characteristics like rationality, autonomy,
out by some substantive conception of
and self-consciousness that make a differ-
what contributes to or detracts from the
ence. Infants lack these characteristics.
intrinsic value or worthwhileness of a life,
Killing them, therefore, cannot be
and to what degree—a conception, that
equated with killing normal human
is, of what it is about a life that deter-
beings, or any other self-conscious beings
mines of how much benefit it is to the
(Singer 1993).
person whose life it is. To this extent, the
At the end of life, Singer and Helga concept is highly permissive: one can, as
it were, plug in whatever conception of
Kuhse have reached similar conclusions.
value one personally favours. (Lockwood
Kuhse (1987) writes, “there is a strong
1988)
connection between the value of life and
the interests of the being whose life it is.
Life may be in a being’s interests, or it Here society asserts the power to vari-
may not—depending what the life is like.” ably define the “intrinsic value” of an
Singer and Kuhse argue that “human life individual life, imposing societal con-
has no intrinsic value but gives rise to two straints as to when life may be beneficial
values: well-being and the value of liberty to the person. Such a relational construc-
or self-determining action…. [D]octors tion appropriates sweeping powers to the
should, whenever possible, maximize State and sets the stage for arbitrary allo-
these values. This may include active cation of life sustaining resources. Such a
euthana- sia…” (Kuhse and Singer 2002). construction is inherently dangerous in a
Paterson (2008) examined these con- time of plenty, and could easily become
cepts as a justification for suicide, assisted malevolent in times of scarcity.53
suicide, and euthanasia. Paterson noted These applications of relational person-
that these concepts allow that hood all share a common theme—
decisions regarding the lives, the welfare,
life is regarded as a positive value as long
and the treatment of persons are made in
as it can “hold its own” against other com-
peting considerations like the disvalue of
a variable ethic, subject to the dictum of
human suffering. The value of human the greater society. A result of this ethic is
life, in the face of competing that persons of advantage or authority may
considerations, is said to diminish or take actions toward vulnerable persons
wane in quality to the point that intending which do not depend upon the consent of
death becomes a rational-choice worthy those individuals and may not reflect their
option.51 best interests. And in this way, these prac-
tical applications of relational personhood
He then interprets the teachings of Kuhse in health care share a commonality with
as justifying the killing of some the broader political applications of rela-
individuals in a quality-of-life ethic.52 tional personhood in slavery, communism
Relational constructs of personhood and genocide.54
also figure prominently in justifying
decisions
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 89

Compare these results with those in accordance with generally approved

associated with the application of existen- medical principles….
tial personhood to these questions. Here 10. Right to dignity
we find clear and unwavering principles.
Catholic social teaching clearly states that, (a) The patient’s dignity and right to
“It is necessary to state firmly once more privacy shall be respected at all times
that nothing and no one can in any way in medical care and teaching, as shall
his/her culture and values.
permit the killing of an innocent human
(b) The patient is entitled to relief of
being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an
his/her suffering according to the
infant or an adult, an old person, or one current state of knowledge.
suffering from an incurable disease, or a (c) The patient is entitled to humane
person who is dying.”55 Pope John Paul II terminal care and to be provided
explicitly condemned euthanasia in ency- with all available assistance in
clical doctrine “based upon the natural law making dying as dignified and
and upon the written word of God,” comfortable as possible….58
stating that “euthanasia is a grave violation
of the law of God, since it is the deliberate Here personhood forms the basis for a
and morally unacceptable killing of a nondiscriminatory ethic for medicine,
human person.”56 The World Medical protecting individual dignity in primacy
Association has also unequivocally con- and providing humane care on a best
demned euthanasia, holding that, interests standard. However, it is impor-
“Euthanasia, that is the act of deliberately tant to note that even this construction
ending the life of a patient, even at the must be carefully framed on an existential
patient’s own request or at the request of basis. For otherwise, the best interests
close relatives, is unethical.”57 standard supplies little protection from
And as to medical care for the weak discrimination in the determination of
and the vulnerable, the World Medical what constitutes “appropriate medical
Association Declaration on the Rights of care.”59 Absent a commitment to an exis-
the Patient sets forth principles regarding tential personhood of humanity, the right
certain rights of all patients, implicitly of “every person” to be free of discrimi-
including individuals in conditions of nation is quite distinct from a right
debility and infirmity, establishing in protecting all human beings.
relevant part: The Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Healthcare Services of the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
1. Right to medical care of good quality
more directly rejects the utilitarian
approach to medical care, holding that
(a) Every person is entitled without
discrimination to appropriate medical In accord with its mission, Catholic
care. health care should distinguish itself by
(b) Every patient has the right to be service to an advocacy for those people
cared for by a physician whom he/ whose social condition puts them at the
she knows to be free to make clinical margins of our society and makes them
and ethical judgements without any particularly vulnerable to discrimination;
outside interference. the poor, the uninsured and the underin-
(c) The patient shall always be treated in sured; children and the unborn; single
accordance with his/her best inte- parents; the elderly; those with incurable
rests. The treatment applied shall be diseases and chemical dependencies;
90 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

racial minorities; immigrants and refu-

CONCLUSIONS
gees. In particular, the person with
mental or physical disabilities, regardless
of the cause or severity, must be treated The personhood of a human being is a
as a unique person of incomparable worth foundational concept for all that we are
with the same right to life and to ade- and all that we do. Throughout history,
quate health care as all other persons personhood has been a topic of human
(United States Conference of Catholic inquiry, a subject of philosophy, and basis
Bishops 2009). of political power. Each society finds in its
accepted construct of personhood the font
And in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae of its government and laws. Application of
John Paul II explicitly condemned the the construct of personhood finds social
‘moral uncertainty’ of relativism and utilitar- expression in multitudes of daily decisions
ianism as a ‘culture of death’, stating that: affecting the lives and welfare of all
This culture is actively fostered by power- individuals.
ful cultural, economic and political The existential construct of personhood
currents which encourage an idea of as a distinctly human state within the
society excessively concerned with effi- natural order, intrinsic to human life, and
ciency. Looking at the situation from this independent of the status of the human
point of view, it is possible to speak in a being, forms a competing metaphysical con-
certain sense of a war of the powerful struct to the relational construct of
against the weak: a life which would personhood. Analysis of the existential con-
require greater acceptance, love and care struct in the interpersonal context finds a
is considered useless, or held to be an
broad range of associated results that are
intolerable burden, and is therefore
manifestly superior to those of the
rejected in one way or another. A person
who, because of illness, handicap or, antithetical relational construct. Such
more simply, just by existing, compro- empiricism supports the normative con-
mises the well-being or life-style or those clusion that the good rests in the existential
who are more favoured tends to be construction of human personhood, and
looked upon as an enemy to be resisted gives credence to a claim of truth that per-
or eliminated.60 sonhood is an essential characteristic of the
human species, and is not a conditional
Common to these teachings and state dependent upon circumstance, percep-
declarations is a direct and express appli- tion, cognition, or societal dictum.
cation of existential personhood. Here
persons are held in highest regard without
relation to their condition or status. Here
all persons hold equality in rights to care
and dignity, forming a beneficent foun- ENDNOTES
dation for determination of best interests.
And here a society finds that by respecting 1. Ps. 8:4.
2. Personhood, of course, has been the
personhood as an existential manifestation subject of broad ranging inquiry and many
of the imago Dei, the cause of justice is would not confine it to the two construc-
established and furthered. In this result tions analyzed in this essay. In his recent
the inviolability of personhood is further anthology of thought on personal identity,
support for the conclusion that the good Lizza (2009) grouped the ideas into eight
categories—persons as immaterial souls,
rests in the existential construct of persons as ensouled bodies, persons as
personhood. human organisms, persons as
psychological
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 91

qualities or functions, persons as psycho- us sight to the end that we might behold
logical substances, persons as constituted the courses of intelligence in the heaven,
by bodies, persons as relational beings, and apply them to the courses of our own
and persons as self-conscious beings. intelligence which are akin to them….”
3. The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal, 10. Aristotle held all living things to have a
Natural History, Book 7. Mary Beagon “nutritive soul”, but animals to also have
(trans). New York: Oxford University “perception.” In De Anima Aristotle (ca.
Press, 2005, p. 59. 350 B.C/1986) writes, “The nutritive soul,
4. Pliny described the frailties of man by then, must be present in all those things
stating, “All other animals are instinctively that grow and decay….The animal,
aware of their own natures, one exercising however, must have perception.”
fleetness of foot, another swiftness of 11. The nous subsumes the nutritive and per-
flight, others their ability to swim. Man, ceptive functions Randall (1960). “With
however, can do nothing unless he is the things that have soul, the earlier
taught, neither speaking nor walking nor member of the series always being present
eating. In short, he can do nothing by in the later….” Aristotle De Anima
natural instinct except weep!” The Elder 2.3.414b.
Pliny, 59. Pliny held that self-awareness 12. O’Callaghan concludes his analysis by
was both benefit and burden, stating that finding that for St. Thomas, as for
“to man alone in the animal kingdom is St. Augustine, “it is indeed in the sub-
granted the capacity for sorrow, for self- stance or essence of a human being that
indulgence of every kind and in every part the image of God is to be found” (p. 144).
of his body, for ambition, avarice, 13. St. Thomas held that the souls of man
unbounded appetite for life and supersti- and animals were quite distinct, as “the
tion; for anxiety over burial and even over souls of brutes are produced by some
what will happen after he is dead. To no power of the body, whereas the human
animal is assigned a more precarious life, soul is produced by God.” Summa
more all-consuming passions, more dis- Theologica, I, Q. 75, Art. 6, ad. 1.
ruptive fear, or more violent anger” (ibid., 14. These authors affirm that “the most
60). important capacity made possible by
5. Pliny held that “the first place will rightly rationality, and the one that without doubt
be assigned to man, for whose benefit most profoundly determines how human
great nature seems to have created every- beings should be treated, is free choice”
thing else.” The Elder Pliny, 59. The (Lee and George 2008).
concept of a creator forms one basis from 15. Pope Benedict XVI, “In the Beginning…:”
which to approach human exceptionalism A Catholic Understanding of the Creation
and the distinctive nature of human and the Fall, trans. Boniface Ramsey
personhood. (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor,
6. Darwin noted that “the moral faculties are Inc., 1990; Grand Rapids, MI: William
generally and justly esteemed as of higher B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1995), p. 48.
value than the intellectual powers” Citation is to the Eerdmans edition.
(Darwin 1874: 699). 16. Noting this distinction in Kant’s thought,
7. Darwin closed the argument by noting Allison (1983) writes that, “A priori judg-
that “the conclusions arrived at in this ments are grounded independently of
work will be denounced by some as highly experience, while a posteriori judgments are
irreligious” ( Darwin 1874: 701). grounded by means of an appeal to experi-
8. Wilson (2004) continues this line of ence. Following Leibniz, Kant regards
thought, proposing that “innate censors necessity and universality as the criteria for
and motivators exist in the brain that the a priori. His fundamental assumption is
deeply and unconsciously affect our that the truth value of judgments which lay
ethical premises; from these roots, claim to universality and necessity cannot
morality evolved as an instinct.” be grounded empirically.” Kant defined
9. In Timaeus, Plato (ca. 355 B.C./1961) philos- ophy, in part, as an antithesis of
held the intelligence of man as like unto empirical science, generating conceptual
that of the Gods: “God invented and gave knowledge through reason as opposed to
the gathering
92 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

of data; see “Kant’s Terminology”, in

the embryo, see Jones (2004). Aquinas, by
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, ed.
contrast, held to a progressive ensoulment
James Mark Baldwin (New York:
of the embryo—first vegetative, then sen-
Macmillan Co., 1901), 591.
sitive, then rational. For a brief discussion
17. Democritus held the perceptions of reality
of Thomistic thought on ensoulment, see
as “conventions.” “By convention sweet
Eberl (2006: 24–26). Eberl also presents a
and by convention bitter, by convention
supposition that Aquinas’ progressive
hot, by convention cold, by convention
ensoulment reflected an understanding of
colour; but in reality, atoms and void”
embryology of his day, and that a modern
(Taylor 1999). “Descartes ascribed all
Aquinas would arguably assign the
psychological functions to the mind”
rational soul to the zygote (Eberl 2006:
(Bennett and Hacker 2003). The mind, as
23–42). Swinburne (1986: 179) has
an entity distinct from the body, allowed a
approached this question from a more
severability of the human condition.
physiologic and deterministic viewpoint,
Modern neuroscientists often substitute
saying that “there exist normal bodily
the brain for the mind in attacking this
processes by which the fertilized egg
construction, but as Bennett and Hacker
develops into a foetus with a brain after
(2003: 110–114) note, they commit a
twenty weeks which gives rise to a
mereologcial error in maintaining a dualis-
functioning soul. If the soul exists just
tic form. Bennett and Hacker term this
because normal bodily processes will bring
construction “Brain-body dualism.”
it one day to function, it surely therefore
18. Phaedo, 115c.
exists, once the egg is fertilized, at
19. Ibid., 115d.
conception.”
20. Summa theologica, I, q. 75, a.
30. For a discussion of this view, see Popp
4. 21. Ibid., I, q. 75, a. 1.
(2007).
22. Ibid., I, q. 76, a. 3.
31. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
23. Ibid.
The ruling held that, “The words “people
24. Summa Theologica, I, Q. 75, Art. 2.
of the United States” and “citizens” are
25. The authors note that contemporary cog-
synonymous terms, and mean the same
nitive neuroscience has “in effect replaced
thing. They both describe the political
the Cartesian dualism of mind and body
body who, according to our republican
with an analogous dualism of brain and
institutions, form the sovereignty, and
body” (Bennett and Hacker 2003: 111).
who hold the power and conduct the
As to reductionism, the authors state that
Government through their representatives.
“there is no hope for any form of
They are what we familiarly call the
reduction that will allow one to derive
“sovereign people,” and every citizen is
laws governing phenomena at the higher
one of this people, and a constituent
level of psychology from the laws govern-
member of this sovereignty. The question
ing phenomena at the neural level”
before us is, whether the class of persons
(Bennett and Hacker 2003: 362).
described in the plea in abatement
26. While explicitly rejecting personhood as
compose a portion of this people, and are
intrinsic to humanity, Dennett does seem
constituent members of this sovereignty?
to accept the converse, finding humanity
We think they are not, and that they are not
“as the deciding mark of personhood”
included, and were not intended to be
Dennett (1981: 267).
included, under the word “citizens” in the
27. 2 Cor. 5:8. The Catholic Commentary on
Constitution, and can therefore claim
Sacred Scripture notes that in this verse
none of the rights and privileges which
Paul “expresses his desire to leave the
that instrument provides for and secures to
body and go home to the Lord” (Stegman
citizens of the United States. On the con-
2009).
trary, they were at that time considered as
28. For a brief discussion of the Pythagoreans
a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
on these points, see Carrick (2001) and
who had been subjugated by the dominant
Veatch (2000).
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
29. For a brief summary of the teachings of
remained subject to their authority, and
Tertullian and Gregory on the soul and
had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the
Government
White – Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species 93

might choose to grant them.” Dred Scott 1997/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_199

v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–405 (1856). 71031_com-teologica_en.html.
Dred Scott v. Sanford was overruled by 42. Here I hold that the dignity of the human
the adoption of the Thirteenth and individual, the equality of individuals in
Fourteenth Amendments to the creation, and the causes of justice and
Constitution of the United States (Vile freedom are man’s good naturally appre-
1994). hended by what St. Thomas Aquinas
32. Solzhenitsyn (1976: 59) went on to say termed “the practical reason.” See Summa
that “The primary, the eternal concept is Theologica Ia-IIæ, Q. 94, Art. 2, for
humanity, and Communism is anti- Aquinas’ discussion of practical rationality
humanity.” in the natural law. Therein Aquinas notes
33. This statute, the Law for the Prevention that “this is the first precept of law, that
of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases (14 good is to be pursued and done, and evil
July 1933), provided for Eugenics Courts is to be avoided. All other precepts of the
to authorize the sterilization of those with natural law are based upon this, so that
specified mental or physical debilities whatever the practical reason naturally
“against the will of the person to be steri- apprehends as man’s good belongs to the
lized.” German History in Documents and precepts of the natural law as something
Images, vol. 7, Nazi Germany, 1933– to be done or avoided” (ibid.).
1945; http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc. 43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–7 (1973).
org/pdf/eng/English30.pdf. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment
34. Although there has been discussion as to to the Constitution of the United States
whether the application of this thought, of America holds, in part, that, ‘… nor
coming at the end of the Myth of Er in shall any State deprive any person of life,
Book X, is confined only to a clarification liberty, or property, without due process of
of the powers of forgetfulness and law; nor deny to any person within its
recollec- tion of the moral lessons of lives jurisdiction the equal protection of the
past, others have found its message more laws.’ Constitution of the United States,
trans- cendent. For example, Richard Amendment XIV.
Lewis Nettleship found this conclusion to 44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
“give us the key-note of the whole passage; However, it is important to note that Roe
the one thing to study on earth is how to v. Wade does contain within its text a
make oneself better and wiser, not for this concept of personhood—the personhood
life alone, but for another….” Lectures on of the fetus is a “suggestion” to be “estab-
the Republic of Plato, ed. G. R. Benson lished.” It is also important to note that,
(New York: The MacMillan Co., 1906), after analysis of the arguments in Roe
359. v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court
35. For a discussion of these arguments, see clearly found a right to life in the
Wootton (2003). Fourteenth Amendment, and clearly
36. Catechism of the Catholic Church related the right to life to personhood.
(New York: Doubleday, 2002), n. 357. 45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)
37. Catechism 1929. (citation omitted).
38. Eugene IV, Sicut Dudum, 13 January 46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1435; http://www.papalencyclicals.net/ 47. Article 1 provides that “All human beings
Eugene04/eugene04sicut.htm. are born free and equal in dignity and
39. John Paul II, ‘Centesimus Annus’ (Vatican rights.” Article 2 provides that “Everyone
City, 1 May 1991); http://www.vatican.va/ is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/docu set forth in this Declaration, without dis-
ments/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus- tinction of any kind….” United Nations
annus_en.html. General Assembly, Universal Declaration
40. Ibid. of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217
41. John Paul II, “Address of his Holiness A (III); http://www.un.org/en/documents/
Pope John Paul II to a Symposium on udhr/index.shtml
The Roots of Anti-Judaism” (Vatican 48. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (11 April
City, October 31, 1997); http://www. 1963), n. 9; http://www.vatican.va/holy_
vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/
94 The Linacre Quarterly 80 (1) 2013

father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_
57. World Medical Association, Declaration
j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html.
on Euthanasia, adopted by the 38th World
49. Ibid., n. 11.
Medical Assembly, Madrid, Spain,
50. Ibid. n. 60, quoting Pius XII’s broadcast
October 1987; http://www.wma.net/e/
message, Pentecost, June 1, 1941, AAS 33
policy/e13b.htm.
(1941) 200.
58. World Medical Association, Declaration on
51. Note the stark contrast between this view
the Rights of the Patient, Adopted by the
and the teachings of Tertullian in A
34th World Medical Assembly, Lisbon,
Treatise on the Soul.
Portugal, September/October 1981, and
52. As Paterson (2008: 20) notes, “For non-
amended by the 47th WMA General
competent patients, Kuhse appeals to a
Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, September
“minimum personhood” standard. A life
1995, and editorially revised at the 171st
falling below this minimum quality
Council Session, Santiago, Chile, October
threshold is not considered to be worth
2005; http://www.wma.net/e/policy/l4.htm.
living and can be intentionally ended via
59. The World Medical Association has not
non-voluntary euthanasia.”
adopted a definition of personhood.
53. It is not my position that allocation of
60. John Paul II, The Gospel of Life
scarce resources is unethical. Rather, I
(Evangelium Vitae), n. 12.
maintain that allocation decisions should
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