1 Technology, Evolution and Purpose
1 Technology, Evolution and Purpose
1 Technology, Evolution and Purpose
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HARVEY BROOKS
poses. We know, for example, that people of widely differing political, cultural,
and religious persuasions can both create and apply the same technologies.
The by which
process technology is conceived, developed, codified, and
on a scale is called innovation. In fact, it is its reproducible and
deployed large
transferable nature that makes it possible for technology to be diffused widely,
often with surprising speed. We know today that innovation is the major source
of economic growth in industrial societies, almost certainly more important
than physical factors such as labor and capital.7 Indeed, growth probably occurs
primarily
as a result of the embodiment of new knowledge both in physical
capital and in human labor and organizations. In this sense, innovation consists
in the creation of sociotechnical systems, and it is these systems that are the
source of economic
growth.
Becauseof the relationship between the creation of technology and econom
ic growth, industrial societies have become increasingly preoccupied with diag
nosis of the innovative process in order to stimulate and nurture it as a source
both of domestic growth and comparative advantage in international trade.8 In
addition, it has become an ever larger component of military power; indeed, the
capacity of the United States to innovate rapidly and efficiently in weapons
systems is frequently put forward as the key source of continuing U.S. military
over the Soviets,
advantage offsetting their greater rate of investment inmilitary
hardware during the past decade.9 Since the early 1970s, concern has
increasing
been expressed in the United States about an alleged decline in our rate of
innovation, especially in comparison with the dynamic economies of
Germany
and Japan.10 The U.S. trade deficit and declining rates of growth of productiv
ity in the domestic economy are attributed in part to declining innovative capac
ity. However, there is little agreement as to whether the declining innovation
rate is a problem in itself or a symptom of other
changes in U.S. society, such as
a low and investment rate and an shift of both innovative
savings increasing
effort and investment toward environmental and
improvement, energy savings,
social services. The product of these improvements is not measured in custom
ary productivity indices, but itmay be of equal or greater value from the stand
of overall social welfare.11
point
Innovation is not the same thing as either R&D or invention, although these
are both
important parts of the innovation process. The process includes the
evolution of a whole technological system, from research through invention, to
for and or
design manufacturing, marketing operational application. As in
dicated earlier, innovation includes organizational change and the creation of
social support systems to make possible the deployment and use of artifacts on a
scale. Thus the of service stations and
large system repair shops, of highways
and highway maintenance, of credit and insurance, of traffic controls and law
enforcement, all comprise the technological system of automobile transporta
tion. Their creation constitutes a part of the innovation process in which the
automobile is the central artifact.12 In this sense, we see that innovations are not
conceived and created all at once, but, rather, that evolve in close inter
they
action with society. Very often the driving force may be the central artifact?in
68 HARVEY BROOKS
our example, the automobile?and this pulls along with it a host of ancillary
technologies, from gasoline pumps to oil refineries to radar speed measuring
devices. One can, in fact, imagine a variety of alternative organizational and
the same basic elements. For ex
supporting systems embracing technological
the automobile system could have developed on a rental rather
ample, entirely
than an ownership basis, much like the telecommunication system.
Most innovations are directed not at the final consumer, but at the develop
ment of capital goods and intermediate products that are inputs to the manufac
or the distribution system. These innovations affect the
turing process
consumer only indirectly their influence on the costs of and
through production
distribution. They may also interface with the public through their effect on the
or
environment public health.
The fact that most innovation is directed at capital and intermediate inputs
is the reason that labor productivity, or factor productivity more generally, can
be used as measures of the rate of technological change. Innovation directed at
the final consumer, contrast, often does not show up in Gross National
by
Product measures. For home that have in
example, appliances enormously
creased the productivity of work in the household, or power tools that have
increased the productivity of do-it-yourself work, hardly show up at all in con
ventional measures of GNP or the tools and appliances
productivity. Only
themselves, not the stream of services are valued in the
continuing they provide,
GNP. new or that reduce or save ener
Similarly, products processes pollution
gy have become an increasingly prominent target for innovation, yet are mea
sured only minimally in the GNP. An auto tire that has a much longer lifetime
or that results in substantial fuel over the life of a car will be counted in
savings
the GNP only to the extent that it is more expensive than the tires it replaces.
This extra initial cost, however, will generally be more than offset by lower
sales of tires and fuel over the lifetime of the car. Thus,
replacement by savings
the net effect of such an innovation could be a reduction of measured GNP,
even though society is obviously materially enriched by its substitution for
older
products.13
In the past, a area of innovation has been that of materials
very dynamic
with new properties, ranging from high-purity silicon fabricated into integrated
circuits to steels. Yet, these material innovations result al
high-strength alloy
most exclusively in intermediate goods that are sold to manufacturers either to
or to be into or consumer
improve production incorporated capital goods goods.
New materials have often made goods cheaper and more durable, as in the
vacuum tube radios and TV by solid state electronic devices that
replacement of
are both we see an
cheaper and longer lasting. Here, again, important package
of innovations that does not show up directly inmeasures of economic output or
personal consumption. They may affect GNP, but only indirectly, by reducing
the cost of final goods, and thus generating increased purchases through the
mechanism of price elasticity of demand, or simply because the goods are more
attractive to consumers.14
ment, whereas the part of natural selection by the environment is played by the
social mechanisms of decision, the market. Just as other species form
including
of the environment that exercises selection on a so
part pressures given species,
do form of the selective environment that deter
competing technologies part
mines the evolution of a given technology. Technologies have ecological rela
tionships with one another, and occupy niches in the overall
ecological
as
technological system, do species in the biological world. The biological meta
phor is most apt in the case of markets, where selection is exercised in millions
of decentralized and uncoordinated decisions. It is less clearly applicable when
case of
society exercises collective choices, as, for example, in the political deci
sions to go forward with or cancel large technological programs such as the S ST
or the breeder reactor. Social decisions to
regulate environmental impact, or
occupational health and safety, similarly have no clear counterpart in natural
evolution, except in the sense that they are and
biological culture-dependent
thus part of the social context of technological evolution.
The biological analog of conscious political choice in technological evolution
is, perhaps, best viewed as analogous to the artificial selection used in creating
domesticated species. Here, man has intervened in natural selection to produce
new are the
biological results that product of conscious collective choice. Just as
man has learned how to direct natural evolution in parts of the ecosystem
so have societies
through artificial selection, gradually learned how to take over
the direction of technological evolution from the market through collective regu
lation or investment. In this sense, the art of assessment
government technology
becomes analogous to the art of plant or animal breeding. The possibilities for
the channeling of technological evolution are still constrained by the internal
logic of technology at a particular stage of its just as the possi
development,
bilities for creating new properties of plants and animals are constrained by the
varieties that exist in the present generation and by the laws of genetics. One
can, perhaps, carry the analogy still further by pointing out that the modern
phenomenon of organized innovation in large firms and laboratories may bear
some resemblance to a kind of genetic in the biological field.
engineering
The biological metaphor is useful because it illuminates the debate between
those who see technology as proceeding inexorably by an inner logic and those
who see technology and innovation as being largely driven by social forces or
class interests. as the variations on which natural selection acts are
Just genetic
determined internal events, so evolution from one of tech
by genetic generation
nology to the next is determined by logic internal to the technological system.
But just as the number of genetic variations is very large compared with the
number that are in the next as a result of natural selec
propagated generation
tion, so is the number of technical possibilities very large compared with those
that actually survive in the development process, and even more so in the mar
ket or society. Thus the influence of society and culture on the inner logic of
is similar to the influence of the environment on
technology genetic inheritance
between successive In each case the inheritance mechanism
generations.
a of possibilities, while the environment selects
produces large redundancy
those that survive to the next generation. In technological evolution, what
survives provides the knowledge base that generates the full range of possibi
lities for the next generation of technology. The genealogy of ideas in the evolu
70 HARVEY BROOKS
Is technology the cause for, or the solution of, the probl?matique of our newly
or is it some combination of both?19
global society,
are of a number of trends or
Following analyses alleged trends and attempts
to their future course.
diagnose
scale Economies of scale have been a major driving force in the evolution
of technology in the twentieth century. These economies apply both to the size
of individual embodiments of technology?supertankers, nuclear power plants,
wide-bodied aircraft, energy and communications networks?and to the size of
the market for consumer technologies?automobiles, TV and radio, pocket
computers. The scale of markets, of course, implies an accompanying large
scale sociotechnical system for marketing and service, so that it equally requires
large organizations and control systems. There is some evidence that we may
have come to the end of the road as far as the scale of individual technological
embodiments are concerned. In the past decade, for example, no additional
economies of scale have been realized with electric generating plants, and there
is even some indication that the reliability of such plants is lower than for small
er in the siting of power plants have increased rapid
plants. Political difficulties
as the scale of individual
ly plants has increased, in part because of the
concentration of environmental impacts. Even though the cost of pollution con
trol tends to be a smaller fraction of cost as size increases, the environmen
plant
tal impact ismore concentrated, and hence visible, and tends to provide a more
obvious target for opposition.20 Supertankers have become so large that they
can enter fewer and fewer
ports, and will be subject to ever tighter navigation
restrictions. Ecological damage from the shipwreck of one supertanker is more
obvious and concentrated, even such tankers account for a small
though only
fraction of the oil entering the marine environment.
Many environmental problems are associated not with new technologies/^
se but with the scale on which
they are applied and diffused. Individually, auto
mobiles are less and smaller demands on natural resources than
polluting place
did the horse-and-buggy. Electric generating plants pollute the air less than
wood stoves relative to the amount of energy produced. Traffic and
congestion
are problems of scale, not of the basic
building blocks of technology. Some of
these of scale arise because a tends to become
problems particular technology
less adaptive to its environment as its scale of application increases: designs
become standardized in order to realize economies of scale, it more
making
difficult to adapt as environmental from this same
designs problems resulting
scale become manifest. evolution, which is highly plastic and
Technological
responsive in its early phases, tends to as a result of itsmarket success.
rigidify
Yet, scale is a and not all trends are in the direction of
complex concept,
centralization. When examined carefully, the concepts of scale and centraliza
tion become rather ambiguous. The automobile, in its individual embodiment,
is a decentralized more
technology that permits much personal control over
mobility than does public transit. Indeed, when the value of time is taken into
account, the automobile appears to be the cheapest form of transportation in
most circumstances. Other small-scale that facilitate con
technologies personal
trol and choice are home appliances, television, phonographs, personal comput
ers, services, and credit cards. From the of the user, these
telephone standpoint
72 HARVEY BROOKS
for the consumer to evaluate the host of products he buys. Where the balance
now lies, therefore, can be endlessly debated without any clear conclusion.
In the nineteenth century caveat emptor was the rule, and the purchaser of a
defective or hazardous product had little recourse other than not to purchase the
num
product a second time. But products were also much simpler and fewer in
ber and variety. The question today is whether the countervailing mechanisms
have kept up with the increased complexity of products. This question applies
not only to issues of safety, but also to matters of durability, maintainability,
energy consumption, and environmental effects, none of which can really be
assessed by the consumer before he buys. In the courts, the burden of proof has
shifted strongly toward the producer to prove the safety and performance of his
product. For high-technology products, such as prescription drugs, an elaborate
assessment mechanism has been created to the consumer, the
protect despite
fact that the physician is an intermediary between the producer and developer
of the drug and the patient. This is because the technical sophistication of the
is the of even a who is not a on
product beyond capacity professional specialist
to evaluate.
pharmaceuticals
Of course, the inability of the consumer
to properly evaluate high
technology products has led to the centralization
of decision-making with re
spect to the safety of such products. Organizations such as the Food and Drug
Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Automobile
Safety Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission intervene between
and consumer. Even for such as ma
producer producer goods, manufacturing
chinery, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration has intervened to
the worker. Products such as aircraft, nuclear reactors,
protect passenger public
transportation equipment, and residential and commercial buildings are all sub
to evaluation by public intermediaries on behalf of the
ject safety and health of
the consumer.
cidence, but are statistically minor in the overall picture. Some diseases thought
76 HARVEY BROOKS
improving trends in the United the last few years. States within
a latent haz
However, all this does prove that technology may not present
ard that has not yet caught up with us. New substances are constantly being
introduced into the environment, and new technology deployed in such a way
that a major commitment is often made in a period that is short compared with
the induction period of cancer produced by low-level exposures to environmen
tal contaminants. Our knowledge of the biological mechanisms of cancer induc
tion is too rudimentary for us to rule out such future delayed effects from
current industrial activities. There have been numerous examples in which oc
cupational exposure to chemicals, or expqsure of patients to new
drugs, has
resulted in serious delayed effects. The cases of asbestos and vinyl chloride
monomer come to mind, as well as several examples of mercury
poisoning.
Fortunately, the population affected has been sufficiently small so that these
episodes have not affected national health statistics. But the potential is there. In
the case of saccharin, for example, more than seventy million people routinely
use saccharin, and the rate of saccharin use children under ten has risen
among
dramatically within a few years.29 With such large populations exposed, even
very minute cancer risks could result in a large number of people being affected
in decades to come. Hence, the concern and debate over whether saccharin
plants.
but until the postwar period the magnitude of military R&D and the rate of
innovation were modest compared with civilian fields. In 1938 agricul
military
tural research constituted 40 percent of all government-supported research in
the United States. By the mid-sixties it had dropped to 1.6 percent. In 1938
perceived in the political process?civilian nuclear energy and the space pro
are the clearest
gram among examples.
Within the last decade to the collective
increasing attention has been given
of to realize certain social goals outside the purview of
channeling technology
the market. The biom?dical research program of the National Institutes of
Health and rising expenditures on energy and environmental research are here
the clearest examples. Environmental an
regulation has also played important
role in the private sector, as illustrated by the dramatic
technology-forcing
growth of research expenditures by the automobile industry in connection with
emission controls and fuel conservation. More precisely stated, regulation has
created a market for technologies that would not have been demanded by con
sumers because their benefits represent a public
good?for example, pollution
controls. has made an accurate estimate of what fraction of the national
Nobody
R&D effort, private and public, is now directed at meeting goals established by
or by citizens
government through regulation through collective action in the
courts.
What is implied by the foregoing, then, is that, although science and tech
have us with the means to overcome scarcity for everybody, it
nology provided
is less than self-evident that the actual application of these means is compatible
with such other goals as democracy, personal liberty, an aesthetically satisfying
environment, the preservation of pristine nature, or individual privacy and dig
nity. These, of course, are culturally derived values, and the culture is certainly
part of the environment that selects future technology. Also, the personality
types that emerge in various systems are different, and may in fact
technological
be contradictory with the character types we idealize and regard as "civilized" in
the best sense.
Perhaps the greatest fear of some critics of technological societies is not that
progress will destroy or eliminate these values and character types, but that, if
we will not even miss them. At all events, it seems to me that this is
they do,
where the central debate on "innovation for what?" lies. Is the society of materi
al abundance for all, which iswithin our reach from a technical point of view, a
we want? The
society that problem is, those who have not attained to the state
of the affluent countries seldom consider that there is a real choice. They want
material progress; they are willing to mitigate the social costs only to the extent
that this does not interfere with progress. If the materially most advanced so
cieties decide that they have had enough of material progress, and look to other
values, not be able to arrest the of at the level.
they may process change present
The rest of the world may over them in its demand for what the
simply sweep
advanced societies have already achieved.
The other problem is, of course, that innovative capacity is largely concen
trated in the advanced societies and ismostly concentrated on the problems and
of those societies, whereas the of innovation are increas
aspirations objectives
ingly related to the poor societies. Some objectives, of course, are to some extent
common, energy supply perhaps being the best example. But even here needs
may be different and technologies not
directly transferable.
We have learned that innovative capacity is the hardest
thing in the world to
transfer. can be transferred, because, as we have seen, the
Technology very
definition of technology implies transferability in some degree, even though the
receptivity of a different culture may be in doubt. But innovative capacity may
be much more culture-dependent. One of the characteristics of all innovation (as
opposed to research or development per se) is that it can only be carried to clo
sure in very close
relationship to the final user of the technology. Even in devel
oped societies many innovations fail because in the end they don't quite "fit."
This problem is compounded when we try to innovate in a society at one cultur
al and material level for the benefit of another society at quite a different level.
Indeed, several participants at the conference that led to this volume have se
verely condemned the whole notion of innovation/or someone else. Yet, if the
world cannot make use of the innovative capacity that
already exists, but has to
wait for the development of indigenous innovative capacity in an almost autono
mous or self-sufficient fashion, it may be too late for the transition. There are
some it is too early to say how they will
promising developments, although
finally turn out. the past eight years the international agricultural re
During
search system, with its network of
independent but cooperating institutes, has
grown to be effective, especially in close to the ulti
extraordinarily innovating
mate user. An number of countries show
increasing developing signs of having
80 HARVEY BROOKS
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TECHNOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND PURPOSE 81
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