SILVAVS NLRC

On its part, Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the
NLRC lacked jurisdiction, there being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that
the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract, the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular
courts; and (2) that petitioners had no locus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed between the union
and Philtread.

Petitioners, however, challenging Philtread’s motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was one for
unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them, as
mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. Being one for unfair labor
practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of
the Labor Code.

ISSUE:

Under said law, POEA was vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment,”15 which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor
Arbiter. As in the instant case, the Labor Arbiter’s assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned
in view of the subsequent enactment of E.O. 797.

E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter’s authority to hear and decide the case filed by private
respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to
give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to
perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.

NOTES While in general, laws are prospective, they are retroactive in the following instances:

1. If the law itself provides for retroactivity (Art. 4, Civil Code), but in no case may an ex post facto law be
passed, such as one that criminalizes an act done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done[7]. A law is considered retroactivity if it is clearly expressed in the language of the statute[8]. The
existence of an effectivity clause defining when the law shall take effect militates conclusively against the
retroactivity of such law[9].
2. If the law is remedial in nature, since there are no vested rights in rules of procedure[10].
3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided it is favorable to the accused/convict and the latter is not a
habitual delinquent as defined under the Revised Penal Code[11].
4. If the law is of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the government[12].
5. If the law is curative, provided it does not impair vested rights nor affect final judgments[13].
6. If a substantive right is to be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are impaired.

OBIASCA VS BASSALOTE

FACTS

ISSUE

whether the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submit
respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment
ineffective and incomplete.

RULING

The Court reached the same conclusion in the recent case of Chavez v. Ronidel49 where there was a similar
inaction from the responsible officials which resulted in non-compliance with the requirement:

To our minds, however, the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment based on this sole technical
ground is unwarranted, if not harsh and arbitrary, considering the factual milieu of this case.

the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment due to a procedural lapse which is undoubtedly beyond
her control, and certainly not of her own making but that of the [petitioner], justifies the relaxation of the
provisions of CSC Board Resolution No. 97-3685, pars. 6,7 and 8. Hence, her appointment must be upheld
based on equitable considerations,

It cannot be overemphasized that respondent’s appointment became effective upon its issuance by the
appointing authority and it remained effective until disapproved by the CSC (if at all it ever was).
Disregarding this rule and putting undue importance on the provision requiring the submission of the
appointment to the CSC within 30 days will reward wrongdoing in the appointment process of public officials
and employees. It will open the door for scheming officials to block the completion and implementation of an
appointment and render it ineffective by the simple expedient of not submitting the appointment paper to the
CSC. As indubitably shown in this case, even respondent’s vigilance could not guard against the malice and
grave abuse of discretion of her superiors.

NOTE: When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness.
Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor
another. As a court of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only
on the cold provision of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and justice.
CARINO VS CHR

FACTS

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances. The “mass
actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24
hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807
and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights
to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier,
upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders.

ISSUE

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

RULING

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power “to investigate,” cannot and
should not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme
Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to
the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more
limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its. ordinary functions. The result of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1793 may be likened to the fact that Courts of First Instance perform the f
unctions of such ordinary Courts of First Instance, those of courts of land registration, those of probate courts,
and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when
the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of
cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these
instances, the court (Court of First Instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be
distinct and, even, separate.

FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint
never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing
petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there
was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed
until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD

1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to
perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the
verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the
U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
Case Digest: De Castro v. JBC

6/25/2020

0 COMMENTS

ISSUE:  Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice 

FACTS:  These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”
Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en
banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that
the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. 

DECISION:  Denied 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and
arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen,
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16
of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

PEOPLE V. SERENO

Elmer Tasong2 years ago

Avg. Rating:

Summary:
Deciding on the quo warranto petition en banc, the Supreme Court justices voted to remove Sereno from
the court on May 11, 2018, by a vote of 8-6, making Sereno the first officer in the Philippines unlawfully
holding office to be removed from office without an impeachment trial. Sereno filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the decision which she filed on May 31, 2018.

Doctrine:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during
the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a  quo
warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.

Facts:
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also
served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009.

On July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC. Despite
the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal
counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP Human Resources
Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of
Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by Respondent were
those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11 out
of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed
as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of
1 June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August 2010.

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice. Included in
the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statements of her SALNs. Such
complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG
requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.

Issues Ratio:
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for  quo
warranto

(2) Whether or not Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

(3) Whether or not Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding 

(4) Whether or not the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

(5)  Whether or not the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
(6) Whether or not Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law
and its implementing rules and regulations

RULING: 

(1)       Yes, Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for  quo
warranto.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for  quo
warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of
Manila, Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court when commenced by the Solicitor General.

In the instant case, direct resort to the Suprme Court is justified, even if it did not gone through to either
the RTC or the CA considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than
Member of the Court. The issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
public office is matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously
cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position. The instant petition is one of first
impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and
appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized
through an action for quo warranto.

Hence, Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for  quo warranto.

(2)       Yes, Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

Jurisprudence teaches that forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues,
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.

Here, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations. The issue in the quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place,
while, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily
presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue
being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office. Moreover,
the reliefs sought are different, respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from
holding a public office in which he/she is ineligible to hold, while, in impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that
he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that
he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy. Lastly, the impeachment proceedings
before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause.
The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate,
thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno.

Hence, Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

(3)       Yes, Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding.

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable
official may be removed from office. The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The
provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Further, Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After
all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former
questions the validity of a public officer’s appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called
impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.

In this case, while Respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer, the quo warranto is a proper remedy to
remove her from her office because the petition is predicated on the validity of her appointment as Chief
Justice, that is, she failed to satisfy the requisite proof of integrity when she applied for the position of Chief
Justice by failing to submit the required SALNs from 1985 to 2006.

Hence, Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding.

(4)       No, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall
have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, the difference between  quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such
culpability. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
In this case, the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment. Furthermore, non-filing of SALN by respondent before she was
appointed in the bench goes against to her integrity which is one of the qualifications required for the
appointment as members of the Supreme Court. Failure to present proof of integrity belies her qualification
to hold office of the Chief Justice, which is a proper subject of quo warranto petition.

Hence, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

(5)       No, the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of the character
of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority
of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from
the Court as to place its non-action or improper actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the
Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for
the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
supervisory and corrective powers.

Here, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not
give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements nor is JBC allowed to waive
or bargain the constitutional requirement that a member of the Judiciary must be
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. In nominating Sereno in the position of the
Chief Justice by the JBC, the Court can inquire to such nomination process especially in view of the
Republic’s contention that Sereno was ineligible to hold office.

Hence, the determination by the JBC of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination partakes of the character of
a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers.

(6)       Yes, Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713, these laws are malum
prohibitum such that the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. “Failure to comply” with the
law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal
from service of the public officer.” Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this
requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to
hold public office.
In this case, Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been
filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court, yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all,
for no clear reason.  The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the
Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by Sereno for calendar years
1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”

Hence, Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations.

Dispositive:
Petition for Quo Warranto granted.
FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is
no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed
limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that
this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat
of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does
not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by
a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has
been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
 and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the
private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be
posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;