Moral philosophy 

is the branch of learning that deals with the nature of morality and
the theories that are used to arrive at decisions about what one ought to do and why. Much
has been written about moral philosophy and the theories that support ethical decisions. One
of the best, brief explanations of moral theories is found in Rachels and Rachels (2010).
If we want to discover the truth, we must try to let our feelings be guided as much as possible
by the arguments that can be given for the opposing views. Morality is, first and foremost, a
matter of consulting reason. The morally right thing to do, in any circumstance, is whatever
there are the best reasons for doing.
Rachels and Rachels, p. 11
I will draw heavily on Rachels and Rachels’ work and briefly present only five moral
theories: ethical egoism, social contract theory, virtue theory, deontological or Kantian ethics,
and utilitarianism. These moral theories are largely unexamined within agriculture but, I
submit, may be operative among those who practice agriculture. The chapter concludes with
the one theory (utilitarianism) that seems to dominate resolution of moral dilemmas in
agriculture. I will not make any attempt to say all that could or ought to be said about
morality, moral philosophy, or moral theories. That is not the purpose of this book and others
(see Blackburn, Comstock, Marks, Rachels and Rachels, and Singer) have discussed these
things well.
A note of caution — the encounter with meaning in ethics often cannot be controlled by the
seeker of meaning. The seeker of scientific truth (what Chapter 1 describes as rational truth)
pursues something that can be defined mathematically, and is publicly verifiable, literal,
definitive, and precise. In ethics, there are no moral facts that can be raised up and offered to
others in the same way. Meaning in ethical discussions, as distinct from scientific truth,
comes about as a result of the application of reason in a relationship of openness and trust
(Van Eenwyk, 1997, p. 79). The relationship may seem to resemble a chaotic mixing in
which those who seek meaning and what is experienced as they seek become so intertwined
that a new symmetry, a new understanding, may come into being. For many, this may seem
to move too close to the realm of personal truth or subjectivity, which, in science, is the least
worthy of being called truth. But in moral philosophy and ethical decision making, the use of
human reason to search for meaning is not just subjective. Invisible, beneath every moral
decision, beneath every gut reaction or feeling about what is the right thing to do, there is a
moral foundation—a moral theory. To say it is all just subjective is an artifice we use to avoid
examining the reasons for ethical decisions (Marks, 2000, p. 13).
Highlight 4.1

Aiken (1998) proposed five proper goals for agriculture:

1.
Profitable production

2.
Sustainable production

3.
Environmentally safe production

4.
Satisfaction of human needs

5.
Compatibility with a just social order

As agriculture’s practitioners think about the ordering, comparative desirability, and the
difficulty of achieving one or more of these goals, it is inevitable that they will ask to what
extent current methods of agriculture lead us toward or away from a productive, sustainable,
and environmentally sensitive agricultural system. It is clear that, except for large producers,
agriculture is not especially profitable and is becoming less so, even for large producers. Our
present system fails to achieve the first goal for many agricultural producers.

Many question if our present capital, energy, and chemically dependent, but highly
productive agricultural system is sustainable. If agriculture is viewed purely as a production
enterprise and its efficiency or achievement is measured solely in terms of output per acre,
per person, or per hour of human labor, then it is efficient. If, however, efficiency is
measured in terms of sustained production over an infinitely long time, then our present
system may not be sustainable. The second of Aiken’s criteria is not satisfied. Because
agriculture is the single, largest human interaction with the environment, it is inevitably
disruptive. Ecological stability is a goal to be constantly approached but possibly never
reached. That means agriculture should not use production and profit as its only criteria of
success. Agriculture should not be just an extractive industry; it must be restorative. Its
required technology must complement, not harm nature. Farming systems that restore
ecological systems are desirable. The proper use of science is not to conquer nature but to
live in it. The “ultimate proper goal of farming is a not the perfection of crops, but the
cultivation and perfection of human beings” (Fukuoka, 1978). Goal three is elusive but
achievable.
Agriculture as we know it in the world’s developed countries satisfies most human needs and
most human wants (e.g., strawberries any month of the year). But do we live by bread alone?
Are small, rural communities important, and, if so, are they important only to their residents
or do they have value for all? Is the agricultural landscape (those amber fields of grain)
valuable? Should a society take pride in the fact that less than 2% (in 2005, in 2009 less than
1%) of its population feeds everyone else, which heralds the decline of rural life and low
income for many who must leave the land? Should satisfaction of human nutritional needs
and wants always take precedence over ecological needs? Do our food needs and wants
support an unsustainable agricultural system? Whose responsibility is it to achieve
agricultural sustainability? These are among the many moral questions those engaged in
agriculture ought to be addressing.
Too many people in my town, in my state, in my country, and in our world are regularly
homeless, hungry, and malnourished. That implies that agriculture is not compatible with a
just social order and not directed toward achieving justice for all. Achieving a just social
order is, by definition, a social, not a production goal. Agriculture has not typically been
regarded by its practitioners as a social enterprise. But, all must eat to survive. To eat all must
be able to grow their own food, harvest it from nature, steal it, buy it, or be given it. Most
humans cannot grow their own or hunt and gather food. Most do not steal. Most buy their
food and a few are given food. A just social order has not been an agricultural goal. It is a
moral goal where agriculture and society intersect.

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Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903)

J.H. Turner, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001
2 The Stigma of Spencer's Moral Philosophy
Spencer's moral philosophy is one reason that his intellectual star began to fade in the early
twentieth century. In his first major work, Social Statics (1850), almost a decade before
Darwin published On the Origin of Species, Spencer coined the phrase ‘the survival of the
fittest’ that was to haunt him for the rest of his career. The more general philosophy in this
work simply argued that individuals should be free to pursue their happiness, as long as they
do not abridge the rights of others to do the same, although there was a hard edge to this
philosophy emphasizing that the less fit should not be supported by the state. Spencer (1904)
complained bitterly in his autobiography about how he had become type cast as a result of
this first book, but it is hard to feel sorry for him because he made the same ‘libertarian’ (in
today's vocabulary) statements in his last work, The Principles of Ethics. For a discipline
such as sociology, which is liberal in the twentieth century as opposed to the nineteenth
century sense where freedom of the individual and lack of governmental activism are
emphasized, this libertarian-sounding ideology has always worked to obscure the important
contributions of Spencer to sociology.
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Morality in Context
Bill Puka, in Advances in Psychology, 2005
The Decades of Our Discontent
Many within both moral philosophy and psychology bemoan the failure of mainstream theory
and research to touch everyday life concerns. Leading moral philosophies imply little about
how to conduct personal relationships or about the ins and outs of interpersonal interactions.
Their focus is more foundational and conceptual, more general and abstract. Indeed, trying to
bring these viewpoints down to earth (or up to it) seems more difficult than the moral
difficulties they should aim to address. Their principles appreciate the equal essence of our
humanity, but overlook the peculiar package of personal traits with which we identify. Thus,
they promote a respect for personhood that leaves our identity out, or uncared for.
This last shortfall is most serious in psychology where interpersonal ties, motivating
emotions, and experiential textures are key. The leading accounts of moral competence focus
on mutual respect and concern through reasoning and cognitive reflection primarily, shown in
the ability to explain and justify our moral stands. Much less research concerns the how-tos
of engaging compassionate sensibilities or engaging in mutually gratifying interpersonal
“negotiations.” The mainstream Piagetian and Kohlbergian accounts follow philosophical suit
to a T, in fact. They depict holistic cognitive structures of reasoning—theories-in-the-head—
not sensitive decision making through personal interplay in the field. While claiming to
observe “social interaction” and the resolution of interpersonal problems or dilemmas, their
depictions ignore the actual dynamics of deliberation and dialogue completely, not to
mention the inner turmoils and shared dramas involved. Their research subjects are not even
observed while problem solving or interacting with others nor questioned on the “how tos” of
such processes.
In moral philosophy, the above dissatisfaction has spawned entire fields of applied and
practical ethics, which prefer case studies to theoretical systems and principles. In moral
psychology, this dissatisfaction has refocused empirical inquiry on particular traits, skills, and
emotions in ethical relating, as opposed to cognitive structures. Empathy, caring, and
interpersonal negotiating are the most prominent (Gilligan, 1982).
The foregoing complaint is odd in one respect. Generally, unified theories in any field are
designed explicitly to provide fundamental explanations, not to decide or predict individual
cases. In ethics, they never attempted to address questions like, “Should I do such a sleazy
person that big a favor?” but, instead, “What are the criteria by which we can distinguish
valid from invalid moral beliefs and rationales?” Moreover, mainstream philosophical
theorists have explicitly resisted their application to practical problem solving, trying to
confine them to academic circles and debates. Criticizing their lack of applicability of the
failure of theorists to apply them is then much like criticizing application for being applied or
practical.

Yet in another sense, ethical theorists claim to deal in practical logic and prescriptivity. They
often represent their work as ethics itself—the study of and teaching. The choice to confine
the field to fundamental explanatory theory is a very odd and skewed one, worthy of
challenge. This is more so in cognitive-moral psychology where practical competences are
supposedly measured for their naturalistic effectiveness in life context.

Thus, it is important to recast fundamental unified theory as merely one brand of ethical
theory that should not dominate. Indeed, “theories generally,” as opposed to “theorizing,”
may not be what ethics need most. Fundamental explanation might best be relegated to the
background of ethics as a very specialized metastudy, modeled perhaps inappropriately on
theory in physics.

But there is still another side. Deep ethical understanding as crucial in dealing with the most
serious and difficult ethical choices and handling difficult conversations about them. The
typical lack of such understanding and reflection figures often in negotiations breaking down.
Depth and breadth of such understanding takes the lead in matured character development
and sense of moral identity. Indeed, attaining moral wisdom in any degree requires a level of
fundamental and global understanding not unlike that sought by fundamental theory in ethics.
(And this is so even if fundamentalism is seen narratively, as just one story to be told, not
especially more privileged or valid than others.) Thus, perhaps we should take a pause, and
consider how the fruits of even the most abstract explanatory theories and models can provide
for practice before we put them in their properly contemplative place.

Major ethical theories would not have attained such longstanding plausibility, after all, had
they not borrowed generously from common sense and experience, likely enhancing it. True,
their vestigial quest for the holy grail—the Law that unlocks the secret of right and good—
paints them in childlike poses from a morally wise perspective. And moral wisdom certainly
focuses on artful living in one’s nexus of social relations, where theory seems most outsized.
But, as truly applied ethics has shown (ethics applying general principles), more guidance for
practice than expected can be found if principles are used artfully as perspectives, not rules,
including particular lenses from which cognitive orientations and attitudes derive. As
Kohlberg aptly put it, contemplating a general principle gives one a moral point of view—a
cognitive perspective for viewing what people are, where their value resides, how it expresses
itself, and the many ways of appreciating it. Certainly, applications to general contexts, like
public policy or a professional ethos, allow us to distinguish what is “in the spirit” of a certain
ethic, or not, just as good laws do. And this spirit applies well to the “basic human” element
of respect even when dealing with one’s intimates—when addressing one’s children or
spouse and recognizing, despite some appearances, that they are their own person, with
relations to strangers in social roles that are independent of you.
Another reason that structural theory in psychology raises more problems than formalistic
philosophy is the former’s reliance on the latter, overlaying general structure with more
general structure. While psychology’s research intent has been applied or social-interactionist
by nature, its methods fail to focus on ethical process or intercourse. We should expect to find
scenarios in the data here, not structures. Moral interviews should be coded as: “Subjects first
think this, then that, then they feel this other thing and are then tempted to say whatever.”
From descriptive scenarios should rise prescriptive ones straightway: “The competent thing is
first do x here, then if A reacts with x, we next do y or perhaps z in the hopes of reaching z
+ 1.” Instead, data is reconstructed as cognitive structure or schemata that must then be
translated for application to assess its plausibility. These two long and conceptually unsure
extra steps make no sense in an empirical exercise.

Worse, critics have drawn a consistent connection between the principled orientation in these
structured accounts and immoral implications for practice. The structure of justice translates
into callous disregard, dismissiveness, and punitiveness in many personal encounters. Just
regard rejects many of our most heartfelt concerns as lacking in moral merit, as “illegitimate
claims to undeserved rewards” (Gilligan, 1982). (The key Kantian criterion of adequacy is
not called “impersonality” for nothing.) This situation is morally perverse and intolerable.
Conscious insensitivity to personal context and particulars is a mortal flaw.
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Should we trust robots? The ethical perspective

Claudia Hauer, in Trust in Human-Robot Interaction, 2021
Teleological ethics
The third pillar of classical moral philosophy is the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Aristotle's
moral philosophy is also challenged by artificial intelligence, but in ways that can serve as a
guide toward a new ethical model that may be able to respond to the age of autonomous
systems. Unlike his post-Cartesian counterparts, Kant and Mill, Aristotle's ethics help us
understand what it is about being human that sets us apart from artificial intelligence.
Aristotle argues that humans’ biological natures create an ethical context for human life.
Human intelligence, that is to say biologically based intelligence, is what Aristotle
calls teleological, from the Greek word telos, which means “goal.” Teleological means “goal
directed.” Everything that someone does deliberately, he or she does for some end or goal.
Getting up in the morning, going for a workout, attending a movie or a class, painting a house
—all these activities are directed toward a goal. The individual may not have given a lot of
thought to the goal and might decide to aim for a more suitable goal upon reflection, but
overall human life is goal directed. Humans choose their goals for the most part because they
think they are choosing good things. They might be wrong about what constitutes a good
thing, but the foundation for Aristotelian ethics is found in the premise that people choose
things because they seem to be good. As Aristotle (1999) famously says in the opening line
of the Nicomachean Ethics, “Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action
and decision seems to seek some good” (p. 1). Moral philosophy is needed because humans
are so easily deceived about what is good for them and need to actively study, reflect, and
deliberate about the true qualities of intended goals.
Furthermore, teleological human existence is grounded in the way humans are biological
organisms. Biological existence is also goal directed. Children's bodies have the goal of
growing to be adults. Mature bodies have the goal of being strong and capable of engaging in
life's activities. Humans are born, humans grow, and humans (hopefully) flourish. This
external process of biological growth is for the most part paralleled by an internal process of
ethical growth. Humans hopefully learn good habits in childhood so that they do not hurt
others and instead come to interact successfully with other people in families, communities,
and states. Aristotle goes further and points out that parents naturally educate their children in
these things. As these children grow, they optimally pay more and more attention
to why these habits are important. Thus adults come to understand the principles behind good
conduct and ultimately are able to exhibit good character in its fullest sense. This is the
Aristotelian model of virtue.
Robots and AI cannot have a teleological existence in this biological sense. They can exhibit
a programmed teleology and will perhaps one day work out a teleology of their own,
governed by their own composition. If this happens, humans will have to ask them about their
own views of ethics, as human ethical constructs will no longer apply to them. For now, I will
stay with the paradigm that robots and AI are programmed entities, lacking a teleological
context for the way they are goal directed. In this paradigm, artificial intelligences cannot
make choices in the fullest sense that a human being can. Realizing this, their human
producers grapple with endowing these entities with a teleology that reflects the human
landscape. Brose (2019) asserts that the challenge of AI has always been identifying how to
invest these intelligences with human intent.
As we accept AI partners into the human world, the ethical challenge lies in maintaining
human moral agency as the authors of these devices’ intentions. This idea that humans have
the responsibility to reflect on the ends desired from our technological partners is compatible
with Aristotelian teleology. Thus Brose (2019) argues in the context of autonomous weapons
systems that the debate regarding these weapons should not be reduced to the binary terms of
whether to use them or not. Such systems, Brose argues, perform certain tasks better than
human beings, and thereby liberate human judgment to focus on desired ends and outcomes.
This is an Aristotelian argument, suggesting that only human deliberative processes can
effectively evaluate ends and goals. Other studies confirm the value of this approach
(e.g., Ajunwa, 2020).
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Morality in Context
Mordecai Nisan, in Advances in Psychology, 2005
1 Theoretical Background
The two dominant trends in moral philosophy, the deontological and the utilitarian, view
impartiality as an essential demand of morality. Treating all people equally, and avoiding
discrimination against people from different groups unless there is a very good reason for it
are perceived as a cornerstone of morality (Nagel, 1991). There is broad agreement on this
point and no need to elaborate.
Nevertheless, some philosophers have pointed out that impartiality should not be taken to
extremes. This view is applied not only to partiality toward oneself, which is often presented
as a condition of personal autonomy, but also toward one’s family and friends; thus, the
ground is prepared for allowing partiality toward a more distant, larger group (such as a
nation). This view highlights our special obligations to the members of our own group and
the positive values that come into play when we are partial toward a person of our own group
—the solidarity and loyalty that are thus manifested. On the face of it, the disparity between
these two views toward partiality is unbridgeable.
This disparity is expressed in philosophical deliberations on patriotism (see Miller,
1995). MacIntyre (1984) distinguished between two different concepts of morality: Universal
morality, which demands that the individual make judgments from a vantage point that is
detached from the one at which he is situated; and particularist morality, which emphasizes
personal attachments and imbues loyalty to the nation with moral meaning. MacIntyre adopts
an extreme particularist approach, arguing that true patriots are those who may abandon
impersonal moral claims and support their own group out of loyalty in the case of a conflict
between the two. Other communitarian philosophers, who also stress the moral status of
social belonging, may not go as far, but they also underscore values involving loyalty to a
group (Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1992). In recent years, several attempts have been made to
reconcile the apparent conflict between these two points of departure (Miller, 1995; Tamir,
1993).
The issue of partiality has not been studied in psychology from the moral point of view taken
here—but it crops up in studies on such issues as loyalty to ones group, discrimination,
intergroup attitudes, and the like (see Druckman, 1994). This research has revealed peoples
strong tendency, expressed in judgments, feelings, and behavior, to favor in-groups and
discriminate against out-groups. Much of this research was carried out in the wake of World
War II and was directly or indirectly inspired by the study of the “authoritarian personality”
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). It is only natural that this work
was guided by a negative attitude toward national partiality, and almost completely ignored
the element of group loyalty. Partiality behavior was generally perceived as an expression of
hostility toward foreigners, of egoism, and ethnocentrism. True, Adorno and his colleagues
distinguish between genuine patriotism (love of country) and pseudo-patriotism, which they
placed on their scale of ethnocentrism. However, this distinction all but disappears in
subsequent research in this field (as an exception, see Feshbach, 1991, who finds a clear
distinction of this kind in factor analysis and correlations with socialization variables).
A similar approach is found in the impressive research program of Tajfel and his colleagues
(1981). One of their major findings was a pronounced tendency to show partiality toward
one’s own group even when that group was “minimal,” being based on an experimenters
arbitrary allocation of the subjects to two groups. This research program culminated in a
well-developed theoretical framework, which is supported by numerous sophisticated studies.
It was found that people not only tend to award more benefits to their own group but also try
to enlarge the gap between their group and the other group at the price of forgoing benefits. A
central theoretical argument of this approach is that discrimination against the other group
has the aim of enhancing the subject’s self-esteem through his group identity. The program
thus focused on one side of partiality behavior—discrimination against the other group (as
opposed to favoring one’s own group). This focus is encouraged by the experimental
paradigm of the minimal group, where the subject has no historical, cultural, or emotional
connection with the group to which he was allocated. Belonging to such a group cannot thus
be an element in the individual’s identity. In such a situation, partiality behavior obviously
cannot be seen as having a good or desirable aspect. A later development of Tajfel’s theory,
the theory of social identity (Turner, 1987), confers central status on social identity, as the
name suggests. It thus paves the way for the idea of normative status for partiality behavior
toward members of one’s own group.
The other side of partiality, that of the needs fulfilled by being loyal to the group and giving
expression to one’s identity, has been a lively topic in social psychology for the past decade.
Many studies of the self suggest the existence of a human need to maintain, affirm, and give
expression to the self (self-verification, self-affirmation, self-actualization; see Baumeister,
1995; Horenczyck & Nisan, 1996). These studies and the associated concepts did not focus
on the issue of partiality; they are rather part of the overall research into the motivations of
the self. Nevertheless, they are obviously connected with the issue of partiality. They suggest
that a decision on whether to be partial may involve people’s motivation to affirm and
express their identity and not only, or necessarily, their hostility to outsiders or their striving
for self-enhancement.
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Development Ethics
N. Dower, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012
Normative Positions in Philosophical Ethics
Since the 1980s, mainstream moral philosophy has entered the discourse of development to a
significant degree. Three kinds of questions can be identified. First, if development is about
change from a worse state to a better state and this centrally involves the improvement of the
lives of human beings, by what criteria do we measure that improvement: what is the good
life? This has been the primary focus of discussion. Part of the debate is over the preferred
terminology such as welfare, well-being, or flourishing, part of it over how to interpret these
key concepts. But two further kinds of question arise: part of what makes a society move
from a worse state to a better state is the general nature and quality of its social structure and
relations, how human well-being is distributed in the society, what kinds of liberties and
rights are in place, what kind of moral culture exists, what values of democratic participation
are established, and so on. Third, ethical questions can be raised about the pursuit of
development by a country in terms of its external relations to at least three things: the
environment, future generations, and other countries in the world.
Aman’s 1992 book Ethical Principles for Development: Needs, Capacities and Rights, based
on a conference on the same theme a year before, reflects accurately the kind of involvement
of moral philosophers in development thinking. Three of the main philosophical approaches
are indeed those of needs (represented there, for example, by Peter Penz), rights (represented,
for example, by Jim Nickel), and capacities (represented by David Crocker). The needs
approach, picking up on an earlier basic needs strategy (associated with Paul Streeten),
stresses the importance of an account of needs, to be sharply distinguished from wants and
luxuries in which to ground the priority of action to address extreme poverty. Interest in
rights theories also has a dual purpose, of providing an account of the essential elements of
human well-being, but also providing the basis for, in the words of Henry Shue, “the
minimum demand of all humanity on all humanity” (Shue, 1996: 52). The capacities or, as it
has generally come to be known, the capabilities approach has gained prominence in recent
years. (Since 2001 the Human Development and Capabilities Association has been the center
of much interest.) The approach found in the writing of the Indian development economist-
cum-philosopher Amartya Sen has been given philosophical development in the writing of
thinkers such as David Crocker and Martha Nussbaum, the latter giving it a neo-Aristotelian
interpretation. The central concern is to map out the central capabilities that are developed
and then exercised in “functionings” in the range of things a person has “reason to want to be
and do,” and so provides an account of human well-being that, while placing sufficient
emphasis upon physical well-being, also properly bring in psychological and social
capabilities and functionings.
Another approach of importance in this debate is what can be called the Kantian approach,
which stresses the fact that human beings are rational agents whose well-being is exhibited in
the properly developed exercise of rational choice and autonomy. A prominent exponent,
Onora O’Neill, argues that extreme poverty undermines the properly developed exercise of
rational agency. Thus this approach gives a good theoretical basis for the thesis that helping
the poor is essentially a matter of empowering them.

There are other approaches as well. For instance, utilitarianism can also provide a basis for
identifying what the essential elements of well-being are (happiness; preference, satisfaction,
etc.) and a rationale for the distribution of well-being in society (i.e., that which maximizes
well-being). Similarly, a liberal theory such as that of John Rawls provides a relatively thin
account of what human good consists in (the exercise of choice to achieve each person’s
conception of the good), an account of the primary goods (wealth and liberty) needed for this,
along with principles for the distribution of these primary goods in society. What is perhaps
striking about utilitarian and liberal theories (including those that stress the importance of
free markets) is the fact that relatively uninformative accounts of what the good consists in
are provided (preference satisfaction, doing what you want/choose), as compared with the
earlier mentioned accounts (such as the capabilities approach). The Utilitarian and liberal
theories tend to go hand in hand with the economic growth paradigm. After all, if one thinks
it is adequate to say that human well-being consists in getting what you want or exercising
choice, then it seems self-evident that more wealth enables you to get more of what you want
or to exercise more choice, so it is obvious that economic growth is desirable. It is this
inference that much of the recent philosophical discussion precisely questions.

This survey of ethical theories is by no means complete. There are, for instance, certain
religiously based ethics or various kinds of ecological ethics that press for a richer account of
what (real) human well-being consists in, and hence of what constitutes real development.

It will be apparent that once the level of discussion engaged in is that of basic moral theories
about the good and the principles of social order, the implications are not merely about
appropriate criteria for change in developing countries, but apply equally to richer countries.
Indeed, much of what motivates philosophical enquiry into the appropriate basis of social
change stems from an unease about the priorities and commitments of rich countries
themselves.
Of course, one source of that unease stems precisely from the relationship that rich countries
have with poorer countries, in terms of their aid programs, but also much more significantly
in terms of their wider economic relationships in trade and investment. For instance, if more
aid should be given or if economic relations should be such as to benefit poorer countries
more, this, it may be argued, requires a willingness to reduce economic growth in the North,
or even question its dynamic altogether. Another source of unease about the economic growth
policies of the North stems from a concern about the way of life in the North being too
affluent, too materialistic, or too consumerist, and so there is a desire to consider more
explicitly the essential values that should underlie policy in the North. A third area of concern
that invites a re-examination of the basic values underlying development in the North stems
from concern for the environment – protecting Nature now and the well-being of future
generations – hence the immense interest in the ethics of sustainable development.

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Justice and Care

M. Tjiattas, in International Encyclopedia of Education (Third Edition), 2010
The Particularity of Caring
Noddings' starting point is that traditional moral philosophy neglects people who, due to
personal or social circumstances, have not been able to attain the status of autonomous agents
and so offers at best a partial treatment of central issues of the moral life. She seeks to
remedy this by providing a permanent place within moral theory and practice for the cared
for.
This leads her to deny that principles and rules are central to morality. Traditional ethics,
centered on moral reasoning and the establishment of principles, employs the language of the
father evidenced by the centrality of justice and fairness. It fails to recognize that sympathy or
empathy feeling with the other, is the wellspring of moral conduct. Sentiments of natural
sympathy are the fundamental source of moral conduct and the caring relation is both morally
and ontologically basic (the desire to maintain and recapture the most caring moments
undergirding the ethical ideal). Caring is rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and
responsiveness, the feminine alternative to Kohlberg's last stage.

The radical nature of Noddings' position stems from her rejection of all general elements and
procedures, both rationalist and sentimentalist. The ethical relationship is not an expression of
universalizability or general benevolence, but is a relationship between two parties and two
parties only: the one caring and the one cared for, a concrete process of caring for
distinguishable from generally caring about. It involves actual people, who, in order to
achieve caring for, need to fulfill specific requirements: on the part of the one caring, of
engrossment in the other (e.g., empathizing with her, stepping into her frame of reference,
and being concerned for her welfare) and on the part of the cared for, requirements of
recognizing and responding to caring. In this scenario, principles are not only redundant, but
also obstructive, since the essential elements of caring are located in the relation between the
one caring and the one cared for. The desired moral response should be immediately elicited
in attending to the cared for. Any moral decision making requires concretization rather than
abstraction.

Noddings shuns talk of moral justification. She says that caring itself and the ethical ideal that
strives to maintain and enhance it guide us in moral decisions and conduct. The marks of
ethical behavior are feeling, thinking, and conducting oneself as the one caring. In part,
ethical conduct is determined by one's actual receptivity. One is irredeemably evil when one
intentionally rejects the impulse to care. Justice plays an ancillary, second-best role: it is
needed only when it is impossible to exercise caring for. Noddings furthermore insists that
the ethics of care can provide alternative notions of reciprocity and obligation based on the
relatedness of caring, and so does not have to make concessions to the ethics of justice in
order to account for these admittedly important elements of morality.

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Liberalism and Education

W. Feinberg, in International Encyclopedia of Education (Third Edition), 2010
Liberalism is an evolving political, economic and moral philosophy that stresses the
significance of individual rights. It has had a significant influence in politics, economics,
moral doctrine, and education especially in Western Europe and the United States. As a
political philosophy it arose as an attempt to re-legitimize political authority at a time when
religious wars had devastated Europe and at a time when the doctrine of the divine right of
kings that had previously been used to justify political and moral order was discredited. As an
economic idea, liberalism's primary concern is the development of market economies. As a
political ideal it is concerned with individual rights and the role of government in protecting
them. The history of liberalism is a history of coming to terms with what these ideas mean in
the context of changing social, political, and economic considerations. As a moral ideal it
takes the individual person as both the agent of and the standard for moral action. As an
educational idea its concern is the development of individual autonomy.
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Planning Ethics
S. Hendler, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001
Planning ethics refers to the integration of planning and moral philosophy. It may be
separated into five areas: everyday behavior, plan-making, administrative discretion, planning
techniques, and normative planning theory. Both descriptive and prescriptive analyses of
planning are included in each of these categories. Guidelines for planning practice may arise
from these analyses and are often articulated in professional codes of ethics and codes of
conduct. The teaching of planning ethics is focused on the development of critical thinking
skills. Together, planning theory, practice, and education benefit from the consideration of
ethical issues through an increased awareness of values in planning endeavors and an
enhanced ability to address these values with colleagues, employers, employees, clients,
students, as well as other publics. Planning ethics also contributes to the development of ideas
in moral philosophy by demonstrating the practical effects of applying abstract moral
principles in concrete situations. As an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, planning ethics thus
furthers both our understanding and resolution of complex moral questions.
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Mercy and Forgiveness

A. MacLachlan, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012
Conclusions
Both mercy and forgiveness hold a peculiar place in moral philosophy. They are generally
recognized to be valuable, but philosophers have struggled to reconcile that value with
overarching commitments to justice, respect for values, self-respect, and standards of
equitable treatment. In part, these difficulties rest on conceptual confusion: It can be difficult
to articulate just what we do when we forgive or just which decisions qualify as acts of
mercy. Recognizing the variable nature of forgiveness and the complex relationship between
forgiveness, pardons, and mercy goes a long way toward clarifying some of these difficulties.
However, interesting philosophical questions remain about the role of mercy in the law, as
well as the complexities of interpersonal and institutional forgiveness.