Santillon
v. Miranda indicate the intent of the law with respect to the
[G.R. No. L-19281. June 30, 1965.] ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get
Bengzon, J.: when they concur with each other, it does not fix
the amount of shares that such child and spouse
Facts: Pedro Santillon died without a will in are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if
Pangasinan, leaving one son CLARO and his wife the latter happens, the pertinent provision on
PERFECTA. Pedro acquired several parcels of intestate succession shall apply; i. e. Art. 996.
land in Pangasinan during his marriage with
PERFECTA. > JBLR agrees, applying StatCon: Our colleague
Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is
Four years after Santillon's death, CLARO filed a quoted as having expressed the opinion that
petition for letters of administration, which was under this article, when the widow survives with
opposed by PERFECTA, who was later on only one legitimate child, they share the estate in
appointed as administratrix of the estate. equal parts.
Later, CLARO filed a motion to declare share of Although the law refers to "children or
heirs. Invoking Art. 892, he claimed that after descendants," the rule in statutory construction
deducting ½ from the conjugal properties as the that the plural can be understood to include the
conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining ½ singular is applicable in his case."
should be divided as follows: ¼ for PERFECTA
and ¾ for CLARO. The theory of those holding otherwise, seems to
be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed speaks of "children," therefore it does not apply
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled to when there is only one "child"; consequently Art.
½ of the remaining half pursuant to Art. 996. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a
process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
In effect, Claro claimed ¾ of Pedro's inheritance, Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because whereas
while Perfecta claimed ½. intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-
fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in
The trial court agreed with Perfecta, ruling that intestate.
the surviving spouse shall inherit ONE-HALF
(1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) > Words in plural include the singular: So Art.
share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): "if
the widow or widower and a legitimate child are
Issue: WON the lower court was correct in left, the surviving spouse has the same share as
awarding Pedro's inheritance to the surviving that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the
spouse and the only child in equal shares, article to this case on the ground that "child" is not
notwithstanding Art. 892. included in "children", the consequences would
be tremendous.
Ruling: YES, the lower court was correct.
> It is incorrect to argue that Art. 996 is unfair
> 892 applies only in testamentary succession: or inequitable, since the surviving spouse may
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the get one-half if the testator so wishes: it is not
chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas correct to assume that intestate succession the
Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or
Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So,
obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to
support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. decide (by testament) whether his or her only
Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving child shall get more than his or her survivor.
spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of
children in testate succession. While it may
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical
inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the
widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.
