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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DOCTRINES
Compiled Cases of Justice Marvic Leonen

I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

1. The Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts is a practical judicial policy designed

to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may
be obtained before the lower courts. Hence, for this Court to be able to
“satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter,” it must remain as a “court of last resort.” This can be achieved by
relieving the Court of the “task of dealing with causes in the first instance.”
(Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017)

2. The Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts is not an iron-clad rule. In this case,

the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right
to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future
similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part
of the electorate to reform the political landscape. (The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

3. The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial policy designed to

restrain direct resort to the Supreme Court if relief can be granted or
obtained from the lower court. It may also be invoked when a direct
resort to the CA is made without going through the RTC. The Court of
Appeals has full discretion on whether to give due course to any petition
for certiorari directly filed before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner's direct
resort to it on the ground that the issue presented was a pure question of
law. No error can be ascribed to it for passing upon the issue. (Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Local Government of Quezon City, G.R. No.
194388, November 7, 2018)

4. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has
full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari, filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners,

we have provided exceptions to this doctrine: 1) When there are genuine

issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time; 2) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance; 3)
When cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court; 4) When
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; 5) Exigency
in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this
court; 6) When the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; 7)
When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and 8) When the petition includes questions that are "dictated
by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy." (Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15,
2017)

5. Under the doctrine of hierarchy of court, recourse must first be sought

from the lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
The constitutional provision on its jurisdiction to “‘review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide’, final judgements and orders of lower courts in , among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures” This means that
the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634,
October 15, 2019)

6. Exception to hierarchy of courts must be anchored on specific reasons,

otherwise, there is a need to exhaust all remedies available. Generally, the
rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when "dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or
the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." For all
other cases, the parties must have exhausted the remedies available before
the lower courts. A petition filed in violation of the doctrine shall be
dismissed. (Marantan v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 206354, March 13,
2019)

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

7. Those who were never made parties to the application for the amended
Environmental Compliance Certificate are not bound by the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is to first exhaust
the available administrative remedies before a party can bring the case to a

court for judicial review. 111 In connection with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under this
doctrine, courts will hold off from determining a controversy involving a
question within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, particularly
when its resolution demands the "special knowledge, experience[,] and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact”. (Cordillera Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10,
2019)

8. Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner

has exhausted all remedies available to it under the law. The doctrine
ensures that the administrative agency exercised its power to its full extent,
including its authority to correct or reconsider its actions. It would, thus, be
premature for courts to take cognizance of the case prior to the exhaustion
of remedies, not to mention it would violate the principle of separation of
powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is required that no other plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy is available to the party. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino
III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)

9. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the

concerned administrative agency must be given the opportunity to decide
a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the
courts, otherwise, the action will be declared premature. Even assuming
that sub-clause 67.1 was not applicable, the case would still fall within
the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
since strict application of the doctrine will be set aside when requiring it
would only be unreasonable under the circumstances. The pertinent
provision on available administrative remedies in this case can be found in
Sub-Clause 67.1 of the Conditions of Contract. A total of 17 demand letters
were sent to petitioner to no avail. To require respondent to wait for the
DPWH Secretary's response while respondent continued to suffer
financially would be to condone petitioner's avoidance of its obligations to
respondent. (Department of Public Works and Highways v.
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732, September 13,
2017)

10. Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the

intervention of courts when “the law provides for remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer.” The practical purpose
behind the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to provide
an orderly procedure by giving the administrative agency an “opportunity
to decide the matter by itself correctly and to prevent unnecessary and

premature resort to the courts.”(Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10,
2017)

11. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

First, petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to
freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state.
This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case
indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on
the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. (The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments

12. A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable.
It can neither be modified nor disturbed by courts in any manner even if
the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived errors of fact or
law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution
of the judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality

becomes immutable and unalterable. The primary consequence of this
principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or amended by
any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or
amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle
known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound
public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that every
litigation must come to an end. The doctrine of immutability of
judgment, however, is not an iron-clad rule. It is subject to several
exceptions, namely: (1) [T]he correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The awarded
damages included life care costs and loss of earning capacity, which
petitioners’ contend were erroneously and ambiguously computed in the
judgment. However, the judgment already attained finality and the alleged
errors were only raised during execution. The court found no errors or
ambiguity in the computation of the award, hence does not fall among the
exceptions on the doctrine of immutability of judgment. (Mercury Drug
Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses Richard Huang et. al.; G.R. No.
197654, August 30, 2017)

Doctrine of the Law of the Case

13. The doctrine of the “law of the case” provides that questions of law
previously determined by a court will generally govern a case through all
its subsequent stages where “the determination has already been made
on a prior appeal to a court of last resort.” If an appellate court has
determined a legal issue and has remanded it to the lower court for further
proceedings, another appeal in that same case should no longer differently
determine the legal issue previously passed upon. Similar to res judicata, it
is a refusal to reopen what has already been decided. (Presidential Decree No.
1271 Committee v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016)

Speedy Disposition of Cases

14. The 24-month period for the Supreme Court to decide on cases, as
provided under Article 8, Section 15 of the Constitution and Rule 13,
Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court is merely directory
in nature. Failure to render a decision within this period would not deprive
the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
(Re: Elvira N. Enalbes, A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019)

II
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction

15. To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is
capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for the
recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the
recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of
money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Therefore, a complaint for the
annulment of a real estate mortgage is considered an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Petitioner contends that its complaint prayed for the
annulment of the real estate mortgage it entered into with respondent and
not for the recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged properties because
it was still the registered owner when it filed its complaint. The evidence
on record supports petitioner's claim; hence, there was no reason for the
dismissal of its Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

This case reassessed the case of Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-II Builders,
Inc., (G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011) In this case, a Complaint for the
rescission of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance it entered into with
Home Guaranty Corporation and National Housing Authority was filed.
The Supreme Court declared that complaint and the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint both involved prayers for the conveyance and/or
transfer of possession of the Asset Pool, causes of action which were
undoubtedly real actions (hence, jurisdiction is determined based on the
assessed value). Justice Leonen said that since the principal remedy sought
by R-II Builders was the resolution of the Deed of Assignment and
Conveyance, the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and Home
Guaranty erred in treating it as a real action simply because the principal
action was accompanied by a prayer for conveyance of real property.
Therefore, the contrary rule espoused in Home Guaranty is thereby set aside.
(First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of Communications
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018)

16. Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal
cases, the imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information
determines the court that has jurisdiction over the case. Even on appeal and
even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the case. The lack of jurisdiction results in voiding all of
the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment issued. In this case, Garcia’s
acquittal was rendered by the RTC who has no jurisdiction over the case,
thus, null and void. (Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., G.R. No. 172505, October
1, 2014)

17. The precedent set in Tijam applies only in cases where jurisdiction was
raised at the very last minute when the parties have already gone through
long years of litigation. Raising the lack of jurisdiction a little under a year,
or even after the lapse of 4 years, will not operate as estoppel against a
party. Thus, as petitoner seasoanbly raised the court’s lack of jurisdiction,
there is neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue not estoppel against the
petitioner. (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.,
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019)

18. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is conferred by law. It

cannot be lost through waiver or estoppel. It can be raised at any time in
the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal. The edict in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction. A court that
does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case will not acquire

jurisdiction because of estoppel. Rather, the edict in Tijam must be

appreciated as a waiver of a party's right to raise jurisdiction based on the
doctrine of equity. It is only when the circumstances in Tijam are present
that a waiver or an estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is appreciated. In
Tijam, this Court ruled that long delay in raising lack of jurisdiction is unfair
to the party pleading laches because he or she was misled into believing
that this defense would no longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years in raising
questions on subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by this Court as
estoppel by laches. In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when: (1) there was a statutory right in favor of
the claimant; (2) the statutory right was not invoked; (3) an unreasonable
length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction; (4)
the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief
from the court without jurisdiction; (5) the claimant knew or had
constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter
jurisdiction; (6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who
relied on the forum and the claimant's implicit waiver. (Amoguis v. Ballado,
G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018)

19. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving

title to real property which is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of
the Regional Trial Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of
a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance and the
annulment of title. (Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. No. 208450 & 208497,
June 5, 2017)

20. Payment of the correct amount of filing fees should not be made
contingent on the result of a case. Otherwise, the government and the
judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as these fees "take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to
man hours used in handling of each case.” The Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. (Heirs of
Dragon v. The Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019)

21. It is the payment of the prescribed docket fees, other than the filing of
complaint or initiatory pleading, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. As mandated by Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 of 1988, all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in thebody of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages

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shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Hence,
the mere mentioning by the Spouses Revilla of the amount of P12,000,000.00
during the pre-trial is inconsequential, as the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction over the action when the Spouses Revilla filed the complaint
and paid the requisite filing fees based on the amount as prayed for in the
complaint. (Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla, G.R. No. 190901, November 12,
2014)

22. The Supreme Court can interfere with the exercise of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the existence of probable cause
only when there is a showing that it acted in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or despotic manner. The Office of the Ombudsman is armed
with the power to investigate. Thus, it is in a better position to assess the
strength or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding
of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound
judgment of the Ombudsman. (Department of Finance v. Yambao, G.R. Nos.
220632 and 220634, November 6, 2019)

23. In the new law, DAR acquires jurisdiction formerly belonging to

DARAB. The jurisdiction over the administrative implementation of
agrarian laws exclusively belongs to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary. This is true even if the dispute involves the cancellation of
registered emancipation patents and certificates of title, which, before
Republic Act No. 9700 amended Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was cognizable by the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. (Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay, G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, March 12,
2019)

24. The Supreme Court may resolve questions of facts when the factual
findings and conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or
inconsistent with those of the Court of Appeals. Judicial review in labor
cases may also resolve questions of facts when the factual findings and
conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or inconsistent with
those of the CA. When there is variance in the findings of the labor
tribunals, as in this case, it becomes imperative the facts be re-examined to
arrive at the correct conclusion.(Claret School of Quezon City vs. Sinday, G.R.
No. 226358, October 9, 2019)

25. The CA’s factual findings are binding before the SC even if contradictory
to those of the trial court. The Court will not disturb the factual findings of
the lower courts if they are supported by substantial evidence except when,

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among other exceptions, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the
trial court. However, a party cannot merely claim that it falls under the
exceptions. It must be demonstrated that a review of the factual findings is
necessary. (Terp Construction Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 221771, September 18, 2019)

26. The Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of Appeals, has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory
orders issued by Regional Trial Courts in a local tax case. In this case,
respondent PEZA availed of the wrong remedy. It should have filed an
appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because the
judgement of the RTC in the injunction case was a judgement on the merits.
(City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203 &
187583 November 26, 2014)

27. HLURB has primary jurisdiction, technical expertise for intra-association

controversies. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the appropriate
government agency to resolve whether the extension of the Deed
Restrictions is valid, and whether petitioner is estopped to question it. It has
the technical expertise to analyze contracts between petitioner and
respondent Association. (Jaka Investments Corp. v. Urdaneta Village
Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 204187 & 206606, April 1, 2019)

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III
CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1
General Provisions

Section 2 - In what courts applicable.

28. The Court of Appeals is not bound by the rules of procedure in

administrative agencies. The procedural rules of an administrative
agency only govern proceedings within the agency. Once the Court of
Appeals has given due course to an appeal from a ruling of an
administrative agency, the proceedings before it are governed by the
Rules of Court. Petitioner’s petition to revive its patent application for
losartan was denied by the Director-General of the IPO. It then filed a
petition for review with the CA. Therapharma, Inc., one of the respondents,
moved to intervene in the pending petition alleging that the decision of the
CA on the matter directly affects its vested right to sell its losartan products
which was already approved by the BFAD. The CA granted Therapharma’s
intervention and denied petition to revive the patent application. Petition
brought the matter to the SC via Rule 45, questioning the action by the CA
granting Therapharma’s intervention arguing that it is a prohibited under
the IPO rules. (E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379,
August 31, 2016)

Section 6 - Construction

29. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Although a
motion for reconsideration is required before this Court can entertain a
petition for certiorari, this rule admits of certain exceptions. (Joson v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435 August 9, 2017)

30. Nevertheless, alluding to the "interest of substantial justice" should not

automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules. While they may
have occasionally been suspended, it remains basic policy that the Rules
of Court are to be faithfully observed. A bare invocation of substantial
justice cannot override the standard strict implementation of procedural
rules. [T]his Court identified situations when it has relaxed this rule in
order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,

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honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling

circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. The CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for
review on the ground of formal defects: (1) The name of Raymundo Codilla
indicated in the motion for extension of time to file petition for review as
one of the petitioners was not indicated in the petition for review and in the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, (2) the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent
evidence of identity of the petitioners, (3) petitioners failed to attach the
copy of the Complaint filed by respondent, and (4) counsel for the
petitioners did not indicate the place of issue of his IBP number. Petitioners
thus elevated the matter to the SC. However, the SC does not consider these
defects to have been so fatal as to peremptorily deny petitioners the
opportunity to fully ventilate their case on appeal. (Alfonso Cortal et. al. v.
Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017)

31. In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Yeung, the Court adopted a

liberal approach to procedural rules and considered the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration as having been properly filed before the
Court of Appeals, though it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. The seven (7)-day delay in filing the motion for reconsideration was
found to be excusable in light of the merits of the case and because the delay
was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. The
Court cited Sanchez v. Court of Appeals among other cases, which sets forth
a number of reasons to be considered in suspending procedural rules:
“Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant
the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.”(National Power Corp. v. Southern
Philippines Power Corp. G.R. No. 219627 July 4, 2016)

32. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard
procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of
procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court

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may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by
the parties. (Dr. Joseph Malixi, et al., V. Dr. Glory Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224,
November 22, 2017)

RULE 2
Cause of Action

Section 2 - Cause of action, defined

33. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening

events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to
exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy that may be resolved
by the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve
issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally
"decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness."
Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for
registration has erased the conflicting interests that used to be present in
this case. Respondent's Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to
act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the
controversy ended when respondent filed that Manifestation. (Republic v.
Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016)

34. A cause of action "is the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another." For a cause of action to exist, there must be, first, a plaintiff's
legal right; second, defendant's correlative obligation; and third, an injury
to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's right.
Here, the Regional Trial Court found that Nordec had no cause of action
against Meralco since they had no contractual relationship, as Meralco's
service contract was with Marvex. The beneficial users of an electric service
have a cause of action against this distribution utility. In Manila Electric
Company v. Spouses Chua, it was the beneficial users who were awarded
damages due to the unjust disconnection of the electric supply, even though
the service contract with Meralco was registered in the name of another
person. (Manila Electric Co. v. Nordec Philippines, G.R. Nos. 196020 & 196116,
April 18, 2018)

35. Orders or judgments subject to the performance of a condition precedent,

are not final until the condition is performed. Before the condition is
performed or the contingency has happened, the judgment is not
effective and is not capable of execution. For this reason, as a general rule,
judgments conditioned upon a contingency, are held to be null and void.
The decision itself must purport to decide finally the rights of the parties

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upon the issue submitted, by specifically denying or granting the remedy

sought by the action. And when a definitive judgment cannot thus be
rendered because it depends upon a contingency, the proper procedure is
to render no judgment at all and defer the same until the contingency has
passed.(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Philippine National Bank v. Spouses
Ledesma, G.R. No. 211176, February 06, 2019)

36. A wrong to the corporation does not necessarily create an individual

cause of action. Where the acts complained of constitute a wrong to the
corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the corporation and not to
the individual stockholder or member. A stockholder who fails to allege a
cause of action personal to him is not the proper party to bring a suit. In this
case, the wrong alleged by the stockholder pertains to the corporation and
not to him as an individual stockholder. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred
in giving due course to the petition, as he was not the proper party to bring
the suit. (Villamor v Umale, G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014)

Section 5 - Joinder of causes of action

37. Under Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court, a joinder of cause of
action is allowed, provided that the joinder shall not include special civil
actions or actions governed by special rules. Two cases were filed by Belo
Medical Group: the Complaint for interpleader and the Supplemental
Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Assuming the case continues on as an
interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint for
declaratory relief as both are special civil actions. However, as the case was
classified and will continue as an intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous
complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous or unnecessary
because in this case’s intra-corporate dispute, the declaration of ownership
on the disputed stocks must be necessarily made first in order to determine
the propriety of the exercise of the right to inspection of the corporate
books. (Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894. August 30, 2017)

RULE 3
Parties to Civil Actions

Section 2 - Parties in interest

38. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured

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by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." In
the instant case, petitioner's complaint has sought not only the nullification
of the foreclosure sale but also a declaration from the trial court that it is
exempt from the local franchise tax. The action began when respondent
ignored petitioner's claim for exemption from franchise tax, and pursued
its collection of the franchise tax delinquency by issuing the warrant of levy
and conducting the sale at public auction – where the Provincial
Government of Bataan was declared as purchaser – of the transmission
assets, despite the purported prior mutual agreement to suspend
administrative remedies for the collection of taxes. The assets were sold to
enforce collection of a franchise tax delinquency against the petitioner.
Petitioner thus had to assail the correctness of the local franchise tax
assessments made against it by instituting the complaint with the Regional
Trial Court; otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and
unappealable. [37] Certainly, petitioner is a real party in interest, which
stands to gain or lose from the judgment that the trial court may render.
(National Power Corporation v. Provincial Government of Bataan, G.R. No.
180654, March 06, 2017)

39. Persons exercising substitute parental authority have the full range of
competencies of a child's actual parents, nothing prevents persons
exercising substitute parental authority from similarly possessing the
right to be indemnified for their ward's death. In an action based on such
death, such a person is a real party in interest. Having exercised substitute
parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party
in interest in this case. Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner,
therefore, is based on two grounds. First, respondent suffered actual
personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when
Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent
would have felt upon the loss of one's child. It is for this injury — as
authentic and personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent seeks
to be indemnified. Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes'
actual parents would have been capacitated to do. (Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016)

40. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Section 2,
Rule 3) This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon
Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at
bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of their father's original

17


complaint for nullity of deed of sale. (Piedad v. Bobilles, G.R. No. 208614,
November 27, 2017)

41. Actions must be instituted by the real parties-in-interest. Otherwise, the

action may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. To issue an injunctive
writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be protected.
Petitioners allege that while they were not privy to the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement, they will be affected by its implementation as
NAPOCOR employees since they are "the ones engaged in the operations
and maintenance of the unsold generation plants." The Petition, however,
fails to show how NAPOCOR employees will be affected by the Operation
and Maintenance Agreement's implementation. Otherwise stated,
petitioners have not claimed any right sought to be protected or any direct
injury they will suffer if the revenues are remitted. (Power Generation
Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 187420, August
9, 2017)

42. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states that a real party in interest
is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Any decision rendered against a person
who is not a real party in interest in the case cannot be executed. Hence,
a complaint filed against such a person should be dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action. A person having legal interest over such
property, even a non-owner, may bring an action under Section 267 of the
Local Government Code (for the invalidation of tax delinquency sale), for
as long as his or her substantive rights have been impaired. The right to
file an action under Section 267 is not barred merely on account of a
plaintiff's not being the owner of the property sold. Respondents have
alleged substantive rights impaired by the sale of the subject property to
petitioner. They have each averred the requisite legal interest for bringing
an action under Section 267 of the Local Government Code. Respondents
represent different categories of plaintiffs, each with unique rights in
relation to the lot put up for a tax delinquency sale. Their respective rights
equally deserve protection and it is their Complaint's allegation that these
rights were violated by the actions of the persons they impleaded as
defendants: the Quezon City Treasurer; the Quezon City Register of Deeds;
petitioner, the buyer; and other individuals who effected the assailed sale.
(Samuel Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017)

43. The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity
of a contract entered into by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no
authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local government unit which

18


stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in

this case. The city councilors merely represent the city in the suit. City
councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the
basis that the city mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor's
authority to bind the city to obligations must emanate from the City
Council. Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455 (b) (1) (vi) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the city mayor may sign all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a
city only upon authority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or pursuant to
law or ordinance. As the City Council is the source of the mayor's power to
execute contracts for the city, its members have the authority, interest, and
even duty to file cases in behalf of the city, to restrain the execution of
contracts entered into in violation of the Local Government Code. The
Court likened the same to a stockholder of a corporation is permitted to
institute derivative or representative suits as nominal party plaintiff for the
benefit of the corporation which is the real party in interest, more so may
plaintiffs as city councilors exclusively empowered by the city charter to
"make all appropriations for the expenses of the government of the city"
and who were the very source of the authority granted to the city mayor to
enter into the questioned transactions which authority was later revoked by
them be deemed to possess the necessary authority, and interest, if not
duty, to file the present suit on behalf of the City and to prevent the
disbursement of city funds under contracts impugned by them to have been
entered into by the city mayor without lawful authority and in violation of
law. Here, it is undisputed that petitioners are members of the City Council
and have alleged that the contract entered into by the previous mayor was
without the authority of the City Council in violation of the requirement of
the Local Government Code. Clearly, as they are part of the very body in
which authority is allegedly being undermined by the city mayor, they have
the right and duty to question the basis of the mayor's authority to sign a
contract which binds the city. (Teodulfo Lao Jr. v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro, G.R.
No. 187869. September 13, 2017)

Section 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.

44. The property owners against whom an action for reconveyance is filed
are not merely necessary parties but indispensable parties. An
indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is
so necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or
her because his or her interests in the matter and in the relief "are so bound
up with that of the other parties." Necessary parties may be joined in the
case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case may go on without

19


them because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on their

rights and interests. (Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. Nos. 208450 &
208497, June 5, 2017)

45. As a collegial body, all members of the Governance Commission should

have been impleaded as indispensable parties in the Petition, since no
final determination of the action can be reached without them. As it is,
petitioner's failure to implead all members of the Governance Commission
should lead to the outright dismissal of this Petition as their non-inclusion
is debilitating since this Court cannot exercise its juridical power when an
indispensable party is not impleaded. (GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019)

46. The rule on communality of interests refers to the effect of a reversal of a

judgment on parties who did not appeal. As a general rule, the reversal of
the judgment on appeal would only bind the parties in the appealed case,
but not those who were not made parties. As an exception, the Court cited
communality of interest among the parties, where a reversal of the
judgment on appeal operates as a reversal to all the parties-even to those
who did not appeal-if it is shown that their rights and interests are
inseparable or so interwoven and dependent on each other. (Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18,
2019)

Section 9 – Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

47. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The issue at hand, however, relates to the assailed decision and resolution
of the Commission on Audit, which disallowed the disbursement of public
funds for the payment of legal fees to petitioner law firm. The net effect of
upholding or setting aside the assailed Commission on Audit rulings
would be to either disallow or allow the payment of legal fees to petitioner.
A necessary party is defined as "one who is not indispensable but who
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action." The actions of the Board of Directors precipitated the
issues in this case. If the petition is granted, then the officers are relieved of
liability to petitioner. If the rulings of Commission on Audit are upheld,
then it is the Board of Directors that will be liable to petitioner. (Law Firm of
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. COA, G.R. No. 185444, January
13, 2015)

20


Section 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.

48. The President cannot be charged with any suit during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's
immunity from suit. To begin with, former President Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III, as President of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded here.
The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal of the judiciary
under the Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from
other branches of government. Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence
of the doctrine of separation of powers. As such, the president cannot be
charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's
immunity from suit. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April
2, 2019)

Section 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel.

49. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
the fact thereof. Since the counsel of Anthony Dee failed to inform the court
of his death, the substitution and appointment motioned by the respondent
is valid and in accordance with the rules. (Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical
Center v. Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 205638, August 23,
2017)

50. Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more
often in civil actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule
that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death
of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. The counsels
for the accused were grossly remiss in this duty for failure to inform the
court that the accused died on March 1, 2015. Instead, his counsels
continued to file pleadings on his behalf. It was only through a letter from
the Bureau of Corrections did the court find out that the accused already
died – 1 year, 4 months, and 15 days from its occurrence. (Tuano y Hernandez
v. People G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution) June 27, 2016)

21


51. As officers of the court and as protectors of the legal interests of their
clients, counsels have a duty to properly act in case of their clients' death
by notifying the Court of this development. Regardless of the nature of
the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the party
without the counsel's proper manifestation. Furthermore, the rules
presume that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than
the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his or her
client. (Tuano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016)

RULE 4
Venue of Actions

Section 4 - When Rule not applicable.

52. For there to be a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between
the parties. Here, no evidence shows that petitioner and respondent had a
meeting of minds and agreed to submit any future issue either to the trial
court or to arbitration. Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be
enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner's
personal action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 201302,
January 23, 2019)

53. The venue for a petition for voluntary insolvency proceeding under the
Insolvency Law is the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
the insolvent debtor resides. Wrong venue is merely a procedural
infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. A corporation is considered a
resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in its
Articles of Incorporation. However, when it is uncontroverted that the
insolvent corporation abandoned the old principal office, the corporation is
considered a resident of the city where its actual principal office is currently
found. In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority: On the one
hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter
of substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the court or
tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought.
Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court
which has no jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the case. On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought."
In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to

22


venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to

dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived.
When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu
proprio dismiss the case. (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017)

RULE 6
Kinds of Pleadings

Section 11 - Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint.

54. The admission of a third party complaint lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. If leave to file a third party complaint is denied, then
the proper remedy is to file a separate case, not to insist on the admission
of the third party complaint all the way up to this Court. The third party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the
plaintiff’s complaint. When leave to file the third party complaint is
properly granted, the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same
case, one on the plaintiff’s complaint and the other on the third party
complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints, as in this case, he
renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff against
defendant and renders another judgment on the third party complaint in
favor of defendant as third party plaintiff, ordering the third party
defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount said defendant is
ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such a
case to ap peal the judgment as against him makes such judgment final and
executory. By the same token, an appeal by one party from such judgment
does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor
can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other. CRC demands the delivery
of a clean title of a land purchased from DBP after it was found that the title
contains a tax lien annotation. DBP insists on filing a third party complaint
impleading APT as third party defendant because the latter already
acquired the assets and liabilities of the former by virtue of Proc. No. 50.
Accordingly, APT assumed the obligation to pay the taxes and cancel tha
tax lien. However, the RTC correctly denied the admission of the third party
complaint even if the claim against APT is connected with the claim of CRC
on the ground that it would cause unreasonable delay and entail
unnecessary costs and that DBP may still be able to comply with its
obligations even without impleading APT. (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Clarges Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016)

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RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading

Section 3 - Signature and address

55. While Bar Matter No. 287 requires the inclusion of the 'number and date
of [lawyers'] official receipt indicating payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current
year'; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership
number". Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt is not even a
requirement. The CA should not have dismissed the petition for review for
failure of the petitioner’s counsel to include the place of issuance of his IBP
number. While its inclusion may certainly have been desirable and would
have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of information, its non-
inclusion was certainly not fatal. As with the other procedural lapses
considered by the Court of Appeals, its non-inclusion could have very
easily been remedied by the Court of Appeals' prudent allowance of time
and opportunity to petitioners and their counsel. (Alfonso Cortal et. al. v.
Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017)

Section 4 – Verification

56. Board resolution conferring authority to an officer to institute the

appropriate legal actions includes authority to sign verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. (As pointed out by Home Guaranty
Corporation, its board of directors issued Board Resolution No. 30, Series
of 2001, specifically authorizing the President of petitioner to designate the
officer to institute the appropriate legal actions. It was pursuant to this
resolution that Atty. Danilo C. Javier, Home Guaranty Corporation's then
Officer-in-Charge and Vice President for Legal, was made signatory to the
present Petition's verification and Certification of non-forum shopping.
(Home Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation, G.R. No.:
168616, January 28, 2015)

57. The difference between non-compliance to a verification, and non-

compliance with a certificate of non-forum shopping as enunciated in
Altres v. Empleo, as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one

24


who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. As to
certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons." The certification against forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Further, as is evident from Rule IV, Section 2 (b) (2) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, the need for a competent evidence of identity is not an
absolute requirement. It is imperative only when the signatory is not
personally known to the notary. When the signatory is personally known
to the notary, the presentation of competent evidence of identity is a
superfluity.In this case, the inclusion of Codilla in the Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review but not in the Petition for Review and in
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping should not have been
fatal to petitioners' appeal. The defective verification amounted to a mere
formal defect that was neither jurisdictional nor fatal and for which a simple
correction could have been ordered by the CA. Petitioners here, too, are
acting out of a common interest. Further, the CA’s bare reference to
petitioners’ inadequate proof of identity does not justify the outright denial
of their appeal. (Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No.
199107. August 30, 2017)

58. Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules), an individual
who appears before a notary public to take an oath or affirmation of a
document must, among others, be personally known to or be identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity, as provided
in Section 12 of the same rules. However, as for the petition itself, the
defect of the failure to show that competent evidence of identity was
presented may be overlooked in view of the merits of the case. Here,
neither the petition's Verification and Compliance with Non-Forum

25


Shopping Law nor its Affidavit of Proof of Service contains any statement
that their respective affiants were personally known to the notary public or
have presented competent evidence of identity pursuant to Rule II, Section
12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The omission is also evident in the
Affidavit of Proof of Service attached to petitioners' Reply. The notary
public was ordered to show cause in order to not be charged
administratively. (Teodulfo Lao Jr. v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro, G.R. No. 187869.
September 13, 2017)

59. Mere belief is insufficient basis and negates the verification which
should be on the basis of personal knowledge or authentic records.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative. xxx The amendment in the rules was made stricter so
that a party cannot be allowed to base his statements on his belief.
Otherwise, the pleading is treated as unsigned which produces no legal
effect. The court, though, in its discretion, may give the party a chance to
remedy the insufficiency. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. APO Cement
Corporation, G.R. No. 193381, February 08, 2017)

Section 5 - Certification against forum shopping

60. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings

involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. However, the rule on
forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that (1) the
original case has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid
procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter is a motion for
reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the
goal of substantial justice for the fresh new·case to proceed. In this case,
the filing of the third case was not precisely to obtain a favorable result but
an attempt to protect their rights, due to the incompetence of their counsel
in the second case. If the twin dismissal rule shall be applied and the third
case be disallowed to continue, the ends of substantial justice will not be
served. (Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014)

61. There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one

forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. Stronghold deliberately committed forum shopping

26


when it filed the present petition despite the pendency of the Spouses
Stroem’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated November 20, 2012. (Stronghold Insurance Company vs.
Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem, G.R. No.: 204689, January 21, 2015)

62. The requirement of identity of reliefs in litis pendencia means identity

of the basic relief sought. True, there is divergence in the details of the
specific reliefs it is seeking, but Home Guaranty Corporation is seeking the
same basic relief, i.e., the recognition of its alleged ownership. (Home
Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation, G.R. No.: 168616,
January 28, 2015)

63. Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is
identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for
and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order
for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining
order from this court. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero,
Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015)

64. Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata). (In Re: Ferrer, A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016)

65. Simultaneously pursuing an appeal (or motion for reconsideration) and

a petition for annulment of judgment is an act of forum shopping. In Yap
v. Chua, et al., to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. (City of Taguig v. City
of Makati G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016)

27


66. Forum shopping exists when parties seek multiple judicial remedies
simultaneously or successively, involving the same causes of action,
facts, circumstances, and transaction, in the hopes of obtaining a
favorable decision. It may be accomplished by a party defeated in one
forum, in an attempt to obtain a favorable outcome in another, "other than
by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari." When willful and
deliberate violation is clearly shown, it can be a ground for all pending
cases' summary dismissal with prejudice and direct contempt. Neither
Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against forum shopping. Their prompt compliance of
the certification against forum shopping appended to their Petitions
negates willful and deliberate intent. Belo Medical Group was not remiss in
its duty to inform this Court of a similar action or proceeding related to its
Petition. It promptly manifested before this Court its receipt of Belo's
Petition before the Court of Appeals. Belo Medical Group and Belo
manifested before this Court that Belo filed a Rule 43 petition to protect her
counterclaims and to question the same Joint Resolution issued by the trial
court. Both did so within five (5) days from discovery, as they undertook in
their respective certificates against forum-shopping. (Belo Medical Group
Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017)

67. In Anderson v. Ho, this Court explained that it is the party who is in the
best position to know whether he or she has filed a case before any courts.
This Court ruled before that: "the lack of a certification against forum
shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its
submission after the filing of the petition." Nevertheless, exceptions
exist, as in the case at bar, and it is more prudent to resolve the case on its
merits than dismiss it on purely technical grounds. It is clear in this case
that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Valderama of the OSG, was not clothed
with authority to sign on petitioner's behalf. However, petitioner
manifested to the court after the petition was posted that the verification
page signed by DPWH Secretary was submitted to the OSG and moved for
its admission. The court noted petitioner’s manifestation and granted its
motion, thereby admitting the verification and attached it to the petition.
(Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint
Venture, G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017)

68. To reverse a court determination that a party has violated the rule against
forum shopping, this party must show that one or more of the
requirements for forum shopping does not exist. When a party institutes
a case while another case is pending, where there is an identity of parties
and identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for such that judgment in

28


one case amounts to res judicata in the other, it is guilty of forum

shopping. (Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 190324; June
6, 2018)

69. There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in

different tribunals, despite having the same "identities of parties, rights
or causes of action, and reliefs sought." Consistent with the principle of
fair play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief in multiple
forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable judgment. The rule against
forum shopping likewise fulfills an administrative purpose as it prevents
conflicting decisions by different tribunals on the same issue. (Eversley
Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814 ;April 4, 2018)

70. The provision regarding forum shopping is intended to cover only

initiatory pleadings or incipient applications asserting a claim for relief.
A claim for relief that is derived only from or is necessarily connected with
the main action or complaint such as an answer with compulsory
counterclaim is not covered by the rule requiring a certificate against forum
shopping. Likewise, a comment to a petition filed before an appellate
tribunal, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certificate
against forum shopping. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No’s.
152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18, 2019)

RULE 8
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

Section 2 - Alternative causes of action or defenses

71. A prayer containing irreconcilable reliefs is not a ground to dismiss the

complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate
causes of action per Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9,
2014)

Section 10 - Specific denial

72. Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial." There are three (3) modes of
specific denial provided for under the Rules: (1) by specifying each

29


material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial;
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and
material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has
the effect of a denial. In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong, this Court held that
using "specifically" in a general denial does not automatically convert that
general denial to a specific one. The denial in the answer must be definite
as to what is admitted and what is denied, such that the adverse party will
not have to resort to guesswork over "what is admitted, what is denied, and
what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief." In
its Answer before CIAC, petitioner denied respondent's claims for
additional costs under Clause 69.4. Petitioner stated that its denial will be
explained more specifically in its Affirmative Defenses. However, a perusal
of petitioner's Affirmative Defenses reveals that no such qualification was
made. This Court finds that petitioner failed to specifically deny the claims
of respondent and had, therefore, admitted such claims. (Department of
Public Works and Highways v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/Hi-Tri Joint Venture,
G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017)

RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead

Section 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded

73. The existence of litis pendencia also means that the rule against forum
shopping was violated. Litis Pendencia exists when the following elements
are present: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. The existence of litis
pendencia also means that the rule against forum shopping was violated.
(Moncayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corp, et al., G.R. No. 149638, December 10, 2014)

74. Forum non conveniens is discretionary. Forum non conveniens does not
operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the
application of foreign law. It was devised to combat the “less than
honorable” reasons and excuses that litigants use to secure advantages,

30


annoy, and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and select a

“friendlier” venue. Dismissal on account of forum non conveniens is
fundamentally discretionary. In pleading such, the rule is: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it
must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it
shall be deemed waived. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, G.R. No.
198587, January 14, 2015)

75. Failure to timely raise an objection as to petitioner’s capacity to sue either

as an affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. (Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017)

76. Res judicata has two aspects. The first aspect refers to bar by prior
judgment while the second refers to conclusiveness of judgment. In bar
by prior judgment, the first judgment "precludes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action." On the
other hand, conclusiveness of judgment states that "issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.'' Thus, the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment is also known as preclusion of
issues. (Taar v. Lawan, G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017)

Section 3 - Default; declaration of

77. The motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma for failing
both in making the motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of
merits. In this case, the CA noted that petitioner’s motion to lift order of
default was not made under oath and it was not accompanied by an
affidavit of merit specifying the facts which would show that their non-
filing of an answer within fifteen days period was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. For, failing both in making their motion
under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel's
motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even
worthy of consideration. The exception that an affidavit of merit is not
necessary where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very
root of the proceedings, such as where the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the defendants, does not apply in this case since the
motion itself was not under oath. (Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249,
October 15, 2014)

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78. After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the
default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set
aside order of default. The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default
must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The defendant must
challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant must
have been prevented from filing his answer due fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense. (Lui
Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014)

RULE 9
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Section 7 - Filing of amended pleadings.

79. The procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be

indicated with appropriate marks, has for its purpose the convenience of
the Court and the parties but failure to use the appropriate markings for
the deletions and intercalations will not affect any substantive right and
its absence cannot cause the denial of any substantive right. The
Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the purpose of this rule rendering the
denial of the motion for leave to admit the amended complaint improper.
As a consequence of the improper denial, the Cabuyao property, which was
already included in the amended complaint, was never considered a subject
of litigation hence, the notice of lis pendens over the same was cancelled.
This cancellation would not have been necessary had the Sandiganbayan
accordingly admitted the amended pleading. (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016)

RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers

Section 2 - Filing and service, defined.

80. When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court,
and the court acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and
pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual. Service is
deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof,
however, of ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not
necessarily proof of a party's claim of when service was made at the
updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when
service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of
where service was or was not made. A party who fails to discharge his or

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her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.Service upon the
parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties
themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered
service upon their lawyers. The reason is simple—the parties, generally,
have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure,
specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies;
thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative
to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal
only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure—either the lawyer
retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he does not intend to
hire a lawyer. (Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor,
G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017)

81. Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this
rule admits of exceptions. It has been held that “relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence.” (Bracero v. Arcelo,
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015)

Section 9 - Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions.

82. OSG's deputized counsel is no more than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor
General in any particular proceeding and the latter remains the principal
counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and
decisions. As the lawyer for the government or the government corporation
involved, the OSG is entitled to the service of said pleadings and decisions,
whether the case is before the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency such
as respondent commission. This rule, however, is subject to the principle of
estoppel and laches. (Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No.
198008, February 04, 2019)

RULE 14
Summons

Section 6 - Service in person on defendant

83. Section 6, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 5, Rule
14 of A.M. 19-10-20-SC provides the definition or explanation how
tendering of the summons is made for the purpose of effecting personal

33


service of summons. The Rules are clear in what it requires: personally

handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the
defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity
of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus
of service. (Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014)

Section 7 - Substituted service.

84. With respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the

availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted
service. Resort to substituted service has long been held to be fair,
reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view
is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that
residents who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for
ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their return, they shall
attend to exigencies that may have arisen. (Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No.
181489, April 19, 2017)

85. As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of

summons. Substituted service is the exception to this general rule. For the
sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a detailed
enumeration of the sheriffs actions showing that a defendant cannot be
served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. These details are contained
in the sheriffs return. Thus, the sheriffs return is entitled to a presumption
of regularity. Courts may allow substituted service based on what the
sheriffs return contains. Failure to serve summons means that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Absent proper
service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant unless there is voluntary appearance. The filing of an answer and
other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance. (People
General Insurance Corp v. Guansing G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018)

Section 11 - Service upon domestic private juridical entity

86. The provisions of the Cooperative Code on notices cannot replace the
rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Proper court procedures shall
be determined by the Rules as promulgated by the Supreme court. The
Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives'
activities as administered by the Cooperative Development Authority.
However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. (Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014)

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Section 14 - Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

unknown.

87. Substituted service or service by publication is not valid when the

sheriff’s return fails to state the facts and circumstances that rendered
service of summons impossible. The lack of any demonstration of effort
on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally upon petitioner
is a deviation from this court's previous rulings that personal service is the
preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her
return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff's return
in this case was defective. No substituted service or service by publication
will be allowed based on such defective return. (De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014)

Section 20 - Voluntary appearance

88. Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on

voluntary appearance. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made and failure
to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief
is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. The appearance of
respondents should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it
was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
records of this case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised
at the first instance and repeatedly argued by respondents in their
pleadings. (Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 158836, 158967,
160726 & 160778, September 30, 2015)

RULE 15
Motions

Section 4 - Hearing of motion.

89. The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that
the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not
religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the
motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the
prescriptive period. (Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017)

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90. The mandatory requirement of notice of hearing in a motion is deemed

complied with when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity
to be heard, and has indeed been heard through pleadings filed in
opposition to the motion. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given
time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by
the court. Hence, the test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as
well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or
controvert the grounds upon which it is based. (City of Dagupan v. Maramba,
G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014)

91. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule
that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least
three (3) days prior. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to
comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate
his or her due process rights. Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for
filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor to
move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused
by general exhortations of human rights. This Petition fails to show any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Furthermore,
the accused, while undergoing trial and before conviction, is already
detained in the Philippines in compliance with the obligations contained in
the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the
Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines (Visiting
Forces Agreement). (Laude vs. Ginez-Jubalde, G.R. No. 217456, November 24,
2015.)

RULE 16
Motion to Dismiss

Section 1 - Grounds.

92. To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss,

only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, in relation
to whether its prayer may be granted. To sufficiently state a cause of action,
the Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the trial court could
grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual allegations. (Guillermo v.
Philippine Information Agency, G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017)

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93. Two (2) categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: first, those that must be filed ahead of an
answer, and second, those that may be entertained even after an answer
has been filed. Motions to dismiss under the first category may plead any
of the 10 grounds under Rule 16, Section 1. Those under the second
category may only plead four (4) of Rule 16, Section 1’s 10 grounds: lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription. In addition to these four (4) grounds, motions to dismiss
under the second category may also plead lack of cause of action and
other grounds that may only be made known after the answer was filed.
Out of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds, four (4) survive the anterior filing of
an answer: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription. Common to all these four (4) grounds that
survive the filing of an answer is that they persist no matter the resolution
of the merits of the case by the court. A judgment issued by a court without
jurisdiction is null and void. Judgments on a similar prior case will be
redundant. Thus, res judicata and litis pendencia can be raised even after
an answer has been filed. Prescription attaches regardless of the resolution
of the case on the merits. Apart from the exceptions recognized in Rule 9,
Section 1, jurisprudence has also clarified that, despite the prior filing of an
answer, an action may still be dismissed on a ground which only became
known subsequent to the filing of an answer. The prior filing of an answer,
therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration of Rule 16, Section 1’s six (6)
other grounds. However, the grounds stated in a belatedly filed motion to
dismiss may still be considered provided that they were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in an answer. There is then no waiver of the previously
pleaded defenses. The complaint may be dismissed even for reasons other
than the non-waivable defenses. The belatedly filed motion to dismiss is not
a useless superfluity. It is effectively a motion for the court to hear the
grounds for dismissal previously pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 6. The grounds stated in the motion to
dismiss filed by Alvarado, particularly the grounds of failure to comply
with a condition precedent and failure to state a cause of action, were also
pleaded as a defense in his answer. Hence, such defenses cannot be
considered waived despite the motion being belatedly filed because an
answer was already filed. The court may still proceed in hearing the merits
of said grounds.(Alvarado v. Ayala Land, G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017)

94. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action may be

considered a judgment on the merits and thereby operate as res judicata
on a subsequent case. It is not necessary that there be a trial in order that a
judgment be considered as one on the merits. A dismissal on the ground of

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"failure to state a cause of action" may operate as res judicata on a

subsequent case involving the same parties, subject matter, and causes of
action, provided that the order of dismissal actually ruled on the issues
raised. What is essential to a judgment on the merits is that it be a reasoned
decision, which clearly states the facts and the law on which it is
based. (Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 197530, July 9,
2014)

95. Litis pendentia has the following elements: first, "[i]dentity of parties, or
at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions;" second, "[i]dentity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts;" and third, "[i]dentity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case." In
filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint." Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are
omitted in pleadings, "[t]he hypothetical admission is . . . limited to the
relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences
fairly deducible therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts "consider
other facts within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and
jurisprudence" in resolving motions to dismiss.(Shell Foundation, Inc. v.
Tomas M. Fredeluces, G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016)

96. Litis pendentia exists when another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action. The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) Identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. (Lui Enterprise, Inc.
v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014)

RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions

Section 1 - Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff

97. The "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance
of the defendant. As a rule, when a complaint is dismissed a second time,

38


the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim. However,
in this case, the first case was dismissed at the instance of the defendant on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
order to file appropriate pleadings after the dismissal of the case, does not
result to an adjudication on the merits. When the plaintiff filed the second
case, it was merely refiling the same that has been previously dismissed on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction. While there are two dismissals on the same
claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim is barred
by Rule 17, Sec. 1. (Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014)

RULE 18
Pre-Trial

Section 1 - When conducted.

98. A.M. No. 03-l-09-SC does not remove the plaintiff's duty under Rule 18,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court to promptly move ex-parte to set his or her
case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. While
pre-trial promotes efficiency in court proceedings and aids in decongesting
dockets, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC did not give sole burden on the courts to set
cases for pre-trial. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, providing that "within five (5) days
from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte
that the case be set for pre-trial conference and if the plaintiff fails to file
said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of
pre-trial," must be read together with Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court on dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault. Plaintiff should thus sufficiently
show justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial; otherwise,
the court can dismiss the complaint outright. (Bank of the Philippine Islands
v. Spouses Roberto and Teresita Genuino, G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015)

Section 2 - Nature and purpose.

99. The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not
identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows
for an exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown which
the Court has previously defined as any substantial reason "that affords a
legal excuse." The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to
be presented at trial even if not previously marked during pre-trial. Here,
the trial court allowed the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial
due to the prosecution's explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit
credit card was still in the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's
custody. (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017)

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Section 4 - Appearance of parties.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear.

100. A pretrial cannot be taken for granted for it serves a vital objective: the
simplification and expedition of the trial, if not its dispensation.
Nonappearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. If it is
the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.” NPC (originally the defendant) failed to attend the first pre-
trial setting without a valid excuse despite being duly notified.
Consequently, it was not notified of the pre-trial’s resetting. But then, NPC
did not bother to inquire the court with regard to the next schedule of the
pre-trial and still failed to attend the second pre-trial setting. Due to NPC’s
failure to attend the pre-trial, the court was authorized by the rules to allow
respondent (originally the plaintiff) to present evidence ex parte.
Consequently, NPC cannot claim that it was denied due process. A motion
for postponement should never be presumed to be granted and it should
be filed on or before the lapse of the day sought to be postponed. NPC
(originally the defendant) filed a motion to postpone the first pre-trial
setting. The motion was not acted upon by the court but NPC still did not
attend said pre-trial. The pre-trial was reset to May 24, 2000, but NPC filed
another motion for postponement only on May 25, 2000, hence was denied
by the RTC for being filed out of time. (National Power Corporation vs. Spouses
Asoque, G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016)

RULE 19
Intervention

Section 1 - Who may intervene

101. The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene
are whether the intervenor has standing to intervene, whether the motion
will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already
established, and whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a
separate action. Petitioner’s petition to revive its patent application for
losartan was denied by the Director-General of the IPO. It then filed a
petition for review with the CA. Therapharma, Inc., one of the respondents,
moved to intervene in the pending petition alleging that the decision of the
CA on the matter directly affects its vested right to sell its losartan products
which was already approved by the BFAD. The CA granted Therapharma’s
intervention and denied petition to revive the patent application. Petition

40


brought the matter to the questioning the validity of the intervention. (E.I.
Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016)

RULE 23
Depositions Pending Action

Section 1 - Depositions pending action, When may be taken

102. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a

deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial.
In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a
“departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the
trial judge.” Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court that is, with leave of
court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer
has been submitted; and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists. However, A.M. 19-10-20-SC amended the ruling of this
case. The new rule deleted the provision on taking deposition with leave of
court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, and the same was just changed to upon ex parte
motion of a party. By stating that the deposition may be had upon ex party
motion of a party, then the provision “at the instance of any party” should
necessarily be deleted, for being redundant. (Santamaria v. Cleary G.R. Nos.
197122 &197161 June 15, 2016)

RULE 27
Production or Inspection of Documents or Things

Section 1 - Motion for production or inspection; Order

103. All documents mentioned in a Deed of Assignment transferring the

credit of the plaintiff in a pending litigation should be accessible to the
defendant through a Motion for Production or Inspection of Documents
under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. Litigation is not a game of skills and
stratagems. It is a social process that should allow both parties to fully and
fairly access the truth of the matters in litigation. (Eagleridge Development
Corporation vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700;
April 10, 2013)

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104. Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide for any time
frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of
documents can be utilized. The Rule only requires leave of court "upon
due application and a showing of due cause”. Hence, it may be availed of
even beyond pre-trial upon a showing of good cause. (Eagleridge
Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. G.R. No.
204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014)

105. The scope of discovery must be liberally construed, as a general rule, to

serve its purpose of providing the parties with essential information to
reach an amicable settlement or to expedite trial. "Courts, as arbiters and
guardians of truth and justice, must not countenance any technical ploy to
the detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full and
complete determination on its merits." Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court does not provide when the motion may be used. Hence, the
allowance of a motion for production of document rests on the sound
discretion of the court where the case is pending, with due regard to the
rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice. (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723,
January 25, 2017)

RULE 30
Trial

Section 5 - Order of Trial

106. Largely, the exercise of the court's discretion under the exception of
Section 5 (f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts
i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in
furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly
interfere with the lower court's exercise of discretion, the petitioner must
show that the lower court's action was attended by grave abuse of
discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the
exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at
all in contemplation of the law. Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the
bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness,
and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment or mere
abuse of discretion. However, the court for good reasons, may, in the
furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their

42


original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when . . .; but
it may be properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and
without justification. The introduction of new evidence even after a party
has rested its case may, therefore, be done but only if the court finds that it
is for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice. The admission is
discretionary on the part of the court and, as explained in Republic, may
only be set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion.
(Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018)

RULE 32
Trial by Commissioner

Section 2 - Reference ordered on Motion.

Section 3 - Order of reference; powers of the commissioner
Section 9 - Report of Commissioner

107. When an inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the

appointment of commissioners under Rule 32 — not Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court — will be followed. The Commissioner’s
powers are subject to other specifications and limitations stated in the
order. The commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the
proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all
measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties
under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum,
swear witnesses, and unless otherwise provided in the order of reference,
he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing
before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the
court. When his powers are not specified or limited, he shall set forth his
findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach
thereto all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the transcript, if
any, of the testimonial evidence presented before him. The court
appointed the branch clerk of court as a commissioner without expressing
any limitation on his duties. Thus, he may make factual findings and
recommendations on the valuation of the property. Further, the case herein
involves an action for payment of just compensation and damages and not
an expropriation proceeding, thus the court is not bound by the rules under
Rule 67, particularly on the procedures on ascertaining just compensation.
(National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507, September 14,
2016)

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RULE 33
Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1 - Demurrer to evidence.

108. The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when

resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s evidence. What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based
on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding
technical aspects such as capacity to sue. To erroneously grant a dismissal
simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence
essentially deprives one party of due process. Guidelines in resolving a
demurrer to evidence as provided by Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez.
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn
therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise
sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and
indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation
necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence
is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. (Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez,
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016.)

RULE 35
Summary Judgments

Section 3 - Motion and Proceedings thereon.

109. Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the
case can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, and other papers filed by the parties. Summary
judgment is proper if the answer filed tenders issues as specific denials and
affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious,
or otherwise not genuine. If the issue of fact "requires the presentation of
evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact". However, if the issue "could be
resolved judiciously by plain resort" to the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, and other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and

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the trial court may resolve the action through summary judgment. (Olivarez
Realty Corporation v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014)

RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry thereof

Section 1 - Rendition of judgments and final orders.

110. A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise,
its decisions are void. This is pursuant to the requisites laid down in Sec.
1 Rule 36, and Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner’s liability. The
Decision merely contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion.
Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question
of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.” It is a
“a remark made, or opinion expressed . . . upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument.” It “lacks the force of an
adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.” The CA
nullified the trial court’s Decision for failure to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 36.
Consequently, the CA cannot rule on the merits of an appealed case where
the Decision therein must be nullified. However, even if the CA had
adjudicated upon the merits of the case, any discussion would have been
considered obiter dictum since the entire case was remanded to the trial
court. (Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs of Entapa, G.R. No. 215072, September
7, 2016)

Section 2 - Entry of judgments and final orders.

111. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the
time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith
be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of
finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its
entry. (Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor, G.R.
No. 198120, February 20, 2017)

RULE 37
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration

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112. The period for taking an appeal is 15 days. Thus, respondent had 15 days
to file her Motion to Reconsider. This period is non-extendible. Failing to
question an order or decision within the period prescribed by law renders
the order or decision final and binding. (Valderrama v. People, G.R. No.
220054, March 27, 2017)

113. Motions for reconsideration not served on the other party are pro forma
and are "mere scrap[s] of paper" not to be acted upon by the court. The
Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in labor standards cases,
requires a written notice of every motion for reconsideration to be served
on the adverse party as compliance with the requirement of due process.
Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the
running of the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Upon lapse of the
reglementary period, the judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes
immutable. As respondent failed to furnish petitioners a copy of its Motion
for Reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order, Regional Director Martinez
had no jurisdiction to act on the Motion for Reconsideration. (Alejandro
Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, G.R. No. 175198,
September 23, 2015)

RULE 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings

Section 1 - Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other proceedings

114. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy
which allows courts to review a judgment tainted with neglect bordering
on extrinsic fraud. Fraud as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment
pertains to extrinsic or collateral fraud or that which prevents a party from
fully and fairly presenting his case or defense. On the other hand, mistake
as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact and not mistake of law. However,
mistake can be of such nature as to cause substantial injustice to one of the
parties. It may be so palpable that it borders on extrinsic fraud. (City of
Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014)

115. If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of
counsel, parties must show that their counsel's negligence could not have
been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence. The mere
allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80
years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an
unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It asks this court

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to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence which

cannot be done. (Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014)

Section 3 - Time for filing petition; contents and verification.

116. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and
should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed
beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a
petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of
immutability of final judgments. (Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No.
199283, June 9, 2014)

RULE 39
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Section 1 - Execution upon Judgments or Final orders

117. In Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, this

Court’s Decision may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land. This Court’s final and executory decision cannot be amended. It
cannot be done by the trial court, much less by its sheriff. The sheriff’s
execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase of adjudication. In
implementing the writ, the sheriff must strictly conform to the letter of the
judge’s order. (Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp., G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212,
June 1, 2016)

118. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties
under a judicially approved compromise agreement is void and courts
can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise
validly entered into by the parties. A writ of execution derives its validity
from the judgment it seeks to enforce and must essentially conform to the
judgment's terms. It can neither be wider in scope nor exceed the judgment
that gives it life. Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus, in issuing writs of
execution, courts must look at the terms of the judgment sought to be
enforced.(Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 07, 2017)

119. A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a

compromise agreement and a judgment on the merits of the case if it
turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties. In Leonis Navigation

47


v. Villamater, it was held that execution of the final and executory decision
or resolution of the NLRC shall proceed despite the pendency of a petition
for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court. While respondents
cite Career Philippines Ship Management Inc v. Madjus, that the
"Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment," the Court holds that it is valid,
hence, the "conditional" settlement of the judgment award insofar as it
operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and
academic. On the other hand, in Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. v.
Legaspi, this Court ruled against the employer in Career Philippines not
because the parties entered into a conditional settlement but because the
conditional satisfaction of judgment was "highly prejudicial to the
employee." The agreement stated that the payment of the monetary award
was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a petition for
certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer
file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after
receiving the payment. Ultimately, in Philippine Transmarine, the Court
ruled that since the agreement in that case was fair to the parties in that it
provided available remedies to both parties, the certiorari petition was not
rendered moot despite the employer's satisfaction of the judgment award,
as the respondent had obliged himself to return the payment if the petition
would be granted. NLRC ruled in favor of respondent, thus petitioner filed
a petition for review on certiorari with the CA. Meanwhile, petitioner
offered to pay the award to respondent without prejudice to the pending
certiorari action with the CA. The parties thereby executed a conditional
satisfaction of judgment award which provides that the satisfaction is
without prejudice to the pending certiorari action. However, in an Affidavit
of Heirship, respondent was prohibited from seeking any further redress
against petitioner. This prohibition on the part of respondent to pursue any
of the available legal remedies should the CA or this Court reverse the
judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action
in another country puts the seafarer's beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage.
Thus, Career Philippines is applicable and the CA did not err in treating the
conditional settlement as an amicable settlement, effectively rendering the
Petition for Certiorari moot and academic. (Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
Inc v. Cynthia de Jesus, G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 2017)

120. A finding that government is liable in a suit to which it consented does

not translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution. Only when the
Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the claimant elevate the matter
to this Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state. (Republic of the
Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019)

48


Section 2 - Discretionary execution

121. A judgment may be executed pending appeal for good reasons, such as
where the government belatedly pays the just compensation for
properties taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), a judgment appealed before the Court of
Appeals may still be executed by the Regional Trial Court, provided there
are good reasons for the judgment's execution. (Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)

Section 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action.

122. Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict application
of the statute of limitations or laches would result in manifest wrong or
injustice. If manifest wrong or injustice would result with the strict
adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it would be
better for courts to rule under the principle of equity. xxx xxx xxx This
Court, in a long line of cases, has allowed for the execution of a final and
executory judgment even if prescription has already set in, if the delay was
caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage. (Piedad
v. Bobilles, G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017)

Section 9 - Execution of judgments for money, how enforced

123. The case not falling within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments, it becomes the court's ministerial duty to
issue a writ of execution, which must "conform to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision." A writ of execution must
substantially conform to the judgment sought to be enforced. A writ of
execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and
should be struck down. Upon a finding of its invalidity, the case may be
remanded to the lower court for the issuance of the proper writ. The
manner of execution of a judgment cannot depend upon the choice or
discretion of a party. The manner of execution of judgments for money is
specifically governed by Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. In this
case, the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC neither varied nor departed
from the terms of the judgment in any manner. However, the dispositive
portion of the judgment did not specify how the damages should be paid.
In the absence of any directive in the body or in the dispositive portion of
the decision that the judgment award should be amortized or paid in
periodic installments, the manner of its execution shall be subject to the

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Rules of Court. (Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses
Richard Huang et. al.; G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017)

Section 13 - Property exempt from execution

124. A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of
assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5)
children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a
statutory right that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a
husband's duty to provide support. The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court that are applicable to this case are in apparent conflict with each
other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory. On the other hand, Section 13(1) provides that the
right to receive pension from government is exempt from execution.
(Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016)

Section 33 - Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption

period; by whom executed or given.

125. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor. Generally, the purchaser
in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession during the redemption period. It is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue such writ upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser. However,
this rule admits an exception. The last sentence of Rule 39, Section 33 of
the Rules of Court is instructive: “xxx The possession of the property shall
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a
third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor.” (Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26,
2017)

Section 47 - Effect of Judgments or Final Orders

126. Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing
of another action based on "the same claim, demand, or cause of action." It
applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final judgment or
order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was "rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties"; and (d) there
is "identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action" between the
first and second actions. Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of

50


judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases

between the same parties involving different causes of action. Its effect is
to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or issues" which have already been
adjudicated in the other case. (Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. Nos. 208450
& 208497, June 5, 2017)

127. Res judicata is not applicable to bail. Further, an interlocutory order

denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does
not give rise to res judicata. . As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the
argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in
prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. Double
jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that
the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First
Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case
dismissed or terminated. Except with respect to civil cases impliedly
instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment has no application in
criminal law proceedings. For criminal procedure, it is not res judicata
under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, but res judicata in prison
grey as double jeopardy, under Rule 117, Section 7. (Escobar v. People, G.R.
No. 205576, November 20, 2017)

128. Res judicata by bar by prior judgment precludes the filing of a second case
when it has the same parties, same subject, and same cause of action, or
otherwise prays for the same relief as the first case. On the other hand, res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment precludes the questioning of a fact
or issue in a second case if the fact or issue has already been judicially
determined in the first case between the same parties. (Presidential Decree
No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334, December 5,
2016)

129. A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits which

has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory
unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have
already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct
errors of fact or law. (Gadrinab v. Salamanca, G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014)

130. The principle of res judicata do not apply to criminal cases. While certain
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration

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under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Webb v. Gatdula, G.R.
No. 194469, September 18, 2019)

131. On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require
absolute identity of parties as substantial identity is enough. Substantial
identity of parties exists “when there is a community of interest between a
party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was
not impleaded in the first case.” Parties that represent the same interests in
two petitions are, thus, considered substantial identity of parties for
purposes of res judicata. Definitely, one test to determine substantial
identity of interest would be to see whether the success or failure of one
party materially affects the other. (Pryce Corp. v. China Banking Corp., G.R.
No. 172302, February 18, 2014)

RULE 40
Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts

Section 7 - Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

132. Rule 40, Section 7 is jurisdictional since the RTC can only resolve errors
that are specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum.
Thus, dismissals based on this rule are premised on the non-filing of the
memorandum. A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal
where the errors have not been specifically assigned. However, procedural
defects should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants.
Even procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be suspended
where "matters of life, liberty, honor or property" warrant its liberal
application. (Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017)

RULE 41
Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

Section 1 - Subject of Appeal

133. The proper remedy to assail interlocutory orders is to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 or, in the alternative, to await the outcome of the
main case and file an appeal. The word interlocutory refers to something
intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy. A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g.,

52


an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented

on the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. (Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. Nos. 158622,
169441, 172958, 173194, 196958, 197120 & 205463, January 27, 2016)

Section 2 - Modes of Appeal

134. Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is
permitted when only questions of law are involved. There is a question
of law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a
particular set of facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or
falsehood of facts be determined or evidence be received and examined.
Matters of evidence more properly pertain to the trial courts as the trier
of facts and the appellate courts as the reviewer of facts. As correctly
pointed out by public respondents, among the four (4) errors that
petitioners assign to the RTC, two (2) are questions of fact. Nonetheless,
whether or not the RTC correctly denied the issuance of the temporary
restraining order and dismissed the complaint due to its lack of jurisdiction
and petitioners' standing is a question of law which may be resolved by this
Court. (Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al., G.R. No.
187869. September 13, 2017)

135. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable. One of these

exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. A direct recourse
to the Supreme Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final orders
or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. (Intramuros
Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co., G.R. No. 196795;
March 7, 2018)

RULE 42
Petitions for Review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals

Section 1. How appeal taken; Time for filing

136. It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions for
extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule 42 enables not
just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. Rule 42 takes a
particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It
explicitly enables extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In

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contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40, or the rules on appeals to the Regional
Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial Courts, and Rule 41, or the rules on
appeals to the Court of Appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
rendered in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, make no similar
reference to any extension to file such appeals. They even proscribe
motions for extension to file motions for new trial or reconsideration. An
initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper
motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made
before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial
extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This
second extension shall, however, only be "for the most compelling
reason." The MTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to
pay the amount prayed for. The RTC affirmed MTC’s ruling. Petitioner filed
a motion for extension to file petition for review under Rule 42 day before
the end of the 15-day reglementary period, citing financial difficulties. A
second motion for extension was filed by petitioner two (2) days before the
end of the extended 15-day period, again citing financial difficulties and
remote proximity from petitioner’s residence to the court. Both motions
complied with the rules and requirements and considering petitioner’s
meritorious circumstances, the CA should have granted the motions.
(Magat Sr, et. al. v. Tantrade Corporation and Pablo Borja, Jr., G.R. No. 205483,
August 23, 2017)

RULE 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals

Section 1 - Scope

137. Only questions of law can be appealed in rule 43 from cases under the
ciac. While there is uniformity between appeals of the different quasi-
judicial agencies, Rule 43 does not automatically apply to all appeals of
arbitral awards. Thus, in CE Construction v. Araneta Center, however, this
Court emphasized that Rule 43 must be read together with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Law, which provides that appeals of arbitral awards
must only raise questions of law. Thus, even if Rule 43 now provides that
appeals may be brought before the Court of Appeals, these appeals must
still be confined to questions of law. (Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada
Construction & Development Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019)

138. The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of

certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic

54


correctness of a judgment of the lower court - on the basis either of the

law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law
or fact - a mistake of judgment - appeal is the remedy. (Taar v. Lawan, G.R.
No. 190922, October 11, 2017)

139. A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc laid down the
rules on modes of appeal in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities
and Exchange Commission: (1) All decisions and final orders in cases
falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (2) The
petition for review shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the decision
or final order of the Regional Trial Court. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule 141 as
amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed 15 days. On the other
hand, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court allows for appeals to the Court of
Appeals to raise questions of fact, of law, or a mix of both. Hence, a party
assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special
commercial court, purely on questions of law, must raise these issues before
the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC
mandates it. Rule 43 allows it. However, based on the policy of judicial
economy and for practical considerations, this Court will not dismiss the
case despite the wrong mode of appeal utilized. Despite the petition filed
by Belo Medical Group under Rule 45 allegedly raising purely questions of
law, the same is not the proper remedy in this case because AM No. 04-9-
07-SC mandates that appeals on all decisions and final orders of RTC sitting
as a special commercial court on intra-corporate controversies are
appealable to the CA via Rule 43. However, since the allegations in the
petition are also the same allegations required under Rule 43, the SC
decided not to dismiss the case on the basis of policy of judicial economy
and proceed on its merits. (Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria
Belo, G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017)

140. For matters falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, decisions,
resolutions, and final orders of the DAR shall be appealed by way of a

55


petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

There are 2 modes of appeal that may be taken from the decisions,
resolutions, and final orders of the DAR depending on the subject matter of
the case. For matters falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the
appeal should be lodged before the CA by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the case may be
elevated to the Office of the President depending on whether the rules
provide for such mode of appeal. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R.
No’s. 152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18, 2019)

141. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an

appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Petitioner committed a
procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court since the assailed orders of the trial court are
interlocutory in nature. This court has laid down the test to determine
whether an order is final or merely interlocutory: "Does it leave something
to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does,
it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." It has been held that an
interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose
of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. It refers to something between the
commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but
it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. Conversely, a final
order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the
case. An order is final if the order or judgment ends the litigation in the
lower court. It is interlocutory if the order simply resolves matters
incidental to the main case and still leaves something to be done on the part
of the court relating to the merits of the case. Here, the orders pertained
only to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15,000,000.00 deposit as
proceeds of the sale of properties that secured respondent G & P's loan
obligation. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. G&P Builders
Incorporated, et al., G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015.)

142. The liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant
disregard of the rules of procedure. Appeals of decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is only when
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or
order. The rules and jurisprudence require the dismissal of the petition

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before the Court of Appeals. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Leovigildo Delos

Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 208976, February 22, 2016)

143. Rule 43, Section 1 explicitly lists CIAC as among the quasi-judicial
agencies covered by Rule 43. Section 3's statement "whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law"
merely recognizes variances in the disparate modes of appeal that Rule 43
standardizes: there were those that enabled questions of fact; there were
those that enabled questions of law, and there were those that enabled
mixed questions fact and law. Rule 43 emphasizes that though there may
have been variances, all appeals under its scope are to be brought before
the Court of Appeals. However, in keeping with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Law, any appeal from CIAC arbitral tribunals must remain
limited to questions of law. (CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc.,
G.R. No. 192725 August 9, 2017)

144. Orders and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases
may be elevated to this Court via Rule 65 petition, while its orders and
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals via Rule 43. (Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018)

145. The proper remedy to assail the decision of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases is by Petition for Review under Rule 43
with the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 which prescribes the manner of appeal
from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated
precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies. However, the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable
decision or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman is available only in
the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final
and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is
convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month
salary; and b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation. In this
case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available
to respondent; however, he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in
complete disregard of the rules. In addition, the petition for certiorari was
filed 60 days from the receipt of the copy of the denial of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration, which was beyond the 15-day period to file an
appeal provided in the rules. (Ombudsman v Leovigildo Delos Reyes Jr.(G.R
No. 208976 October 13, 2014)

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Section 3 - Where to appeal

146. Rule 43 Section 3 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal under this
Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As a general rule, findings of
fact of CIAC, a quasi-judicial tribunal which has expertise on matters
regarding the construction industry, should be respected and upheld. In
National Housing Authority v. First United Constructors Corp., this Court
held that CIAC's factual findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
will not be overturned except as to the most compelling of reasons. The
all too-familiar rule is that the Court will not, in a petition for review on
certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when such factual findings were
drawn from a vacuum or arbitrarily reached, or are grounded entirely on
speculation or conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the
supposed evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record or when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken or absurd. This conclusion is
made more compelling by the fact that the CIAC is a quasi-judicial body
whose jurisdiction is confined to construction disputes. Indeed, settled is
the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this instance there was
absence of a compelling reason to overturn the finding of facts by the CIAC.
The subsequent affirmation of the CA rendered it final. (Department of Public
Works and Highways v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R.
No. 179732. September 13, 2017)

147. In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision

may be appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43. Judicial review of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases was
previously directed to the Supreme Court as provided in Section 27 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 but in Fabian v. Hon Desierto, Section 27 was
declared unconstitutional for increasing the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction in violation of the proscription under Article VI, Section 30 of
the Constitution. (Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and
197435, August 9, 2017)

Section 6 - Contents of the Petition

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148. Judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are appealed to the
Court of Appeals through petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 appeals shall be taken through the
filing of a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, within
15 days from notice of the appealed action. In Quintano v. National Labor
Relations Commission, this Court explained that appending a copy of an
original complaint is not even required. Given this Rule's generic
reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto," The [Court of Appeals] will ultimately determine if
the supporting documents are sufficient to even make out a prima facie
case. If the [Court of Appeals] was of the view that the petitioner should
have submitted other pleadings, documents or portions of the records to
enable it to determine whether the petition was sufficient in substance,
it should have accorded the petitioner, in the interest of substantial
justice, a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition
outright. Clearly, this is the better policy. To be sure, the determination of
what is sufficiently pertinent to require inclusion in a pleading is not a
whimsical exercise. Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora laid down
guideposts for determining the necessity of the pleadings or parts of the
records. It also clarified that even if a pertinent document was missing, its
subsequent submission was no less fatal. First, not all pleadings and parts
of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which
are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
whether the document in question will support the material allegations in
the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the
petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition,
it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be]
found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the
material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is
attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case
record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed)
upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or
that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits. Here, the remedy sought by petitioner was proper since DARAB is
a quasi-judicial body and petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the
complaint originally filed by respondent before the DARAB should not
have been fatal to their Rule 43 petition. (Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki
Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017)

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149. The party who seeks to avail itself of an appeal must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Rules
of procedure are required to be followed, except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice. For the courts to exercise liberality, petitioner must show that it is
suffering from an injustice not commensurate to the thoughtlessness of its
procedural mistakes. (Viva Shipping Lines, Inc V. Keppel Philippines Marine,
Inc., G.R. No. 177382., February 17, 2016)

Procedure in the Court of Appeals

RULE 44
Ordinary Appealed Cases

Section 10 - Time of filing Memoranda in Special Cases

150. Failure to comply with the Rules or with any order of the court is a ground
to dismiss the action. Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
expressly states that the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum
within the period therefore may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
That the case was not properly calendared in the list of due dates of the
Associate Solicitor and his overwhelming workload do not justify counsel’s
failure to file the memorandum on behalf of the Regional Office. (Buena, Jr.
v. Benito G.R. No. 181760 October 14, 2014)

Section 13. Contents of Appellant’s brief

151. Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, particularly paragraph (e),
provides that the appellant’s brief must include a clear and concise
statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its
judgment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it did not find the
propriety of impleading the two Malaysian Corporations for the petitioner
did not assign the same as an error in the first place. (Philippine National
Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, G.R. No. 172301,
August 19, 2015)

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1 - Filing of Petition with Supreme Court

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152. Factual issues may be raised in a Rule 45 petition where facts of weight
and substance have been overlooked, misconstrued, or misapplied. As a
rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted
where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misconstrued,
or misapplied. (Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019)

153. A determination of where the preponderance of evidence lies is a factual

issue which, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition. A
determination of whether a matter has been established by a preponderance
of evidence is, by definition, a question of fact. It entails an appreciation of
the relative weight of the competing parties' evidence. (DST Movers Corp. v.
People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016)

154. Only questions of law should be raised in petitions for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court however it admits of
exceptions subject to the Court’s sound judicial discretion. In Medina v.
Mayor Asistio, Jr., findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be reviewed
by this Court: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record. For this Court to review the facts of the case, these
exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties.
(Toquero v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 213482, June 26, 2019)

155. The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds with the
mandate to review and audit public spending. The Court generally
sustains the decisions of administrative authorities like the Commission
on Audit in recognition of the doctrine of separation of powers and their
presumed knowledge and expertise of the laws they have been tasked to
uphold. At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of

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certiorari is not the proper remedy to challenge a judgment conviction

rendered by the [Sandiganbayan]. Petitioner should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or resolution of the . . . Sandiganbayan . . . whenever authorized
by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition . . . shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." Section 2 of Rule 45 likewise provides that the petition
should be filed within the fifteen-day period from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of judgment. (Aquilina
Granada, et al. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017)

156. Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is a general rule that factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court are conclusive, especially when they have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of
Appeals bind this Court. Although jurisprudence has provided several
exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and
proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the
case. (Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 205638 August 23, 2017)

157. The Court can entertain questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition when
factual findings are conflicting. Since the factual findings are conflicting,
they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on
appeal and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this Court may
determine what is more consistent with the evidence on record. While only
questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions, this rule is not without
exceptions. (William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &
Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019)

158. Questions of fact may only be raised in a Rule 45 petition when it falls
under the exceptions established by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court
requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45, as factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. It is not this Court's function to weigh all over again evidence
that were already considered in the lower courts. However, these rules do

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admit of 10 exceptions, as listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. (Cordillera

Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019)

159. The finding of guilt is always a question of fact. Appeals of criminal cases
confer upon the reviewing court full jurisdiction and render it competent to
examine the records, revise the judgment from which an appeal arose,
increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate penal law provision. Thus,
this Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court "if it is not
convinced that [such findings] are conformable to the evidence of record
and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses." Significant
facts and circumstances may have been overlooked, which, if properly
considered, could affect the result of the case. (Constantino v. People, G.R. No.
225696, April 8, 2019)

160. Questions of fact may not be reviewed by the Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact
are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as they dwell on the truth or falsity of facts. This Court
would have to evaluate the evidence presented. (BNL Management Corp. v.
Uy, G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019)

161. A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a

petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the
court. In Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center
Corporation, the Supreme Court ruled that a petition for certiorari seeks
to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include
errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. In this case, what Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed
as errors of judgment of the CA. These errors pertain to Steamship’s
allegations of CA’s failure to rule that a valid arbitration agreement existed
between the parties and to refer the case to arbitration. It does not impute
any error with respect to the CA’s exercise of jurisdiction. As such, the
Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process where a case is
elevated from the trial court of origin, to the CA, and to this Court via Rule
45. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that a petition for review must be
verified and must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping.

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"A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his [or
her] personal knowledge or based on authentic records." While a
certification against forum shopping is a petitioner's statement "under
oath that he [or she] has not . . . commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions, or any other tribunal or agency[.]" In case the petitioner is a
private corporation, the verification and certification may be signed, for
and on behalf of this corporation, by a specifically authorized person,
including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be established by the documents. Verification is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement. On the other hand, a certification not signed
by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.
Moreover, the lack of or defect in the certification is not generally curable
by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases
where this Court exercised leniency due to the presence of special
circumstances or compelling reasons, such as the prima facie merits of
the petition. In some cases, the subsequent submission of proof of
authority of the party signing the certification on behalf of the
corporation was considered as substantial compliance with the rules and
the petition was given due course. In this case, the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping were signed by Steamship’s counsel
pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney vested upon him by Steamship.
Court holds that there is substantial compliance with the rules on
verification and certification against forum shopping. Steamship's
subsequent submission of the Secretary's Certificates showing Davis'
authority to execute the Power of Attorney in favor of Del Rosario & Del
Rosario cured the defect in the verification and certification appended to
the petition. Under the circumstances of this case, Steamship's counsel
would be in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the
allegations in the petition and certify on non-forum shopping considering
that "it has handled the case for . . . Steamship since its inception." (Steamship
Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. G.R. No. 196072,
G.R. No. 208603, September 20, 2017)

162. Disagreement on findings of the lower and appellate court do not

warrant automatic recourse to the supreme court. While the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, this
alone does not automatically warrant a review of factual findings by this
court. The lower courts' disagreement as to their factual findings, at most,
presents only prima facie basis for recourse to this court: One such exception,
is where – xxx with great circumspection and upon a clear showing that

64


manifestly correct findings have been unwarrantedly rejected or reversed.

Thus, while a conflict in their findings may prima facie provide basis for a
recourse to this Court, only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or
extraordinary misperception or manifest bias in the Appellate Court's
reading of the evidence will justify this Court's intervention by way of
assuming a function usually within the former's exclusive province.
(Malabanan v. Malabanan Jr., G.R. 187225, March 6, 2019)

163. It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. A departure from the
general rule may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of
the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are
unsupported by the evidence on record. (Torres y Salera v. People, G.R. No.
206627, January 18, 2017)

164. A special civil action for certiorari is not the only remedy against an
interlocutory order, since an interlocutory order may be appealed in an
appeal of the judgment itself. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is
appealable, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case. (Crispino v. Tansay, G.R. No. 184466,
December 5, 2016)

165. A review of appeals filed before this Court is “not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion.” The Rules of Court requires that only
questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari.
Findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA,
are binding upon this Court. It is not this Court's function to once again
analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts. (Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 205035, November 16,
2016)

166. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing an order

denying a motion to dismiss may be treated by the Supreme Court as
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 if the order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal and may only be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case.
As such, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. Nevertheless,
as the actions of the RTC Cebu Branch 10 are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this court treated the

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Rule 45 petition as a Rule 65 petition and gave it due course. (Aboitiz Equity
Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 197530, July 9, 2014)

167. Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under rule
45 of the rules of court, this court being bound by the findings of fact
made by the court of appeals. (In labor cases, if the petitioner can show that
the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard
of evidence material to the controversy, the factual findings of the National
Labor Relations Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately
rejected. In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct
conflict with the National Labor Relations Commission, this court may
examine the records of the case and the questioned findings in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction. It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence
of one of the exceptions to the general rule for this court to conduct a factual
review. (Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 169303,
February 11, 2015)

168. Rule 45 is applicable when the issues raised before this court involved
purely questions of law. BCDA and Northrail primarily seeks to construe
the arbitration clause in the Joint Venture Agreement. They assert that the
clause does not bind DMCI-PDI and Northrail. This issue is a question of
law. (Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project Developers,
Inc., G.R. No. 173137, January 11, 2016)

169. A Petition for Review on Certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a

judgment rendered by Sandiganbayan on civil forfeiture
proceedings. Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution,
and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture
proceedings. In a civil forfeiture proceeding under Republic Act No. 1379,
Petitioner correctly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court since Section 1 of the Rule provides that the mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan is
through a verified petition for review on certiorari. (Republic vs. Gimenez and
Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016)

170. The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. However, these rules admit exceptions.
Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists down 10 recognized exceptions: (1)
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of

66


discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record. . However, that the findings of the
Court of Appeals and of the trial court are opposite does not warrant this
Court’s automatic review of factual findings. This only presents a prima
facie basis for recourse to this Court. The case herein falls under the
exceptions in Medina, particularly in that: (1) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken when the CA mistakenly applied 2 case precedents
which were of peculiar circumstances as compared to the case herein; and
that (2) the findings of the CA on the presence of good faith on the part of
respondent are contrary to those of the trial court, necessitating a review of
the question of fact raised before the SC. (Padilla, Jr. vs. Malicsi, G.R. No.
201354, September 21, 2016)

171. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct
errors of jurisdiction. Courts lose competence in relation to an order if it
acts in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A petition for review under Rule 45, on the other hand, is a
mode of appeal intended to correct errors of judgment. Errors of
judgment are errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction. This
includes a review of the conclusions of law of the lower court and, in
appropriate cases, evaluation of the admissibility, weight, and inference
from the evidence presented. Intervention results in an interlocutory order
ancillary to a principal action. Its grant or denial is subject to the sound
discretion of the court. Interlocutory orders, or orders that do not make a
final disposition of the merits of the main controversy or cause of action,
are generally not reviewable. The only exception is a limited one, in that
when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where it can be
shown that the court acted without, in excess, or with such grave abuse of
discretion that such action ousts it of jurisdiction. The question of whether
intervention is proper is a question of law. Settled is the distinction between
a question of law and a question of fact. A question of fact arises when there
is doubt as to the truth or falsity of certain facts. A question of law, on the
other hand, arises when “the appeal raises doubt as to the applicable law

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on a certain set of facts.” The test often used by this Court to determine
whether there is a question of fact or a question of law “is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it
is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.” The question of whether the Court of
Appeals may resolve a motion for intervention is a question that assails an
interlocutory order and requests a review of a lower court’s exercise of
discretion. Generally, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will lie to raise this issue in a limited manner. There must be a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion for the writ of certiorari to be issued.
However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of
intervention and the merits of the case, an appeal through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy. Petitioner’s petition to revive its patent application for losartan
was denied by the Director-General of the IPO. It then filed a petition for
review with the CA. Therapharma, Inc., one of the respondents, moved to
intervene in the pending petition alleging that the decision of the CA on the
matter directly affects its vested right to sell its losartan products which was
already approved by the BFAD. The CA granted Therapharma’s
intervention and denied petition to revive the patent application. Petition
brought the matter to the SC via Rule 45, questioning the validity of the
intervention. Respondents, however, argued that the petition raises
questions of fact and that the proper remedy should be petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. (E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R.
No. 174379, August 31, 2016)

172. In a Rule 45 petition, the Court does not address questions of fact,
questions which require us to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts.” (Loria v. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014)

173. Appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. This
Court may, in its discretion, entertain questions of fact if they fall under
certain exceptions. But the presence of any of the exceptions to the general
rule, however, does not automatically place the case under this Court's
review. This Court explained in Pascual v. Burgos that the party claiming an
exception "must demonstrate and prove" that a review of the factual
findings is necessary. (Noell Whessoe, Inc v. Independent Testing Consultant,
Inc., G.R. No. 199851, November 07, 2018)

174. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari
shall only pertain to questions of law. While several exceptions to these

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rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated,

and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts
of the case. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the
exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. (Quirino T. Dela Cruz
vs. National Police Commission G.R. No. 215545, January 07, 2019)

175. Factual findings of trial courts will only be disturbed on appeal if it is

convincingly shown that they "overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The trial
courts factual findings and appreciation of the witnesses' testimonies are
given much respect, more so when their conclusions are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. (People of the Philippines v. Nady Magallano, Jr. Y Flores
G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018)

176. In a special civil action for certiorari, this Court cannot correct errors of
fact or law not amounting to grave abuse of discretion. This Court may
review ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial
powers, but only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion in an
"arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner. The rule on non-
interference is based on the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.
(Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman G.R. No. 212416, December 05, 2018)

177. The Office of the Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is

executive in nature, and with its power to investigate, it is in a better
position than this Court to assess the evidence on hand to substantiate its
finding of probable cause or lack of it. (Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 187794, November 28, 2018)

178. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, “only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.” It
is not the function of this Court to review and weigh anew the evidence
already passed upon by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
absent any showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.
(Lucido v People, G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017)

179. In a Rule 45 petition, only questions of law may be raised. Unless a case
falls under any of the exceptions, this Court will not undertake a factual
review and look into the parties' evidence and weigh them anew.(CE Luzon
Geothermal Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos.
197526 & 199676-77, July 26, 2017)

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180. The SC has reiterated that the practice of raising new issues on appeal
violates due process, hence it cannot stand. The object of a Notice of Sale
in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is to inform the public of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold and the time, place, and
terms of the auction sale. Mistakes or omissions that do not impede this
objective will not invalidate the Notice of Sale. In this case, records show
that petitioner only raised this argument in the Petition for Review
submitted before the SC. The alleged defect was not raised before the lower
courts. Notably, this is not the first time petitioner raised a new issue on
appeal. In any case, the alleged defect in the posting is superficial. The
Notice of Sale was posted on August 15, 2000, while the auction sale took
place on August 31, 2000. The Notice of Sale was posted for 16 days, only
four (4) days less than what the law requires. (Gotesco Properties, Inc. v.
Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017)

181. The factual findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by

substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties
and are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized
exceptions. This court is not a trier of facts and we are not duty bound to
re-examine evidence. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Mendoza admitted against his interest when he stated in his Joint Affidavit
that respondent "has continuously occupied and cultivated the land."
Unless it can be shown that irregularity tainted the free patent proceedings
conducted before the Director of Lands, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed stands. (Mendoza v. Valte, G.R. No. 172961,
September 7, 2015)

182. A re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain

material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court
which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal." The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating
the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates
the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's
consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate
authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish
all the elements of theft. (Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015)

183. Ordinarily, it is not for this Court to review factual issues in petitions
such as the present Rule 45 Petition which may only raise questions of
law. This rule, however, admits certain exceptions: 1. when the factual

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findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.
(Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 209910, November 29, 2017)

184. Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court.
Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules,
exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this
court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. Exceptions to the rule.
At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in
Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record. In any event, even in such cases,
this court retains full discretion on whether to review the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals. (Pascual vs. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11,
2016)

185. It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of

appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been
repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when
"there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." Certiorari can not be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not
being a substitute for lost appeal. As a general rule, it becomes improper
for this court to consider factual issues. The findings of fact of the trial
court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on
this court. The reason behind the rule is that this Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of
the evidence adduced before the lower courts. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019)

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186. There is a question of law "when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts" and there is a question of fact "when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There are instances
when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review.
These instances include the following: (1) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the
parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9)
when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record. (Lopez v. People G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)

187. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors in jurisdiction,

not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. Consequently, an error of judgment
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is
not one of jurisdiction, but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment,
appeal is the remedy. (Tankeh v. Development of the Philippines, G.R. No.
171428, November 11, 2013)

188. A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure
to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45. Unlike
a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original
or independent action. Consequently, the Resolutions of the CA dismissing
the Petition via Rule 65 and denying reconsideration are final resolutions
contemplated under Rule 45. These resolutions would attain finality if these
are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court order
would also become unassailable. (Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5,
2013)

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189. The Rule that only Questions of Law may be raised on a petition for
Review on Certiorari based on Rule 45 is not an absolute rule.
Nonetheless, this Court admits certain exceptions to this rule, upon a
showing of the existence of any of the following circumstances:(1) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on
speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked
undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record. (Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018)

190. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. There is a question
of law "when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain
set of facts. There is question of fact when the matter involves the
examination of probative value of the evidence presented. In this case, a
Rule 45 petition is proper as the petitioner seeks to question the ruling of
the CA on the proper application of the Rules Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies. (Villamor v. Umale, G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014)

191. This Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It only
entertains questions of law — those which ask to resolve which law
applies on a given set of facts. It does not rule on questions which
determine "the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. The Rules of Court states
that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only
questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is
not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has
already been considered in the lower courts. (Rodriguez v. Your Own Home
Development Corp. , G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018)

192. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. It

should be careful not to substitute its own appreciation of the facts to those
of the tribunals which have previously weighed the parties' claims and even
personally perused the evidence. (Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., G.R.
No. 208396; March 14, 2018)

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Section 2 – Time for filing; extension

193. A liberal construction of the rules of procedure, including the period

within which a petition for review must be filed, requires justifiable
reasons or at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them. Failure
to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it,
within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party's
loss of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory right,
must "be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down
by law. Failure to file one's appeal within the reglementary period is fatal
to a party's cause, "precluding the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case." (Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose
Cooperative v. Diaz, G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018)

Section 4 - Contents of Petition

194. Defect or non-compliance in Verification does not render the pleading

fatally defective. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. When all
petitioners share a common interest, the signature of one petitioner in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
rule. For the certification against forum shopping, Altres stated the general
rule that non-signing petitioners will be dropped as parties to the case.
Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a common
interest, the signature of one petitioner in the certification against forum
shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial compliance rule. (Cordillera
Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019)

195. The failure to state the names of the parties in the Petition for Review is
NOT a fatal defect. The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court for failing to state the names of the parties in the body. The
names of the parties are readily discernable from the caption of the petition,
clearly showing the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party
as the respondent. Orient Freight filed its Reply and notes that a cursory
reading of the petition would readily show the parties to the case. (Orient
Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., Inc., G.R. No.
191937, August 9, 2017)

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196. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it may still be
given due course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition “be accompanied
by . . . such material portions of the record as would support the petition,”
the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of
the complaint.

The Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider in

determining whether or not the rules of procedures should be relaxed, as
follows:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question
will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince
the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need

not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found
in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material
allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment,
it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may
still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing
that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve
the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits

Respondents attack the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner

for failure to attach certain documents to support its factual and legal
arguments. However, petitioner argues that the attached copies of the CA
decision, resolution, and amended decision are already sufficient to
support its allegations. Petitioner also attached additional documents in its
consolidated reply to its respondents’ comments. The SC is thus justified to
relax the application of rules and give due course to the petition. (E.I.
Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016)

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RULE 47
Annulment of Judgments or Finals Orders and Resolutions

Section 2 - Grounds for Annulment

197. Annulment of judgment may be availed of only in two instances, in cases

of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction under this
rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured." The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as
the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and
the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud. (Castro v.
Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014)

198. An allegation of a trial court's lack of jurisdiction to render the assailed

judgment, final order, or resolution must be brought in a separate action
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
An action for the annulment of judgment is an equitable recourse that is
independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases, such as
when there is no more available or other adequate remedy. (Tortal v.
Taniguchi, G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018)

199. The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death

obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent. The provision on
reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of
the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. In this
case, Celerina (petitioner) does not admit to have been absent. She seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification
of its effects. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be
considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death
is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No.
187061, October 8, 2014)

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RULE 50
Dismissal of Appeal

Section 1 - Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal.

200. The term "may" in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court means that the
Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the
enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when
it decided that the interest of justice would be better served by overlooking
the pleading's technical defects. Time and again, the Court has declared that
dismissal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. It is judicial policy
to determine a case based on the merits so that the parties have full
opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses. did not err in taking
cognizance of the appeal. (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017)

201. Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a “purely

statutory right.” The right to appeal “must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law” and requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court
on appeals. Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall
not be a deprivation of due process of law. (Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig
Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014)

202. Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of
the appellant to file the appellants' brief on time. But, the dismissal
is directory, not mandatory. Hence, the court has discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.
The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case. (Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November
7, 2018)

Section 2 - Dismissal of Improper Appeal to the Court of Appeals

203. According to Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, an improper appeal
before the Court of Appeals is dismissed outright and shall not be
referred to the proper court. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law
shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s
appeal for raising pure questions of law. (City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic
Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014)

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204. Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely
questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by
notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant
raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
(Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, March 3,
2014)

Section 3 - Withdrawal of Appeal

205. Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic

withdrawal of the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to
withdraw appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this motion. A motion prays
for a relief other than by a pleading. As the court may either grant or deny a
motion, or otherwise defer action on it until certain conditions are met,
lawyers have the obligation to apprise themselves of the court's resolution,
and not to simply second-guess it. (In re: CA-G.R. CV No. 94656 v. Mortel,
A.C. No. 10117 (Resolution), July 25, 2016)

RULE 51
Judgment

Section 8 - Questions that may be decided

206. Rule 51, Section 8 provides that only errors which have been stated in the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief will be considered
by the appellate court. However, an appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which
is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case
or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the
trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which

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the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. (Oriental

Assurance Corp. v. Ong, G.R. No. 189524, October 11, 2017)

207. The CA may review errors that are not assigned but are closely related to
or dependent on an assigned error. The CA is allowed discretion if it “finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just
resolution of the case.” Inasmuch as the CA may consider grounds other
than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the
same on the basis of such other grounds, the CA may, with no less
authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds
other than those raised as errors on appeal. (Heirs of Loyola v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017)

RULE 52
Motion for Reconsideration

Section 2 - Second Motion for Reconsideration.

208. As a general rule, the filing of second motions for reconsideration of a

judgment or final resolution is prohibited, unless there are
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: For the Court
to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, it must present
“extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained.” Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion for
Reconsideration is no longer prohibited. A decision or resolution of the
court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the
parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to
file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period.
It only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should
the second motion for reconsideration be granted. (Club Filipino, Inc. v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015)

RULE 53
New Trial

Section 1. Period for filing; ground

209. The CA’s power to receive evidence to resolve factual issues in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction is qualified by its
internal rules. In an ordinary appeal, the CA may receive evidence when a

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motion for new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence.

(Crispino v. Tansay, G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016)

RULE 56
Original and Appealed Cases

B
Appealed Cases

Section 6 - Disposition of Improper Appeal

210. Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal

by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for
decision or appropriate action. In the present case, there are factual matters
that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC.
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that although factual issues are beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition, the Court may refer the case to the Court of
Appeals under paragraph Rule 56 for further appropriate proceedings.
(Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019)

211. Procedural rules are not mere technicalities that can be disregarded at
whim by the parties or by our courts. Neither should they be applied so
mechanically without any appreciation of their purpose and object. The
Sandiganbayan improperly denied the application for writ of preliminary
attachment on the mere ground of petitioner’s failure to present particular
allegations which would support the issuance of the writ. However,
considering that the requisites of the law have been substantially met,
particularly the registration of the Cabuyao property in Marcos children’s
names as a form of concealment of properties illegally acquired by former
President Marcos by taking advantage of his power, there is indeed factual
basis for the issuance of the preliminary attachment under Sec. 1(b and c)
of Rule 57. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295,
October 5, 2016)

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IV
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

RULE 57
Preliminary Attachment

Section 1 - Grounds upon which attachment may issue

212. It was improper for the Sandiganbayan to deny the application on the
mere ground of failure to present particular allegations which would
support the issuance of the writ. In this case, the allegations in the admitted
complaint fall within Section 1(b) and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities
of the Marcos cases, the allegations of former President Marcos taking
advantage of his powers as President, gravely abusing his powers under
martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57. The allegation
that the Cabuyao property was registered under the names of the Marcos
children when they were still minors is sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao
property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of
Court. These allegations have substantially met the requirements of the law
for the issuance of a preliminary attachment. Hence, it was improper for the
Sandiganbayan to deny the application on the mere ground of failure to
present particular allegations which would support the issuance of the writ.
Thus, petitioner’s application for the writ of preliminary attachment must
be granted because its allegations therein are sufficient for the issuance of
said writ. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295,
October 5, 2016)

RULE 58
Preliminary Injunction

Section 1 - Preliminary injunction defined; classes

213. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case.
The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last
actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs
which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. The ordinary meaning
of status quo is “the existing state of affairs,” while status quo ante refers to
“the state of affairs that existed previously.” Relying in good faith on the
ordinary meaning of status quo as differentiated from status quo ante,
respondents pushed through with the construction, which had been the

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existing state of affairs at the time the Resolution was issued, consistent
with Republic Act No. 8975's policy. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015)

Section 3 - Grounds for issuance of Preliminary Injunction

214. Under Section 78 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), no
restraint or injunction whether permanent or temporary, could be issued
by any court except by the Supreme Court (SC). The injunction
contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere interlocutory action by a court but a
permanent remedy. (Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National
Power Corp., G.R.187420,August 9, 2017)

215. A writ of preliminary injunction entails a procedure for the judge to

assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered
moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full
requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial
court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of
injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially
breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant.
Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be
suffered is irreparable. (Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, G.R. No. 214073, October
04, 2017)

216. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order

issued as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both
parties. For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must
show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and
substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury. (Department of Public Works and
Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp, G.R. No. 182944, November 9,
2016)

217. For an action for injunction to prosper, the applicant must show the
existence of a right, as well as the actual or threatened violation of this
right. The limitations on the right of stockholders to inspect the corporate
books provided under Sec. 74 of the Corporation Code must be raised by
the corporation as a matter of defense, not as a matter of right. Absent any
right of petitioner which can be violated, the remedy of preliminary
injunction is generally unavailable. (Philippine Associated Smelting and
Refining Corp. vs. Lim, G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016)

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218. Absent the showing of an existing right to be protected, a party's

application for an injunctive relief must necessarily be denied. For a writ
of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show, by prima
facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and substantial
invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is necessary
to prevent irreparable injury. (Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. De
Leon, G.R. Nos. 236577 & 236597, August 15, 2018)

Section 4 - Verified application and Bond for Preliminary Injunction or

Temporary Restraining Order

219. Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits the issuance by all courts, other
than this Court, of any temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, or preliminary mandatory injunctions against national
government projects. This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes
or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited
to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. However, this prohibition shall
not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court,

which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. If
after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and
void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the
contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the
same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur
under existing laws. Among the "national government projects" covered
by the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 are projects
covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, otherwise known as the
Build-Operate-Transfer Law.

While conclusive proof of the right to be protected is not necessary, there

must still be a clear presentation of the existing basis of facts which
shows the right being threatened. There must be an existing basis of facts
affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary,
its existence need not be conclusively established.

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Here, the alleged breach of petitioners' ostensible rights was neither clear
nor compelling as to warrant an exception from Republic Act No. 8975.
Petitioners' mere allegations that the Agora Complex BOT Contract would
require that the Agora Complex be made an exclusive terminal for public
utility vehicles in violation of the "constitutional right of citizens to free
enterprise" does not entitle them to a temporary restraining order. (Teodulfo
Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al., G.R. No. 187869. September 13,
2017)

Section 5 - Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; Exception

220. In every application for provisional injunctive relief, the applicant must
establish the actual and existing right sought to be protected. The
applicant must also establish the urgency of a writ's issuance to prevent
grave and irreparable injury. Failure to do so will warrant the court's denial
of the application. Moreover, the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction may be denied in the same summary hearing as the
application for the issuance of the temporary restraining order if the
applicant fails to establish requisites for the entitlement of the writ. (Evy
Construction and Development Corp. v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corp., G.R.
No. 207938, October 11, 2017)

221. A temporary restraining order cannot be extended indefinitely to take the

place of a writ of preliminary injunction, since a temporary restraining
order is intended only to have a limited lifespan and is deemed
automatically vacated upon the expiration of 72 hours or 20 days, as the
case may be. In this case, the judge issued a status quo ante order which
indefinitely extended the temporary restraining order on the registration of
the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds. The rules provide that if
the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within
the given periods, the temporary restraining order is automatically vacated
and the court has no authority to extend or renew it on the same ground of
its original issuance. Petitioner applied for a writ of preliminary injunction,
yet the Regional Trial Court did not conduct any hearing for that purpose
and merely directed the parties to observe the status quo ante. As such, the
temporary restraining order has long expired and, in the absence of a
preliminary injunction, there was nothing to stop the sheriff from
registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds. (First Sarmiento
Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 202836,
June 19, 2018)

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Section 6 - Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, Injunction
or Restraining order.

222. The CA lifted and cancelled the injunction via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based on the grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, not based on a motion for dissolution of the injunction under
Sec. 6, Rule 58. The CA evaluated the basis for the injunction granted by
the RTC rather than whether the injunction would cause irreparable
damage to respondents. Hence, CA did not err in not requiring respondent
to submit any affidavit or counter-bond pertaining to irreparable damage
among others pursuant to Rule 58 Section 6. (Philippine Associated Smelting
and Refining Corp. vs. Lim, G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016)

RULE 60
Replevin

Section 2 - Affidavit and Bond

223. A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally
decided, resolved, or terminated, regardless of whether the applicant fails
to renew the bond. The applicant will be liable to the surety for any
payment the surety makes on the bond, but only up to the amount of this
bond. A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is
finally decided, resolved, or terminated. This condition is deemed
incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the surety,
regardless of whether they failed to expressly state it. (Enriquez v. The
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018)

R.A. 9262
Issuance of Protection Order

224. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their
children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the issuance
of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law. However,
the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file
such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself.
Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her
daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed. (Pavlow v.
Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017)

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V
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1 - Who may file petition

225. A petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy once a notice of
assessment is already issued. A declaratory judgment may issue only if
there has been “no breach of the documents in question.” If the contract or
statute subject matter of the action has already been breached, the
appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. (City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil.
Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014)

226. The trial court cannot classify the case based on potentialities. Rule 63,
Section 1 of the New Rules of Court only requires as an indispensable
requisite; that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may
be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants. An interpleader merely demands as a sine
qua non element that there be two or more claimants to the fund or thing
in dispute through separate and different interests. The claims must be
adverse before relief can be granted and the parties sought to be
interpleaded must be in a position to make effective claims. Additionally,
the fund thing, or duty over which the parties assert adverse claims must
be one and the same and derived from the same source. The two
defendants in this case are both stockholders on record. They continue to
be stockholders until a decision is rendered on the true ownership of the 25
shares of stock in Santos’ name. If Santos’ subscription is declared fictitious
and he still insists on inspecting corporate books and exercising rights
incidental to being a stockholder, then, and only then, shall the case cease
to be intra-corporate. Hence, a complaint of interpleader cannot prosper.
(Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No. 185894.
August 30, 2017)

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit

Section 1 - Scope

227. The remedy against an adverse decision, order, or ruling of the

Commission on Audit is a petition for certiorari, not review or appeal. A
petition for review on certiorari is the remedy provided in Rule 45, Section
1 of the Rules of Court against an adverse judgment, final order, or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law. On the other hand, Rule
64 of the Rules of Court pertains to "Review of Judgments and Final Orders
or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit." (Oriondo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211293, June 4, 2019)

228. Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65
is applicable specially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action,
there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr.,
Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to
oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited
involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing
candidate against the winning candidate. In the present case, petitioners are
not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their
fundamental right to expression. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Section 3 - Time to file Petition

229. The period for filing a Petition for Certiorari to assail the decisions,
orders, or rulings of the constitutional commissions is 30 days from
receipt of the decision, order, or ruling; and not 60 days under Rule 65.
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has
a reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The Constitution, however, specifies that the reglementary
period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional
commissions is 30 days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For
this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the Rules of Court. (Law Firm of
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
185444, January 13, 2015)

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230. Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court is beyond the
prescriptive period in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Audit when no Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the latter.
Without a motion for reconsideration being filed within the 30-day period
prescribed in the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Audit, the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Supreme Court
consequently went beyond the 30-day period in Rule 64, Section 3 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rotoras v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211999,
August 20, 2019)

231. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive

duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law. Not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (City of General Santos v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014)

RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 1 - Petition for Certiorari.

232. Any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming,
reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the
Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors
may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.Even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the
exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

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jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of

prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. (De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, 11 January 2016)

233. Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not a mere error of judgment
on the part of the court but constitutes grave abuse of discretion. When a
court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is
issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse
of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 224974,
July 03, 2017)

234. The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review.

Thus, administrative agencies like DARAB, may not issue writs of certiorari
to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they exercise supervisory
authority over these officers or organs. (Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017)

235. The Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it
commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where
a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. Joson failed to show that the Office
of the Ombudsman acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner." The Office of the Ombudsman laboriously discussed each and
every charge of petitioner by enumerating the elements of each law and
pointing out where petitioner fell short in evidence. (Joson v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017)

236. Mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to

constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is necessary for the petitioner to
prove "that the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in
such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the
law." (Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 213957-58, August 7, 2019)

237. A Rule 65 petition is an original action, independent of the action from

which the assailed ruling arose while a Rule 45 petition is a mode of
appeal. Rule 45 petitions engendered by prior Rule 65 petitions

89


for certiorari and/or prohibition are, therefore, bound by the same basic
issue at the crux of the prior Rule 65 petition, that is, "issues of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion." (Department of Public Works and Highways v.
City Advertising Ventures Corp, G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016)

238. A motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for reconsideration is required before
a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the
assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. (Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283,
June 9, 2014)

239. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not

operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction. (Certainly, a breach of
the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from
COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.) (The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

240. Judicial power includes the power to enforce rights conferred by law and
determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality. Jurisprudence has consistently referred to these two as
the court's traditional and expanded powers of judicial review.
Traditional judicial power is the court's authority to review and settle actual
controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce
legally demandable rights. On the other hand, the framers of the 1987
Constitution deliberately expanded this Court's power of judicial review.
This Court's expanded power of judicial review requires a prima facie
showing of grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality. This broad grant of power contrasts with the remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65, which is limited to the review of judicial and quasi-
judicial acts. Nonetheless, this Court, by its own power to relax its rules,
allowed Rule 65 to be used for petitions invoking the courts' expanded
jurisdiction. (GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
210773, January 23, 2019)

241. Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC is through a Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Precisely because it was
confronted with a Rule 65 Petition, it was the CA's business to determine
whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

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excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner should not fault the CA for examining the
records and evidence at its disposal and for embarking on its own analysis.
(Jovita S. Manalo vs. Ateneo De Naga University, Tabora and Bernal, G.R. No.
185058, November 9, 2015)

242. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole”
judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express
statement that “judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice .
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” In Libanan v. HRET, the Supreme
Court referred to this power of judicial review in exceptional cases as
extraordinary jurisdiction, upon determination that the Tribunal’s
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Exclusive, original
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus,
vested in the electoral tribunals. However, the judgments of these tribunals
are not beyond the scope of any review. The Supreme Court reviews
judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. The review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.

A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the

Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
independent civil action. The viability of such a petition is premised on
an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” There is grave abuse of
discretion when a constitutional organ such as the SET or COMELEC,
makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical
pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or
not accounted for. However, these circumstances are not present in this case
as the SET’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive
reading of the Constitution and that Poe was able to adduce evidence that
she is a natural-born Filipino. (David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
221538, September 20, 2016)

243. A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these

writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. (Pemberton v. De
Lima, G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016)

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244. Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a
petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, or a petition for
review on certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic. Payment
of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a petition for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, or a petition for review on
certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic. In Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc., et al. v. Canja, This court held that: In cases where a petition for
certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and
reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC. (Maricel S. Nonay v. Bahia
Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016)

245. This Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the
extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari. It is true that petitions for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of this court. However, this is
also true of regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals. Department
Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the Secretary of
Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and
pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher
associations is mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural
lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. (Quezon
City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720.
February 23, 2016)

246. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable

before resort to the special civil action for certiorari is made. This is to
afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. An
omission to comply with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of
the writ of certiorari applied for. Furthermore, contrary to petitioners'
allegations, we find no "extreme necessity and urgency" to excuse their
direct resort to a certiorari before the CA. Hence, the CA correctly dismissed
petitioners' Rule 65 Petition. (Celso F. Pascual, Sr. v. Caniogan Credit and
Development Cooperative, G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015)

247. Grave abuse of discretion pertains to acts of discretion exercised in

areas outside an agency's granted authority and, thus, abusing the power
granted to it. Respondents were only complying with their duties under the

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Social Security Act when they issued the assailed issuances. There is no
showing that respondents went beyond the powers under the law that
amounts to lack of or in excess of their jurisdiction. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v.
Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)

248. Section 1 of Rule 65 presupposes that the remedies of appeal and

certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive." When
the remedy of appeal is available to a litigant, a petition for certiorari shall
not be entertained and should be dismissed for being an improper remedy.
The Court ruled in the present case that the trial court's noncompliance with
the mandatory period for filing of a judicial affidavit constitutes grave
abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1,
2019)

249. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not correct alleged errors of
fact or law that do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. In the present
case, the Court only reviews the Office of the Ombudsman's determination
of whether probable cause exists upon a clear showing of its abuse of
discretion, or when it exercised it in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,]
or despotic manner." Absent a showing that the Office of the Ombudsman
acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,] or despotic manner[,]" this
Court will not interfere with its exercise of discretion in determining the
existence of probable cause. (Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
216949, July 3, 2019)

250. In a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
as in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to conduct
its own factual determination when it finds that there was grave abuse of
discretion. It can disregard evidence material to the controversy and to do
such, it has to look at the evidence. In this case, contrary to the assertion of
the petitioner, the CA can have a factual finding, even if it is contrary to the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission. (Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., G.R. No. 225899,
July 10, 2019)

251. When a demurrer is granted in a criminal case, the private complainant

can file a Rule 65 petition on the civil aspect of the case, as long as he or
she can show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the demurrer. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

93


jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the

petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In a criminal case, the
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In this case, the totality of the petition for
certiorari asserts the complainant’s concern over the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Hence, petitioner has the legal personality to file a special
civil action insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned. (BDO Unibank,
Inc. v. Choa, G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019)

252. The non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration prior to the filing of a

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not fatal when the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court. The settled rule is that a Motion for
Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed
by well-defined exceptions, such as where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013)

253. The Supreme Court in the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of substantial justice, has treated petitions for certiorari as
an appeal: (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review
on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there
is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. (City of Lapu-Lapu
v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26,
2014)

254. The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or decision. Certiorari, therefore, "is
not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration." It is settled that a motion for
reconsideration is a "condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari." This enables the court to correct "any actual or perceived error"
through a "re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case." To dispense with this condition, there must be a "concrete,
compelling, and valid reason." (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403,
September 5, 2018)

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Section 2 - Petition for Prohibition

255. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and will not lie for acts already
accomplished. In this case, the project had already commenced and had
been ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case. (Dynamic Builders &
Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7 2015)

Section 3 - Petition for Mandamus

256. Mandamus cannot lie from invoking ipra or indigenous peoples' rights
act of 1997. For a writ of mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there
must be a concurrence between: (1) a clear, duly established legal right
pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by
law upon respondent, which that respondent unlawfully neglects.
Additionally, a writ of mandamus, as with certiorari and prohibition, shall
be issued only upon a showing that "there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Philippine legal
system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never
intended and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal
offenses. Individuals belonging to indigenous cultural communities who
are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or
the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and
liability under courts of law. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in
support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
(Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019)

257. The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and
punishment of tax offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that
cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not a legally mandated
ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a person who only makes
sweeping averments about undisclosed wealth, rather than specific tax
offenses, and who fails to show that the information which he or she
supplied was the undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a tax
offense, the conviction and/or punishment of the persons liable, and an
actual recovery made by the State. Indiscriminate, expendable information
negates a clear legal right and further impugns the propriety of issuing a
writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown
that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions
for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without
exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary

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jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing
amounts to an act of forum shopping. (Lihaylihay v. Tan, G.R. No. 192223,
July 23, 2018)

258. Associations or corporations may sue in behalf of their member who

suffer direct and substantial injury. In these cases, there must be an actual
controversy, with a clear and convincing demonstration of special reasons
why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue or that the
representation of the association is more efficient for the petitioners to
bring. In addition, there must be a showing of the transcendent nature of
the right involved. Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring
a grounded level of urgency can be transcendent. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos.
211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634, October 15, 2019)

259. In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court
has ruled that the Civil Service Commission's attestation is a ministerial
duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the position. Given his claim
that he possesses the required civil service eligibility for the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, he correctly filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the Compel the Civil Service Commission to approve
his appointment. (Buena, Jr. v. Benito,G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014)

260. Mandamus is the relief sought “[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station,” and “there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Through a writ of mandamus, the courts “compel
the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the defendant or respondent” by operation of his or her office, trust,
or station. The COMELEC may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus,
to enable the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for
the 2016 Elections. (Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 222731. March 8, 2016.)

261. Mandamus will not issue if there is no actual controversy or legal

standing. (This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a
bill is not a law. A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed
into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret
laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
bill that Congress may or may not pass. Adding to this, the writ of
mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial.
An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and

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the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate. In a petition for

mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is entitled
to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a corresponding
duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. (In The
Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence And Fiscal Autonomy
Movement Vs. Abolition Of Judiciary Development Fund (Jdf) And Reduction Of
Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

Section 4 - When and where to file the petition

262. Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non

before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an
opportunity for the tribunal or officer to correct any error attributed to it
by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
However, exceptions to the rule exist: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial Court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are
a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or
in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. As argued
by respondents, a second motion for reconsideration would have been
futile since the DOJ had already passed upon the same issues twice. (ABS-
CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015)

Section 5 - Respondents and costs in certain cases

263. Section 5 of Rule 65 sets that when a petition for certiorari is filed assailing
an act of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a
private respondent, and is then mandated to appear and defend both on his
or her own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected by the
proceedings. Furthermore, unless otherwise specifically directed by the

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court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear
in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If
the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents
shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the
proceedings therein. Hence, there is no need for the petition to be served on
the Solicitor General. (Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019)

Section 6 - Order to comment

264. Section 6 of Rule 65 states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once
it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall issue an order requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition. Compared with an ordinary civil
action, where summons must be issued upon the filing of the complaint,
the court need only issue an order requiring the respondents to comment
on the petition for certiorari. In the case, the failure to serve summons upon
petitioners did not prevent the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction and to
render its decision void. (Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019)

Section 7 - Expediting proceedings; Injunctive relief

265. Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the
judgment or order that it assails. Unless a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is issued, the assailed decision lapses into
finality. Thereafter, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified,
and execution may ensue. As basic as the principle of finality of judgments
is the rule that filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure "shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."
Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the
judgment or order that it assails. (De Ocampo vs. Radio Philippines Network,
Inc., G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2017)

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RULE 67
Expropriation

Section 1. The complaint

266. In a negotiated sale, the government offers to acquire for public purpose
a private property, and the owner may accept or reject it. A rejection of the
offer, however, would most likely result merely result in the
commencement of an expropriation proceeding that would eventually
transfer title to the government. Hence, the government’s offer to acquire
for public purpose a private property may be considered as an act
preparatory to an expropriation proceeding. (Republic v. Ortigas and Co.
Limited Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014)

267. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking
or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of
to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.
There is taking in the context of the state’s power of eminent domain when
the following elements are present: (1) The expropriator enters a private
property; (2) The entrance into the private property is indefinite or
permanent; (3) There is color of legal authority in the entry into the
property; (4) The property is devoted to public use or purpose; and (5) The
use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a
“taking” under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for
an indefinite period. NPC entered and installed transmission lines on
spouses’ private property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
The spouses were only paid 10% of the market value of the property in
accordance with Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, because
it is merely subjected to a right-of-way. However, the spouses demand a
just compensation equivalent to the full and fair value of the property even
if it was merely subjected to a right-of-way because such burden already
constitutes taking under eminent domain. (National Power Corporation vs.
Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016)

Section 2 - Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized

government depository

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268. Motion to withdraw expropriation proceedings is allowed subject to the

approval of the court. (The expropriation case is not automatically
dismissed when the property ceases to be for public use. The state must first
file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to
Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is always subject to judicial
discretion. (National Power Corporation vs. Posada, G.R. No. 191945, March 11,
2015)

Section 5 - Ascertainment of compensation

269. In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action filed, the
property owner may file its own action to question the propriety of the
taking or to compel the payment of just compensation. Among these
inverse condemnation actions is a complaint for payment of just
compensation and damages. When an inverse condemnation is filed, the
provisions for the appointment of commissioners under Rule 32 — not
Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court — will be followed.
When a government agency itself violates procedural requirements, it
waives the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. NPC entered and
installed transmission lines on spouses’ private property without initiating
expropriation proceedings despite the disagreement in the amount of just
compensation. Thus, the spouses may file an action for payment of just
compensation and damages. Since it is not an expropriation proceeding, the
court is not bound by the rules under Rule 67.

Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just compensation for

property taken in expropriation is a judicial prerogative. Just
compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected
property. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, states that only
10% of the market value of the property is due the owner of the property
subject to a right-of-way easement. However, this rule is not binding on the
Court. (National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507,
September 14, 2016)

Section 8 - Action upon Commissioners’ Report

270. The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the

original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. Under
Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may accept
Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further
report, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of

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it and reject the other parts. The determination of just compensation is a

judicial function, which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much
less by an administrative rule. The delay in payment likewise requires the
imposition of legal interest by way of damages. (Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)

R.A. 8974
An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes

271. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency
must, upon filing of the expropriation complaint, immediately pay the
property owner an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the value of any improvements or structure on a
replacement cost method. There is nothing that prevents a court from
setting aside a Writ of Possession on appeal when it is found that the
guidelines were not complied with, and such is not similar to a
injunction. The provisional value that must be paid under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974 should not be confused with the payment of just
compensation required by the Constitution in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. It only serves as a pre-payment so that the government
may take possession of the property. Moreover, the value need not be
judicially determined; rather, the value has already been set by the current
relevant zonal value of the area as classified by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. The pre-payment must also be paid immediately to the owner of
the property. (Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015)

RULE 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 - Who may institute proceedings, and when.

272. The prescriptive period for forcible entry through stealth is reckoned
from the date of discovery. Generally, the prescriptive period for forcible
entry is counted from the date of actual entry into the land – except when
this entry was made through stealth, in which case, the period is reckoned
from the time of discovery. (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi
Appliance M.C. Corp., G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019)

273. Possession of a property belonging to another may be tolerated or

permitted, even without a prior contract between the parties, as long as

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there is an implied promise that the occupant will vacate upon demand.
Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action for summary
ejectment. Thus, prior demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be instituted. However,
prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case for
unlawful detainer if the demand to vacate is premised on the expiration of
the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-compliance of the terms
and conditions of the lease. (Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, G.R. No. 205539,
October 4, 2017)

274. To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court,
the allegations in the complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts
must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case for unlawful
detainer if the complaint states the following: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment. (Intramuros Administration v. Offshore
Construction Development Co., G.R. No. 196795; March 7, 2018)

RULE 71
Contempt

Section 3 - Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing

275. There is no question that in contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of
the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor
should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does
not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the
party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence
of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative
of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where
he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes
proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion
as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully
and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.” This Court finds no clear
and contumacious conduct on the part of Steamship. It does not appear that
Steamship was motivated by bad faith in initiating the arbitration
proceedings while an action is pending with the Philippine courts. Rather,

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its act of commencing arbitration in London is but a bona fide attempt to

preserve and enforce its rights under the Club Rules. (Steamship Mutual
Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. G.R. No. 196072, G.R. No.
208603, September 20, 2017)

276. The general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may
be punished with contempt. The Court agrees with respondents, that they
should not be faulted for releasing a subsequent press statement regarding
the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The statements were
official statements made in the performance of respondents' official
functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an
institutional action in response to a serious breach of security. Respondents,
in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for
responding publicly to such public actions. Given the circumstances, citing
respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise of this Court's
contempt power. (Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017)

277. Deliberate forum shopping is a ground for contempt. The Court cannot
countenance defiance of its authority on repetitious assertions of the
meritoriousness of a party’s cause, no matter how sincerely or genuinely
entertained. There has been a final determination of the issues in these cases
and petitioner has been repeatedly directed to abide thereby. (Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and Dolores Molina, G.R.
No. 109645, January 21, 2015)

278. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or

prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished
for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which
is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that
there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or
thing is forbidden or required. The court's contempt power should be
exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive, purpose.
Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power
be exercised. (Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
(POPARMUCO) v. Inson, G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019)

279. To be held liable for contempt, a person’s act must be done willfully or
for an illegitimate or improper purpose. Good faith, or lack thereof, of the
person being cited in contempt should be considered. However, intent is a
necessary element only in criminal contempt cases. Because the purpose of
civil contempt proceeding is remedial and not punitive, intent is

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immaterial. Hence, good faith or lack of intent to violate the court’s order is
not a defense in civil contempt. (Webb v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 194469, September
18, 2019)

280. Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or

defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which
"tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice"
or "interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during
litigation. (Oca v. Custodio, G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017)

281. A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who
appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name
commits indirect contempt of court. Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's
name in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner's name in
the firm name. The latter is allowed as long as there is an indication that the
partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other
hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may
mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to
practice law. (David Yu Kimteng v. Atty. Walter T. Young, G.R. No. 210554,
August 5, 2015)

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VI
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
DECEASED PERSONS

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estates

Section 4 - Liability of Distributees and Estate

282. In any event, Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
Onofre Andres who never alleged being an excluded heir or unpaid
creditor of his brother Roman Andres and Roman’s wife. Hence, PNB was
not negligent in not considering the two-year period in conducting its
investigation. (Onofre Andres v. PNB, G.R. No. 173548, October 15, 2014)

RULE 102
Writ of Habeas Corpus

Section 1 - To what Habeas Corpus extends

283. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due
to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained. Even if petitioner
Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been
cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang Salibo”
will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. (In re Salibo
v. Warden, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

Section 2 - Who may grant the writ

284. When a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court
only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause
why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed
was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. However, once the
superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the
Rules of Court, the lower court designated “does not thereby become
merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusions are
devoid of effect.” The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a

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decision of the lower court, not of the superior court. (In re Salibo v. Warden,
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

Section 4 - When writ not allowed or discharge authorized

285. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary, summary, and equitable writ,

consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty." Its primary
purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient." However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the
remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. (Osorio v. Navera,
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018)

A.M. No. 07-09-12-SC

Writ of Amparo

286. Hearsay evidence may be considered in a Writ of Amparo proceeding if

required by the unique circumstances of the case. The evidentiary rule on
the admissibility of evidence was merely relaxed, maintaining all the time
the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary
situation by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the
consistency of the hearsay evidence with other available evidence in the
case. (Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019)

287. The remedy of writ of amparo is initiated through a petition to be filed

in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation
of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed". After evaluation, the judge has the
option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case.
Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show
that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ
itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The
court compels the respondent to appear before a court of law to show
whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are
necessary. The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance
of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as responsive
pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes

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aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required
to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party. If the respondents are public officials or employees,
they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the
identity of the aggrieved party: (ii) recover and preserve evidence related
to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii)
identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or
disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of
death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected
offenders before a competent court. There will be summary hearing only
after Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether
interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be
done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within
10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The
judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for
the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify
and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that
could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. (De Lima v.
Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013)

RULE 108
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Section 2 - Entries Subject to Cancellation or Correction

288. The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in

a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth. Rule 108
of the Rules of Court is confined to innocuous or clerical errors. What is
being sought in the case is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple
matter of correcting a single letter in respondent's surname due to a
misspelling. Rather, respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as
changing her surname will also change her status. This will affect not only
her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is
substantial. (Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019)

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R.A. 9048
Act Authorizing the C/MCR or Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order

289. Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the
correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108.
It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any
clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first
name or nickname. The current law, Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply
since R.A. No. 10172 was enacted only 15 August 2012. In addition to the
change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person
may now be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172
clarifies that these changes may now administratively corrected where it is
patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in the entry.
With the present governing law, it may now be changed by filing a
subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city
or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed
is kept. Also note that although there was no compliance by Gallo of the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, for reasons of equity, the
Supreme Court allowed this petition for the prosecutor’s failure to raise the
issue of at an opportune time. (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17,
2018)

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VII
THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110
Prosecution of Offenses

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions

290. Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of
the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's
guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. The trial
court has already determined, independently of any finding or
recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause
exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable
cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore,
has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the
validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment. (De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016)

291. Probable cause for the filing of an information is a matter which rests on
likelihood rather than on certainty. Probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It
is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. (Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019)

292. An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the

charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The introduction
of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from
including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. The inclusion of such
enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the
offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
(People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014)

293. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal

action. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information
in the proper court. In turn, the filing of said information sets in motion the

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criminal action against the accused in Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it the determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. (Napoles v. De Lima G.R. No. 213529
July 13, 2016)

Section 5 - Who must prosecute criminal actions

294. A criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, if the public prosecutor does not give his or her
conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the required
legal personality to pursue the case. The required conformity of the public
prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a
criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to
prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines
who are the real party in interest. (Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054,
March 27, 2017)

Section 6 - Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

295. The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime,

including any circumstance that may aggravate the accused’s liability, is
for the accused to be able to adequately prepare for his or her defense.
The Information filed against the accused contains the circumstances of
murder and the aggravating circumstance of disguise attending the alleged
crime. The inclusion of the circumstance of disguise in the Information did
not prevent the accused from interposing his defense of alibi. (People of the
Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al., G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016)

Section 14 - Amendment or Substitution

296. Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal

amendments when the accused has already entered his or her plea, it is
important that the amendments made should not prejudice the rights of
the accused. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018)

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RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1 - Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

297. The simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal of the civil aspect in a

criminal case, and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for the judgment
of acquittal in the criminal aspect, amounts to forum shopping. If the state
pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainants failed to reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is
inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the
civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari
assailing the acquittal of the accused. The private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating
the doctrine of non-forum shopping. In this case, Ferro Chemicals
committed forum-shopping when it filed a notice of appeal with respect to
the civil aspect of the estafa case against Garcia, and a petition for certiorari
for the judgment of acquittal. There is forum-shopping as the civil aspect
was not reserved prior to the institution of the criminal case, thus, it was
filed with the criminal case and went through with the petition for
certiorari. (Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals Inc., G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014)

RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation

Section 1 - Preliminary investigation defined; when required.

298. The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing an

information is lodged with the public prosecutor. It is not reviewable by
courts unless it is attended by grave abuse of discretion. The court may
not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor's determination of the
existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its
correctness. It does not review the determination of probable cause made
by the prosecutor. It does not function as the prosecutor's appellate court.
(Securities and Exchange Commission v. Price Richardson Corp., G.R. No.
197032, July 26, 2017)

299. No grave abuse of discretion in findings of preliminary investigation,

when the same is founded on evidence. The relevant issues in determining
whether grave abuse of discretion attended the preliminary investigation

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are: (1) whether petitioner had been so fundamentally deprived of an

opportunity to be heard in relation to the purposes of preliminary
investigation; (2) whether the infirmities were so fatal that they effectively
deprived petitioner of any opportunity to be heard during the judicial
examination, pre-trial, and trial; and (3) whether there would be a public
policy interest in suspending the criminal action. (Marantan v. Department
of Justice G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019)

300. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary

investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment. The filing of the
information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant
of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot. It is settled that executive
determination of probable cause is different from the judicial determination
of probable cause. (Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016)

301. Judges must act with cautious discernment and faithfully exercise their
judicial discretion when dismissing cases for lack of probable cause. An
order granting the withdrawal of an information based on the prosecutor's
findings of lack of probable cause must show that the judge did not rely
solely on the prosecution's conclusions but had independently evaluated
the evidence on record and the merits of the case. (Personal Collection Direct
Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017)

Section 2 - Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations

302. As a general rule, the SC does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give
the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public
officials and government employees. The rule on noninterference is based
on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.” An independent
constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is “beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of
the public service.” Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there
is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused.
This function is executive in nature. (Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016)

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Section 3 – Procedure

303. Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has

the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but he
does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her
co-respondents. During preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman is not
required to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. (Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017)

304. Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary
investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against the accused.
Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning
but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding
each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of
view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would
need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused
must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure
to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right. Mode of
analysis in situations where the right to speedy disposition of cases or
the right to speedy trial is invoked. First, the right to speedy disposition
of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for
both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in
criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition
of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to
be invoked. Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal
complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities
and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against
the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the
filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay. Third, courts must first
determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked
within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that
the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time
period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying
the delay. If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether

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the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is

attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not
contribute to the delay. Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution,
the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure
in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the
case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence
made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay. Fourth, determination of the length of
delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the
case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or
complexity of the issues raised. An exception to this rule is if there is an
allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice,
such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged
from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If
malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case
would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the
delay. Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to
speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven
that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no
longer be invoked. In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the
causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant
court. Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy
trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy
disposition of cases. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, G.R. Nos.
206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018)

305. There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. While the determination of
probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the
prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental right
to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence,
it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause. (Mendoza v.
People. G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014)

306. Questions on the preliminary investigation are moot once information is

filed. Once an information is filed before a court, that court acquires

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jurisdiction over the case. Notably, a petition questioning the preliminary

investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information based on the
preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in turn, would
complete its own determination of probable cause. (Marantan v. Department
of Justice G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019)

307. Certiorari will lie in case where grave abuse of discretion attended in not
appreciating facts to find probable cause. As a general rule, a public
prosecutor's determination of probable cause — that is, one made for the
purpose of filing an Information in court — is essentially an executive
function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Public prosecutors must address the
different dimensions of complaints raised before them. When they provide
well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpable
indications that another crime has been committed, they fail to responsibly
discharge the functions entrusted to them. This amounts to an evasion of
positive duty, an act of grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
(Tupaz v. Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas G.R. 212491-92, March 6,
2019)

Section 4 - Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review

308. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary
of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the
provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a
pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify,
reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors. Decisions or
resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. (De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330,
January 11, 2016)

Section 5 - When warrant of arrest may issue

309. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal
evaluation of the prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They
may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the submission of

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additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another
conduct of preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier
preliminary investigation was improperly conducted. The courts do not
interfere with the prosecutor’s conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her
discretion. Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine
whether an information should be filed in court or whether the complaint
should be dismissed. Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors'
conduct of preliminary investigation was "incomplete" and that their
determination of probable cause "has not measured up to the standard," she
encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of
determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary
investigation. (Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15,
2017)

310. The determination of probable cause for filing an information in court

and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. During
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of
probable cause for filing an information in court or dismissing the criminal
complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines
during preliminary investigation whether "there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." At this
stage, the determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent
grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by
the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.
(Napoles v. De Lima G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016)

Section 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.

311. We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge

is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before
him, he issues a warrant of arrest. (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403,
September 5, 2018)

RULE 113
Arrest

Section 5 - Arrest without Warrant; when lawful

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312. A prior surveillance is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an

entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or
textbook method… The police officers may decide that the time is of the
essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. This flexibility is
even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency
of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate
action on the part of the law enforcers. (People of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R.
No. 211465, December 3, 2014)

313. The instances of lawful arrest without warrant are provided in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The police officer
must have personal knowledge of the commission of an offense. Under
Section 5 (a), the officer himself or herself witnesses the crime; in Section 5
(b), the officer knows that a crime has just been committed and had
witnessed some facts that led him or her to believe that the person about to
be arrested committed the offense. (Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078,
September 4, 2019)

314. For an in flagrante delicto arrest to be valid, the person to be arrested: (1)
must execute an overt act indicating that he/she has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. A warrantless arrest is invalid absent any overt act from the person
to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. In hot pursuit arrest, an offense has
just been committed and the law enforcers, although they need not
personally witness the commission of a crime, have personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it. (Veridiano y Sapi v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017)

315. Where a warrantless search preceded a warrantless arrest but was

substantially contemporaneous with it, what must be resolved is whether
or not the police had probable cause for the arrest when the search was
made. Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a
crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. (Aparente y
Volcan v. People, G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017)

316. Requisites for stop and frisk: personal knowledge and totality of
circumstances which warrant suspicion. For a "stop and frisk" search to be
valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by
the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person

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is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on

this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.
(Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019)

317. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality
of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against
him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the
arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to
the jurisdiction of the trial court. (Lapi y Mahipus v. People, G.R. No. 210731,
February 13, 2019)

318. Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although

done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the
traveling public. Thus, Petitioner is precluded from claiming an invalid
warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his
person by voluntarily submitting his bag for inspection to the port
authorities. The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was
voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not.
He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of
probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing
through ports or terminals. (Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

RULE 114
Bail

Section 5 - Bail, when discretionary

319. The presence of even one of the enumerated circumstances in Section 5,

Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is sufficient to deny or cancel the bail. After
conviction of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the grant of bail becomes discretionary upon the court,
which may either deny or grant it. In circumstances where the penalty
imposed exceeds six years, the court is not precluded from cancelling the

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bail previously granted upon a showing by the prosecution of the

circumstances enumerated in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
(Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019)

Section 17 - Bail, where filed

320. Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the

province, city, or municipality where the case is pending has no authority
to grant bail. To do so would be gross ignorance of the law. The text of
Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that there is an order of
preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence or
unavailability of the judge where the case is pending, the accused must first
go to a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case is
pending. Furthermore, a judge of another province, city, or municipality
may grant bail only if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending. (Tejano v. Marigomen,
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017)

Section 22. Cancellation of bail

321. Petitioner's right to due process was not violated when it was not given
notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond.
No notice or hearing was necessary, since the bail was automatically
cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. Petitioner's hypothetical
objections to the Motion to Release Cash Bond would have been
superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to
respondent was already warranted under the Rules of Court. (Personal
Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017)

RULE 115
Rights of Accused

Section 1 - Rights of accused at the trial

322. The right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a personal one which may
be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation
of the right of cross-examination. When an accused is given the opportunity
to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be
deemed to have waived this right. The witness' testimony given during
direct examination will remain on record. If this testimony is used against
the accused, there will be no violation of the right of confrontation. (Kim
Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018)

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RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea

Section 1 - Arraignment and Plea; how made

323. Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court – Criminal Procedure requires
the attendance or presence of the accused at the arraignment. The Court
held in the case at bar that without evidence of the accused’s arraignment,
the Regional Trial Court had no authority to order his acquittal. “It is not
an idle ceremony that can be brushed aside peremptorily, but an
indispensable requirement of due process, the absence of which renders the
proceedings against the accused void.” In this case, after the warrant of
arrest issued against he accused was returned, the latter’s name appeared
only in the order of the RTC. There is no statement if he was belatedly
arraigned or whether he made a voluntary appearance. (People v. Palema y
Vargas, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019)

Section 11 - Suspension of Arraignment

324. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension
of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment. Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in
certain circumstances only: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.–Upon
motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement
for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition
for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office. (ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No.
195956, March 11, 2015)

325. Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined that
probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, like in this

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case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial Court. Therefore, it

can proceed in conducting further proceedings on the amended
information and on the issuance of a warrant despite the pendency of a
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. Rule 116, Section 11
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an
arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the Department
of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused. (Corpus, Jr.
v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018)

RULE 117
Motion to Quash

Section 3 – Grounds

326. With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in a point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." An
accused filing a motion to quash "hypothetically admits the facts alleged in
the information" and cannot present evidence aliunde or those extrinsic
from the Information. The effect of the grant of the motion to quash
depends on the grounds availed of. When the defect in the complaint or
information can be cured by amendment, the grant of the motion to quash
will result in an order directing the amendment. If the ground is that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment." If,
despite amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect, the complaint or information shall be quashed. (Osorio v.
Navera, G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution); February 26, 2018)

Section 4 - Amendment of complaint or information

327. When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be

cured by amendment before arraignment, courts must provide the
prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information. It must be
clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by
amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is void ab
initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment
which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should
be given a chance to correct the defect. The court can order the dismissal
only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. The trial court's failure to

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provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary

exercise of power. (Dio v. People G.R. No. 208146 June 8, 2016)

RULE 119
Trial

Section 23 - Demurrer to Evidence

328. Section 23 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court – Criminal Procedure, sets
out that “after the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.”… The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall
specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. In the case at bar,
the Court ruled that the five-day period shall commence not on the day of
the filing of the formal offer of evidence, and not on the date the trial court
admitted the evidence. Instead, the five (5) day period shall commence to
run on the date of the receipt of the order admitting the evidence, for only
then was he notified that the prosecution had rested its case.” (BDO
Unibank, Inc. v. Choa, G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019)

RULE 120
Judgment

Section 4 - Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

329. Under the Rule on Variance, if there is a variance between the offense
charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the
offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may
also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in
the offense proved. As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime
with which he or she is charged. This rule proceeds from the Constitutional
guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on
variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. If the elements of of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC
(offense charged) are not present, persons who receive money for
investment in a particular company but diverted the same to another
without the investor's consent may be held criminally liable for other
deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of other

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deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included
in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope
intended to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315,
316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code. (Osorio v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018)

RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - New Trial or Reconsideration

330. As a rule, parties are bound by the acts, omissions, and mistakes of their
counsel. To adopt a contrary principle may lead to unnecessary delays,
indefinite court proceedings, and possibly no end to litigation for all that
a defeated party would do is to claim that his or her counsel acted
negligently. An exception to this is when the gross and inexcusable
negligence of counsel deprives the latter's client of his or her day in court.
The allegation of gross and inexcusable negligence, however, must be
substantiated. In determining whether the case falls under the exception,
courts should always be guided by the principle that parties must be "given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of [their] action or defense."
For a New Trial to be granted in a criminal case, it must be shown that they
have a meritorious defense and that the evidence they seek to introduce
would probably lead to their acquittal. Moreover, the failure of their former
counsel to present other pieces of evidence in addition to what their co-
accused had presented or the failure to incorporate other arguments in the
record of the case, cannot be considered as grossly negligent acts. For a
claim of gross negligence to prosper, "nothing short of clear abandonment
of the client's cause must be shown." (Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408,
202409 & 202412, June 27, 2018)

RULE 122
Appeal

Section 1 - Who may appeal

331. The Court has nonetheless recognized that if the criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question
such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case.

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(Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958,

November 8, 2017)

Section 3 - How appeal taken

332. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law. In criminal cases,
however, the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven. To prove guilt, courts must evaluate
the evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged.
Thus, the finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact. For this reason,
the entire records of a criminal case are thrown open for this Court's review.
(Lapi y Mahipus v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019)

333. Availment of the wrong remedy is a ground for the dismissal of an

appeal. (While the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case,
Molina pursued another remedy, specifically, a review of the City
Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
(Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and Dolores
Molina, G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015)

Section 11 - Effect of appeal by any of several accused

334. Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
pertains to the effect of the appeal of one of the accused to his or her co-
accused who did not appeal. An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. In
the case at bar, accused-appellant's acquittal arising from a lack of proof of
corpus delicti favors the other accused, Sison and Bautista, even if they did
not appeal before this Court. (People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019)

RULE 124
Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Section 18 - Application of certain rules in Civil Procedure to Criminal Cases

335. Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings. Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil

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case, not in an interlocutory order in a criminal case. (People v Escobar, G.R.

No. 214300, July 26, 2017)

RULE 126
Search and Seizure

Section 13 - Search incident to lawful arrest

336. Section 13 of Rule 126 in relation with Section 1 of Rule 130 tackles the
admissibility of evidence procured in an instance where searches and
seizure are validly done even without the presence of a search warrant.
We would note, however, that warrantless searches can only be carried out
when founded on probable cause, or "a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged." There must be a confluence of several
suspicious circumstances. A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause;
items seized during warrantless searches based on solitary tips are
inadmissible as evidence. A search of a moving vehicle is one of the few
permissible exceptions where warrantless searches can be made. In such
case, probable cause must be founded on more than just a solitary
suspicious circumstance. The case at bar resulted to the acquittal of the
accused men because the corpus delicti, as a product of an invalid search
and seizure, and placed beyond the Regional Trial Court's contemplation,
left the prosecution with a fatal handicap. (People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 238453,
July 31, 2019)

337. One of the jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and

frisk" It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to
a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. An arrest
conducted in violation of this guideline renders the search incidental to it,
void. In this case, the accused was not acting suspiciously. The
apprehending officer merely relied on the supposed “signal” of another
civilian that the accused was carrying marijuana. Hence, the stop and frisk
and subsequently, the arrest of the accused was invalid. (People v. Cogaed,
G.R No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

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VIII
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

RULE 128
General Provisions

Section 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

338. Evidence seized as a result of an illegal warrantless arrest cannot be used

against an accused. Even if the seizure was reasonable, the arresting
officers' unjustified noncompliance with the legal safeguards under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165 compromises the integrity of the confiscated
drug. This creates reasonable doubt on the conviction of the accused for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078,
September 4, 2019)

339. Human memory is not infallible. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of

prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the
dangerous drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of
custody is established with moral certainty. (People v. Dimaano y Tipdas, G.R.
No. 174481, February 10, 2016)

340. When the integrity of the corpus delicti in criminal actions involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is cast in doubt due to failure to comply
with the requirements of the chain of custody rule, it follows that there
is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Compliance
with Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is
critical. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of
corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused.(Lescano y Carreon v. People, G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016)

341. Admissibility of evidence and weight accorded to evidence are two

distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
governs admissibility and provides that "evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules." The
weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after evidence has
been admitted. To this end, courts evaluate evidence in accordance with the
rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, consistent
with basic precepts of rationality and guided by judicially established

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standards. It is improper to even speak of evidentiary weight when the

piece of evidence in question has not even been admitted. Exhibit "F" was
ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section
20 thus, it failed the standard of competency. Consistent with this, reliance
on NPC’s Exhibit "F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of NPC's
pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does
not form part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration.
(Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 181683 & 184568,
October 7, 2015)

342. Extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a

valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Jara, the
Supreme Court held that where a confession was illegally obtained from
two (2) of the accused, and consequently were not admissible against them,
with much more reason should the same be inadmissible against a third
accused who had no participation in its execution. (People v. Opiniano y
Verano, G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017)

343. The Constitution provides the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the
poisonous doctrine. It states that any evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. It has been held that an
invalid warrantless arrest follows the invalidity of the search conducted
incidental to it. With this, the evidence obtained in the conduct thereof is
inadmissible in evidence as it violates the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, since none of the instances
for a valid warrantless arrest was made, the evidence obtained through the
incidental search is inadmissible. Consequently, there is no more evidence
left to convict the accused. (People of the Philippines v Victor Cogaed, G.R No.
200334, July 30, 2014)

RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility

A
Object (Real) Evidence

Section 1 - Object as evidence

344. In buy-bust operations, the apprehending team's inadequate

preparations are not justifiable grounds for its noncompliance with the

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requirements under Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165. Indeed, strict
compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act may not always be possible under varied field
conditions but the prosecution must satisfactorily prove that: (1) there is
justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. (People v. Ramos, G.R. No.
225325, August 28, 2019)

345. Discrepancies between the inventory receipt and chemistry reports are
blatant irregularities that cast serious doubts on the seized items'
identity. We cannot dismiss as mere "clerical error" the discrepancies
between the inventory receipt and chemistry reports. The inventory receipt
labeled the seized item as marijuana, while the chemistry reports indicate
it was shabu. They completely defeat the police officers' self-serving
assertions that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug were
preserved. (People v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019)

346. The failure of law enforcers in buy-bust operations to photograph seized

drugs in accordance with Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
combined with the prosecution's failure to address this omission, raises
doubt on the identity of the drugs seized, especially when the amount of
dangerous drugs allegedly taken from the accused is minuscule. Thus,
before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite
noncompliance with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be
identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. It has the positive duty to establish its reasons for the procedural
lapses. (People v. Ternida y Munar, G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019)

347. The unjustified noncompliance with Section 21 creates a substantial gap

in the chain of custody and casts doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti. The gaps in the chain of custody created by the unexplained lapses
cannot be remedied by a presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, as the lapses themselves are clear proof of irregularity.

A conviction in criminal proceedings requires proof beyond reasonable

doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty;
rather, it calls for moral certainty since "the conscience must be satisfied that
the accused is responsible for the offense charged." The prosecution is
tasked with establishing an accused's guilt purely on the strength of its own
evidence, not on the weakness of the accused's defense. (Veriño y Pingol v.
People, G.R. No. 225710, June 19, 2019)

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348. Where the amount of narcotics seized is miniscule, a stricter adherence to

the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is required to
preserve the evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Where the seized drugs
were not marked by the apprehending team but by an investigating officer
at the police station and the prosecution failed to address such issue or to
provide a justifiable reason for such fact, it is enough to cast a shadow of
doubt on the integrity of the operation. (Aparente y Volcan v. People, G.R. No.
205695, September 27, 2017)

349. The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an

essential part of the chain of custody; absent this step, a gap is created
which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the
dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which
must be resolved in favor of the accused. The four (4) links that should be
established by the prosecution to constitute an unbroken chain of custody
are: (a) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; (b) the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (c) the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and (d) the turnover and submission of
the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (People
v. Cabellon y Cabanero, G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017)

350. When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule, the

requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, must be strictly
complied with. The prosecution must prove four (4) links in the chain of
custody of evidence. First, the apprehending officer seizes and then marks
the dangerous drug taken from the accused. Second, the apprehending
officer turns over the seized dangerous drug to the investigating officer.
Third, the investigating officer turns over the seized dangerous drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination. Fourth, the forensic chemist
turns over and submits the marked confiscated dangerous drug to the
court. The chain of custody of evidence must show the names of officers
who had custody and received the evidence from one officer to another
within the chain. (People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677 August 23, 2017)

351. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven by

presenting evidence of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. The burden of

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proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants
an accused's acquittal.

Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases

will result in an accused's acquittal. Generally, noncompliance with these
requirements would not have rendered the search and seizure invalid
"under justifiable grounds." However, the absence of any justification only
serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's performance of their
official duties. (People v. Comoso y Turemutsa, G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019)

352. Officers who come into possession of seized drugs must show how they
handled and preserved the integrity of the seized drugs while in their
custody. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
cases, the corpus delicti is the illicit drug seized from the accused. Its
identity and integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded. The chain
of custody rule removes unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs presented in court. (People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210;
August 7, 2019)

353. In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus
delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment
of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug must be clearly
established. Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To
determine their composition and nature, they must undergo scientific
testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to
alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the
drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects tested
in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody,
as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving
the identity of seized drugs are removed. (People v. Jaafar y Tambuyong, G.R.
No. 219829, January 18, 2017)

354. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so
much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are
removed. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close
its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links
in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or

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otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar

evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the
same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. To be
admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (People
v. Caiz y Talvo G.R. No. 215340 July 13, 2016)

355. Section 21 of R.A. 9165 (COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS

ACT) in relation to Rule 130, Section 1 of the Rules of Court prescribes
strict adherence to the Doctrine of Chain of Custody. Section 21 requires
the presence of the accused, representatives from the Department of Justice
and the media, and an elected public official during the actual seizure of the
evidence and their subsequent inventory and photographing. Since
prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act primarily
revolve around the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, compliance
with its guidelines on the custody and disposition of the dangerous drugs
seized is vital. Unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody
procedure will shroud in doubt the identity and integrity of the dangerous
drug allegedly seized. When there is reasonable doubt, an accused's
acquittal must ensue. (People v. Merando y Aves, G.R. No. 232620, August 5,
2019)

356. Section 1 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2 of Rule
133 of Rules of Court sets that the evidence gathered in drug-related cases
must be handled in accordance with the Doctrine of Chain of Custody, as
required and provided for Section 21 of R.A. 9165, to sustain a conviction
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The mere marking of seized items,
unsupported by a proper physical inventory and taking of photographs,
and in the absence of persons whose presence is required in the marking
thereof will not justify conviction. Justification for the absence of third-
party witness must be alleged, identified and proved. In the case, the
prosecution alleged time constraints and uncertainty of the accused’s
appearance for the non-procurement of witness. However, by their own
admission of a week-long surveillance of the accused, should have given
them sufficient time to coordinate with any person to become a witness.

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The prosecution cannot invoke the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty to conveniently disregard such lapse whenever
there is an unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirements. Noncompliance obliterates proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, warranting an accused's acquittal. Thus, the constitutional right to
presumption of innocence prevails. (People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 229053,
July 17, 2019)

357. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, cannot be utilized to
frustrate legitimate efforts of law enforcers. Minor deviations from the
mandated procedure in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a
guilty defendant. In other words, the arresting officers' non-compliance
with Section 21 is not fatal, provided that that there is a justifiable reason
for their deviation and that the evidentiary worth of the seized drugs or
articles was preserved. Non-conformity with the mandated procedures will
not make the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized inadmissible
as evidence. What matters most is that the integrity and evidentiary worth
of the seized articles were maintained since these will be used in resolving
the guilt or innocence of the accused. (People v. Pangan, G.R. No. 206965,
November 29, 2017)

358. Section 1 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that object evidence
must preserve its integrity to be rendered admissible. In relation, the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act require Compliance with the chain
of custody requirement, to ensure the integrity of confiscated, seized, or
surrendered drugs and drug paraphernalia. By failing to establish identity
of corpus delicti, non-compliance with therewith indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It
follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. In this
case, there is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved,
labeled, and recorded. The apprehending officers cannot even provide the
name of the investigator. The officer who turned over the seized drugs to
the forensic chemist was not even a member of the buybust team. Given the
procedural lapses in the chain of custody. The accused cannot be convicted.
(People of the Philippines v Roberto Holgado, G.R No. 207992, August 11, 2014)

B
Documentary Evidence

1
Best Evidence Rule

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Section 2 – Documentary Evidence

359. Documentary evidence will generally prevail over testimonial evidence.

As the Court of Appeals noted, the return card submitted by respondent
proves that the demand letter was received by petitioner. This Court is
inclined to give more evidentiary weight to documentary evidence as
opposed to a testimony, which can be easily fabricated. (Gotesco Properties,
Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017)

3
Parol Evidence Rule

Section 9 - Evidence of Written Agreements

360. Section 10, Rule 130 of A.M. 19-10-20-SC and Section 9, Rule 130 of the
1997 Rules of Procedure allows exception to the Parol Evidence Rule
provided the issues must raise in a verified pleading. The parol evidence
rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented
from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment. (Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc. G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014)

361. Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in
issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves
to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Although the complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such
as “mistake,” “imperfection,” or “failure to express the true intent of the
parties”, it is evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint
is their assertion that the Agreement was founded on the parties’ supposed
understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of
respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995. (Spouses Paras v. Kimwa
Construction, G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015)

C
Testimonial Evidence

1
Qualification of Witnesses

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Section 20 - Witnesses; their qualifications

362. A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC now repeals Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. The deleted provision refers to persons who cannot be witnesses:
(1) those whose mental condition makes them incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others; and (2) children whose mental
maturity renders them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully. The deletion of the two
exceptions, particularly of second enumeration in the original Section 21,
was in keeping with Section 6 of the Rule on Examination of Child Witness,
which provides that every child is presumed qualified to become a witness.
Full weight and credit are given to the testimonies of child victims. Their
youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. This
court held that “leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors,
especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.” (Ricalde v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015)

363. The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld

provided that he/he is capable and consistent in narrating his/her
experience. An intellectually disabled person (and/or with low Intelligence
Quotient) is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. He
or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is
admissible in court. (People v. Corpuz y Flores, G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017)

364. A witness' inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her
credibility as long as there are no material contradictions in his or her
absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive
identification of the accused as one (1) of the main assailants. Any
inconsistency, which is not relevant to the elements of the crime, "is not a
ground to reverse a conviction." (People v. Dimapilit y Abellado, G.R. No.
210802 August 9, 2017)

Section 21 - Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity

365. The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld

provided that he/he is capable and consistent in narrating his/her
experience. An intellectually disabled person (and/or with low Intelligence
Quotient) is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. He
or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or

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she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is

admissible in court. (People v. Corpuz y Flores, G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017)

3
Admissions and Confessions

Section 32 - Admission by Silence

366. The provision on admission by silence refers to any “act or declaration

made in the presence and within the hearing of another,” not to a
declaration made in written correspondences. Nonetheless, the basic
wisdom underlying the provision on admission by silence is obvious and
commonsensical. The application of that underlying wisdom, if not of the
actual rule, is appreciable here. (Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019)

5
Testimonial Knowledge

Section 36 - Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay

excluded

367. The hearsay rule renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court

statements made by persons who are not presented as witnesses but are
offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule proceeds from the basic
rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable to
cross-examine the person making the statement. (DST Movers Corp. v.
People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016)

368. The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is

enough to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimony of one of the victims of fraternity hazing positively identifying
the accused as one of his attackers is sufficient for conviction. (People of the
Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al., G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016)

369. As held in the case of Miro v. Vda. de Erederos, hearsay evidence is

defined as a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the
facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are
derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself

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but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony
or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as
affidavits. The effect of A.M. 19-08-15-SC (New Rules) on the ruling: The
original Section 36 was moved to the amended Section 22 and the sequence
seems proper since it provides for what a witness should testify on – those
facts of his or her personal knowledge. Previously, this provision was
placed right before the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since there was a
change in order, the last phrase laying the basis for the exceptions to the
hearsay rule that would refer to the provisions following the same was
deleted, since the exceptions to the hearsay rule no longer follow the new
Section 22. The deletion does not mean that there is no more admissible
hearsay evidence or exceptions to the hearsay evidence. There is still
admissible hearsay evidence and the title on Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
found in the later part of the rules was maintained. Other than the
foregoing and the amendment to address gender sensitivity, the
comparable provisions are the same. (Lopez v. People G.R. No. 212186, June
29, 2016)

370. An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up is inadmissible if

it is tainted with improper suggestions by police officers. To convict an
accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive
identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory.
It must also show that the identified person matches the original
description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The
unbiased character of the process of identification by witnesses must
likewise be shown. (Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018)

6
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Section 42 - Part of the Res Gestae

371. Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but may have little
persuasive value in a given case, as opposed to the positive identification
of the victim. The statements made by the bystanders immediately after the
startling occurrence, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
they could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and
at different points in time. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed
against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from
beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of
the fact that an attack occurred. (People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May
5, 2014)

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Section 44 - Entries in official records.

372. In applying “Entries in Official Records” as an exemption to the Hearsay

Rule the public officer or other person must have sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information. (DST Movers Corp. v. People's General
Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016)

7
Opinion Rule

Section 49 - Opinion of Expert Witness

373. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they
may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which serve to illuminate his statements. (Tortona v. Gregorio, G.R.
No. 202612, January 17, 2018)

RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 1 - Burden of Proof

374. Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations; that is, the party
who “alleges the affirmative of the issue.” Burden of proof never shifts
from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This
shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.
In a case for quo warranto, petitioner has the burden of proving that private
respondent is not qualified for a seat in the Senate. However, establishing
that private respondent is a foundling, contrary to the requisite that
senators must be natural-born Filipinos, does not create a prima facie case
in petitioner’s favor in order to shift the burden of evidence to private
respondent. (David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September
20, 2016)

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375. The presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent purchaser

for value is disputable and may be overcome by contrary evidence. Once
a prima facie case disputing this presumption is established, the adverse
party cannot simply rely on the presumption of good faith and must put
forward evidence that the property was acquired without notice of any
defect in its title. (Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7,
2018)

Section 3 - Disputable presumptions

376. Documents acknowledged before a notary public are presumed to have

been duly executed. This presumption may be contradicted by clear and
convincing evidence. A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale where the
thumbmark of a party is shown to be a forgery is void. (Tortona v. Gregorio,
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018)

377. Presumption of regular performance of official duty shall prevail in the

absence of proof to the contrary. (The registry return card is the official
record evidencing service by mail. It carries the presumption that it was
prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed
and, therefore, it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise. With
petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that his
former counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as
indicated in the registry return card. The 15-day period to appeal
commenced from this date. Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within
15 days from April 29, 2003, the Decision became final and executory on
May 15, 2003.) (Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191972, January 26,
2015)

378. Section 3 (gg) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides That a printed or
published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published. Such presumption is satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
In the present case, the Court ruled that the translations presented by
petitioner are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese
laws;" rather, it is in the KANPŌ or the Official Gazette where all official
laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Hence, the same is
not a self-authenticating document dispensing the need of authentication.
(Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019)

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379. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is a disputable
presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court. As a
disputable presumption — [I]t may be accepted and acted on where there
is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc., G.R. Nos. 201398-99 & 201418-
19, October 3, 2018)

380. There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of

a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person
has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the
author of the theft. However, the presumption is subject to the requirement
that the guilt of the accused should still be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, doubts as to the integrity of object evidence, coupled with
testimonies based on hearsay, are not insufficient to establish the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the accused. (People of the Philippines v Mark
Jason Chavez, G.R No. 207940, October 22, 2014)

381. There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of

a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person
has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the
author of the theft. However, the presumption is subject to the requirement
that the guilt of the accused should still be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, doubts as to the integrity of object evidence, coupled with
testimonies based on hearsay, are not insufficient to establish the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the accused. (People v. Chavez y Bitancor, G.R.
No. 207950, September 22, 2014)

RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

Judicial Affidavit Rule

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382. Section 9 in relation to Section 10 of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC requires that “the
prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five
days before the pre-trial, serving copies of the same upon the accused...”
Nevertheless, if the belated submission of judicial affidavits has a valid
reason, the court may allow the delay once as long as it "would not unduly
prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not
less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court."
However, in the case at bar, prosecution’s excuse —"for whatever reason"
— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the
Judicial Affidavits. (Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019)

B
Authentication and Proof of Documents

Section 19 - Classes of documents

383. A last will and testament is specifically excluded from the application of
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. This implies that when the
document being presented as evidence is a last will and testament, further
evidence is necessary to prove its due execution, whether notarized or not.
(Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019)

Section 20 – Proof of Private Document

384. Private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as

witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by
presenting an evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which
it is claimed to be. (Imperial v. Heirs of Spouses Bayaban, G.R. No. 197626,
October 3, 2018)

Section 23 - Public documents as evidence

385. Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them.
Ordinance No. 132 is a public document. Under Rule 132, Section 19(a) of
the Rules of Court, written official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines are public
documents. Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in

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them. Thus, there is prima facie evidence of the security and safety issues
within Diamond Subdivision. (William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v.
Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019)

386. A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries

evidentiary weight with respect to its due execution. As such, it need not
be proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it is
entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and
effect. To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects,
there must be a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity. The
required quantum of proof is a clear, strong, and convincing evidence.

In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they

could be admitted in evidence. To establish their authenticity, the best
proof available must be presented. (Rodriguez v. Your Own Home
Development Corp., G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018)

Section 24 - Proof of Official Record

387. Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of
the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact
before the Regional Trial Court. In this relation, a Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible to prove the fact of
divorce under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Filipino
spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the
foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his
or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the
dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute. In this case, the Civil
Code of Japan provides two recognized types of divorce, namely: (1)
judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement. The divorce by agreement
becomes effective by notification, orally or in a document signed by both
parties and two or more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the
provisions of Family Registration Law of Japan. The petitioner was able to
prove the national law of the foreigner in this case. Moreover, a Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce issued
by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has been
accepted on December 16, 2009 was submitted. Rule 132, Section 24 of the
Rules of Court provides that the admissibility of official records that are
kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in that foreign country. Therefore, the Certificate

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of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact

of divorce between petitioner and respondent. (Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, G.R.
No. 199515, June 25, 2018)

388. Section 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. In this case, the translation of the
Japanese Civil Code is not a self-authenticating document, and its English
translation is, insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that
these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs. (Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019)

Section 25 - What attestation of copy must state

389. Section 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. In this case, the translation of the
Japanese Civil Code is not a self-authenticating document, and its English
translation is, insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that
these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs. (Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019)

Section 31 - Alterations in document, how to explain

390. Rule 132(B), Section 31 of the Rules of Evidence provides that it there is
an alteration in the document, the party producing a document as
genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for
the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another,
without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties

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affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the

alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (Republic
v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015)

C
Offer and Objection

Section 34 - Offer of evidence

391. Supreme Court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules
of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Rules of
procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist
and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of
the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value in the
context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive
at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Dismissal on the basis of a
very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration
of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19
years of litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be
encouraged. To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the
Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal
Offer of Evidence. (Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673,
January 11, 2016)

392. The Court cannot consider any evidence not formally offered. In Spouses
Ong v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that “a formal offer is necessary,
since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their judgment
solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To
allow parties to attach any document to their pleadings and then expect the
court to consider it as evidence, even without formal offer and admission,
may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties will be deprived
of their chance to examine the document and to object to its admissibility.”
(Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017)

Section 36 – Objection

393. When a party fails to formally offer his or her documentary or object
evidence within a considerable period after the presentation of
witnesses, he or she is deemed to have waived the opportunity to do
so. All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot

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consider them. This rule ensures that judges will carry out their
constitutional mandate to render decisions that clearly state the facts of
cases and the applicable laws. Judgments must be based "only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit." This rule also affords
parties their right to due process by examining the evidence presented by
their opponent, and to object to its presentation when warranted. (Amoguis
v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018)

RULE 133
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Section 2 - Proof beyond reasonable doubt

394. Noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements raises doubts on

the credibility of the corpus delicti, and consequently, on the very claim
that an offense penalized by the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
was committed. The prosecution's failure to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the critical elements of the offenses charged against accused-
appellant can only serve to warrant his acquittal. (People v. Castillo, G.R. No.
238339, August 7, 2019)

395. The testimony of a single eyewitness to a crime, even if uncorroborated,

produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt as long as it is credible
and positive. A considerable lapse of time between the commission of the
offense and the identification of the accused in open court, by itself, would
be insufficient to overturn a finding of guilt. (People v. Balao y Lopez, G.R. No.
207805, November 22, 2017)

396. Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's
case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative strength as against
that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
acquittal must follow as a matter of course. While not impelling such a
degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the
prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral
certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience.
While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne, not
by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity: This rule places upon
the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the

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defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis

not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the
right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to
discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must
be acquitted. (Capistrano Daayata, et al. v. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
205745, March 08, 2017)

397. Prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Every conviction requires no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Guilt must be founded on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense. Reasonable doubt on the evidence presented will result in an
acquittal. (Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019)

398. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt and the prosecution has the burden
to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If it fails to
discharge this burden, courts have the duty to render a judgment of
acquittal. The burden of proving the accused's guilt rests with the
prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution's evidence
produces even an iota of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice
but to rule for the accused's acquittal. (People v. San Jose y Gregorio, G.R. No.
206916, July 03, 2017)

399. To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a

positive identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of
human memory, it must also show that the identified person matches the
original description made by that witness when initially reporting the
crime. Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness identification must be
approached meticulously, cognizant of the inherent frailty of human
memory. Eyewitnesses who have previously made admissions that they
could not identify the perpetrators of a crime but, years later and after a
highly suggestive process of presenting suspects, contradict themselves
and claim that they can identify the perpetrator with certainty are grossly
wanting in credibility. Prosecution that relies solely on these eyewitnesses'
testimonies fails to discharge its burden of proving an accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017)

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400. Failure of the prosecution to establish the identity and integrity of the
drugs presented as evidence naturally raises grave doubt. In drug-related
cases, the corpus delicti is the seized drugs themselves. Its existence must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and this demands that unwavering
exactitude to be observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubt
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. When a court cannot
be assured that the drugs presented as evidence are exactly what the
prosecution purports them to be, it cannot be assured that any activity or
transaction pertaining to them truly proceeded, as the prosecution claims
that they did. Thus, no conviction can ensue. (People v. Asaytuno, Jr., G.R.
No. 245972 December 2, 2019)

401. Conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the

felony subject of the agreement of the parties," that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. (Agbulos even declared in open court that Benito had no
participation in the case at bench. Agbulos' statement was an admission
against her interest. The statement negated the alleged "common design or
purpose" between her and Benito and would lead to her being solely liable
for the crime.) (Benito vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.: 204644, February
11, 2015)

402. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the
requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases which is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly.
Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. For evidence to be believed, it must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve under the circumstances. (Macayan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175842,
March 18, 2015)

403. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to

produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience
of those who act in judgment, is necessary to surmount the presumption
of innocence. In cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit
drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the
charges. "It is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug,
the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt." Its identity and
integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded. Aside from proving the
elements of the charges, "the fact that the substance illegally possessed and

146


sold was the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict." The chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed." To establish "whether there was a valid entrapment or whether
proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it
is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation
are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence." Hence, the miniscule quantities of dangerous drugs
allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties with regard their integrity.
Trial courts should thoroughly take into consideration "the factual
intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165." Thus,
"[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving miniscule amounts of drugs for these can be readily planted and
tampered. (People v Sagana y Guzman, G.R. No.208471, August 2, 2017)

404. The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond

reasonable doubt. This does not entail absolute certainty on the
accused's guilt. It only requires moral certainty or "that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." For the defense of
alibi to prosper, there must be a showing that it was physically impossible
for the accused "to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission." (People v Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017)

405. Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
veracity, substance, or weight of the witness' testimony. It is well-
established that “physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.” Lone yet credible
testimony of the offended party is sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused. (People v. Divinagracia, Sr., G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017)

406. Every criminal prosecution begins with the "constitutionally-protected

presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that can only be
defeated by proof beyond reasonable doubt." "Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment" is
crucial in defeating the presumption of innocence. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires "that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti — the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit
drug." Moreover, "every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established." The rule on chain of custody plays this role in buy-bust

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operations, warranting that there are no doubts on the identity of evidence.

(People v. Segundo y Iglesias, G.R. No. G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017)

407. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires that in a
criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Alibi or denial, though inherently weak
and an unreliable, may be used as a defense against a conviction of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, for his defense of alibi to be
credible, he must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene when the crime was committed. (People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828,
July 24, 2019)

408. Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an
accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on
the weakness of the defense of an accused. In every criminal prosecution
for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody
of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation
until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight
of evidence. The following links should be established in the chain of
custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court. (People v. Que y Utuanis; G.R. No.
212994, January 31, 2018)

Section 4 - Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient

409. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if, taken as a

whole, it creates an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the
accused authored the crime. The commission of the crime, the identity of
the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established by
circumstantial evidence. However, the proven circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
(Bacerra y Tabones v. People, G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017)

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410. A person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the

requisites enumerated in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are
present. A judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Cirero y Ustelo v. People, G.R.
No. 181843, July 14, 2014)

411. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court allows the use of circumstantial
evidence as means to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
committed a crime. A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to
by credible witnesses and duly established from the evidence, points to no
other conclusion than that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape
and killing of the seven-year-old child, AAA, especially when testimonies
regarding the details were given by disinterested witnesses whom the
accused himself had not managed to discredit for having any ill-motive
against him. (People vs. Baron, G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016)

412. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial

evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings (i.e. civil and administrative proceedings). If circumstantial
evidence suffices for such a high standard of proof of reasonable doubt in
criminal cases, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of
proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. The attending
circumstances at the time when private respondent was abandoned in a
church in Iloilo, which is predominantly populated with Filipinos without
available airport, thereby suggesting remote possibility of foreigners
travelling in and out of the province, and her physical appearance when
she matured as woman are sufficient to conclude that she is a natural-born
Filipino. (David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016)

413. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused,

and the fact that he had been discharged from the information does not
affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as
well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be
determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this connection, it has been
held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory
and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-
accused (People v. Opiniano y Verano, G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017)

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414. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence accommodates

circumstantial evidence as sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the
Court sustained that the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the
several circumstantial evidence in convicting the accused-appellant. In the
absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually
necessary in proving the commission of rape. This is because the crime "is
generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for
[him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of
rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer
testify." (People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019)

415. The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may
be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
conviction of an accused: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, while there is no direct evidence
showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death,
nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a
solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond
reasonable doubt, that accused committed the crime charged. (People v.
Chavez y Bitancor, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014)

Section 5 - Substantial evidence

416. Complainants in administrative proceedings carry the burden of proving

their allegations with substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means
"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." In a charge of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the
Office of the Ombudsman has the burden of proving that Fetalvero Jr.
deliberately committed falsehood or transgressed established rules to give
Lockheed undue preference during the bidding process of the contract for
services. The Supreme Court defined “dishonesty” as the "disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity." It involves
intentionally making a false statement to deceive or commit a fraud.
Moreover, misconduct is more than just mere error of judgment as it
involves a wrongful intention from the public officer involved. It is also
defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

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more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public

officer. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to discharge its
burden. What it managed to prove was that the alleged unlawful act was
made upon orders of a superior, collated the ratings and recommendations
submitted by the other officers and then summarized them into a report. By
no stretch of mind can the submission of a report, an act which was done
within the confines of his function as the Superintendent of the Port District
Office-Luzon, be seen as an unlawful act. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Fetalvero, Jr., G.R. No. 211450, July 23, 2018)

RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1 – Disqualification of Judicial Officers

417. A judge will not be required to inhibit in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that he will dispense
justice in accordance with law and evidence. This Court will also not
allow itself to become an instrument to paper over fatal errors done by
the petitioner and the prosecution in the lower court. Whether or not to
voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within the judge's
discretion. Absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption, the Court will not interfere. With the second paragraph of
Rule 137, Section 1, it shall always be presumed that a judge will decide on
the merits of the case without bias. Allowing a judge to inhibit without
concrete proof of personal interest or any showing that his bias stems from
an extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to abuse. In this case, there
was no concrete proof presented of the judge’s personal interest in the case.
There was no showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial source. Not
only that, but none of his acts, as shown on the record, was characterized
by any error. More importantly, bias cannot be attributed to a judge when
the scheduling of the presentation of witnesses was made in accordance
with the rules on expeditious disposition of cases and the mandatory
continuous trial system. (Chavez v. Marcos, G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018)

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IX
REVISED RULES ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE

418. The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars the

consideration of other questions on appeal. Courts, on appeal, cannot rule
on an issue that was not raised in the lower courts or grant relief not prayed
for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. In
relation thereto, parties also cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal,
otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity
to present evidence against it as there is no trial in summary procedure.
(Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner, G.R. No. 191458, July 03, 2017)

419. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing
of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged
involved is an ordinance. For violation of a special law or ordinance, the
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from
the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of
the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
(Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013)

X
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

420. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy that "covers

environmental damages the magnitude of which transcends both
political and territorial boundaries." A writ of continuing mandamus, on
the other hand, "is a special civil action that may be availed of 'to compel
the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.'" (Abogado, et.al. v.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et.al., G.R. No. 246209,
September 3, 2019)

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XI
A.O. NO. 07
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

421. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office

of the Ombudsman does not stay the immediate execution of the penalty
of dismissal imposed upon a public office. According to Administrative
Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Rule III, Section
7, the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before
the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate
implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or
resolutions. Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory
even pending appeal, it follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance
of an injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the right
of the person seeking its issuance must be clear and unmistakable.
However, no such right of petitioner exists to stay the execution of the
penalty of dismissal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute
right to hold office. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition
for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to resolve his motion for
reconsideration within the five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he should have
awaited the Ombudsman's ruling on his motion for reconsideration, then,
in the event of a denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals. (Lee v. Sales, G.R. No. 205294, July 4,
2018)

422. In determining whether the Ombudsman's decision is appealable, the

deciding factor is the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in the
decision itself. It is not determined by the penalty imposed for the
offense as provided under the law. Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07, as amended, provides that the Ombudsman's decision may not be
appealed if it dismisses the complaint or imposes the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a
fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals under the requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is confirmed by jurisprudence that when
the Ombudsman has exonerated the defendant, its decision is
unappealable. In this case, a complainant loses his or her right to appeal.
The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse,
whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or

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by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the

respondent is granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable
and the penalty imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-
month suspension or a fine equivalent to one[-]month salary. In this case,
since the respondents were exonerated by the respondents, Canlas has no
right to appeal this Decision. This also affects his legal standing to claim for
any relief. Assuming however that he has the legal standing to question the
ruling of the Ombudsman, he may only do so through a Rule 65 Petition
but must show that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No.
199625, June 6, 2018)

XII
R.A. 9285
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM

423. A contract may be encompassed in several instruments even though

every instrument is not signed by the parties, since it is sufficient if the
unsigned instruments are clearly identified or referred to and made part
of the signed instrument or instruments. The arbitration agreement
contained in the Club Rules, which in turn was referred to in the Certificate
of Entry and Acceptance, is binding upon Sulpicio even though there was
no specific stipulation on dispute resolution in said Certificate. (Steamship
Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. G.R. No. 196072,
G.R. No. 208603, September 20, 2017)

424. As a general rule, the board of directors of a corporation, the latter being
a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause, cannot be compelled
to submit to arbitration as they are not parties to the agreement. However,
when the complaint alleges piercing the veil of corporate fiction, thus
making them solidarily liable with the corporation, they are compelled
to submit into arbitration for the expedient resolution of the case. The
determination of the circumstances to warrant the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction should be made in a single proceeding, where all parties
involved shall participate, to determine, if any, the extent of their
liabilities. In this case, the complainants have no choice but to institute only
one proceeding against the parties. If later on the personalities of petitioners
and corporation may later be found indistinct, it will result to multiplicity
of suits. (Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corporation, G.R. No. 174938 October 1, 2014)

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425. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the
resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. Arbitration of
construction disputes through the CIAC was incorporated into the general
statutory framework on alternative dispute resolution through R.A. No.
9285, or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. Brushing aside a
contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be
a step backward. Consistent with the policy of encouraging alternative
dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration
clauses. (Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charter Chemical and Coating
Corp., G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019)

426. An arbitration clause in a document of contract may extend to subsequent

documents of contract executed for the same purpose. Arbitration is a
mode of settling disputes between parties. Like many alternative dispute
resolution processes, it is a product of the meeting of minds of parties
submitting a pre-defined set of disputes. They agree among themselves to
a process of dispute resolution that avoids extended litigation. In this case,
the arbitration clause in the Joint Venture Agreement should not be
interpreted as applicable only to the Joint Venture Agreement's original
parties. The succeeding agreements are deemed part of or a continuation of
the Joint Venture Agreement. The arbitration clause should extend to all the
agreements and its parties since it is still consistent with all the terms and
conditions of the amendments and supplements. Nominees of a party to
and beneficiaries of a contract containing an arbitration clause may become
parties to a proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause. (Bases
Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project Developers, Inc., G.R. No.
173137, January 11, 2016

XIII
INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTE

427. A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC or the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies, enumerates the cases where the rules will
apply. Section 1 (5) Inspection of corporate books. To determine whether
an intra-corporate dispute exists and whether this case requires the
application of these rules of procedure, this Court evaluated the
relationship of the parties. The types of intra-corporate relationships
were reviewed in Union Glass & Container Corporation v. Securities and
Exchange Commission: [a] between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; [b] between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c]
between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far

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as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and [d] among

the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of
these intra-corporate relationships exist between the parties, the
controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate. This is known as
the "relationship test." DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain
Reserve, Inc. employed what would later be called as the "nature of
controversy test." It became another means to determine if the dispute
should be considered as intra-corporate. In DMRC Enterprises, the
Supreme Court held that it was not just the relationship of the parties
that mattered but also the conflict between them. This Court now uses
both the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test to
determine if an intra-corporate controversy is present. Applying the
relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and Santos are named
shareholders in Belo Medical Group's Articles of Incorporation and General
Information Sheet for 2007. The conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it
involves 2 shareholders although the ownership of stocks of one
stockholder is questioned. Applying the nature of the controversy test, this
is still an intra-corporate dispute. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a
determination of the true owner of the shares of stock registered in Santos'
name. Ultimately, however, the goal is to stop Santos from inspecting
corporate books. This goal is so apparent that, even if Santos is declared the
true owner of the shares of stock upon completion of the interpleader case,
Belo Medical Group still seeks his disqualification from inspecting the
corporate books based on bad faith. Therefore, the controversy shifts from
a mere question of ownership over movable property to the exercise of a
registered stockholder's proprietary right to inspect corporate books. (Belo
Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No. 185894. August 30,
2017)

428. The Court of Appeals has no power to appoint a receiver or management

committee. The Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies, including incidents of
such controversies. These incidents include applications for the
appointment of receivers or management committees. In this case, it was
improper for the CA, on a petition for certiorari, to place the corporation
under receivership and appoint an interim management committee as the
jurisdiction of the case remains with the RTC. (Villamor v Umale, G.R No.
172843, September 24, 2014)

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“That in all things, God may be glorified!”

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