Specpro Case Digest

RULE 67 - EXPROPRIATION
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 1 TOPIC: Venue of personal action; RTC
CASE TITLE: BPI Family Savings vs GR No. 175796

Spouses Yujuico
Date: July 22, 2015
DOCTRINE
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency
after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does
not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
FACTS
In 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five
parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two
of the parcels of land were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
In 2000, the RTC of Manila rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for
public use and the judgment became final and executory. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to
Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant's Request to Release, but the RTC denied the
motion for having been "filed out of time." Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan. After holding the public
auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00.
Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522,155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such
deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds,
namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the
plaintiff's claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.
RTC - denied the motion to dismiss. There was nothing to support the claim that the obligation had
been abandoned or extinguished apart from the respondents' contention that the properties had
been subjected to expropriation by the City of Manila.
In a reply to petitioner’s comment on the motion to dismiss, respondents raise for the first time their
objection on the ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the
deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real
action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the
properties were located.
CA - granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, hence this petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner’s action to recover deficiency in the Makati RTC should be dismissed
on the ground of improper venue
HELD
NO. Petition for certiorari is granted. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or
a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed
by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a
real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is
to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action.
In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include
those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a
transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No. 03- 450 in the Makati RTC because
Makati was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Additional notes
Actually, the main issue of the case was the improper venue. There was no mention of expropriation aside
from the bold text in the facts.
Whether or not a creditor may still foreclose real property already expropriated. According to the
case, YES. BPI not only extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and was awarded the two lots but may also
claim deficiency from the respondent-debtors.
ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 2 TOPIC: MTC Jurisdiction

CASE TITLE: Marrieta Barrido vs Leonardo GR No. 176492
Nonato
Date: October 20, 2014
DOCTRINE
The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for
the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real
property.
FACTS
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they
were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot. In 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more
reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato led a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of a affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their
children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because
the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Bacolod MTCC - adjudicated the land in favor of Marietta, applying Art. 129 of the Family Code. Nonato
appealed.
RTC - reversed the MTCC decision. Ordered the equitable partition of the house and lot.
CA - affirmed RTC decision. It held that since the property's assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly
fell within the MTCC's jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of
the property. Barrido led a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Whether or not the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the partition case
HELD
YES. Contrary to Barrido's contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Here, the subject property's assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not
exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of
the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their

marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in
question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the
property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a
notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be
private and cannot be converted into a public document, 21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated. 22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact,
she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be
owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 3 TOPIC: RTC; jurisdiction over expropriation cases
CASE TITLE: Devorah E. Bardillon vs Brgy. GR No. 146886

Masili of Calamba, Laguna
Date: April 30, 2003
DOCTRINE
an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the
subject of the action is the government's exercise of eminent domain — a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation
FACTS
The controversy surrounding the two complaints for eminent domain which were filed by herein respondent
for the purpose of expropriating a 144 sq-meter parcel of land situated in Brngy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna
owned by herein petitioner under a TCT. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation
the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
1st complaint:
The case, Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A. Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E. Bardillon,
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna following the failure of Barangay Masili to
reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer P200,000.00. The expropriation of the
subject lot was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and
he MTC dismissed the case for “lack of interest” of respondents and its counsel
benefit of its constituents. T
to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents.
2nd complaint:
The case, 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Devorah E. Bardillon' was filed before the RTC of Calamba,
Laguna. The complaint also sought the expropriation of the subject lot for the erection of a multi-purpose
hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this complaint by alleging in
the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that respondent's cause of action is barred by prior
judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of the case (1st
complaint) has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. With the subsequent approval of the
Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261, showing the authority for expropriation – the RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent and issued the Writ of Possession.
CA: Held that the RTC of Calamba did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that the 2nd complaint was
not barred by res judicata. The reason is that the MTC which dismissed the 1st complaint had no jurisdiction
over the action since the assessed value of the property was PHP 28,960 – beyond the jurisdictional
amount cognizable by the MTCs.
ISSUES
1. WON the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case

2. WON the dismissal before the MTC constituted res judicata
3. WON the CA erred when it ignored the RTC’s issuance of the Writ of Possession despite the
pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner.
HELD
1.NO. That the value of the property is only PHP 11,448, hence within the jurisdiction of the MTC is
n expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
immaterial. A
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and should be led with the regional trial courts. As held in the case of Brgy.
San Roque v Heirs of Francisco. ”It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation
suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking
of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process” a nd that “the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the
land, because the subject of the action is the government's exercise of eminent domain — a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
2.NO. Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by
judgment. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving same claim, demand or cause of action.
The following are the requisites of res judicata:

1. former judgment must be final
2. court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3. It is a judgment on the merits; and
4. There is — between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties subject matter and
cause of action.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds
no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.
3.NO. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local
government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated
based on its current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied
with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly
addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of
the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to
inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a
genuine necessity for it.
Additional notes
ASENIERO | BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO
(2019-2020)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 4 TOPIC: RTC jurisdiction over expropriation cases; 2

phases of expropriation proceedings
CASE TITLE: Barangay San Roque vs. Heirs GR No. 138896

of Francisco Pastor
Date: June 20, 2000
DOCTRINE
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the
courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.
FACTS
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a complaint to expropriate a property
of the respondents. The MTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. I t reasoned that
the eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just
compensation, therefore the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that
the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and not with the MTC.
RTC: RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether
the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law – which court has the
jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation.
ISSUES
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over expropriation cases.
HELD
YES. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. That in determining whether an action is
one, the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion
of:
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought;
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for
support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (RTC).
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases ( those not capable of pecuniary
estimation), besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance (RTC) , which were the lowest courts of
record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.
Two phases in expropriation proceedings:
First phase: is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Otherwise, it ends with an order
of dismissal, if this be ordained, it would be a final one, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one,
for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, 'no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.'
Second phase: is concerned with the determination by the court of 'the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. ' This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is
the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.
Additional notes
ASENIERO | BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 5 TOPIC: Ejectment case vis-a-vis expropriation case
CASE TITLE: GR No. 214782

National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda
Development Corporation Date: April 3, 2019
DOCTRINE
It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public
utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land belonging to
the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or
expropriation proceedings, will not prosper.
FACTS
Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) led a case for Unlawful Detainer against Petitioner National
Transmission Corporation [TransCo] with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. Here, MTC held in
favor of Bermuda and ordered TransCo to vacate the subject lot and remove all structures thereon.
TransCo appealed, while Bermuda sought issuance of Writ of Execution. RTC issued a Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal.
In the meantime, TransCo filed a Complaint for Expropriation on January 10, 2010 of the parcel of land,
the same property subject of the Unlawful Detainer case. Petitioner [Transco] then deposited the amount of
P10,704,000.00 with the Landbank of the Philippines, purportedly representing the provisional value of the
property sought to be expropriated. Consequently, on 29 March 2010, RTC Branch 25 issued an Order
granting Petitioner's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Meanwhile, the RTC Branch 24 dismissed TransCo’s appeal in the Unlawful Detainer case for being “moot
and academic” “[w]ith the filing of an expropriation proceeding covering the subject property by (TransCo)
and possession thereof having been formally delivered to it x x x”
TransCo sought reconsideration of the adverse ruling by was denied by the RTC. CA dismissed TransCo’s
petition, reasoning that it would be circuitous for the CA to require TransCo to first vacate the subject
property covered by Transfer Certicate of Title No. T-258244 in view of the adverse judgment in the
unlawful detainer case of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao (MTC), and then soon thereafter, restore it
again in possession of the property on account of the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 25, the
court where the expropriation case is pending. The CA added that this sort of pernicious and unreasonable
delay of government infrastructure/development projects will not be countenanced by it.
ISSUES
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo's appeal allegedly because it has become moot and
academic with the filing of the expropriation complaint involving the same property subject of the unlawful
detainer case.
HELD
NO. It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a
public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land
belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated
purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to
vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction
for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel.
The proper recourse is for the ejectment court:
1) dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner ling the proper action for recovery of just
compensation and consequential damages; or
2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
therein; or
3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation
and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the
ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.
In Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, the Court held that it is clear that
recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of
estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to
continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Given that BDC led before the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against TransCo, which erected and
then energized a 230 KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the subject property, the MTC should
have found or taken judicial notice that TransCo is a public service corporation with the power to
expropriate. Upon suc finding, the MTC, pursuant to the aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have
then ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case without prejudice to BDC's right to recover the
value of the land actually taken, or ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and damages assessed therein. The MTC could not have
proceeded to determine just compensation given that the value of the subject property is clearly beyond its
jurisdiction.
The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful
detainer case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful detainer
case and not dismissing it following the prevailing jurisprudence.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 6 TOPIC: Determination of just compensation

Eusebio v. Luis
Date: October 13, 2009
DOCTRINE
Even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is
still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject property. Although
ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners' findings may only be
disregarded or substituted with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
or excessive.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for
recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
FACTS
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
53591 and 53589 with an area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig
sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw,
Pasig City. Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993,
assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995,
respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of
their land. One of the respondents called the attention of Mayor Eusebio that a property in the same area,
as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter
when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Subsequently, respondents' counsel sent a demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio,
demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation
for respondents' property. In response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing
respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
A Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937) against herein petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. The RTC held in favor of the
respondents-plaintiffs,
1) declaring as illegal or unjust the action of the defendants in taking the properties without their
consent and without the benefit of expropriation proceedings;
2) ordering defendants to return the subject properties; and
3) in the event that said properties can no longer be returned to the plaintiffs, pay the plaintiffs the fair
and reasonable value of P5,000 per square meter or total of P7,930,000 with payment of reasonable
rental thereto.
CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUES
Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the
1980's and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to
respondents be determined.
HELD
Re: Prescription
At the outset, where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title
thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner's action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe.
Re: entitlement to regain possession of their property
In Forfom Development Corporation v. PNR, the court held that because the landowner did not act to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period of time and even negotiated with the
PNR as to how much it should be paid as just compensation, said landowner is deemed to have waived its
right and is estopped from questioning the power of the PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the
power was exercised.
Herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980
until the early 1990's) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken,
witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor
Caruncho we always asked for compensation". It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the
city government on respondents' property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig
City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their
land, but are entitled to just compensation.
Re: just compensation
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein,
the Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just
compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in
Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three
competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the subject property.
Although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners' findings may only
be disregarded or substituted with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
or excessive.
Verily, the determination of just compensation for property taken for public use must be done not only for
the protection of the landowners' interest but also for the good of the public. In formulating and promulgating
the procedure provided for in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67, found this to be the fairest way of arriving at the
just compensation to be paid for private property taken for public use.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for
recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling. In this case, the trial court should have xed just
compensation for the property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record
showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its
valuation for the subject land on the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city
government only sometime in the year 1994.
Additional notes
Re: entitlement to damages
In taking respondents' property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents' proprietary rights. Such
conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be
held liable for damages to respondents.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 7 TOPIC: Deposit

Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes
Date: March 31, 1915
DOCTRINE
While Section 1 of the Act No. 1592 clearly empowers the court wherein expropriation proceedings are
pending to fix the amount of the required deposit and to give possession of the land upon the making of the
deposit; it as clearly denies, by necessary implication, the power of the court to change or modify the
amount thus fixed, or to disturb the possession of the railway, after the deposit thus fixed has actually been
made by the railway corporation. The statute expressly provides that the corporation "shall have the right to
enter immediately upon the possession of the land involved" upon the making of the prescribed deposit.
The statutory right of possession thus secured to the railway corporation is an unqualified right of
possession during the pendency of the expropriation proceedings.
FACTS
Sometime prior to the first of April, 1913, the Railroad Company entered upon and took possession of a
long, narrow strip of land, running between the municipalities of Pagbilao and Lopez in the Province of
Tayabas, for use as a roadbed for a railroad which it was engaged in building under its charter. The
Railroad Company took possession of this strip of land with the consent of the various owners and
occupants claiming title thereto, and with the understanding that it would pay the owners of all the lands
thus taken a price to be agreed upon thereafter; not having been able to agree upon a price, it was
compelled to institute proceedings for the condemnation of the land thus taken.
Hence, in 1st day of April, 1913, it instituted expropriation proceedings looking to the condemnation of all
these lands under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon it by its charter and under the laws
applicable to such proceedings. On the fourth day of April, 1913, the Honorable Herbert Gale, the judge
then presiding in the court wherein these proceedings were pending, entered an order granting to the
Railroad Company the right of possession of all these lands, upon the filing of a deposit in an amount
certified by the provincial treasurer to be equal to the average assessed value of all these lands, which, in
the language of the order itself was the value of the lands, "hereby provisionally ascertained and fixed." The
Railroad Company then deposited the sum of P8.971.72, the assessed value of the lands in question as
shown by certificate of the provincial treasurer.
Thereafter, the land companies claiming to be the owners and successors in. interest of the original owners
of most of the lands in question, entered their appearance as defendants in the expropriation proceedings,
and acting jointly with the various claimants whose lands had not been acquired by them, procured the
appointment of commissioners for the valuation of these lands. On the ninth of January, 1915, the land
companies and the other claimants to these lands moved the court to increase the amount of the deposit
from P8,971.72, the amount originally fixed, to P1,000,000. The respondent judge after hearing the parties
and considering the evidence, and notwithstanding the objection, issued an order directing the Railroad
Company to increase its deposit to P1,000,000.
This is the order which the applicants seek to have this court declare null and void.
ISSUES
Whether the order of the court increasing deposit may be declared null and void.
HELD
NO. It is said that the jurisdiction of the respondent judge to issue the order complained of is recognized in
the following paragraph of section 1 of Act No. 1592, to wit:
"When condemnation proceedings are brought by any railway corporation, in any court of competent jurisdiction
in the Philippine Islands, for the purpose of the expropriation of land for the proper corporate use of such railway
corporation, said corporation shall have the right to enter immediately upon the possession of the land involved,
after and upon the deposit by it with the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands of the value of the land, in money, as
provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, said sum to
be held by the Treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition of the court: x x x”
While this section of the Act clearly empowers the court wherein expropriation proceedings are pending to
fix the amount of the required deposit and to give possession of the land upon the making of the deposit; it
as clearly denies, by necessary implication, the power of the court to change or modify the amount
thus fixed, or to disturb the possession of the railway, after the deposit thus fixed has actually been
made by the railway corporation.
The statute expressly provides that the corporation "shall have the right to enter immediately upon the
possession of the land involved" upon the making of the prescribed deposit. The statutory right of
possession thus secured to the railway corporation is an unqualified right of possession during the
pendency of the expropriation proceedings; but if it were within the power of the court to change or
modify the amount of the deposit as it sees fit, at any time throughout the proceedings,the statutory right of
possession thus guaranteed and expressly conferred upon the railroad company might well become
illusory.
It will be observed, furthermore, that the statute expressly empowers and directs the court, "upon the
making of the deposit," to place the railway corporation in possession of the land; and that there is nothing
in the statute which either expressly or by implication reserves to the court the power to undo its
act, or to deprive the Railroad Company of possession, in the event that, pending the proceedings,
the judge should become convinced that the amount of the deposit is insufficient.
Act No. 1592 provides that they may have execution as of right upon the order for possession, immediately
upon the making of the prescribed deposit. It follows, under the reasoning of the case above referred to,
that immediately upon the making of a deposit fixed by order of the court, the court loses plenary control
over the order fixing the amount of the deposit, and has no power to annul, amend or modify it in matters of
substance pending the course of the condemnation proceedings. A contrary ruling would tend directly to
defeat the manifest intention of the legislator to provide a speedy and summary procedure whereby the
peaceable possession of lands necessary for the construction of railroads may be secured without the
delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownership and value of such lands, which
should not be permitted to delay the progress of the work.
It is the duty of the judge of the court wherein the proceedings are brought promptly and provisionally to
ascertain the value of the land involved therein; and when he has satisfied himself in this regard, it is his
duty to enter the order for the prescribed deposit, even though he may be well aware that upon full inquiry
his estimate may prove to be less than or in excess of the true value of the land, and even though the
claimants and owners have not been heard.
In this jurisdiction the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation
contains no express provision requiring prepayment; and following the weight of authority, we are of opinion
that there is no prohibition against the legislative enactment of a form of procedure whereby immediate
possession of lands involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision
is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners.
Having concluded that the constitutional prohibitions do not deny to the legislature the right to
authorize the taking of land in expropriation proceedings without prepayment of just compensation,
if due provision is made for the adjudication and payment of just compensation without
unreasonable delay; and having arrived at the further conclusion that the deposit of the value of the
lands involved, in money, as promptly and provisionally ascertained by an impartial judge, in the
course of expropriation proceedings already instituted, suciently and satisfactorily secures the end
in view, even though the owners of the land are not given an opportunity to be heard as to the
amount of the deposit; we conclude that these statutory provisions do not deny any right of the
owners of such lands guaranteed in the Constitution or the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Although it might thereafter be made to appear that the amount so determined would not furnish just
compensation of the lands taken, or that it was grossly inadequate, it is by no means certain that proof of
the mere inadequacy of the amount of the value of the lands thus provisionally ascertained would be
sufficient in itself to establish an allegation of abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, who adopted the
assessed valuation as a standard for the provisional determination of the amount of the deposit to be made
under Act No. 1592.
Additional notes

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 8 TOPIC: Rights of landowner whose land is subject to
condemnation by the government
CASE TITLE: DE YNCHAUSTI vs. MERALCO GR No. G.R. No. 11647
Date: September 26, 1917
DOCTRINE
It is clear, therefore, that with relation to lands which a railroad corporation is authorized under its charter to
have condemned for its use, and which have been entered upon and occupied by the railroad corporation,
under a claim of right and in good faith, but without first instituting the appropriate condemnation proceedings,
the right of election secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code has, in substance and
effect, been destroyed by the enactment of the legislation conferring the power upon the railroad corporation
to take possession in condemnation proceedings. The only right secured to the landowner in such case is the
right to his lands not taken, which right he may enforce in an ordinary action to compel the corporation to pay
the value of the land under the terms of article 361 of the Code, or, if he so desires, by the institution of
appropriate proceedings to compel the corporation to have the land condemned and to pay the compensation
and damages assessed in the course of the condemnation proceedings.
FACTS
Early in the year 1912, the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company was duly authorized by the Director of
Public Works, acting on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the Province of Rizal, to
construct an electric railroad track upon the provincial highway running from the city of Manila to the municipality
of Parañaque. The precise location of the track was designated by that official, who authorized and required the
company to construct its track along the side of the road.
The track was completed toward the end of the year 1912, and thereafter some question appears to have arisen
as to the width of the highway, the plaintiff in this action insisting that the ancient highway was not as wide by 3
meters as was claimed by the Director of Public Works; and further, that the railroad company had encroached
on his land, and is now occupying a strip thereof some 200 meters long and 3 meters broad.
The prayer of the complaint is for recovery of possession of this strip of land and for damages for the alleged
unlawful taking and detention, in the sum of P1,000.
Early in the year 1912, the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company was duly authorized by the Director of
Public Works, acting on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the Province of Rizal, to
construct an electric railroad track upon the provincial highway running from the city of Manila to the municipality
of Parañaque. The precise location of the track was designated by that official, who authorized and required the
company to construct its track along the side of the road.
The track was completed toward the end of the year 1912, and thereafter some question appears to have arisen
as to the width of the highway, the plaintiff in this action insisting that the ancient highway was not as wide by 3
meters as was claimed by the Director of Public Works; and further, that the railroad company had encroached
on his land, and is now occupying a strip thereof some 200 meters long and 3 meters broad.
The prayer of the complaint is for recovery of possession of this strip of land and for damages for the alleged
unlawful taking and detention, in the sum of P1,000.
ISSUES
Whether or not the land owner is entitled to the recovery of the land subject of the complaint
HELD
No
If the railroad corporation were not clothed with any special or exceptional rights under its charter, touching the
condemnation of lands necessary for its use, it is clear that under the general provisions of law, the plaintiff would be
entitled to elect, either to recover the value of the lands thus taken, or to recover possession of these lands, upon
condition that he first reimburse the corporation for the expenditures made upon the land while in its possession. This
under the terms of article 361 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:
The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the work, sowing, or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige the person
who has built or planted, to pay to him the value of the land and to force the person who sowed to pay the proper rent.
But the railroad corporation being clothed with the right to take the land in question in condemnation proceedings, it
would be a manifestly vain and useless formality to render judgment for the restoration of possession upon payment of
an indemnity to reimburse the railroad corporation for its expenditures on the land — with the full knowledge that
before such judgment could be executed the railroad corporation could and would take possession of the land in
condemnation proceedings upon payment of compensation for the value of the land and the improvements made upon
it. It is clear, therefore, that with relation to lands which a railroad corporation is authorized under its charter to
have condemned for its use, and which have been entered upon and occupied by the railroad corporation,
under a claim of right and in good faith, but without first instituting the appropriate condemnation
proceedings, the right of election secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code has, in
substance and effect, been destroyed by the enactment of the legislation conferring the power upon the
railroad corporation to take possession in condemnation proceedings. The only right secured to the
landowner in such case is the right to his lands not taken, which right he may enforce in an ordinary action to
compel the corporation to pay the value of the land under the terms of article 361 of the Code, or, if he so
desires, by the institution of appropriate proceedings to compel the corporation to have the land condemned
and to pay the compensation and damages assessed in the course of the condemnation proceedings.
One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance
or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His
acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made
imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed,
he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or
operation of the road. (St. Julien vs. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.)
The trial judge denied plaintiff's prayer for possession, but being of opinion that he is entitled to recover the value of
the land, gave judgment for an amount equal to its assessed value. From this judgment plaintiff appealed, and insists
upon his right to recover possession of the land occupied by the railroad corporation and damages for its detention. In
the light of what has been said, it is clear that the trial judge correctly declined to give judgment for possession; but we
think that he erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount equal to the assessed
value of the land.
No such relief was sought or prayed for by the plaintiff, and no evidence was introduced into the record in support
thereof. The trial judge appears to have assumed, without proof, that the assessed value of the land might be taken as
its true market value; and however this may be, it is a fact that there is no evidence in the record upon which to base a
finding as to the true value of the land, even if a judgment could properly be entered in favor of the plaintiff for
damages the amount of which he did not allege or make any attempt to prove at the trial.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed without costs in this instance, and that
the complaint in this action praying for possession and for damages for the alleged unlawful detention of the land in
question should be dismissed with the costs in first instance against the plaintiff; but that such dismissal of the
complaint in this action should be without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to institute the appropriate proceedings to
recover the value of the lands actually taken, or to compel the railroad corporation to take the necessary steps to
secure the condemnation of the land and to pay the amount of the compensation and damages assessed in the
condemnation proceedings.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 9 TOPIC: Difference b/w expropriation proceeding and a case
for the fixing of just compensation; defendants in expropriation
case
CASE TITLE: DE KNECHT vs. COURT OF GR No. G.R. Nos. 108015 & 109234
APPEALS
Date: May 20, 1998
DOCTRINE
It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation
proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself,
lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties expropriated and declared
that just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law for
expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all
other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain,
the owner of the fee is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation
FACTS
The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago over the same subject
matter. This involves a parcel of land with an area of 8,102.68 square meters, more or less, located at the corner of the
south end of the E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by
petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht , under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9032 issued in
their names by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight (8) houses of strong
materials, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence.
In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated Civil Case No. 7001-P for expropriation against the Knechts' property
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 111, Pasay City. The government sought to utilize the land for
the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas
Boulevard.
The CFI issued a writ of possession. On petition of the Knechts, however, this Court, in G.R. No. L-51078, held that
the choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary. We annulled the writ of possession and enjoined the trial
court from taking further action Civil Case No. 7001-P.
In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from
1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction on May 27,
1982 for the sum of P63,000.00, the amount of the deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses
Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the
Sangalangs).
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the date of sale. In August 1983, Anastacio Babiera filed
with respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, a petition for registration of his name as co-owner
pro-indiviso of the subject land. This case was docketed as LRC Case No. 2636-p and was filed allegedly without
notice to the Knechts. On September 15, 1983, the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to register Babiera's name
and the Knechts to surrender to the Register of Deeds the owner's duplicate of the title.
On March 12, 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation (Salem) for
P400,000.00. TCT No. 86670 was cancelled and TCT No. 94059 was issued in the name of Salem.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government
to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension, the EDSA Outfall of the Manila Flood Control
and Drainage Project, and the "Cut-Off" of the Estero Tripa de Gallina which were all projects of the National
Government. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340.
On September 9, 1991, the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands sought to be
expropriated by the government. The value of the subject land was set at P28,961.00 per square meter. This valuation
did not include the improvements.
It was after these orders that the Knechts, on September 25, 1991, filed a "Motion for Intervention and to Implead
Additional Parties" in Civil Case No. 7327. They followed this with a "Motion to Inhibit Respondent Judge Sayo and to
Consolidate Civil Case No. 7327 with Civil Case No. 8423."
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the Knechts had no right to intervene in Civil Case No. 7327 for
lack of any legal right or interest in the property subject of expropriation. The appellate court declared that
Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation proceeding under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but
merely a case for the fixing of just compensation. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after
they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Whatever right remained on the property
vanished after Civil Case No. 2961-P, the reconveyance case, was dismissed by the trial court. Since the
petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court,
the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land
ISSUES
1. Whether the case was not an expropriation proceeding under rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but merely
a case for the fixing of just compensation
2. Whether the the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were
instituted.
HELD
1. Yes
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an
expropriation case. It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P.
Blg. 340 that expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be
expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely
described the specific properties expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be
determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways as the
administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law for
expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state
with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned,
and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein,
showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners,
averment to that effect may be made in the complaint.
The power of eminent domain is exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall join as defendants all persons
owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part of the expropriated land or interest therein. If a known owner is not
joined as defendant, he is entitled to Intervene in the proceeding; or its he is joined but not served with process and
the proceeding is already closed before he came to know of the condemnation, he may maintain an independent suit
for damages.
2. No, the Knechts insist that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case
No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the
expropriation proceedings. When the case was filed, all their eight (8) houses were still standing; seven (7) houses
were demolished on August 29, 1990 and the last one on April 6, 1991. They claim that as occupants of the land at the
time of expropriation, they are entitled to a share in the just compensation.
Civil Case No. 7327, the expropriation case, was filed on May 15, 1990. Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil
Case No. 2961-P for reconveyance was dismissed with finality by this Court and judgment was entered in February
1990. The Knechts lost whatever right or colorable title they had to the property after we affirmed the order of the trial
court dismissing the conveyance case. The fact that the Knechts remained in physical possession cannot give them
another cause of action and resurrect an already settled case. The Knechts' possession of the land and buildings was
based on their claim of ownership, not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since the issue of
ownership was put to rest in Civil Case No. 2961-P, it follows that their physical possession of the property after the
finality of said case was bereft of any legality and merely subsisted at the tolerance of the registered owners. This
tolerance ended when Salem filed Civil Case No. 85-263 for unlawful detainer against the Knechts. As prayed for, the
trial court ordered their ejectment and the demolition of their remaining house.
Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted.
They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead
Additional Parties." Their intervention having been denied, the Knechts had no personality to move for the inhibition of
respondent Judge Sayo from the case. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
27817.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They
include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When a parcel of land is taken
by eminent domain, the owner of the fee is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In
the American jurisdiction, the term "owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the
persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee
and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity
in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned
is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 10 TOPIC: Rule 67
CASE TITLE: ROBERN DEVELOPMENT GR No. 135042

CORPORATION vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, and NATIONAL Date: September 23, 1999
POWER CORPORATION
DOCTRINE
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once
the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited.
FACTS
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking
to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril,
Davao City. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss,alleging (a) that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect
for not showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Cañete,
who signed the verification and certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general manager or
an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be
expropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for use in a low-cost housing project, a public
purpose within the contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar properties
available within the area. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession based on Presidential Decree No. 42 and later deposited P6,121.20.
The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on September 11 stating that issues raised are matters
that should be dealt with during the trial proper. A MR was filed but was denied. The petitioner filed MR on
the September 11 order issued. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration, A Writ of
Possession was issued. Before counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court directing the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed property. On Certiorari, Robern
assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a) patent on the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional
defect, prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the Writ of Possession was
irregular, arbitrary and unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the "appropriate value for purposes of
taking or entering upon the property to be expropriated." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the
following grounds: The issues of whether the expropriation was properly authorized by the board of
directors and whether Cañete's verification and certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized were
evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of evidence and the issuance of the Writ of
Possession was proper in view of NPC's compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the disputed property.
ISSUES
1. WoN NPC had legal standing to file the expropriation case

2. WoN t he Writ of Possession was validly issued?
HELD
Yes. Rule 67, Section 1 does not require that the Complaint be expressly approved by the board of directors
of a corporation. In any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be threshed out during the trial.
As held by the appellate court, "the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings [were] authorized
by the Board of Directors or that those who signed the complaint [were] authorized representatives are
evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial proper."
Yes. In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for
the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered
by the 1997 Rules. With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession
becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in
the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC's Motion
for the issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit. Under
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full
assessed value of the property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional
deposit of NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to expropriate portions, not the whole, of four parcels of land
owned by Robern, the provisional deposit should be computed on the basis of the Tax Declarations of the
property. Hence, the amount of the provisional deposit should be increased in order to conform to the
requirement that it should be equivalent to the assessed value of the property. In the interest of justice, NPC
should in the meantime pay Robern reasonable rental, to be fixed by the trial court in its final decision, for
the use and occupation of the disputed property from the date of entry until the deposit of the full assessed
value of the property, as mandated by Rule 67.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 11 TOPIC: Rule 67
CASE TITLE: METROPOLITAN WATER GR No. L-33545

DISTRICT vs. SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES, ET
AL., Date: March 7, 1931
DOCTRINE
The very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public
use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be
maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use.
FACTS
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. The plaintiff is a public
corporation organized under and by virtue of Act No. 2832, for the purpose of furnishing an adequate water
supply to the City of Manila and the nearby municipalities. The purpose of the action was to secure the
expropriation of the land of the defendants situated in the municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal. The
plaintiff alleged that said land was necessary in the construction of the Angat Waterworks System, and that
a portion of said waterworks, to wit, the watershed, was definitely located by the plaintiff over and through
said land of the defendants. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the Court of First Instance of Rizal fixed the
provisional value of the land at P2,000, and authorized the plaintiff to enter into and take possession of the
land upon deposit of P2,000 with the provincial treasurer of Rizal. Defendants answered, denying generally
and specifically each and every allegation of the complaint, and prayed that the same be dismissed with
costs.
The court appointed three commissioners to hear the parties, view the premises, fix the value thereof, and
assess damages and to make a full and complete report of their proceedings to the court. The lower court
rendered a judgment in accordance with the recommendation of the majority of the commissioners, fixing
the value of the land at P58,750.60 and the improvements at P15,1510, and ordered the plaintiff to pay said
amounts to the defendants with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date the plaintiff took possession
of the land, with costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff-appellant contends that the value of the land and
improvements is grossly excessive, exorbitant, unreasonable and unjust. On the other hand the
defendants-appellants claim (1) that the value fixed by the lower court is less than the actual value of said
land and improvements, and (2) that they are also entitled to damages equivalent to 6 per cent of the total
value of the land and improvements. During the pendency of this appeal, the Metropolitan Water District
Board passed a resolution requesting the Attorney-General to petition the proper court to quash these
condemnation proceedings. defendants filed a vigorous opposition contending that it would be improper and
unjust for this court to set aside and quash all the proceedings had after five years of litigation, during which
time the plaintiff has been in possession of the land, and after the defendants have incurred heavy
expenses and other troubles incident to a long litigation.
ISSUES
WoN the condemnation proceedings may be dismissed
HELD
Yes. There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff here to acquire the land under the
power of eminent domain. That power was expressly granted by its charter. The power of eminent domain
is a right reserved to the people or Government to take property for public use. That being true, the very
moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the
action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at
all except when the expropriation is for some public use. In the present case the petitioner admits that the
expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made
in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appears positively, by resolution of the
plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without
a motion on the part of the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff, for causing such damages to the defendants,
must be required under the facts in the present case to answer for all the damages so occasioned to the
defendants
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 12 TOPIC: Dismissal of an action for eminent domain
CASE TITLE: NHA v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GR No. 154411

GUIVELONDO
Date: June 19, 2003
DOCTRINE
The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban poor dwellers in the
locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost more than petitioner had expected. Respondent
landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to
institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds the amount of
just compensation unacceptable.
FACTS
On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Petitioner alleged that defendants are owners of the lands within a blighted
urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project.
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their
objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. Hence, the trial court issued an Order
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of the defendants who are heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo.
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just
compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter.3 The trial court adopted
the recommendation.
Petitioner NHA filed two motions for reconsideration dated August 30, 2000 and August 31, 2000, assailing
the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation, respectively. Respondent
Heirs also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Partial Judgment.
RTC: denied petitioner’s August 31 MR and respondent’s MR. But granted petitioner’s August 30 MR on the
ground that the Commissioner’s Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and 19 within its coverage.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, on October 31, 2000, the trial court issued an
Entry of Judgment over the Partial Judgment. Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution,
which was granted on November 22, 2000.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Clarificatory Ruling were denied. A
petition for review was filed by petitioner with this Court, but denied. MR denied.
Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner, on July 16, 2001, filed with the
trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that
the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the
unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can
not afford.12 The Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment had
already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of
the case.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Dismissed. On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff
served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys
and interests of petitioner therein.19 Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal
properties of petitioner.20
ISSUES
1. WON dismissal of an action for eminent domain at the instance of the plaintiff where the case
had been decided and the judgment had already become final and executory is allowed in this
case
2. W
ON petitioner is exempt from garnishment
HELD
1. N
o, it is not allowed in this case.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined
that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.
The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an
order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends
with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.30 An order of
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and
legally exercised its power of eminent domain.31 Once the first order becomes final and no appeal
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
The above rule is based on Rule 67, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: xxx A
final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. xxx
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court which declared that it has a lawful
right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final
and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court.
Petitioner contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings. More specifically, petitioner alleges that the intended public use was rendered
nugatory by the unreasonable just compensation fixed by the court, which is beyond the means of the
intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing project. The argument is tenuous.
The Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls with the confines of "public use". xxx xxx xxx. Provisions
on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.35
The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of
just compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban poor
dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost more than petitioner had
expected. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner
cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later
when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s
property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the
ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in
the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and
irresponsible stance.
2. N
o, petitioner is not exempt from garnishment.
In order to resolve the issue of the propriety of the garnishment against petitioner’s funds and personal
properties, there is a need to first determine its true character as a government entity. Generally, funds and
properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which
is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are
not exempt from garnishment.39 This is so because when the government enters into commercial business,
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such
government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in
character, are not exempt from garnishment.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 13 TOPIC: dismissal of an expropriation case
CASE TITLE: NPC v. CA and Pobre GR No. 106804
Date: August 12, 2004
DOCTRINE
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint
precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The
plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval
and to certain conditions.
FACTS
Private respondent Antonino Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in
Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan
11-9709. The Commission on Volcanology the thermal mineral water and steam present beneath the
property and suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use.
NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances.
First was when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.5 On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the
expropriation of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC
began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was
pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The
dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not
act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for
the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and
Republic Act No. 5092.7 NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank.
On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre
claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by
NPC's actions and for the payment of damages.
On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC
had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property
due to Pobre's opposition.
RTC: decision in favor of Pobre.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUES
1. WON the expropriation case may be dismissed on the ground that NPC had found an
alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property
2. WON Pobre may recover damages
HELD
1. No.
A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not
intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, provided
that:
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action
based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval
of the court.
While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or summary judgment," the Rules then did not
require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases.23 In lieu of an answer,
Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of
his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the complaint.24 In
short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the
answer.
The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer"25 even
before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January
1985. However, as early as 10 December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court and served on
NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer." A certain Divina Cerela received Pobre's pleading on behalf of NPC.
NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right
under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served o n the
plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of
the complaint.27 Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to
dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject
to court approval and to certain conditions.
The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it
appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,32 then it becomes the duty of the court
to dismiss the action.33 However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the
expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages
ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.34
2. Yes.
There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant's
claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of
dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in
the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case.35 The
dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's
right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.36 The trial court in this case reserved
Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC's own
fault.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 14 TOPIC: Ascertainment of Compensation
CASE TITLE: PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL GR No. 208771

NORTE VS BUENAVENTURA-NAVARRO
Date: February 27, 2019
DOCTRINE
When there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.
FACTS
Lina Buenaventura-Navarro (respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-47666 with an area of 70,463 square meters. Allegedly, the Municipal Government of Carmen, Davao del
Norte, constructed a barangay road at Barrio La Paz, Carmen, appropriating a 3,587 square-meter portion
of the said property without just compensation being paid to respondent. This road is now a provincial road
and is maintained by the Province of Davao Del Norte. Respondent sent formal demand letters to the local
government of Carmen, Davao del Norte, as well as to petitioner, for back rentals and payment of just
compensation. The two local governments ignored her demands. This prompted her to file an action for just
compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees. The RTC declared petitioner in default for its failure to file
a pre-trial brief and to appear during the pre-trial conference. Thus, respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. RTC rendered a decision for the respondent and ordered petitioner to pay just
compensation. Petitioner did not appeal the decision; hence, respondent moved for its execution.
Consequently, the RTC issued a writ of execution on August 12, 2004. On September 1, 2004, petitioner
filed the instant petition for relief from judgment with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.
RTC Ruling: RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It did not agree with petitioner's argument that the
negligence of its employees was so gross that it should not be bound by it. It found inexplicable petitioner's
failure to avail of the legal remedies available at all stages of the proceedings in the lower court.
CA Ruling: It found that the omission of petitioner's former counsel could not be characterized as
excusable or unavoidable. It could have been prevented had prudence and ordinary diligence been
exercised.
Petitoner’s contention:Petitioner insists that the petition for relief from judgment should be granted
because excusable negligence is present. The workload of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is
allegedly gargantuan and is aggravated by support personnel unfit for the job or inadequate. The
negligence of its former counsel should not bind it because it would deprive it of its right to due process.
Petitioner also alleges that the RTC erred in adopting the valuation presented by respondent. Purportedly,
respondent's appraiser declared a misleading formula or computation of the property's market value, by
allegedly using the 2004 valuation of the property as the basis for computation. Since petitioner was not
afforded the chance to rebut respondent's evidence, it was unable to present other sources for the valuation
of the property, such as the tax declaration or the zonal valuation/appraisal. These documents would have
reflected the valuation of the property in 1975, the time of the supposed actual taking of the subject road.
Further, it insists that the RTC should have appointed commissioner/s for the determination of just
compensation pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS

NOT ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY OF RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
HELD
NO. Negligence, to be "excusable," must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. Measured against this standard, it is apparent that the reasons offered by petitioner for its
counsels' failure: that the nature of Atty. Sevilla's appointment is coterminous and political in nature; that
upon his appointment, he was busy fixing the political structure of the province; that the workload of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is allegedly gargantuan, aggravated by the fact that support personnel
were lacking or not fit for the job, by no means constitute the excusable negligence recognized by law as a
ground for the grant of relief from judgment. The negligence of petitioner's counsels could have been
prevented by their exercise of ordinary diligence and prudence. Also, for the exception to apply, gross
negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client
has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case.
Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. The Court
agrees with the CA that petitioner itself is guilty of negligence. It failed to exercise any diligence or prudence
in monitoring the status of its case. Its consistent failure to avail itself of the numerous remedies afforded by
law is due to its failure to exercise ordinary diligence and prudence in the defense of the case. Petitioner
was not deprived of its right to due process of law; it squandered its right to it.
In addition to that, petitioner's argument concerning the RTC's alleged error in its failure to appoint
a commissioner for the determination of just compensation, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, is without merit. The Court notes that the initial proceedings before the RTC were not for
expropriation, but for payment of just compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees. The Court
has previously held that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing with the appropriate court of a complaint
for eminent domain by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered
to have violated procedural requirements and, hence, has waived the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. When there is
no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation are no
longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. This ruling was reiterated by the
Court in the 2016 case of National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoquel. Since the initial proceedings
before the lower court was not for expropriation but for payment of just compensation, petitioner is
considered to have violated procedural requirements and has waived the usual procedure
prescribed in Rule 67. The provisions on ascertainment of just compensation are no longer
applicable and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 15 TOPIC: Determination of Just Compensation
CASE TITLE: GARCIA VS CA GR No. L-47553
Date: January 31, 1981
DOCTRINE
By virtue of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there being no taking of the
property in question for purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings instituted over the
same to speak of, the time as of which the market value should be fixed is the time when the trial court
made its order of expropriation. It is the date of appropriation or the investing date which as everyone
knows required more than a day, sometimes weeks to carry through as would an ordinary real estate
purchase and sale. Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the
uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the
condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner.
FACTS
National Power Corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, praying that it be allowed to acquire right of way easements over the property of petitioners
consisting of two adjoining parcels of land (Lots Nos. 633 and 634) with a total area of 15.98 hectares; that
the proposed right-of-way is needed to construct the 69 KV Mexico-Balibago power line which will
encompass some 2,835 square meters of petitioner's property.
The Commissioner respectfully recommended that judgment be rendered;
Expropriating the areas covered by Block 19 (20,439 sq. meters) and Block 10 (6,190 sq. meters) of
the subdivision plan (Exhibit 3) of the defendant's properties in favor of the plaintiff; Ordering plaintiff
to pay the defendants Juana Garcia Sandico, Belen Garcia Diokno and Bienvenido Garcia (a) by
way of just compensation, the amount of P15.00 per square meter for the Total area encomposed
in Block 19 and Block 10, supra, with 6% interest computed from March 16, 1970, until paid, (b) an
amount to be fixed by the Court as and for attorney's fees.
The lower court affirmed such recommendation. National Power Corporation, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The court of Appeals ordered the plaintiff to pay to the same defendants but lowered the amount
to P14,511.69 as the market value for Block 19 (20,439 square meters) at P0.07 per square meter with
legal interest from July 1, 1957.
The CA stated that the market value must be determined as of the time the plaintiff takes possession. Thus
when possession is ahead of the filing of the complaint, the date of possession determines the market
value. The possession of the property took place 13 years before the defendants filed their counterclaim
praying for the damages with respect to the occupation of Block 19. The defendants did not present
evidence as to the market value of Block 19 as of 1957. The tax declaration therefore should constitute the
prima facie evidence of the market value for the purpose of determining the just compensation. As per tax
declaration (Exhibits B, B- 1) the market value should be P.07 per square meter or a total amount of
P14,511.69 for Block 19 which consists of 20,439 square meters.
ISSUES
Whether or not the CA erred in lowering the market value
HELD
YES. It is apparent that the substantial reduction of what compensation has to be paid for Block 19 came
about as a result of the application of the doctrine enunciated in the case of the Republic vs. Phil. National
Bank, et al., clarifying the question petition as to what date the market value of condemned property should
be fixed, that "where the taking of the property precedes the institution of the condemnation proceedings,
the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking". A careful reading of this case and the cases
mentioned therein shows certain material facts which are not Identical to the case at bar, to wit: 1) the
properties in question became the subject of expropriation proceedings initiated by the plaintiff Government,
and 2) that the possession or "taking" of the Government of the properties in question, whether it was made
before or after the filing of the complaint for expropriation was made for purposes of eminent domain or with
the intent to expropriate. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in reducing the amount from P15.00 per square
meter to P0.07 per square meter, made the value stated in the tax declaration of Block 19 in 1957 its basis
on the assumption that in the said year 1957 the private respondent had taken possession of the land for
the purpose of eminent domain and on the further presumption that subsequent thereto an action for
expropriation was entered in court over this property. However, these facts assumed by the Court of
Appeals are not borne by the evidence on record.
It is alleged that the construction of the Ambuklao-Manila and Mexico-Tarlac transmission lines were with
the permission of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, their father, Eutiquiano Garcia. As shown by the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of June 26, 1971. Mr. Eladio Espiritu, a witness of
the private respondent, attempted to establish that the entry of private respondent to petitioners' property
was with the consent of their predecessor. Likewise, as found by the Commissioner in his Report, all that
the plaintiff, private respondent herein, could show was an alleged authority to construct the
Ambuklao-Manila line only, allegedly signed by defendants' father (Exhibit "M"), pending completion of the
negotiation of the compensation to be paid. Exhibit "M", in clear and unmistakable terms, states the nature
of the possession that the private respondent was granted at the time. The title of this document is
"PERMISSION TO OCCUPY LAND" which undoubtedly grants to the National Power Corporation a
privilege and the same is subject to the terms and conditions embodied in the document. As the private
respondent's entry was gained through permission, it did not have the intention to acquire
ownership either by voluntary purchase or by the exercise of eminent domain. And the fact remains
that the private respondent never completed the negotiation as to compensation. Not only this, private
respondent went on to construct another line — the 69 KV Mexico-Tarlac without defendants' permission
nor a court authorization. All these prove the private respondent's intention not to expropriate Block 19, as
it did not seek so in the action it instituted on August 8, 1969. Neither did it have the intention to do so in
1953 as shown by the terms in Exhibit "M". It is clear, therefore, that the private respondent not only did not
take possession with intent to expropriate Block 19, but that it did not institute expropriation proceedings
over the same. Consequently, since the areas covered by Block 19 were never entered into or possessed
for purposes of eminent domain, nor did they become the subject of an action for eminent domain, neither
the date of entry nor the filing of the action by private respondent for expropriation of a "right-of-way"
easement on December 8, 1969 could be reckoned with as the basis for the determination of just
compensation.Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the fair market value of the property in
question based on the tax assessment in 1957 is an error of law, as it is a conclusion predicated on the
wrong assumption that there was a taking or possession of Block 19 in 1957 for purposes of expropriation
and that there was an action for expropriation of the same.
By virtue of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there being no taking of the property
in question for purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings instituted over the same to
speak of, the time as of which the market value should be fixed is the time when the trial court made its
order of expropriation. It is the date of appropriation or the investing date which as everyone knows required
more than a day, sometimes weeks to carry through as would an ordinary real estate purchase and sale.
Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be
applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the
use to which it is then applied by the owner.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 16 TOPIC: Basis for just compensation; interest on just
compensation
CASE TITLE: Evergreen Manufacturing GR No. 218628 & 218631
Corporation vs Republic
Date: September 6, 2017
DOCTRINE
● Just compensation should be made at the time of taking, and the amount of payment should be
the fair and equivalent value of the property.
● Just compensation in expropriation cases has been held to contemplate just and timely payment,
and prompt payment is the payment in full of the just compensation as finally determined by the
courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in full of the expropriated property. Absent full
payment, interest on the balance would necessarily be due on the unpaid amount.
FACTS
Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a portion of Evergreen’s Property covering 173.08 square meters
(Subject Premises) which will be used for a public purpose — the construction of Package 3, Marikina
Bridge and Access Road, Metro Manila Urban Transport Integration Project.
Based on the zonal, industrial classification and valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the real
properties situated in Barangay Santolan, Evangelista Street, in the vicinity of A. Rodriguez boundary
where the Subject Property is situated, the properties have an appraised value of P6,000.00 per square
meter. While Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject Premises by negotiated sale, Evergreen
declined this offer. Thus, Republic-DPWH filed a complaint for expropriation on 22 March 2004.
|||Evergreen, in opposing the complaint for expropriation, alleged that the conditions for filing a complaint
for expropriation have not been met, and that there is no necessity for expropriation. In the alternative, in
the possibility that expropriation is deemed proper, Evergreen prayed that in addition to the payment of
just compensation, Republic-DPWH be ordered to (a) cause a re-survey of the remaining areas of the
Subject Property and draw a new lot plan and vicinity plan for each area; (b) draw up a new technical
description of the remaining areas for approval of the proper government agencies; (c) cause the
issuance of new titles for the remaining lot; (d) provide new tax declaration for the new title; and (e) pay
incidental expenses relative to the titling of the expropriated areas.
On 19 August 2004, after depositing P1,038,480.00 — which is equivalent to 100% of the value of the
Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of P6,000.00 per square meter — Republic-DPWH
filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. A Writ of Possession was issued by the RTC.
Subsequently, on 2 March 2006, Evergreen filed a Motion to Withdraw the Initial Deposit. This was
opposed by Republic-DPWH as it was not yet allowed entry into the Subject Premises. On 21 April
2006, the parties entered into an agreement allowing Republic-DPWH to enter into and/or possess the
Subject Premises. On 15 November 2006, the RTC granted the Motion to Withdraw Initial Deposit.
During the pre-trial, Evergreen and Republic-DPWH agreed that the issue to be resolved in the
expropriation complaint was the amount of just compensation. Three (3) real estate brokers/appraisers
were appointed as commissioners to determine the current fair market value of the Subject Premises.
The RTC rendered its Decision fixing the just compensation for the Subject Premises at Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos per square meter. Both Republic-DPWH and Evergreen filed their respective Motions
he CA increased the amount of just compensation for the Subject
for Partial Reconsideration.||| T
Premises at P35,000.00 per square meter. The CA, however, denied the claim of consequential
damages or interest by Evergreen. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the basis of just compensation should be the value of the expropriated property at
the time of taking
2. Whether or not Evergreen is entitled to legal interest on the balance of the just compensation,
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint until the judgment attains finality.
HELD
1. Yes. The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial

prerogative.This determination of just compensation, which remains to be a judicial function
performed by the court, is usually aided by the appointed commissioners. |||
Unfortunately, in this case, all of the conditions they took into account in determining just
compensation did not reflect the value of the Subject Premises at the time of taking. Documentary or
otherwise, the commissioners failed to rely on such evidence that would prove the value of the
Subject Premises at the time of the taking, which should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation. There was nothing to show the value of the property in 2004, which was the year the
taking of the Subject Premises took place. The BIR Zonal Valuation and the court decisions were
reflective of the value of the property in 2000, four years before the taking of the Subject Premises
by the government. On the other hand, the ocular inspection was conducted in 2008, four years after
the time of taking. Clear factual evidence must be presented for the correct determination of just
compensation.
||| It has been settled that the value and character of the land at the time it was taken by the
government are the criteria for determining just compensation. All three commissioners found that
the property was located in an area that was classified as commercial. It also found that the
property was best used as commercial. The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the
commissioners who conducted an ocular inspection, and the lower courts which affirmed the
findings of the commissioners. However, we find that the lower courts and the commissioners failed
to consider the time of taking when they arrived at their respective findings on the amount of just
compensation.
In 2000, this Court found that the just compensation for similar properties situated in the vicinity was
P26,100.00. In 2008, the commissioners found the selling price of the properties in the surrounding
area to be from P35,000.00 to P40,000.00 per square meter. The time of taking was in 2004, or right
in the middle of 2000 and 2008. Thus, we may consider the mean of the prices of the properties for
the years 2000 and 2008 to arrive at the amount of just compensation in 2004. Taking the higher
value of the range of price in 2008 and the amount of just compensation as affirmed by this Court in
2000, The Court finds that the amount of just compensation in 2004 is P33,050.00 per square meter
or a total of P5,720,294.00.
2. Yes. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no private property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation." Just compensation in expropriation cases has been held
to contemplate just and timely payment, and prompt payment is the payment in full of the just
compensation as finally determined by the courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in
full of the expropriated property. Absent full payment, interest on the balance would necessarily be
due on the unpaid amount. In Republic v. Mupas, we held that interest on the unpaid compensation
becomes due if there is no full compensation for the expropriated property, in accordance with the
concept of just compensation. We held: cSEDTC
The reason is that just compensation would not be "just" if the State does not pay
the property owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the taking of the
property. Without prompt payment, the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation
of both his land and its fruits or income. The owner's loss, of course, is not only his
property but also its income-generating potential.
Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made available to the property
owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he
would have derived income from his expropriated property.
In the present case, we find that there is still unpaid compensation due to Evergreen.
Republic-DPWH complied with Republic Act No. (RA) 8974, the applicable law for expropriation
in this case. Section 4 of RA 8974 provides in part:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall
initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant,
the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
xxx xxx xxx
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start
the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a writ of possession, the implementing agency shall
present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's
proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner
within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision
of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation
as determined by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic-DPWH had complied with the requirements of Section 4, paragraph (a) of RA
8974 when it deposited the equivalent of 100% of the value of the Subject Premises
based on the BIR zonal valuation of the property for the account of Evergreen. This
deposit was made before Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject
Premises through the issuance of the writ of possession. Verily, under the law, the initial
payment is a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of possession. However, this
payment alone and by itself does not constitute just compensation. We note that this is
only the first of the two payments the government must make. Section 4 of RA 8974
specifically provides that "when the decision of the court becomes final and executory,
the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already
paid and the just compensation as determined by the court." Thus, under RA 8974, there
must be a completion of two payments before just compensation is deemed to have been
made.
Therefore, while Republic-DPWH had made the deposit of the amount as prescribed in
the first paragraph of Section 4 of RA 8974, it still has not made the constitutionally
required payment of just compensation because the amount deposited is much less than
that adjudged by the court. The law requires two payments to constitute payment of just
compensation. Again, in Republic v. Mupas, we have explicitly stated that the initial
payment does not excuse the government from paying the difference of the amount
adjudged and the interest thereon:
The Government's initial payment of just compensation does not excuse it from
avoiding payment of interest on the difference between the adjudged amount of just
compensation and the initial payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of
possession under RA 8974 only provides the Government flexibility to immediately take
the property for public purpose or public use pending the court's final determination of
just compensation. Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 only addresses the Government's need to
immediately enter the privately owned property in order to avoid delay in the
implementation of national infrastructure projects.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 17 TOPIC: Just compensation; interest on just

compensation; who is entitled to just compensation
CASE TITLE: Republic of the Philippines vs GR No. 181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731
Mupas
Date:
DOCTRINE
● The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. In an
eminent domain situation, compensation must likewise be just to the public which ultimately bears
the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually
loses; what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking.
● All persons who have lawful interest in the property sought to be expropriated should be
impleaded in the complaint for purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just compensation.
● In the Philippine jurisdiction, the person who is solely entitled to just compensation is the owner of
the property at the time of the taking.
FACTS
The DOTC awarded, through a notice of award, the NAIA-IPT III project to the Paircargo Consortium (
PIATCO). On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the
construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme.
Under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplemental Agreement (for brevity,
PIATCO contracts),the Government authorized PIATCO to build, operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III
during the concession period of 25 years.
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III under an Onshore
Construction Contract. On the same date, PIATCO,through an Offshore Procurement Contract, likewise
contracted the services of Asahikosan, for the design, manufacture, purchase, test and delivery of
the Plant in the NAIA-IPT III.
PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to their respective
contracts. To settle the problem, Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO's payments until
June 2003, conditioned on their receipt of adequate security from PIATCO.
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the
Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts.On the same day, Takenaka and Asahikosan
notified PIATCO that they were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO's failure to
provide adequate security.
The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876

On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
III. The Government informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III's assessed value. On the same day, the
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of Manila v. Serrano,the RTC
held that that it had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon: (1) the filing of the complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the Government's deposit of the amount
equivalent to the property's assessed value, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
On January 4, 2005,the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and directed: (1) the Land
Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the amount of US$62,343,175.77 that would be deducted from
the just compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds for
the payment of just compensation; and (3) the Government to maintain and preserve the NAIA-IPT III
pending the expropriation proceedings and the full payment of just compensation. The RTC likewise
prohibited the Government from performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such as awarding
concessions or leasing any part of the NAIA-IPT III to other parties. The Government sought
reconsideration of the January 4, 2005 Order, arguing that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, and not RA
8974, applied to the case since the NAIA-IPT III was not a national government infrastructure project.
On January 7, 2005,the RTC appointed three Commissioners to determine just
compensation without consulting the Government and PIATCO. Due to these successive adverse
rulings, the Government sought to inhibit Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTC's presiding judge, from
hearing the case. (The judge was ambushed and killed on December 31, 2005.) On January 10,
2005,the RTC denied the Government's urgent motion for reconsideration and motion for inhibition.
On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan filed a motion for leave to intervene in Civil Case No.
04-0876 (the expropriation case). On the other hand, Takenaka filed a Manifestation dated December
15, 2005, with the attached Manifestation and Motion alleging that the Government impleaded it as an
additional defendant in an amended complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III, but was not served
summons. Takenaka thus manifested its voluntary appearance before the RTC.
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they had previously filed two collection cases
against PIATCO. In both instances, the London Court ruled in their favor. Takenaka and Asahikosan
asked the RTC to: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just compensation to PIATCO until the London
awards are recognized and enforced in the Philippines; and (b) order that the just compensation be
deposited with the RTC for the benefit of PIATCO's creditors.
The RTC treated Takenaka's Manifestation with the attached Manifestation and Motion as
a motion to intervene and allowed Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene in the case as
PIATCO's creditors. Pending the RTC's resolution of Takenaka and Asahikosan's motions for leave to
intervene in the expropriation case, the Government went directly to the Court seeking Judge
Gingoyon's inhibition from the case; the nullification of the order of release of the sum of $62.3 million to
PIATCO; and the nullification as well of the appointment of the commissioners.
||| The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429

The Case and the Decision dated December 19, 2005
The Government, et al.,filed a petition for certiorari with the Court assailing the validity of the
January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the RTC in the expropriation case.
The Court partly granted the petition and rendered the following rulings:
First, under the 2004 Resolution in Agan:(a) PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (b) the Government is barred from
taking over the NAIA-IPT III until just compensation is paid.
Second, RA 8974 applies in the expropriation case insofar as the law: (a) requires the
Government to immediately pay PIATCO at least the proffered value of the NAIA-IPT III; and (b)
provides valuation standards in determining the amount of just compensation.
RA 8974 is the governing law in cases where the national government expropriates property for
the purpose of commencing national government infrastructure projects such as the construction of the
NAIA-IPT III. However, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court applies in determining the assessed value and the
mode of deposit of just compensation if the national government initiates the expropriation complaint for
purposes other than national infrastructure projects.
Under both Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and RA 8974, the Government initiates the
expropriation by filing an expropriation complaint. However, the rules on the mode of deposit differ
because Rule 67 of the Rules of Court merely requires the Government to deposit the assessed value
of the property sought to be expropriated with an authorized government depositary before the issuance
of a writ of possession.
In contrast, RA 8974 commands the Government to make a direct payment to the property
owner prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. Under RA 8974, the payment shall be based on:
(a) the BIR's zonal valuation in case of land; and (b) the value of the improvements or structures
under the replacement cost method. If the completion of a government infrastructure project is
of utmost urgency and importance and if there is no existing valuation of the property, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the proffered value of the property.
We thus observed that Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is contrary to our January 21,
2004 Resolution which required the Government to make prior payment of just compensation to
PIATCO before it could take over the NAIA-IPT III. ETHIDa
The Court at the same time qualified the applicability of RA 8974 to the expropriation of the
NAIA-IPT III. We held that the Congress may legislate on the valuation standards of just compensation
and the manner of its payment since these are substantive matters. We made clear, however, that the
Congress cannot legislate on the procedural aspects of expropriation since this power lies with
the Court. In fact, Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR provides that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall apply to
"all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and
conflicting claims,effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the
complaint."
Third, we held in abeyance the implementation of the writ of possession until the Government
directly pays to PIATCO the proffered value of P3 billion. The zonal valuation method under Section 4 of
RA 8974 shall not apply since the Government owns the land on which the NAIA-IPT III stands.
Consequently, PIATCO should only be paid the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.Pending the determination of just compensation, the Government shall pay
the sum of P3 billion as the provisional amount of just compensation because there was no expedited
means by which the Government could immediately take possession of the NAIA-IPT III.
We also stated that the replacement cost method is only one of the factors to be
considered in determining just compensation. Equity should likewise be considered in
determining just compensation.
This ruling qualified the Court's statement in its January 21, 2004 Resolution that "[f]or the
Government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the
said structures." Nonetheless, we clarified that the title to the NAIA-IPT III shall pass to the Government
only upon full payment of the just compensation since the proffered value is merely a provisional
determination of just compensation.
Fifth, we ordered the RTC to complete its determination of just compensation within sixty (60)
days from finality of our decision since it was no longer possible for the RTC to determine just
compensation within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint under Section 4 of RA 8974.
Sixth, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in appointing the commissioners. Neither
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court nor RA 8974 requires the RTC to consult the parties in the expropriation
case prior to the appointment of commissioners. We also stated that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
shall apply insofar as it is consistent with RA 8974, the IRR, and the Court's rulings in Agan.
Considering that the expropriation proceedings were effectively suspended seven days after the
appointment of the commissioners, the parties may file their objections with the RTC within five days
from finality of the decision in accordance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Seventh, there was no ground to order Judge Gingoyon's inhibition since the Government failed
to show his alleged partiality.
Motion for Reconsideration

The Court also categorically stated that PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive
just compensation in accordance with law and equity before the Government may take over the
NAIA-IPT III.
Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 after the Finality of the Gingoyon Case
|||
On June 20, 2006, the RTC ordered Land Bank to immediately release the amount of P3 billion
to PIATCO. The RTC ruled that the collapse of a portion of the NAIA-IPT III was not a supervening
event that would hinder the payment of the proffered value to PIATCO. In compliance with this order,
the Government tendered to PIATCO a P3 billion check on September 11, 2006. On the same day,
the RTC reinstated the writ of possession in favor of the Government.
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their list of nominees for the appointment of
an independent appraiser. The RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as independent appraiser.
On May 18, 2007,the RTC directed the Government to submit a Certificate of Availability of
Funds to cover DG Jones and Partners' $1.9 Million appraisal fee. On January 9, 2008, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the May 3 and 18, 2007
Orders as well as the January 7, 2008 Order.
The Parties and the BOC's Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III
The Government manifested that it was ready to present its own valuation of the NAIA-IPT III and other
supporting evidence. PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan did not object to this manifestation.
On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III
with supporting documents and affidavits. The Government appraised the NAIA-IPT III at
$149,448,037.00 while PIATCO concluded that its replacement cost was $905,867,549.47.On the other
hand, Takenaka and Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT III's construction cost amounted to
$360,969,790.82.
|||
The BOC's Appraisal
On March 31, 2011, the BOC submitted its Final Report recommending the payment of just
compensation of $376,149,742.56 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the
time of the taking of the property until the amount is fully paid, plus commissioner's fees
equivalent to 1% of the amount fixed as part of the costs of the proceedings.
The RTC Rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876

A. The Main Decision
In a decision dated May 23, 2011, the RTC directed the Government, Takenaka, and
Asahikosan to pay the commissioners' fees in the amount of P1,750,000.00 each; and ordered the
Government to pay PIATCO just compensation in the amount of $116,348,641.10. The RTC rejected
PIATCO, Takenaka, Asahikosan, and the BOC's computation for lack of factual and legal basis. The
court criticized the BOC's computation of construction cost and stated that the BOC erroneously relied
on the amounts allegedly paid by PIATCO to Takenaka and Asahikosan. The RTC pointed out that
PIATCO failed to present proof that it had indeed paid Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of
$275,119,807.88. The RTC further posited that the BOC did not take into account the actual cost of the
NAIA-IPT III at the time of taking which was in a state of collapse and deterioration.The RTC stated that
just compensation is limited to the value of the improvement at the time of the filing of the expropriation
complaint. The payment of just compensation does not include the right to be compensated of the
franchise to operate the airport, and the increased value of improvements due to inflation rate.
The Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011

The RTC clarified that PIATCO is the sole entity entitled to receive the payment from the Government.
The RTC pointed out that the Court has remanded the Gingoyon case for the sole purpose of
determining the amount of just compensation to be paid to PIATCO.
Moreover, the Government did not raise the alleged dispute in the ownership of the NAIA-IPT III
during the expropriation proceedings. The RTC stated that it could not take judicial notice of the
allegation that PIATCO was indebted to various creditors, apart from Takenaka and Asahikosan, since
these alleged creditors were not impleaded in the expropriation complaint.
The RTC likewise observed that compliance with the Government's conditions under 8.1 and 8.3
for the release of just compensation from the escrow account pending appeal was legally impossible.
For this reason, the payment through an escrow account was not the payment that would transfer the
title of the NAIA-IPT III to the Government.
The RTC lastly ruled that the payment of just compensation through an escrow account shall be
payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.Consequently, the Government may exercise
full rights of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III upon the creation of an escrow account.
III. The CA Rulings

A. CA-G.R. CV No. 98029
The CA upheld the validity of the RTC's May 23, 2011 decision. The CA ruled that the parties did not need
to be furnished the BOC Final Report since RA 8974 is silent on the appointment of the BOC, as held in
Gingoyon.
The CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of the NAIA-IPT III's replacement cost.
The CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of the BOC. Since Takenaka
and Asahikosan's inputs on the construction costs of the NAIA-IPT III were heard by the RTC, they should
share in the expenses of the BOC. The CA likewise denied Takenaka and Asahikosan's prayer to set
aside in an escrow account a portion of the just compensation corresponding to the amounts owed them
by PIATCO. RA 8974 expressly provides that the Government shall directly pay the property owner upon
the filing of the complaint as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession.
||| B. CA-G.R. SP No. 123221
In a decision dated October 18, 2014, the CA reversed the Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011, for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
||| The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an action to enforce the London awards. RTC recognized the validity
of the London awards and declared these awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction. The
RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of $85.7 million. PIATCO
appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the RTC rulings in a decision dated March 13, 2012. The
CA likewise denied PIATCO's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated May 31, 2012.
||| To summarize, the cases pending before the Court are the consolidated cases: G.R. Nos. 209917,
209696, 209731, and 181892, and G.R. No. 202166 as a separate case.
G.R. No. 209917 is the Government's petition for review on certiorari to partially reverse the
CA's August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and its October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
98029.
G.R. No. 209696 is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Takenaka and Asahikosan to
partially reverse the CA's August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and its October 29, 2013 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.
G.R. No. 209731 is PIATCO's petition for review on certiorari to reverse the CA's August 22,
2013 Amended Decision, and October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.
G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731 originally arose from the Government's complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III filed with the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876.The
main issue before the Court in these petitions is the valuation of the just compensation due for the
Government's expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. TCAScE
G.R. No. 181892 is the Government's petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, assailing the May 3, 2007, May 18, 2008, and January 7, 2008 orders of
the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
This petition likewise arose from the Government's complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
III. The main issue in this petition is the propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 202166 is PIATCO's petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA's March 13, 2012
decision and May 31, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96502. The petition arose from Takenaka
and Asahikosan's action to enforce the London awards before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 in Civil
Case No. 06-171. As previously mentioned, this case was not consolidated with the four (4) cases
above and shall thus be separately ruled upon by the Court.
|||
Government’s Position
G.R. No. 209696
The Government alleges that it is willing to pay just compensation to the lawful claimant.
However, just compensation should not be set aside in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan since their
claim against PIATCO has not yet been resolved with finality. The Government asserts that Takenaka
and Asahikosan should share in the BOC's expenses. Under Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
the rival claimants should shoulder their costs in litigating their claim while the property owner should
shoulder the costs of the appeal if he appeals the case and the appellate court affirms the lower court's
judgment.
G.R. No. 181892
The Government disputes the RTC's appointment of an independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT
III. It claims that Section 11 of RA 8974 IRR solely authorizes the implementing agency to engage the
services of an appraiser in the valuation of the expropriated property, while under Section 10 of RA
8974 IRR, it is the implementing agency that shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or
structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement cost method. Pursuant to these provisions,
the Government engaged the services of Gleeds, Ove Arup and Gensler for purposes of appraising the
NAIA-IPT III. The Government likewise avers that the appointment of an independent appraiser would
only render the expropriation proceedings more costly. The Government would be forced to pay for the
services of two appraisers, which is not the intention of RA 8974. The court-appointed appraiser, too,
would render the BOC's functions useless. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it is the BOC that is
required to receive evidence in the determination of just compensation. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
does not require the appointment of an appraiser in eminent domain cases.
Lastly, the Government complains that the RTC order requiring it to submit a Certificate of
Availability of Funds is vague because the RTC did not specify the costs of the expropriation
proceeding.
PIATCO’S POSITION
G.R. No. 209731
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PIATCO maintains that the Government's deposit in an escrow account of a portion of just
compensation is not equivalent to payment; hence, interest on the full amount of just compensation shall
continue to apply.
||| G.R. No. 209696
PIATCO agrees with the CA that just compensation must be directly paid to it as the owner of
the NAIA-IPT III. It stresses that RA 8974 and its implementing rules clearly provide that the owner of
the expropriated property shall receive the entire amount of just compensation. PIATCO insists that it
would be erroneous to create an escrow account in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan since the
enforceability of Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 in Philippine jurisdiction has yet to be decided by
the Court in G.R. No. 202166. It points out that the main issue in G.R. Nos. 209731, 209917, and
209696 is the amount of just compensation, not the determination of Takenaka and Asahikosan's
money claims against PIATCO. Takenaka and Asahikosan's insistence to enforce their money claims
against PIATCO in G.R. Nos. 209731, 209917 & 209696 constitutes forum shopping and is still
premature.
PIATCO likewise denies that it refuses to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan's money claims.
PIATCO posits that the eminent domain case is not the proper venue for the adjudication of Takenaka
and Asahikosan's money claims.
G.R. No. 181892

PIATCO agrees with the RTC's appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function. The trial court's
power to appoint commissioners is broad enough to include the power to appoint an appraiser who shall
assist the commissioners in ascertaining the amount of just compensation. The latter power is inherent
in the court's task to receive evidence and to arrive at a fair valuation of the expropriated property.
Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court allows the court to amend and control its processes and
orders so as to make them consistent with law and justice. Furthermore, nothing in RA 8974 IRR that
prohibits the trial court from appointing an independent appraiser. Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court provides that all parties may introduce evidence on the valuation of the property sought to be
expropriated. The trial court is not bound by the report of the commissioners and of the independent
appraisers, much less of the findings of the Government-hired appraisers.
PIATCO asserts that the Government is estopped from assailing the appointment of an
independent appraiser. The Government voluntarily participated in the nomination of an independent
appraiser, and in fact, submitted its own nominees before the trial court. It also rgues that the
Government should solely bear the expenses of DG Jones and Partners. Section 12, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court provides that all costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid
by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in
which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner
Takenaka and Asahikosan's Positions

G.R. No. 209696 and G.R. No. 209731
Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that law and equity dictate that just compensation of at least
$85,700,000.00 should be set aside to answer for their money claims against PIATCO. RA 8974 does
not prohibit the creation of an escrow account pending the determination of the parties' conflicting claims
on the property and on the just compensation. Takenaka and Asahikosan assert that the interest of
justice will be served if the Court allows the creation of an escrow account in their favor. They point out
that the lower courts already ruled on the enforceability of Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269.
Furthermore, the Court, in Gingoyon,merely ordered the direct payment of just compensation to
PIATCO in order to ensure that the builder of the NAIA-IPT III is compensated by the Government as a
matter of justice and equity. Takenaka and Asahikosan underscore that they are the real builders of the
NAIA-IPT III as PIATCO's subcontractors.
Takenaka and Asahikosan maintain that Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court apply with
respect to the adjudication of the parties' conflicting just compensation claims. The Court did not declare
in Gingoyon that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall not apply to the payment of final just compensation.
The Court merely applied RA 8974 in Gingoyon insofar as the law prescribes direct payment as a
prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession in eminent domain cases.
Under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if there are conflicting claims on the property, the
court may order the just compensation to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in
the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that they are the lawful
recipients of just compensation as the real builders of the NAIA-IPT III and as the prevailing parties in
Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269.Even assuming that PIATCO is the owner of the NAIA-IPT III, the
owner of the expropriated property is not solely entitled to the full amount of just compensation.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not replacement cost is considered a factor in determining just compensation

2. What kind of replacement cost method should be used in appraising the value of NAIA-IPT III
3. Whether or not gross replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III as of December 2002 should be
adjusted to its cost as of December 2004
4. Whether or not the claims are entitled to interest
5. Whether or not PIATCO is entitled to the fruits and income of the NAIA IPT III.
6. Whether or not Takenaka and Asahikosan should share in the BOC's expenses
7. Whether or not Takenaka and Asahikosan's intervention in the case as unpaid subcontractors is
proper.
8. Whether or not PIATCO is the entitled recipient of just compensation
9. Whether the NAIA IPT III shall be burdened by liens and mortgages even after the full payment of
just compensation
3.
HELD
1. The Court explained in Agan and Gingoyon that the replacement cost method is only one of the
factors to be considered in determining the just compensation of the NAIA-IPT III. The Court
added that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well.
In Agan,we stated:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the
NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in
their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just
and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.
We also declared in Gingoyon that:
Under RA 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the owner of
the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the
value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2)
the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As
stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject
to immediate payment should be limited to "the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing
rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on
the land." Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the
improvements/structures are to be based using "the replacement cost method."
However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in
determining the just compensation.
In addition to RA 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the
payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus,
in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court
is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as RA 8974, but
to principles of equity as well. (Emphasis supplied) HSEa
The Court's pronouncements in Agan and Gingoyon are consistent with the principle that "eminent
domain is a concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole. It is not the
amount of the owner's investment, but the 'value of the interest' in land taken by eminent domain, that is
guaranteed to the owner.”
In sum, in estimating the fair market value of the NAIA-IPT III, the Court shall use (1) the
replacement cost method and (2) the standards laid down in Section 5 of RA 8974 and Section 10
of RA 8974 IRR. Furthermore, we shall likewise consider (3) equity in the appraisal of NAIA-IPT III
based on the Agan and Gingoyon cases.
|
The replacement cost method is a cost approach in appraising real estate for purposes of
expropriation. This approach is premised on the principle of substitution which means that "all things
being equal, a rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the cost of building
an acceptable substitute with like utility."
The cost approach considers the principles of substitution, supply and demand, contribution and
externalities. "The value of the land and the value of improvements are determined separately according
to their highest and best use." 202 "Buyers assess the value of a piece of property not only based on
the existing condition of the property, but also in terms of the cost to alter or improve the property to
make it functional specifically for the purposes of the buyer's use. This may include building new
structures, renovating existing structures, or changing the components of an existing structure to
maximize its utility."
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2. In these consolidated cases, we rule that the depreciated replacement cost method,rather
than the new replacement cost method, is the more appropriate method to use in
appraising NAIA-IPT III.
Injustice would result if we award PIATCO just compensation based on the new replacement
cost of the NAIA-IPT III, and disregard the fact that the Government expropriated a terminal that is not
brand new; the NAIA-IPT III simply does not have the full economic and functional utility of a brand new
airport.
Adjustments for depreciation should be made to reflect the differences between the modern
equivalent asset and the actual asset or the NAIA-IPT III. The reason is that depreciation involves the
loss of value caused by the property's reduced utility as a result of damage, advancement of technology,
current trends and tastes, or environmental changes.
This conclusion is consistent with Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR which allows us — and under the
NAIA-IPT-III's circumstances effectively direct us — to consider the kinds and quantities of
materials/equipment used, configuration and other physical features of the properties, among other
things, in determining the replacement cost of a building. To quote Section 10:
Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures — Pursuant to Section 7 of
the Act, the Implementing Agency shall determine the valuation of the improvements
and/or structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement cost method. The
replacement cost of the improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary to
replacement improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials,
equipment, labor, contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures. In the valuation of the affected improvements/structures,
the Implementing Agency shall consider, among other things,the kinds and
quantities of materials/equipment used, the location, configuration and other
physical features of the properties,and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis
supplied)
Depreciation should be deducted because modern materials and design are assumed in the
replacement cost method. In using the depreciated replacement cost method, "[t]he intent is to provide a
functionally similar improvement in order to apply a meaningful level of depreciation."
If we adopt the new replacement cost method, PIATCO would be compensated for more
than what it had actually lost. We must remember that the concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone. In an eminent domain situation, compensation must likewise
be just to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to
compensation only for what he actually loses; what he loses is only the actual value of the
property at the time of the taking.
Just compensation must not extend beyond the property owner's loss or injury. This is the only
way for the compensation paid to be truly just, not only to the individual whose property is taken, but
also to the public who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even as undervaluation would deprive the
owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the
prejudice of the public.
3. Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR provides that the replacement cost shall be based on the current
market prices of construction and attendant costs. Under the depreciated replacement cost
method, the replacement cost shall be based on the current gross replacement cost of the asset.
In its pleadings, the Government itself explained that the cost of replacing an asset under both
depreciated replacement cost and new replacement cost methods should be measured at its current
prices.
In our jurisdiction, the word "current" should be equated with the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. In the present case, the word "current"
should necessarily refer to December 21, 2004, the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
In National Power Corporation v. Co, the Court suppletorily applied Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court in determining the value of the property sought to be expropriated for purposes of
implementing national infrastructure projects. Under the Rules of Court, just compensation shall be
determined from the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first. Thus, where the filing of an action precedes the taking of the property, just
compensation shall be computed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 334
The relevant valuation date when we shall reckon the current gross replacement cost is
December 21, 2004, or the date of filing of the complaint for expropriation. DHITCc
The Government's base valuation of $300,206,693.00 is only a measurement of the current
gross replacement cost as of December 2002. We agree with PIATCO that the gross replacement cost
of the NAIA-IPT III as of December 2002 should be adjusted to its cost as of December 2004 for the
plain reason that the Government's computed gross replacement cost is not current, as required by the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
||
Interests, Fruits and Income
To avoid confusion in computing interests, we first distinguish three interrelated concepts in just
compensation: (1) the valuation period of just compensation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; (2) the
reckoning period of interest in eminent domain cases pursuant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the initial and final payments of just compensation under RA 8974. cEaSHC
Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the complaint for expropriation,
whichever is earlier, thus:
Section 4. Order of expropriation. —If the objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to
defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
(4a) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation." The 1987 Constitution thus
commands the condemnor to pay the property owner the full and fair equivalent of the property from
the date of taking.This provision likewise presupposes that the condemnor incurs delay if it does not
pay the property owner the full amount of just compensation on the date of taking
The reason is that just compensation would not be "just" if the State does not pay the property
owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the taking of the property. Without prompt
payment, the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or
income. The owner's loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential.
Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made available to the property owner so that
he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income
from his expropriated property. C
However, if full compensation is not paid for the property taken, then the State must pay for the
shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement
property from which income can be derived. Interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due as
compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.
Thus, interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of
course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of taking."
Lastly, RA 8974 requires the Government to pay just compensation twice: (1) immediately
upon the filing of the complaint, when the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, and the value of the improvements and/or
structures sought to be expropriated (initial payment);and (2) when the decision of the court in the
determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, in which case the implementing
agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation
as determined by the court (final payment).
In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the initial payment shall be the
proffered value of the property. Section 4 of RA 8974 also states that the initial payment of just
compensation is a prerequisite for the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession, to wit:
acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government
guidelines: SaCIDT
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR);and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation,
the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the
expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present
to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered
value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty
(60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the
court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner
the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as
determined by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
The Government's initial payment of just compensation does not excuse it from avoiding
payment of interest on the difference between the adjudged amount of just compensation and the initial
payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of possession under RA
8974 only provides the Government flexibility to immediately take the property for public purpose or
public use pending the court's final determination of just compensation. Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 only
addresses the Government's need to immediately enter the privately owned property in order to avoid
delay in the implementation of national infrastructure projects. cHECAS
Otherwise, Section 4 of RA 8974 would be repugnant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution which mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. To reiterate, the Constitution commands the Government to pay the property owner no
less than the full and fair equivalent of the property from the date of taking.
In the present case, the Government avers that PIATCO is not entitled to recover interest.
According to the Government, PIATCO should not be allowed to profit from the void contracts. This
contention, however, stems from a mistaken understanding of interest in expropriation cases.
Contrary to the Government's opinion, the interest award is not anchored either on the law of
contracts or damages; it is based on the owner's constitutional right to just compensation. The
difference in the amount between the final payment and the initial payment — in the interim or before
the judgment on just compensation becomes final and executory — is not unliquidated damages
which do not earn interest until the amount of damages is established with reasonable certainty. The
difference between final and initial payments forms part of the just compensation that the property
owner is entitled from the date of taking of the property.
Thus, when the taking of the property precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the
Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation from the date of taking whose
interest shall likewise commence on the same date. The Court does not rule that the interest on just
compensation shall commence the date when the amount of just compensation becomes certain,
e.g.,from the promulgation of the Court's decision or the finality of the eminent domain case.
With respect to the amount of interest on just compensation, we decisively ruled in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that the just compensation due to the property owner is effectively a forbearance of
money, and not indemnity for damages.
4. Yes. In the present case, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III on
December 21, 2004. On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the
Government upon the deposit of P3,002,125,000.00 with the Land Bank. In Gingoyon, the Court
held in abeyance the implementation of the writ of possession pending the direct payment of the
proffered value of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO. On September 11, 2006, the RTC reinstated the
writ of possession after the Government tendered PIATCO a check in this amount. On April 11,
2012, the MIAA and the Land Bank entered into an escrow agreement in the amount of
$82,157,716.73. On the same date, the MIAA and the DBP likewise executed an escrow
agreement in the amount of $34,190,924.59.
Based on these factual circumstances, interest shall accrue as follows:
1. The principal amount of just compensation shall be appraised on the date of the filing
of the complaint for expropriation or on December 21, 2004. The just
compensation shall not earn interest from December 21, 2004, until September
10, 2006,since the Government did not take possession of the NAIA-IPT III during
this period.
2. The difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the proffered
value of P3,002,125,000.00 shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from the
date of taking or September 11, 2006 until June 30, 2013. HCaDIS
3. The difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the proffered
value of P3,002,125,000.00 shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from July 1,
2013, until the finality of the Court's ruling.
4. The total amount of just compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of the Court's ruling until full payment.
Clearly, the Government does not intend to pay the just compensation due to either PIATCO or
Takenaka and Asahikosan during the pendency of the expropriation case or until the finality of
the Court's rulings in G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731.
5. No. PIATCO is not entitled to the fruits and income of the NAIA IPT III.
PIATCO insists that aside from the interest on just compensation, it is also entitled to all income
generated from the operations of the NAIA-IPT III, from the date of taking up to the present. PIATCO's
claim is unmeritorious. The State, by way of interest, makes up for the shortfall in the owners' earning
potential and the absence of replacement property from which income can be derived. This is because
the interest awarded by the expropriation court is, in reality, the equivalent of the fruits or income of the
seized property. In fact, PIATCO itself admitted in its petition in G.R. No. 209731 that the interest on
just compensation already answers for the loss of income that the owner suffered as a result of the
State's deprivation of the ordinary use of his property.
6. No. Takenaka and Asahikosan should not share in the BOC's expenses.
|||
SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed
as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the
owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the
appeal shall be paid by the owner. [Emphasis supplied]
This provision specifically deals with the costs of eminent domain cases. Hence, we find that
Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, more specifically, the statement allowing the court to divide
the costs of an action to either party to the case, is inapplicable to the present case. DACcIH
Based on the clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is the plaintiff — in this case, the Government
— not the property owner or third-party intervenors, i.e.,Takenaka and Asahikosan, who shall shoulder
the costs of the expropriation before the court of origin. Since the expenses of the BOC form part of the
costs of the suit — as these are expenses necessary in prosecuting or defending an action or a distinct
proceeding within an action — the Government solely bears the expenses of the BOC. The property
owner shall only bear the costs of the appeal if he loses in his appeal.
PIATCO, in its pleading, has not questioned its share in the expenses of the BOC before the
Court. PIATCO's voluntary sharing in the expenses of the BOC and its non-objection to its payment
amount to a waiver of its right not to share in the expenses of the BOC.
In sum, just compensation shall is computed as $510,304,535.80
7. Yes. Takenaka and Asahikosan's intervention in the case as unpaid subcontractors is

proper.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property
condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying, or claiming to own the property. Under
Sections 8 and 14 of RA 8974 IRR, in relation with Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, all persons
who claim to have lawful interest in the property to be condemned should be included as defendants in
the complaint for expropriation:
Section 8 of RA 8974 IRR. Expropriation. — If the owner of a private property needed by
the government implementing agency does not agree to convey his property to the
government by any of the foregoing modes of acquiring and/or transferring ownership of
the property, then the government shall exercise its right of eminent domain by filing a
complaint with the proper Court for the expropriation for the private property.
The verified complaint shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation,
describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants
all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein,
showing as far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to
any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise
obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify
the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint.
Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR. Trial Proceedings. — Within sixty (60)-day period
prescribed by the Act, all matters regarding defences and objections to the
complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal
on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall
be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If
the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any
part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for
the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the
same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment
of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff
can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has
already been made. (9a) (Emphasis supplied) IDTSEH
All persons who have lawful interest in the property sought to be expropriated should be
impleaded in the complaint for purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just
compensation. If a known owner is not joined as defendant, he may intervene in the proceeding. If the
owner is joined but not served with process and the proceeding is already closed before he came to
know of the condemnation, he may maintain an independent suit for damages.
Consequently, Takenaka and Asahikosan are correct in invoking Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court for purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just compensation in this case. This rule is
likewise their proper basis of intervention in the RTC's March 12, 2007 order in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
Our ruling on this point does not contradict Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 which provides for a
scheme of direct and immediate initial payment to the property owner in cases involving national
government infrastructure projects.
Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 applies only to cases where the issue of ownership of the expropriated
property is not disputed. In cases where the ownership is contested; where conflicting claims or
interests over the expropriated property exist; or where there are other incidents affecting the complaint
for expropriation, the governing rule is Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. By creating a separate
provision applicable only to the latter cases, Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR necessarily acknowledged that
the scheme of immediate and direct initial payment is not an absolute and all-encompassing rule
applicable in all circumstances.
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8. Yes. PIATCO as the Lawful Recipient of Just Compensation.
In the Philippine jurisdiction, the person who is solely entitled to just compensation is the owner of the
property at the time of the taking. As shown below, the test of who shall receive just compensation is
not who built the terminal, but rather who its true owner is.
From the express provision of Section 4 of RA 8974, just compensation shall only be paid to the
property owner. We implead persons with lawful interests in the property in order to determine the
person who shall receive just compensation. Note that the last paragraph, Section 4 of RA 8974 states:
"When the decision of the court becomes final and executory,the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the
court." This provision thus envisions a situation where the court determines with finality, for purposes of
payment of just compensation, the conflicting claims of the defendants and intervenors.
The cases cited by Takenaka and Asahikosan are inapplicable to justify their right to receive just
compensation. The Court did not award just compensation to a non-owner in De Knecht v. Court of
Appeals. The Court held in that case that a person who had no legal interest in the property at the time
of the filing of a complaint for expropriation had no right to intervene in the case. The Court ruled that
only persons who have lawful interests in the property may be impleaded as defendants or may
intervene in the expropriation case under Section 1, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. This case thus, at
most, support their right to intervene.
The record of the present case show that PIATCO has been the original contracting party
commissioned by the Government to construct the NAIA-IPT III based on a build-operate-transfer
arrangement and who, in this capacity, contracted out the actual construction to Takenaka and
Asahikosan. Thus, when the NAIA-IPT III was built, it was in PIATCO's name and account, although it
subsequently owed sums to subcontractors, incurred in the course of the construction. From this
perspective, PIATCO has been the owner recognized as such by the Government although the basis of
its contractual relationship with the Government was later on nullified. Takenaka and Asahikosan, on the
other hand, had always been subcontractors with whom the Government did not have any formal link.
These facts indubitably show that PIATCO has been the owner of the NAIA-IPT III entitled to receive the
just compensation due. Takenaka and Asahikosan for their part, have not shown that they possess legal
title or colorable title to the NAIA-IPT III that would defeat PIATCO's ownership.
9. The determination of whether the NAIA IPT III shall be burdened by liens and mortgages
even after the full payment of just compensation is still premature.
The determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall be burdened by liens and mortgages even after the
full payment of just compensation is still premature. The enforceability of Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and
HT-05-269 in this jurisdiction has yet to be decided by the Court in G.R. No. 202166. Furthermore, the
application of Article 2242 of the Civil Code 371 presupposes that PIATCO declared insolvency or has
been declared insolvent. This, of course, should be litigated in insolvency proceedings, not in the
present eminent domain case.
|||
Additional notes
● Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power
of a sovereign state to appropriate private property within its territorial sovereignty to promote
public welfare. The exercise of this power is based on the State's primary duty to serve the
common need and advance the general welfare. It is an inherent power and is not conferred by
the Constitution. It is inalienable and no legislative act or agreement can serve to abrogate the
power of eminent domain when public necessity and convenience require its exercise.
The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the legislature which has the
exclusive power to prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be exercised.
Thus, the Executive Department cannot condemn properties for its own use without direct
authority from the Congress.
The exercise of eminent domain necessarily derogates against private rights which must yield to
demand of the public good and the common welfare. However, it does not confer on the State the
authority to wantonly disregard and violate the individual's fundamental rights.
|||
● Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to
convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. On the other hand, the word "compensation" means "a full indemnity
or remuneration for the loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for
public use." Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to
the monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve
this monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the property at the
time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier.
● ||| Fair market value is the general standard of value in determining just compensation Jurisprudence
broadly defines "fair market value" as the sum of money that a person desirous but not compelled to
buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received for a property. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be just, the
compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. |||
● While jurisprudence requires the "fair market value" to be the measure of recovery in expropriation
cases, it is not an absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation. There are exceptional
cases where the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value of the property is
difficult to determine.|||In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property.
In the United States, the methods employed include: (1) the cost of replacing the condemned
property, less depreciation; (2) capitalization of the income the property might reasonably have
produced; (3) the fair rental value of the property during a temporary taking; (4) the gross rental
value of an item over its depreciable lifetime; (5) the value which the owner's equity could have
returned, had the owner invested in monetary instruments; (6) the cost of repair or the capitalized
cost of inconvenience, whichever is less; and (7) the loss of investment expenses actually
incurred. The primary consideration, however, remains the same — to determine the
compensation that is just,both to the owner whose property is taken and to the public that will
shoulder the cost of expropriation.
● ||| RA 8974 allows the Government to enter the property and implement national infrastructure
projects upon the issuance of the writ of possession. When the taking of the property precedes the
payment of just compensation, the Government shall indemnify the property owner by way of
interest.
● "Taking" under the power of eminent domain means entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. "Taking" of property takes place when: (1)
the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; (2) there is a practical destruction or
a material impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of
the property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.
● The taking of property is different from the transfer of the property title from the private
owner to the Government. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, there are two phases of
expropriation: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be
for a public purpose or public use; and (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. aHSTID
The first phase is concerned with the determination of the Government's authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. The court declares that the Government has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint.
The second phase relates to the just amount that the Government shall compensate the property
owner.
Whenever the court affirms the condemnation of private property in the first phase of the
proceedings, it merely confirms the Government's lawful right to take the private property for
public purpose or public use. The court does not necessarily rule that the title to the private
property likewise vests on the Government.
The transfer of property title from the property owner to the Government is not a condition
precedent to the taking of property. The State may take private property prior to the eventual
transfer of title of the expropriated property to the State.
● The reckoning period, however, of the valuation of just compensation is the date of taking or
the filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is earlier.In either case, it is only after
the finality of the second stage and after the payment of just compensation that the title shall
pass to the Government. As we have ruled in Gingoyon, the title to the property does not
pass to the condemnor until just compensation is paid.
● Under Section 4 of RA 8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of possession upon
initial payment of just compensation to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of
a certificate of availability of funds.
A writ of possession does not transfer title to the Government; it is "a writ of execution
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff
to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment." 380
Section 4 of RA 8974 further states that the writ of possession is an order to take
possession of the property and to start the implementation of the project, to wit:
acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government
guidelines: TaCEHA
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant,
the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);and
(2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no
zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of
sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up
with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the
area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the
standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present
to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered
value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty
(60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court
becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by
the court. (Emphasis supplied) acHTIC
The Government is provisionally authorized to take the property for public purpose or public use
whenever the court issues a writ of possession in favor of the Government. It may take possession of
the property or effectively deprive the property owner of the ordinary use of the property. If the court,
however, later on determines that the State has no right of expropriation, then the State shall
immediately restore the defendant of the possession of the property and pay the property owner
damages that he sustained. Section 11, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; Effect of reversal. — The right of the plaintiff to
enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or
purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court
determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered
ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of
the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant
sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
The State's taking of the property is not based on trust or contract, but is founded on its inherent
power to appropriate private property for public use. It is also for this reason — to compensate the
property owner for the deprivation of his right to enjoy the ordinary use of his property until the naked
title to the property passed to the State — that the State pays interest from the time of the taking of the
property until full payment of just compensation.
RULE 68 - FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 1 TOPIC: Jurisdiction; Foreclosure of REM

ROLDAN vs SPOUSES BARRIOS
Date: April 23, 2018
DOCTRINE
In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to
foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to
the payment of the obligation. Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against property,
and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. As foreclosure of
mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines the court's
jurisdiction.
FACTS
In 2014, petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against
respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D. Matorres.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants borrowed from plaintiff the sum of P250,000.00 php payable within the
period of one (1) year, with an interest thereon at the rate of 5% per month; and to secure the prompt and
full payment of the principal and interest, defendants made and executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel of land and improvements thereon situated in Baybay, Makato, Aklan,
containing an area of 478 square meters, more or less x x x declared in the name of Spouses Barrios, with
an assessed value of P13,380.00.
The Spouses failed and refused to pay both the principal obligation and the interest due starting from
February 2011 to the present despite repeated demands; On the other hand, plaintiff recently discovered
that the defendants mortgaged again to the Romel D. Matorres the same property for 150,000.00 php and
thus, a mortgagee in bad faith.
RTC – dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Since the assessed value of the property mortgaged is
only P13,380.00 and being a real action, the assessed value of the property determines the
jurisdiction.
Petitioner and Matorres filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that foreclosure of real estate
mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court.
RTC denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC when it ordered the dismissal of her foreclosure case without prejudice and
denying her motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES
Whether or not a petition for foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus jurisdiction lies with the RTC.
HELD
NO.
Preliminarily, we need to point out that generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
Since petitioner raises a pure question of law pertaining to the court's jurisdiction on complaint for
judicial foreclosure of sale, we would allow petitioner's direct resort to us.
Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 pertinently provides for the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the first level courts. The RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil
actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil
cases involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds P20,000.00, and if it is below P20,000.00, it is the first level court which has
jurisdiction. An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff’s cause of action is
based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that the loan
obtained by respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such loan which
was secured by a mortgage on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in case of default
of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to the court, the property be ordered sold to answer for the
obligation under the mortgage contract and the accumulated interest. Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal
obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the
property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. Therefore,
the foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition
of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res.
As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines the
court's jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, the
RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of BP
129 as amended.
Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We are not persuaded. Clearly, the
last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for recovery of money,
the court's jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the property involved.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 2 Topic: splitting cause of action not allowed
CASE TITLE: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., GR No. L-45350

INC v ESTEBAN ICARANGAL and
ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC Date:MAY 29, 1939
DOCTRINE
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for
a
debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
two remedies, but not both
FACTS
Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., a promissory note for P1,614 and in security for its payment, said Esteban Icarañgal
executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna, which was duly registered
on August 5, 1931, in the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Laguna.
Thereafter, promisors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore,
plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount
due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution was
subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of Laguna, at the indication of
the plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged
by Esteban Icarañgal in favor of the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging
that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in another civil case the property which was the subject
of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at
the public auction on May 12, 1933.
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in
consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage which the trial court
dismissed in an order. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
WON Bachrach Motor is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has
elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against defendant on the promissory note
for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security.
HELD
YES. For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action
against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution
of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of
the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the
non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the
debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for
a single breach of that obligation.
Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively,
one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, it is in effect, authorizing him plural
redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation
and oppression to the debtor.
Therefore, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both.
By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the
properties of the debtor f or attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself.
And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property,
an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in
which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open
to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency.
In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages
attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right
of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action
against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged
property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to and obnoxious to law and
equity, but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.
Additional notes
BASIS: The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation
between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes
from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed
for one and the same cause).
RULE 69 - PARTITION
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 3 TOPIC: Jurisdiction

Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado
Date: June 6, 2018
DOCTRINE
An action for partition of real estate is at once an action for the determination of the co-owners of the subject
property and an action for the eventual conveyance of specific portions thereof to the co-owners. While this
subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the proper court which would have jurisdiction over the
action would still depend on the subject property's assessed values in accordance with Secs. 19 (2) and 33
(3) of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
FACTS
Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado (Ma. Rosario), Ruth Librada Agarrado (Ruth), and Roy Agarrado (Roy)
are children of the late spouses Rodrigo (Rodrigo) and Emilia (Emilia) Agarrado. The spouses, during
their lifetime, acquired a 287-square-meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
Unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita
Librando-Agarrado (Cristita), with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. Ana Lou was
conceived during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born a month after
the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia’s marriage through Emilia’s death, whose death is intestate.
Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died. He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children
by his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.
On January 23, 2003, Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint for partition before the RTC of Bacolod
City for the partition of the subject property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, and “other heirs of Rodrigo
Agarrado” as defendants. RTC ordered the parties to partition of the subject property among themselves
by proper instruments of conveyance or any other means or method.
Petitioners appealed before the CA, which it dismissed, affirming the RTC decision, with modification, to
wit: 2/9 of the property to Cristita; Ma. Rosario, Ruth, and Roy entitled to 6/9 + 1/4 to be divided equally
among them; and Ana Lou Agarrado entitled to 1/9 of the property.
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners argue that the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the
respondents to allege the assessed value of the subject property. They said that the appellate court failed
to appreciate this jurisdictional requirement, which was indispensable in the determination of the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUES
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject complaint
HELD
NO. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance
(Cabrera v. Francisco).
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased: the Court ruled that partition is at once an
action:
(1) for declaration of co-ownership and
(2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.
Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the
subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.
In Russel v. Vestil, w hile actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary estimation owing to its
two-phased subject matter, the determination of the court which will acquire jurisdiction over the same
must still conform to Sec. 33 (3) of B.P. 129, as amended. To wit:
“While actions under Sec. 33 (3) of B.P. 1 29 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically
mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real
property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value
exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).”
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is determined by
law. Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.
The provision states that all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTC).
Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the
partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the
complaint. In Foronda-Crystal v. Son, failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the
complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. The reason put forth by the Court is that, absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the
RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
Case at bar
None of the assertions in the complaint indicate the assessed value of the property to be partitioned that
would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction. More, none of the
documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
amount. Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it
has none to exercise.
Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable of pecuniary
estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the amounts
specied in Secs. 19 (2) and 33 (3) of BP 129. Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the
assessed value of the subject property in his.her complaint, or in the attachments, is dismissible because
the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be identified.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 2 TOPIC:
CASE TITLE:. G.R. No:
DATE:
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUES
HELD
Additional notes
CASE TITLE: GR No.
Date:
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUES
HELD
Additional notes
CASE TITLE: GR No.
Date:
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUES
HELD
Additional notes
CASE TITLE: ARCELONA V. CA GR No. 102900

Date:October 2, 1997
DOCTRINE
Considering that private respondent was suing to establish his status as a tenant over the subject fishpond,
the responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably rested on him.
FACTS
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are natural-born Filipinos who
are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U.S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving
spouse and legal heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with
their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a
fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents.4 The six Arcelonas (two brothers and
four sisters) are named as co-owners in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences
ownership over the fishpond.
On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and
Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2,
1984. Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the
same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination of the
lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors,
Olanday, et al.
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted Civil Case D-7240
for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the
issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., before Respondent Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 40. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the
fishpond. RTC ruled in favor of Farnacio.
Olanday, et al. elevated the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)8 which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private
respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by TCT 34341.
Petitioners then filed with Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against
private respondent and the implementing sheriff. Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners
"to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 50, Dagupan City."
Respondent Court promulgated in due course the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioners contend that Respondent Court of Appeals erred in decreeing "the all-sweeping and
categorical pronouncement that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud,"
and in thereby ignoring various Supreme Court rulings that a final judgment may also be annulled for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners further maintain that since "the case involves the personal status of the private
respondent, or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, then the petitioners as
non-residents" are entitled to extra-territorial service,17 which is a "due process requirement.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the ruling in Civil Vase D-7240 may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
petitioners as co-owners were not joined as indispensable parties
2. Whether or not the action for annulment of a decision filed in the Court of Appeals may still prosper when
the remedy of intervention was not availed of in the RTC during the original proceedings
3. Whether or not petitioners’ action may be barred on the ground of estoppel and laches.
HELD
1. Yes
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the ground(s) for annulment of judgment to only one,
namely, extrinsic fraud. To set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a
litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court25 on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the
judgment but not more than six (6) months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul the
judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul
a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the
joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.31 It is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."32 The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of
Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which
specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it
is not possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established
and ruled upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as
indispensable parties. No final determination of a case could be made if an indispensable party is not
impleaded. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without
joining all the other co-owners. Former Chief Justice Moran, an eminent authority on remedial law,
explains:. . . . it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the
pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a
tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire
co-owned land. Thus, the Court, through former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, held that a person who
was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be
affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
Admittedly, in this case, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court in rendering its decision in Civil Case No.
D-7240 is not patent on the face of said judgment. However, there were glaring documentary and
testimonial pieces of evidence referred to by the trial court in its decision which should have prompted it to
inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. These facts and
circumstances should have forewarned the trial court that it had not acquired jurisdiction over a number of
indispensable parties. In American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction
may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only. We
believe that this rule should be applied to this case, considering that in the assailed trial court's decision,
referrals were made to crucial evidence which if scrutinized would readily reveal that there were
indispensable parties omitted.
Considering that private respondent was suing to establish his status as a tenant over the subject
fishpond, the responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably rested on him as
provided under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 3 requires that "every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs." Further, Section 7 of
the same rule states that "(p)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendant.
Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the pleader is required to set forth the names, if known to
him, of persons who ought to be parties, if complete relief is to be accorded to those who are already parties
but who are not joined; and to state why they have been omitted. Surely, he brought suit to establish his
status as a tenant. It is thus his responsibility to state the names of all the persons against whom he wants
to establish his status as tenant.
Both the private respondent and the trial court knew of the obvious omission of petitioners as party
defendants. Telling is the fact that, by reciting part of the transcript of stenographic notes, private
respondent himself provided clear evidence in his memorandum that he knew of the existence of other
co-owners who were not impleaded in his case against Olanday et al. He also knew that in executing the
lease, Pacita Olanday represented only her sisters (Maria and Natividad) who were residing in the
Philippines. Definitely, at the time of the execution of the contract, she had no brother residing in the
Philippines because her only brothers, Marcelino and Benedicto Arcelona, (the latter now deceased and
represented in this case by Petitioner Ruth Arcelona) were living in California.
In fact, only these co-owners who are residing in the Philippines were joined as defendants in Civil Case
D-7240. But the mention of Pacita's relatives who were residing abroad should have made the trial court
aware of the existence of indispensable parties who were not yet impleaded. Despite this knowledge of the
apparent defect in the complaint and in its jurisdiction, the trial court did not take the initiative to implead
petitioners as defendants or to order private respondent to do so, contrary to the clear mandate of Rule 3,
Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes.
The foregoing testimony on the existence of other co-owners was a clear signal that indispensable parties
had not yet been impleaded. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is
placed on private respondent and on the trial court, respectively. Since no evidence was presented to
prove that petitioners were aware of the civil case filed against Olanday et al., they cannot be faulted
for not intervening therein.
In sum, we hold that the nullity of a judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only by
what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence found
in the records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.
Also, we hold that intervention is not the only remedy to assail a void final judgment. There is no procedural
rule prescribing that petitioners' intervention in the hearing for the issuance of a writ is the only way to
question a void final judgment. Petitioners were not aware of such hearing. Besides, as already discussed,
a direct action is available in assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic fraud, while a direct or a
collateral action may be used to show lack of jurisdiction.
3. No
In an action to declare a judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter,
only evidence found in the records of the case can justify the annulment of the said judgment. Contrariwise,
the nullity of the judgment due to lack of jurisdiction may be proved at most by the evidence on record but
never by extraneous evidence.
We should add, however, that where an action for annulment of judgment is grounded on extrinsic fraud,
extraneous evidence is admitted. We have held that, although a person need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled by reason of extrinsic fraud, he must prove his allegation that the judgment was
obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.58 Fraud must
be extraneous, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
Equally important, the finding of estoppel and laches by Respondent Court is not supported by the evidence
on record. The silence of petitioners can easily be explained by the fact that they were not in the country
during the pendency of the subject civil case. Such absence from the country was never rebutted by private
respondent. Even in the proceedings antecedent to this case before us now, petitioners were merely
represented by their attorney-in-fact.61 Moreover, they were not at all impleaded as parties in the judgment
sought to be voided. Neither were they properly served summons. The indelible fact is that they were
completely ignored.
Inasmuch as there is no proof that petitioners had knowledge of the pending tenancy case filed by private
respondent, it is only fair that they should not be held in estoppel for failing to intervene in and to question
the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil Case No. D-7240. Thus, private respondent may not say that he was
misled into believing that petitioners knew of the lease contract and of the litigation of Civil Case No.
D-7240. Undisputedly, from the evidence on record, petitioners had no such knowledge.
Petitioners' receipt of lease rentals cannot be used as proof of recognition of private respondent as a
caretaker-tenant. This issue was not raised in the lower court and is being alleged for the first time before
us. Well-settled is the doctrine that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.
Additional notes
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 5 TOPIC: Partition estoppel
CASE TITLE: Gavina Magculot-Aw vs GR No. 132518

Leopoldo Magculot
Date: March 28, 2000
DOCTRINE
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the
portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot
claim both under and against the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them
by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or
none.Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity of any part of it.
FACTS
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that
they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas
Maglucot on 16 August 1927. On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639. Consequently, on 13 May
1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six
portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot 1639-F.
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently,
Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969,
respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased
lots. They paid the rental amount P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents
stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax
declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and
1639-B, respectively) as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that
Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact,
who commenced the action for partition.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax
declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. The CA likewise found that
the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there
was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
ISSUES
Whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.|||
HELD
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which
determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision
confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court,
as the case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the
real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition
so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is
decreed — the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second
phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that
it is final and appealable. The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No.
1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the
order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and
executory and cannot now be disturbed.
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso, which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of
the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. In this case, both the order
of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not
object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot
thereafter question the decree, especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has
been incurred in the execution of the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their respective
lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more
than forty years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. In that case,
the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition
to the Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to
approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not
binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves
actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give
effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by
actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this
case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to
mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are
estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan. Cd
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the
portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot
claim both under and against the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them
by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or
none.Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity of any part of it. Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest,
already occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action
was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who
took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan.
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely
tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that
agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was
instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In
1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any
change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of
partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude,
therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of
actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been
discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially
tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and
the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such
oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya, we declared that
an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, this Court has ruled, thus:
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained
on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to
parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the
agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of
the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or
have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the
operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact
between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard
to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
Additional notes
● A co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and
conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a
party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of
the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over
their share for a long time.
● ||Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus,
after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that
recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series
of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual
partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were
not recorded. And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of
the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is
no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has
been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name it bears.
CASE TITLE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE GR No. G.R. No. L-34224

DECEASED EDUVIGES BAÑAGA, LIBRADA
LUCERO Date:October 15, 1974
vs.
LEONORA BAÑAGA and MARIA BAÑAGA
DOCTRINE
The term "delivery" or tradition has two aspects: (1) the de jure delivery or the execution of deeds of conveyance
and (2) the delivery of the material possession (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388, 393). The usual practice is that, if
the land to be delivered is in the name of the decedent, the administrator executes a deed, conveying the land to
the distributee. That deed, together with the project of partition, the order approving it, the letters of
administration and the certification as to the payment of the estate, inheritance and realty taxes, is registered in
the corresponding Registry of Deeds. Title would then be issued to the distributee. Thereafter, the administrator
or executor places him in material possession of the land if the same is in the custody of the former.
In strict legal theory, the remedy of the administratrix is to file a separate action against Anselmo Pascasio and
the heirs of Rufina Pascasio and Felix Pascasio, for the purpose of cancelling the titles in their names and asking
for the reconveyance to the estate of Eduviges Bañaga of the lots registered in their names, so that the same
may in turn be conveyed to the distributees thereof pursuant to the project of partition (See section 2, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court).
It should finally be observed that a partition may be novated with the consent of all the interested parties)
especially if such novation is required in the interest of justice and equity and is warranted under the prevailing
circumstances for the expeditious settlement of the estate.
FACTS
Eduviges Bañaga died intestate on September 24, 1921 in San Antonio, Zambales. She was survived by her two
legitimate children named Rufina Pascasio and Anselmo Pascasio and two acknowledged natural children named
Felix Bañaga and Leonora Bañaga
Rufina Pascasio died on December 31, 1943. She was survived by her eight legitimate children all surnamed Lucero.
Among them is Librada Lucero, the administratrix.
Special Proceedings No. 346 were instituted for the settlement of the estate of Eduviges Bañaga (on a date not shown
in the record) in the Court of First Instance of Zambales. Rufina Pascasio administered her estate. After Rufina's
death, her daughter, Librada Lucero, succeeded her as administratrix
On February 10, 1959 Librada Lucero submitted a project of partition. dated July 19, 1957, which bore the conformity
of oppositors' counsel and of Leonora Bañaga as well as the conformity of Remedios Lucero, Adoracion Lucero,
Teofilo Lucero, Sr. The only interested parties who did not expressly give their conformity to the project of partition
were Anselmo Pascasio, Wilfredo Lucero, Artemio Lucero and Teofilo Lucero, Jr., all residents of the United States.
In that project of partition, fourteen lots and portions of two other lots were adjudicated to Anselmo Pascasio and the
heirs of Rufina B. Pascasio in satisfaction of their two-thirds share of the decedent's estate. On the other hand,
fourteen lots and portions of two other lots were adjudicated to Leonora Bañaga and Maria Bañaga in satisfaction of
their one-third interest.
Pursuant to the probate court's order of February 20, 1959, the project of partition was published in a newspaper so
that the non-resident heirs may be duly notified. The absent heirs were required to present their opposition to the
project of partition within sixty days from the date of the last publication.
On December 23, 1966, or long after the publication of the project of partition, the probate court issued an order
approving it. The administratrix was directed to deliver to the heirs their shares.
On May 15, 1967, or after the order of approval had become final, the administratrix filed a motion praying for the
exclusion from the partition of sixteen registered lots on the ground that their Torrens titles are not in the name of the
deceased Eduviges Bañaga but were issued "in the names of other persons" as evidenced by a certification of the
Register of Deeds. The administratrix prayed that the order approving the project of partition be set aside, that
the registered lots listed in the said certification be excluded from the decedent's estate and that a new
project of partition be ordered for the "true estate" of the deceased. The certification reveals that the "other
persons", named as the registered owners, are Anselmo Pascasio, Rufina Pascasio and Felix Pascasio, the
children of Eduviges Bañaga. Felix Pascasio is also known as Felix Bañaga.
Maria Bañaga and Leonora Bañaga opposed the motion for exclusion. The probate court, in its order of
September 7, 1967, denied the motion. The administratrix filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied in the
order of December 21, 1967. The administratrix appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to this
Court because the assignment of errors "reveals no factual problem" and "presents pure questions of law". The
briefs do not contain statements of facts.
ISSUES
1. Whether the true owner of the lands in question is the estate of Eduviges Bañaga.
2. Whether he administratrix can file a separate action against Anselmo Pascasio and the heirs of Rufina Pascasio
and Felix Pascasio, for the purpose of cancelling the titles in their names and asking for the reconveyance to the
estate of Eduviges Bañaga of the lots registered in their names,
3. Whether partition may be novated with the consent of all the interested parties
HELD
1. Y
es
Leonora Bañaga and Maria Bañaga repeatedly alleged in their pleadings that the sixteen registered lots
in question, which were owned by Eduviges Bañaga, formed part of her estate. They were included in the
inventory of her estate and in the project of partition with an indication of their Torrens titles. They have been in
the possession of the administratrix for more than twenty-five years except Lots 5069 and 5137 which were titled
in the names of Anselmo, Rufina and Felix, all surnamed Pascasio, and other persons. The estate and
inheritance taxes were paid on the theory that the sixteen registered lots belonged to the estate of Eduviges
Bañaga.
The contention of the administratrix that the inclusion of those lots in the inventory and partition was
due to a mistake or inadvertence might not be true.
The probate court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, apparently gave credence to oppositors'
allegation that the registered lots were "undoubtedly the properties formerly belonging to the late
Eduviges Bañaga and, as a matter of fact, said properties are included in the inventory".
We are of the opinion that the partition, approved by the probate court, should stand. To all appearances, it was
a partition that was soberly deliberated upon by the interested parties. It has the express concurrence of the
interested parties, except four of them, who are abroad. Those four were given constructive notice of the project
of partition by means of publication. The order approving the partition had long become final. Hence, the
trial court's order, denying the administratrix's motion for exclusion and setting aside the project of
partition, should be affirmed.
The term "delivery" or tradition has two aspects: (1) the de jure delivery or the execution of deeds of conveyance
and (2) the delivery of the material possession (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388, 393). The usual practice is that, if
the land to be delivered is in the name of the decedent, the administrator executes a deed, conveying the land to
the distributee. That deed, together with the project of partition, the order approving it, the letters of
administration and the certification as to the payment of the estate, inheritance and realty taxes, is registered in
the corresponding Registry of Deeds. Title would then be issued to the distributee. Thereafter, the administrator
or executor places him in material possession of the land if the same is in the custody of the former.
In this case that routinary procedure can be followed with respect to the unregistered lots. Oppositors Leonora
Bañaga and Maria Bañaga are entitled to deeds of conveyance for the unregistered lots adjudicated to them.
They are likewise entitled to the material possession of all the lands adjudicated to them, registered or
unregistered (except Lots 5069 and 5137), if in the present posture of the intestate proceeding no injustice would
be caused to anyone by such conveyance and transfer of possession.
2 . yes
The oppositors, in their appellees' brief, alleged that in 1966 they waived their right to demand a final accounting from
the administratrix. Their waiver was motivated by a desire to receive without delay their shares in the project of
partition. They intimate that the administratrix and her co-heirs, the children of Rufina Pascasio, have already been
enjoying their own shares, whereas, the oppositors have been denied for a long time the right to possess the
properties adjudicated to them. Those properties have been possessed by the administratrix for more than a quarter of
a century.
The sixteen registered lots, whose Torrens titles are in the names of the decedent's children, Anselmo, Rufina
and Felix, all surnamed Pascasio, presumably as trustees, pose a legal problem. The administratrix cannot
convey them directly to the distributees without first causing those titles to be cancelled and the lots to be
reconveyed to the estate and then registered in its name. Without the proper deed of conveyance from the
registered owner, or without the appropriate court order, the titles cannot be changed (See Secs. 50 and 112, Act
496). The lots should first be returned to the decedent's estate so that the administratrix could deliver them to the
distributees.
The problem is complicated by the fact that Anselmo Pascasio is abroad and has not voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, thus precluding the ventilation of the cancellation of the titles in the intestate
proceeding (See Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561). Three other heirs are non-residents. Rufina Pascasio and
Felix Pascasio, the other registered owners are dead. On the other hand, it should be underscored that the three
registered owners were children of Eduviges Bañaga.
In strict legal theory, the remedy of the administratrix is to file a separate action against Anselmo Pascasio and
the heirs of Rufina Pascasio and Felix Pascasio, for the purpose of cancelling the titles in their names and asking
for the reconveyance to the estate of Eduviges Bañaga of the lots registered in their names, so that the same
may in turn be conveyed to the distributees thereof pursuant to the project of partition (See section 2, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court).
Of course, such a judicial action is without prejudice to whatever extrajudicial measures may be resorted to by
the administratrix. She could try to persuade her uncle, Anselmo Pascasio (a) to execute the proper deed,
wherein he would acknowledge that his interest in the registered lots is restricted solely to what has been
adjudicated to him in the project of partition and (b) at the same time to convey to the distributees the residue of
the shares registered in his name. Similar representations may be made by the administratrix to her co-heirs and
to Maria Bañaga for the extrajudicial settlement of the estates of Rufina Pascasio and Felix Pascasio so that their
heirs (among whom is the administratrix herself) could in turn convey the corresponding portions of the
registered lands to the distributees named in the project of partition.
2. yes
It should finally be observed that a partition may be novated with the consent of all the interested parties)
especially if such novation is required in the interest of justice and equity and is warranted under the prevailing
circumstances for the expeditious settlement of the estate.
What we have stated above are premised on the assumption that Anselmo Pascasio, Rufina Pascasio and Felix
Pascasio are merely the nominal registered owners of the lots in question and that the true owner thereof is the
estate of their mother, Eduviges Bañaga. That assumption is based on the pleadings of the parties. It has
already been noted that the orders under appeal and the briefs do not contain a clear and concise statement in
narrative form of the uncontroverted facts from which the pure legal issues supposedly arise.
The guidelines already set forth should not preclude the probate court from making a thorough and searching
inquiry as to how the Torrens titles for the lots in question came to be placed in the names of the children of
Eduviges Bañaga instead of in the name of her estate. Should it turn out that Anselmo, Rufina and Felix, all
surnamed Pascasio, are the true owners of the lots, not merely the nominal owners or trustees, then the partition
would be void as to those properties. No one can give that which he has not (nemo dat quod non habet) .
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RULE 67 - EXPROPRIATION

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 1 TOPIC: Venue of personal action; RTC

CASE TITLE: BPI Family Savings vs GR No. 175796

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 2 TOPIC: MTC Jurisdiction

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 3 TOPIC: RTC; jurisdiction over expropriation cases

CASE TITLE: Devorah E. Bardillon vs Brgy. GR No. 146886

1. WON the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case

The following are the requisites of res judicata:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 4 TOPIC: RTC jurisdiction over expropriation cases; 2

CASE TITLE: Barangay San Roque vs. Heirs GR No. 138896

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over expropriation cases.

Two phases in expropriation proceedings:

ASENIERO | BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 5 TOPIC: ​Ejectment case vis-a-vis expropriation case

CASE TITLE: GR No. ​214782

The proper recourse is for the ejectment court:

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 6 TOPIC: ​Determination of just compensation

CASE TITLE: GR No. ​162474

Re: just compensation

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 7 TOPIC: ​Deposit

CASE TITLE: GR No. 10173

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

Date:​ ​September 26, 1917

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 10 TOPIC: Rule 67

CASE TITLE: ​ROBERN DEVELOPMENT GR No. 135042

1. WoN NPC had legal standing to file the expropriation case

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 11 TOPIC: Rule 67

CASE TITLE: ​METROPOLITAN WATER GR No. ​L-33545

WoN the condemnation proceedings may be dismissed

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 12 TOPIC: ​Dismissal of an action for eminent domain

CASE TITLE: NHA v. ​HEIRS OF ISIDRO GR No. ​154411

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 13 TOPIC: dismissal of an expropriation case

CASE TITLE: NPC v. CA and Pobre GR No. 106804

Date: August 12, 2004

NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances.

RTC: decision in favor of Pobre.

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 14 TOPIC: Ascertainment of Compensation

CASE TITLE: PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL GR No. 208771

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 15 TOPIC: Determination of Just Compensation

CASE TITLE: GARCIA VS CA GR No. L-47553

Date: January 31, 1981

Whether or not the CA erred in lowering the market value

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

1. Yes. The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial

ASENIERO| BACOLOD | BONSATO | HAMOR | MACATANGAY | MEDINA | ORTIGOZA | SY SPECPRO (2019-2020)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 17 TOPIC: Just compensation; interest on just

The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876

|||​ ​The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 5 TOPIC: Ejectment case vis-a-vis expropriation case

CASE TITLE: GR No. 214782

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 6 TOPIC: Determination of just compensation

CASE TITLE: GR No. 162474

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 7 TOPIC: Deposit

Date: September 26, 1917

CASE TITLE: ROBERN DEVELOPMENT GR No. 135042

CASE TITLE: METROPOLITAN WATER GR No. L-33545

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 12 TOPIC: Dismissal of an action for eminent domain

CASE TITLE: NHA v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GR No. 154411

||| The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429

The Parties and the BOC's Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III

CASE TITLE: GR No. 214803

CASE TITLE: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., GR No. L-45350

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE 3 TOPIC: Jurisdiction

CASE TITLE: GR No. 212413

CASE TITLE:. G.R. No:

CASE TITLE: ARCELONA V. CA GR No. 102900

Whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.|||

CASE TITLE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE GR No. G.R. No. L-34224