G.R. No.
168081
YRASUEGUI v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Yrasuegui was an international flight steward of Respondent PAL. The
problem arose when petitioner failed to meet the weight requirement for stewards, prompting
PAL to grant him leave. Regular checkups were done by PAL to monitor Petitioner’s weight but
the latter consistently failed to meet the standard. Until such time that he no longer attended
the weight checks. Consequently, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him
"which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered
terminated "effective immediately."
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Both the LA and the NLRC ruled in his favor,
concluding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. However, the weight standards
need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties; that "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in itself." As a consequence, there can be
no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to
lose weight.
ISSUE(S): W/N weight is considered a BFOQ.
RULING: Yes, dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense or BFOQ. in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order
to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job. In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent
quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."
A common carrier, from the nature of its business, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances. the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must
maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for
the passengers when something goes wrong. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a
cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open
emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
G.R. No. 164774
Star Paper Corporation v Simbol
April 12, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of
paper products. On the other hand, petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol
(Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees
of the company. When all three of them engaged in a romantic relationship with other three
employees respectively; two got married, and one got pregnant, they all resigned on different
dates pursuant to a company policy that in case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one
male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.
Petitioner contend that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity".
ISSUE(S): W/N the policy stated is a BFOQ.
RULING: No. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two
factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC, the court ruled that [A] requirement
that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational
qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same,
but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the
workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The court found no reasonable necessity in this case. Anent to petitioner’s argument,
respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when
they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could
be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment
will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned
policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based
upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
G.R. NO. 173849
Pier 8 Arrastre v. Jeff Boclot
Sept. 28, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner PASSI is engaged in the business of providing arrastre and stevedoring
services. Respondent was employed as stevedore “reliever” by PASSI. Being reliever,
respondent would only work as a stevedore in the absence of the employee regularly employed
for the very same function. Respondent was able to serve for 228.5 days. Respondent then filed
a complaint against PASSI, compelling the latter to regularize his employment having rendered
one year of service pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner contends that respondent was hired as a mere "reliever" stevedore and, thus, could
not become a regular stevedore.
The case reached the NLRC and CA; both ruled in favor of respondent for the reason that the
activities performed by the respondent were usually necessary and desirable in the business of
petitioners, applying article 280 of the Labor Code
ISSUE(S): W/N respondent’s employment may be regularized by petitioner.
RULING: Yes. The court ruled in favor of respondent, but not based on the Labor Code but on
the CBA. By virtue of Article 280 of the Labor code, a regular employee is (1) one who is either
engaged to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of
the employer except for project or seasonal employees; or (2) a casual employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activity in which he is employed. The first type will not apply to respondent since by nature of
his work, his situation is similar to that of a project or seasonal employee, albeit on a daily basis.
The second type will also not apply to respondent since he only accumulated a period of 228.5
days which does not fall under the classification of a casual turned regular employee after
rendering at least one year of service, whether continuous or intermittent.
Nonetheless, the court still found respondent to be a regular employee on provision under the
CBA between PASSI and its Workers' union, which stated that “the Company agrees to convert
to regular status all incumbent probationary or casual employees and workers in the Company
who have served the Company for an accumulated service term of employment of not less than
six (6) months from his original date of hiring.” Having rendered 228.5 days, or eight months of
service to petitioners since 1999, then respondent is entitled to regularization by virtue of the
said CBA provisions.
G.R. No.199683
Arlene Samonte et al v. La Salle Greenhills
Feb. 10, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners were doctors and dentist employed by respondent LSGI to comprise the
Health Service Team (HST). Their contract of retainer states the ff:
1. xxx
2. This retainer shall, without need of any notice to the retainer, automatically cease on the
aforespecified expiration date/s of the said project/undertaking and/or the said job/task; provided,
that this retainer shall likewise be deemed terminated if the said project/undertaking and/or
job/task shall be completed on a date/s priot to their aforespecified expiration date/s;
3. The foregoing notwithstanding, at any time prior to said expiration or completion date/s, La Salle
Greenhills, Inc. inay upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate this contract should the
retainer fail in any way to perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle Greenhills, Inc.
or for any other just cause.
After 15 years of continued renewal, the LSGI through its Head Admin, informed petitioners
that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the following school year by reason of LSGI's
decision to hire two (2) full-time doctors and dentists. Petitioners then demanded for their
separation pay but were denied, prompting them to file a complaint.
Petitioners mainly argues that they are regular employees because they received benefits such
as overtime pay, allowances, Christmas bonuses and the like; that they were subjected to
administrative rules such as those that regulate their time and hours of work, or subjected to
LSGI's disciplinary rules and regulations; and that they were treated as part of LSGI's
professional staff. The CA ruled that petitioners were fixed-term employees, not entitled to
security of tenure and separation pay.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are regular employees of LSGI.
RULING: Yes, they are regular employees. A fixed-term employment is allowable under the
Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the parties who must
have dealt with each other on equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other.
Further, a fixed-term contract is an employment contract, the repeated renewals of which
make for a regular employment. The court ruled in Fuji Network v. Espiritu that the repeated
engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the
[employee's] work in respondent's business and where employee's contract has been
continuously extended or renewed to the same position, with the same duties and remained in
the employ without any interruption, then such employee is a regular employee.
Contracts of Retainer signed by petitioners were prepared by LSGI alone. Petitioners, being
medical professionals, were not on equal footing with LSGI as they obviously did not want to
lose their jobs that they had stayed in (15) years. There is no specificity in the contracts
regarding terms and conditions of employment that would indicate that petitioners and LSGI
were on equal footing in negotiating it. Notably, without specifying what are the tasks assigned
to petitioners, LSGI "may upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate [the] contract
should the retainer fail in any way to perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle
Greenhills, Inc. or for any other just cause." While vague in its sparseness, the Contract of
Retainer very clearly spelled out that LSGI had the power of control over petitioners.
Given the following: (1) repeated renewal of petitioners' contract for fifteen years, interrupted
only by the close of the school year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by petitioners as
school physicians and dentists; and (3) the existence of LSGI's power of control over the means
and method pursued by petitioners in the performance of their job, the court held that
petitioners attained regular employment.
G.R. No. 192558
Bitoy Javier v Fly Ace
Feb. 15, 2012
FACTS: Respondent Fly Ace is engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries.
Sometime in December 2007, Petitioner Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as
extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of ₱ 300.00 per trip, which was later increased
to ₱ 325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month
whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. On
April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier, resulting to his termination.
Claiming to be an employee of Fly Ace, Javier asserts that he was illegally dismissed by the
latter. Javier anchors his claim to the argument that he is an employed stevedore of Fly Ace; he
was made to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery
items for delivery to clients
LA ruled in favor of Javier; upon appeal, NLRC favored Javier in view that "Payment by result x x
x is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a mere
method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship."; CA reversed NLRC decision.
ISSUE(S): W/N Javier is a regular employee of Fly Ace.
RULING: No. The court agreed with the decision of the CA that “Whoever claims entitlement to
the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x.” Sadly, Javier failed
to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. the well-settled tests to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employee’s conduct.
Javier could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular
employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his
conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javier’s allegations did not establish that his
relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis
of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier was not able to refute Fly Ace’s assertion
that it had an agreement with a hauling company to undertake the delivery of its goods.
Nevertheless, the court did not disagree with CA when it ruled that "payment by the piece is
just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation." Payment on a
piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. "The term ‘wage’ is broadly defined in
Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms
of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by
the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relations.
Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee
relationship. However, in determining whether the relationship is that of employer and
employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts
and all the features of the relationship are to be considered." Unfortunately for Javier, the
attendant facts and circumstances of the instant case do not provide the Court with sufficient
reason to uphold his claimed status as employee of Fly Ace.
G.R. No. 178184
Grand Asian Shipping Lines v. Galvez
Jan. 29, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc (GASLI) is a domestic corporation engaged in
transporting LPG from Petron. Respondents are employed as crewmembers of M/T Dorothy
Uno, a vessel owned by Petitioner. Sometime in January 2000, vessel oiler Richard Abis
reported to GASLI an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents. It was contended
that respondents would misdeclare the consume fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports and
the save fuel oil were sold to other vessel out at sea (at nighttime). Profits would be divided
amongst themselves. After investigation, a complaint for qualified theft was filed against
respondents.
After placing respondents on prevenitve suspension, GASLI later terminated them for breach of
trust, commission of crime against employer. Prompting respondent to file separate complaint
for illegal suspension and dismissal, underpayment/nonpayment of salaries/wages, overtime
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive pay, tax refunds and indemnities
for damages and attorney’s fees against GASLI.
The LA ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents with full backwages and to pay their
money claims for unpaid salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, holiday
and service incentive leave pay, as indicated in the Computation of Money Claims.
ISSUE(S): (1) W/N respondents were illegally dismissed; (2) W/N they are entitled to monetary
claims.
RULING: (1) No. In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or
valid cause rests on the employers. The mere filing of a formal charge does not automatically
make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see
if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination.
(2) NO. Respondent Galvez and Gruta, as managerial employees, are not entitled to their claims
for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day. Article
82 of the Labor Code specifically excludes managerial employees from the coverage of the law
regarding conditions of employment which include hours of work, weekly rest periods,
holidays, service incentive leaves and service charges.
As for respondent Arguelles, Batayola, Fresnillo, Noble, Dominico, Nilmao and Austral, although
not managerial nor field personnel, the corut did not grant them their claims for holiday pay,
premium pay for holiday and restday, overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.
Respondents do not dispute petitioners’ assertion that in computing respondents’ salaries,
petitioners use 365 days as divisor. In fact, this was the same divisor respondents used in
computing their money claims against petitioners. Hence, they are paid all the days of the
month, which already include the benefits they claim. As for overtime pay and premium pay for
holidays and restdays, no evidence was presented to prove that they rendered work in excess
of the regular eight working hours a day or worked during holidays and restdays. In the
absence of such proof, there could be no basis to award these benefits. For the claim of service
incentive leave pay, respondents did not specify what year they were not paid such benefit. In
addition, records show that they were paid their vacation leave benefits. Thus, in accordance
with Article 95 of the Labor Code, respondents can no longer claim service incentive leave pay.
G.R. No. 175869
Robina Farms Cebu v Villa
April 18, 2016
FACTS: Respondent Villa was employed by petitioner Robina Farms (Robina) as sales clerk. In
later part of 2001, she availed herself of the company’s retirement program. Due to failure to
deliver invoices as required by Robina, she was suspended for 10 days. When she reported back
to work, she was prevented by the petitioner, and was told that her application for retirement
was approved, but later disapproved; that she had been advised to tender resignation with
request for financial assistance. After manifesting her intent to return to work, petitioner was
again prevented, and replaced her with another employee, prompting her to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal, seeking backwages, and overtime pay.
The NLRC found petitioner liable for illegal dismissal, ordering them to reinstate respondent.
ISSUE(S): (1) W/N Respondent was illegally dismissed; (2) W/N respondent is entitled to
overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.
RULING: (1) Yes. Ordinarily, after an employee [has] served her suspension, she should be
admitted back to work and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the case at
bar, it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately after her suspension.
Records show that when private respondent reported back after her suspension, she was
advised not to report back anymore as her application was approved, which was latter [sic] on
disapproved. It is at this point that, they advised private respondent to tender a resignation
letter with request for financial assistance. The letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua dated April 11,
2002 to private respondent which reads:
"As explained by Lucy de Guzman xxx your request for special retirement with financial
assistance of 86%/year of service has not been approved. Because this offer was for employees
working in operations department and not in Adm. & Sales.
"However, as per Manila Office, you can be given financial assistance of V2 per year of service if
you tender letter of resignation with request for financial assistance."
This shows that petitioner Lily Ngochua has also advised private respondent to the same. These
acts are strong indication that petitioners wanted to severe [sic] the employer-employee
relationship between them and that of private respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that
when private respondent signified her intention to return back to work after learning of the
disapproval of her application, she was prevented to enter the petitioner's premises by
confiscating her ID and informing her that a new employee has already replaced her.
(2) Entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that the overtime work was
actually performed before the employee may properly claim the benefit. The burden of proving
entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employee because the benefit is not incurred in the
normal course of business. Failure to prove such actual performance transgresses the principles
of fair play and equity. The DTRs did not substantially prove the actual performance of overtime
work. The petitioner correctly points out that any employee could render overtime work only
when there was a prior authorization therefor by the management. Without the prior
authorization, therefore, Villa could not validly claim having performed work beyond the
normal hours of work.
As for the SIL, The Labor Arbiter originally awarded the service incentive leave pay because the
petitioner did not present proof showing that Villa had been justly paid. The petitioner
submitted the affidavits of Zanoria explaining the payment of service incentive leave after the
Labor Arbiter had rendered her decision. But that was not enough, for evidence should be
presented in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, not after the rendition of the adverse
decision by the Labor Arbiter or during appeal. Such a practice of belated presentation cannot
be tolerated because it defeats the speedy administration of justice in matters concerning the
poor workers.
G.R. NO. 157775
LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. LEYECO IV EMPLOYEE UNION-ALU
Oct. 19, 20007
FACTS: Petitioner Coop and respondent Union, entered into a CBA covering petitioner rank-
and-file employees, for a period of five (5) years effective January 1, 1998. On June 7, 2000,
respondent demanded holiday pay for all employees, pursuant to the CBA. Petitioner, on the
other hand, found that it had paid all the holidays enumerated in the CBA.
The issue was submitted to the NCMB where the petitioner presented the formula (365 divisor)
they used proving that regular and special days were paid including 51 un-worked Sundays and
Saturdays, respectively. Respondent admitted that they were paid but it argued that it is not
prevented from making separate demands for the payment of regular holidays concomitant
with the provisions of the CBA, further invoking a computed amount of P1,054,393.07 for the
unpaid legal holidays, and several pay slips.
The Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) decided in favor of respondents concluding that petitioner failed
to show that it complied with the CBA mandate that holiday pay be "reflected during any
payroll period of occurrence" since the payroll slips did not reflect any payment of the paid
holidays.
ISSUE(S): W/N Petitioner is liable to pay monetary claims as demanded by respondents.
RULING: No. The VA Ignored the admission of respondent that the employees were paid all the
days of the month even if not worked. In light of such admission, petitioner's submission of its
360 divisor in the computation of employees' salaries gains significance. In Union of Filipro
Employees v. Vivar, Jr. the Court held that "[t]he divisor assumes an important role in
determining whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid employee's
salary and in the computation of his daily rate".
In Producers Bank v. NLRC, the employer used the divisor 314 - by subtracting all Sundays from
the total number of calendar days in a year, since Saturdays are considered paid rest days - The
Court held that the use of 314 as a divisor leads to the conclusion that the ten legal holidays are
already included therein. In Odango v. NLRC, the employees were required to work only from
Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the
result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays and less 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays).
In this case, the employees are required to work only from Monday to Friday. Thus, the
minimum allowable divisor is 263, which is arrived at by deducting 51 un-worked Sundays and
51 un-worked Saturdays from 365 days. Considering that petitioner used the 360-day divisor,
clearly above the minimum, indubitably, petitioner's employees are being given their holiday
pay. The VA’s decision imposed a “double burden” upon the petitioner as it was made to pay
twice for its employees' holiday pay when payment thereof had already been included in the
computation of their monthly salaries.
G.R. No. 222980
Lourdes Rodriguez v. Park N Ride Inc.
March 20, 2017
FACTS: In 1984, Petitioner Rodriguez was employed by spouses Javier in their various business,
the last being Park N Ride. Petitioner was also entrusted by the sps. Javier in certain personal
matters, or duties not related to her position. Her main task was to open the office at 8am.
Petitioner alleges that in one instance, she was late in opening the office after her usual
“pamalengke” for the sps. Javier. Estelita Javier called her on the phone and scolded, and
berated her. As a result of continued frustrating working environment, Petitioner resigned in
2009. Contending that she was constructively dismissed by the Sps. Javier, petitioner then
prayed for separation pay; full back wages; service incentive leave pay; proportional 13th
month pay; moral damages of P100,000.00; exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and attorney's
fees.
The case reached the CA, which ruled that there was no constructive dismissal, but ordered Sps.
Javier to pay SIL and 13th month pay only for 2006 to 2009 pursuant to the prescriptive period
provided by Article 219 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE(S): W/N the CA’s application of prescriptive period of the SIL was proper.
RULING: No. In Fernandez v. NLRC , the court held that Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the IRR
provides that "[e]very employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled
to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay." Service incentive leave is a right which
accrues to every employee who has served "within 12 months, whether continuous or broken
reckoned from the date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid
regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy,
or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period
shall be considered as one year." It is also "commutable to its money equivalent if not used or
exhausted at the end of the year." In other words, an employee who has served for one year is
entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value.
Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave credits and opts for its
commutation upon his resignation or separation from employment, his cause of action to claim
the whole amount of his accumulated service incentive leave shall arise when the employer
fails to pay such amount at the time of his resignation or separation from employment. In light
of this, it is concluded that the (3)-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the
year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave,
but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of
commutation or upon termination of the employee's services, as the case may be.
Thus, petitioner must be awarded service incentive leave pay for her entire 25 years of service
—from 1984 to 2009—and not only (3) years' worth (2006 to 2009) as determined by the CA.
G.R. No. 204651
OUR HAUS REALTY v. PARIAN
Aug. 6, 2014
FACTS: Respondents are laborers of Petitioner Our House, engaged in construction services. In
2010, Petitioner suspended some of its projects due to a financial distress, ordering
respondents to take vacation leave. When respondents were asked to return to work,
respondents filed a complaint before the LA for underpayment of wages, stating that their
wages were below the minimum wage rates.
Petitioner on the other hand, contend that aside from paying the monetary amount of the
respondents’ wages, they also subsidized their meals (3 times a day), and gave them free
lodging near the construction project they were assigned to. In determining the total amount of
the respondents’ daily wages, the value of these benefits should be considered, in line with
Article 97(f)11 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE(S): W/N lodging and meals were properly charged to respondent’s wages based on the
nature of their work.
RULING: NO. The court applied the purpose test, which states that if a benefit or privilege
granted to the employee is clearly for the employer’s convenience, it will not be considered as a
facility but a supplement. Facilities include articles or services for the benefit of the employee
or his family but exclude tools of the trade or articles or services primarily for the benefit of the
employer or necessary to the conduct of the employer’s business. The law also prescribes that
the computation of wages shall exclude whatever benefits, supplements or allowances given to
employees. Supplements are paid to employees on top of their basic pay and are free of
charge.
In the present case, the board and lodging provided by petitioner cannot be categorized as
facilities but as supplements. Petitioner is engaged in the construction business, a labor-
intensive enterprise. The success of its projects is largely a function of the physical strength,
vitality and efficiency of its laborers. Its business will be jeopardized if its workers are weak,
sickly, and lack the required energy to perform strenuous physical activities. Thus, by ensuring
that the workers are adequately and well fed, the employer is actually investing on its business.
In finding that the lodging and meals are actually “supplements”, being beneficial to the
employer, the petitioner cannot validly deduct such to the respondents’ wages.
G.R. No. 128845
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE v. QUISUMBING
June 1, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the union and faculty of respondent International School.
The case stems from the school’s manner of treating its employees, as it hired both local and
foreign teachers, grouped as local-hires and foreign-hires, respectively. The School grants
foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance, and a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%)
more than local-hires. As justification, the school explains that “a foreign-hire would necessarily
have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an
educator, but this time in a foreign land. The compensation scheme is simply [an] adaptive
measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international education.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory
to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination. In its answer, the School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence
that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.
ISSUE(S): W/N the school’s grant of a higher salary to foreign-hires as compared to local-hires
was valid.
RULING: NO. Article 135 of the Labor Code prohibits the payment of lesser compensation to a
female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization. Further, Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights states that “Fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for
equal work.” The above provisions institutionalizes the long honored legal truism of "equal pay
for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why
he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the
employee is treated unfairly. In this case, there is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. Thus, the grant of 25%
higher salary to foreign-hires is contrary to law.
G.R. No. 208027
PHIL.JOURNALISTS INC. v. DE GUZMAN
April 1, 2019
FACTS: Respondents are managerial employees of Petitioner PJI, employed on different dates.
On October 2008 and January 2009, respectively and before the cessation of their employment,
respondent availed of optional retirement plan embodied in the CBA. Petitioner refused on the
ground that the CBA grants retirement benefits only to rank-and-file employees, but not with
managerial positions.
Respondents posit that the grant of retirement benefits even to managerial employees have
been a company practice, citing cases of former employees, Nepthalie Hernandez, Ferdinand
Trinidad, and Atty. Liza Madera, who availed of, and were granted optional retirement benefits
despite being managerial employees.
ISSUE(S): W/N the grant of benefits, as a company practice, may supersede the CBA.
RULING: Yes. To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by
substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it
has been made consistently and deliberately. Jurisprudence has not laid down any hard-and-
fast rule as to the length of time that company practice should have been exercised in order to
constitute voluntary employer practice. In many cases, the bases were regularity and
deliberateness of the grant of benefits over a significant period of time. It requires an
indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit knowing fully well
that the employees are not covered by any provision of the law or agreement requiring
payment thereof. In sum, the benefit must be characterized by regularity, voluntary and
deliberate intent of the employer to grant the benefit over a considerable period of time.
The grant of optional retirement benefits to management employees in the past was voluntary,
deliberate, and done with sufficient regularity as would indicate that this had become a
company practice within PJI, which they now refuse to apply in the case of respondents, on the
pretext that the company was losing money at that time. But PJI was not incurring losses, and
was in fact exhibiting conduct inconsistent with the claim. What is clear is that it engaged in
unfair labor activities and took an anti-labor stance at the expense of its employees, including
respondents.
As noted by the NLRC, respondents have been with the [PJI] for (14) and almost twenty (20)
years respectively. Had it not been true that it has been a practice for [PJI] to grant [its]
employees including managerial/confidential employees optional retirement benefits in
accordance with the CBA, they would not have filed an application for optional retirement.
There is nothing on record that would suggest why [respondents] would sever their
relationships with [petitioners] except for their intention to avail of the benefits under the
optional retirement plan.
