CIRIACO HINOGUIN v.

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GSIS,

Doctrines:
Labor Law; Labor Standards; Death Benefits; Work-Connected Injuries; The work-
connected character of Sgt. Hinoguin’s injury and death was not precluded by the fact
that he was on an overnight pass at the time he was accidentally shot by a fellow
soldier. – Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official
functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out
above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters
had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred “in line of duty.”
It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24
hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt.
Hinoguin was not). Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt.
Hinoguin’s injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance
that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under
his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing “official
functions” because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for
a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was
nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us
that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have
clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going
on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered,
be pre-terminated by superior orders.
Same; Same; Same; From the very nature of his occupation, a soldier assumes the
risk of being accidentally shot or fired upon by his fellow soldiers. – More generally, a
soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired
upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only
risk that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession
as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the
Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the
risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded
as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.
Same; Same; Same; The death of Sgt. Hinoguin which resulted from the accidental
discharge of his fellow soldier’s firearm, is work-connected and therefore,
compensable. – We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from
his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the
circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a
soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence
compensable.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Labor Code provisions must be given
interpretation most likely to effectuate their beneficient and humanitarian purposes. –
It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of
official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context
of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is
commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.

Facts:
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called
to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army
as a private first class.
On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl.
Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie
Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of “A” Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao,
Nueva Viscaya, to settle an important matter thereat. Captain Besas orally granted
them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering
that Aritao was regarded as “a critical place,” that is, it had peace and order problems
due to the presence of elements of the New People’s Army (“NPA”) in or in the vicinity
of Aritao.
Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon
on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o’clock P.M. on
the same day. They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog’s parents where they had
lunch. About 4:00 o’clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and
relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2)
large bottles of beer.
Three hours later, at about 7:00 o’clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to
return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-
driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while
Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of
Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab,
holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle’s safety lever was on
“semi-automatic” (and not on “safety”). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a
single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the
left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had
been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the
ground.
His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for
treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon
being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter
confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog.
Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there
he died on 7 August 1985. An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion
on 11 August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was “purely accidental
in nature.”
A “Line of Duty Board of Officers” was convened by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion, “to
determine Line of Duty Status of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin. After deliberation, the
Line of Duty Board concluded and recommended that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin is in
Line of Duty. The Board further recommends that all benefits due the legal dependents
of Sgt. Hinoguin be given.
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under
P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected
and therefore compensable. This was denied by the GSIS on the ground that
petitioner’s son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the
Philippine Army at the time of his death. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which
was, however, denied. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission on the ground that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin did not arise out of
employment as he was not on his place of work, nor was he performing official
functions and that he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when
accidentally shot by his companion.
Such denial, spurred the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable
statute and regulations.

Held:
Yes. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental
discharge of the M-16 rifle of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose
out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

Ratio:
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable “injury” quite
simply as “any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment.” The Amended (Implementing) Rules have,
however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule
III, Section 1 (a) reads:
Section 1. Grounds – (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply
to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable
flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a “work place” referred to in Ground
1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as
if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in
a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed.
In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija. Aritao being approximately l-1/2hours away from the latter by public
transportation.
But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their
Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which
soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We
note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not
utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or
authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend
themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao
or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might
encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their
way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed
by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any
difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.
Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin wasperforming official functions at
the time he sustained thegunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that
the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had
already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred “in line of duty.” It
may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24
hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt.
Hinoguin was not).Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguin’s
injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was
on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own
command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing “official functions”
because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for a few hours
for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the
course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier
should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be pre-
terminated by superior orders.
More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance,
that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not,
of course, the only risk that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his
occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily
also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier
must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This
is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.
It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of
official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context
of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is
common place that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.