SHARON CASTRO, petitioner vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA et al, respondents.
G.R. NO. 163586
27 January 2009
DOCTRINE:
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
FACTS:
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on February 16, 2001. On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information
failed to allege her salary grade a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed
against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the
public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on
August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001
of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the
Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. Hence, the
Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an
Order dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not
depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the
offense charged. The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule
117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under
review. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman can prosecute cases cognizable by the RTC.
RULING:
Yes. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Section 15 paragraph (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 paragraph (4) granting the Special Prosecutor
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Section 15 of RA 6770
gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law
defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this
authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers
and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. Moreover,
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority
of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its Page 2 of 3 power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers
and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability
in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of
RA 6770. It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman
has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information
filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the
issue. Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have
retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is
constitutionally proscribed." Petitioner is grasping at straws. A judicial interpretation of a statute,
such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage.
Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts
light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that law. Hence, the March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of
the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989. Where a judicial interpretation declares a law
unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that
acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the
validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by
the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the
declaration can only have a prospective application. But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine
abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of
its legislation. In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon
by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act
as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held
by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.
