G.R. No. 121099 February 17, 1999 FIDEL T. SALAMERA vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent.

The case is an appeal via certiorari taken by petitioner from a decision of the Sandiganbayan and its resolution convicting him of
malversation of public property defined and penalized in Article 217 in relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of full restitution, imposing upon him the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum; to six (6) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as maximum; the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine of P5,000.00, the value of the .38 Cal. Smith & Wesson revolver, with Serial No.
879886.

We reverse.

The facts may be related as follows:

On February 2, 1988, petitioner was elected to and assumed the position of mayor of the municipality of Casiguran, province of Aurora.

Later that month, he received from Casiguran Barangay Captain 1 Antonio Benavidez one .38 Caliber Smith & Wesson Revolver, with
Serial No. 879886. The gun was owned by and licensed to Ponciano Benavidez, an uncle of Antonio, who mortgaged it to him.
Petitioner placed the gun in an attache case.

After about a week, petitioner together with his security men, went to Manila, and brought with them the attache case with the gun in it.
On their return to the province, their car was stopped at a spot checkpoint in Quezon City, where Pat. Alfredo B. Villanueva of the
Quezon City Police saw the revolver. On petitioner's instruction, his security men surrendered the gun to police officer Villanueva.

Back in the municipality of Casiguran, Ponciano Benavidez, the licensed owner of the gun claimed it from petitioner. The latter informed
Ponciano that the gun was confiscated by the Quezon City Police.

On September 30, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora a complaint for theft against
petitioner and Antonio Benavidez.

On December 13, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the Department of Local Government, an administrative complaint against
petitioner for abuse of authority, ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a public servant.

On January 20, 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora dismissed the case for theft.

On April 6, 1989, complainant Ponciano Benavidez filed a complaint for theft against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman in
Manila.

On August 21, 1990, during the investigation of the administrative case by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aurora, complainant
Ponciano Benavidez executed an affidavit of desistance acknowledging that petitioner had paid the value of the gun, and withdrawing
the administrative case and the criminal case he filed against petitioner with the Ombudsman.

On August 22, 1990, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved a resolution dismissing the administrative case against petitioner.

On March 9, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing by Special Prosecution Officer Prospero G. Pelayo of an information against
petitioner for malversation of public funds, which was duly filed on March 12, 1992, with the Sandiganbayan, Manila.

On March 30, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest. On March 30, 1992, petitioner posted a cash bail of P20,000.00,
which he deposited with the provincial treasurer of Aurora, duly approved by Regional Trial Court Judge Filemon N. Tan of Baler,
Aurora. 2

Upon arraignment on June 1, 1992, before the Sandiganbayan, First Division, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, and accordingly,
the court scheduled the case for pre-trial conference.

Meantime, on or about August 14, 1992, petitioner was able to contact Pat. Villanueva in Camp Karingal, Quezon City. The latter said
that he returned the gun to Patrolman Orgas, one of petitioner's security men on the very next day after he had confiscated it.
Unfortunately, Pat. Orgas did not inform petitioner about the recovery of the gun, and, at the time Villanueva so informed petitioner,
Pat. Orgas had died.

At the pre-trial conference held on August 28, 1992, the prosecution and the accused (petitioner herein) assisted by counsel de parte,
entered into a stipulation of facts signed by them, as follows:
1. At all times relevant to this case, the accused was the Mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Aurora;

2. That in the exercise of his functions as Mayor, the accused had the occasion to confiscate one .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver
with Serial No. 879886 from Barangay Captain Antonio Benavidez;

3. This weapon was actually owned by Ponciano Benavidez, the value of which the parties have not agreed upon;

4. That the accused confiscated this weapon in the performance of his official functions and was, therefore, in custody thereof in his
capacity as such;

5. That demand was made from the accused by Ponciano Benavidez sometime in June of 1988 to produce the above-mentioned
firearm but the accused failed to do so;

6. That at a subsequent time, the accused and Ponciano Benavidez went to the offices of the Quezon City Police Department in search
of this weapon;

7. That there has been restitution of the value of the firearm by the accused to the complaining witness Ponciano Benavidez although
there is disagreement as to the amount of the restitution;

8. That the following affidavits were executed:

a. By complaining witness Ponciano Benavidez indicating his desistance from further prosecution thereof for reasons stated therein;

b. By Alfredo Villanueva of the Quezon City Police Department purporting to describe the circumstances under which he allegedly
confiscated the weapon in question from the accused Mayor.

Further to the above stipulations, the Government now marks the following exhibit which is admitted by the accused:

Exhibit "A" — a xerox copy of the License to Carry Firearm No. 0188490, issued by Necesitas Katigbak of the Firearm and Explosives
Unit, to Ponciano Benavidez involving .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver with SN 879886.

The accused for his part has marked the following exhibits:

Exhibit "1" — The Order of the Fiscal dated January 20, 1989, dismissing the charge of Theft, which is Annex "1" to the Supplemental
Affidavit;

Exhibit "2" — The administrative complaint filed by the complaining witness dated December 13, 1988, which is Annex "2" to the
Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "3" — The Complaint for the filing of the case before the Ombudsman on April 6, 1989, which is Annex "3" to the Supplemental
Affidavit;

Exhibit "4" — The investigation before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan dated August 21, 1990 at Baler, Aurora, wherein the owner of
the gun submitted his affidavit of desistance and admitting therein that he was paid for the loss of the gun, which is Annex "4" to the
Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "5" — the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the owner of the gun dated August 21, 1990, marked as Annex "5" to the
Supplemental Affidavit, wherein the owner of the gun admitted that he verified the loss of the gun to be true and also admitted that the
equivalent amount in cash and in kind for the .38 caliber revolver was paid to him, for which he promised to dismiss the criminal case
and the administrative case.

Exhibit "6" — the Minutes of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Aurora dated August 22, 1990, which decided to dismiss the
administrative case, which is marked as Annex "6" to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "7" — the Resolution of the Investigating Fiscal for the Ombudsman dated February 24, 1992, which is marked as Annex "7" to
the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "8" — the Resolution of the Ombudsman, which is marked as Annex "8" to the Supplemental Affidavit;
Exhibit "9" — a copy of the Order of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan, marked as Annex "9" to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "10" — the payment of the Bond for the provisional release of the accused, marked as Annex "10" to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "11" — the Joint Affidavit of the Chairman of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and a certain Angelito Salamera stating that they
were present when payment was made for the gun to the owner, which is marked as Annex "11" to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "12" — the Affidavit executed by Alfonso Villanueva dated August 14, 1992, wherein he admitted that he had confiscated the
gun at a checkpoint in Quezon City, which is marked as Annex "12" to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit "13" — the Affidavit executed by Antonio Benavidez dated July 30, 1989, which is marked as Annex "13" to the Supplemental
Affidavit.

On June 30, 1993, the prosecution formally presented as its evidence Exhibit "A" 3 and upon the admission thereof, rested its case.

On the other hand, the defense presented two (2) witnesses including petitioner.

After the testimony of the witnesses on July 21, 1993, the court gave the defense counsel ten (10) days to formally offer his evidence in
writing. In time, the defense formally offered its exhibits, and on Septepber 6, 1993, the court admitted all exhibits except Exhibits 11
and 13, which were rejected for being hearsay.

On February 17, 1995, more than a year after the case was submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision, the
decretal portion of which narrated in the opening paragraph of this opinion.

On March 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision; However, on July 5, 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied
the motion.

Hence, this appeal.

On October 4, 1995, the Court required respondent to file its comment on the petition. On January 4, 1996, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed its comment on the petition for review. On January 30, 1996, the Solicitor General also filed his comment.

We give due course to the petition.

To begin with, petitioner is charged with malversation under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code, providing
as follows:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of  prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of  prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of  prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal  in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than
6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.

4. The penalty of  reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less
than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal  in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (As amended by
Rep. Act No. 1060, approved June 12, 1954).

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any
capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individuals.

One essential element of the crime of malversation is that a public officer must take public funds, money or property, and
misappropriate it to his own private use or benefit. There must be asportation of public funds money or property, akin to the taking of
another's property in theft. The funds money or property taken must be public funds or private funds impressed with public attributes or
character for which the public officer is accountable.

In this case, Antonio Benavidez voluntarily turned over the gun, a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, to petitioner mayor of the town
of Casiguran, Aurora. Antonio surrendered the gun to the mayor. The gun was duly licensed. It was not seized or confiscated. Antonio
obtained possession of the gun from Ponciano Benavidez, an uncle of his, who was the owner and licensee of the gun. Ponciano
mortgaged it to Antonio.

The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal provisions are that —

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by
another person of, such funds or property. 4

The question may be asked: Did Antonio's surrender of the gun to petitioner mayor invest the gun with public character sufficient to
consider the gun as public property for which the mayor is accountable? There was no reason to surrender or confiscate the gun. It
was duly licensed to Ponciano Benavidez. The license is not transferable. Antonio could not validly possess the gun. He should have
returned the gun to Ponciano, the licenced owner or surrendered it to the local police or to the Constabulary Provincial Commander. By
turning over the gun to petitioner mayor, the gun did not become public property because it was not intended for public use or purpose
nor was it lawfully sized. The gun continued to be private property, that is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its return to him, not to
be turned over to the public coffer or treasury. Petitioner's failure to return the gun after demand by the private owner did not constitute
a prima facie evidence of malversation. The property was private and the one who demanded its return was a private person, not a
person in authority. The presumption of conversion will not apply.

A respected author in Criminal Law wrote "Malversation can only be committed by a public official who has charge of public funds or
property by virtue of his official position. A public official not responsible for public funds or property and without authority to safeguard
the same can not be convicted of malversation." 5

What is more, the gun was confiscated by a police officer at a checkpoint in Quezon City. The policeman should have turned over the
confiscated gun to the Constabulary Firearm and Explosive Unit, in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Instead, he returned the gun to a
security aide of petitioner mayor, as a "favor" to the mayor. The security aide died in the meantime, and, apparently, the gun got lost.
Assuming that the loss was due to petitioner's fault or negligence, he is not criminally liable for malversation through negligence
because there was no evidence of public funds or property to the use or benefit of the accused. The legal presumption of malversation
created by a demand for restitution of public funds or property is not applicable because the gun was private property and a public
officer entitled to its possession did not make the demand for its return.

The presumption takes the place of affirmative proofs showing the actual conversation. It obviates the necessity of proving acts of
conversation; a thing most extremely difficult to do. If in a particular case a demand was made upon an accountable public official to
produce the funds in his custody and he failed to do so, the presumption thereby arising would render unnecessary further proof of
conversation. The disappearance of public funds in the hands of the accountable public officer is prima facie evidence of its
conversation. Here, there is no presumption of conversion nor evidence of actual conversion.

Nevertheless, petitioner made restitution of the value of the value of the gun to the private owner, Ponciano Benavidez. Obviously,
petitioner did not malverse the gun by dolo or culpa to his private use or benefit.

One more point. Admittedly, there was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of the gun to enable the court to fix the penalty
to be imposed on the accused. Assuming that petitioner malversed the gun, in malversation, the penalty for the offense is defendent on
the value of the public funds, money or property malversed. In this case, the Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum
value of the gun in the absence of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market value and estimated its "reasonable
value" at P5,000.00. This is a grievous error.

The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be duly proved in evidence as a fact. The court can
not take judicial notice of a disputed fact. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the court must receive
evidence of disputeds facts with notice to the parties. This is an innovation introduced in the Revised Rules of Evidence the Supreme
Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which should not be unknown to the lower
courts. 9 The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it was decided in 1995, six years after its effectivity.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the appealed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No.
17563, and ACQUITS the accused Fidel Salamera y Torres, with costs de oficio.

The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith cancel the cash bail of the accused, and immediately reimburse the amount to him.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 135695-96    October 12, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-
6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutor’s Office two separate
complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s
will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s
will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.

The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and his
daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home."3

Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.

On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby
sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:

(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and

(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil
Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and

c) To pay the costs.

II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby
sentenced to the penalty of death;

b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:

(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and

(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil
Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and

(3) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.4

In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s version of what accused did to her.

The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is
a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was
living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.

xxx

That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, she was in the house together with her father. But before she went to
sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside
him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was
embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts
and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital,
which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.

That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : ‘Does it feel
good?’ And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he
got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.

That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told
him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: ‘Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)’

That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father
just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.

That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That
after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he
did to her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood
again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.

That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and
told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the
policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was brought
back by the police and was investigated by them."5

Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of
rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that:6

THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.

Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a
watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening. On
November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because
when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such
wrongdoings."7

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial court’s decision, with the
recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of
these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no room to disturb
the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.

Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a
trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters, 9 such defense
is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification
by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging
appellant with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent.11 Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by
the court.12

In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most important issue.13 The determination of the credibility of
witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at
first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and
conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of
the case, or that the trial court’s finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the
judgment rendered affirmed.15

Moreover, we note here that private complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:

Genitalia: grossly female

Pubic Hairs: scanty

Labia Majora: coaptated

Labia Minora: -do-

Fourchette: U-shaped

Vestibule: pinkish

Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock position(s).

Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease

Vagina:

Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent

Uterus: small

Cervix: closed

Discharges: Mucoid, minimal

Smears:

Conclusions: sperm identification (-)

Gram staining of vaginal disc.16

Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant’s private parts meant a history of sexual
congress on her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainant’s
genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainant’s U-shaped fourchette
since the fourchette of a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under
cross-examination, that the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was
sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the
hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainant’s claim that she was raped by appellant.

Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he had
castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding
with private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her
delinquent behavior.20

Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that
a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag
herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 21 More so,
where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.

Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and his
wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from
his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him.22 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus
"free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter."23

Nor does appellant’s assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood
the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-
examination:

Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?

A : Yes.

Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?

A (Witness nodding.)

xxx

Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father would be found guilty, two
death sentences will be imposed against him?

A: Yes.

Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?

A: I want this to proceed.24

Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her
father as qualified rape26 and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1)
sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent27 and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the
additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.28

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s father.29 But the victim’s age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she
admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate
was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30

COURT TO WITNESS

Q: When were you born?

A: I do not know.

Q: You do not know your birthday?

A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.

COURT: Proceed.

FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here is
below 18 years old.

ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted. …

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable
of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or
secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate,
e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the
victim is sharing with the accused’s sister.32

The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue.33

On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians
concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature" since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.

As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are ascertainable
from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact
pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. -  During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or
in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for
the purpose.

Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory
rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on
February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victim’s birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mother’s testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal
certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.

However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory
rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the
rape.1âwphi1 The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the
said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were
hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.

In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial evidence
from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the
victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as
the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim
was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was
bereft of any independent  evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private
complainant’s age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have
been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove
the victim’s age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.

Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we
reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier  without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by independent
proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual age of a rape
victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an ‘iota of doubt’ that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the
imposition of the death penalty set by the law.

In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The
penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of
R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known
as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.

As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of
another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for
each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for pleading or
proof as to the basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape.

The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the
father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here
as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has
been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty
mandatory.39 However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim,
taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters,
exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters.40

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA

A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom into a flower. Such is the case of Lizette
Arabelle Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been defiled at a very tender age. She was at the time voiding her body waste at their
neighbor’s backyard, but that did not deter herein appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed, lust is no respecter of time and
place.1

On 27 January 1995, an information2 for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
(hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to
have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the will and consent of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.

Upon motion of PRUNA’s counsel, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the Information was amended changing the name of the
accused from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth certificate.3 However,
when he testified in court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court proceedings, he signed the name
Manuel Pruna.

On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental Examination4 filed by PRUNA’s counsel on
the ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a coherent answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that the accused
be brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental examination.5 Accordingly, the trial was
suspended, and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong City.

On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram6 from the NCMH stating that PRUNA was in "fair condition." The NCMH later
submitted to the trial court a report7 on the psychiatric evaluation of PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to jail for the
resumption of court proceedings. The report also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends were under the bridge
sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl defecating in the river bank; that they called her; and, upon the order of
his friends he placed her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was not, however, offered in evidence by
the prosecution or the defense.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as follows:

Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m., she was fetching water from the artesian
well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria
Tolentino. Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet, Jacqueline headed
toward the place where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was
already returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and appeared to be very frightened. When
asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain "Boy" to the grassy area at the back of Gloria’s
house where she was sexually molested (or "kinantot" in the Tagalog dialect). LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the
house of PRUNA, which was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community as "Boy," was
not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to
the Bataan Provincial Hospital.8
Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old, but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17
October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTE’s last birthday was on 19 April 1995.9

LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called "Boy." She pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to her, PRUNA
laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it is a
sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.10

Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted
a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The specimen was
sent to the laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for LIZETTE.11 The Medico-Legal
Report12 prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings:

Essentially normal PE-Findings

Infantile areola & nipples

Flat breasts (-) hematoma

(-) pubic hair

Labia minora and majora –well coaptated

Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration

(Vaginal Opening)

LABORATORY RESULT:

WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis

NSS- Negative for fungi

SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells

Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism

URINALYSIS: RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells –few.

WBC-0-2

Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report13 includes a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr.
Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on
the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vaginal
opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.14

Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and prepared the corresponding
reports,15 testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE.16

SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar Municipal Station, testified that on 3 January
1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer to have it blottered.
Upon his advise, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from the hospital, he took their statements.
Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be
photographed, which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the neighborhood, and one of them
answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their
station by four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but the former did not give any
reply.17

On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.
Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well together with Jacqueline. After having drawn water
from the well, Jacqueline called her daughter, who was then defecating on the road near the river; and they both went home. After a
while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused
him of having raped the child. Carlito asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he (PRUNA) was in his house from
the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her mother went to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA
was at home because the former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to
the barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought PRUNA to the municipal building to prove that he was
innocent.18

PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for
Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latter’s friend then brought
him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail. There, the mother
of the child threw at him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat; then he was
mauled. Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to masturbate. Worse, his testes were burned with
cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was hit with a 2"x 2" piece of wood.19

After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty
of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000, plus costs.20 Hence, this automatic review.

In his Appellant’s Brief,21 PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors:

… IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD, THAT THE LATTER WAS
THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED WHEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF THE CHILD.

II

… IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE ALLEGED RAPE OF HER CHILD.

III

… IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS ONLY THREE (3) YEARS OLD
WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS ONLY FIVE (5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.

IV

… IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE.

The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial court’s decision with the modification that an
additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be granted in favor of the offended party.

As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape
occurred and 5 years old when she testified;

(2) Whether Jacqueline’s testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;

(3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal;

(4) Whether appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

We shall resolve these issues in seriatim.

I. LIZETTE’s Competency and Credibility as a Witness

Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age. When LIZETTE was called to testify, his counsel
interposed a vigorous objection to the admission of her testimony because of her tender age. The trial court noted the objection and
allowed her to testify; thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

PROS. LUMABAS:

Do you know Manuel Pruna?

A Yes, sir.

Q How do you call Manuel Pruna?

A Boy, sir.

Q Where is he?

A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave his name as Manuel Pruna)

PROS. LUMABAS:

What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you?

A "Inihiga niya ako" and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q And in what place did he do this to you?

A In the grassy area, sir.

Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?

ATTY. BALUYOT:

The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question.

PROS. LUMABAS:

I think that will be all for the witness.22

After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that he intended to file a motion for her
disqualification as a witness.23 The court then proceeded to ask her a few questions, thus:

COURT :

Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth?

A "Sa lupa."

Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will be filing a written motion for the striking out of the
testimony of the witness considering her tender age.24
No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel cross-examined LIZETTE, as follows:

ATTY. BALUYOT:

On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you?

A I was in the grassy area, sir.

Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing?

A None, sir.

Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic]… a few meter[s] away from you, is it not?

A Near, sir.

ATTY. BALUYOT:

Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is beside a street?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her pumping from the well, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel? Please demonstrate the distance?

A Up to that door, sir.

Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your bowel?

A For a short period of time, sir.

(Sandali lang po.)25

As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The
court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.26

Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those
disqualified are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and relating them truthfully."lawphil.net

No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child
is the test of the competency as a witness.27 It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive
and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.28

In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred
such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to
the court at the time he is offered as a witness.29 The examination should show that the child has some understanding of the
punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that
he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to
saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing.30 A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity
renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully.31

The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge
sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligation of an oath.32 Since many of the witness’ manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of
the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous.33

In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her age. He failed to discharge the
burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of
observation, recollection, and communication34 and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the
trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight.

We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape "when the
interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the person
responsible therefor.35

In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full
credit,36 especially where no motive is attributed to the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused.37 Indeed, a girl of
such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the expense,
trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped.38

II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales

Contrary to appellant’s contention, Jacqueline’s testimony that LIZETTE told her that appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted
his penis into her vagina is not covered by the hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does not testify. This
rule, as enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence
which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to
that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination.39 If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person
not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.40

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the
right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed.41 Moreover, the court is without opportunity to
test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.42lavvphil.net
In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even
cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s
testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.

Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its non-admission would not save the day for the appellant.
Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA laid her down in the grass
and inserted his private organ into hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTE’s testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is
sufficient basis for conviction.

At any rate, Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victim’s conduct immediately after the rape. It shows that LIZETTE immediately
revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks
of the truth of the charge of rape.

III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness

Appellant harps on the prosecution’s failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino, who was listed as a witness and executed an
affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the appellant carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house.

It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan,
and could not be found anymore. In any event, as opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only
be corroborative of LIZETTE’s testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.

IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence Against Appellant

When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their neighbor, as the one who defiled her. A rape
victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant
that enables her to have a good look at the latter’s physical features.43

LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her
genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was truly
committed.44 She is not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her.45 And when her testimony
passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof, for in most cases it is the only evidence that can be
offered to establish his guilt.46

Likewise, LIZETTE’s mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what happened to her and readily identified
PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the house of PRUNA.47 Thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report
the incident, and then to the hospital for LIZETTE’s medical examination.

By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA inserted his penis into her vagina. The
Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who
was presented as an expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.48 The presence of
sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTE’s
claim of rape.

This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTE’s organ despite the fact that she was examined
immediately after she was raped. We have already ruled, however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding
of rape,49 especially when the victim is of tender age.50 Well- settled is the rule that rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female.51 The presence of hyperemia in LIZETTE’s vaginal opening and the existence of
sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that PRUNA’s organ indeed touched the labia or pudendum of
LIZETTE.

In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE
of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her act of leading her
mother to appellant’s house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the authorities; (e) LIZETTE’s
submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and
urine.

The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it
must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.52 We have also held that when alibi is established only by the
accused, his relatives, or close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny.53
Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellant’s parents, corroborated PRUNA’s testimony that he (PRUNA) was in his house
during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the place where the rape occurred was just a few
meters away from the house of PRUNA. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in the grassy area to consummate
the crime of rape.

The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against PRUNA the charge of rape. According to him,
LIZETTE’s grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy the place of the PRUNA family, but the latter refused.54 Aside from the fact that such
testimony was not corroborated, said motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No mother in her right mind would use her
offspring as an engine of malice. She would not subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even the stigma attendant to a
prosecution for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person responsible for her child’s defilement.55

V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty

The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the prosecution, we now come to the question of the
penalty to be meted upon him.

Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death
penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a "child below seven (7) years old." We have held that in such a case
the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the
victim’s age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.56

A person’s age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victim’s birth certificate a sine qua non requirement
to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent
jurisprudence has conflicting pronouncements.

In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved by the
prosecution:

1. In People v. Vargas,57 the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10 years old at the time of the rape were not
considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This Court also observed that the victim could easily be mistaken for a child below 12
years of age, and hence it was not correct to judge the victim’s age by her appearance. We held: "The difference of two or three years
in age may not always be readily apparent by mere physical manifestations or appearance."

2. In People v. Javier,58 the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not contest her age. Ratiocinating that in this
age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old one insofar as physical features and
attributes are concerned, this Court held that an independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim is vital and essential so as to
remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in R.A.
No. 7659.

3. In People v. Brigildo,59 aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended party’s birth certificate or other equally
acceptable official document concerning her age, the testimonies on record were not clear as to her exact age. The victim declared that
she was 11 years old when she testified in court a year after the incident, while her mother claimed that she was around 15 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime. The informations even alleged a different age. Hence, this Court refused to appreciate the
qualifying circumstance of minority because of the uncertainty regarding her age.

4. In People v. Tipay,60 the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16 years of age. No "independent" evidence was
presented to prove it. This Court recognized that the minority of a victim who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest and may be
taken judicial notice of by the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of 15 and 17 where minority may seem to be
dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution should prove the fact of minority with certainty. The lack of objection on
the part of the accused concerning the victim’s age does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.

5. In People v. Cula,61 the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the rape was committed, but no evidence at all
was presented to prove her age. We held that the failure of the accused to deny such allegation cannot make up for the failure of the
prosecution to prove with certainty the victim’s minority. Because of the lacuna in the prosecution’s evidence, coupled with the trial
court’s failure to make a categorical finding of minority of the victim, we declined to consider the qualifying circumstance of minority.

6. In People v. Veloso,62 the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was raped. Citing People v. Vargas,63 this Court refused
to consider the testimonies of the victim and her father as sufficient proof of her age.

7. In People v. Pecayo,64 the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination that she was 14 years old and that she
was born on 13 January 1983. We held that the victim’s casual testimony as to her age is not enough, and that the lack of denial on the
part of the accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through competent evidence such as a duly certified
certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or some other authentic document showing her age.

8. In People v. Tundag,65 the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was raped, but she did not know exactly when she
was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth certificate, the prosecution moved that judicial notice be taken of the fact that she was
below 18 years old at the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of such fact, this Court held that the age of the victim
is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary. Under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, a hearing is
required before such fact can be taken judicial notice of by courts.

9. In People v. Geraban,66 the victim’s testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15, but her mother’s testimony regarding her
age was not clear. We thus declared that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving minority.

10. In People v. Liban67 and People v. Llandelar,68 the only evidence adduced to prove the minority of the victims was the victims’ bare
testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old, respectively. This Court held that while the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an
exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be
accorded to it is another matter. The prosecution should present the victim’s birth certificate or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence that can help
establish the age of the victim. Neither the obvious minority of the victim nor the absence any contrary assertion from the defense can
exonerate the prosecution from its burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129
of the Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient compliance with the law.

11. In People v. Alvarado,69 the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape, and this was confirmed by the
accused, who was victim’s father. The victim’s mother, however, testified as to her date of birth which showed that she was 13 years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime. For this doubt as to the victim’s age, the accused was held guilty of simple rape only
and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the
prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age:

1. In People v. Rafales,70 the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only 10 years old when she was raped, which
was not denied by the accused, was deemed sufficient to prove her age for the purpose of determining whether the accused could be
held guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.

2. In People v. De la Cruz,71 the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were both 14 years old at the time of the rape
incidents was deemed sufficient because there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the mother, who had personal knowledge of
the ages of her children. Moreover, said testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood unrebutted by any other evidence.

3. In People v. Bali-balita,72 the victim’s testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by her half-sister, was deemed sufficient. We
noted that the victim testified in court four months after the rape, and hence it was not difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice
that she was under 18 years of age.

4. In People v. Velasco,73 the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the complainant herself, who was held to be
competent to testify on her age, as it constituted family tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a 12-year-
old minor; and (c) the categorical finding of the trial court that she was "a minor of a little over twelve years."

5. In People v. Remudo,74 the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority on the strength of (a) the offended party’s
testimony as to the date of her birth, which showed that she was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the admission of said date
of birth by the accused who was the victim’s brother.

6. In People v. LLanita75 the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 7 years old at the time of
the alleged rape was the victim’s own testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of the date of her
birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said testimony was held admissible for being an assertion
of family tradition regarding pedigree. Her testimony and the accused’s admission that she was 5 years old during the commission of
the crime were held sufficient to establish her age.

7. In People v. Agustin,76 the victim’s testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents, coupled with the express
admission of her age by the accused who was her father, sufficiently proved her minority.

8. In People v. Esuela,77 the testimony of the victim’s mother that the victim was 13 years of age at the time of the rape was held
sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a mother she was in the best position to know when she delivered her child. Also
considered were the victim’s own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court that she could not have been
more than 18 years old when she testified.
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if
clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to
prove her age. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:

In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as alleged in the information and the defense did
not contest her age and as a matter of fact was questioning her qualification to testify because of her tender age when she testified two
(2) years later in Court. The victim’s Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 … established the fact that at the time of the
commission of the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only 3 years old.79

It thus appears that the trial court’s finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was raped was based on the Medico-Legal Report
prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact that the defense did not contest her age and even questioned her qualification to testify
because of her tender age.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing
therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE’s age. Her mother, Jacqueline,
testified on 17 October 1995 as follows:

Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you were?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at that particular date and time?

A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir.

Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water?

A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of our neighbor, sir.

How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales?

A. Three years old, sir.

Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she?

A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now.

Q. When was her last birthday?

A. April 19, 1995, sir.80

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old.81 However, when
the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old.
Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.82

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty
that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death
penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject
to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.83

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
authentic document should be introduced in evidence84 in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not
necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA
cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.

However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s mother that she was 3 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof,
having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on
PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance
with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 without need of pleading or
proof because the mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious.85

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal Case No. 6044 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the
sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynarez-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on official leave.

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @
"Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi,"
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL
PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE
MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also pending before it, does not affect the
conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both
testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not
synonymous with life imprisonment.

The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three
Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid,"
and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for
the names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who
was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway
of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City
and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim;
there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and
circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male
public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating circumstance in that
the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On April 8,
1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court renders its judgment, ordering and
finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for some other offense besides these
8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty
as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who insured impunity. Therefore,
the penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life
imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y
Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par.
4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not having lasted more than
five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused —
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve
two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these
charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old,
[n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty
imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF  prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders "convicted of an offense punishable by death or
life" by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense)
the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to return the following personal
effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being solidary.

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be extended to those sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos
and several "John Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED. 9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint
Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal
because of their application for "amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal
of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11

The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring
team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team;
Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto
Perez, representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico
Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its classrooms. After
inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their
way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings. They were then ordered
to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused their group to be divided.
Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their captivity, the victims were able to
recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like
cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were informed that they would be released. They started
walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00.
The same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives
of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)

. . . 12

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-
appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed.
Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie
Manuel were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were
brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company
who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives
for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch
water and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to
bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was cooking
and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her chance and
made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen
years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the
mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise
performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between the
group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in
going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to
Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel.
(Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers
did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board
a six by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed
them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused
Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night,
the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City
where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga
City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers
came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in the
duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman
and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two
counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as
follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and their version of what had happened on December
12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or
imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only
because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine
accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained
where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively
seven of the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-
complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6)
Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore,
be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as charged in the eight
Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut
themselves off from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide
their hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them
material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting
them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty
as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed. They
actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from
place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among
the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court
quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of
infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and from which
may logically be inferred that there was a common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit
the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the sixteen accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question. (U.S.
vs. Bundal, et.  al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).) 14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who
allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an encounter;
thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in
not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos
Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of
sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense. 15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and
fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to
Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in
another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his
purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of
Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. 18 This
is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant
Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely,
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.

Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those
who were assigned to give us some food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?

A Yes.

Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira —
another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to know them. Will you still be able to
recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what else was he doing while you were
in their captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx 19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus
and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who
stopped you, you would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong.  (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot
Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was]
Commander Falcasantos?

A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong.  (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x           x x x          x x x

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN

Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx 21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or detention did take place: the
five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that
Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial
court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent from the testimony of
Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the
ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. 22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there
are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will make you remember that these are
really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there
are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].

Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature above the same. Did you come to
know who signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion here which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga
uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on
Friday, February 3, 1989.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us
why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)

Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER:

They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one
half medium, one half large.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you
know if these letters were sent? If you know only.

A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as
P500,000.00, and when we were already — I was asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof
that all of us are alive. 26 [sic]

Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto Perez. 28 The receipt of the
ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money
were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 having been sufficiently
proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the
trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the government monitoring
team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the
appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter. In People vs. Domasian, 33 the
victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused
therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion
was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from
going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court
held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is
that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City
Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be
punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed was not kidnapping under
Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going
with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued
the girl from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the
appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the victims were detained, albeit
for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the
armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses' positive
identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
negative testimonies of the defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez
testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no
ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him head on. His testimony
dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain
where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro
and Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with
ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life
imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably
imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code. 41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three
counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five
terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion
perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the
kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the
kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
G.R. No. 85423             May 6, 1991 JOSE TABUENA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower
courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato,
Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was
required to vacate the disputed lot.1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United
States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the
subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said
land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint
was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even
before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of
the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the
Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took
cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court
also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties
but a different parcel of land.

The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:

Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact
formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length.2 The challenged decision
also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T"
and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that
the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B",
"C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear
contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the
evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit,
Inc. vs. Aviles,3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause,
and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the patties at the trial.4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if,
first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But
we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly
considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on
them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was
identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?

A The translation of the letter.

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?

Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a
case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard
or are actually pending b before the same judge.7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or
when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the
request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.8

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"
or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and
was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all
reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences
submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by
the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of
land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the
same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the
trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have
validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such
authorization has been presented.

It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many cases.1âwphi1 However, that rule is
also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and
his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact,
the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property.9

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land.11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to
remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that
he was not much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is
specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the
property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention
at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared
in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in
her own name.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property.
Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there
until she died.12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name.13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot.14 He
even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the
owner.15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an
overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and even to regard them as
conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to
the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and
therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the
evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in
violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should
not have been sustained by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed
property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the
petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 106102 October 29, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.ARMANDO SARABIA, accused-appellant.

Appeal from the Decision dated May 4, 1992, handed down by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case
No. 10201, finding appellant Armando Sarabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonbale (sic) doubt of the charge of MURDER,
qualified by treachery, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided for by
law; to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,00000) as death indemnity; and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt

As to the civil aspect, this Court awards P15,000.00 for moral damages, P29,700 for actual damages; P180,000.00 for loss of income
of Edward Liza; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and P300.00 per court appearance.

Filed on May 7, 1991 by Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo M. Nolido, the Information indicting appellant Armando Sarabia, alleges:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 1991, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one EDWARD LIZA, thereby
inflicting multiple injuries upon his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law. 1
With the appellant entering a negative plea upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, on August 6, 1991, trial ensued, with the
prosecution presenting Joelouie Dolorosa, Pfc. Jose Laboyo, Dr. Emmanuel Bando, Raul Villanueva and the victim's father, Rolando
Lisa, as its witnesses.

For the defense, Rogelio Onate and appellant Armando Sarabia took the witness stand.

As summarized in the Appellee's Brief, the fact sued upon by the People are as follows:

The prosecution's case, as well as the trial court's conviction of appellant, is primarily anchored on the testimony of eyewitness
Joelouie Dolorosa, a cable tender of the Victorias Milling Company's Murcia Transloading Station and a resident of New Barrio Central,
Victorias, Negros Occidental.

Dolorosa testified that on March 16, 1991, he was working at the Murcia Transloading Station at Hda. Josefa, Brgy. Blumentritt, Murcia,
Negros Occidental (Tsn, Aug. 22, 1991, p. 7). With him were Raul Villanueva and Edward Liza, who had similar tours of duty for that
day, i.e., from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. (id., p. 9). Liza was the office clerk in that transloading station.

Around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, while Dolorosa and Liza were inside the office of the transloading station, appellant suddenly
barged into the room with a bolo ("ginunting") in his hand. Without warning, appellant hacked the unsuspecting Liza twice, once on the
head and once on the neck (id., pp. 12-14). Fearing for his life, Dolorosa instinctively rushed outside the office and hid himself at the
nearest refuge he could think of — an old, enclosed cane car used for stockpiling sugar (ibid.). This car was the favorite resting place of
employees in that transloading station. When Dolorosa went inside the car, he saw Raul Villanueva there together with about four (4)
other employees (Tsn, Oct. 3, 1991, pp. 38-40). Immediately, he narrated to Villanueva what happened. As they were about to leave
the car, they saw the appellant, still clutching a bolo and shouting. "Who are the others?" (Tsn, Aug. 22, 1991, pp. 15-16). Thus, they
decided to stay in the car for some time. While they were inside, they saw appellant being accosted by a certain Junior, the station's
overseer (id., p. 18). The overseer brought appellant to the Municipal Hall and it was only then that Dolorosa and company got out of
the car. They went back to the station office.

At the time the entire incident happened, the transloading station was well-lighted. Around five (5) or six (6) powerful search lights
surrounded the station and were in full operation (id., pp. 16-17).

Inside the station office, Dolorosa and Villanueva saw Liza dead and covered with blood. Liza's neck was almost severed. They saw a
hacked wound on the left portion of Liza's neck measuring about three (3) to four (4) inches in length (id., p. 36). Without touching the
corpse, Dolorosa and Villanueva contacted the Victorias Milling Company by radio and reported the incident. Then, policemen arrived
at the scene, followed by an investigator and photographer from the Victorias Milling Company. Rolando Liza, father of the deceased-
victim, also arrived at the station (id., pp. 19-22). Photographs were taken of Liza's corpse and the interior of the station office. All these
were identified by Dolorosa in open court.

Thereafter, Liza's corpse was loaded on a truck and taken to the Alisbo Funeral parlor (id. p. 33).

The Post-mortem Certificate issued by Dr. Emmanuel Bando, Murcia's Rural Health Physician who autopsied Edward Liza's cadaver
on March 17, 1991, enumerated the following injuries:

Wound No. 1, hacked wound, 8 inches long, left forehead, with chip fracture of the skull; wound No. 2, hacked wound 3 inches long, left
face, 1/2 inch deep area of the cheekbone; wound No. 3, hacked wound, 5 inches long, left temporal head, with chip fracture of the
skull; wound No. 4, hacked wound, neck, left side, 9 inches long, cutting blood vessels and muscles, trachea esophagus, chip fracture
of the cervical vertebrate; wound No. 5, hacked wound, left postero-part of the neck 4 inches long cutting blood vessels, muscles, chip
fracture of the cervical bone; wound No. 6, stabbed wound, 3 inches wide, penetrating the left chest 1 1/2 inches from the left nipple, at
the level of the 2nd and 3rd ribs, anterolateral at the side of the left nipple, injuring the lobe of the left lung; wound No. 7 contusion, right
forearm; wound No. 8 hacked wound, 5 inches long, 1 1/2 inches deep, back right side, cutting part of the scapular bone (Tsn, Oct. 3,
1991, pp. 11-13; emphasis supplied).

Dr. Bando indicated the cause of Liza's death to be cardio-respiratory arrest due to multiple hack wounds and stab wound (id., p. 13).
He testified further that the deceased victim's wounds were caused mainly by a sharp and pointed instrument, probably a bolo or
"ginunting" (id., pp. 13-19). In his expert opinion, the position of the assailant, at the time of the attack, could have been at the left side
of or directly behind the victim (id., pp. 28-31). 2

Assisted by the Public Attorney's Office, appellant placed reliance on self-defense and theorized:

. . . while he was in the house of their overseer together with his co-worker Rogelio Onate, Edward Liza, his kumpadre, arrived and
invited him to have a drink at MUCH office at around 10 to 11:00 o'clock in the evening as the latter's officemate would be attending a
dance. He accepted the invitation. When he arrived at and entered the MUCH office, Liza was alone drinking. Looking surprised of his
arrival, Liza asked "what will you do herre (sic)?". Before, he could answer, Liza got hold of the "ginunting" and poised to hack the
victim. To protect himself, he boxed Liza at his stomach causing the latter to fall to the ground and to release the bolo. He picked up the
bolo and hacked Liza hitting him on the head and on the neck.1âwphi1.nêt

Had he not hit Liza, he would have been dead by now.

Joelouie Dolorosa was not present at the MUCH office at that time. (TSN., November 28, 1991, pp. 3-36).

Rogelio Onate testified that he is a laborer at MUCH Transloading Station. He had known accused Sarabia for about three to four years
being likewise a resident of Hacienda Josefa. He had also known victim Edward Liza for almost three years. Accused and the victim
were kumpadres.

At around 9 p.m. of March 16, 1991, he was at the store of the overseer drinking Pilsen as it was pay day and a Saturday. Armando
Sarabia was also there, standing by the side of the store and asking from the overseer the computation of his indebtedness. Victim
Edward Liza was in front of MUCH office, six to eight meters away. Edward Liza arrived and told Sarabia to go with him to the office.
Liza went back to the office.

After Sarabia had the computation of his indebtedness, or after about 15 minutes, he went to the MUCH office at the invitation of Liza.
As it was already late in the evening, and his house was still one (1) kilometer, more or less, away, he already went home. At about 8
o'clock the following morning, he learned about what happened to Armando Sarabia (TSN., January 21, 1992, pp. 3-12). 3

On May 4, 1992, the trial Court came out with a Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge, and sentencing him thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused. guilty beyond reasonable (sic) doubt of the charge of MURDER,
qualified by treachery, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided for by
law; to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000,00) as death indemnity; and to pay the costs.

As to the civil aspect, this Court awards P15,000.00 for moral damages, P29,700 for actual damages; P180,000.00 for loss of income
of Edward Liza; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and P300.00 per court appearance. 4

The trial Court gave credence to the testimony of eyewitness Joelouie Dolorosa who narrated that there was a sudden assaul against
Liza, identifying the herein appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Dolorosa, together with Mr. Raul Villanueva, testified on the exact
location of the crime. Dr. Emmanuel Bando identified the death certificate and explained the  post-mortem examination he conducted
on the victim's body. As regards the civil aspect of the case, the victim's father was called to the witness stand. The trial Court also
gave credence to the testimony of Pfc. Jose Laboyo who narrated:

. . . he was designated to investigate the incident of March 16, 1991. He conducted a fact finding investigation at the police
headquarters on March 17, 1991, in Murcia, Negros Occidental, and prepared affidavits of witnesses. At around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, March 17, 1991 the suspect voluntarily surrendered to the police officers headed by Pfc. Rolando Salamisan after the
commission of the offense at MUCH Transloading Station, Brgy. Blumentritt, Murcia, Negros Occidental, on March 16, 1991. Suspect
Armando Sarabia admitted having killed Edward Liza by hacking the victim inside the office of the MUCH Transloading Station on the
evening of March 16, 1991 because of the long time grudge. Pfc. Laboyo prepared an investigation report, the basis of the Fiscal in
filing this information. Pfc. Laboyo likewise identified the accused Armando Sarabia, the investigation report dated March 17, 1991,
Exh. "G" and his signature as Exh. "G-1". In the said report it is reflected that the suspect Armando Sarabia was turned over by a fellow
peace officer together with the bolo stained with blood, measuring about 23 inches from tip to the handle, the lethal weapon, Exh. "H",
used in the killing of Edward Liza. Likewise identified was the police blotter report and also the two pictures left to him by the father the
deceased when they reported the matter to the police headquarters of Murcia, Negros Occidental, which pictures are marked as Exhs.
"I" and "J" for the prosecution. Pat. Jose Laboyo, when shown the blade of the combat bolo (ginunting), Exh. "H", said that the
bloodstain looked like rust for the blood has dried and has been there for quite a time. He also identified the excerpt of the piece of
police blotter marked as Exh. "K" signed by Lt. Celso Gonzales and also that of Pat. Ranilo Mercurio, the desk officer. 5

Hence, this appeal.

In the Appellant's Brief, the appellant assigned the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING OUTMOST CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY AND REPORT OF PFC. JOSE LABOYO,
JR., WHICH PIECE OF EVIDENCE IS PURELY HEARSAY AND VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PROVEN VITAL FACT THAT IT WAS THE VICTIM WHO
PROVOKED THE FIGHT BY FIRST HACKING AND INSULTING APPELLANT AND IN NOT APPRECIATING (sic) SELF-
DEFENSE SIMPLY BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS NOT INJURED. 6
The appeal is devoid of merit.

To begin with, having invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the appellant is deemed to have admitted having killed the
victim and the burden of proof shifted to him to establish and prove the elements of self-defense, to wit, "(a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself." (People v Cahindo, 266 SCRA 554). "Self defense, . . . , should be established as convincingly
as possible and the onus falls on the appellant who relies on it to prove its unequivocal signification" (People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA
305, 315).

"The plea of self-defense cannot justifiably be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but
is in itself extremely doubtful. The question of whether the appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact" (Jacobo v
Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 270). In the present case, one Rogelio Onate merely testified that they (Onate and the appellant) were
together on that fateful day of killing. Nothing was mentioned in Onate's testimony that he witnessed the killing and the appellant just
defended himself.

It has also been held by this Court that, "unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense." (People v. Ignacio, 270 SCRA 445, 451) "For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People v. Ignacio, supra, citing the
doctrine laid down in People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 [1986]; as reiterated in People v. Pletado, 210 SCRA 634 [1991]; People v. Bausing,
199 SCRA 355; [1991]; People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989]) and the appellant must present proof of positively strong act of real
aggression" (Ibid, see Pacificar v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]; People v. Aquiatan, 123 SCRA 501 [1983]; Aquiatan, 123
SCRA 501 [1983]; People v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835 [1083]. "Absent such unlawfu1 aggression, there can be no self-defense" (People
v. Sol, 272 SCRA 392). In this case, appellant Sarabia was unable to substantiate his claim. A careful scrutiny of the facts showing that
Sarabia admitted that Liza, was very much surprised when he saw the former. Appellant also claimed that Liza had even asked
Sarabia why he was there. If Liza, indeed, invited Sarabia, Liza should not have been surprised and the latter would not have asked
appellant why he went to the MUCH office.

Verily, "self-defense is a time-worn excuse resorted to by assailants in appealed criminal cases" (People v. Maalat, 275 SCRA 206).

The appellant insisted that the trial court of origin erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation against the appellant. Treachery, whenever present and alleged in the information, qualifies the killing of the victim and
raises it to the category of murder. "But to constitute treachery, the means, methods or forms of attack must be consciously adopted by
the offender" (People v. Tumaob, 83 Phil 742). In the present case, the appellant used a "ginunting" and ensured the death of the
victim. Liza had been caught unaware leaving him defenseless from Sarabias aggression.

If evident premeditation is also proven, it shall be considered as generic aggravating circumstance. "The essential elements for evident
premeditation to be appreciated are: (1) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the
appellant clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the
execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People v. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600).

In this case, there is direct evidence showing that the appellant meditated and reflected on his intention to kill the victim. The medical
findings proved that Sarabia deliberately employed reliable and unfailing means to ensure the killing without giving the victim an
opportunity to defend himself.

The appellant begged of this Court to give a second look to the lower court's finding of probative value in the testimony of Pfc. Jose
Laboyo which he claimed was nothing but hearsay evidence. This Court is aware that "hearsay evidence carries no probative value".
(Waterous Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 280 SCRA 735). "When evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay" (People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630).

Generally, "a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof except (1) when it is made through
palpable mistake and (2) when it is shown that no admission was in fact made. "In spite of the presence of judicial admission in a
party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented" (Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596).
Undaunted, the appellant inflicted eight (8) wounds on the victim's body. Six (6) of them were hack wounds, one (1) stab wound and
one (1) contusion in the right forearm. "The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted on the victim thus belie and negate the
claim of self-defense" (People v. Unarce, 270 SCRA 756). "Presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim negates
self-defense" (People v. Alverez, 267 SCRA 266).

In a long line of cases, it was held that "the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to highest degree of
respect" (Juliano v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 52, see also People v. Tañedo, 266 SCRA 34; People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305;
People v. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335; People v. Sarabia, 266 SCRA 471; People v. Navales, 266 SCRA 569; Lustan v. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA, 663; People v. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26; Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 89; People v. Valles, 267 SCRA 103;
People v. Alvarez, 267 SCRA 267; People v. Borja, 267 SCRA 370; People v. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93; People v. Letigio, 268 SCRA
227; People v. Qiamco, 268 SCRA 516; People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531; Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764; People v.
Corea, 269 SCRA 76; People v. Hebrieto, 269 SCRA 472; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495).

All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds the guilt of the appellant proven beyond reasonable doubt. His
allegation that he acted in self-defense has not been substantiated. The prosecution was also able to prove the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and the evident premeditation as generic aggravating circumstance, beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 10201 finding
appellant guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the awards for moral damages and loss of income are hereby
deleted. Costs against appellant.

G.R. No. 74336 April 7, 1997 J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., VITALIADO P.
ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari  seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court
of Appeals)2 finding petitioner J. Antonio Aguenza liable under a continuing surety agreement to pay private respondent Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company (hereafter, Metrobank) a loan jointly obtained by the General Manager and a bookkeeper of Intertrade a
corporation of which petitioner is President and in whose behalf petitioner had, in the past, obtained credit lines.

The following facts are not disputed:

On February 28, 1977, the Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a Board Resolution, authorized and empowered petitioner and
private respondent Vitaliado Arrieta, Intertrade's President and Executive Vice-President, respectively, to jointly apply for and open
credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. Pursuant to such authority, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed several
trust receipts from May to June, 1977, the aggregate value of which amounted to P562,443.46, with Intertrade as the entrustee and
private respondent Metrobank as the entruster.

On March 14, 1977, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement whereby both bound
themselves jointly and severally with Intertrade to pay private respondent Metrobank whatever obligation Intertrade incurs, but not
exceeding the amount P750,000.00.

In this connection, private respondent Metrobank's Debit Memo to Intertrade dated March 22, 1978 showed full settlement of the letters
of credit covered by said trust receipts in the total amount P562,443.46.

On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, bookkeeper in the employ of Intertrade, obtained P500,000.00 loan
from private respondent Metrobank. Both executed Promissory Note in favor or said bank in the amount of P500,000,00. Under said
note, private respondents Arrieta and Perez promised to pay said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of
P20,000.00 each starting on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704%  per annum, and in case of default, a further 8 % per annum.

Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments thus resulting in the entire obligation becoming
due and demandable. In 1979, private respondent Metrobank instituted suit against Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her
husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only the unpaid principal obligation, but also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.

More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an Amended Complaint dated August 30, 1980
for the sole purpose of impleading petitioner as liable for the loan made by private respondents Arrieta and Perez on March 21, 1978,
notwithstanding the fact that such liability is being claimed on account of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977
executed by petitioner and private respondent Arrieta especifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and granted to, Intertrade,
through petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were specially given authority by Intertrade on February 28, 1977 to open credit
lines with private respondent Metrobank. The obligations incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines were completely paid as
evidenced by private respondent Metrobank's debit memo in the full amount of P562,443.46.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision absolving petitioner from liability and dismissing private respondent
Metrobank's complaint against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring that the Promissory Note dated March 21, 1978, marked as Exhibit A is the responsibility only of defendant Vitaliado P.
Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, in their personal capacity and to the exclusion of defendant Intertrade and Marketing Co., Inc.;
2) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P1,062,898.92, due,
of September 15, 1982, plus interest, fees and penalties due from that date pursuant to the stipulations in the promissory note until the
whole obligations shall have been paid and finally settled;

3) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia Perez to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P44,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees and other litigation expenses, albeit there is no award for exemplary damages;

4) Declaring defendant Patricio Perez, as conjugal partner of defendant Lilia Perez, as jointly and severally liable with her for what the
latter is ordered to pay per this Decision;

5) Dismissing this case insofar as defendants Intertrade and Marketing Co., Inc. and J. Antonio Aguenza are concerned, although their
respective counterclaims against the plaintiff are also ordered dismissed.

Costs of suit shall be paid, jointly and severally, by defendant Vitaliado Arrieta and Lilia Perez.

SO ORDERED.3

Private respondents Arrieta and spouses Perez appealed the foregoing decision to the respondent Court of Appeals.

On February 11, 1986, respondent appellate court promulgated the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering Intertrade & Marketing Co., Inc., and J. Antonio
Aguenza, jointly and severally:

1) to pay the Bank the principal of P440,000.00 plus its interest of 18.704% per annum computed from April 15, 1979 until full payment;

2) to pay the Bank the sum equivalent to 8% of P440,000.00 as penalty, computed from July 19, 1978 until full payment;

3) to pay the Bank the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The complaint is dismissed as against Lilia Perez, Patricio Perez and Vitaliado P. Arrieta who are absolved from liability.

All counterclaims are dismissed.

Costs against Intertrade and Aguenza, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED.

In setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals ratiocinated such reversal in this wise:

No dispute exists as to the promissory note and the suretyship agreement. The controversy centers on whether the note was a
corporate undertaking and whether the suretyship agreement covered the obligation in the note.

As far as Intertrade is concerned, it seems clear from its answer that the loan evidenced by the note was a corporate liability.
Paragraph 1.3 of the answer admits ". . . defendant's obtention of the loan from the plaintiff . . ."; the affirmative defenses admit default,
and invoking the defense of usury, plead adjustment of excessive interest which Intertrade refused to make.

On the basis of this admission, it is no longer in point to discuss, as the appealed decision does, the question of the capacity in which
Arrieta and Perez signed the promissory note, Intertrade's admission of its corporate liability being admission also that the signatories
signed the note in a representative capacity. The Bank itself gave corroboration with its insistence on Intertrade's liability under the
note. . .

The stated purpose of the note is "operating capital." It cannot be contended that the words "operating capital" refer to the capital
requirements of Perez and Arrieta. In the first place, it was not shown that they were in business for themselves. Besides, Perez was
only a bookkeeper of Intertrade with a salary of P800.00 a month . . . Their combined resources would not have been sufficient to
justify a business loan of the note's magnitude. From these follows the only logical conclusion: that Arrieta and the Perez spouses are
not liable on the note.

The surety agreement presents a different problem.

There is no question that Aguenza signed the agreement . . . Its second paragraph shows, typewritten in bold capitals, that the
agreement was executed "for and in consideration of any existing indebtedness to the Bank of INTERTRADE & MARKETING
COMPANY, INC." Nowhere in its entire text is it shown that its execution was for the benefit of Perez or Arrieta.

Aguenza feigns ignorance of the promissory note and claims his knowledge of it came only when he received summons. This is difficult
to believe. As Intertrade's first letter to the Bank . . . shows, the Board of Directors and principal stockholders met to discuss the
obligation. Aguenza was at the time president of Intertrade and acting chairman of its board . . .

Aguenza also argues that the suretyship was executed to enable Intertrade to avail of letters of credit to finance importations, which
had all been paid in full, and therefore the agreement was thereby terminated. Again, the agreement shows up the fallacy of this
argument. The document is boldly denominated "CONTINUING SURETYSHIP," and paragraph VI thereof stipulates it to be a
continuing one, "to remain in force until written notice shall have been received by the Bank that it has been revoked by the surety . . . "
In other words, the option to cancel, in writing, was given to the sureties; the evidence does not show any written notice of such
cancellation. . . .

And, the argument that the agreement was executed as security for letters of credit that had already been paid is in itself confirmation
that the suretyship was meant to benefit Intertrade. The trust receipts . . . and the bills of exchange . . . are all in the name of Intertrade.

The suretyship is both retrospective and prospective in its operation. Its wording covers all obligations of Intertrade existing as of its
date as well as those that may exist thereafter. Hence, its coverage extends to the promissory note as well.4

Understandably, petitioner lost no time in bringing this case before us via a petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING AND [SETTING] ASIDE THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENTS VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS NOT A
CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND THAT PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE THEREON UNDER THE
"CONTINUING SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT" DATED 4 MARCH 1977.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY
RESPONDENT VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND
CONSEQUENTLY RENDERING PETITIONER LIABLE IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A SURETY UNDER THE "CONTINUING
SURETYSHIP" OF 4 MARCH 1977, IS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS AND PREMISED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

THE CONCLUSIONS AND CONSTRUCTION REACHED BY RESPONDENT COURT FROM THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF
RECORD, ARE INCORRECT RESULTING IN AN ERRONEOUS DECISION GRAVELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.5

The petition has merit,.

The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial court's absolution of petitioner is its finding that the loan made
by private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to be its own obligation.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is neither factual nor legal basis for such a finding by
respondent Appellate Court.

First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader"6 is
not an absolute and inflexible rule7 and is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (Emphasis supplied).

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing that it was made by
improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear or the
admission was taken out of context."8

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in appreciating the "Answer" filed by the lawyer
of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading filed by Atty.
Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability
warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it
was taken out of context and no admission was made at all.
In any event, assuming arguendo  that the responsive pleading did contain the aforesaid admission of corporate liability, the same may
not still be given effect at all. As correctly found by the trial court, the alleged admission made in the answer by the counsel for
Intertrade was "without any enabling act or attendant ratification of corporate act,"9 as would authorize or even ratify such admission. In
the absence of such ratification or authority, such admission does not bind the corporation.

Second, the respondent appellate court likewise adjudged Intertrade liable because of the two letters emanating from the office of Mr.
Arrieta which the respondent court considered "as indicating the corporate liability of the corporation." 10 These documents and
admissions cannot have the effect of a ratification of an unauthorized act. As we elucidated in the case of Vicente
v. Geraldez, 11 "ratification can never be made on the part of the corporation by the same persons who wrongfully assume the power to
make the contract, but the ratification must be by the officer as governing body having authority to make such contract." In other words,
the unauthorized act of respondent Arrieta can only be ratified by the action of the Board of Directors and/or petitioner Aguenza jointly
with private respondent Arrieta.

We must emphasize that Intertrade has a distinct personality separate from its members. The corporation transacts its business only
through its officers or agents. Whatever authority these officers or agents may have is derived from the Board of Directors or other
governing body unless conferred by the charter of the corporation. An officer's power as an agent of the corporation must be sought
from the statute, charter, the by-laws, as in a delegation of authority to such officer, or the acts of the Board of Directors formally
expressed or implied from a habit or custom of doing business. 12

Thirdly, we note that the only document to evidence the subject transaction was the promissory note dated March 21, 1978 signed by
private respondents Arrieta and Lilia Perez. There is no indication in said document as to what capacity the two signatories had in
affixing their signatures thereon.

It is noted that the subject transaction is a loan contract for P500,000.00 under terms and conditions which are stringent, if not onerous.
The power to borrow money is one of those cases where even a special power of attorney is required. 13 In the instant case, them is
invariably a need of an enabling act of the corporation to be approved by its Board of Directors. As round by the trial court, the records
of this case is bereft of any evidence that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon Arrieta and Lilia Perez the authority
to contract a loan with Metrobank and execute the promissory note as a security therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a stockholder's
resolution was presented by Metrobank to show that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were empowered by Intertrade to execute the promissory
note. 14

The respondents may argue that the actuation of Arrieta and Liliah Perez was in accordance with the ordinary course of business
usages and practices of Intertrade. However, this contention is devoid of merit because the prevailing practice in Intertrade was to
explicitly authorize an officer to contract loans in behalf of the corporation. This is evidenced by the fact that previous to the
controversy, the Intertrade Board of Directors, through a board resolution, jointly empowered and authorized petitioner and respondent
Arrieta to negotiate, apply for, and open credit lines with Metrobank's. 15 The participation of these two was mandated to be joint and
not separate and individual.

In the case at bench, only respondent Arrieta, together with a bookkeeper of the corporation, signed the promissory notes, without the
participation and approval of petitioner Aguenza. Moreover, the enabling corporate act on this particular transaction has not been
obtained. Neither has it been shown that any provision of the charter or any other act of the Board of Directors exists to confer power
on the Executive Vice President acting alone and without the concurrence of its President, to execute the disputed document. 16

Thus, proceeding from the premise that the subject loan was not the responsibility of Intertrade, it follows that the undertaking of Arrieta
and the bookkeeper was not an undertaking covered by the Continuing Suretyship Agreement. The rule is that a contract of surety is
never presumed; it must be express and cannot extend to more than what is stipulated, 17 It is strictly construed against the creditor,
every doubt being resolved against enlarging the liability of the surety.

The present obligation incurred in subject contract of loan, as secured by the Arrieta and Perez promissory note, is not the obligation of
the corporation and petitioner Aguenza, but the individual and personal obligation of private respondents Arrieta and Lilia Perez.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals 18 dated February 11, 1986 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the trial court dated February 29, 1984 is hereby REINSTATED.

No Costs.

G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition 1 defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU
members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an
intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around
the barangays of Caibiran. 2

From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met the group of accused-
appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-
appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government
agents, fled. 3

Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut
leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he
asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm
and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal
possession of firearm. 4

Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only given to him by one of
his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was
a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was
the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up. 5 Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano
that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves. 6

On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the
prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. 7 It found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact
that SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible
accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he
followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that
he did not know his companions. 8

Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in the imposition of the maximum penalty against the
accused-appellant. 9

This court, in the case of People v.  Lualhati10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the
product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be
secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it
did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides, inter alia:

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the
poisonous
tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant acquitted.

Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12 where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to
be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a
search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardy tenable. He and his companions'
drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform
or a jungle suit 13 and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were
precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. 14

The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v.  Court of Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at the time
the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspended that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant."

This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas
himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be
made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as a government
agents. 16 The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest.
There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents.
Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the
part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.

As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit
to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to
prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. 17

Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license
and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential
element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 18

In People v.  Tiozon, 19 this Court said:

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to support the view that it is
incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm,
but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in
criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution
must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged," the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to
prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The
information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had
no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not
merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the
accused was charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be
a voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime charged and
should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral. 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal
practice of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he
received monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical
Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for
instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such
circumstance, need only establish a  prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the
Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a
firearm. Former Chief Justice Moral upholds this view as follows:

The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making
the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some
knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act
or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had
acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more
facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, encumber upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the
allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the
accused  prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him." (6 Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).

Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on this question. As this Court summed
up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling: 20

We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the
offense as alleged against the accused in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided by
the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all
the elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus alleged.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer
Niño at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he
had one. 21 In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove the second element.

Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm which is that
accused-appellant does not have the corresponding license? Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the accused-
appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the
pleading and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged.

This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of
circumstance from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." 22 In
other words, it is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." 23 From the above principles, this Court can
infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.

Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof.

Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not
stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.

This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject
firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words,
such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned." 24

Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and
the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the
negative." 25

In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a
licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued
detention, with cost de oficio.

G.R. No. 119845 July 5, 1996 ANTONIO M. GARCIA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1994, in CA-G.R. No.
38329 entitled, "Security Bank and Trust Co. plaintiff-appellant vs. Dynetics, Inc., defendant-appellant and Antonio M. Garcia,
defendant-appellee", modifying the trial court's judgment dated March 9, 1992, in that said decision of the Court of Appeals held herein
petitioner Antonio M. Garcia jointly and severally liable with then defendant-appellant Dynetics, Inc. to plaintiff-appellant Security Bank
and Trust Co. for the unpaid obligation under the Export Loan Line in the amount of P24,743,935.35 and a Swap Loan Facility in the
deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72, both of which amounts appear to have now ballooned to P2 billion due to interests, penalties, and
attorney's fees (pp. 27-28, CA Decision; 175-176, Rollo). Dynetics, Inc. is not a petitioner herein and accepts its liability. The only issue
is whether petitioner Garcia is jointly and severally liable with Dynetics, Inc. for such loans.

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On November 19, 1980, respondent Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) granted Dynetics, Inc. a short-term EXPORT loan line in the
amount of P25 million pursuant to an Advisory Letter-Agreement (Exh. A, A-1). The loan was secured by a deed of assignment with
pledge on export letters of credit and/or purchase orders equivalent to 100% of their face value. The said credit line was subsequently
renewed on various dates and in various amounts, the last renewal having been made on January 24, 1985 in the increased amount of
P26 million evidenced by the Renewal Credit Line Agreement (Exh. B).

Pursuant to said Renewal Credit Line Agreement, Dynetics availed itself of the export loan for the period of February to May 1985 in
the total amount of P25,074,906.16, executing and signing for said purpose 34 promissory notes of various dates covering the
aforementioned period (Exhs. C to JJ), and trust receipts (pp. 7-8, CA Decision; pp. 155-156, Rollo).

Prior to this 1985 availment, particularly on April 20, 1982, Dynetics obtained another credit accommodation or SWAP loan from SBTC
in the amount of $700,000.00. To secure payment thereof, petitioner Antonio Garcia, with Vicente B. Chuidian, executed an Indemnity
Agreement in favor of SBTC on April 26, 1982 (Exh. NN).

It appears that Dynetics did not avail itself of this SWAP loan. Subsequently, however, in 1983, the SWAP loan facility was renewed in
the reduced amount of $500,000.00 and it was this loan which Dynetics availed of in 1985 and concerning which it issued a promissory
note (Exh. PP). The SWAP loan was renewed in 1984, this time on a quarterly basis, the last quarterly renewal having been made on
April 22, 1985. By this time, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a continuing suretyship undertaking (Exh. OO, OO-1) in accordance
with, and in pursuance of, which petitioner Garcia bound himself jointly and severally with Dynetics to pay all the latter's obligations with
respondent SBTC. Subsequent thereto, however, and without the consent and knowledge of Garcia, SBTC required Dynetics to
execute a chattel mortgage over various pieces of machinery to secure the SWAP loan (Exh. LL).

Dynetics failed to pay the SWAP loan upon its maturity on July 22, 1985, prompting SBTC to foreclose on the chattel mortgage. The
mortgaged chattels were sold at public auction on September 15, 1985 to SBTC as highest bidder for the amount of P6,850,861.30.
This amount was applied as partial payment of the SWAP loan, leaving a deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72.

Dynetics also defaulted in the payment of the EXPORT loan which amounted to over P464 million, exclusive of attorney's fees and
costs, as of June 30, 1989 (Exh. KK).

In view of Dynetics' failure to settle its account with SBTC relative to the EXPORT loan and the deficiency balance of the SWAP loan,
despite repeated demands, a complaint was filed in court by SBTC against Dynetics, petitioner Garcia, and his co-surety Vicente
Chuidian for recovery of a sum of money.

Dynetics, in its answer, contended that the promissory notes had no consideration; that the names of the executive officers of SBTC
were stamped on the blank promissory notes; and that the chattel mortgage was not registered, hence it was converted into a pledge,
thus barring recovery of the deficiency balance of the obligation after foreclosure, as the principal obligation was extinguished.

Petitioner Garcia, for his part, asserted that no prior or written demand was made by SBTC or its counsel upon any of the defendants
prior to the filing of the case in court; that the loans had long been paid and extinguished; and that the chattel mortgage discarded the
Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Suretyship.

After trial, Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati, rendered its judgment on
March 9, 1992, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Dynetics Incorporated
which is hereby ordered:

1) to pay plaintiff the principal sum of P24,743,935.35 as consequence of and in connection with the promissory notes (Exhs. C to JJ),
plus accrued interests thereon, compounded quarterly effective from their respective maturity dates until fully paid, and monthly penalty
charges of five percent (5%) of the total outstanding obligation and accrued interests due and unpaid;
2) to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,596,758.72 (or its dollar equivalent of US$187,550.97) as deficiency balance on the chattel mortgage
(Exh. LL); and,

3) to pay plaintiff attorney's fees equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the aforestated entire amounts due and outstanding, litigation
expenses of P250,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

The case against defendant Antonio M. Garcia is hereby DISMISSED, together with said defendant's counterclaim for damages.
Plaintiff is however ordered to pay defendant Garcia the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. Furthermore, the writ of preliminary
attachment dated September 8, 1989 insofar only as affecting defendant Garcia's properties is hereby quashed, dissolved and/or lifted.

(p. 11, RTC Decision; p. 193, Rollo.)

SBTC, as well as defendant Dynetics, appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On August 12, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision modifying that of the trial court by holding Garcia
solidarily liable with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid balance under the EXPORT loan and the deficiency balance on the SWAP loan,
together with interests, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs. Disposed thus respondent court:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED and defendant-appellant Dynetics
and defendant-appellee Antonio Garcia are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally unto plaintiff-appellee SBTC the following:

1) P24,743,935.35 representing the unpaid principal obligation under the promissory notes sued upon, plus accrued interests,
compounded quarterly reckoned from the respective maturity dates of the promissory notes until fully paid, and monthly penalty
charges of 5% of the total outstanding obligation;

2) P3,596,758.72 representing deficiency balance on the chattel mortgage with legal interest from 1 September 1989 (date of filing of
complaint); and

3) attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts due and outstanding, and litigation expenses of P100,000.00, plus costs.

The award of attorney's fees in favor of appellee Antonio Garcia is eliminated and the writ of attachment issued by the court a quo over
the shares of stock owned by appellee Antonio Garcia in Chemphil is hereby declared to be valid and subsisting until full satisfaction of
the aforementioned amounts.

(pp. 27-28, CA Decision; pp. 175-176, Rollo.)

A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by Garcia, but the same was denied by respondent court on April 7, 1995.

Hence, the instant petition filed on August 4, 1995, wherein Garcia assigns the following alleged errors:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding Garcia liable as surety for the export loans granted by SBTC to Dynetics because the suretyship
he assumed was intended only for another loan, the SWAP LOAN facility,

II

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the chattel mortgage executed by Dynetics on 26 April 1985 to secure the promissory note it
issued upon availment of the SWAP LOAN facility ($500,000.00) did not replace and extinguish the 1983 suretyship undertaking of
Garcia for the same obligation.

III

On the assumption that the SBTC claim against Garcia as surety is partly or wholly valid, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding so
exorbitant amounts of damages, that is P1,747,359,429.30 as  penalty charges (5% monthly of total outstanding obligation or 60% per
year on the export loan, excluding those on the swap loan) and P408,652,357.42 as attorney's fees (20% of the amounts due and
outstanding) on top of P267,558,663.80 as interest earning on the principal obligation of only P24,743,935.35 as export loan and
P3,596,758.72 as SWAP LOAN.
Involved in the case at bar are two loans — an EXPORT loan and a SWAP loan obtained by Dynetics from SBTC, with Garcia as
surety in the SWAP loan. The controversy arose when Dynetics failed to pay said loans, giving rise to the issue of whether or not
petitioner Garcia as surety is liable jointly and solidarily with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid obligations of Dynetics
under both the EXPORT loan and the SWAP loan, together with the interests, penalty charges, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, by virtue of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) and the Continuing Suretyship (Exh. OO, OO-1). In other words, does the
liability of Garcia as surety in the SWAP loan cover or extend to the EXPORT loan?

It is the stand of Garcia that he is not liable as surety to SBTC for the EXPORT loan because the Indemnity Agreement and Continuing
Suretyship he executed covered only the SWAP loan, which, however, were later replaced and extinguished by the chattel mortgage
executed by Dynetics in favor of SBTC.

On the other hand, SBTC contends that Garcia is liable for both the EXPORT loan and SWAP loan transactions by virtue of the
comprehensive provisions of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) and the Continuing Suretyship (Exh. OO, OO-1) he signed and
executed jointly and severally with Dynetics in favor of SBTC.

After a painstaking study of the records before us, we find for petitioner Garcia. We hold that he is not liable for the EXPORT loan.
Stated differently, Garcia's liability as surety for the SWAP loan under the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, if any at all,
does not extend to the EXPORT loan.

In holding Garcia liable for both the EXPORT loan and the SWAP loan, respondent Court of Appeals relied heavily on the provisions of
the Indemnity Agreement dated April 26, 1982 executed by Garcia together with Dynetics (Exh. NN) that:

. . . Antonio Garcia . . . hereby bind(s) himself/themselves jointly and severally with the CLIENT in favor of the BANK for the payment,
upon demand and without benefit of excusion, of whatever amount or amounts the CLIENT may be indebted to the BANK under and by
virtue of aforesaid credit accommodation(s) including the substitutions, renewals, extensions, increases, amendments, conversions and
revivals of the aforesaid credit accommodation(s), as well as of the amount or amounts of such other obligations that the CLIENT may
owe the BANK, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books, and records of the BANK, plus
interest and expenses arising from any agreement or agreements that may have heretofore been made or hereafter executed by and
between the parties. . . .

(p. 349, Rollo).

At first glance, from the words "as well as of the amount or amounts of such other obligations, . . . that the client may owe the BANK", it
would appear that SBTC was also referring to the obligation of Dynetics under the EXPORT loan. But the above quoted phrase, to our
mind, and contrary to the claim of SBTC, did not impose on Garcia the obligation to pay the EXPORT loan in addition to the SWAP
loan. Particular attention must be paid to the statement appearing on the face of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) "evidenced by
those certain loan documents dated April 20, 1982" (Exh. 1-B, Garcia). From this statement, it is clear that the Indemnity Agreement
refers only to the loan document of April 20, 1982 which is the SWAP loan. It did not include the EXPORT loan. Hence, petitioner
cannot be held answerable for the EXPORT loan.

The Indemnity Agreement specifically secured the $700,000.00 SWAP loan which was not availed of. The Continuing Suretyship, on
the other hand, specifically secured the reduced $500,000.00 SWAP loan. The Indemnity Agreement is not involved in the reduced
SWAP loan. There was no reason for SBTC to require the execution of the Continuing Suretyship if its intention were to have the
earlier Indemnity Agreement secure the SWAP loan in both the original and in the reduced amounts. It may be added that the
execution of this Continuing Suretyship for the reduced amount of the SWAP loan confirms our conclusion that SBTC's "present and
hereafter obligation" clauses are not binding on Garcia, and that a particular collateral secures only such obligation identified in the
document evidencing the security.

Other important considerations negate respondent court's finding that petitioner's liability as surety under the SWAP loan extends or
covers the EXPORT loan.

Reviewing once more the record, it may be noticed that the EXPORT loan was secured by:

1. A Deed of Assignment with pledge on the export LC's and PO's equivalent to 100% of their face value, (Par. 3, Letter-Agreement,
Exh. A, pp. 242-243, Rollo), by virtue of which the right of the assignor is transferred to the assignee, who would then be allowed to
proceed against the debtor. This assignment had the effect similar to that of a sale (Wyco Sales Corp. vs. BA Finance Corp., 200
SCRA 637 [1991]).

2. Trust Receipts (Pars. 2 & 3, Exh. B, Renewal Credit Line, p. 246, Rollo) which is a separate and independent security transaction
intended to aid in financing importers whereby the imported goods are held as security by the lending institution for the loan obligation.
In this regard, Justice Melencio-Herrera's statements in Vintola vs.  Insular Bank of Asia and America (150 SCRA 578 [1987]), later re-
echoed in Nacu vs.  Court of Appeals  (231 SCRA 237 [1994]), are instructional, to wit:

. . . A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endowed with its own distinctive features and characteristics. Under that set-up a bank
extends a loan covered by the letter of credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a
loan feature represented by the letter of credit and a security feature which is the covering trust receipt.

xxx xxx xxx

A trust receipt therefore is a security agreement, pursuant to which

a bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods. "It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that
secures no obligation . . ."

. . . as elucidated in Samo vs.  People [footnote deleted] "a trust receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in
financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of
merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or
purchased

(at pp. 583-584.)

Thus, by virtue of the trust receipt agreement, SBTC should proceed against the trust receipt because the bank, through said trust
receipt agreement theoretically acquired ownership of the imported personal property (Nacu vs. Court of Appeals, supra.).

3. Thirty-four Promissory notes — (Exh. C to JJ, pp. 245-346, Rollo) signed by Dynetics' Vice-President for Treasury and Finance,
making the latter liable on its due date for the amount stated.

4. Hold-Out Arrangement Proviso (Par. 6, Exh. B) providing for the right of SBTC to apply even without notice to the debtor, in payment
of and all obligations of Dynetics, whatever funds or property of Dynetics which may be under the control or possession of SBTC on
deposit or otherwise.

5. Deposit Balances — to be maintained subject to hold-out, authorizing SBTC to apply all deposit funds of Dynetics in payment of its
unpaid obligations.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is obvious that the EXPORT loan was more than fully secured. SBTC can proceed against these
securities in payment of said loan.

The EXPORT loan transaction and SWAP loan transaction are totally alien to each other. Noteworthy is the fact that the EXPORT loan,
its renewal of credit line containing the trust receipts and hold-out provisos were extended to Dynetics and the only participation of
Garcia was to sign in his capacity as President of Dynetics. The promissory notes were signed by the Vice-President for Treasury and
Finance Luvina Maglaya for Dynetics. On the other hand, the SWAP loan was applied for and extended to Dynetics as principal, with
Garcia as surety under the Indemnity Agreement. While Garcia is a party in both transactions, he acted in different capacities.

Clearly, the two loan transactions involved two sets of parties. The Indemnity Agreement signed by Garcia is a distinct contract and can
not in anyway be related to the EXPORT loan.

Even if we momentarily disregard the foregoing circumstances, and confine ourselves to the provisions of the Indemnity Agreement,
still the conclusion can not be escaped that the same does not cover the EXPORT loan. To say otherwise would be to make the
provision too comprehensive and all-encompassing as to amount to absurdity.

The phrase "such other obligations" in the Indemnity Agreement is vague, equivocal, and patently ambiguous. It raises doubt as to its
real meaning. It is, therefore, subject to interpretation. If the parties intended the 1982 SWAP loan to apply to and cover the 1980
EXPORT loan transaction, SBTC should have clearly and categorically stated so in the said Indemnity Agreement. Respondent bank
failed in this regard.

It is a well-stated legal principle that if there is any doubt on the terms and conditions of the surety agreement, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the surety (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 767 [1991]). Ambiguous contracts are
construed against the party who caused the ambiguity (De Leon vs. Court of Appeals 186 SCRA 345 [1990]).

An additional point to consider is that the Indemnity Agreement is set out in a printed contract form of SBTC. Its provisions appear to be
the standard stipulations imposed by SBTC upon all persons seeking to secure surety bonds. To this extent, the Indemnity Agreement
is a contract of adhesion, having been prepared by respondent SBTC. Consequently, any ambiguity is to be taken contra proferentum,
that is, construed against the party who caused the ambiguity which could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care (Orient
Air Services and Hotel Representatives vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 [1991]; Nacu vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 237 [1994];
De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 345 [1990]; Equitable Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 518
[1988]; Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 562 [1989]). To be more emphatic, any ambiguity in a contract whose
terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it (Orient Air Service and Hotel
Representatives vs. Court of Appeals, supra.; Cadalin vs POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721 [1994]).

The foregoing pronouncements are, of course, based on Article 1377 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

On the matter of petitioner's liability for the deficiency balance under the SWAP LOAN, it is of course correct to say that the chattel
mortgage executed between Dynetics and SBTC was merely for additional security which did not alter, affect, or modify the terms and
conditions of the Indemnity Agreement executed between Garcia and SBTC, even if, it must be admitted, the chattel mortgage was
entered into without the knowledge of or notice to Garcia. Hence, Garcia, contrary to his submission, was not released as surety by
virtue of execution of the aforementioned chattel mortgage.

Nonetheless, under the prevailing facts of the case, we believe that Garcia still cannot be held liable for the deficiency of
P3,596,758.72, the reason being that SBTC expressly and judicially waived the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) and the Continuing
Surety (Exh. OO) through no less than Atty. Bello, counsel for SBTC, during the cross-examination by petitioner's lawyer of one of
SBTC's witnesses, thusly:

ATTY. GANGOSO:

But, I'm not asking what the counsel is after. I'm trying to show that the Swap Agreement is not covered by a Continuing Agreement of
Mr. Garcia, because, the Swap Loan Agreement is . . .

ATTY. BELLO:
But we are willing to admit, Your Honor.

ATTY. GANGOSO:
There was a statement, that the Continuing Agreement did not cover the Swap Agreement.

ATTY. BELLO:
I'm admitting that as far as the Swap Loan is concerned, this was secured; the chattel mortgage only secured the swap loan.

ATTY. GANGOSO:
Considering then, for that matter that I will stop asking Mrs. Marquez between the relations of the Swap Loan Agreement, and the
Continuing Suretyship.

ATTY. BELLO III:

I was saying that the chattel mortgage more or less, secures the swap loan.

In fine, insofar as the SWAP loan was concerned, SBTC did away with the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, opting
instead to rely solely on the chattel mortgage. The aforequoted declarations of Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are conclusive. Such
admission is binding and no amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.

. . . Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the
same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made

We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court, more so after the opposing party relied upon
such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings does not require proof. The record here does not show any attempt on the part of SBTC to contradict such
judicial admission on the ground of palpable mistake.

Finally, it should be noted that the chattel mortgage was entered into by Dynetics and SBTC. Garcia was not a party to the chattel
mortgage nor was he aware of the contract or its provisions. It is a basic principle in law that contracts can only bind the parties who
had entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person (Oreano vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 40 [1992]). Only those who
are parties to contracts are liable for their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby impose any liability on one who, under its terms,
is a stranger to the contract. And considering that it is Dynetics which executed the chattel mortgage, the liability for the deficiency
therefor, must be adjudged against Dynetics alone.

With the conclusions thus reached, we find it unnecessary to discuss the issue concerning the reasonableness of the damages
awarded, the penalty charges, and attorney's fees the Court of Appeals ordered Garcia to pay SBTC.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1994 in its CA-G.R. CV No. 38329 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held petitioner Antonio M. Garcia jointly and severally liable with Dynetics, Inc. to SBTC, and
a new decision is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Antonio M. Garcia.

G.R. No. L-4123               November 16, 1907 LA YEBANA COMPANY vs.TIMOTEO SEVILLA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

The complaint filed in this action alleges that on February 23, 1907, the defendant Timoteo Sevilla was indebted to the plaintiff in the
sum of P4,363.42; that on that day the defendant admitted this indebtedness and promised to pay the same; and that, although
demand had been made for payment, neither the amount due nor any part thereof had been paid at the time of the filing of the
complaint.

The defendant Sevilla in his answer admitted the truth of the allegations of the complaint, but alleged by way of special defense that,
while it was true he had promised to pay the debt, the plaintiff had agreed to accept payment either at the rate of P500 weekly until the
entire amount was paid or from time to time in such sum as he, Sevilla, might be able to collect or recover from the owners of certain
stores in the Province of Bataan who had received on credit goods furnished Sevilla on commission.

Counsel from the plaintiff thereupon prayed for judgment upon the pleadings; and the trial court, without taking evidence as to the truth
of the allegations of the defendant, gave judgment against Sevilla and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P4,362.42, with interest at
the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the filing of the complaint. In support of this judgment the trial judge holds in his opinion "that the
special defense set up by the defendant Sevilla, in so far as it consists of allegations of facts, alleges the existence of an agreement by
virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly installments of P500," and that, the complaint having been filed
on the 21st day of March, 1907, "it is evident that, admitting the truth of the allegations set up by the defense, the debt in controversy
has become due and payable."

The trial court seems to have overlooked the fact that the answer of the defendant Sevilla alleges not only that it was agreed that the
debt might be paid in weekly installments of P500 each but the complainant also agreed to accept payment in such sums as Sevilla
should from time to time collect or recover from the owners of certain stores in the Province of Bataan who had received on credit
goods furnished Sevilla on commission. There is nothing in the pleadings to show that Sevilla collected or recovered anything from
these persons between the date of the alleged agreement and the date of the filing of the complaint; and, if it be true that he had the
alternative right to pay his indebtedness from time to time as he collected or recovered funds from his debtors in Bataan, the only
amount which was due and payable at the time of the filing of the complaint, was such amount as might appear to have been
recovered from these debtors prior to that date.

It must be admitted that the language wherein it is alleged that the defendant had the alternative right to pay his indebtedness in the
manner and form above stated admits of various constructions; and it may be that the agreement touching the payment, from time to
time, of such sums as Sevilla recovered from his debtors was in effect an agreement that he would pay over all the amounts thus
collected notwithstanding that they should exceed the sum of P500 weekly, as provided in the first part of the alleged agreement. But,
however this may be, the effect of a motion by the plaintiff for a judgment on the pleadings is to admit the truth of the defendant's
relevant allegations, and we do not think that in such cases judgment for the plaintiff should be rendered on a particular construction of
the language of the pleadings, favorable to the plaintiff, when such judgment could not be entered on another construction to which the
language used in the pleadings is equally susceptible. In the case at bar we think the usual and ordinary construction of the language
used in setting out the alleged agreements as to the form of payment gave to Sevilla the alternative right either to pay at the rate of
P500 weekly or to pay from time to time all money recovered from his debtors in Bataan.1awphi1.net

But we would be compelled to reverse the judgment upon the mere allegation of the defense of the existence of an agreement, by
virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly installments of P500, without an allegation as to an alternative
mode of payment. It appears from the pleadings that the alleged agreement as to the mode of payment of the admitted indebtedness
was entered into on the 23rd day of February, 1907. The complaint was filed on the 21st day of March, 1907, so that not quite four
weeks had elapsed from the date of the alleged agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint. Where a debt is payable in
installments, recovery can be had only for those installments due and payable when the action was commenced, in the absence of any
stipulation to the contrary in the contract. (La Compania General de Tabacos vs. Araza, 7 Phil. Rep., 455; Artadi y Compania vs. Chu
Baco, 1 5 Off. Gaz., 711.) It is evident, therefore, that, since it does not appear from the pleadings that it was expressly stipulated that
upon the failure to pay any one of the weekly installments the whole debt should thereupon become at once due and payable, the most
that could be recovered would be the sum of P1,500, being the weekly installments of P500 for the three full weeks which had elapsed
from the date of the agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint.

The judgment appealed from should be, and is hereby, reversed without costs in this instance to either party. So ordered.