FM 3-98

Reconnaissance and Security

Operations

JULY 2015
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 FM 3-98

Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-98 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, -XO\

Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Contents
Page
PREFACE............................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1 IMPORTANCE OF RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY AND ROLES OF
CAVALRY ORGANIZATIONS ........................................................................... 1-1
Section I – Role of the Cavalry Formation in Unified Land Operations ...... 1-1
Section II – Cavalry Employment in Unified Land Operations ..................... 1-5
Cavalry in Unified Land Operations .................................................................... 1-5
General Employment of Cavalry Units ............................................................... 1-6
Reconnaissance Considerations at Echelons Above Brigade ........................... 1-7
Brigade Operations Officer and Squadron Employment within the BCT ......... 1-10
Section III – Organizations............................................................................. 1-17
Brigade Combat Team ..................................................................................... 1-18
Cavalry Squadrons ........................................................................................... 1-19
Cavalry Troops ................................................................................................. 1-19
Scout Platoon ................................................................................................... 1-20
Chapter 2 THREAT ............................................................................................................. 2-1
Section I – Understanding the Threat ............................................................. 2-1
Enemies and Adversaries................................................................................... 2-2
Section II – Potential Threat Groups .............................................................. 2-3
States.................................................................................................................. 2-3
Section III – Threat Characteristics and Organization .................................. 2-4
Threat Capabilities, Tactics, and Techniques .................................................... 2-5
Countering Adaptations and Retaining the Initiative .......................................... 2-7
Chapter 3 SHAPE, ENGAGE, AND CONSOLIDATE GAINS ............................................ 3-1
Section I – Understanding the Operational Environment ............................ 3-1
Section II – Shaping the Environment ............................................................ 3-3
Section III - Engagement Activities ................................................................. 3-4
Section IV – Influence ...................................................................................... 3-6
Section V – Consolidation of Gains ................................................................ 3-6

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

i
Contents

Chapter 4 MISSION COMMAND ......................................................................................... 4-1

Section I – Mission Command For Reconnaissance and Security .............. 4-1
Mission Command .............................................................................................. 4-1
Reconnaissance and Security Operations .......................................................... 4-2
Section II – Exercise of Mission Command .................................................... 4-4
The Operations Process ..................................................................................... 4-4
Section III – Integrating Processes and Continuing Activities ................... 4-23
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield .........................................................4-24
Targeting ...........................................................................................................4-24
Timely Reporting and Assessment ...................................................................4-24
Update the Collection Plan ...............................................................................4-26
Screen Reports ................................................................................................. 4-26
Correlate Reports to Requirements ..................................................................4-26
Provide Feedback and Revise Scheme of Maneuver .......................................4-27
Chapter 5 RECONNAISSANCE .......................................................................................... 5-1
Section I – Fundamentals, Methods, and Management ................................ 5-1
Fundamentals ..................................................................................................... 5-1
Reconnaissance Techniques .............................................................................. 5-2
Reconnaissance Methods ................................................................................... 5-2
Reconnaissance Management ........................................................................... 5-4
Reconnaissance Assets and Systems ................................................................ 5-4
Section II – Forms of Reconnaissance ........................................................... 5-6
Zone Reconnaissance ........................................................................................ 5-6
Area Reconnaissance .......................................................................................5-16
Route Reconnaissance .....................................................................................5-18
Reconnaissance in Force .................................................................................5-21
Special Reconnaissance ...................................................................................5-21
Section III – Reconnaissance Handover ....................................................... 5-22
Chapter 6 SECURITY .......................................................................................................... 6-1
Section I – Fundamentals of Security ............................................................. 6-1
Security ............................................................................................................... 6-1
Fundamentals ..................................................................................................... 6-2
Commander’s Security Guidance ....................................................................... 6-2
Section II – Counterreconnaissance ............................................................... 6-3
Section III – Forms of Security ........................................................................ 6-4
Screen ................................................................................................................. 6-5
Guard ................................................................................................................6-11
Cover .................................................................................................................6-19
Area Security.....................................................................................................6-26
Local Security....................................................................................................6-31
Chapter 7 STABILITY TASKS ............................................................................................ 7-1
Section I – Reconnaissance and Security ...................................................... 7-1
Cavalry Units Role .............................................................................................. 7-2
Support to Reconnaissance and Security During Stability ................................. 7-3
Sustainment ........................................................................................................ 7-6

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 Contents

Interdependent Capabilities ................................................................................ 7-7

Section II – Principles and Framework........................................................... 7-8
Section III – Tasks ............................................................................................ 7-9
Chapter 8 SUSTAINMENT .................................................................................................. 8-1
Section I – Reconnaissance and Security Tasks .......................................... 8-1
Section II – Planning for Reconnaissance and Security Tasks ................... 8-1
Planning Fundamentals and Procedures ........................................................... 8-2
Logistics .............................................................................................................. 8-3
Personnel Services ............................................................................................. 8-5
Support Areas ..................................................................................................... 8-7
Echelons Above Brigade Sustainment Support ................................................. 8-9
Section III – Sustainment Considerations for Reconnaissance, Security,
and Stability Tasks ........................................................................................... 8-9
Sustainment of Reconnaissance Tasks ............................................................. 8-9
Sustainment of Security Tasks ......................................................................... 8-10
Sustainment of Stability Tasks ......................................................................... 8-11
Section IV – Special Sustainment Considerations ..................................... 8-11
Attachments and Detachments ........................................................................ 8-11
Sustainment Considerations for Specific Units ................................................ 8-12
Appendix A ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) FORMAT AND INSTRUCTIONS . A-1
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... References-1
INDEX ..................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures
Figure 1-1. Reconnaissance and security BCT .................................................................... 1-10
Figure 1-2. Brigade reconnaissance cell .............................................................................. 1-11
Figure 1-3. Squadron in its own area of operation ............................................................... 1-12
Figure 1-4. Squadron in BCT deep area of operations ........................................................ 1-13
Figure 1-5. Squadron operating across another battalion’s area of operation..................... 1-14
Figure 1-6. Squadron conducting route reconnaissance throughout the brigade AO .......... 1-16
Figure 1-7. Cavalry units (shaded) in BCTs ......................................................................... 1-18
Figure 4-1. CCIR and EEFI .................................................................................................... 4-8
Figure 4-2. Reconnaissance tempo ..................................................................................... 4-10
Figure 4-3: Development of guidance for reconnaissance and security tasks ..................... 4-13
Figure 4-4. The BCT information collection timeline ............................................................ 4-15
Figure 4-5. Relationship of SIRs to Indicators, to EEIs to PIR ............................................. 4-17
Figure 5-1. IBCT zone reconnaissance graphics ................................................................. 5-10
Figure 5-2. Notional scenario for initial entry ........................................................................ 5-13
Figure 5-3. Notional scenario zone reconnaissance ............................................................ 5-15
Figure 5-4. ABCT area reconnaissance ............................................................................... 5-17

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Contents

Figure 5-5. Notional scenario area/route reconnaissance ................................................... 5-18

Figure 5-6. SBCT route reconnaissance mission ................................................................ 5-20
Figure 5-7. Reconnaissance handover (phase one) ............................................................ 5-23
Figure 5-8. Reconnaissance handover between squadron and combat aviation
brigade .............................................................................................................. 5-24
Figure 5-9. Reconnaissance handover follow-on battalion continues mission .................... 5-25
Figure 6-1. SBCT stationary screen mission ......................................................................... 6-8
Figure 6-2. Armored brigade combat team advance guard mission .................................... 6-14
Figure 6-3. IBCT Cavalry squadron stationary flank guard .................................................. 6-15
Figure 6-4. SBCT moving flank guard (method one) ........................................................... 6-17
Figure 6-5. Armored brigade combat team moving flank guard mission (method two) ....... 6-18
Figure 6-6. Reinforced SBCT performing advanced cover .................................................. 6-21
Figure 6-7. Reinforced ABCT performing flank cover .......................................................... 6-23
Figure 6-8. Reinforced ABCT performing defensive cover .................................................. 6-25
Figure 6-9. Reinforced Cavalry squadron conducts area security ....................................... 6-27
Figure 6-10. Convoy security organization .......................................................................... 6-29
Figure 7-1. Stability tasks ..................................................................................................... 7-10
Figure 8-1. Process for evacuation of the wounded .............................................................. 8-7

Tables
Table 1-1. Squadron Employment Comparisions ................................................................ 1-15
Table 4-1. Available Reconnaissance and Security and Information Collection Assets ..... 4-18
Table 6-1. Typical Attachments for Cover............................................................................ 6-20

iv FM 3-98 -XO\ 2015

 Preface
Field Manual (FM) 3-98 provides doctrinal guidance and direction for Cavalry organizations, as well as
reconnaissance and security organizations. This FM establishes the foundation for the development of tactics and
procedures in subordinate doctrine publications. This publication applies across the range of military operations.
While the main focus of this field manual is Cavalry formations within the units listed below, all maneuver
formations must be able to conduct reconnaissance and security tasks.
z Armored brigade combat team (ABCT) Cavalry squadron.
z Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) Cavalry squadron.
z Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) Cavalry squadron.
z Battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) Cavalry squadron.
z It is applicable to the—
„ Scout platoon of maneuver battalions.
„ Combat aviation brigade air squadron.
The principal audiences for FM 3-98 are commanders, leaders, and staffs responsible for the planning, execution,
or support of reconnaissance and security operations as well as instructors charged with teaching reconnaissance
and security operations.
Commanders ensure their decisions and the actions of their units comply with applicable United States (U.S.),
international, and host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders ensure that their Soldiers operate
according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 27-10 for more information.)
FM 3-98 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-98 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the
text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-98 is the proponent
publication are boldfaced in the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of
the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National
Guard (ARNG), the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve
(USAR), unless otherwise stated.

Unless otherwise stated in this publication, the masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The
preparing agency is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning, Georgia.
Send your comments and recommendations by any means (U.S. mail, e-mail, fax, or telephone). Use Department
of the Army (DA) Form 2028, (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Point of contact
information is as follows:
E-mail: usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil
Phone: COM 706-545-7114 or DSN 835-7114
Fax: COM 706-545-8511 or DSN 835-8511
U.S. Mail: Commanding General, MCoE
ATTN: ATZK-TDD
Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410

-XO\2015 FM 3-98 v
 Introduction
Doctrine consists of fundamental principles that describe how to fight. At the tactical level, doctrine consists of
authoritative principles concerning how to execute reconnaissance and security operations as part of Army and
joint operations that require professional military judgment in their application. Importantly, our doctrine must
describe how brigade combat teams (BCT) and subordinate units combine the capabilities of various arms into
cohesive, combined arms, air-ground teams and provide a clear description of how to execute reconnaissance and
security operations.

This publication provides the commander and staff of Cavalry formations with doctrine relevant to Army and
joint operations. This publication explains how effective reconnaissance and security operations generate depth,
allow commanders reaction time and maneuver space, fight for information and collect information through
stealth, protect against surprise, ease the forward movement of follow-on forces, and provide commanders with
flexibility and adaptability. The doctrine described in this publication is applicable across unified land operations.
The previous proponent manual for Cavalry Operations was FM 3-20.96, published 12 March 2010, which
included operational considerations. This publication provides doctrinal guidance for all formations assigned to
the ABCT, the IBCT, and SBCT. The following is a summary of each chapter in the manual:
z Chapter 1 addresses the role of Cavalry in unified land operations and Cavalry organizations.
z Chapter 2 discusses understanding the threat, potential threat groups and threat characteristics.
z Chapter 3 addresses the operational environment, shaping, engaging, and influencing outcomes, and
consolidating gains.
z Chapter 4 highlights the updated concepts of mission command in relation to commander’s
reconnaissance and security guidance, the operations process and information collection.
z Chapter 5 begins with an overview, followed by a detailed discussion of the fundamentals of
reconnaissance, forms of reconnaissance, and reconnaissance handover.
z Chapter 6 begins with an overview, followed with the fundamentals of security operations,
counterreconnaissance, and the forms of security.
z Chapter 7 provides a short overview and then devotes a section to reconnaissance and security stability
planning, stability principles and frameworks, and stability tasks.
z Chapter 8 describes sustainment for reconnaissance and security tasks, sustainment planning
considerations for reconnaissance and security, sustainment considerations for reconnaissance and
security and special sustainment consideration.

To understand FM 3-98, the reader must understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links
between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, JP 3-0, ADP 3-0, and ADRP 3-0. The reader
should understand how the offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities’ tasks described
carry over and affect the conduct described by the other (in ADPs 3-07, 3-28, and 3-90 and ADRPs 3-07 and 3-
90). The reader should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process
relates to the Army’s military decision making process and troop-leading procedures described in ADP 5-0 and
ADRP 5-0. The reader must also understand the concepts associated with mission command as described in ADP
6-0 and ADRP 6-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding FM 3-98.

While doctrine provides leaders at all echelons authoritative principles to consider before, during, and after
execution of reconnaissance and security operations, FM 3-98, is not a substitute for common sense, professional
military judgment, and leaders’ imperatives to act aggressively. As in any combat operation, success in unified
land operations will depend mainly on leaders and Soldiers who are tough, disciplined, competent, and who take
initiative consistent with the mission, commander’s intent, and the principles outlined within this manual.

vi FM 3-98 -XO\
 Chapter 1
Importance of Reconnaissance and Security and Roles of
Cavalry Organizations
Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to effective execution of unified
land operations. Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and
exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained
land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order
to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable
conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). BCTs conduct reconnaissance and security operations
to develop the situation and identify, create, and preserve options to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.

Reconnaissance and security tasks allow BCTs to achieve positions of relative

advantage. Effective reconnaissance and security tasks confirm or deny the
commander’s and staff’s initial understanding and visualization of the tactical and
operational situation and further develop the intelligence picture for the BCT to allow
the commander to describe, direct, lead, and assess military operations as well as make
effective decisions.

Reconnaissance and security tasks provide a continuous flow of combat information

and intelligence that help commanders cope with uncertainty, make contact under
favorable conditions, identify opportunities, prevent surprise, and make timely
decisions. Reconnaissance and security tasks provide BCT commanders with freedom
of movement and action that create advantageous conditions for future operations that
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

SECTION I – ROLE OF THE CAVALRY FORMATION IN UNIFIED LAND

OPERATIONS
1-1. Reconnaissance operations allow commanders to understand the situation, visualize the battle, and
make decisions. Security operations provide reaction time and maneuver space to enable decisions and
protect the force from unanticipated danger. Reconnaissance and security tasks answer commanders’ critical
information requirements (CCIR), mitigate risk, identify enemy weakness, and isolate the enemy from
sources of strength.
1-2. Cavalry units conduct reconnaissance and security tasks in close contact with enemy organizations and
civilian populations. Cavalry organizations employ appropriate combinations of mounted and dismounted
tactics and are able to both fight for information and develop the situation through stealthy tactics and
observation based upon the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

HISTORICAL ROLES OF CAVALRY UNITS

1-3. Armies have used Cavalry forces to capitalize upon their significant advantage in mobility that made
them well suited for long-range reconnaissance and security operations. Cavalry forces ability to fight also
made them well suited for creating and providing options for the commander, shaping subsequent fights and
allowing the commander to make timely decisions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Reconnaissance

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Chapter 1

and security gave commanders the ability to concentrate forces at decisive points while protecting against
surprise. Cavalry continued to play key roles such as—
z Conduct reconnaissance operations to detect enemy weaknesses and strengths.
z Conduct security to provide early warning and maneuver space.
z Cover retreats.
z Counter enemy Cavalry.
z Counterattack enemy Infantry attacks.
z Administer the decisive blow through isolation and pursuit.

1-4. The operations of the newly organized Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during the
Gettysburg campaign were an essential factor in the Union's success in that pivotal battle. At Gettysburg, the
Union Army employed an effective Cavalry force that worked directly for the commanding General of the
Army.

Shaping the Battlefield with Cavalry: Gettysburg, the First Day

In June 1863, as General Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia through
the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland and Pennsylvania, Almost one half of the confederate
Cavalry forces under Major General J.E.B. Stuart were conducting independent operations.
The absence of this leader and his reconnaissance and security force would disadvantage
Lee as he concentrated his forces in south central Pennsylvania near the town of Gettysburg.
The Union Army of the Potomac moved north in several columns, screened by its
Cavalry. The westernmost column benefited from the protection of BG John Buford’s Cavalry
division, a combined arms force. On 29 June this formation moved to a nexus of roads near
Gettysburg, leaving one of its brigades to cover the passes of the Catoctin Mountains to
protect the army’s flank. After a brief encounter with Confederate forces Buford led his
remaining two brigades and one battery of artillery into Gettysburg the following day. He
bypassed initial contact to focus on his reconnaissance objective, the location and actions of
Lee’s Army.
Aware of a Confederate concentration of forces to his west but lacking more detailed
information, Buford dispatched scouts to conduct an area reconnaissance west and north of
Gettysburg. They reported completely and accurately the locations and lines of march for all
three corps of Lee’s army. Buford immediately transmitted collected information to General
Meade and made recommendations to, the Union army commander. Buford’s reports allowed
Meade to understand and visualize the terrain surrounding Gettysburg before occupation.
Based on his scouts’ reports, Buford deployed his division to cover the primary approaches
to the town from the north and west. He also ensured local security by implementing martial
law, the arrest of a suspected spy, and the prohibition of alcohol sales to his soldiers. Buford
understood his mission to delay the Confederates and deny access to the heights overlooking
the town to enable the Army of the Potomac to occupy that position.
Having pinpointed and identified their lines of march and probable objective
(Gettysburg), Buford undertook preparations to delay the Confederate forces (after
identifying their advance) as long as possible. He prepared his two brigades to cover a seven
mile arc outside the town, stretching from the west to the northeast. His main effort focused
on the Chambersburg Pike that reached Gettysburg from the west, where the closest
Confederate forces were encamped. A series of ridgelines crossed the road, and Buford used
these to add depth to his position. His main position lay upon McPherson Ridge, where he
deployed much of one brigade, supported by his artillery battery. A series of picket lines and
small 4 to 5 man patrols occupied the ridgelines forward of this position to a depth of nearly
two miles. At their most advanced point along Whistler’s Ridge, Buford’s pickets lay only a
half mile from their Confederate counterparts. In Gettysburg’s Lutheran Seminary, whose
high cupola permitted observation of the town and its surroundings, Buford established his
signals officer.

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 Importance of Reconnaissance and Security and Roles of Cavalry Organizations

Buford’s operations lay in complete contrast to those undertaken by the

Confederates. When a North Carolina brigade approached Gettysburg and discovered the
Union Cavalry in the town, its commander withdrew and reported the contact to his division
and corps commanders. Neither officer considered the enemy presence in Gettysburg to be
significant and determined to evict it the following day. They lacked detailed information of
Buford’s force, and they were under orders not to trigger a general engagement before the
arrival of the rest of Lee’s army. A thorough reconnaissance of Gettysburg might have
provided a more realistic assessment of the Union position. With much of the Confederate
Cavalry on detached service, they were not available to locate and track the movements of
the Army of the Potomac, much less conduct a deliberate reconnaissance of Gettysburg,
depriving Lee of vital information.
In the early hours of 1 July, Confederate Major General Henry Heth led elements
of his division down the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg. Heth’s forces quickly
encountered Buford’s forward picket line. Large numbers of Confederate skirmishers
deployed to engage the pickets, while an artillery battery provided fire support. Buford’s
pickets withdrew slowly, keeping the enemy engaged and unable to make a rapid advance.
The Confederate advance was further delayed when Buford reinforced his forward lines.
Buford’s actions caused the Confederates to prematurely deploy their brigades in
preparation for a general assault and commence an artillery bombardment of the Union
positions. Confederate deployment allowed the Army of the Potomac the opportunity to gain
positions of tactical advantage and retain initiative.
Buford and his division set conditions for Meade’s success. As more U.S. formations
arrived on the field, Buford’s division was relieved by other Union forces. Buford’s actions
ensured that the Army of the Potomac secured the high ground. Over the next two days,
General Lee’s army would shatter itself in repeated attacks upon these heights.
Reconnaissance operations to identify Confederate forces and key terrain along with security
operations delaying Confederate advances and protecting the main body proved decisive at
The Battle of Gettysburg.
CURRENT ROLE
1-5. The fundamental purpose of Cavalry is to set conditions for successful operations of the unit for which
they are conducting reconnaissance and security tasks. These roles are not necessarily missions themselves,
but translate into mission statements.
Enable Mission Command
1-6. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to successful operations. BCTs conduct
continuous reconnaissance and security tasks mainly through their organic Cavalry organizations. BCTs must
defeat adaptive and determined enemies as well as consolidate tactical gains. Effective reconnaissance and
security tasks improve situational understanding and help commanders to—
z Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations.
z Visualize operations in the context of mission variables (METT-TC).
z Achieve situational understanding.
z Develop the situation through action in close contact with enemy and civilian populations.
z Execute operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability, synchronization, and
integration.
z Identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Provide Accurate and Timely Information to the Operations Process and Intelligence Collection
Cycle
1-7. Accurate and timely reporting allows the BCT to seize and retain the initiative and concentrate combat
power at the right time and place. The BCT commander requires accurate and timely information on: enemy,
terrain, and the indigenous population as they affect the mission. To understand, visualize, describe, direct,
lead and assess combat operations, the BCT commander relies on information collection assets, including,

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Chapter 1

national intelligence sources, military intelligence units, long-range surveillance detachments, unmanned
aerial systems, aviation, electronic warfare and cyber warfare platforms, and any unit in contact. These assets
assist intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the operations process, and adjustments during
operations. The commander’s best means of visualizing and understanding their area of operation is through
the conduct of reconnaissance tasks.
1-8. Commanders require timely and accurate information during the execution of operations to maneuver
and direct future combat operations against the enemy. The primary source of fresh information for the
commander during battle is his reconnaissance and security organization—his Cavalry.
1-9. Cavalry units.—
z Counter enemy deception efforts better than any sensor system.
z Provide the most reliable means of assessing terrain.
z Operate actively not passively —Cavalry not only finds the enemy but can further develop the
situation and force the enemy to reveal more information including enemy intentions and fighting
ability.
z Disseminate relevant information immediately to commanders.
z Develop recommendations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

1-10. Performing reconnaissance, Cavalry forces provide commanders with combat information needed to
strike at the right place and time, such as the actual size and composition of the enemy, his exact dispositions,
strengths and weaknesses and location of the decisive point.
Operate as Combined Arms Air-Ground Teams
1-11. Cavalry organizations are combined arms teams that, when paired with aviation assets, form air-ground
maneuver teams that utilize appropriate combinations of mounted, dismounted, and aerial operations to
accomplish their mission. The organization is equipped, organized, and trained to identify enemy locations
to improve situational awareness and provide security for the BCT. Cavalry units must move continually and
at times rapidly to positions of tactical advantage to observe and fight. Cavalry units require organized,
integrated, and synchronized support from all warfighting functions to ensure effective reconnaissance and
security operations.
1-12. Cavalry forces satisfy commanders’ critical information requirements by employing all available
combat power. While the enemy seeks to protect or conceal vital information and key assets, Cavalry units
overcome these efforts and fight for information within their capabilities to develop the situation rapidly and
accurately report the specific details of the tactical situation. Air-Ground teams allow reconnaissance efforts
to develop the situation in multiple dimensions to maximize information collection and assist the commander
in visualizing and understanding the area of operations.
1-13. Air-ground operations are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of ground forces with
manned and unmanned, rotary- and fixed-wing aviation and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Effective air-ground operations are built upon relationships, mutual trust, and a common understanding of
the operational environment, operation, and mission. They require detailed planning, coordination, and
synchronized employment of ground and air maneuver and fire to achieve the commander's objectives and
ensure freedom of movement and action.
Provide Reaction Time and Manuever Space
1-14. BCTs use the Cavalry squadron to develop tactical and operational depth and to create sufficient
reaction time and maneuver space. Cavalry organizations conduct stealthy reconnaissance and security tasks
to detect and observe enemy developments well forward of the BCT’s main body. The BCT develops the
situation by fighting for information to buy the time and space required for an effective response to enemy
actions. Reconnaissance tasks develop the situation forward or to the flanks of the main body to prevent the
BCT commander from fighting at a disadvantage. Security tasks provide space to maneuver, creating
flexibility for the commander to respond to unanticipated enemy actions or developments within his areas of
operations. Security operations provide time for the commander to assess the situation, determine a course
of action, issue orders, make continuous assessments, issue additional fragmentary orders, and maneuver.

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 Importance of Reconnaissance and Security and Roles of Cavalry Organizations

Preserve Combat Power and Achieve Economy of Force

1-15. To develop the situation, Cavalry units locate enemy forces, identify key terrain, and interact with the
civilian population. As they do so, Cavalry units provide reaction time and maneuver space to allow the
maneuver commander to preserve combat power to use at the decisive time and place. Cavalry organizations
provide security for the BCT main body, which protects and preserves the combat power of the BCT. In
offensive tasks, effective Cavalry operations prevent the premature deployment and loss of critical combat
power. In defensive tasks, an effective Cavalry operation provides early warning, destroys enemy
reconnaissance forces, and fixes the lead elements of enemy organizations within the capabilities of the
respective Cavalry organization. As a result, Cavalry organizations, by their role, are an economy of force.
1-16. Economy of force: Expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the
maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. (ADRP 3-0.) The flexible capabilities of Cavalry allow
the commander to conserve the combat power of their BCTs to use at a time and place of his choosing. When
augmented with additional combat power—based on METT-TC—the BCT’s Cavalry organizations can
provide the BCT a critical capability based on a principle of war—economy of force.
Facilitate Movement and Transitions
1-17. Cavalry units assist movement and transitions by executing reconnaissance and facilitating
coordination and contact between units. Scout platoons occupy contact points and passage points, and they
coordinate with higher and adjacent units or headquarter to ensure seamless transitions and cross-unit
coordination.
1-18. Effective reconnaissance tasks assist the BCT to ease transitions in plans, phases, and priorities of
effort and mitigate information gaps between units. Reconnaissance tasks assist commanders to employ the
most appropriate forms of maneuver to envelop, turn, dislocate, and ultimately defeat enemy forces.
Combined arms air-ground operations answer priority intelligence requirements (PIR), create options, and
develop the situation to set conditions for reconnaissance handover or decisive engagement.
1-19. Transitions mark a change of focus and priorities between phases, or between the ongoing operation
and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between the elements of military operations,
such as from offense to stability tasks, involve a transition. Cavalry units are instrumental in providing the
commander information to make the transition as seamless as possible. They can provide protection for the
main body transitioning from offense to defense. However, Cavalry units are vulnerable to enemy threats,
unanticipated changes to the situation, or the danger of relaxing discipline and safety standards during their
own and higher transitions. As a result, commanders should establish clear conditions for mission execution.
Fight for Information
1-20. The information friendly forces seek is generally of equal importance to the enemy, who will act to
protect the vital information. While preserving their freedom of maneuver Cavalry units overcome these
efforts and fight for information within their capabilities to develop the situation rapidly and accurately report
the specific details of the tactical situation.

SECTION II – CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-21. Commanders and staffs determine the reconnaissance requirements for the operation and the
commander issues reconnaissance planning guidance early to ensure that reconnaissance tasks can precede
the mission and identify options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Reconnaissance operations often
begin before completion of course of action analysis so the reconnaissance unit can inform the planning
effort.

CAVALRY IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-22. The core competencies of Cavalry forces are to conduct reconnaissance and security in close contact
with enemy forces and civilian populations. These competencies allow the BCT to accomplish its core
missions. Cavalry forces facilitate the supported commander’s ability to maneuver concentrate superior
combat power against the enemy at the decisive time and place, and take appropriate actions to consolidate
gains while preparing for the next mission.

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1-23. For reconnaissance and security tasks to be most effective, they must be initiated early in the planning
process for BCT-level missions and continued throughout the mission. As a result, commanders and staffs
develop information requirements throughout the operations process and continuously assess, add, or delete
requirements during planning and execution.
1-24. Cavalry commanders conduct operations consistent with the fundamentals of reconnaissance and
security. They help the BCT commander identify gaps or weaknesses in the plan as well as opportunities to
exploit and improve the situational understanding. Reconnaissance and security tasks answer PIR and enable
the commander to make decisions and direct forces to achieve mission success. Both reconnaissance and
security tasks enable successful offense, defense, and stability tasks. Commanders and staffs first identify
information gaps during the military decision-making process and continuously assess, adapt, add, and delete
requirements throughout the operation. Staffs identify specified, implied, and essential tasks necessary for
mission success during mission analysis, reviewing available assets and indentifying resource and
information shortfalls.
1-25. During mission analysis, staffs identify critical facts and assumptions that aid in the development of
the initial commander’s critical information requirements. Commander’s critical information requirements
are composed of priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) which
facilitate timely decision making. Priority intelligence requirements are an information requirement
necessary to understand the adversary or operational environment. Priority intelligence requirements identify
information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that the commander considers most
important and have impact upon future decisions. Friendly force information requirements identify
information about friendly forces and supporting capabilities—information that affects future courses of
action and decisions from a friendly perspective.
1-26. Based upon identified information requirements, staffs assign tasks to prioritize, manage, and develop
collection of information requirements leading to future decisions. As staffs identify requirements necessary
for successful execution, the staff recommends and assigns tasks for Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance
and provide answers that allow the commander to make decisions and capitalize on opportunities.

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY UNITS

1-27. During operations, the commander and staff’s time and resources are balanced between four major
activities in a continuous learning and adaptive cycle called the operations process which includes planning,
preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (refer to ADP 5-0 for more information).
Operations process activities are sequential but not discrete; all overlap and recur as circumstances demand.
1-28. Commanders implement early information collection and security to help protect and prepare the force
for execution. Cavalry units should deploy in the planning phase to shape preparation activities and execution.
(Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
1-29. Commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding before execution of the
mission which requires aggressive and continuous information collection from Cavalry forces. Through
information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and
forces to collect timely and accurate information to help meet commander’s critical information requirements
and other information requirements.
1-30. The force as a whole is often vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation, when forces
are often concentrated in assembly areas. Security tasks (screen, guard, cover, area security, and local
security) are essential during preparation. Cavalry units assigned security missions execute these missions
while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation.
1-31. When a Cavalry unit’s higher headquarters (HQ) is conducting offensive tasks, the Cavalry unit
develops the situation for the higher commander. For example in a brigade movement to contact, the Cavalry
squadron may be the lead element conducting a zone reconnaissance.
1-32. During defensive actions, a higher HQ typically tasks the Cavalry unit with conducting security tasks
to provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts, and protect the main battle
area. The commander tasks the Cavalry unit to execute security tasks based upon the degree of protection
required by its higher HQ.

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1-33. Stability tasks are integrated into all operations and are critical to sustaining or establishing civil
security and control over areas, populations, and resources. By focusing on reconnaissance and security
missions that enable its higher HQ to develop a better understanding of the situation, Cavalry units are critical
to successful execution of stability tasks and the units’ ability to consolidate tactical gains. Chapter 5 and
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5 provide details on the five stability tasks.
1-34. Based upon mission variables commanders task organize Cavalry units with combat power necessary
to accomplish the mission. If a higher HQ is conducting security operations, it assigns appropriate security
tasks to the Cavalry unit and ensures the Cavalry unit is appropriately task-organized to accomplish their
mission. Augmentation may include an aviation task force, tank and mechanized Infantry units, additional
Cavalry units, engineers, direct support artillery, close air support (CAS), military intelligence units, and
logistical elements. Reconnaissance and security operations often precede the main operation in time and
space, enablers organized with Cavalry units can often be cut from divisions and corps to provide
reconnaissance and security at echelons above brigade. Mission variables and the commander’s intent
determine what additional assets the Cavalry unit requires.

RECONNAISSANCE CONSIDERATIONS AT ECHELONS ABOVE

BRIGADE
1-35. Corps and division commanders depend on situational understanding to seize and retain the initiative.
Corps requires proficient reconnaissance formations capable of developing the situation through action and
in particular, to determine enemy intentions, strength and disposition. These forces must be able to deploy to
positions of advantage while concurrently developing the situation through action for the Joint Task Force
(JTF) commander. Regionally aligned reconnaissance and security forces to Geographic Combatant
Commands ensure the capability is resident throughout all phases of a joint operation.
1-36. To support the requirement for reconnaissance and security at echelons above brigade, the corps
commander designates and task-organizes a BCT to perform reconnaissance and security tasks. Similarly, a
division commander selects and task-organizes either a BCT or a squadron size unit to perform these
operations. The reconnaissance and security formations’ task organization can vary in duration from semi-
permanent formations to short duration.
1-37. In situations where an reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) BCT is not available or insufficient, the
corps commander may alternatively elect to task the divisions with guard or cover missions. The determining
factors will be the ability of the divisions to accomplish their missions while simultaneously performing the
reconnaissance and security tasks required by the corps. The division normally operates at the tactical echelon
and includes reconnaissance and security maneuver in its plans. It can employ either a BCT or a Cavalry
squadron to conduct reconnaissance and security tasks. The decision to employ an entire BCT for
reconnaissance and security will be depend upon the mission variables of METT-TC. The division
commander considers several factors sequentially before detaching a Cavalry squadron from a BCT for an
independent reconnaissance or security mission. These factors are—
z Is the mission distinct from that assigned to the BCT?
z Will the BCT be unable to complete its mission without the Cavalry squadron?
z What sustainment will the detached Cavalry squadron require?
z What additional artillery, aviation, engineer, and maneuver forces will the Cavalry squadron
require?
z Is the Cavalry commander able to control the necessary reinforcements?

1-38. The reconnaissance and security formation’s proficiency will normally increase with time as leaders
and Soldiers become competent in the individual and collective tasks and become adjusted to METT-TC
factors that differ from offensive and defensive tasks. Rotating the mission and designation between
formations challenges the desired expertise.
1-39. The corps or division commander creates the task organization enabling it to conduct reconnaissance
and security operations in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. There are several aspects
to consider when deciding on the necessary task organization to include a thorough review of the mission
variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations) and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The commander must include an evaluation

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of priorities and an evaluation of risk in order to make an informed and conscious decision. The constantly
changing operating environment requires decentralized, combined arms formations capable of working with
joint and interagency partners to defeat a variety of threats from state and nonstate actors. These various
aspects provide a general list of recommended capabilities for reconnaissance task organization. For a
reconnaissance in force, commanders place special emphasis on the maneuver, mobility, and fires
requirements since fighting for information is probably a key aspect of the mission.
1-40. Task organizing a reconnaissance and security formation for employment at echelons above brigade
will normally include the following capabilities:
z Ground Maneuver.
„ Reconnaissance capabilities: Dependent on the number of routes or areas; size of the zone or
area(s); anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; speed required; detail
required; mobility about the enemy and the main body.
„ Security capabilities: Size of the security area or area of operations; anticipated enemy;
requirement to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities.
z Manned Aviation.
„ Reconnaissance capabilities: Dependent on the number of routes or areas; size of the zone or
area(s); anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; speed required; terrain.
„ Security capabilities: Size of the security area or area of operations; anticipated enemy;
requirement to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities;
terrain.
z Unmanned Aerial Systems.
„ Dependent on unit capabilities; speed required; number and types of NAIs or reconnaissance
objectives; terrain.
z Mobility.
„ Engineer reconnaissance capabilities: Dependent on obstacles anticipated and the detail
required; detail of infrastructure required.
„ Engineer mobility capabilities: Dependent on obstacles anticipated and the requirement to
breach; types and number of gaps anticipated and required to cross.
z Countermobility.
„ Engineer countermobility capabilities: Dependent on time available and whether it is a
stationary or moving operation; anticipated enemy; size of security zone or area of operations;
organic capabilities; requirement to defeat, delay, attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver
capabilities.
„ Engineer survivability capabilities: Dependent on time available and whether it is a stationary
or moving operation; anticipated enemy; organic capabilities; requirement to defeat, delay,
and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities.
z Indirect Fires.
„ Supporting reconnaissance: Dependent on organic capabilities; anticipated enemy and the
need to fight for information; distance from the main body or supporting fires capabilities.
„ Supporting security: Dependent on organic capabilities; anticipated enemy; requirement to
defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities; distance from the
main body or supporting fires capabilities.
„ Indirect fires radar capabilities: Dependent on other units’ ability to provide radar coverage;
distance from main body.
z Intelligence.
„ Signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities: Dependent on requirement to collect on specific
aspects of enemy communications; distance from the main body and capabilities of SIGINT
assets; site exploitation requirements.
„ Human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities: Dependent on time available to collect; specific
information required; site exploitation requirements.
„ Technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities: Dependent on time available to collect;
specific information required; site exploitation requirements.

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z Protection.
„ Air Defense capabilities: Dependent on air threat and ability of other air defense artillery
units to provide coverage.
„ Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance and decontamination
capabilities: Dependent on anticipated CBRN threats and hazards; anticipated contaminated
areas; WMD sites that might be encountered in need of assessment and possible exploitation.
z Sustainment.
„ Capabilities supporting reconnaissance: Dependent on the breadth and depth of the
reconnaissance mission; organic sustainment capabilities; duration of the mission.
„ Transportation capabilities: Dependent on the mobility of the unit conducting
reconnaissance; travel distance; time available; speed required.
„ Capabilities supporting security: Dependent on the breadth and depth of the security area or
area of operations; organic sustainment capabilities; duration of the mission.
„ Transportation capabilities: Dependent on the mobility of the unit conducting security;
distance required to travel; time available; terrain.
z Mission Command.
„ Level of headquarters: Dependent on span of control, unity of command required; span of
control; discretion of the commander.
1-41. Task organizing a reconnaissance and security BCT formation for employment at echelons above
brigade will normally include the following organization. This formation is a modular force that should be
provided various enablers and augmentation based on METT-TC and staff analysis to answer the division or
corps commanders PIRs. An example of a reconnaissance and security BCT formation appears in figure 1-1
on page 1-10.

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Figure 1-1. Reconnaissance and security BCT

BRIGADE OPERATIONS OFFICER AND SQUADRON

EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE BCT
1-42. BCT commanders and their staff integrate operations and intelligence in the conduct of reconnaissance
and security tasks. A commander focuses information collection, combined arms, sustainment and signal
organizations and reconnaissance efforts on answering the commander’s PIR through the brigade S-3.
BCT S-3
1-43. The brigade S-3 is responsible for coordinates, and synchronizes information collection and
reconnaissance and security tasks. The brigade S-3 allocates organic, attached, and supporting information
collection assets (for example, answer PIR or refine reconnaissance objectives) and ensures that
reconnaissance tasks are oriented on assisting the commander and subordinate units in the accomplishment
of key tasks consistent with the concept of operations. In concert with the brigade and subordinate staffs, the
brigade S-3 ensures operations conducted by the Cavalry squadron, combined arms battalions’ scout

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platoons, and other information collection assets are nested and complementary and focused on mission
accomplishment.
1-44. BCTs establish coordination within the staff to synchronize. This cell might include S-2 (intelligence
community/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), S-3 Plans (organic maneuver assets—aviation
units, Cavalry troops or scout platoons), Fire Support Officer (Field artillery battalion), S-4 brigade
sustainment assets, Brigade aviation element (BAE), and the TAC-P (CAS/J-STARS). (See figure 1-2.) At
the same time, to achieve this intent, the BCT commander task organizes the Cavalry squadron with the
necessary combined arms, maneuver support, sustainment, and signal organizations to execute the mission.
At the conclusion of mission analysis, the BCT publishes reconnaissance guidance and a fragmentary order
to initiate reconnaissance forces operations. The Cavalry squadron is usually the lead element in the brigade,
parallel and collaborative planning between the Cavalry squadron and BCT staffs is essential to timely
execution of operations as well as the integration of intelligence collection with reconnaissance and security
tasks.

Figure 1-2. Brigade reconnaissance cell

CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO)
1-45. The BCT commander employs the Cavalry squadron based on mission variables. The squadron can
operate in its own AO or unassigned deep areas in the BCT AO or across another maneuver battalion’s AO.
Assignment of Its Own AO
1-46. When the BCT commander assigns the Cavalry squadron a specific area of operation (see figure 1-3)
squadrons must perform the following:
z Terrain management.
z Information collection.

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Chapter 1

z Conduct civil affairs operations (with attached civil affair forces).

z Air and ground movement control.
z Clearance of fires.
z Security.
z Personnel recovery.
z Environmental considerations.
z Minimal essential stability tasks.
1-47. Assignment of an AO provides the squadron with the maneuver space necessary to execute its
assigned mission. (See ADRP 3-90 for a discussion of what these authorities entail.)

Figure 1-3. Squadron in its own area of operation

Within BCT Deep Areas
1-48. The squadron can also operate in BCT deep areas. In noncontiguous areas of operations, the deep area
is the area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas of operations (ADRP 3-
0). The BCT commander may assign urban areas to maneuver battalions allowing them to focus on that area
while the Cavalry squadron conducts operations in the open areas. The BCT may have deep areas due to:

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z A decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.

z Areas not assigned to battalions are sparsely populated or the terrain is compartmentalized.
z Insufficient combat power to assign all areas to subordinate battalions.
1-49. The BCT is responsible for controlling deep areas within its AO. The BCT commander may direct the
Cavalry squadron to operate in deep areas. (See figure 1-4.)
1-50. Squadrons operating in the BCT deep area are not usually responsible for the entire deep area. The
squadron in the deep area generally operates in one of the following ways:
z In a contiguous portion of the unassigned area.
z In multiple, noncontiguous AOs within the unassigned area.

Figure 1-4. Squadron in BCT deep area of operations

Across Another Battalions’ AO
1-51. The squadron may conduct operations across another battalion’s area of operation (see figure 1-5.)
such as during an area security mission or in preparation for offensive defensive tasks. In this case, the BCT
commander has assigned the entire area of operations to subordinate units or battalions, the BCT commander
retains control of the squadron by cutting an AO across the maneuver battalions (for example, along a route).
The squadron retains mission command of its squadron and significant military intelligence (MI) capabilities.

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Chapter 1

Conditions may include hybrid threat networks operating across brigade boundaries. During transitions to
offense or defense the BCT commander can place the squadron or troops under operational control to the
maneuver battalions (for example, one troop in front of each maneuver battalion scout platoon). The squadron
remains focused on collecting information to assist in answering the higher commander’s PIR or other
information requirements. When operating across other battalions AO, squadrons are still assigned specific
missions by higher HQ.

Figure 1-5. Squadron operating across another battalion’s area of operation

EMPLOYMENT METHOD COMPARISON
1-52. On a contiguous battlefield, the Cavalry squadron may have an AO forward of the battalions or operate
across the BCT AO. On a noncontiguous battlefield the Cavalry squadron may operate in the unassigned area
inside the BCTs area of operations. On a contiguous battlefield where there are no unassigned areas the
Cavalry squadron may employ elements within the BCT AO or across battalion areas of operation to answer
information requirements that cross battalion boundaries such as a route security mission that spans the BCT
AO (See figure 1-6 on page 1-16). It may have an area of operation to meet an economy of force role in areas
where the primary task is reconnaissance and surveillance, such as in border areas. A comparison of the three
general employment methods is in table 1-1.

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Table 1-1. Squadron Employment Comparisions

EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS

Assignment in its own Operations in the BCT Operations across

area of operations. deep areas. another battalion’s area
of operation.
Tactical Tasks Route Recon. Route Recon. Route Recon.
Area Recon. Area Recon. Area Recon.
Zone Recon. Area Security. Area Security.
Recon in Force. Route Security. Route Security.
Screen. Convoy Security. Convoy Security.
Guard. Hasty Attack.
Cover.
Area Security.
Route Security.
Convoy Security.
Hasty Attack.
Advantages x Least restrictive x Mitigates some risk to BCT x BCT commander can
x Focuses squadron in the unassigned areas. focus squadron where
efforts in one area. x Allows BCT to focus needed most.
x Covers a broader area. battalions in smaller AOs. x Enables detailed
x Limits risk of fratricide. x Potentially enables ability coordination with
x Provides greater to identify networks across maneuver battalions and
freedom of action and larger area. BCT.
maneuver. x Allows the BCT x Battalions can provide
x Simplifies sustainment. commander to weight his rapid transition to offensive
main effort. and defensive tasks.
Disadvantages x Broader area may x Most restrictive. x Requires significant and
require significant x Increased risk of constant coordination with
augmentation. fratricide. maneuver battalions and
x Potential for disbursed BCT.
x Broad knowledge of
x Most restrictive to
AO rather than deeper operations over a large
freedom of action.
understanding. area; noncontiguous
x Greatest risk of fratricide.
x Provides limited view operations within the
squadron. x Increases sustainment
of networks (cannot
complexity.
operate across x High coordination with
boundaries). adjacent units and BCT
x Difficult fire support. headquarters most
difficult sustainment
operations.
x Most difficult fire support.

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Figure 1-6. Squadron conducting route reconnaissance throughout the brigade AO

BCT RECONNAISSANCE AND COLLECTION TEAMING
1-53. BCT reconnaissance and collection teaming is the pairing of collection assets, usually by the brigade
S-3, to enhance collection assets ability to conduct integrated reconnaissance and security tasks to answer the
CCIR. Do not keep reconnaissance and information collection assets in reserve. The commander forms
reconnaissance and collection teams to complement capabilities of reconnaissance and intelligence
collection. These teams consist of appropriate combinations of Cavalry Soldiers and multidiscipline
intelligence Soldiers.
1-54. The brigade engineer battalion’s MI company provides multidiscipline combat intelligence, to include
limited SIGINT, electronic warfare, and interrogation of prisoners of war, multidisciplinary
counterintelligence, tactical HUMINT, and air reconnaissance from tactical unmanned aircraft system
(UAS). BCT commanders build reconnaissance and collection teams in executing offensive, defensive, and
stability tasks.
Reconnaissance and Security Collection Teaming
1-55. The BCTs organic MI company augments the Cavalry squadron based on mission variables and PIR.
They operate together for security of collection assets and provide the appropriate combat information and
intelligence necessary to answer the PIR of the supported commander. These brigade reconnaissance,
collection, and security teams provide the supported commander with the ability to more effectively separate
combatants from noncombatants under conditions of uncertainty.
1-56. The MI company’s roles include multifunctional teams (MFTs) comprised of all source HUMINT and
SIGINT disciplines (refer to ATP 2-19.4 for more information), human intelligence collection teams (HCT)
teams, counterintelligence (CI) teams, SIGINT platoons, and operational management teams that coordinate
the various team missions. BCT commanders can augment the squadron to provide the secure access to the
local population that is necessary for MI discipline collection tasks across the brigade.
Composition of Collection Teams
1-57. The lowest level for task-organizing Cavalry units with additional assets and capabilities is the section
although most assets will operate under the operational control of a Cavalry troop or scout platoon. For

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example, a scout platoon from the Cavalry squadron can receive an attached or operational control MI
discipline collection team comprised of a controlling operational management teams, multifunctional teams,
and a HUMINT collection or CI team. Intelligence and reconnaissance teams provide enhanced security for
MI teams, facilitate its movement, and expand the capability of reconnaissance during a mission.
Reconnaissance and collection teams combine and integrate collection and reconnaissance specialties to
accomplish the mission. Teaming allows rapid communication and sharing information as teams work
together to answer critical information requirements.

SECTION III – ORGANIZATIONS

1-58. Reconnaissance and security operations are foundational to all successful operations. Through
effective information collection and continuous reconnaissance, brigades develop and sustain the necessary
understanding to defeat adaptive and determined enemies. Reconnaissance and security tasks help brigades
reduce and adapt to uncertainty. They are essential to understanding the tactical, human, and political
environment; visualizing operations; developing the situation, and identifying or creating options to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. Cavalry units provide flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the maneuver
commanders operations synchronizing and integrating lethal combined arms teams to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative based on relevant understanding of the situation.
1-59. Reconnaissance units provide information on enemy location, disposition and composition, early
warning, protection, and munitions effectiveness. (See figure 1-7 on page 1-18.) Reconnaissance and security
units preserve the BCTs freedom of maneuver over the enemy. Successful reconnaissance allows the brigade
commander to initiate combat under advantageous conditions to defeat the enemy and accomplish the
mission. Roles and organizations listed in this manual depict habitual attachments and augmentees.

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Figure 1-7. Cavalry units (shaded) in BCTs

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-60. The BCT is the Army’s fundamental combined arms organization and its primary close combat force.
For combat actions, the combatant commander may build the ground component of a JTF around the BCT.
The BCT includes units and capabilities from every warfighting function; it is task-organized to meet specific
mission requirements.
1-61. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s main instrument for executing reconnaissance and
security tasks at the brigade level; however, each subordinate organization of a BCT is responsible for
information collection, local reconnaissance, and security within their assigned area of operations or battle
position. When the BCT assigns reconnaissance or security tasks to a subordinate element, it task-organizes
subordinate elements and allocates the resources necessary to meet mission requirements. To perform
reconnaissance or security tasks, the BCT commander may allocate tank and mechanized Infantry units,
reconnaissance units, engineer elements, aviation units, priority of fires and CAS, intelligence systems and
sustainment units.

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CAVALRY SQUADRONS
1-62. Cavalry squadrons conduct reconnaissance and security operations through close contact with enemy
and civilian forces. They maintain contact with the enemy to fight for information while preserving their own
freedom to maneuver. They shape the battlefield for the commander to allow him to close with and destroy
the enemy through maneuver and superior firepower at a time and place of his choosing.
1-63. All ground Cavalry squadrons possess the following capabilities:
z Fight for information within unit capabilities.
z Gather information about all categories of threats.
z Support lethal and nonlethal targeting and target acquisition for the higher HQ.
z Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance in complex terrain.
z Rapidly develop the situation.
z Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the higher HQ
commander to avoid contact, or to achieve overwhelming combat power.
z Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing precision joint fires
to disrupt the enemy commander’s decision cycle and deny planned or future options.
z Conduct collaborative and parallel planning that fully integrates with higher and adjacent units
and results in employment of reconnaissance and security assets to support higher HQ operations.
z Reestablish mission command through two distinctly different situations:
„ Repel an enemy attack that caused a disruption in mission command.
„ Retransmission of information for units or elements out of communication range of the main
body.
1-64. All ground Cavalry squadrons are constrained in that—
z They require augmentation to perform effective offensive and defensive actions as an economy of
force role.
z They have limited sustainment assets that frequently operate over extended distances.
z Wheeled vehicle-equipped squadrons lack direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open
and rolling terrain and need augmentation when arrayed against enemy armor.
z Medium-weight wheeled vehicles have limited cross-country mobility.

CAVALRY TROOPS
1-65. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security tasks throughout the AO of their parent brigades.
Reconnaissance synchronized predeployment and operational tracker report and aerial sensor capabilities
allow the troop to build an accurate operational picture of the AO. That operational picture can focus on any
mixture of the METT-TC variables when necessary by the parent BCT mission. However, to develop an
accurate operational picture complex terrain requires additional time.
1-66. The Cavalry troop’s operational picture helps form a squadron common operational picture (COP) in
command nodes within and external to the parent BCT. This COP allows commanders within and external
to, the parent BCT to accurately assess the situation and develop their situational understanding of the correct
courses of action to take. This discussion focuses on the cavalry troops of the BCT organizational variants
ABCT, IBCT, and SBCT.
TROOP MISSIONS
1-67. Regardless of organization, Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security in support of the
information collection plan as outlined in Annex L of the Cavalry squadron’s operations order.
1-68. Cavalry troops can develop the situation in close contact with civilian populations. They can conduct
security force assistance tasks and multinational reconnaissance and security tasks.
1-69. Troops can conduct limited offensive and defensive tasks though they typically support higher level
offensive and defensive task completion through the conduct of reconnaissance and security tasks. The

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commander considers the troop’s capabilities and limitations before employing the troop in any specific
mission.
ROLES AND ORGANIZATION
1-70. As the eyes and ears of the squadron commander, the Cavalry troop is the squadron commander’s
primary reconnaissance and information collection asset. Reconnaissance units provide the combat
information the commander needs to conduct better informed planning, to direct operations, and to visualize
the AO. It skillfully conducts reconnaissance and security tasks to collect information on enemy location,
disposition, composition, and battle damage assessment (BDA). In turn, these operations allow the
commander to proactively shape the AO and to accept or initiate contact at times and places of his choosing.
1-71. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security tasks throughout the squadron AO. The troop
develops the situation by focusing on the reconnaissance objective in a designated AO. This discussion
focuses on the organizational variations of the reconnaissance and troop.
COMMON CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
1-72. All types of BCT Cavalry troops have the following capabilities:
z Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely information through the combined use of
long-range scout surveillance systems, UAS, and mounted and dismounted scouts.
z Gather information about hybrid threats.
z Rapidly develop the situation and direct reconnaissance tasks to answer PIR.
z Overcome enemy deception, and cover and concealment by employing integrated information
collection and reconnaissance and surveillance systems.
z Employ joint fires to include the fires support team, weapons locating radar, and UAS.
z Conduct stealthy reconnaissance or fight for information against light and motorized forces or, if
reinforced, against armored forces.
z Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the squadron to avoid
contact or achieve a combat power advantage, if contact is necessary.
z Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing fires to disrupt the
enemy.
1-73. All BCT Cavalry troops have the following limitations, which can be mitigated with careful
employment or augmentation:
z With limited dismounts within scout sections, sections may have to combine to generate the
required dismounts to conduct the following:
„ Long-duration observation posts (OPs).
„ Continuous screening.
„ Dismounted tasks associated with zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
z Limited direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability.
z Require augmentation to perform technical engineer tasks.
z Speed of movement is generally equal to that of the main body, making it difficult to stay ahead
while on the march.
z Limited sustainment assets that frequently operate over extended distances.

SCOUT PLATOON
1-74. The fundamental role of the scout platoon is to conduct aggressive or stealthy reconnaissance that
satisfies the commander's critical information requirements. The commander gives missions to the platoon
and the platoon progressively builds situational awareness (SA) of the operational environment (OE) for the
commander. The critical information the platoon provides enables the commander to develop situational
understanding, make comprehensive plans and decisions, and direct follow-on or future operations.

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Threat
The various actors in any area of operation can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an
adversary, a neutral, or a friend. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces
that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national
interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of
individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states,
or national alliances. Threats become enemies when they execute their capability to do
harm to the United States.

An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which force is authorized (ADRP 3-0).
An enemy is a combatant. Target combatants but treat under the rule of law. An
adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against
which force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). A neutral is a party identified as neither
supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces (ADRP 3-0).

Land operations are often complex and uncertain because threats, enemies, adversaries,
neutrals, and friends intermix and challenge army forces’ ability to classify them.

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular
forces, terrorist forces, and criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting
effects (ADRP 3-0).

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

2-1. Understanding threats, criminal networks, enemies, and adversaries—to include both state and
nonstate actors—in the context of the operational environment is essential for the BCT commander to
understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess operations. To develop and maintain estimates of the
situation as the basis for continuous adaptation, commanders and staffs consider their own forces in context
of threats, enemies, and adversaries as well as the mission, terrain, friendly forces, and civilian populations.
The BCT must be prepared to engage in close combat with adaptive enemies and adversaries while operating
in complex terrain and among civilian populations.
2-2. Actors in the operational environment may include agents or forces of—
z Other nation-states.
z Political parties and officials.
z Insurgents.
z Tribes, clans, or ethnic groups.
z Transnational criminal organizations.
z Terrorists or violent extremist organizations.
z Media.
z Indigenous governmental security forces.
z International and private security organizations.
z Multinational corporations.
z Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations.
z Private volunteer organizations.

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ENEMIES AND ADVERSARIES

2-3. Current and future combat operations require the BCT to fight and win in mountainous, urban, jungle,
desert, and subterranean environments. Besides the physical challenges presented by complex terrain, the
continuous interactions of numerous actors—each with their own agendas, objectives, interests, and
allegiances—influence the operational environment and mission accomplishment.
2-4. The human and political dynamics in the brigade area of operations increase the complexity of BCT
operations. Commanders and staffs work to understand the complicated relationships and complex
interactions between actors that produce tactical challenges and opportunities. Understanding is critical to
seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative over enemies and adversaries, and equally critical to the
consolidation of tactical gains to achieve sustainable outcomes consistent with the mission. Emphasis is on
using situational understanding to identify and exploit enemy weakness while isolating enemies from sources
of strength and support. Emphasis is also on bolstering the strength of legitimacy of friends.
STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS
2-5. The BCT must be prepared to defeat determined state and nonstate actors that combine conventional
and unconventional tactics to avoid our forces’ strengths (such as our mobility, long-range surveillance, and
precision fires capabilities) while attacking perceived vulnerabilities (such as our difficulty distinguishing
the enemy from the civilian population). Threats combine a variety of means, to include conventional
combined arms operations, terrorism, insurgency, political subversion, and information operations to
accomplish objectives and attack United States forces. Enemies and adversaries exploit perceived United
States and coalition military, political, social, economic, and information vulnerabilities as they seek to seize
the initiative and dictate the terms and tempo of operations in their favor. They often rely on networks to
facilitate movement of logistics, finances, people, and weapons.
2-6. Enemy organizations employ countermeasures to limit United States forces ability to develop the
situation, avoid decisive engagements, and initiate contact under advantageous conditions. Enemy
organizations employ technological countermeasures to reduce their signature on the battlefield and degrade
United States forces ability to detect, engage, and destroy them. Many hostile nation-states continue to
procure conventional capabilities such as armor and antiarmor, manned aircraft, and air defense systems,
which are increasingly available to nonstate enemy organizations and hybrid threats. Enemy forces also
integrate emerging technologies such as robotics, unmanned aerial systems, and nanotechnologies. Enemies
and adversaries combine conventional and unconventional tactics to counter, evade, or disrupt United States
forces efforts across the range of military operations.
2-7. Many threat organizations already possess weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and the delivery systems to employ them (for example, rockets
and artillery). Threat organizations that do not possess weapons of mass destruction may attempt to
proliferate, acquire and employ them. While many threat organizations have pursued the use of chemical and
biological weapons, most have opted for large scale explosive events due to the effectiveness and success
over the last decade. BCT commanders and staffs plan for weapons of mass destruction by conducting seize
or secure and isolate activities. (See ATP 3-11.23 for more information on elimination operations.)
2-8. BCT commanders must understand the threat in the context of local conditions that affect the mission.
Such a contextualized understanding allows commanders to identify emerging opportunities to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative.
NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS
2-9. The BCT commander and staff determine an enemy’s objectives, strategies and the multiple
dimensions (physical, cognitive, informational, and political) in which he operates to defeat him. The BCT
identifies categories, organizations, and networks that affect the mission as friendly, enemy, or neutral based.
The BCT supports friendly networks, influences neutral networks, and disrupts, neutralizes, or defeats enemy
organizations or networks. Assessment of networks and organizations is continuous and collaborative,
integrating joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners whenever possible. At the
tactical level, units develop an understanding of various networks through information collection and

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reconnaissance in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Considerations for network and
organization assessment include:
z Objectives and strategy.
z Key individuals, groups, nodes, and their roles within a network or organization.
z Relationships between key individuals and nodes within networks and organizations.
z Flow of resources (such as people, money, weapons, and narcotics) across, into, and out of
networks.
z Where networks and organizations connect to other institutions, businesses, and entities.
z Network strengths and vulnerabilities.

SECTION II – POTENTIAL THREAT GROUPS

2-10. Multiple threat groups may operate within a BCT’s area of interest. These threat groups may include
military forces of nation states, insurgent organizations, transnational criminal organizations and terrorist
groups. These threat groups may form alliances based on mutual goals and common interests. As a result,
BCTs must be prepared to defeat a complicated and often shifting array of enemies and threats.
Understanding enemy and threat capabilities as well as their political, economic, or ideological aims is
essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.

STATES
2-11. States are sovereign governments that control a defined geographic area. The state is the entity that can
generate, sustain, and employ military forces, raise money, and mobilize resources. Military institutions
develop doctrine, build organizations, and develop materiel components of combat power. As a result, the
BCT commander must understand the combat capabilities of nation fielded forces.
NONSTATE ORGANIZATIONS
2-12. Nonstate organizations operate within states, but act outside of the state institutions to pursue their
individual goals. Such organizations can be small and informal, or large and formal. Organizations frequently
consist of a predominant tribal, ethnic, national, or religious group, but there are corporate, criminal, and
transnational organizations as well. Transnational criminal organizations attempt to obtain power, influence,
monetary, and commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through
a pattern of corruption and violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational
organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.
Some organizations pursue political objectives and some of these may use violence as part of a broad strategy
to accomplish these objectives. Threat organizations often combine criminal networks, terrorists, insurgents,
transnational groups, proxies, and paramilitaries in the pursuit to attain short- or near-term objectives. For
example, during the Iraq war a variety of organizations operated in the country, several posed threats to the
United States mission. Insurgent groups included the Jaysh al Mahdi, Asaab al Haq; militia organizations
included the Sons of Iraq, Khattaib and a variety of Kurdish groups; terrorist groups included Islamic State
of Iraq and Al Qaida. Other groups did not pose a friendly or neutral threat. These groups include corporations
with their private security forces operating inside the country, as well as political parties. The United Nations
and other transnational organizations also operated within the country. Each of the organizations that operated
in Iraq had different goals. Some organizations were actively opposed to United States forces; others were
not overt enemies but had separate goals that did not align with United States interests. As a result, the BCT
commander must understand all nonstate organizations and be prepared to work with and fight against a wide
variety of organizations.
CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND OPPORTUNISTS
2-13. Criminal networks are often stakeholders in state weakness, as it is the weakness of the government’s
institutions that provides the freedom of action and the ability to engage in criminal activity and divert state
resources unchecked by law enforcement and rule of law. Criminal networks often ally other state and
nonstate organizations, engage in, and facilitate a range of illicit activities (often through intimidation and
coercion) to capture and subvert critical state functions and institutions. These networks often pursue political
and criminal agendas. They often form alliances with political leaders, financial institutions, law

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Chapter 2

enforcement, foreign intelligence, and security agencies. Many operate with impunity—taking advantage of
state weakness and subverting law enforcement, investigative, and judicial institutions within a nation-state’s
government.
2-14. Opportunists take advantage of the conditions of instability and state weakness in the pursuit of their
interests. Opportunists can work with, for, or against insurgent organizations. Opportunists often benefit from
a wartime economy by working with multiple parties in a conflict to maximize influence or profit. For
example, opportunists might facilitate movement of insurgents while providing intelligence to
counterinsurgents.
2-15. Commanders and staffs should identify criminal networks and opportunists, assess their impact on the
mission, and force protection while executing actions to accomplish the mission. Commanders’ work with
local, area, federal, and law enforcement personnel and unified action partners to develop understanding and
mitigate the threat these groups pose. BCTs integrate law enforcement personnel into operations and
coordinate military and law enforcement efforts to defeat threats and individuals. Collaboration allows the
BCT to consolidate security gains such as local law enforcement agencies that can assume responsibility for
maintaining security.
INDIVIDUALS
2-16. Although United States forces have not historically focused on threats from individuals, people with
sufficient technical skills or access to destructive weapons may pose a significant threat to United States
interests or forces. For example, an individual may conduct a cyber attack to degrade or destroy automated
mission command systems. BCTs must be prepared to defend against cyber attacks, whether initiated by a
state, organization, or individual. BCTs must be prepared to identify and neutralize individuals that pose a
threat to the mission or the force.

SECTION III – THREAT CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATION

2-17. BCTs prepare to fight and win against combinations of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces,
and criminal elements. These “hybrid” enemy threat organizations employ conventional, unconventional,
and terrorist tactics and methods to achieve their strategic goals and political aims.
2-18. Nation states organize, train, equip, and employ regular forces to defeat an enemy’s armed forces,
destroy an enemy’s war-making capacity, seize territory, and defend territory.
2-19. Regular forces often possess technologically advanced weapon systems integrated into mechanized or
motorized combined arms formations as well as light Infantry forces. BCTs are prepared to defeat enemy
forces that include armored fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, air defense systems, ballistic missiles,
manned and unmanned aircraft, indirect fire systems, mines, improvised explosive devices, digital
communications systems, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Regular forces may also possess
CBRN capabilities and have access to space capabilities. Regular forces organizations are hierarchical (for
example, companies, battalions, brigades, and so forth) with a generally centralized command and control
structure. They can conduct long-term campaigns and employ combinations of conventional and
unconventional tactics. Examples of regular forces include:
z Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
z Peoples Liberation Army of China.
z Russian Army.
z North Korean People’s Army.

2-20. Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
police, or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). Irregular forces employ unconventional, asymmetric
methods to counter U.S. advantages. Unconventional methods may include terrorism, insurgency, and
guerrilla warfare. Weaker enemy organizations often use unconventional methods to exhaust the United
States collective will through protracted conflict. They usually employ sophisticated strategies that combine
economic, political, and informational initiatives to subvert United States partners, strengthen their
organizations, and disrupt United States efforts to accomplish the mission. Irregular forces or complex threats
often combinations of paramilitaries, terrorists, guerillas, and criminal organizations and networks.

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 Threat

2-21. Irregular forces or complex threats generally have political objectives motivated by ideologies or
grievances. These grievances may be real or perceived. Identifying their objectives and motivations is often
difficult because—
z There may be multiple insurgent groups with differing goals and motivations.
z Leaders change and the organization goals shift over time.
z Movement leaders may have different motivations from their followers.
z Organizations hide their true motivations and make false claims.

2-22. Irregular forces customarily operate in small, dispersed, decentralized formations or cells (team and
squad size) within a decentralized command and control structure while retaining the ability to concentrate
forces if they perceive weakness. They establish local, regional, and worldwide support networks. Irregular
threats’ military capabilities often include small-arms weapons, antitank weapons, man-portable air defense
missiles, mortars, short-range rockets, homemade radio frequency weapons, rudimentary robotics, unmanned
aircraft systems, and improvised explosive devices. Some irregular threats possess significant financial
means, state sponsorship, and can acquire advanced weapon systems and technologies. Irregular forces that
have engaged in recent armed conflict including—
z Revolutionary Army Forces of Columbia-People’s Army.
z Mujahidin in Afghanistan (1979).
z PLO in the West Bank (2001).
z Al Qaeda in Iraq (2007).
z Taliban in Afghanistan (2009).

2-23. Hybrid threats combine regular and irregular threats, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified (or
allied) to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats may include nation-states that employ
protracted regular as well as proxy forces. Hybrid threats can operate under a centralized or decentralized
command and control structure. Examples of hybrid threats in recent conflict include the Iraqi Fedayeen al
Saddam forces in 2003.
2-24. Combat experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent conflicts such as those in Lebanon, Mali,
Syria, Gaza, Northern Nigeria, and Southern Thailand reveal a migration of capabilities, tactics, and
techniques previously associated only with military forces of nation-states to state-sponsored and nonstate
threat organizations. This migration of capabilities presents BCTs with challenges that extend beyond
defeating an enemy’s regular force. Threats combine regular and irregular warfare, adopting strategies,
tactics, and techniques to evade and disrupt United States advantages and gain tactical advantages within the
physical, cognitive, informational, and political dimensions of armed conflict. As a result, the BCT must be
prepared to continuously assess the situation and adapt to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

THREAT CAPABILITIES, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES

2-25. Enemy organizations employ tactical and technical countermeasures to counter United States
operational and tactical advantages. Tactical countermeasures include deception operations, dispersion,
concealment, and the intermingling with civilians in urban terrain. The enemy employs technological
countermeasures, such as cyber attacks and global positioning system jamming and other forms of electronic
warfare, to evade and disrupt United States forces ability to operate effectively.
2-26. BCT commanders and staffs anticipate and counter disruptive enemy capabilities, determine enemies
across multiple battlegrounds or contested aspects of the mission including the physical, cognitive,
informational dimension, and political battlegrounds.
PHYSICAL DIMENSION
2-27. Enemies operate within complex terrain to evade United States weapon systems and advanced
combined arms, air-ground capabilities. The enemy operates in and among populations to evade detection,
preserve their combat power, and retain their freedom of movement. The enemy often establishes
relationships with local, regional, and transnational criminal organizations and violent extremist
organizations to finance their operations and gain access to illicit trafficking networks for the movement of
weapons, munitions, people, narcotics, or money.

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Chapter 2

EVASION TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

2-28. Enemy forces use deception, cover and concealment, and obscuration. They may move in small,
dispersed units, formations, groups, or cells to avoid detection and then concentrate against perceived
weakness. Irregular and regular forces often conduct short engagements and attempt to break contact before
United States forces can bring indirect fire or other assets to bear. The enemy employs deception measures
to reduce United States forces information collection efforts. Deception measures include enemy
organizations, hardened and buried facilities, and multispectral decoys to mask the signatures of high-value
systems (for example, short-range ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles). The enemy exploits safe
havens within hostile states or in ungoverned areas, and takes advantage of subterranean infrastructure (for
example tunnels, underground facilities, sewers, and drainage systems) to avoid detection. As enemies evade
United States and coalition forces, they simultaneously seek to expand their freedom of movement through
intimidation and coercion. This creates dilemmas where lethal operations may negatively influence the
perceptions of the BCT and degrade popular support (for example, engaging United States forces from
densely crowded populations which causes civilian damage from BCT forces’ response). The enemy often
uses civilian populations and cultural sites to hide or shield key weapon systems or command and control
facilities.
DISRUPTION TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
2-29. The enemy employs combinations of lethal, (for example offensive and defensive tasks, assassination,
terrorist attacks) and nonlethal (political subversion, propaganda and intimidation) actions to disrupt United
States forces to shape the environment, influence key actors, consolidate gains and efforts to accomplish the
mission.
2-30. The enemy conducts reconnaissance to assess the BCT’s strengths and weaknesses, identify
opportunities, achieve positions of relative advantage, and neutralize the BCT’s strengths in mobility and
firepower. Enemy reconnaissance often operates among the civilian populace to avoid detection. The enemy
conducts deliberate counter-reconnaissance tasks to deny the BCT their ability to develop the situation in
close contact with the enemy and civilian populace. Conventional enemy counter-reconnaissance efforts
include antiarmor and antipersonnel ambushes, indirect fire, UAS assets, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft,
electronic countermeasures, cyber attacks, raids, and spoiling attacks to degrade the BCT’s reconnaissance
and security tasks. Insurgents and guerillas use ambushes, suicide bombers, demonstrations, propaganda,
assassinations, and indirect fire mortars and rockets to disrupt the BCT’s reconnaissance efforts and
momentum. Additionally, the enemy conducts propaganda and disinformation to discredit the BCT and
generate popular opposition to United States and coalition efforts.
2-31. The enemy augments the tactical capabilities of small combined arms teams with inexpensive
countermeasures such as IEDs, suicide bombers, and fire and smoke as a weapon system to impede United
States forces. The enemy seeks to leverage commercial and military technologies for precision strike
capability, satellite imagery, forward-looking infrared, and electronic warfare systems or platforms.
2-32. In addition, enemies are proficient at establishing and maintaining communications as well as
disrupting United States forces automated mission command systems and combined-arms capabilities
through combinations of global positioning system jamming, cyber attacks, data pirating, and potential
satellite neutralization. Developing and maintaining these capabilities requires extensive recruitment,
training, and outsourcing of personnel with the required skill set to conduct such attacks.
2-33. Regular, irregular, and hybrid forces present formidable tactical challenges to BCTs through area
denial; artillery munitions, land mines, technologically advanced antiship and antiaircraft systems or weapons
of mass destruction. The enemy emphasizes deception, cover, infiltration techniques, mobility, and most
importantly, depth for its defense and operations. Enemy offense operations emphasize deception, cover,
infiltration techniques, mobility, and, most importantly depth for its defense and operations. Taken together,
regular, irregular, and hybrid forces on the current and future battlefield employ significant combined arms
capabilities that seek to disrupt BCT operations and dislocate BCT combined arms capabilities.
COGNITIVE AND INFORMATIONAL DIMENSION
2-34. Enemies recognize the importance of public perception and its impact on the conduct of operations.
The enemy attempts to influence the will of the American people, key allies, and the conflicting populations,

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 Threat

through enemy information activities and attacks on United States and allies assets at home or abroad. The
enemy will use information for effect, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda to shape local and
international public opinion and perception against the United States, host nation, or coalition forces by
undermining ongoing stabilization efforts, marginalizing successes, exploiting instances of friendly force
missteps, and fabricating or exaggerating friendly force cultural shortcomings. Enemy organizations attempt
to manipulate local, regional, and worldwide news and social media outlets to achieve their ends and solicit
new recruits to their cause. For example, posting improvised explosive devise detonations captured on digital
cameras or internet chat rooms for a worldwide audience.
POLITICAL DIMENSION
2-35. Politics, and in particular, competition for power, resources, and survival drive conflicts. Conflicts
demand ultimately political solutions. Understanding the political dynamics at the local-level allows BCT
commanders to identify the enemy’s strategy, capabilities, and potential weaknesses within the political
environment vulnerable to enemy exploitation. Understanding aids in identifying targets that undermine or
counter United States and coalition efforts that consolidate gains and achieve a sustainable political outcome
consistent with United States vital interests.
2-36. The enemy exploits societal divisions along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. Enemy organizations often
offer benefits to favored groups to consolidate power and improve popular support. The enemy seeks
opportunities to exert their legitimacy by filling societal roles that United States forces or host-nation leaders
have failed to address. As enemies and adversaries pursue this strategy they often align with criminal
organizations to undermine and attack existing government institutions. Organized crime networks take
advantage of failed states or contested spaces, forge alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and
foreign intelligence services, and destabilize political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states.
Additionally they undermine competition in markets, use cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate
sophisticated frauds, create the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and
expand narco-trafficking and human and weapon smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly
turn to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. These groups operating together
create corruption, acceptance of illicit activities, and paralysis which undermine political reform, stability
efforts, and effective governance. The enemy promotes weakness within political institutions by disrupting
or influencing elections at all levels through attacks on voting sites, intimidating election officials,
manipulating political districts, or backing corrupt officials. The enemy may attempt to assassinate, abduct,
or extort key civic, ethnic, or military leaders to undermine security and good governance, degrade friendly
forces’ morale, garner media attention to gain support and sway populace opinion, raise funds, and attract
recruits. Weak government institutions provide the enemy with opportunities to divert state resources
unchecked by law enforcement and rule of law.
2-37. Enemy campaigns of political subversion exploit existing social and political weaknesses. Degrading
public opinion of United States and host-nation efforts, disrupting United States and local force abilities to
provide essential services and security, and alienating the populaces from supporting friendly forces’ are all
efforts within this campaign. The BCT commander and staff must recognize and counter these efforts to
maintain the initiative. They must visualize the threat in its political context to accurately understand the
dynamics within the area of operation and direct efforts toward accomplishing tactical objectives that achieve
sustainable political outcomes consistent with United States vital interests. Understanding the political
dynamics of a conflict enables the commander to reassure and protect indigenous populations, while
simultaneously identifying, disrupting, isolating, and ultimately defeating the enemy.

COUNTERING ADAPTATIONS AND RETAINING THE INITIATIVE

2-38. Countering enemy adaptations and retaining the initiative in future armed conflict requires forces that
understand the threat and the operational environment. Reconnaissance operations must overcome
increasingly sophisticated area-denial actions and capabilities to develop the situation, and combined arms
and joint capabilities must be complimentary and effectively integrated to seize the initiative and dominate
an ever increasingly challenging and complex environment.
2-39. The BCT must fight for information to develop the situation while in contact with the enemy and near
the population. Commanders and staffs must understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics
associated with current and future armed conflict because of the requirements and challenges of the

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Chapter 2

operational environment. Understanding these dynamics must extend beyond enemy organizations and
capabilities and include ethnic groups, political factions, tribes or clans, religious sects, or ideological
movements and their agenda. Identifying and distinguishing these groups and the associated dynamics is
extremely difficult and requires a detailed, in-depth intelligence collection effort through every phase of the
operation. Only through an effective intelligence collection effort can the BCT gain the understanding
necessary to defeat an adaptive and determined enemy on current and future battlefields.

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 Chapter 3
Shape, Engage, and Consolidate Gains
To win within all operational frameworks, BCTs must understand the operational
environment, shape the operational environment through action, engage local leaders
to influence the population, and consolidate gains to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.
Commanders shape the operational environment by conducting multiple missions and
efforts seeking to achieve a common goal and end state that nests with high command
objectives and end state. Commanders must have an understanding of competing
interests within the operational and information environment to determine what is of
value to competitive parties and entities within their area of operations. Understanding
interests helps develop courses of action to engage leaders and information operations
the populace and political structure, enhance the security situation, and lead to mission
success. BCTs consolidate gains and favorable milestones to seize and exploit
weaknesses, capitalize on opportunities, and further the interests of allies to secure
stable political settlements and objectives complimentary to desired outcomes.

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-1. Interests are motivations that provide insight to perceived rights, influence, responsibilities, and power.
Interests influence how populations perceive complexity, physical security, political systems, economic
influence, tribal and religious identity, self-serving, or a combination of two or more. Brigades develop an
understanding of operational variables (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information,
physical environment and time, or PMESII-PT) and mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time, and civil considerations, or METT-TC) through reconnaissance and
information collection to enhance situational awareness and understanding of competing interests.
Understanding competing interests within the area of operation allows the commander and staff to frame
specific problems. BCTs seek to understand the motivations and recognize each interest has multiple
perspectives. To operate effectively under conditions of complexity and in close contact with enemies and
populations, BCT’s consider political interests from multiple perspectives. Understanding interests assists
commanders and staffs to plan information operations that shape the information environment and modify
behaviors to further sustainable objectives.
3-2. Understanding interests requires analysis of the operational (PMESII-PT) and mission (METT-TC)
variables within a particular region. Understanding requires an appreciation of the operational environment’s
complex, humanistic, political environs within the context of war as a contest of wills. To communicate
effectively brigades must develop an understanding of cultural communication techniques of the local
audience. BCTs must understand the most important aspect of cultural communication is how the population
receives the information rather than how the unit transmits the information. Determination of valued interests
within an area provides options for BCTs to establish programs that incentivize cooperation leading to
mission accomplishment. Comprehension of interests allows for understanding to implement disincentives
that seek to coerce and persuade adversaries, enemies, and neutral parties with interests counter to the
objectives established by the brigade and higher. The understanding and acknowledgement of interests help
frame information operations in future operations.
3-3. Efforts to understand interests begin before deployment. Country studies, analysis of the social
demographics, constructs of local, sub-national, and national governance, and understanding of key
personalities and organizations within the brigade’s future area of operation provide a baseline knowledge to
increase situational awareness and identify potential areas of friction before the brigade deploys. BCTs
consider the elements of PMESII-PT within their area of operations to gain understanding of the interests

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Chapter 3

and motivations particular to enhance situational awareness. Unified Action Partners, Army Special
Operations Forces (SOF), and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM)
organizations are key resources all units use to develop situational understanding during shaping efforts
leading to a sustainable security environment. The military information support operations (MISO) assets
organic and attached to the BCT can assist in conducting adversary information message analysis and
exploitation. The MISO staff planner can obtain division or higher-level MISO support to counter the
adversary information activities as necessary. Analysis of these considerations allows informed leaders to
identify information gaps and develop courses of action that increase situational understanding within their
area of operation.
3-4. BCTs conduct information collection through reconnaissance tasks focused on information
requirements to bridge information gaps. Gaps identified during IPB develop into information requirements
through continuous reconnaissance. Staffs consider operational variables of PMESSI-PT and the mission
variables of METT-TC with emphasis on civil considerations to understand the interests within their area of
operation. By focusing civil considerations within the construct of area, structures, capabilities,
organizations, people, and events information requirements are defined and collected that develops
situational understanding of the interests within a particular area. BCTs employ a diverse range of integrated
capabilities to understand the cultural implications of conducting military operations among indigenous
populations and institutions (IPI). The BCT S-9 develops plans, policies, and programs to further the
relationship between the BCT and the civil component in the assigned AO and provides a mechanism for
civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication with the BCT AO. Human terrain system
teams provide a social science-based research, analysis, and training capability to assist commanders and
staffs in understanding the indigenous culture in the BCT AO.
3-5. Commanders and staffs consider culture and pillar organizations that influence the civil considerations
of the operational environment. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts
members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Pillar organizations are organizations or
systems on which the populace depends for support, security, strength, and direction. Examination of culture
provides insight to the motivations and interests of people and organizations. Consideration of culture is
imperative to successful shaping operations that set conditions for future success. Thorough understanding
of the interests of groups and individuals allow for informed and viable courses of action that seek to
favorably shape the environment contributing to positive outcomes and objectives within the brigade’s area
of operation.
3-6. Host nation security organizations and political partners provide invaluable insight into values, beliefs,
and interests. These organizations are composed of the people they secure and govern; their native fluency
in the customs, courtesies, cultures, beliefs, interests, and ideals provides the partnering BCT cultural
perspective and intelligence that develop understanding of the operational environment. Close positive
relationships with host nation partners breed trust, which leads to an enhanced understanding of the
operational environment.

When “Ready First” 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division arrived in Ramadi, Iraq in June
2006, the situation was dire. Attacks averaged over thirty per day, spiking on some days to over
fifty. Less than 100 police out of an authorized 4,000 were present for duty, bunkered in their
stations. Attacks bombarded the garrison at the government center several times daily with
mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and small arms fire. The population of this provincial
capital was terrified of an anticipated full-scale assault on the city to remove the insurgents.
The Armored Brigade Combat Team of 5,000 U.S. Soldiers and 3,000 Iraqi Army troops
employed a far different strategy. Instead of launching a massive assault to clear the city house
by house, the brigade isolated the insurgents. Disregarding the theater emphasis to withdraw to
large bases, the brigade pushed out, placing company sized combat outposts in the worst insurgent
areas. These outposts restricted insurgent movement and demonstrated willingness to confront Al
Qaeda in his sanctuary. Using the outposts as an example of the BCT commitment to free the city
from insurgent control, the brigade and Iraqi partners reached out to the remaining local tribal
leaders, offering protection and economic development in exchange for police recruits to clear
the city. Frustrated by Al Qaeda’s excesses and abuse, the tribal leaders provided over 4,000
recruits over the following six months to fill the dwindling police ranks.

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In the meantime, the brigade continued to execute a clear, hold, build strategy in the city,
emplacing more combat outposts to reduce insurgent control over the city’s center. A linked
information and operations campaign began to discredit Al Qaeda in the eyes of the people.
Intelligence provided by allied tribes enabled raids that demoralized the Al Qaeda force. The Iraqi
Army and U.S. forces liberated the city’s large hospital, freeing access to medical care. Micro
and macro economic development projects began in cooperative areas, providing much needed
local jobs. Sensing diminishing support and legitimacy among the population, Al Qaeda attempted
to retaliate against cooperating tribes through a murder and intimidation campaign. The Ready
First stood by the tribes, providing air, artillery, and troop support to defend against insurgent
attacks when required. This demonstration of solidarity solidified the tribal rebellion, which
expanded exponentially.
Returning police recruits provided security in cleared areas, and provided the flexibility to
expand and clear the remaining sanctuaries. In addition to sending troops to far away police and
army schools, the Ready First Brigade provided a leadership academy to develop local forces’
ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Soldiers and local security forces inhabited joint
security stations throughout the city, working together to provide security. The tribal councils
selected mayors and local leaders to rebuild the human infrastructure of the city. By February
2007, violence decreased by nearly 70 percent, and by summer 2007 attacks practically ceased in
Ramadi. The awakening spread quickly from Ramadi to the rest of Anbar, changing the course of
the Iraq war.

SECTION II – SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT

3-7. Commanders and staffs consider the competitive environment of their area of operation and shape the
operational environment to set conditions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Different political entities
and personalities, tribal dynamics, religious interests, economic motivations, sources of security, and
potential havens of refuge for adversaries all contribute to the competitive nature of the operational
environment in that not all interests will be parallel and mutually supportive of the objectives and end state
for a particular region. Shaping the environment requires BCTs to develop situational understanding,
influence personalities and organizations through engagement to achieve specific objectives, persuading and
empowering other personalities and organizations to modify behaviors and actions consistent with friendly
forces intent and objectives, and to conduct limited offensive operations to maintain initiative. Shaping is an
enduring process throughout all operations and not separated by phase.
3-8. Commanders actively seek to understand the competitive interests within their area of operation and
how interests influence desired outcomes and objectives. Some interests and motivations will be supportive
of the BCT’s objectives and others will conflict, counter, and disrupt efforts supportive to the desired end
state. The ability of the BCT to shape conditions favorable to future outcomes relates to their understanding
of the threat and adversary influences as well as their ability to develop the situation through reconnaissance
and security tasks that collect information requirements enhancing situational awareness and understanding.
A thorough understanding of the threat is imperative to identifying conflicting interests and information
collection requirements that are developed through reconnaissance and security tasks. BCTs actively seek
answers to information gaps through the development of information requirements that are satisfied through
active reconnaissance tasks within a given area. Through information collection and analysis, staffs develop
options for the commander to further inform the populace, influence various actors, seize opportunities, and
maintain initiative.
3-9. Analysis of the motivations and interests of personalities and organizations provide insight to future
information activities seeking to modify behaviors counter to friendly force objectives. Staffs develop plans
and operations that support the BCT commander’s intent and desired end state. Supporting efforts empower
key influencers and organizations and persuade neutral audiences to bolster legitimacy and secure vital
interests and objectives. Coercive efforts attack to neutralize the enemy’s narrative. BCTs use coercive efforts
to counter adversary/enemy information activities and isolate adversaries from their support base to begin
the psychological breakdown of enemy organizations. BCTs shape conditions for favorable objectives in line

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with the interests of the host nation governments contributing to the enemy’s defeat through use of military
deception, engagements, and communication mediums.
3-10. Shaping activities derive success in how effectively they persuade the populace and empower the host
nation government. All efforts focus on bolstering the legitimacy of the rule of law and the host nation’s
ability to provide for effective governance. Persuasion and empowerment demand engagement strategies that
provide connections and relationships with pillar organizations and individuals who control and influence
the local community. Engagements secure common and clearly defined goals and ideals that provide a
common reference point for future engagements and activities. Engagements seek to reinforce the authority
of legitimate leaders and pillars and restore or solidify confidence in host nation security forces, governance,
and rule of law. Persuasive efforts utilize a compelling narrative that justifies and explains friendly actions
while delegitimizing motivations and behaviors of adversaries and those entities opposing positive gains
within the area of operations. Additionally, persuasive efforts specifically target neutral or fringe entities with
the goal of tipping neutrality to a favorable alliance.
3-11. Offensive operations of limited scope, duration, and objectives specifically targeting enemy,
capabilities, groups, or individuals seize initiative and opportunities contributing to enduring success. By
building trust and collecting information BCTs identify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
to destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, or isolate enemy organizations and discredit enemy actions. Offensive
operations shape the operational environment within the three operational frameworks and establish
conditions for future operations. Effective offensive operations retain initiative through coherent and
compelling narratives guiding information operations.
3-12. Shaping the operational environment requires understanding of competing dynamics within the BCT’s
area of operation. Commanders and staffs understand through analysis of mission and operational variables
enhanced and developed through information collection and both reconnaissance and security operations.
Understanding and analysis are continuous tasks not bound by phase or operation and executed through the
entire operations process. BCTs seek to understand the interests and motivations of the populace and identify
pillar organizations that provide guidance, inspiration, and strength to the populace. Understanding
influences enables the BCT to engage leaders, influence behaviors, persuade neutral and fringe groups to
synthesize with friendly objectives, and plan and execute limited offensive operations that set conditions for
future successes. Ultimately, greater understanding of mission and operational variables assist in the
development, planning, and execution of information operations activities that further shape the operational
environment.

SECTION III - ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

3-13. Influence is the central activity to shape the operational environment as all activities conducted by all
units will directly or indirectly contribute to or detract from their ability to influence the populace and
environment. Information operations activities are the integration of designated information-related
capabilities to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global
audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making (ADRP 3-0). BCTs
engage local leaders and pillar organizations to clarify intentions through common narratives, counter
adversary/enemy information activities, expose corruption in competing groups or entities, and bolster the
legitimacy of host-nation power and governance. Information operations activities modify behaviors and
efforts through engagement, persuasion, cooperation, or coercion that lead to successful operations that
secure the populace and provide order to the social structure.
3-14. Narratives provide a mechanism and engagement framework for communicating and are the unifying
structures between action and communication with the populace. Simple narratives tie together the actions
of the BCT with unit objectives and provide a basis for informing and influencing leaders and pillars as to
the purpose behind actions and activities conducted by host nation forces and the BCT. Compelling narratives
seek to address concerns and interests of the populace while explaining the methodologies endeavored by the
host nation government and security forces in partnership with the BCT. All leaders must understand the
narrative as they play a central role in key leader engagements and all information operations activities.
Narratives explain and justify friendly actions while delegitimizing the actions of adversaries. In this method,
narratives simultaneously serve as both communication mechanisms and counter-propaganda instruments
that gain favor of the populace and seek to neutralize or disable the support structures provided to adversary

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or enemy groups and factions. Leaders must be aware of the multiple narratives and audiences within a given
information environment. Competing narratives provide valuable insight for the BCT in determining the
multiple and disparate interests and motivations of the population and its subsets. BCTs determine competing
narratives by identifying the different actors and analyzing the narratives; staffs then articulate these
competing narratives to inform commander’s decisions.
3-15. BCTs address adversary/enemy information activities efforts by preempting and countering
adversary/enemy information activities to neutralize their effects on friendly actions and objectives. MISO
assists adversary information message exploitation. The analysis of adversary information messaging and
products focuses on print substrates, images, graphics, media, and production. These activities include
coordination with MISO forces and use of the source, content, audience, media, and effect (SCAME) and
message, audience, reaction, carrier, origin (MARCO) analysis methods. The resulting information feeds
analysis of the broader adversary information program and appropriate responses, if necessary. All units
maintain initiative by continuously engaging leaders and organizations to maintain credibility with the host
nation populace and countering adversary/enemy information activities that seeks to delegitimize host nation
government and friendly forces actions. Use of mainstream media, social media, community meetings, key
leader engagements, and other messaging mechanisms provide multiple means to counter adversary/enemy
information activities and address accusations and misinformation before the local, regional, national, and
global audience perceives deceit and lies as truth and fact. BCTs actively collect information that allows
unhindered observation of enemy messaging and propaganda platforms to identify enemy information
campaigns that seek to degrade the effectiveness of friendly actions and activities. All units counter
adversary/enemy information activities by crafting narratives, identifying enemy counter-messaging and
propaganda efforts through reconnaissance and information collection, aggressively delivering counter-
messages that discredit adversary/enemy information activities, and assessing the impacts of both friendly
and enemy influence upon the populace at the local, regional, nation, and international level.
3-16. The presence of criminal patronage networks that undermine progress for political or economic gain
require transparency, accountability, and combined oversight with host nation partners. Political
environments and security organizations provide opportunists the ability to infiltrate legitimate systems and
pursue agendas outside the interests, aims, and objectives supportive of sustainable and favorable outcomes.
Political subversion undermines legitimacy and provides adversaries insider information as to friendly
motivations and operations.
3-17. All units and leaders must understand the external and internal influences of corruption within host
nation political, economic, and security systems. BCTs, with their host nation partners, must identify corrupt
officials, discredit enemy influence in legitimate systems, and eliminate subversive elements that provide
negative influence to legitimate governmental processes or other pillar organizations. By denying enemy
organizations sanctuary in pillar organizations they will be required to seek support elsewhere or retire from
a given area, thereby making themselves vulnerable to friendly forces who can identify transitions, seize
initiative, exploit weakness, and neutralize or destroy enemy forces.
3-18. Above all, BCTs support efforts designed to bolster host nation partner legitimacy between the
populace and global audience. Legitimacy takes on varying forms depending upon the social, cultural, and
political systems of a particular society. Rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance. Partnered
security operations between the BCT and host nation security forces are essential to gaining and maintaining
the rule of law and a sustainable security environment. The populace decides whether the governance
mechanisms within their society are legitimate as local and cultural norms define legitimacy and acceptance
by the people. BCTs enhance legitimacy by measurable and noticeable progress, however slight, that
improves the security, law and order, economic situation, and social structure over time.
3-19. BCTs that exhibit an understanding of the operational environment are prepared to engage their
counterparts to influence and enhance the effectiveness of their operations. Engagement activities
communicate action and intent to the populace, encourage cooperation through persuasion and relationships,
effectively counter adversary/enemy information activities, expose and defeat corruption, and bolster the
legitimacy of host nation partners. Effective information operations activities shape the operational
environment and enable sustainable outcomes that lead to rule of law, effective governance, address the needs
of the people, and enhance mission accomplishment.

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SECTION IV – INFLUENCE
3-20. Commanders conduct information operations activities within their area of operation to empower the
successful accomplishment of objectives. Influence alters public opinion garnering support for military and
diplomatic operations. Well planned and executed information operations activities lead to diplomatic and
political conclusions that minimize or eliminate the need for military operations. BCTs use lethal means
through combat operations and nonlethal means through information operations activities to achieve
objectives. Objectives encapsulate the results of activities and the expected or desired conclusion of missions
and tasks. Use of lethal and nonlethal capabilities nested within tactical, operational, and strategic objectives
reinforce narratives that promote influence.
3-21. Culture, history, religion, politics, tradition, and needs hierarchies all contribute to interpretation and
acceptance of the narratives presented to adversaries, host nation forces, and indigenous populations.
Competing narratives clash within the operational environment concurrently with lethal, nonlethal, and
ancillary capabilities. Commanders work with information related capabilities such as civil affairs, public
affairs, intelligence, and other special capabilities such as military information support to operations to draft,
implement, distribute, and monitor the effectiveness of narratives. Unintended or unconsidered
consequences, impacts from activities and actions of entities outside of the commander’s sphere of control,
and the adversaries competing narrative all struggle for acceptance or rejection of the narrative within the
operational environment. Using environmental metrics, civil considerations intelligence, monitoring of
media (both external and social), and constant attention to all competing narratives increase the commander’s
development of influence within his area of operations.
3-22. Influence and outcomes are inextricably linked, allowing commanders to consolidate combat power,
both soft and hard, resulting in mission success and end-state accomplishment. Subsets within influence and
its attainment are concepts and actions such as conflict resolution, negotiation, accommodation,
reconciliation, compromise, and release of authority and responsibility to host nation military and political
forces and entities. Continuous information collection and analysis of intelligence within the human dynamic
are essential to gaining and implementing influence. Commanders and staffs must continuously assess and
modify information operations to maintain narrative dominance, ensuring that any expected or desired
outcomes of other activities and operations are linked and nested with the influence operation and narrative.

SECTION V – CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS

3-23. Consolidating gains is the combination and nesting multiple objectives to unite military advantage and
influence within the area of operation. BCTs consolidate gains through the execution of tasks to accomplish
objectives consistent with the higher intent. Gains capitalize success in military operations, engagement
activities that influence local, regional, national, and international audiences, and combined operations to
accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.
3-24. Consolidating gains occurs upon the capitalization of positive actions and objectives through
information collection, offensive operations, information operations, narratives, messaging, and host nation
partnership to bridge tactical success with operational and strategic objectives. BCTs consolidate gains by
seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and opportunities resulting from reconnaissance, information
collection, interaction with people and organizations, offensive operations, and information operations
activities resulting in bolstered legitimacy of the host nation forces. BCTs seek opportunities to maintain
pressure on enemy forces, highlight and promote positive contributions in rule of law and governance, and
exploit weaknesses in enemy narratives. Consolidating gains is tied to mass, a principle of war, though instead
of forces or lethal effects it is a matter of positive impacts through lethal, nonlethal, information collection,
and influence mechanisms. In essence, the consolidation of gains links positive contributing tactical actions
with operational and strategic objectives.

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Note. A BCT establishes two combat outposts within a contested area. These COPs represent gains
in security and stability within their immediate surroundings, but the contested space (physical-
geographical, political, social, and so forth.) between the COPs remains under the control and
influence of adversarial groups. The BCT “consolidates” (nests) these “gains” (COPs security and
stability) through the rapid introduction of joint patrolling and influence operations within the
contested space. Thus the BCT maintains the initiative and momentum towards mission
accomplishment, and operational and strategic goal achievement.

3-25. Commanders and staffs tie complimentary tactical objectives across multiple lines of effort to influence
operational and strategic objectives with tactical actions. BCTs conduct activities that ensure gains are
sustainable. Commanders and staffs build partner capacity through collaboration and empowerment that
enhances legitimacy of host nation forces and government. Partner capacity must be sustainable and
eventually independent of BCT influence to maintain legitimate authority and perception of the rule of law
and governance. The BCT Cavalry squadron plays an important role in assessing the effectiveness of all
operations. Through continuous reconnaissance and information collection BCTs develop and reassess the
situation, perceptions, and opportunities to maintain positive momentum and resultant of tactical, operational,
and strategic gains.
3-26. BCTs collect information and develop intelligence to understand, shape, and influence the operational
environment and consolidate positive gains leading towards desired objectives. Shaping transcends phases
and is continuous throughout all operations. Commanders and staffs analyze operational and mission
variables to provide understanding of the operational environment and to influence the people and
organizations within their area of operation. BCTs shape the environment by influencing, persuading, and
empowering people and organizations to support sustainable objectives. Commanders and staffs influence
their host partners and populace through compelling narratives that explain actions, discredit
adversary/enemy information operations, and highlight common goals, themes, and messages. BCTs
consolidate gains to capitalize on successes and seize, retain, and exploit initiative to achieve tactical,
operational, and strategic objectives.

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 Chapter 4
Mission Command
BCT commanders and staffs apply the principles of mission command to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage against
adaptive, capable, and determined enemies. Significantly, timely and accurate combat
information provided by reconnaissance and security tasks is the key to allowing BCT
commanders to execute effective mission command.
BCT commanders and squadron commanders must apply the principles of mission
command to develop the situation in close contact with the enemy and civilian
populations to develop their understanding, visualization, and description of the
operating environment, the terrain, local populations, and the enemy. At the same time,
commanders use the information gained from reconnaissance and security tasks to
modify existing or developing plans and reallocate BCT assets as they refine their
direction, leadership, and assessment of both reconnaissance and security tasks and the
BCT’s decisive operations.
The role of reconnaissance and security operations in mission command is essential.
To make effective decisions in an uncertain environment, the BCT commander requires
timely and accurate combat information from his reconnaissance and security
formations.

SECTION I – MISSION COMMAND FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

4-1. Military operations are complex human endeavors characterized by continuous, mutual adaptations
among all participants. The threats, enemies, and adversaries that U.S. forces face in combat will consist of
capable, adaptable, and determined enemies who will resist our actions, employ countermeasures to our
strengths and capabilities, and will seek to impose their will on all actors within the operational environment.
At the same time, Army forces will conduct operations in and among civilian groups whose desires influence
and are influenced by military operations. As a result, Army forces will encounter a wide variety of political
agendas and changing perceptions throughout an operational area. As operations progress in close contact
with enemy forces and civilian populations, commanders will face thinking and adaptive enemies, changing
civilian perceptions, and differing agendas of various organizations and actors throughout the area of
operations. The result of the continuous process of interactions is an environment defined by uncertainty.

MISSION COMMAND
4-2. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to
enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower leaders in the conduct of unified land
operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command includes visualizing the current situation and the future endstate,
then formulating concepts of operations to get from one state to the other by employing unified land
operations. One of the foundations of unified land operations, the philosophy of mission command helps
commanders capitalize on subordinates’ ability to take action to develop the situation rapidly to achieve the
commander’s intent and desired end state. When contrasted with detailed command, mission command
emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative.
4-3. Mission command helps commanders and staffs to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing
the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders understand that some decisions must be made quickly
and are better made at the point of action. Further, mission command is based on mutual trust and a shared

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Chapter 4

understanding and purpose between commanders, subordinates, staffs, and unified action partners. In
exercising mission command, commanders are guided by six principles—
z Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
z Create shared understanding.
z Provide a clear commander’s intent (to include providing clear reconnaissance guidance).
z Exercise disciplined initiative.
z Use mission orders.
z Accept prudent risk (refer to ADRP 6-0 for more information).

4-4. Mutual trust, shared understanding, clear intent, mission orders, and disciplined initiative fosters agile
and adaptive forces. Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration
and dialogue within their organizations and with unified action partners to facilitate unity of effort.
Commanders provide clear intent and use mission orders to identify information gaps, describe their
reconnaissance guidance, assign tasks, and allocate resources. Based on the commander’s guidance
subordinate units take appropriate actions to develop the situation, answer identified information
requirements, identify, create, and exploit opportunities, anticipate change, and perform the necessary
coordination without requiring new orders.
4-5. The nature of military operations requires responsibility and decision making at the point of action.
Mission command demands leaders who can adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment
techniques to the specific situation they face. Mission command demands agile and adaptive reconnaissance
and security organizations that can develop the situation through action in close contact with the enemy and
civilian populace to set conditions for future success. Although BCT and squadron commanders and staffs
must accept that they will often have to act despite significant gaps in their understanding, focused
reconnaissance and security tasks answer the prioritized information requirements that seek to eliminate
information gaps. The resulting combat information and intelligence ultimately allow commanders and staffs
to make timely adjustments in response to changes.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

4-6. BCT and squadron commanders apply the principles of mission command to develop the situation in
close contact with the enemy and civilian populations to develop their understanding, visualization, and
description of the operating environment, the terrain, local populations, and the enemy. Through effective
information collection and continuous reconnaissance and security tasks, BCTs develop and sustain the
necessary tactical and operational understanding to defeat adaptive and determined enemies as well as set
conditions to consolidate tactical gains. Reconnaissance and security tasks improve situational understanding
and help commanders to—
z Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations.
z Visualize operations in the context of mission variables (METT-TC).
z Describe the commander’s decisive operations in time, space, and purpose with a greater degree
of detail, accuracy, and fidelity.
z Direct the execution of decisive operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability,
synchronization, and integration.
z Lead the BCT to concentrate its strengths against enemy weakness.
z Assess progress through continuous reconnaissance, monitoring, and evaluation.
z Modify existing or developing plans and reallocate BCT assets based on changing tactical
situations.
z Achieve tactical depth.
z Identify and create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

4-7. Based on their initial understanding of the operational environment and the tactical situation, BCT and
squadron commanders generate information requirements for the BCT and its organic Cavalry organizations.
Commanders visualize how the Cavalry squadron and other reconnaissance and security assets (to include
national level intelligence assets, surveillance assets, joint enablers, and special reconnaissance) will work
together, and describe how the BCT’s activities will contribute to the success of higher, adjacent, and lower

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 Mission Command

echelons. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s primary asset to develop the situation and provide
the combat information that will ultimately refine subsequent courses of action for the BCT’s decisive
operations. As a result, the BCT commander—working with his staff, the BCT S-3 (see Chapter 1), and his
Cavalry squadron commander—directs reconnaissance and security tasks to address information
requirements and develop the situation to establish conditions conducive to mission success.
4-8. Effective reconnaissance and security tasks create opportunities that allow commanders to confirm or
deny assumptions, make decisions, and take action. Commanders establish the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR), and continuously update information requirements based on changing
battlefield conditions. Commanders and their staffs first identify information gaps and continuously assess,
adapt, add, and delete requirements throughout the operation. As staffs identify requirements necessary for
successful execution, they recommend and assign tasks for Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance and
provide answers that allow the commander to make timely and effective decisions. As they continuously
plan, task, and employ collection assets to answer the commander’s CCIR and other information
requirements, commanders and staffs must—
z Develop and continuously update a list of intelligence requirements.
z Identify and update the CCIR.
z Tie the CCIR directly to the scheme of maneuver and decision points.
z Limit the CCIR to only the most critical intelligence and combat information needs.
z Seek higher echelons’ collection of—and answers to—information requirements.
z Ensure CCIR include the latest time information is off value (LTIOV) to ensure timely reporting
and decision making.
4-9. Reconnaissance and security tasks provide flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the BCT commander’s
scheme of maneuver by synchronizing and integrating combined arms, air-ground teams to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative based on a relevant understanding of the situation. By employing combined arms, air-
ground teams, the BCT commander fights for information and develops the situation against a broad range
of threats, adversaries, and enemies throughout his area of operations. Reconnaissance and security tasks
provide the BCT commander with tactical depth, freedom to maneuver, flexibility, and critical combat
information.
4-10. Commanders conduct reconnaissance and security tasks continuously to protect the force and to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. The commander sets reconnaissance priorities early, as reconnaissance tasks
will precede main body movement, minimizing time available for troop-leading procedures for the Cavalry
unit (including planning and rehearsal times, pre-combat checks and inspections, and maintenance). The
commander sets priorities in the warning order (WARNORD), establishing focus, tempo,
engagement/disengagement criteria, and displacement criteria. Missions without focus degrade the collection
capabilities of the Cavalry unit. Improper utilization of assets can leave an enemy vulnerability—or a
catastrophic threat—undiscovered.
4-11. Reconnaissance and security tasks are most effective when integrating multiple combined arms, air-
ground teams enabled by the tenets of mission command. Reconnaissance and security tasks require quick
dissemination and execution of orders. Reconnaissance leaders must be decisive, make plans quickly, pass
information available to subordinates, report to higher headquarters accurately and rapidly, and be responsive
to changing conditions on the battlefield. Information collection assets, air-ground operations, fires, and
sustainment assets assure completeness in planning and execution and enhance the security effort’s ability to
exercise operations in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security.
4-12. The following historical example illustrates the value of a flexible Cavalry force that directly
contributed to effective mission command. The operations of the Napoleon’s Cavalry corps during his 1806
campaign against the Prussian Army demonstrates how Cavalry—particularly when operating in close
contact with the enemy and civilian populations—were an essential factor in the Napoleon's successful
campaign.
Napoleon’s Cavalry and Mission Command
On October 12, 1806, French Cavalry swept through the little Saxon village of Zeitz,
25-miles south of Leipzig. Napoleon’s light Cavalry—his principle reconnaissance and

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security force—were executing an advanced guard forward of the lead Corps of the Grande
Armee. As the Cavalry secured the town, scouts and commanders immediately went to work
collecting critical combat information for their Emperor. Marshal Joachim Murat,
Napoleon’s chief of Cavalry, and his staff halted temporarily to interrogate the local
postmaster, priest, and mayor—key civilians—concerning the location and disposition of
the Prussian Army, key terrain features, and important civilian activities. In Zeitz, a French
spy emerged from the crowd of on-lookers and reported that the enemy lay to the west and
south, in the vicinity of Erfurt.
A scout produced pen, paper, and a field desk from his kit, established a hasty
command post and rapidly converted the spy’s initial report into multiple copies of an
important message that contained the critical combat information that the reconnaissance
organization knew their commander and the Emperor needed. Murat approved the report
and handed it to a series of riders who maneuvered along a series of connecting files that
relayed the message to Napoleon.
That night, the report reached Napoleon. The Emperor and his staff quickly analyzed
the combat information, updated situation maps, and then, in a rush of rapid, harshly
accented orders, updated the plan, and issued a series of fragmentary orders. By the next
morning, all of Napoleon’s subordinates received the same word—the enemy was massing
to the west around Erfurt and Weimer. Two days later, elements of the Grand Armee,
operating decentralized but still within mutual support, and taking advantage of the
effective reconnaissance and security operations of its Cavalry screen, crushed the
Prussian army in the battle of Jena-Auerstadt.

SECTION II – EXERCISE OF MISSION COMMAND

4-13. To function effectively and have the greatest chance for successful mission accomplishment,
commanders, supported by their staffs, exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations. The
exercise of mission command encompasses how BCT and squadron commanders and staffs apply the
philosophy of mission command, described above, using the operations process—the major mission
command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing
the operation.
4-14. The operations process and reconnaissance and security tasks are mutually dependent. Just as the
planning, preparation, and assessment of the operations process informs and directs reconnaissance and
security tasks, the BCTs and squadrons conduct reconnaissance tasks during all phases of the operations
process and provide the necessary information to complete plans, preparations, adjust the execution of
operations, and provide further assessments of the tactical situation and the operational environment. The
activities of the operations process are not discrete; planning, preparing, executing, and continuously
assessing the operation overlap and recur as the circumstances of the tactical situation and operational
environment demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process, yet upon completion of the initial
order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances (and timely reports
from Cavalry units). Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a
plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of
relative advantage. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)

THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

4-15. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous tasks executed by the BCT’s
organic Cavalry organizations and other subordinate units. Commanders must organize and train their staffs
and subordinates as an integrated team to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations reconnaissance and
security tasks while simultaneously planning, preparing, and assessing the BCT’s decisive operations.
4-16. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following
principles for the effective employment of the operations process:
z Commanders drive the operations process.
z Commanders and staffs collaborate to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations.

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z Commanders and staffs build and maintain situational understanding.

z Commanders and staffs encourage collaboration and dialogue.
COMMANDERS DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-17. The commander is the central figure in the operations process. While the staff performs essential
functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, the commander is ultimately responsible for
accomplishing assigned missions.
4-18. Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through a clear commander’s intent while providing
enough direction to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time during reconnaissance
and security tasks. Early dissemination of intent is particularly important as Cavalry operations will precede
main body movement and the conduct of decisive operations. The commander relies upon subordinates to
respond quickly to mission-type orders and execute disciplined initiative. To this end, the commander
performs six primary mission command tasks (refer to ADRP 6-0 for additional information); understand,
visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.
Understand
4-19. Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. Moreover,
understanding is essential to effective decision-making during planning and execution. Analysis provides the
information used to develop understanding and frame the tactical problem in the context of the operational
environment. In addition, detailed planning assists commanders to develop their initial understanding of the
operational environment and the tactical challenges further. To develop a better understanding of the
operational environment as well as the specific characteristics of the mission variables (METT-TC),
commanders circulate within their area of operations, collaborate and consult with subordinate commanders,
Soldiers, and key staff officers (such as the Brigade S-3 outlined in Chapter 1). Using their own training,
experience, education, and inputs from others (to include running estimates from the staff and unified action
partners), commanders improve their understanding of the operational environment and specific tactical
problems throughout the operations process.
4-20. Reconnaissance and security tasks, as part of the BCT’s information collection efforts, are
indispensible to building and improving the commander’s understanding of the situation. As the commander
refines his understanding, he must quickly formulate the commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs), keep them current, determine where to place key personnel, and arrange for liaison teams to
contribute further to improving the commander’s understanding. In short, greater understanding of the
situation will enable commanders to make better decisions throughout the conduct of operations.
Visualize
4-21. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the tactical problem, they
visualize potential solutions and their desired endstate. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of
developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational
approach through which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 5-0). The process of commander’s
visualization applies to both the BCT’s primary mission (its decisive operation) as well as the collective
visualization of reconnaissance and security tasks that influence the BCT’s decisive operations.
4-22. Close collaboration between the BCT command and his Cavalry squadron commander, as well as close
synchronization between the BCT staff and the squadron staff, are critical to developing the BCT’s
visualization of reconnaissance and security tasks. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.) Assignment
of a mission focused on specific reconnaissance and security objectives provides the focus for developing
the commander’s visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders. During
preparation and execution, the commander’s visualization helps commanders (and their subordinates)
determine if, when, and what to decide as they adapt to changing conditions and the updated information
reports produced by the BCT’s reconnaissance and security tasks.
Describe
4-23. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate
shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their

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visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution commanders describe
modifications to their visualization, modifications informed by continuous reconnaissance and security tasks,
in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the unit’s mission.
Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying their visualization as
circumstances require. Commanders express their visualization in terms of—
z Commander’s intent.
z Planning guidance.
z Commander’s critical information requirements.
z Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
z Reconnaissance and security guidance.

Commander’s Intent
4-24. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired
military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff. It helps subordinate and
supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when
the operation does not unfold as planned. (Refer to JP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
4-25. For reconnaissance and security tasks, the commander’s intent statement described what constitutes
success for the reconnaissance and security operation including the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the
conditions that define the end state. Intent links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate
units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions
that represent mission accomplishment. During execution the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative.
4-26. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by commanders and staff
two echelons lower in the chain of command. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of writing the
commander’s intent statement.) The more concise the commander’s intent, the easier it is to recall and
understand. Commanders develop their intent statement personally using the following components:
z Expanded purpose.
z Key tasks.
z End state.

4-27. When describing the expanded purpose of the reconnaissance and security operation, the commander’s
intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it addresses the broader purpose of the
operation and its relationship to the force as a whole (often, incorporating how the operation relates to one or
more of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security can clearly convey the expanded purpose of an
operation).
4-28. Key tasks are those activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state (ADRP
5-0). Key tasks are not specified tasks for any subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of implied
tasks. During execution, when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no
longer fits the situation, subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired end
state.
4-29. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation
concludes. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly
force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, other friendly forces, and civil considerations.
A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.
Planning Guidance
4-30. Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization of the current
situation, their experience, and their professional military judgment. Planning guidance reflects how the
commander sees the operation unfolding with sufficient detail, context, and clarity. It broadly describes when,
where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher
commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders’ maximum latitude
allowing both the BCT staff and the Cavalry squadron staff to develop flexible and effective options in
parallel, simultaneous, and complimentary efforts. Leaders within the BCT’s Cavalry organizations, the
leaders who will execute the reconnaissance and security tasks in support of the BCT, must clearly understand

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the BCT commander’s planning guidance so they know what and when to report as they identify combat
information, fill information gaps, and answer priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
4-31. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. The two key elements are priority
intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirement (FFIR). (Refer to JP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0
for more information.)
4-32. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for
reconnaissance and security tasks and intelligence collection, that the commander needs to understand about
a threat, enemy, or adversary or about the operational environment (for example, terrain or civil
considerations). PIRs identify the information about the enemy and the operational environment that the
commander considers most important. Normally tied to either a named area of interest (NAI) or a target area
of interest (TAI) (JP 1-02), PIRs become the central focus for the Cavalry organizations conducting the
BCT’s reconnaissance and security tasks.
4-33. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (Refer to JP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops, and support available, and time available for
friendly forces that the commander considers most important.
4-34. A commander’s critical information requirement directly influence decision making and facilitates the
successful execution of flexible military operations, or decision point tactics. Commanders decide to
designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the
course of the operation. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to
designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, both the BCT and the Cavalry squadron staff may
recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—
z Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
z Applicable only to the commander who specifies it (or his subordinates executing reconnaissance
and security tasks in support of the commander).
z Situation dependent—directly linked to a current mission or a decision that will create a new
mission, branch, or sequel to the current mission.
z Time-sensitive.

4-35. Commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts of its organic Cavalry organizations or
task-organized combined arms, air-ground teams that will conduct reconnaissance and security tasks for the
BCT. With fewer prioritized CCIRs, subordinate units can apply greater concentrations of combat power and
reconnaissance focus to each information requirement. At the same time, fewer prioritized CCIRs facilitate
timely and accurate reporting and provide the commander with the required information sooner.
4-36. Throughout an operation, the list of CCIRs will constantly change. BCT commanders, through their
staffs, effective liaison teams, the tactical network, and direct communications with their subordinate
commanders, constantly refine and develop their information requirements throughout the operations process
as they add and delete CCIRs based on the information needed for specific decisions.
Essential Elements of Friendly Information
4-37. Commanders describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information.
An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the
enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore
protected from enemy detection. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.) Although EEFIs are not CCIRs,
they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than ones to seek or
collect. EEFI identification is central to prioritizing units, information, or activities focusing security tasks.
(See figure 4-1.)

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Figure 4-1. CCIR and EEFI

Reconnaissance Guidance
4-38. Commanders provide clear reconnaissance guidance that offers both freedom of action to develop the
situation as well as adequate direction to ensure that their organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish
stated reconnaissance objectives within the required timeframe. The commander’s reconnaissance and
security planning guidance provides a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, and
objective. Reconnaissance and security guidance explains focus, levels of detail required, levels of
covertness, and guidelines for engagement, disengagement, and displacement of the organization. The
commander develops his planning guidance based on the BCT mission, timeline and intent in order to satisfy
information requirements and identify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The
commander specifies different reconnaissance guidance for each phase of an operation and adjusts the
components of his guidance when appropriate. The commander’s guidance consists of four elements—
z Focus.
z Tempo of reconnaissance.
z Engagement/disengagement criteria (if any), both lethal and nonlethal.
z Displacement criteria.

Focus
4-39. Reconnaissance focus defines the Cavalry organization’s area of emphasis and is made of four
categories; threat, infrastructure, terrain and weather effects, and society. The higher commander’s intent as
well as the commander’s initial assessment of information requirements and information gaps serves as the
basis for establishing the focus for reconnaissance tasks. Focus helps the Cavalry organization narrow the
scope of operations to get the information most important to developing the situation for future operations.
4-40. Commanders and staffs can further focus reconnaissance efforts by assigning specific reconnaissance
objectives. A reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which
the commander wants to obtain additional information. The objective should directly support the end state
defined in the commander’s intent.
4-41. For example, during offensive tasks, a BCT’s Cavalry squadron may conduct reconnaissance to locate
an enemy’s security force, to include its composition, disposition, and capabilities. At the same time, the
squadron could also address information gaps concerning terrain—collecting information on key terrain
features that might affect friendly forces, the enemy’s disposition, and the various courses of action the BCT
commander might develop during his planning. In stability tasks, however, Cavalry troops may focus on
locating IED manufacturing sites. The information developed by terrain- or enemy-focused reconnaissance
helps update templated enemy courses of action as part of the continuous assessment (through Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield [IPB]) of the tactical situation and the operational environment.

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4-42. Additionally, a reconnaissance objective may include gaining an awareness of how the local society
affects military operations as well as the impact of military operations on that society. Cavalry organizations
might have to conduct reconnaissance to gather information on the size, location, composition, and political
temperament of the society. Such reconnaissance focuses on developing an understanding of the cultural and
human factors that affect friendly as well as adversarial perceptions and operations, such as religion,
ethnicity, language, and political or tribal organizations. Civil considerations also address infrastructure—
the systems that support the inhabitants, economy and government of a specific area. The six factors of areas,
structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events summarize the aspects of civil considerations that
might be a component of reconnaissance focus. Regardless of its focus on terrain, the enemy, or civil
considerations, the reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by stating the
most important result of the reconnaissance effort.
4-43. Reconnaissance focus—derived from the commander’s intent and defined by specific reconnaissance
objectives—allows subordinate Cavalry organizations and commanders to prioritize tasks to accomplish, and
the assets used to accomplish them.
Tempo of Reconnaissance
4-44. Tempo of reconnaissance refers to the level of detail and covertness required of the Cavalry
organization to best accomplish either reconnaissance or security tasks. Tempo is described by four terms:
rapid, deliberate, stealthy, and forceful. “Rapid” and “deliberate” are levels of detail and are mutually
exclusive in all cases, as one cannot be rapid and deliberate at the same time. However, Cavalry organizations
can oscillate between the two from phase to phase or even within sub-phases of an operation. “Stealthy” and
“forceful” indicate mutually exclusive levels of covertness. (See figure 4-2 on page 4-10.) Commanders
choose the appropriate form of reconnaissance to accomplish the mission balanced with the other mission
variables of METT-TC.
4-45. “Rapid” tempo dictates that the level of detail for the reconnaissance operation is limited to a certain
prescribed list of tasks or PIR. Rapid tempo is appropriate when time is of the essence and only a limited
number of information requirements are necessary to accomplish the mission.
4-46. “Deliberate” tempo implies all tasks of the mission must be accomplished to ensure mission success.
Deliberate tempo allows the organization more time to answer all information requirements. Detailed and
thorough reconnaissance and security tasks require time-intensive, comprehensive, and meticulous mounted
and dismounted efforts to observe reconnaissance objectives and develop the situation.
4-47. “Stealthy” tempo emphasizes avoiding detection and engagement dictated by restrictive engagement
criteria. Stealthy reconnaissance typically takes more time than aggressive reconnaissance and utilizes
dismounted scouts to take maximum advantage of cover and concealment to reduce signatures that lead to
compromise. Stealthy reconnaissance is used when time is available, detailed reconnaissance and stealth is
required, enemy forces are likely in a specific area, danger areas are encountered, and when restrictive terrain
limits effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance.
4-48. “Forceful” tempo develops the situation through action by employing air and ground reconnaissance,
technical means, and both direct and indirect fire systems moving rapidly to develop the situation. Forceful
reconnaissance requires firepower, aggressive exploitation of action on contact, operational security, and
training to survive and accomplish its mission. Forceful reconnaissance is appropriate when time is limited,
detailed reconnaissance is not required, terrain is open, environmental conditions allow for mounted
reconnaissance, and when dismounted reconnaissance cannot complete the mission within existing time
constraints.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-2. Reconnaissance tempo

Engagement/Disengagement Criteria
4-49. Engagement criteria are defined in FM 3-90-1 as protocols that specify those circumstances for
initiating engagement with an enemy force. They can be either restrictive or permissive. The squadron
commander visualizes engagement criteria through analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC) of mission,
enemy, troops and support available, and civil considerations.
4-50. The commander must define the size or type of enemy force he expects his subordinate units to engage
or avoid which drives planning for direct and indirect fires, as well as establishment of bypass criteria. The
squadron commander must consider information engagement and how the squadron interacts and influences
the local populace.
4-51. Merely defining engagement criteria using terms such as “aggressive” or “discreet” is not sufficient.
Engagement criteria should be defined using precise doctrinal terms. Again, the squadron commander issues
specific planning guidance to clearly define the engagement criteria. The staff and subordinate commanders
refine that guidance into specific execution information. Examples include the following:
z Engagement criteria.
z Guidance for actions on contact.
z Bypass criteria.
z Reconnaissance handover criteria.
z Priority of fires.
z Rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for use of force.
z Fire support coordination measures.
z Weapons control status.

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Displacement Criteria
4-52. Displacement criteria define triggers for planned withdrawal, passage of lines, or reconnaissance
handover between units. As with engagement and disengagement criteria, the conditions and parameters set
out in displacement criteria integrate the commander’s intent with tactical feasibility. Conditions are either
event driven (for example, associated PIR being met, threat contact not expected in the area, and observed
NAIs or avenues of approach denied to the enemy); time driven (for example, latest time information of value
[LTIOV] time triggers are met); or threat driven (observation posts have been compromised). Failure to
specifically dictate conditions of displacement, nested within the higher scheme of maneuver will likely result
in ineffective reconnaissance and security tasks.
Security Guidance
4-53. As with reconnaissance guidance, commanders provide clear security guidance that offers freedom of
action and direction to ensure that their organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish stated objectives
within the required timeframe. The commander’s security planning guidance provides a clear understanding
of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, and objective and the protection requirements of the security
mission. The elements and purpose of security guidance are the same as reconnaissance guidance.
Focus
4-54. The focus of security tasks defines what the Cavalry organization is to protect and why—the focus
describes the expected results of the security operation. Security tasks are threat, terrain, or friendly unit-
oriented (see Chapter 6 for additional information on security tasks). Examples of focus in security tasks
include the enemy, threat, or adversaries, terrain (key terrain, routes, bridges and gap crossing sites,
defensible terrain), troops and friendly forces (the protected force), and civil considerations.
4-55. The focus of security tasks allows the commander to determine specific critical tasks, their priority,
and their relation to his intent and end state. Moreover, focus allows subordinate commanders to narrow their
operations to acquire the information most important to higher headquarters and protect the most critical
activities.
4-56. Named areas of interest (NAIs) provide a graphical method to focus Cavalry organizations as they
execute security tasks. Significantly NAIs link most likely and most dangerous threat activities to terrain
where those activities may occur. Given the NAIs, subordinate commanders can prioritize the employment
and deployment of their forces and assets to provide the most effective observation and coverage throughout
the area of operations as they develop their scheme of maneuver and observation plans.
Tempo of Security
4-57. Clearly articulating the tempo of security tasks allows the commander to establish associated time
requirements that will drive security tasks planning such as the method of establishing observation posts
(either mounted or dismounted), length of UAS rotation, and required logistical and communications support
necessary to execute the mission. Tempo can also relate to depth, especially in screen missions, as time is
needed to properly deploy into screen lines to achieve the required depth throughout the area of operations.
Commanders consider tasks, their CCIR, the LTIOV, tactical risk, movement techniques, reconnaissance
methods (stealthy or forceful, mounted or dismounted, or appropriate combinations of both), and formations
when articulating the security tempo.
4-58. In addition, tempo affects whether Cavalry units will employ short- or long-duration OPs in their
security tasks.
z Short duration: Cavalry organizations man short duration OPs for periods less than 12-hours.
Cavalry units establish short duration OPs quickly to allow commanders to take advantage of
available time and to mass reconnaissance assets through maximizing the number of OPs and
associated observing forces on the ground and in the air for a short period of time.
z Long duration: Cavalry organizations man long-duration OPs for greater than 12-hours.
Significantly, the number of OPs decreases as platoons and troops must allocate additional forces
to each OP to manage a deliberate rotation schedule and rest plan. Units must coordinate for
adequate resupply for all classes of supply to support OPs that will operation for extended periods
of time.

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Chapter 4

Engagement/Displacement Criteria
4-59. Just as the commander issues guidance concerning engagement and displacement criteria in his
reconnaissance guidance, the same criteria apply to security tasks. In addition, commanders should consider
the following when assigning a security mission and employing a security force:
z Force or area to secure.
z Location and orientation of the security area.
z Initial location and types of OPs, if applicable.
z Time allocated to establish the security operation.
z Criteria for transitioning from the security operation to BCT decisive operations.
z Task organization and augmentation of security forces.
z Level of protection and minimum warning time requirements.
z Threat considerations, such as the smallest enemy element allowed passage without engage or the
threat’s capability to influence main body activities.
Direct
4-60. Commanders direct all aspect of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting
achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process,
commanders direct forces by—
z Preparing and approving plans and orders.
z Establishing command and support relationships.
z Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures and task organization.
z Positioning units to maximize combat power.
z Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure effective mission command.
z Allocating resources to exploit developing opportunities and counter emerging threats.
z Committing the BCT reserve, as required.

Lead
4-61. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate
commanders, their staff and Soldiers. The commander’s physical presence is necessary to lead effectively.
During reconnaissance and security tasks, the BCT commander balances his time between leading the staff
through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders
and Soldiers forward of the command post. Once the Cavalry squadron initiates their reconnaissance and
security tasks, the Cavalry squadron commander will need to command his squadron and develop the
situation well forward of the squadron and BCT command posts.
Assess
4-62. Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine
how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force
to changing circumstance. Commanders incorporate the assessment of the staff, subordinate commander, and
unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment, commanders
modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances. (See figure 4-3.)

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Figure 4-3: Development of guidance for reconnaissance and security tasks

COMMANDERS AND STAFFS COLLABORATE TO PLAN, PREPARE, EXECUTE, AND ASSESS
4-63. The operations process consists of the major activities of mission command conducted during
operations: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Commanders drive the operations
process, while remaining focused on the major aspects of operations. Staffs conduct the operations process;
they assist commanders in the details of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing.
4-64. The continuous nature of the operations process—and the critical combat information and timely and
accurate reports provided during reconnaissance and security tasks—allows commanders and staffs to make
adjustments, enabling agile and adaptive forces. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate activities and
operations throughout the BCT and the squadron as they exercise mission command. Throughout the
operations process, they develop an understanding and appreciation of the operational environment and the
tactical situation. They formulate a plan and provide purpose, direction, and guidance to the BCT.
Commanders then adjust operations as changes to the operational environment and the tactical situation
occur, allowing commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage
over the enemy. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
4-65. Throughout the entire operations process, the staff supports the commander and subordinate
commanders in understanding situations, decision-making, and implementing decisions throughout the
conduct of operations. The staff does this through four staff mission command tasks—
z Conduct the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess).
z Conduct knowledge management and information management.
z Conduct information operations.
z Conduct cyber-electromagnetic activities.

Plan
4-66. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying
out effective ways of bringing that future about. (Refer to ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0, Chapter 2, for more
information.) Army leaders plan to create a common vision among subordinate commanders, staffs, and
unified action partners for the successful execution of operations. Planning results in an order that clearly
communicates a commander’s vision and directs actions to synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose
for achieving objectives and accomplishing missions.

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Chapter 4

4-67. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot
predict exactly what the effects of the operation will be, describe with precision how enemies will behave, or
anticipate how civilian populations will respond to military operations. Understanding and learning that
occurs during planning has great value, even if operations do not proceed precisely as envisioned, the process
of planning results in improved situational understanding that facilitates future decision making. Plans and
planning help leaders to—
z Understand and develop solutions to problems.
z Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.
z Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.

Understand and Develop Solutions

4-68. The commander and staff conduct conceptual planning (using the Army design methodology) to
understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment and the operational approach to the problem.
Army design methodology entails framing an operational environment, framing a tactical problem, and
developing an operational approach to solve the problem. Army design methodology results in an improved
understanding of the operational environment, a problem statement, initial commander’s intent, commander’s
reconnaissance guidance, and an operational approach that serves as a link between conceptual and detailed
planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during Army design methodology, commanders
issue planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more detailed planning using the
military decision-making process (MDMP). (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.) The BCT and
Cavalry squadron’s detailed planning efforts use the MDMP to produce a synchronized plan that provides
mission type orders to subordinate units, including the BCT’s Cavalry squadron. (See figure 4-4.)
4-69. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (Refer to ADP 5-0 and
ADRP 5-0 for more information.) The MDMP integrates the activities of the commanders, staffs, subordinate
headquarters, and unified action partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare
courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operations
order for execution. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and
professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions.
The MDMP helps commanders, staffs, and others to think critically and creatively while planning and results
in an improved understanding of the situation and an order that guides the force through preparation and
execution.
4-70. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has various inputs, a method (step) to
conduct, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation and to facilitating the
next step of the MDMP.
4-71. The MDMP facilitates collaboration and parallel planning. The BCT headquarters solicits input and
continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, warning orders,
operations orders, and fragmentary orders. Commanders encourage active collaboration to build a shared
understanding of the situation, participate in course of action development and decision making, and resolve
conflicts before publishing the order.
4-72. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs
conduct a time analysis of their planning and preparation activities early in the planning process. Time
analysis may require the commander to direct subordinates through a series of warning orders to start
necessary movements, conduct task organizations changes, begin reconnaissance and security tasks, and
execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. For example, to support reconnaissance and
security tasks, the Cavalry squadron commander and staff must conduct parallel planning simultaneously
with the BCT staff.

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Figure 4-4. The BCT information collection timeline

4-73. The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply a decision maker
in the process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts.
During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing.
4-74. The staff’s efforts during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make
decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during
planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products that the staff develops during mission analysis help
commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s visualization. The mission analysis
products also define the staff’s input into the initial phases of the BCT’s reconnaissance and security tasks.
Anticipate Events and Adapt to Changing Circumstances
4-75. Cavalry squadrons are the “eyes and ears” of the BCT and the commander, the squadron commander
and staff must be able to assist the BCT commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the area of
operations and the tactical situation. The squadron’s operations primary purpose is to answer the BCT
commander’s PIR. (See figure 4-5 on page 4-17.)
4-76. To this end, outputs of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (such as the enemy situational
template, the event template, and the BCT and squadron commanders’ CCIR) are critically important to
assisting the BCT in anticipating events and adapting to changing situations. As commanders articulate,
assess, and refine their information requirements, the BCT and squadron staffs further refine the
commanders’ information requirements into specific reconnaissance and information collection plans.

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Chapter 4

4-77. As described previously in this chapter PIR are information requirements that drive decision points.
(Refer to ADRP 3-90 for additional information). For example, the BCT commander could establish a PIR
concerning enemy capabilities and disposition as well as PIR concerning civil considerations in conjunction
with a series of FFIRs about the BCT:
z Priority intelligence requirements, information about the enemy which drives decision points. For
example:
„ When will enemy artillery be in range of our main body?
„ Where is the enemy main body?
„ Where are civilians on the battlefield?
z Friendly force information requirements, the things we know about ourselves. For example—
„ Completion and status of defensive preparations.
„ Loss of communications with quick reaction force.
„ Loss of key weapons system to maintenance backlogs.
4-78. The Cavalry squadron staff will further refine the BCT commander’s PIR into essential elements of
information (EEI). And the squadron staff and troop commanders, will, in turn, designate EEIs that nest with
the higher commander’s PIR. In the above example, the BCT commander wants to know “when will enemy
artillery be in range of our main body?” After establishing EEIs the squadron staff and troop commanders
may establish indicators. Indicators are items of information that reflect the intention or capability of an
adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). After doing an analysis of likely firing positions given
the terrain, subsequent EEIs for their respective AO could include the following:
z Squadron EEI:
„ Is enemy reconnaissance present in the vicinity of NAI number 3?
„ Is there enemy movement south of phase line (PL) Gowins?
„ Do the bridges at grid A and grid B support tracked vehicles?
z Troop EEI:
„ What are the trafficable routes into NAI number 3?
„ Does terrain support artillery firing positions?
„ What attack routes north into NAI number 3 can support the combined arms battalion?
z Troop indicator:
„ Confirm/deny presence of enemy reconnaissance vehicles vicinity of NAI number 3.
„ After developing EEIs into indicators, the staff and troop commanders will then assign staff
and troop commanders will then assign specific information requirements (SIR) to facilitate
tasking by matching requirements to asset capability.

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