Diplomacy & Statecraft

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United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited:

A Proposal

Ville Lättilä & Aleksi Ylönen

To cite this article: Ville Lättilä & Aleksi Ylönen (2019) United Nations Security
Council Reform Revisited: A Proposal, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30:1, 164-186, DOI:
10.1080/09592296.2019.1557423

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2019.1557423

Published online: 27 Feb 2019.

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DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
2019, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 164–186
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2019.1557423

United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited: A

Proposal
Ville Lättiläa and Aleksi Ylönenb
a
Political Science, University of Turku, Turku, Finland; bDepartment of International Relations, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, United States International University—Africa, Nairobi, Kenya

ABSTRACT
The United Nations [UN] came into being following the Second
World War. Resembling earlier efforts of co-operation by the
most powerful states of the international system, it was an
attempt to effect global governance through the maintenance
of international peace and security amongst states. However,
led by its main executive organ, the Security Council, the UN
has been unable to prevent and effectively deal with armed
conflicts and mass atrocities in a number of situations. Over
the years, the inability of the UN Security Council to take
collective action has resulted in its ineffectiveness in dealing
with war and humanitarian crises. This situation has led to calls
for Security Council reform and has generated several initia-
tives to that end. This analysis discusses major shortcomings of
the Security Council, analyses prominent reform initiatives, and
introduces a proposal, the “Two-Layered Regional Model,” for
Security Council reform.

The idea of United Nations [UN] Security Council reform has lingered for
decades. Most of the organisation’s member-states favour it,1 whilst the UN
General Assembly has agreed to pursue an increase in its membership.2
Several arguments exist in favour of Security Council reform. First, the
landscape of inter-state relations has changed drastically over time. Few
states dominated the 1945 San Francisco Conference, which included 50
countries, and resulted in the UN Charter.3 Today, the organisation has
193 member-states: almost four times more than in the beginning. So far,
the most significant change concerning Security Council membership has
been the addition of four non-permanent seats in 1965, but this has not been
enough to quell dissenting voices. For example, African states have often
stated that the continent’s under-representation in non-permanent seats and
its exclusion from permanent Security Council seats is a “historical
injustice.”4 This arises because Africa’s 54 states have little influence over
the Security Council’s decisions that target them in approximately 75 percent
of the cases.5

CONTACT Ville Lättilä ville.lattila@hotmail.com; vitala@utu.fi Political Science, University of Turku, Turku
FI-20014, Finland
© 2019 Taylor & Francis
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 165

In addition, the relative power of the member-states has changed drasti-

cally since 1945. France and Britain have lost their empires, and the Soviet
Union has ceased to exist. At the same time some non-permanent member-
states, for instance, Brazil, India, Japan, and Germany, have gained interna-
tional stature. In economic, political, and military terms, the five permanent
members [P-5] are no longer unique.
Moreover, individual economic and peacekeeping contributions to the UN
by a number of the P-5 members have not been what one might expect from
Powers in charge of upholding international peace and security. In 2014
alone, Japan and Germany were the second and third biggest contributors to
the UN regular budget, with Japan, at nearly 11 percent, contributing twice as
much as France, Britain, or China, and four times more than Russia.6
Meanwhile the United States, at 22 percent, is the single largest contributor
but has at times used its position to blackmail the UN to meet its demands to
pay its arrears.7 China, with 2,500 peacekeeping troops and police, is the only
permanent member that contributes a significant number of peacekeeping
personnel. United States and Russia contribute less than 100 each, whilst
poor states, such as Bangladesh, Rwanda, India, and Ethiopia, all contribute
more than 6,500.8
Second, the privileges of P-5 members generate inequality amongst UN
member-states. Although a number do not contribute much in terms of
funds or personnel, they retain their privileges: permanent seats and the
veto. These privileges have led to the so-called “Cyprusisation” effect: the
P-5 dominating deliberations in the Security Council whilst largely ignoring
non-permanent members.9 This domination exists in terms of voting power,
with each P-5 member commanding much more such power than a non-
permanent member does. A number of existing studies assuming the Security
Council’s decision is binary may exaggerate the relative voting power of
permanent members10 because they fail to capture fully the effect of choosing
to abstain.11 Other studies taking into account all voting options, and mod-
elled according to various stages of voting, confirm the assumption that P-5
members command much greater voting power than non-permanent mem-
bers although the difference appears to be less than in calculations based on
binary modelling.12
At the same time, the P-5’s veto power has been controversial. It has
maintained the decision probability of the Security Council at a very low
level, whilst abolishing the veto would increase decision probability
significantly.13 The veto has also allowed the P-5 to make questionable
decisions by blocking several resolutions.14 Whilst the use of the veto has
decreased dramatically since 1989, the role of informal consultations has
increased so that the threat of veto exercised behind closed doors can
persuade other Security Council members.15 There is also the issue of
Security Council’s lack of democracy. The UN states that the organisation
166 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

finds basis on democracy,16 equal rights of nations17 and sovereign

equality.18 However, the most powerful institution of the organisation, the
Security Council, is not democratic, and two of its permanent members,
China and Russia, are hardly democracies.19 On the other hand, the United
States, Britain, and France are clearly democratic but prefer to maintain
privileged positions, which upholds a non-democratic political culture in
the Security Council. Finally, the Security Council has not been very effective
in protecting international peace and security. Initially, following the exam-
ple of its nineteenth century predecessors, and the preceding Council of the
League of Nations, the Security Council was supposed to function as
a concert of Great Powers, but international disputes and crises during the
Cold War pointed to its persistent flaws.20
However, the end of the Cold War opened international space for the
UN’s interventionist activities and exposed the Security Council’s significant
shortcomings. Utter failures in Somalia and Rwanda—and to an extent in
Bosnia21—as well as interventions without Security Council approval in Iraq,
Kosovo, and Libya, or impasses failing to produce collective action in
Zimbabwe, Crimea, and Syria, show that the UN’s executive organ has
been unable to address some of the most destructive post–Cold War conflicts
and humanitarian crises. A number of these failures have to do with the
changed nature of armed conflict since the 1990s: intrastate struggles having
surpassed interstate wars as the norm. It points to the outdated structure of
the Security Council that was originally conceived mainly to address inter-
state conflicts and has led critics to argue that so many states have bypassed
the UN Charter and used armed force that the UN regulation of the use of
force “can only be said to have collapsed.”22
The Security Council decisions are the inevitable result of its design. The
criticism often targets outcomes, such as the Security Council’s various fail-
ures in international crises, but several flaws in its composition make it
dysfunctional. A closer look into Security Council dynamics reveals four
major shortcomings that need addressing by any reform that aspires to
improve its legitimacy and effectiveness: inequality, exclusiveness, rotating
seats, and representation.
First, inequality is a result of the veto and the Security Council’s division
into permanent and non-permanent seats. As has been discussed, this inequal-
ity produces a bias towards its strongest members who may use their powers
for self-interest. At the same time, the veto makes the decision probability very
low. Second, the exclusiveness of the Security Council results from limited
membership. This causes the 15-member Security Council to lack legitimacy
because its decisions do not necessarily take into account the views of key
actors outside its ambit.23 Security Council exclusivity also exacerbates its
inherent inequality by making its agenda selective. For example, 60 member-
states—nearly one-third of the total UN membership—have never had the
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 167

chance to serve on it.24 This group includes many small island developing
nations, one-fifth of the total UN member-states, which seek to address issues
such as climate change as a matter of security.25
Third, the system of rotating seats leads to unpredictability and random-
ness because Security Council decision-making and agenda setting follow the
interests of its members. The reaction of the Security Council to an interna-
tional crisis depends largely on the goals and ambitions of its most powerful
members, the P-5, although its non-permanent members can affect it. Hence,
during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, arguably the biggest Security Council
failure until today, the Government of Rwanda held one of the non-
permanent seats of the African Group and fed the Security Council mis-
information about developments in the country.26 This delayed Council
proceedings and saw the Rwandan government gain valuable information
from other members until the very end of the genocide.27 In fact, Rwandan
President Juvénal Habyarimana’s inner circle learnt through its Security
Council representative that months before the genocide started, the United
States would not support stronger intervention.28 In addition, two non-
permanent members, Djibouti and Oman, provided the Rwandan govern-
ment with information, and Djibouti helped it delay Security Council
proceedings.29 Had the non-permanent seats, especially Rwanda’s, been
held by other states, Security Council decisions would most likely have
been different.
Finally, the system of representation has severe shortcomings. The logic
behind representation is that members of the Security Council are to repre-
sent interests of their respective regions. However, few states are content with
this system and instead prefer to seek membership for themselves.30 Powers
like Japan, Germany, and India vigorously seek permanent membership in
the Security Council despite neighbouring an existing permanent member,
whilst other states, such as South Korea, Argentina, Italy, Spain, and
Pakistan, are strongly opposed to having a small number of new permanent
seats.31 This is largely because their regional rivals, Japan, Germany, India,
and Brazil, seek these seats.32 Meanwhile, the 54 African states, after more
than a decade, have not been able to agree on which of them would be the
candidates to represent the continent if they gained permanent seats.33
Whilst these four major shortcomings have been instrumental in under-
mining Security Council legitimacy and effectiveness, a number of UN
members find themselves presently ignored in official discussions that seek
to pinpoint the main elements of organisational reform. The current UN
negotiation process finds basis on Decision 62/557 adopted in 2008. It
stipulates that the key issues under consideration are categories of member-
ship, the veto, regional representation, the size of the enlarged Security
Council, working methods, and the relationship between the Council and
the General Assembly.34 Only inequality and exclusiveness are on the agenda,
168 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

with problems related to rotating seats and representation unmentioned. In

fact, most reform proposals seek not to address all the major shortcomings
and may even significantly deepen them. It has inspired a wide debate
amongst International Relations scholars in recent years.35
Attempts at Security Council reform have occurred several times, espe-
cially after the Cold War, but these attempts have been unsuccessful. In 1997,
the so-called “Razali Proposal” that sought to enlarge the Council to 24
members, eagerly supported by Germany, India, Japan, and Brazil, eventually
failed because their regional rivals and the P-5—with the exception of France
—opposed it.36 Another major push for reform under Secretary-General Kofi
Annan took place before the 2005 World Summit. Again, the idea was to
enlarge the Council to 24 members, but with two possibilities: Model A with
six new permanent seats, and Model B with additional renewable seats
only.37 Again, Germany, India, Japan, and Brazil—known as the G4—sought
permanent seats but had trouble reconciling competing demands38; their
regional rivals—now grouped as Uniting for Consensus [UfC]—did not
want new permanent seats, whilst African states demanded two permanents
seats with veto rights and without compromises.39 The final nail in the coffin
of this ambitious initiative was Chinese, Russian, and American hostility to
reform. The American and Chinese UN ambassadors openly gathered sup-
port to defeat the G4 proposal,40 which the Chinese envoy called “very
dangerous.”41 Thus, the reform failed, although positive remarks appeared
regarding Annan’s initiative.42
Currently, negotiations at the UN occur in a forum called “Intergovernmental
Negotiations” based on General Assembly Decision 62/557, which defines the
five key issues under consideration.43 However, the process remains contentious,
repetitive, and slow44: in early 2015, tellingly, only one-quarter of member-states
were actively taking part within the negotiations.45 Meanwhile, some diplomats
have claimed that real discussions have not yet taken place.46 In addition,
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/30 established that any expansion of
the Council requires a two-third’s majority of member-states,47 which seems
difficult to achieve.
The current positions of member-states regarding reform are four-fold.
First, the G4 has continued to push for permanent positions as well as two
seats for Africa. It also advocates for four or five new non-permanent
Security Council members balanced amongst world regions.48 In this effort,
the G4 has tried to compromise between the positions of other reform groups
and the P-5. Brazil, Germany, and Japan have expressed their support for
compromise models, like suggested longer-term non-permanent seats, but
India has opposed them.49 The G4 have also ultimately agreed not to extend
the veto to new permanent members until deciding the matter after a review
period of 15 years.50 In 2012, 80 member-states supported the G4 proposal
but it has not been enough to convince the remaining majority.51
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 169

Second, the L69, a diverse group of 42 developing countries, has put

forward its own proposal.52 It criticises the current Security Council for its
inability to resolve pressing issues of war and peace and supports the African
position of demanding two permanent seats for the continent.53 The L69
seeks six new permanent members to the Security Council: two from Africa
and Asia, one from Latin America, and one from the Western European and
Others Group. In addition, it proposes increasing the number of non-
permanent members to 16, balanced by regions with one non-permanent
seat for Small Island Developing States54 to compensate for 78 percent of
these members never serving on the Security Council even though they make
up one-fifth of UN membership.55 The L69 favours abolition of the veto or
its extension to new permanent members.56 In 2012, Jamaica claimed that the
L69 had the support of more than 80 countries,57 but it has not resulted in
significant pressure on other states in part due to the ambiguous position of
Brazil and India.
Third, the UfC continues to rival the G4.58 The group’s principal
concern is perpetual exclusion from Security Council if the G4 proposal
for permanent seats were to materialise59 and, therefore, it stresses that
elected seats guarantee that each member-state can sit in the Council
periodically.60 Whilst the UfC group is defined by its opposition to new
permanent seats, it alternatively seeks to add up to 26 new two-year non-
permanent seats and create a new category of membership that consists of
longer term non-permanent seats that have the possibility of immediate
re-election.61 In addition, small and medium-sized states would get non-
permanent seats to guarantee them Security Council representation.62
Importantly, the UfC also advocates the abolition of the veto, or at least
strict limits to its use.63 In total, more than 30 countries have expressed
support for the UfC over the years,64 but the group has failed to gain
wider participation in part because some states correctly view its position
as a mere counter-claim to G4.
Fourth, the African Group, based on the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus,
encompasses the African Union and its 54 member-states. The African
Group describes the current situation in the Security Council, where Africa
is the only continent not represented by a permanent seat and under-
represented in non-permanent seats, as a “historical injustice.”65 Therefore,
it demands two permanent and five non-permanents seats for Africa, aboli-
tion of the veto or its extension to new permanent members, and the right to
choose Africa’s representatives on its own.66 In general, the African Group
advocates for a Council of 11 permanent seats and no less than 15 non-
permanent two-year seats.67 However, the reform debate has opened signifi-
cant regional rivalries in the African Union.68 Some states—especially
Nigeria and South Africa—have been ready to join the G4 and forfeit the
demand on the veto due to the perception that insisting on it as “morally
170 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

defensible, but politically futile,” but other African states have derailed this
attempt.69
Another major issue in the African Group is that there is no agreement on
how to distribute the two permanent seats. The African Union, largely
dependent on external funding and experiencing rivalries amongst its leading
states,70 seems highly unlikely to be able to agree which of its 54 members are
entitled to permanent seats. Another possibility could be to grant the perma-
nent seats to the African Union as a whole, but it faces likely opposition by
the countries that are eyeing seats for themselves, whilst one might question
whether 54 countries can agree on how and when to exercise the veto. Such
situation could also potentially hinder UN intervention on the African
continent where most such actions have taken place.
Fifth, the Arab Group of states has its own collective interest regarding
Security Council reform. Supporting the principle of geographical represen-
tation and wanting improvements in Security Council working methods, the
22 members of this Group prefer a comprehensive solution instead of partial
reform.71 Its only explicit demand is “a permanent Arab representation in
any future expansion of the permanent seats category in the Security
Council,”72 and it vigorously criticises the veto but does not offer an
alternative.73
Sixth, a distinct state-sponsored proposal is advocated by “Accountability,
Coherence and Transparency” group [ACT], consisting of 21 smaller mem-
ber-states that seek only to improve the working methods of the Security
Council because in their view any enlarged body will remain highly
exclusive.74 One example of the group’s efforts is the “Code of Conduct” in
which members of the Security Council voluntarily pledge not to use the veto
in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and, instead,
commit to timely and decisive action in such cases. There would be no
procedural trigger when the Code would apply, as facts on the ground
would determine its application.75 France and Mexico have co-hosted
a very similar proposal,76 with the difference that the veto could still be
used in cases of vital national interest for the initiative to be “realistically
applicable.”77 The ACT’s Code of Conduct has gained the backing of 104
member-states78 whilst the Franco–Mexican version has 80 supporters.79
However, these proposals have significant shortcomings. First, in the case
of the Code of Conduct, a simple voluntary pledge is unlikely to change
behaviour in the Security Council. Moreover, any facts on the ground are
always subject to dishonest interpretation80 and the use of the veto can be
justified in a number of ways.81 A more impartial alternative would be to let
the International Criminal Court [ICC] define the abuses.82 However, the
ICC has been heavily criticised by a number of African states for having
a bias for targeting mainly Africans.83 In short, if individual member-states
are to interpret any such clauses, and if following the new rules is voluntary,
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 171

then the Security Council is likely to function as it always has. Second, just
improving the working methods leaves the old mechanisms in place and
simply introduces new ones seeking to curb their abuse. Even though
revamping Security Council working methods seems easy, it continues to
face stiff resistance from P-5 members and groups such as the UfC because it
contests the authority of the current Council and does not address reform
comprehensively.84
The P-5 share a preference for status quo, and they have tried hesitantly to
deflect criticism by making small improvements to Security Council working
methods.85 France and Britain appear most open towards reform and share
extremely similar views. Both support permanent seats for the G4 and Africa
and a “moderate” expansion in non-permanent seats,86 with France open to
a permanent seat for an Arab country.87 Although both are against regional
representation, they are open to improving the working methods between the
Security Council and General Assembly, whilst maintaining that ultimately
the Council defines the nature of this relationship. However, a key difference
is that France is willing to extend the veto to new permanent members whilst
Britain is not.88 The United States, Russia, and China appear more cautious
regarding reform. For example in 2015, along with the Arab and UfC groups,
they refused to express their views through the framework document
requested by the chair of Intergovernmental Negotiations and used by
roughly 115 member-states as a template for negotiations.89
United States reluctance towards the reform is symptomatic of diffidence.
It is “open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-
permanent members,” but opposes expanding the veto and only accepts new
permanent Security Council members after consideration of their ability and
willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security and other UN purposes.90 Simply adding the G4 countries without
veto powers is a beneficial scenario for Washington because it gains at least
two reliable allies in Germany and Japan.91 Although largely remaining on
the sidelines, except in 2005 when it pronounced against the veto for the
G4,92 the United States might again become more active if the reform process
gains momentum. Whilst the current Donald Trump Administration has
pronounced Security Council reform as a priority, it has mainly emphasised
efficiency but remained silent about expansion of Council permanent
membership.93
China does not specify what kind of a reform it prefers, but it views that
remodelling the Security Council should prioritise the voice of developing
countries, especially those of Africa, over which it exercises increasing influ-
ence. China, together with the UfC, have opposed the framework document
on the basis that it is not driven by the member-states themselves, thus
criticising the Intergovernmental Negotiations chair for influencing the
negotiations.94 Rather, Beijing wants seats distributed to different
172 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

geographical regions, civilisations, and cultures,95 whilst arguing that new

permanent members should come from the developing world only, thus
excluding the American allies, Germany and Japan.96 China views that the
reform process can be directed only by member-states and should be aimed
at consensus,97 this whilst claiming that a step-by-step reform will not work
and that it should be comprehensive.98
Russia, too, has expressed its interest in more developing countries from
Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the Security Council.99 The Russian
foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has expressed that the diversity of the
world requires that collective leadership be truly representative both geogra-
phically and in terms of civilisation.100 Therefore, Russia sees that the
enlarged Council should not go much beyond 20 members.101 Russia has
been in favour of granting new permanent seats to two G4 countries, South
Africa and Egypt, whilst remaining adamant that the veto should be neither
taken away nor expanded to new Council members.102 Moscow has pro-
nounced, “trying to eliminate the veto would be an historical and political
mistake.”103
Finally, whilst the possibility of a single European Union seat has emerged
several times, member-states still see Security Council membership as
a national prerogative, even when subsumed within the African and Arab
groups.104 European Union member-states have no common position on
Security Council reform and instead belong to a variety of competing groups,
such as the UfC, G4, and ACT. Besides general declarations of support for
reform, there has been silence in Brussels in relation to reforming Security
Council membership.105
All reform proposals by member-states, with the exception of the ACT
group’s initiative, are remarkably similar, which means that the proposals
also share the same weaknesses. The Security Council would still find basis
on the idea of regional representation despite its misgivings. Only France and
Britain appear to be against regional representation,106 but this is likely due
to the fear of losing their respective privileged positions. The system of
rotating seats would also continue. The Security Council would remain as
an exclusive body because even the UfC group’s proposal to add 20 new non-
permanent seats would mean that the Council would be composed of only
about 18 percent of the entire UN membership. Most important, inequality
within the Security Council would continue because of both the division
between permanent and non-permanent members and the veto likely
remaining.
In sum, major reform initiatives would result in a Security Council that
resembles the current one and shares its major shortcomings. At best, such
a reform only slightly alleviates the current flaws, whilst the reformed
Council might be even more dysfunctional than the current one.107
Accordingly, if the veto remains and is extended to six new permanent
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 173

members, decision-making in the Security Council will be extremely difficult.

A reformed Council with eleven permanent members would require the
consent of all eleven on every resolution.
Meanwhile, various groups and individuals have come up with innova-
tive reform proposals that contain a wide variety of potentially applicable
ideas.108 Hence, former American UN ambassadors Morton Abramowitz
and Thomas Pickering propose that instead of reforming the Security
Council’s design, one could significantly improve effectiveness by giving
more responsibility to the P-5.109 They recommend that the current P-5
would each commit 5,000 troops for peacekeeping missions authorised by
the Security Council. The force could begin as a rapid-deployment one to
respond quickly to humanitarian disasters and later, if successful, its
mandate could expand. Abramowitz and Pickering recognise that the
crisis-response force would not guarantee UN action against abusive
regimes but assert that it offers a greater likelihood of strong international
action.
The main problem with the proposal is that an increase in military
operational capacity does not automatically translate into higher Security
Council efficiency. The use of force would be subject to political will. In
one crucial instance, during the Rwandan genocide, the United States
together with Britain deliberately avoided using the word “genocide” to
evade having to act under the 1948 Genocide Convention,110 whilst France
supported the Rwandan regime with arms.111 In fact, the P-5 members might
be even less willing to address international crises militarily because they
would each have to commit thousands of troops. Moreover, forcing the P-5
to make such commitments would mean that they would never accept
limitations on their veto power, making reform impossible. Finally, building
the force, at least initially, as a response to humanitarian crises, ignores the
main purpose of the Security Council, which is to uphold international peace
and security and alleviate crises. Overall, none of the major flaws of the
Security Council could be addressed profoundly.
Second, the Elders, a group that includes internationally renowned
individuals,112 has forwarded a four-fold Security Council reform proposal.
It would first establish a new category of long-term, re-electable, non-
permanent seats as a temporary solution for those now seeking
a permanent seat. Second, member-states should pledge not to use their
veto in cases of threats or materialised atrocity crimes, such as genocide,
without explaining publicly what alternative action they suggest to protect
the populations in question. Third, members of the Security Council would
have to be more open in both their deliberations, address those affected by
them, and systematically use the “Arria-Formula” under which the Security
Council meets with a variety of civil society organisations. Finally, the P-5
should give the General Assembly more than one candidate to nominate in
174 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

elections for secretary-general, appointed for a single non-renewable term of

seven years.113
The Elders reform proposal targets only specific issues, and the suggested
changes would keep the design of the Security Council almost entirely intact.
With reform long overdue, such a modest and temporary compromise
solution would most likely hinder measures that are more significant in the
future.114 Limiting the veto is the main suggestion in the proposal, but like
the efforts of France, Mexico, and the ACT, it rests entirely on voluntary
action and is therefore likely unable to achieve change.
Third, Professor Richard Barron Parker has proposed a completely new
Security Council based on states’ populations and economic size. In his
model, distribution of permanent seats would occur amongst the ten most
populous countries and ten largest economies with one seat for each cate-
gory. To entice the P-5, they all gain an extra seat. In addition, Parker
suggests that the General Assembly vote to fill four two-year non-
permanent Council seats. Overall, 18 nations would have 29 seats and the
veto abolished.115 Finally, to motivate further P-5 support, Parker proposes
amending the UN Charter so that Security Council resolutions are not
binding on member-states. This concept gives any state or a group of states
the option to stand behind the resolutions, or ignore or actively resist them,
even militarily.116 The advantage of the proposal is that there are two easy
criteria to allocate Council seats, but there are also significant shortcomings.
First, whilst it eliminates regional representation, the Security Council
becomes extremely exclusive; out of 29 seats, South America would have
two and Africa one, whilst China, Russia, and the United States three each.117
The four available non-permanent seats offer a little balance. Second, the
division between the top ten states and those just outside is harsh and
positions can change. So, in 2015, Mexico—126 million people—was the
eleventh most populous state and Japan tenth, with only two million
more118; in 2014, the Russian Gross Domestic Product [GDP]—US$1.86
trillion—made it the tenth largest economy, with Canada—US$1.77 trillion
—marginally the eleventh.119 Third, the proposal to make its resolutions
non-binding eliminates many of the primary tools of the Security Council,
such as arms embargoes and sanctions, whilst diminishing the Council’s
influence and undermining its authority relative to powerful individual
states. Finally, enabling a UN military coalition intervention against a state
supported by another UN state or coalition is likely to result in an increasing
perception of a Realpolitik anarchy that emphasises the power of individual
states and possibly precipitates destructive multipolar competition and con-
flict, which is precisely what the UN has sought to prevent by working as
a collaborative organisation.
One more non-state proposal has surfaced and attracted recurrent atten-
tion. Called “weighted voting,” it aims at replacing the one-country-one-vote
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 175

system. Weighted voting exists for international organisations such as the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Simulating a hypothetical
Security Council elected by the General Assembly and then dividing it into
18 voting groups based on geography and ideology offers one of the more
recent versions for weighted voting. It uses three principles to distribute the
votes: population, paid regular contributions to the UN, and so-called basic
votes that function as a measure of sovereign equality.120 In this case, with
the three principles weighted equally, the United States would gain 9.11,
China 8.02, Germany 1.39, and Nigeria 0.92 percent of global votes.121
The system of weighted voting has some notable benefits. It is inclusive
and eliminates the veto, whilst adjusting to changes in the relative standing of
states. It removes the need for future reforms of the Security Council, given
that all states continue to agree on the set of principles and on their weights
to distribute voting power. Moreover, weighted voting is a sophisticated
system that has an endless number of combinations available—at least in
theory—to gain an arrangement that can be acceptable to all states. Finally,
the system can be designed to reward participatory behaviour, such as
contributions of funds or personnel, which might tackle the issue of lack of
political will.
Yet, weighted voting also presents important shortcomings. Whilst the
system works in theory, its practical complexity undermines reaching an
agreement that is acceptable to all parties. Initially, all UN members need
to agree on several principles of weighted votes, how to weigh each principle,
and majority rule. In addition, since voting power does not depend on votes
but winning coalitions and majority rule, the calculations are rather
complex.122 Furthermore, inequality features as a major shortcoming. In
such a Security Council, the United States would actually have more influ-
ence in forming winning coalitions than it does in the current iteration, if
weighing all principles equally and the majority decision rule remains under
72 percent.123 The United States, Japan, China, and India would have
30.6 percent of all votes in the Security Council, whilst the states of Sub-
Saharan Africa excluding South Africa would have 10.7 and the states of
South America and the Caribbean excluding Cuba 10.15 percent.124 The four
states would have, therefore, more votes than two entire continents. Together
with the European states, which possess about 22 percent of votes, they
would already form a simple majority in the Security Council. Therefore,
to prevent the most powerful states dominating the Security Council, the
majority rule needs a high figure, but this makes it easy for the powerful
members to block action. In this sense, bringing the majority rule to 60 per-
cent decreases decision probability to 21 percent, whilst the majority rule of
70 percent further lowers it to about five percent.125 Finally, abandoning the
principle of sovereign equality of states is controversial because it is one of
the fundamental building blocks of the UN. If it adopts weighted voting, the
176 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

main organisation of global importance will abandon the principle of formal

equality of states. Similar to the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund, it would allow the more powerful states to dominate agenda setting
and decision-making.
As has been shown in the above discussion, reform proposals have gen-
erally been unable to address the Security Council’s major flaws without
introducing new ones. Here, to contribute to the debate, is a proposal for
a “Two-Layered Regional Model” that would transform the Council into
a more efficient body.
This proposal sets out to change the Security Council thoroughly. First, it
addresses the issue of exclusivity. In this model, the Security Council opens
up to all UN member-states and each will have the possibility to be present in
all Security Council debates and decisions. Second, the model emphasises
equality of all UN member-states, abolishing the veto and all other privileges.
To honour the principle of democratic equality, all states share equal powers
even if their resources are vastly different. Third is the adoption of the idea of
regional groups. The member-states divide into groups during voting, which
emphasises regional responsibility and representation before all crises touch-
ing peace and security and limits external interventions that do not gain
regional consent. This concept finds inspiration by an attempt to respond to
the prevailing form of current crises, including complex regional conflict and
humanitarian emergencies that tend to affect, and often involve, territories
and populations of various states simultaneously. Such regional responsibility
is already practiced, or taking shape, in some world regions, but a more
systematic approach arguably generates an unprecedented increase in legiti-
macy and interest to engage in ensuring peace and security in situations of
large-scale armed violence.
In the Two-Layered Regional Model, UN membership consists of
a number of regional groups based on the current ones in the UN but with
three significant differences.126 First, a new group will comprise small island
states to remedy their under-representation,127 and because they are quite
different from the rest of the member-states and yet share strong interests
such as the ocean level rise. Second, another new group includes North
African and Middle Eastern countries. This Middle Eastern Group is neces-
sary because the states in the region experience severe security issues and
crises, and it is necessary that they have a greater degree of collective control
over them at the UN level. Alternatively, these states are required to join the
African Group or the Asia-Pacific Group where their weight in arbitrating
Middle Eastern affairs remains greatly diminished. Third, the existing
Eastern European Group needs disassembling, with most states joining the
Western European and Others Group, whilst Russia and the states of the
Caucasus join the Asia-Pacific Group. This rather obvious change is because
most of the Eastern European countries find themselves directly linked to the
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 177

rest of Europe, and many are already members of the EU and North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation.
For states located between two regional groups that have clear, and
justifiably legitimate, direct security or socio-cultural links to both regions,
the proposal is to overlap membership. For example, North African states
would most likely prefer to have membership in both the African Group and
Middle Eastern Group through geographical ties to Africa and membership
in the African Union, whilst sharing profound cultural affinity and security
issues with the Middle East. Overlapping memberships could have similar
application to Russia and the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. In
addition, special arrangements, such as a standalone status, can be included
for states in particularly hostile regional political environments.
However, the model’s description of the composition of the regional
groups is only suggestive since the regions should form according to the
wishes of the member-states. Still, in general terms, the system would work
best if the geographical limits of the regional groups were over continuous
territory, with the states in the region facing similar and related security
concerns and sharing some socio-cultural similarity that binds them
together. The regional groups should also be large enough not to allow
a single powerful state to dominate them. In Africa, as a case in point, the
African Union is more preferable than the groups based on sub-regional
organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community, the
Economic Community of West African States, or the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development. These are too small and allow excessive
influence by the respective sub-regional powers, South Africa, Nigeria,
and Ethiopia.
Moreover, the model proposes to change the voting system: voting on
draft resolutions proceeds by taking two separate votes—first by the region
that the draft resolution concerns and then the rest of the member-states.
Consequently, a draft proposal on intervention in a Country A sees a first
vote by the states of the regional group of which Country A forms part, say
Africa. Then, each as a single entity, the rest of the regional groups vote on
the same draft proposal. Both votes will have to gain a 60 percent majority to
pass, and both need to pass for Security Council adopting the draft resolu-
tion. The Security Council as a whole explicitly takes votes on issues, such as
the recommendation of the next secretary-general, that do not concern
a state or states. In cases of clear interstate conflict, the Council votes as
a single entity to protect states from domination by the regional groups,
whilst in unclear cases of inter/intrastate conflict, it votes as a single entity
with the possibility of referring cases to the International Court of Justice, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, or the ICC. In short, in intrastate conflicts,
the Security Council takes two separate votes, and in interstate conflicts and
other matters, it takes a single vote.
178 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

Finally, the composition of voting groups is set up in the way that the
neighbouring states can always vote with the region if the draft resolutions
concern their immediate neighbours. Accordingly, if Greece were a target of
a draft resolution, Turkey would be allowed to vote in the Western European
and Others Group despite its membership in the Middle Eastern Group,
because Turkey is Greece’s neighbour and the impact of the draft resolution
concerns Turkey as much as—or more than—members of the Western
European and Others Group.
The Two-Layered Regional Model voting system, based on 60 percent
majority, has several benefits. First, when voting on interstate conflict, only
one vote could pass a draft resolution. When voting on intrastate conflict,
both of the two separate votes require a 60 percent majority. Draft resolu-
tions are therefore more difficult to pass in the cases of intrastate conflict
than those of interstate conflict, which automatically considers state sover-
eignty. The model’s design is to take into account the highly contentious
nature of multilateral interventions in the internal affairs of states whilst still
enabling them in cases of overwhelming support. Alternatively, in different
settings, the Security Council could follow different majority rules. Hence,
whilst voting as a single entity and maintaining the 60 percent majority
threshold, a 51 percent majority could be established as the requirement
for passing a resolution when voting in two stages. However, this arrange-
ment would further complicate the procedure.128
Second, this reform proposal generates a more functional Security Council
and results in a wider distribution of responsibility. Its advantage over other
well-known proposals is that the Security Council becomes more efficient
than ever due to the elimination of its four major flaws: inequality, exclu-
siveness, representation, and rotating seats. In addition, Security Council
decisions gain significant legitimacy because regions have more authority
to decide on their internal affairs and therefore they are not targets of
interventions without their consent. This increase in legitimacy enables
already widely accepted norms such as the “responsibility to protect” to be
put in practice more easily, and the significance of each region in the
decision-making means that they gain responsibility. If events such as the
ones that unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 were to happen again under such
a Security Council, much of the responsibility for the decisions would fall to
the regional African Group instead of a few powerful states with little, or
contradicting, interest in dealing with the unfolding crisis.
Third, the increasing responsibility of regional groups also means that the
current P-5, whilst remaining key actors, would have significantly less
responsibility. The likelihood of illegitimate Security Council decisions
would drastically decrease and the major Powers less likely singled out
regarding resolutions deemed unjust. Finally, the model hinders the ability
of the current Security Council Powers, deprived of veto power, to block
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 179

resolutions. However, it instead enables influential member-states to inter-

vene more legitimately in situations of threat to international security.
Moreover, regional blocs of states closer to emerging crises remain better
situated to tackle them early on, which has been a much-criticised short-
coming of the current Security Council. This course would improve the
timeliness of crisis response.
The idea of Security Council reform has been around for a long time. This
analysis has reviewed major initiatives and suggestions for Security Council
reform coming from states and individuals. However, as this examination
shows, most such ideas fail to resolve the four identified main disappoint-
ments of the Security Council. Inspired by the attempt to address all four
shortcomings is the introduction of a proposal for Security Council reform:
The Two-Layered Regional Model. Admittedly, although this proposal is
highly capable of tackling the Security Council’s main flaws, it faces the
obvious obstacle because, like other proposed reforms, it is likely to lead to
diminishing the P-5 states’ hegemonic control of the UN global governance
system.

Notes
1. UN General Assembly, 12 November 2014, 6, A/69/PV.49: http://undocs.org/A/69/
PV.49.
2. UN General Assembly, 23 December 2007, 5 September 2008, 107, A/62/49 (Volume
III): http://undocs.org/A/62/49(VOL.III).
3. The United States, for example, ensured its success in the negotiations by intercepting
diplomatic cables from almost all attending countries and wiretapping the conference:
Stephen Schlesinger, “Can the United Nations Reform?” World Policy Journal, 14/3
(1997), 48.
4. UN General Assembly, 9, A/69/PV.49.
5. Ibid., 6. For example, in 2008, the Security Council put forward a draft resolution
calling for an arms embargo as well as financial and travel restrictions on Zimbabwe’s
president, Robert Mugabe, and 13 other regime leaders. See UN Security Council,
11 July 2008, S/2008/447: http://undocs.org/S/2008/447. The resolution would have
passed had it not been vetoed by China and Russia. The African Union had debated
the situation in Zimbabwe and opposed the draft, but it had no say in either the draft
or the final decision. See UN Security Council, 11 July 2008, 4, 7–8, S/PV.5933: http://
undocs.org/S/PV.5933.
6. Russia, at 2.4 percent, contributed only more than double of Switzerland: UN
Secretariat, 27 December 2013, 9–10, ST/ADM/SER.B/889: http://undocs.org/en/ST/
ADM/SER.B/889.
7. Schlesinger, “United Nations Reform?” 52.
8. For more on UN peacekeeping contributions, see “United Nations Contributions to
UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post,” 30 April 2018. https://peacekeep
ing.un.org/sites/default/files/1_summary_of_contributions_2.pdf
9. The Cameroon Security Council representative complained that the P-5 members are
tempted to believe that agreement amongst the permanent members is the same as
180 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

agreement amongst the entire Security Council: Kishore Mahbubani, “The Permanent
and Elected Council Members,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the
21st Century, ed. D.M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 253.
10. Cf. L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of
Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review, 48/3 (1954),
787–92; Philip D. Straffin, “Power Indices in Politics,” in Political and Related
Models, ed. Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas, and Philip D. Straffin (New York,
NY: Springer-Verlag, 1983), 256–321; Barry O’Neill, “Power and Satisfaction in the
United Nations Security Council,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40/2 (1996), 219–37;
Madeleine O. Hosli, Rebecca Moody, Brian O’Donovan, Serguei Kaniovski, and Anna
C.H. Little, “Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations
Security Council Reform,” Review of International Organizations, 6/2 (2011), 163–87.
11. Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover, “The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority
Voting,” Social Choice and Welfare, 18/3 (2001), 431–64.
12. Matthew Gould and Matthew D. Rablen, “Equitable Representation in Councils:
Theory and an Application to the United Nations Security Council,” Public Choice,
169/1–2 (2016), 19–51.
13. See Hosli, Moody, O’Donovan, Kaniovski, and Little “Squaring the Circle?” 172,
180–81.
14. The Soviet Union used veto 51 times to prevent new members joining the UN: see Adlai
E. Stevenson, Looking Outward: Years of Crisis at the United Nations (New York, NY: Harper
& Row, 1963), 75. France and Britain used the veto to continue their involvement in the Suez
Crisis: Osita G. Afoaku and Ukaga Okechukwu, “United Nations Security Council Reform:
A Critical Analysis of the Enlargement Options,” Journal of Third World Studies, 18/ 2
(2001), 156. Britain, the United States, and France vetoed sanctions on South Africa’s
Apartheid regime several times; the United States has kept vetoing resolutions concerning
Israel and Palestine, and China and Russia have vetoed Security Council action on Syria four
times since 2011: “Security Council—Veto List,” 8 January 2016, [UN Dag Hammarskjöld
Library]: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. This includes a draft resolution on Syria in
2014 directly supported by over 60 member-states and all other Security Council members
except China and Russia. See UN Security Council, 4, S/2014/348: http://undocs.org/S/2014/
348 and S/PV.7180: http://undocs.org/S/PV.7180. In October 2016, Russia used its veto
again to block a draft resolution concerning Syria with the support of only Venezuela whilst
even China abstained: UN Security Council, 6, S/PV.7785: http://undocs.org/S/PV.7785.
The use of veto to prevent action against oneself has also been a common practice. For
instance, the United States has used its veto to block two International Court of Justice-
backed resolutions against its actions in Nicaragua: see UN Security Council, 54–55, S/
PV.2704: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.2704; UN Security
Council, 51, S/PV.2718: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.
2718. Meanwhile, Russia prevented UN action against itself after annexing Crimea in
March 2014: UN Security Council, 3, S/PV.7138: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol = S/ PV.7138.
15. Céline Nahory, “The Hidden Veto” (May 2004): www.globalpolicy.org/security-
council/42656-the-hidden-veto.html.
16. UN, “Democracy”: http://static.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/democracy/index.html.
17. UN Charter, ”Preamble.”
18. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2.1.
19. The Polity IV database classifies China as an autocracy and Russia as an open
anocracy: “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946–2013,” 6 June 2014.
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 181

20. Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence (London: Longman,
1973).
21. Cf. Robert G. Patman, “Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States
and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention,” African Affairs, 96/
385 (1997), 516–17; M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Attitude toward U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations since 1989,” Asian Survey, 36/11 (1996), 1114; Romeo Dallaire, Kishan
Manocha, and Nishan Degnarain, “The Major Powers on Trial,” Journal of
International Criminal Justice, 3/4 (2005), 861–78; Human Rights Watch, “The Fall
of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping,” Report 7/13 (1 October 1995):
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bosnia1095web.pdf.
22. Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs, 82/3 (2003), 22.
23. For instance, this was the case of Security Council ignoring the views of the African
Union in its draft resolution against Zimbabwe in 2008.
24. See UN Security Council, “Current Members”: www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
25. See idem., “Countries Never Elected Members of the Security Council”: www.un.org/en/sc/
members/notelected.asp; UN, “Issues Facing Small Island Developing States ‘Global
Challenges’ Demanding Collective Responsibility, Secretary-General Tells Security
Council” (30 July 2015): www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11991.doc.htm.
26. Linda Melvern, “The UK Government and the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” Genocide
Studies and Prevention, 2/3 (2007), 255.
27. The Rwandan government representative, Jean-Damascène Bizimana, attended meet-
ings of the Security Council until 14 July 1994. Rwanda’s seat then sat unoccupied
until 2 September 1994. See UN, Meeting Records: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/
records/1994.shtml.
28. African Union, International Panel of Eminent Personalities, “Rwanda: The
Preventable Genocide” (11 July 2000), 101: www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html.
29. Human Rights Watch, “Leave None to Tell the Story” (March 1999), 948, 967: www.
hrw.org/reports/pdfs/r/rwanda/rwanda993.pdf; Evelyn Leopold, “UN Council Issues
Statement, No Troops for Rwanda,” Reuters (30 April 1994).
30. Gould and Rablen, “Equitable Representation,” 44.
31. Lydia Swart, “Reform of the Security Council: 2007–2013,” in Governing & Managing
Change at the United Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to
September 2013, ed. L. Swart and E. Perry (New York, NY: Center for UN Reform
Education, 2013), 51.
32. For instance, Italy sees a German seat as a threat to its own relevance in the UN:
Marco Pedrazzi, “Italy, the USA and the Reform of the UN Security Council,” Journal
of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 9/2 (2007), 187.
33. Center for UN Reform Education, “Security Council Reform Update 2015: Similar
Scenarios, Same Positions, New Outcomes?” (12 January 2015): http://centerforunre
form.org/?q=node/627.
34. UN General Assembly, A/62/49 (Volume III), 107.
35. See Schlesinger, “Can the United Nations Reform?,” 49; Thomas G. Weiss, “The
Illusion of UN Security Council Reform,” Washington Quarterly, 26/4 (2003),
149–51, 156; Edward C. Luck, “How Not to Reform the United Nations,” Global
Governance, 11/4 (2005), 409–10; Jochen Prantl, “Informal Groups of States and the
UN Security Council,” International Organization, 59/3 (2005), 561; Brian Cox,
“United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible
Consequences,” South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, 6/1
(2009), 116–20; Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council
Enlargement and U.S. Interests,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special
182 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

Report No. 59 (December 2010), 6–9: www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-

alliances/un-security-council-enlargement-us-interests/p23363; Mohamed Berween,
“Democratization of UN: Isn’t it Time for Structural Reform at the United
Nations?” Review of International Affairs, 2/2 (2002), 40–62; Daniel Deudney and
Hanns W. Maull, “How Britain and France Could Reform the UN Security Council,”
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 53/5 (2011), 107–28; David Bosco, “Assessing
the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” Global Governance, 20/4 (2014),
554–59.
36. Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform
(London: Routledge, 2005), 76, 79; Yeshi Choedon, “India’s Perspective on the UN
Security Council Reform,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 63/4
(2007), 30–31.
37. Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, A/59/200543: https://undocs.org/A/
59/2005.
38. Mark Imber, “The Reform of the UN Security Council,” International Relations, 20/3
(2006), 333.
39. Joachim Müller, Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle for Legitimacy and
Effectiveness (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 67.
40. Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of the Security Council: 1945–2000,” in Governing &
Managing Change, ed. Swart and Perry, 8.
41. Edith M. Lederer, “China: UN Council Resolution Dangerous,” Associated Press
(1 June 2005): www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/41203.
html.
42. Mark Malloch Brown, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Can the UN Be Reformed?”
Global Governance, 14/1 (2008), 5.
43. On 15 September 2008, Decision 62/557 detailed the framework for the
Intergovernmental Negotiations: UN General Assembly, A/62/49 (Volume III), 107.
44. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 23.
45. Center for UN Reform Education, “Security Council Reform Update 2015.”
46. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 24.
47. This was considered a victory for the Non-Aligned Movement and Italy: Freiesleben,
“Reform of the Security Council,” 5.
48. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document. As Populated by Member
States (SC/6A),” 5 May 2015, 8: http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/
050515_security-council-reform-framework-document.pdf.
49. Center for UN Reform Education, “Security Council Reform Update 2015.”
50. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 15.
51. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 47.
52. The L69 includes Brazil and India—both part of G4—along with 11 African states,
small island states, Caribbean Community members, and a number of countries from
Latin America: Center for UN Reform Education, “Security Council Reform Update
2015.”
53. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 6–7.
54. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 2, 5.
55. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the UN, “Maldives Calls for
a SIDS-Specific Seat on the Security Council”: http://www.maldivesmission.com/
index.php/news-updates/maldives_calls_for_a_sids_specific_seat_on_the_security_
council. The smallest states in terms of population suffer from very significant
under-representation: Gould and Rablen, “Equitable Representation,” 22.
56. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 16.
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 183

57. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 38.

58. In 2005, the UfC included Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta,
Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey, which remain its
core members; Ibid., 51.
59. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 8. For example, Italy sees that a German seat in
the Security Council is a major threat to its relevance in the international community
and would put Italy into a totally marginal position within and outside the UN.
Indeed, Italy’s seemingly main purpose in presenting a competing vision of Security
Council reform is to gain a large enough following to prevent a reform it does not
want: Pedrazzi, “Italy,” 187, 189.
60. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 7.
61. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters Document,” 5 May 2015, 25: http://
centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/link2_0.pdf#overlay-context=.
62. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 51.
63. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 25.
64. Swart, “Reform of the Security Council,” 51.
65. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 9.
66. African Union, “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the
United Nations: ‘The Ezulwini Consensus,’” (8 March 2005), 10–11: http://www.un.
org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_screform_2005.pdf.
67. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 91.
68. Choedon, “India’s Perspective,” 41.
69. Martin Welz, “The African Union beyond Africa: Explaining the Limited Impact of
Africa’s Continental Organization on Global Governance,” Global Governance, 19/3
(2013), 429; “Hope Stalls for UN Reform,” Africa Monitor, 10/4 (2005), 4.
70. An example of the tension between them is Nigeria accusing South Africa of “not
really [being] a black country, that South Africa isn’t black enough”: Welz, “African
Union,” 429–30.
71. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 17–18.
72. Ibid., 18.
73. Ibid., 19.
74. William Pace, “21 Member States Launch New Initiative to Improve the Working
Methods of the Security Council” (21 May 2013): http://www.centerforunreform.org/?
q=node/541.
75. Center for UN Reform Education, “Explanatory Note” (1 September 2015): http://
centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Final%202015-09-01%20SC%20Code%20of%
20Conduct%20Atrocity.pdf.
76. “Political Statement on the Suspension of the Veto in Case of Mass Atrocities” (n.d.):
http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/French%20Mexican%20Proposal%
20English.pdf.
77. Laurent Fabius, “A Call for Self-Restraint at the U.N.,” NY Times (4 October 2013):
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/a-call-for-self-restraint-at-the-un.html?_r=1.
78. Jessica Kroenert, “ACT Group Formally Launches Security Council Code of Conduct”
(26 October 2015): http://centerforunreform.org/?q=node/679.
79. Permanent Mission of France to the UN, “France and UN Reform”
(2 November 2015): www.franceonu.org/France-and-UN-Reform.
80. During the Rwandan genocide, perhaps the clearest case of genocide in recent history, it
took almost two months before the Security Council decided to create a commission of
experts to examine “possible acts of genocide.” UN Security Council, 1 July 1994, 2, S/RES/
935 (1994): http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/935%20(1994)
184 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC. The United States knew enough about the genocide early on to
intervene, but shunned the term “genocide” for fear of being obliged to act. See Samantha
Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” Atlantic (September 2001): www.theatlantic.com/maga
zine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/.
81. When Russia invaded Crimea, it made a series of incorrect allegations regarding the
situation: Alexander J. Motyl, “Putin’s Zugzwang: The Russia-Ukraine Standoff,”
World Affairs (July/August 2014), 59–60.
82. Pace, “21 Member States.”
83. In October 2017, Burundi withdrew from the ICC claiming bias against Africa, whilst
South Africa and other African states have also debated their ICC membership mainly
due to this reason. See Jina Moore, “Burundi Quits International Criminal Court,” NY
Times (17 October 2017): https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-
international-criminal-court.html; Swell Chan and Marlise Simons, “South Africa to
Withdraw from International Criminal Court,” Ibid. (21 October 2016): www.nytimes.
com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html?_r=0.
84. Again, the British representative, whilst welcoming the constructive way the initiative
was framed, asserted, “the Security Council is master of its procedures”: Pace, “21
Member States.”
85. Madeleine O. Hosli and Thomas Dörfler, “Why Is Change So Slow? Assessing
Prospects for United Nations Security Council Reform,” Journal of Economic Policy
Reform (2017), 13.
86. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 63, 95.
87. Permanent Mission of France to the UN, “France and UN Reform.”
88. President of the General Assembly, ”Framework Document,” 63, 95.
89. Center for UN Reform Education, “Populated framework document on Security
Council reform” (11 May 2015): http://centerforunreform.org/?q=node/631.
90. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 16.
91. McDonald and Patrick, “Security Council Enlargement,” 15.
92. Yehuda Z. Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform,” American Journal of
International Law, 99/3 (2005), 647.
93. “UNSC Reform a Priority for Donald Trump Administration: Nikki Haley,” Indian
Express (16 September 2017); “President Donald Trump Silent on Security Council
Expansion at UN,” Economic Times (19 September 2017).
94. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 3; Permanent Mission of Italy to the
UN, “Uniting for Consensus” (10 April 2015), 2: http://centerforunreform.org/sites/
default/files/link3.pdf.
95. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 7.
96. Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Fues, “Do the Asian Drivers Pull their Diplomatic
Weight? China, India, and the United Nations” World Development, 36/2 (2008), 299.
97. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 19.
98. President of the General Assembly, “Six Letters,” 8.
99. Ibid., 11.
100. Sergey Lavrov, “Russia and the World in the 21st Century,” Russia in Global Affairs, 3
(9 August 2008): http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11291.
101. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 12.
102. Alexander Nikitin, “Russia as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council”
(November 2012), 11: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09461.pdf.
103. UN General Assembly, A/69/PV.49, 12.
104. Edith Drieskens, “Curb Your Enthusiasm: Why an EU Perspective on UN Security
Council Reform Does Not Imply an EU Seat,” Global Affairs, 1/1 (2015), 62–63.
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 185

105. Ibid., 61.

106. President of the General Assembly, “Framework Document,” 9.
107. Using their theoretical framework, Matthew Gould and Matthew D. Rablen, “Reform
of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency,” Public Choice, 173
(2017), 148, asserts that recent reform proposals would achieve very little in terms of
equity and efficiency. According to their calculations, the only way to improve both
equity and efficiency is to limit the use of veto.
108. The proposals presented here are just some of many noteworthy contributions. For
others, see Richard Hartwig, “Squaring the Circle: A Regional/Economic Proposal for
Reform of the United Nations Security Council,” Critical Currents, 4 (2008), 41–75;
Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyoruk, “Security Council reform models: Models A and
B, Italian Proposal, Blue and Green Models and a New Model C” (May 2005): http://
centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Special%20Paper%20No.%204_1.pdf#overlay-
context=node/506%3Fq%3Dnode/506; Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill and James Sutterlin,
“Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam,” Global Governance, 2/1 (1996),
65–80; Joseph E. Schwartzberg, “Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations
Reform,” Ibid., 9/1 (2003), 81–114; Kemal Derviş, A Better Globalization: Legitimacy,
Governance, and Reform (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005),
73–105.
109. Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering, “Making Intervention Work,” Foreign
Affairs, 87/5 (2008), 100–08.
110. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide”; Dallaire, Manocha, and Degnarain, ”Major Powers
on Trial,” 874.
111. Human Rights Watch, ”Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide” (May 1995): www.hrw.org/reports/1995/
Rwanda1.htm.
112. The Elders describes itself as an independent group of global leaders who work
together for peace and human rights. It includes individuals, such as Desmond
Tutu, Gro Harlem Brundtland, and Jimmy Carter; the recently deceased Kofi Annan
was a member.
113. The Elders, “Strengthening the United Nations” (7 February 2015): https://theelders.
org/sites/default/files/2015-04-22_elders-statement-strengthening-the-un.pdf.
114. Ibid., 2.
115. Richard Barron Parker, “A Proposal for a Reformed and Strengthened United Nations
Security Council,” 修道法学 [Shudo Law Review], 29/1 (2006), 52–54.
116. Ibid., 57.
117. Ibid., 53–54.
118. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects: The
2017 Revision”: https://population.un.org/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20
(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2017_POP_F01_1_TOTAL_
POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.xlsx
119. World Bank, “GDP at Market Prices (Current US$)”: https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
120. Jonathan R. Strand and David P. Rapkin, “Weighted Voting in the United Nations
Security Council: A Simulation,” Simulation and Gaming, 42/6 (2011), 776.
121. Ibid., 777.
122. Cf. Gould and Rablen, “Equitable Representation” for one such calculation.
123. Strand and Rapkin, “Weighted Voting,” 786.
124. Ibid., 794–96.
125. Ibid., 792.
186 V. LÄTTILÄ AND A. YLÖNEN

126. Currently there are five groups: African, Asia-Pacific, Eastern European, Latin American
and Caribbean, and Western European and Others: UN Department for General
Assembly and Conference Management, “United Nations Regional Groups of Member
States” (9 May 2014): http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml.
127. Cf. Gould and Rablen, “Equitable Representation.”
128. Having such a narrow difference between the winning—51 percent—and the losing
coalition—49 percent—would most likely be unproductive because Security Council
resolutions require broad support. On the other hand, having a majority rule higher
than 60 percent would mean that draft resolutions could be too difficult to pass,
especially when voting in two stages.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Ville Lättilä is a graduate student at the Department of Political Science at the University of
Turku. His academic interests include global governance, the United Nations, humanitarian
interventions and religious violence. He is currently finishing his thesis on the subject of
religious violence with an emphasis on Christianity and Islam.
Aleksi Ylönen is an associate professor of International Relations at the United States
International University—Africa. He is also a collaborating researcher at the Center for
International Studies at University Institute of Lisbon and a member of the African Studies
Group of Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain. His research interests include interna-
tional politics, regionalism, separatism and politics, and armed conflicts in the greater Horn
of Africa.