PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Can the police conduct a warrantless int1usive search of a vehicle on the

sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an anonymous informant? On this
question, jurisprudence has vacillated over the years. The Court definitively
settles the issue once and for all.

In threshing out this issue, it must be remembered that in criminal

prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of the law on dangerous
drugs, our constitutional order does not adopt a stance of neutrality - the
law is heavily in favor of the accused. By constitutional design, the accused
is afforded the presumption of innocence1 - it is for the State to prove the
guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court is
given no alternative but to acquit the accused.

Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence against the accused is

tainted by a violation of the accused's right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill
of Rights, the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to
the accused's acquittal.

Therefore, while the Court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive

stance against the scourge of illegal drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs
in our society cannot be achieved by subverting the people's constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In simple terms, the
Constitution does not allow the end to justify the means. Otherwise, in
eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister one is
cultivated - the trampling of the people's fundamental, inalienable rights.
The State's steadfastness in eliminating the drug menace must be equally
matched by its determination to uphold and defend the Constitution. This
Court will not sit idly by and allow the Constitution to be added to the
mounting body count in the State's war on illegal drugs.
 The Case

Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y

Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari (accused-appellant Sapla), assailing
the Decision3 dated April 24, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the Court of
Appeals (CA)4 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed the
Judgment5 dated January 9, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C entitled People of
the Philippines v. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari,
finding accused-appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6 otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as narrated by the CA in the

assailed Decision, and as culled from the records of the case, are as
follows:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with

violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion of
the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca,

Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of
marijuana leaves, a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight of
3,9563.111 grams and transport in transit through a passenger [jeepney]
with Plate No. AYA 270 the said marijuana without license, permit or
authority from any appropriate government entity or agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was

committed to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) at
Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla]

pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged against him. In the court a quo's
Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution and the Defense
stipulated their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a quo.
Also, the Prosecution identified and marked its pieces of evidence, while
the Defense made no proposals nor pre-mark[ed] any exhibits.

Trial ensued thereafter.

The Prosecution presented three (3) police officers as its witnesses,

namely: 1) Police Officer (PO)2 Jim Mabiasan (hereinafter referred to
as PO2 Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd Maneuver Company,
Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City and was the seizing
officer; 2) PO3 Lito Labbutan (hereinafter referred to as PO3 Labbutan), an
intelligence operative of Kalinga Police Provincial Office - Provincial Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (KPPO PAIDSOTG) who was
tasked as the arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Delon
Ngoslab (hereinafter referred to as PSI Ngoslab), deputy company
commander of the RPSB and team leader of the joint checkpoint operation.

The evidence for the Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at

around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty at the RPSB office received
a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a
certain male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and
into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to
their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-
PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a standard
operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan, an operative of
KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). Afterwards, the chief of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar
Lingbawan (hereinafter referred to as PSI Lingbawan), briefed his
operatives on the said information. Later on, the said operatives of KPPO-
PAIDSOTG arrived at the RPSB. PSI Ngoslab immediately organized a
team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing
officer, PO3 Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police
officers would provide security and backup. The said officers then
proceeded to the Talaca detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message
which stated that the subject male person who [would] transport marijuana
[was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
[was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate
number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint
checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon,

wherein the police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said
vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan
and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla]
seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked [accused-
appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which
the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
[accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant
Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4)
bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an
old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-appellant
Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights
in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan further searched [accused-appellant
Sapla] and found one (I) LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan
seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought
[them] to their office at the Talaca detachment for proper markings.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an

inventory of the seized items, one (1) blue sack and four (4) bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer placed his
signature on the said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was
witnessed by [accused-appellant Sapla], and by the following: 1) Joan K.
Balneg from the Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected
barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media representative.
Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the said [accused-appellant Sapla] at
the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M.
Duyan for further investigation.

At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to
the investigator of the case, PO2 Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to
as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and proper disposition. Also, PSI
Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which
requested that a chemistry examination be conducted on the seized items.
The following specimens were submitted for initial laboratory examination:
1) one (1) blue sack with label J&N rice, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014
EXH. "A" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1) brick of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, which weighed 998.376 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN.
10, 2014 EXH. "A-1" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 3) one (1) brick of
suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 929.735 grams, marked
"2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-2" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one
(1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 1,045.629
grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-3" PNP-TALACA and
signature;" 5) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which
weighed 979.371 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-4" PNP-
TALACA and signature,"· The said initial examination revealed that the
specimens "A-1" to "A-4" with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams,
yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug. In
addition, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014 revealed that indeed the said
specimens [did] contain marijuana and that the said report indicated that
the "specimen[s] submitted are retained in this laboratory for future
reference."

Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to

conceal his true identity by using a fictitious name - Eric Mallari Salibad.
However, investigators were able to contact [accused-appellant Sapla's]
sister, who duly informed the said investigators that [accused appellant
Sapla's] real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.

On the other hand, the Defense presented [accused-appellant Sapla] as its

sole witness.

The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the charges against him and instead,
offered a different version of the incident. He claimed that on 8 January
2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain relative named Tony Sibal.
Two (2) days later, [accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a jeepney, and left
for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon reaching Talaca checkpoint,
police officers f1agged down the said jeepney in order to check its
passenger[s'] baggages and cargoes. The police of1icers then found
marijuana inside a sack and were looking for a person who wore fatigue
pants at that time. From the three (3) passengers who wore fatigue pants,
the said police officers identified him as the owner of the marijuana found
inside the sack. [Accused-appellant Sapla] denied ownership of the
marijuana, and asserted that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter,
the police officers arrested [accused-appellant Sapla] and brought him to
the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to
him.7
 The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-

appellant Sapla for violating Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the
crime. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused JERRY

SAPLA Y GUERRERO, a.k.a. ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The accused to pay the fine of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be submitted to any authorized

representative of the PDEA for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal

and affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications. The dispositive portion
of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 9

January 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk City, Branch 25
in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Jerry
Sapla y Guerrero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay the fine of P1,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-
appellant Sapla was without a search warrant, the same was lawful as it
was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the
essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless
search and seizure.
Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Stripped to its core, the essential issue in the instant case is whether there
was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers. The
answer to this critical question determines whether there is enough
evidence to sustain accused-appellant Sapla's conviction under Section 5
of R.A. 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The instant appeal is impressed with merit. The Court finds for accused-
appellant Sapla and immediately orders his release from incarceration.

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the

Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of
Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a
position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power."11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is "at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the
same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, x x x for the right to
personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of
the right against unreasonable search and seizure."12

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is

found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the

authorities is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant after it
has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against

unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any
deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and
is strictly construed against the government.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in

the absence of a search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of
circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured."13

The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches

and seizures are:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(3) search of a moving vehicle;

(4) consented warrantless search;

(5) customs search;

(6) stop and frisk; and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.14

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the

authorities, the RTC and CA considered the police operation as a valid
warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving

vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a
warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace
officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."15

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only

when "the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction."16

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the
instant case is a search of a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the
instant case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling

inasmuch as the facts of the said case are virtually identical to the instant
case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the

authorities as regards an alleged courier of marijuana who had in his
possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from
Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually called the authorities
and informed them that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with
body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro
City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and
violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." With this information, the
police officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the authorities did in the
instant case. Afterwards, upon seeing the bus bearing the said body and
plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar to the instant
case, the said vehicle was flagged down. The police officers boarded the
bus and saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The
man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap.
The man was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so,
the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana
leaves.

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be
classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search,
the vehicle is the target and not a specific person."18 The Court added that
"in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a
means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus
was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus,
they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their
informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus."19

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed

that the target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney
boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said
vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched the
description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the
person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
carrying a blue sack.

As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of

searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled
warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of
waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint
along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it
arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person."20

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be

characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and

Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a

search of a moving vehicle, the operation undertaken by the authorities in
the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
In People v. Manago,21 the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Estela
M. Perlas-Bernabe, explained that a variant of searching moving vehicles
without a warrant may entail the setting up of military or police checkpoints.
The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its
necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non--

violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, the search
must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the
officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the
inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to

conduct intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as
opposed to a mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle
to be searched."23

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a
mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part
of the apprehending officers.

It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 ( Valmonte) where the Court first held that

vehicles can be stopped at a checkpoint and extensively searched only
when there is "probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense."25 This doctrine was directly adopted from United States
jurisprudence, specifically from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court
of the United States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v. Taylor.26
As subsequently explained by the Court in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals,27 probable cause means that there is the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched:

x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion supp01ied by circumstances

sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according
to the facts of each case.28

Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not

engender Probable Cause on the part of the Authorities that warrants an
Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle

As readily admitted by the CA, the singular circumstance that engendered

probable cause on the part of the police officers was the information they
received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from an anonymous
person. Because of this information, the CA held that there was probable
cause on the part of the police to conduct an intrusive search.29

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person

suffice to create probable cause that enables the authorities to conduct an
extensive and intrusive search without a search warrant? The answer is a
resounding no.

The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations
involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act
solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay
no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse
suspicion."30
A. United States Jurisprudence on Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped
Information

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless search of a

moving vehicle necessitates probable cause was adopted by the Court
from United States jurisprudence, examining United States jurisprudence
can aid in a fuller understanding on the existence of probable cause vis-a-
vis tipped information received from confidential informants.

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31 the SCOTUS delved into the

constitutional requirements for obtaining a state search warrant. In the said
case, two Houston police officers applied to a local Justice of the Peace for
a warrant to search for narcotics in the petitioner's home based on "reliable
information" received from a supposed credible person that the "heroin,
marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are
being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use
contrary to the provisions of the law."32

In invalidating the search warrant, the SCOTUS held that a two pronged
test must be satisfied in order to determine whether an informant's tip is
sufficient in engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the informant's "basis of
knowledge" must be revealed and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the
informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report must be
provided:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, and need not

reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying
circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S.
528, was "credible" or his information "reliable."33

Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois v. Gates,34 the police received

an anonymous letter alleging that the respondents were engaged in selling
drugs and that the car of the respondents would be loaded with drugs.
Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency searched the respondents' car,
which contained marijuana and other contraband items.
In finding that there was probable cause, the SCOTUS adopted the totality
of circumstances test and held that tipped information may engender
probable cause under "a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all
the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's
tip"35 In the said case, the SCOTUS found that the details of the
informant's tip were corroborated by independent police work.

The SCOTUS emphasized however that "standing alone, the anonymous

letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the
basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to
believe contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. x x x
Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude
that there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in
the Gateses' home and car."36

B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to

Engender Probable Cause

As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled that an extensive warrantless
search and seizure conducted on the sole basis of a confidential tip is
tainted with illegality. In People v. Aminnudin,37 analogous to the instant
case, the authorities acted upon an information that the accused would be
arriving from Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities
waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted the accused, and inspected the
latter's bag wherein bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court
declared that the search and seizure was illegal, holding that, at the time of
his apprehension, Aminnudin was not "committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. x x x To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension."38

Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the Court, through former Chief

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that the warrantless search and
subsequent arrest of the accused were deemed illegal because "the
prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable
ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a
crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were
made."40 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the authorities
merely relied on "the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received
that morning."41 The Court characterized the tip received by the authorities
from an anonymous informant as "hearsay information"42 that cannot
engender probable cause.

In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities acted solely on an informant's tip

and stopped the tricycle occupied by the accused and asked the latter to
alight. The authorities then rummaged through the two strapped plastic
baby chairs that were loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities then found
a package of marijuana inserted between the two chairs. The Court, again
through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "raw
intelligence"44 was not enough to justify the warrantless search and
seizure. "The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode
the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be
ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."45

Likewise analogous to the instant case is People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where

an informant had told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
transporting illegal drugs from Baguio City by bus. Hence, the police
officers situated themselves at the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa."
Subsequently, the authorities apprehended the woman and inspected her
bag which contained marijuana leaves.

In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court

in Aruta held that "it was only when the informant pointed to accused-
appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana
that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not
have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant."47 Hence, the Court held that the search conducted on the
accused therein based solely on the pointing finger of the informant was "a
clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure."48

Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise

involved a search conducted through a checkpoint put up after an
"unidentified civilian informer" shared information to the authorities that a
person would be transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that
justified a warrantless search, the Court, through Associate Justice Marvic
Mario Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that in cases finding sufficient
probable cause for the conduct of warrantless searches, "the police officers
using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their
experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit
drugs."50 However, the Court reasoned that the case of the accused was
different because "he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who
signaled to the police that Cogaed was 'suspicious.'"51

In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that

justifies a valid warrantless search, "[i]t is the police officer who should
observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person and
effects."52 The Court explained that "the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the (acts leading to the suspicion of an
illicit act," and not merely rely on the information passed on to him or her.53

Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion

in Esquillo v. People,54 the Court in Cogaed stressed that reliance on only
one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.55 The Court emphasized that the matching of information
transmitted by an informant "still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant."56

Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 (Veridiano), a concerned citizen

informed the police that the accused was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities set up a checkpoint.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance of the
accused. Eventually, the police chanced upon the accused inside a
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. The jeepney was
flagged down and the police asked the passengers to disembark. The
police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for
possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from the accused a tea bag containing what
appeared to be marijuana.

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through

Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, held that the accused
was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would
give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the police had basis
or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious."58

The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act solely on the
basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter
how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."59

A year after Veridiano, the Court decided the case of Comprado. As in the

instant case, the authorities alleged that they possessed reasonable cause
to conduct a warrantless search solely on the basis of information relayed
by an informant.

The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an

informant was not sufficient to incite a genuine reason to conduct an
intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained that "no overt
physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime."60

The Court emphasized that there should be the "presence of more than

one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 In the said case, as in the
instant case, the accused was just a passenger carrying his bag. "There is
nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such
circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe
that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana."62
Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People v.
Yanson63 (Yanson) that a solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause
that warrants the conduct of a ·warrantless intrusive search and seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the instant

case, "the Municipal Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a
radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with plate number 619
and carrying three (3) people - that was transporting marijuana from Pikit.
The Chief of Police instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the
riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M'lang."64

Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the
checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers on standby. The
team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver
alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2)
sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine."65

In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,

the Court held that, in determining whether there is probable cause that
warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless searches of a moving
vehicle, "bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not
demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it
requires the existence of 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.'"66

The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated
warrantless searches and seizures on the basis of tipped information, "the
seizures and arrests were not merely and exclusively based on the initial
tips. Rather, they were prompted by other attendant circumstances.
Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was progressively
heightened by other factors, such as the accused's failure to produce
identifying documents, papers pertinent to the items they were carrying, or
their display of suspicious behavior upon being approached."67 In such
cases, the finding of probable cause was premised "on more than just the
initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence of initial tips and
a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable
cause."68 However, the case of Yanson was markedly different from these
other cases. Just as in the instant case, the police officers proceeded to
effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip:

This case is markedly different. The police officers here proceeded to effect
a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip: the radio
message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting
marijuana from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this
description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting officers went ahead to
initiate a search asking the driver about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon
this insistence did the driver alight. It was also only upon a police officer's
further prodding did he open the hood.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established

facts or the prosecution's mere allegations, that the three (3) people on
board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there were other odd
circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an
extensive search. Evidently, the police officers relied solely on the radio
message they received when they proceeded to inspect the vehicle.69

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished
by informants cannot produce probable cause, the Court held that
"[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the
very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
to be searched."70

As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise

would be to sanction frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded
searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants."71

And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, promulgated its Decision in People v. Gardon-
Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the said case, police officers had set up a
checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan
based on a tip from an unidentified informant that the accused-appellant
would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually,
the authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van matching the
description obtained from the informant and conducted a warrantless
search of the vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle
containing marijuana.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable
cause, the Court held that a tip, in the absence of other circumstances that
would confirm their suspicion coming from the personal knowledge of the
searching officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a
search:

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the
basis for the officers' suspicion about the block-shaped bundle
contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and
belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers
concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court
whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to
determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have
never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause
when none exists."

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-
appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, impelling him and
PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did
occur, give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?

For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped
bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if
the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required
her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-
unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to
initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves
well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for
independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the
foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then
obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that
would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or
arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest
or conducting a search.73

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v.

People74 (Saluday), a bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a
military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case, the
authorities merely conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive
inspection"75 of the accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag that noticeably
appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the
instant case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing of the
contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer

information relayed by an informant, unlike in the instant case. In Saluday,
the authorities had relied on their own senses in determining probable
cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was
inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the
accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing
a reasonable search of a bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search
must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be discriminatory; (3) as to
the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety;
and (4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in
place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.76

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual

and minimally intrusive, the search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla
was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that he
allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant

Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike in Saluday where the bags of the other
bus passengers were also inspected, the search conducted in the instant
case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent
of ensuring public safety. At the most, the search was conducted to
apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was
transporting illegal drugs.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures

were undertaken by the police to ensure that no evidence was planted
against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory,
photographing, and marking of the evidence were not immediately
conducted after the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the scene
of the incident.

C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of

jurisprudence holding that information received by the police provides a
valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,77 tracing its origins to the
1990 cases of People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and People v. Maspil,
Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.). Several of the cases following this line of jurisprudence
also heavily rely on the 1992 case of People v. Bagista80 (Bagista).

It is high time for a re-examination of this divergent line of jurisprudence.

In Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers that dangerous

drugs would be transported through a bus, the authorities conducted a
surveillance operation at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San
Fernando, Pampanga. At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed a person
carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted
him and requested him to open his bag. The police found marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper inside the bag.

It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct

the warrantless search did not rest solely on the tipped information supplied
by the informants. The authorities, using their own personal observation,
saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.

Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases upholding the validity of

a warrantless search and seizure on the basis of a confidential tip, the
police did not rely exclusively on information sourced from the
informant. There were overt acts and other circumstances personally
observed by the police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the
holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted on
the solitary basis of tipped information is far from being an established and
inflexible doctrine.

To cite but a few examples, in the early case of People v.

Malmstdedt,81 the authorities set up a checkpoint in response to some
reports that a Caucasian man was coming from Sagada with dangerous
drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus
and inspected it. Upon reaching the accused, the police personally
observed that there was a bulge on the accused's waist. This prompted the
officer to ask for the accused's identification papers, which the accused
failed to provide. The accused was then asked to reveal what was bulging
on his waist, which turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In
this case, the Court ruled that the probable cause justifying the warrantless
search was based on the personal observations of the authorities and not
solely on the tipped information:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to
present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification
papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of
the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.82

In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did not solely rely on confidential

information that the accused would deliver an unspecified amount
of shabu using a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411. Upon
conducting a visual search of the motor vehicle that was flagged down by
the authorities, the police personally saw a gun tucked on the accused's
waist. Moreover, the accused was not able to produce any pertinent
document related to the firearm. This was what prompted the police to
order the accused to alight from the vehicle.

In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities did not solely rely on the police

informer's report that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep
with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, at a
Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan. The authorities conducted a
surveillance operation and personally saw the accused handing out a white
envelope to her co-accused, a person included in the police's drug watch
list.

In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the authorities had probable cause

in conducting an intrusive warrantless search, the Court explained that
probable cause was not engendered solely by the receipt of confidential
information. Probable cause was produced because a prior test-buy was
conducted by the authorities, which confirmed that the accused was
engaged in the transportation and selling of shabu.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,86 the person subjected to a
warrantless search and seizure was personally observed by the police to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked
what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. The Court held that the
policemen had sufficient reason to accost the accused-appellant to
determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a
haven for drug addicts.87

In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers noticed a man who appeared

drunk. This man was also 'wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.'
Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the suspicion.
After stopping him the police officers found an unlicensed 'homemade
firearm' in his possession."89

In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the authorities did not rely on an anonymous,

unverified tip. Deep penetration agents were recruited to infiltrate the crime
syndicate. An undercover agent actually met and conferred with the
accused, personally confirming the criminal activities being planned by the
accused. In fact, the agent regularly submitted reports of his undercover
activities on the criminal syndicate.

The jurisprudence cited by the CA in holding that the anonymous text

message sent to the RPSB Hotline sufficed to engender probable cause on
the part of the authorities, i.e., People v. Tampis91 (Tampis), stated that
"tipped information is - sufficient to provide probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure."92

However, in Tampis, as in the aforementioned jurisprudence, the police did

not merely rely on information relayed by an informant. Prior to the
warrantless search conducted, the police actually "conducted a surveillance
on the intended place and saw both appellants packing the suspected
marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings 'Tak Tak Tak
Ajinomoto' inscribed on its side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were able to
personally witness the accused packing illegal drugs into the brown bag
prior to the warrantless search and seizure.

Moreover, it is observed that when the Court in Tampis held that "tipped

information is sufficient to provide probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the case of Aruta as its basis.
However, the Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped information in and of
itself is sufficient to create probable cause. In fact, in Aruta, as already
previously explained, despite the fact that the apprehending officers
already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged
activities, the warrantless search conducted on Aruta was deemed unlawful
for lack of probable cause.

The earliest case decided by the Court which upheld the validity of an
extensive warrantless search based exclusively on a solitary tip is the case
of Maspil, Jr., wherein the authorities set up a checkpoint, flagged down the
jeep driven by the accused, and examined the contents thereof on the sole
basis of information provided by confidential informers.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless search, the Court in Maspil,

Jr. depended heavily on the early case of Valmonte, which delved into the
constitutionality of checkpoints set up in Valenzuela City.

It bears stressing that the Court in Valmonte never delved into the validity
of warrantless searches and seizures on the pure basis of confidential
information. Valmonte did not hold that in checkpoints, intrusive searches
can be conducted on the sole basis of tipped information. Valmonte merely
stated that checkpoints are not illegal per se.95 In fact, in Valmonte, the
Court stressed that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search."96

Hence, the jurisprudential support of the Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at

best, frail.

With respect to Bagista, the Court held therein that the authorities had
probable cause to search the accused's belongings without a search
warrant based solely on information received from a confidential informant.

In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs.
U.S97 (Carroll) in holding that "[w]ith regard to the search of moving
vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."98
Does Carroll support the notion that an unverified tipped information
engenders probable cause? In Carroll, which upheld the validity of a
warrantless search of a vehicle used to transport contraband liquor in
Michigan, the SCOTUS found that the warrantless search was justified in
light of the following circumstances:

The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer,
federal prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a state officer, in December,
1921, as the car was going westward on the highway between Detroit and
Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts
leading to the search and seizure were as follows: on September 29th,
Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men
came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants,
Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford,
working in the Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to
buy three cases of whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three
men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the liquor
and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went
away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it
that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it
the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as
an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified,
a[s] did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the
evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so. One may
surmise that it was suspicion of the real character of the proposed
purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when
arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were
engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids,
looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their
regular tour of duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward
from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett
and Scully some distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to
Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had passed them going
toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see where
they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to
Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some two
months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with
Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the
road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same
automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The
government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point
some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and
searched the car.

xxxx

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit,
and that Detroit and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the
International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing
illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It
is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a
regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to
stop and seize liquor carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing
evidence to make them believe that the Carroll boys, as they called them,
were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged
in plying the unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers
had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids half way to Detroit, and
attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they
escaped observation. Two months later, these officers suddenly met the
same men on their way westward, presumably from Detroit. The partners in
the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the
same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to furnish the
whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm
equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source of
supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where they plied their trade. That
the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they were
carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that
they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put by defendant's
counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not
looking for defendants at the particular time when they appeared. We do
not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did appear, the officers
were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which
they had previous knowledge in respect to the defendants.99

Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause justifying the warrantless search

was not founded on information relayed by confidential informants; there
were no informants involved in the case whatsoever. Probable cause
existed because the state authorities themselves had personally interacted
with the accused, having engaged with them in an undercover transaction.
Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the jurisprudential support upon
which Bagista heavily relies is not strong.

It is also not lost on the Court that in Bagista, the Court did not decide with
unanimity.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla

expressed the view that "the information alone received by the NARCOM
agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the accused,
did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless search made
on the bag of the accused." In explaining his dissent, Justice Padilla
correctly explained that:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the
accused on the basis alone of an information they received that a woman,
23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3" in height would be
transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made
on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was
riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical
appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the
alleged information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by
the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the
baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to
answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the
NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly found the
marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the
NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence when they searched the
baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no
probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the
woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they allegedly
received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal effects of
herein accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my
mind bereft of probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that
the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was
inadmissible in evidence.100
It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future
age.101 For Justice Padilla's Dissenting Opinion, such age has come. This
holding, which is reflected in the recent tide of jurisprudence, must now fully
find the light of day as it is more in line with the basic constitutional precept
that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law,
hovering above the articles on governmental power. The Court's holding
that tipped information, on its own, cannot engender probable cause is
guided by the principle that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any
allowable transgression of such right is subject to the most stringent of
scrutiny.

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the
cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified,
anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which
include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be
the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.

Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous

precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of an unverified information passed
along by an alleged informant, the authorities are given the unbridled
license to undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the
absence of any overt circumstance that engenders a reasonable belief that
an illegal activity is afoot.

This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V.

Panganiban in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v.
Montilla.102 In holding that law and jurisprudence require stricter
grounds for valid arrests and searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban
explained that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on tipped
information alone places the sacred constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures in great jeopardy:

x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants,

reminiscent of the Makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one
whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law
could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless
power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath
their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to
justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this
as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can
always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day
or afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal
requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure.
Indeed, the majority's ruling would open loopholes that would allow
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.103

It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow
intrusive warrantless searches and seizures on the solitary basis of
unverified, anonymous tips.

Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false
and fabricated information to the police. Unscrupulous persons can
effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate another
by simply giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to
invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis
of a bogus tip.

On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can

easily justify the infiltration of a citizen's vehicle or residence, violating his
or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw intelligence was
received, even if there really was no such information received or if the
information received was fabricated.

Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against

unreasonable search and seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips. The
right against unreasonable searches and seizures will be rendered hollow
and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of
Rights.

D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police
merely adopted the unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion of another
person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. Apart
from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no reason to
reasonably believe that the passenger vehicle contained an item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable
cause on the part of the police to conduct an intrusive search is the fact
that the information regarding the description of the person alleged to be
transporting illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed merely through
a text message from a completely anonymous person. The police did not
even endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The
authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the information
coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this
anonymous text message, without giving any second thought, the police
accepted the unverified information as gospel truth and immediately
proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information coming
from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police officers
undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot
reasonably produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an
intrusive search.

In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the

authorities did not even personally receive and examine the anonymous
text message. The contents of the text message were only relayed to them
by a duty guard, whose identity the police could not even recall:

Q x x x [W]ho received the information, was it you or another person, Mr.

Witness?

A The duty guard, sir.

Q And usually now, informations (sic) is usually transmitted and text (sic) to
the duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you produce the transcript of the text message (sic) can you write in
a piece of paper, Mr. Witness?

A Our duty guard just informed us the information, sir.

Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A I cannot remember, sir.104

Simply stated, the information received through text message was not only
hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.

Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself, tipped information

received by the authorities through the duty guard was unwritten and
unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating Procedure that any
information received by a police station that shall be duly considered by the
authorities should be properly written in a log book or police blotter:

Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating Procedure that any information

received by the Police Stations or a detachment properly written in a log
book or written in a Police blotter, that is the Standard Operating
Procedure, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q It was not written the information that you received, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Not at that time, sir.105

Further, it does not escape the attention of the Court that, as testified to by
PSI Ngoslab on cross-examination, the mobile phone which received the
anonymous person's text message was not even an official government -
issued phone.106 From the records of the case, it is unclear as to who
owned or possessed the said phone used as the supposed official hotline
of the RPSB Office. Furthermore, PSI Ngoslab testified that he was not
even sure whether the said official hotline still existed.107

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and

seizure cannot possibly arise from double hearsay evidence and from an
irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and prudent
man will surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item sought in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched
based solely on the say-so of an unknown duty guard that a random,
unverified text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a
complete stranger.
Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an
intrusive warrantless search, considering that the police officers failed to
rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and
anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant
Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

The Inapplicability of The Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless

Searches and Seizures

Neither are the other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and

seizures applicable in the instant case.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-

appellant Sapla was not incidental to a lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful
arrest that precedes the search, which is not the case here. Further, the
prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of
evidence in plain view, that it was a customs search, and that there were
exigent and emergency circumstances that warranted a warrantless
search.

Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be

considered a valid stop and frisk search. The Court has explained that stop
and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the
allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is limited to a "protective search
of outer clothing for weapons."108 The search conducted by the authorities
on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a protective search of outer
clothing for weapons or contraband.

Moreover, while it was clarified by the Court in Malacat v. Court of

Appeals109 that probable cause is not required to conduct stop and
frisk searches, "mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a 'stop and
frisk.' A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him."110 In Comprado, Cogaed,
and Veridiano, the Court has held that mere reliance on information relayed
by an informant does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police
to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. In other words, in the
aforesaid cases, the Court has held that information from an informant is
mere suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.
Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant

Sapla as a valid consented search.

The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in

this case and that the illegal drugs - four (4) bricks of marijuana, discovered
as a result of consented search [are] admissible in evidence."111

The Court disagrees.

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are
present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the

existence of such right; and

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.112

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional

right, the Court has held that "[t]he fundamental law and jurisprudence
require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid
waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a
search does not amount to permission thereto."113

Hence, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag114 or
the chairs containing marijuana to the arresting officer,115 the Court has
held there was no valid consent to the search.116

Again, in Veridiano, the Court emphasized that the consent to a

warrantless search and seizure must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and unattended by duress or coercion.117 Mere passive conformity
to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not
amount to consent and that the presence of a coercive environment
negates the cl2im that the petitioner therein consented to the warrantless
search.118

The very recent case of Yanson is likewise instructive. As in the instant

case, "Sison, [the therein accused] who was then unarmed, was prodded
by the arresting officers to open the pickup's hood. His beguiling conformity
is easily accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who
had specifically flagged him and his companions down. He was under the
coercive force of armed law enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly
vitiated."119

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the
Court that accused-appellant Sapla's apparent consent to the search
conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given,
and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that
accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment,
considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a
checkpoint.

In fact, from the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily

apparent that accused-appellant Sapla's alleged voluntary opening of the
sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan asked accused-appellant
Sapla to open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a
while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]."120

At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of opening the blue sack

was mere passive conformity to a warrantless search conducted in
a coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot consider
the search conducted as a valid consented search.

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search

and seizure conducted by the police in the instant case is
the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence

obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."121

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, there

is no more need for the Court to discuss the other issues surrounding the
apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla, particularly the gaps in the chain
of custody of the alleged seized marijuana bricks, which likewise renders
the same inadmissible. The prosecution is left with no evidence left to
support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla. Consequently, accused-
appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.

Epilogue

The Court fully recognizes the necessity of adopting a resolute and

aggressive stance against the menace of illegal drugs. Our Constitution
declares that the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.122

Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right against

unreasonable searches and seizures for expediency's sake, the very
maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered wholly nugatory.
By disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the
proliferation of illegal drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare,
oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words, when
the Constitution i.s disregarded, the battle waged against illegal drugs
becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged
against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war
on drugs; it is a war against the people.123

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience.

Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of
law.124

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision dated April 24, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt,
and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is
being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be
issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said
Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.