Module 15 Cases

BLTB vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-33138-39, 27 June

1975
Indeed, quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is an independent source of obligation between
two persons not so formerly bound by juridical tie.

In February 1963, Andres Ilagan was driving a bus owned by Batangas Laguna Tayaban
Bus Company, Inc. (BLTB) along Manila South Super Highway. He sped pass a big cargo
truck thereby taking the opposite lane and he hit the car driven by a certain Ricardo de
los Reyes which resulted in the latter’s death and the latter’s niece’s death and causing
serious injuries to the other car passengers. Ilagan was sued for homicide through
reckless imprudence and while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals the
victims sued Ilagan and BLTB for damages via an independent civil action based on
Article 2180. BLTB assailed the suit as it invoked the opinion penned by Justice
Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje which states that under Article 33 of the Civil Code it
excludes criminal negligence as one of those which an independent civil action can be
filed, hence homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under
the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his
civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party
reserved his right to institute a separate civil action; and based on this, BLTB wanted the
dismissal of the civil suits pending the criminal suit in the CA.

Whether or not a civil suit can be filed independently of the criminal negligence
case pending before the CA.

The opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje is not controlling because it is not
doctrinal – this is because the majority of the court did not agree with it. Also, the
Corpus case was different because the damages claimed there were based on the same
criminal negligence. But in the case at bar, the damages sought to be recovered were
based on quasi-delict or Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code which is an
independent civil action.
Bernabe Africa, et al. vs. CALTEX, et al. L-
12986, 31 March 1966
Doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” (literally translated as “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself”)
A fire broke out at a Caltex service station.  It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank trunk into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tank where the nozzle of the hose had been inserted.  The fire destroyed several
houses.  Caltex and the station manager were sued.

Without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, would the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor apply such that the defendants can be presumed negligent?
Under the principle of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.  In this
case, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under
the control of defendants. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were defendants and their employees, but they gave no explanation at all regarding the
fire.  It is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of their want of
care.

Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation

L-21749, 29 September 1967
Doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” (literally translated as “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself”)
A barge belonging to the Luzon Stevedoring Company rammed against one of the
wooden supports of the old Nagtahan Bridge (a stationary object). 

What presumption arises?

There arises the presumption that the barge was negligent (doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
meaning, the thing speaks for itself.)  This is evident because the bridge (at that time)
was an immovable, stationary object, adequately provided with openings for the
passage of watercraft).  The doctrine can indeed be applied, for in the ordinary course
of events, such a ramming would not occur if proper care is used.
 

Picart vs. Smith G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March

1918
Doctrine of “last clear chance” (also known as “doctrine of discovered peril”, or
“doctrine of supervening negligence”, or “the humanitarian doctrine”
A person driving an automobile on a bridge saw a man on horseback riding towards
him but on the wrong side of the bridge.  The driver sounded his horn several times,
but the horse rider made no move to go to the correct side.  The driver continued in his
original direction until it was too late to avoid a collision. 

Is the auto driver liable?

Although the horse rider was originally at fault, it was the auto driver who had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury by merely swerving, while still some distance away, to
the other part of the bridge.  “Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the
one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.”   This is the doctrine known as the “last clear chance.” 

Phoenix Construction, Inc.  vs. IAC G.R. No.

65295, 10 March 1987
If the plaintiff’s negligence was merely contributory to the damage suffered, but the
proximate cause was still defendant’s negligence
At about 1:30 am, LD was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with
his boss.  During the cock-tails, LD had taken a “shot or two” of liquor.  LD was driving
his car and had just crossed the intersection, not far from his home when his headlights
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright” and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2-½ meters away from his car.  The dump truck, owned by
Phoenix, Inc. was parked on the right-hand side of the street (i.e., on the right-hand side
of a person facing in the same direction toward which LD’S car was proceeding), facing
the oncoming traffic.  The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb)
in such manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic.  There were no lights nor any so-called “early warning” reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.  LD tried to avoid a collision by swerving
his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.  LD
suffered physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a “nervous breakdown”
and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
LD sued Phoenix and its driver claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Phoenix’s driver had parked the dump
truck.  Phoenix and its driver countered that the proximate cause of LD’s injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.  Phoenix also sought to
establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of LD.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision but modified the award of damages.

Is Phoenix liable for the damages sustained by LD?

The Supreme Court found that LD was negligent the night of the accident.  He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection, as he approached his residence,
and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.  Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the trial court and the appellate court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of LD’s injuries was the wrongful
and negligent manner in which the truck was parked.
The Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the dump truck
driver’s negligence on the one hand and the accident and LD’s injuries on the other
hand.  The collision of LD’s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver’s negligence.  The truck driver’s negligence far from
being a “passive and static condition” was an indispensable and efficient cause.  The
collision between the dump truck and LD’s car would in all probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices.  The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving and for having so created this risk the truck driver must be
held responsible.  LD’s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver’s
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause.  What Phoenix and its driver describe as an “intervening cause” was
no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.  LD’s negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.
LD’s negligence was “only contributory.”  The immediate and proximate cause of the
injury remained the truck driver’s “lack of due care.”  Hence, LD may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the Courts.
The truck driver’s proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part
of his employer in supervising its employees properly and adequately.

Saludaga vs. FEU  G.R. No. 179337, 30 April

2008
CONTRACTUAL NEGLIGENCE (or CULPA CONTRACTUAL)
S, a student of X University, was shot and wounded by G, a security guard of the
school, while inside the campus.  S sued X University for damages on the ground that it
breached its obligation under the enrollment contract to provide students with a safe
and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.  In defense, X
University pleaded fortuitous event on the ground that it could not have reasonably
foreseen nor avoided the accident since G was not its employee, and that it complied
with its obligation to ensure a safe environment for its students by having exercised
due diligence in selecting the security services of the SA Security Agency.  

Is X University liable for damages for breach of contract due to negligence in providing
a safe learning environment?
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.  The
school failed to prove that it undertook steps to ascertain that the security guards
assigned to it actually possessed the required qualifications.  A learning institution
should not be allowed to completely relinquish security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired. To do so would result in contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.  The defense of
fortuitous event or force majeure must also fail.  An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of the loss sustained.
Umali vs. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, 30
January 1976
(proximate cause vs. contributory negligence)
A storm hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan on May 14, 1972 which caused the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) to be
blown down and fall on the electric wire. This resulted to the cutting of the wire. The
following morning, the barrio captain saw and asked a laborer of the AEP to fix it, but
the latter told the barrio captain that he will call a lineman to fix it instead.

Thereafter, a 3 year-old boy named Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the
opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after
the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Whether there is negligence on the part of AEP;

YES. Negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in the AEP resulted in the death
of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner
could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be
endangered by banana plants being blown down.
Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants’ (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner’s liability for injury caused
by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RCPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 79578, 13 March 1991

(award of exemplary damages for gross negligence amounting to wanton misconduct)
A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI). The condolence telegram was
correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However, the condolence
message as communicated and delivered to the addressees was typewritten on a
“Happy Birthday” card and placed inside a “Christmasgram” envelope. The RCPI’s
defense is that it ran out of social forms and envelope for condolence telegrams.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which was
affirmed in toto by the CA. RCPI now submits assignment of errors regarding the award
of damages and attorney’s fees against it.

WON RCPI is liable for breach of contract and negligence as decided by the 2 courts

The SC fully agrees with the appellate court’s endorsement of the trial court’s
conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its
services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest. As such, it
is bound to exercise that degree of diligence expected of it in the performance of its
obligation. One of RCPI’s main arguments is that despite the fact that there was “error”
in the social form and envelope used, it asserts that there was no showing that it has
any motive to cause harm or damage on private respondents:
In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and
meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. It seems out of this world,
therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same
in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render
violence to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the
sender’s feelings.

The findings of the respondent court are persuasive.

When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social condolence telegram,
defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the exhaustion of such social condolence
forms. Defendant-appellant accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order
and received the corresponding compensation therefor. …. Gross negligence or
carelessness can be attributed to defendant-appellant in not supplying its various
stations with such sufficient and adequate social condolence forms when it held out to
the public … the availability of such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are no such forms as
testified to by its Material Control Manager and entering into a contract for the
transmission of messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad
faith, fraud or malice. . . .
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send
his message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of
the message is typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is
placed in a special form with the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the
occasion and the message and delivered in an envelope matching the purpose of the
occasion and the words and intent of the message. The sender pays a higher amount
for the social telegram than for one in the ordinary form.
It is clear, therefore, that when the message was being prepared, it committed a breach
of contract as well as gross negligence. It could not have been faulted had it delivered
the message in the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the
private respondents.

St. Francis High School, et al. vs. CA, G.R. No.

82465, 25 February 1991
(Art. 2180, par. 4, in relation to Art. 2176, NCC) 
Teachers or heads of establishment of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a
school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him
to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went
on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue,
but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent
spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found
teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not
in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private
affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school
sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the
picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

PNR vs. Vizcara, G.R. No. 190022, 15 February

2012
(doctrine of last clear chance)
On May 14, 2004, at about three o'clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo)
was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel
Natividad (Samuel),... Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While
crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train,
then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and
rammed the passenger jeepney. The... collision resulted to the instantaneous death of
Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel,
sustained serious physical injuries.
On May 14, 2004, at about three o'clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo)
was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel
Natividad (Samuel),... Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While
crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train,
then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and
rammed the passenger jeepney. The... collision resulted to the instantaneous death of
Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel,
sustained serious physical injuries.
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop"
signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another...
signboard.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision[8] dated March 20, 2007, ruling
in favor of the respondents

THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS

The petitioners' negligence was the... proximate cause of the accident. 

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a
person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence.

There was no contributory negligence... on the part of the respondents. 

As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents, this
court rule in the negative. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which... he is required to conform for his own protection.

The doctrine of last clear... chance is not applicable.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in
the instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the... other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom.

People vs. Villarmea, G.R. No. 200029, 13

November 2013.
(amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict under Art. 2206, NCC)
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2000 in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stab one Arnaldo Diez y Dadang with a bladed instrument, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds at his vital portion which caused his death soon
thereafter.
WHEREFORE, this Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Basilio Villarmea y
Echavez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accordingly, the
accused Basilio Villarmea is hereby sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua together with the accessories imposed under the law. Accused is
also hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnaldo Diez, the amounts of: ₱50,000.00 as
damages ex delicto; ₱25,000.00 as actual damages; ₱10,000.00 as moral damages and
₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

The appellate court found no reversible error in the lower court’s finding that appellant
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the murder of the victim, but
ordered that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs be
increased to ₱50,000 and ₱25,000, respectively.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we affirm the ruling of the appellate
court and sustain that the award of moral damages be increased to ₱50,000. We,
however, modify the award of civil indemnity to be increased from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000,
and the amount of exemplary damages to be increased from ₱25,000 to ₱30,000, to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence

Clearly, there was treachery in the case at bar. The victim was utterly defenseless,
unarmed and taken by surprise by the sudden and unexpected attack from his
assailants. Such unity of mind and purpose is shown by the twelve stab wounds and
several abrasions found on different parts of the body of the victim that led to his
instantaneous death. The defense of denial interposed by appellant cannot overcome
the positive identification made by Candelada, an eyewitness in the case at bar, that he
and his co-accused conspired in mauling and stabbing the victim. As correctly observed
by the appellate court, it does not lessen the evidence on record that sufficiently proves
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the award of damages, we make the following modifications to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence. The award by the trial court of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for
the death of the victim is increased to ₱75,000 which is mandatory and is granted
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime which caused the
victim’s death. We agree with the appellate court that the award of moral damages by
the trial court should be increased from ₱10,000 to ₱50,000. This amount is awarded
despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs as
a violent death necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. As to the award of exemplary damages, we increase the award made by
the appellate court from ₱25,000 to ₱30,000. The actual damages amounting to
₱25,000 as awarded by the trial court is sustained.

Dela Cruz vs. Octaviano, G.R. No. 219649, 26

July 2017.
(establishment of causal link between negligence of the party and succeeding injury in
proving contributory negligence)
Renato Viano, Wilma Viano, and Janet Viano, rode a tricycle driven by Eduardo Padilla.
While at the tricycle, Renato was asking his mother for a change to complete his ten-
peso bill when suddenly he saw a light from an oncoming car which was going too fast.
The car, driven by the petitioner, hit the back portion of the tricycle where Renato was
riding. The impact of the accident caused the tricycle to turn around and land on the
pavement near the gutter where Renato was thrown and landed on the gutter which
was about two meters away.

The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was negligent. Negligence is the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The Civil Code makes liability for negligence under Article 2176
and Article 20. Petitioner was negligent and the Court of Appeals correctly appreciated
the pieces of evidence presented by the respondents.

First, with regard to the damage or injury, there is no question that the plaintiffs
suffered damage due to the incident. Plaintiff Renato’s right leg was crushed by the
impact of the car driven by the defendant against the tricycle where the Octavianos
were riding which resulted in Renato’s right leg being amputated. Plaintiff Wilma
suffered traumatic injuries on different parts of her body by the evidence submitted to
the trial court. The damages or injuries were duly proved by preponderant evidence.
Second, with regard to the wrongful act or omission imputable to the negligence of the
defendant, the Supreme Court held that the trial court missed the glaring fact that the
defendant was guilty of negligence. There is ample evidence to show that the
defendant was negligent within the purview of Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Hence, he
cannot escape liability.

Darines vs. Quiñones, G.R. No. 206468, 2

August 2017
(culpa contractual and culpa acquiliana; rule for recovery of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees)

Judith D. Darines and her daughter, Joyce D. Darines alleged in their that they boarded
the Amianan Bus Line as paying passengers en route from Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
to Baguio City. Respondent Rolando M. Quitan was the driver of the bus. While
travelling on Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet along Kennon Road, the bus crashed into a truck
which was parked on the shoulder of Kennon Road. As a result, both vehicles were
damaged; two passengers of the bus died; and the other passengers, including
petitioners, were injured. Joyce suffered cerebral concussion while Judith had an eye
wound which required an operation. Petitioners argued that Quitan and respondent
Eduardo Quinones, the operator of Amianan Bus Line, breached their contract of
carriage as they failed to bring them safely to their destination. They also contended
that Quitan's reckless and negligent driving caused the collision. For their part,
Quinones and Quitan disputed that, during the incident, Quitan was driving in a careful,
prudent, and dutiful manner at the normal speed of 40 kilometers per hour. According
to them, the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of the truck driver,
who parked the truck at the roadside right after the curve without having installed any
early warning device.

The RTC awarded moral damages grounded on Judith's testimony regarding her pain
and suffering. It likewise awarded exemplary damages by way of correction, and to
serve as example to common carriers to be extraordinarily diligent in transporting
passengers. It also granted petitioner’s attorney's fees plus costs of suit on the ground
that petitioners were compelled to litigate the case. The CA reversed and set aside the
RTC Decision stressing that respondents did not dispute that they were liable for breach
of contract of carriage; in fact, they paid for the medical and hospital expenses of
petitioners. Nonetheless, the CA deleted the award of moral damages because
petitioners failed to prove that respondents acted fraudulently or in bad faith, as shown
by the fact that respondents paid petitioners' medical and hospitalization expenses. The
CA held that, since no moral damages was awarded, then there was no basis to grant
exemplary damages. Finally, it ruled that because moral and exemplary damages were
not granted, then the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted.

Whether or not award of moral damages may be recovered in this case

The aforesaid concepts of fraud or bad faith and negligence are basic as they are
distinctly differentiated by law. Specifically, fraud or bad faith connotes "deliberate or
wanton wrong doing"or such deliberate disregard of contractual obligations while
negligence amounts to sheer carelessness. Fraud includes "inducement through
insidious machination." In turn, insidious machination refers to such deceitful strategy
or such plan with an evil purpose. On the other hand, bad faith does not merely pertain
to bad judgment or negligence but relates to a dishonest purpose, and a deliberate
doing of a wrongful act. Bad faith involves "breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud." In other cases, the
Court disallowed the recovery of moral damages in actions for breach of contract for
lack of showing that the common carrier committed fraud or bad faith in performing its
obligation. Similarly, the Court did not also grant moral damages in an action for
breach of contract as there was neither allegation nor proof that the common carrier
committed fraud or bad faith. The Court declared that "[t]o award moral damages for
breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendant, as required by [Article 2220 of the Civil Code], would be to violate the clear
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. The Court also
sustains the CA's finding that petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
awarded only in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.
Since petitioners are not entitled to either moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages, then their claim for exemplary damages is bereft of merit.
Finally, considering the absence of any of the circumstances under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code where attorney's fees may be awarded, the same cannot be granted to
petitioners. All told, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners are not entitled to moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.