FINAL MUGHAL INDIA REVISION

Adarsh saini, DU
adarshsaini1100@gmail.com

Topics:
 Akbar
o Political Challenges
o Religious Policy
o Rajput Relations
 Jahangir
o Rajput Relations
 Shah Jahan
o Rajput Relations
 Aurangzeb
o Religious Policy
o Role in Decline
o Rajput Relations
 Agrarian Settlement
o Rural Society
o Zamindars
o Land Revenue Systems
 Deccan Relations
 Mughal Painting
 Mughal Architecture
 The Marathas (Done)
 Sources
o Abu’l Fazl
o Abdul Qadir Badauni
o Nizamuddin Ahmad
 Mughal Decline
 Interpreting the 18th Century

* * *

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 AKBAR: MUGHAL – RAJPUT RELATIONS
Mughal relations with the Rajputs matured with the accession of Akbar, who understood the
strategic importance of an alliance with them. However, these relations underwent significant
changes due to existing socio-political factors as well as the individual policies of various
rulers, both Rajput and Mughal.

A major factor in Mughal-Rajput relations was the area occupied and controlled by Rajput
rulers, known as ‘Rajputana’. It is situated in the better part of modern-day Rajasthan, and
formed a crucial link between the Gangetic valley and the flourishing sea ports on the west
coast of India as well as the prosperous tract of Malwa, which was important for trade access
to Gujarat and the Deccan region. Conventional wisdom dictated that the Mughal state would
be vulnerable to attacks both from the North West Frontier and Malwa if the Rajputana region
was not brought under central control. The Rajputs were also seen as a possible threat to the
Mughals, due to their reputation as warriors, the proximity of the region to Delhi and the
strategic benefits of the Aravalli hills to the Rajputs.

Satish Chandra believes that it was the Mughal desire to conciliate the ruling classes as well
as the Rajput reputation for loyalty and service that formed the basis of this alliance. In fact,
rulers before Akbar also recognized this. Although they faced much resistance from the
Rajput clans, both Humayun and Babur saw them as an important group in the politics of an
unstable empire.

There is much conjecture regarding the reasons why Akbar sought to gain Rajput support.
Vincent Smith saw it as an outcome of the ruler’s quest for territorial expansion and political
expediency. Beni Prashad and A.L. Srivastava considered his Rajput policy as an extension of
his religious policy, and felt that this was a part of his attempt to construct a composite culture
in the Empire. Iqtidar Alam Khan, however, felt that Akbar’s decision was political in nature,
as he looked to settle the imbalances of power within his nobility which was dominated at that
point by the Turani nobles. Khan’s argument was that internal rebellions made Akbar realize
the need to create an effective bulwark and a class of efficient administrators. His wish to use
the traits of the Rajputs as a part of his strategy of consolidation lay at the heart of his policy.

Satish Chandra saw Mughal-Rajput relations going through three distinct phases. The first
phase continued from 1556 to 1567, and saw the building of Rajput loyalty to the Mughals,
with most rajas accepting the suzerainty of the Mughals while retaining their principalities.
Akbar utilized their services in his administration, and they were expected to perform military
service to the state within Rajputana. This was important for Akbar who, at this time, faced

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rebellion from his foster family, as well as various factions of the nobility, and needed the
military strength of the Rajputs in order to compete with the nobles.

Matrimonial alliances were an important feature of the policy towards the Rajputs as they
became important in effecting permanent ties with the principalities. The earliest example of
this was in 1562 when Akbar married Harkha Bai, daughter of Raja Bharamal of Amber,
thereby cementing an alliance with the Kachhwaha clan. This gave the Kachhwahas, who
were a minor clan, the chance to become high-ranking nobles in the Mughal court.

Akbar also initiated a series of liberal policies such as the abolition of the Pilgrimage Tax and
Jiziya between 1562 and 1564 in order to attract support from the Rajputs. However, the first
phase of his relations with the Rajputs did not yield complete peace and cooperation, and
served as the background to the second phase.

In the second phase (1568 – 1580), one could see Akbar adopting a far more ‘hard-line’
approach, seeing the use of force in coaxing the Rajput clans to accept alliances. He did still
rely on diplomatic and peaceful means, but his confrontations with Rana Uday Singh of
Mewar, the Chittor campaign of 1567 and Ranthambore in 1569, as well as the prolonged
campaign against Maharana Pratap, clearly showed a violent side to his approach.

According to Abu’l Fazl, Akbar was compelled to take up arms against an arrogant Rana
Uday Singh, while Badauni and Ahmed pointed to the fact that he was harbouring Baz
Bahadur, an Afghan chief and enemy to the Mughal court. Whatever the case may have been,
the Chittor campaign in 1567 – 68 had been one of the most brutal conflicts faced by Akbar.
More compelling was the issue of the ‘fathnama-i-Chittor’ by Akbar in which he utilized
uncharacteristically communal language to announce his victory. However, most historians
considered the fathnama an aberration as Akbar still inducted a large number of Rajputs into
imperial service. The Rajputs now became the military bulwark of the state and actively aided
in the expansion of the Empire. In fact, with the exception of the Sisodias of Mewar, most
Rajput states entered into alliances with the Mughals. Even after Maharana Pratap’s defeat at
the Battle of Haldighati in 1575, Mewar continued to resist Mughal domination.

From 1580 onwards, the third phase of the Rajput policy began, and saw the Rajputs enjoy
enhanced prestige as nobles. They were active players in the imperial resistance to the Turani
revolt led by Mirza Hakim. The Rajputs, in fact, composed about 16% of the nobility
according to figures compiled by M. Athar Ali.

G.S.L. Devra noted that while Akbar’s relations with larger states such as Mewar and Marwar
were always strained, he remained much more cordial with smaller clans like the
Kachhwahas, who considered the alliance to be an opportunity to break the bounds of being a
small state.

S. Inayat Ali Zaidi felt that Akbar’s Rajput policy should be seen in terms of the integration
of the Rajputs through the jagirdari system. As Rajputs were made mansabdars, their payment
came in the form of revenue rights in jagirs. Akbar, recognizing the sentimental attachments
of the Rajputs, assigned their own principalities to them as ‘watan jagirs’. To further the
process of Rajput integration into the imperial framework, however, he also assigned them

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additional jagirs in other parts of the Empire in order to merge their interests with that of the
kingdom.

While giving a great deal of autonomy to the Rajputs, Akbar also retained much control over
their affairs, most importantly in disputes of succession in Rajput states, for which the
Mughal Emperor was empowered to have the final word. At times, Akbar used this to his
advantage, as seen in Marwar when he held off on making a decision until tensions in the
region forced him to.

Therefore, Akbar’s Rajput policy cemented relations with the Rajput states and ensured a case
of mutual benefits. While the Rajputs were able to secure high posts in administration, come
to form a major part of the nobility and gain much financially, Akbar was able to recruit brave
and loyal warriors as the military bulwark of the state, ensure peace in Rajputana and have
control over numerous strategic areas. This is the reason why Norman Zielger considered the
Rajput alliance as one of the more prominent Mughal successes.

MUGHAL – RAJPUT RELATIONS UNDER

JAHANGIR AND SHAH JAHAN
After the death of Akbar in 1605, the ascendancy of Jahangir to the Mughal throne raised
questions as to whether the alliance with the Rajputs would survive. However, Jahangir was
determined to continue the policy of his predecessor, as did his successor, Shah Jahan. These
relations developed against the backdrop of slow expansion in the Empire and limited
economic growth in the 17th century. Hence, it did suffer a setback due to internal conflicts
amongst the Rajputs and the proclamation of regional autonomy by different sections.

Under Jahangir, the relations with the Rajputs continued to be cordial, and he took up the
matter of the alliance more seriously and energetically. With regard to Mewar, Jahangir
directed a direct campaign against the Sisodias in 1613 in order to resolve the conflict. His
ability to settle this dispute in 1615 has been marked as one of his greatest achievements by
historians. He exempted the Rana of Mewar from attendance at court or service, and he didn’t
insist on a matrimonial alliance either. This lack of insistence enabled Jahangir to maintain
good relations with the Rajputs, though it is doubtful that any formal treaty was concluded, as
the condition imposed was that Chittor should not be fortified.

Moreover, the status of all of the more powerful Rajput states improved under Jahangir. The
ruler of Jodhpur was granted high a mansab of zat rank 5000, as did Bikaner, Mewar and
Amber. Jahangir also continued Akbar’s policy of matrimonial alliances with Rajput states,
though this was largely discontinued after the submission of Mewar. Notably, there is
evidence of an increased Maratha presence in court, possibly at the cost of the Rajputs.

Shah Jahan’s reign saw the Rajputs establishing themselves as the military arm of the Mughal
state, with there being hardly any major military expedition in which the Rajputs did not pay a
part. In Shah Jahan’s expeditions to Balkh, Badakhashan and Qandahar, the Rajputs were
granted important military commands.

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In terms of administrative jobs, some Rajputs like Jaswant Singh, Jai Singh and Rao Ratan
Hada held special favour form the Emperor, despite the fact that the Rajput role in
administration began to wane. The fact that Jaswant Singh was favoured by Shah Jahan was
evident by the fact that he supported Dara Shikoh, his favourite son, after the death of the
Emperor. This favour received from Shah Jahan also enabled Jaswant Singh to ignore clan
sardars, which was unheard of up till then.

An important development in this period was the conflicts that arose with the Bundela chief
Jhujhar Singh and Rana Amar Singh of Mewar. This conflict, according to Satish Chandra,
arose out of differing interpretations of suzerainty and paramountcy. It was based on two sets
of relationships – the first of class allies who had common interest in the extraction of land
revenue and maintenance of law and order, the other of their respective rights and privileges.
This conflict led to a straining of relations with Mewar.

This, it may be concluded that while the Rajputs remained valuable allies and partners under
Jahangir and Shah Jahan, their role in governance weakened and conflicts became inevitable
given the conditions of the Empire at the time.

MUGHAL – RAJPUT RELATIONS UNDER

AURANGZEB
Aurangzeb’s policy towards the Rajputs has been clouded by immense controversy and it
caused worry both to the Rajputs as well as to a section of the Mughal nobility. The Mughal
alliance with the Rajput chiefs is said to have been breached under Aurangzeb, leading to the
weakening and subsequent disintegration of the empire. According to Jadunath Sarkar, the
general perception was that Akbar built symbiotic and cordial relations with the Rajputs while
Aurangzeb’s policies led to the breaking up of alliances.

Aurangzeb went out of his way to win over and conciliate some of the leading Rajputs during
the War of Succession. The Rajputs played a significant role in Aurangzeb’s coming to power
Raja Jai Singh of Amber and Rana Raj Singh of Mewar both had become supporters of
Aurangzeb helping him overthrow Dara Shikoh.

After accession to the throne in 1658, Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajputs passed through
a number of phases that need to be analyzed separately, argued Satish Chandra. In the early
phase of Aurangzeb’s reign (1658 – 1667), the relations with the Rajputs were cordial and
they were treated as partners in the Mughal state, with their position actually improving. The
heads of the three leading Rajput states, Mewar, Marwar and Amber had cordial relations
with Aurangzeb. Rana Jai Singh of Amber was a close advisor to Aurangzeb and was often
called the key to the brain of Aurangzeb. He also maintained good relations with the other
important states of Bikaner, Bundi and Kota despite the initial opposition shown by these
Rajput states against Aurangzeb’s accession to the throne.

Matrimonial alliances came to an end during Aurangzeb's reign as they had been used by
Akbar to strengthen the relationship with the Rajputs, which had already been achieved by the
time of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. However the relations between Aurangzeb and the

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Rajputs gradually seemed to be cooling down.

Between 1666 and 1679, Aurangzeb faced a series of domestic challenges and he undertook a
number of measures that had far reaching implications. The Mughal state faced rebellions
from the Jats and Satnamis and was in continuous conflict with the Afghans, Assamese and
Marathas. The Rajputs continued to support the Mughal army in quelling these rebellions
despite Aurangzeb’s recourse to Islam as a major bond of unity by instituting a series of
orthodox measures, and coming closer to the ulama. The fact that Rajput forces were
dispatched to distant places and were virtually made to languish there for long periods
suggested that during this period, Aurangzeb had been exercising restraint in promoting the
Rajputs. This can be further attested by the fact that the percentage of Rajput nobles to the
total number of nobles dropped, as did their aggregate ranks. All this points to a growing
reservation on the part of Aurangzeb towards the Rajputs and forms the background to the
breach with Marwar and Mewar.

The real break in relations comes in the latter half of Aurangzeb’s reign. This period
witnessed the major rebellion by the states of Marwar and Mewar in 1679. It is on account of
these rebellions that it is generally believed that the Mughal-Rajput relations were completely
reversed. The re-imposition of jiziya by Aurangzeb in 1679 is regarded by historians such as
Jadunath Sarkar and S.R. Sharma as marking the culmination of the spirit of religious bigotry,
which led to the alienation of the Rajputs. Thus, while Aurangzeb’s policies may have been
important, it is far more important to analyze these rebellions from the point of view of inter-
state relations in the area and the ambitions of the individual rulers that may have drawn the
Mughal Empire into Rajput affairs.

The crisis began when Jaswant Singh of Marwar died in November 1678, with no surviving
heir. At the time of his death, his two wives were pregnant but there was no certainty of the
birth of a male child. This raised the problem of who was to succeed to the gaddi and there
were no definite principles of primogeniture among the Rathores.

In Marwar there were two claimants to the throne – Anup Singh (grandson of Amar Singh –
brother of Jaswant Singh) and Indra Singh (son of Amar Singh). The gaddi could not be
conferred on Rani Hadi, the Chief Queen, according to Rajput tradition. Both offered a huge
amount of peskhash to Aurangzeb and Anup Singh also volunteered to escheat Jaswant
Singh’s property to realize the dues he owed to the government.

When news reached Aurangzeb, he issued orders that the state of Marwar including Jodhpur
be taken into khalisa. Apart from the disputed succession, another reason for the state being
taken into khalisa was that on the death of the Maharaja, the various zamindars who had been
subject to him, withheld revenues and in many cases created disturbances. Jaswant Singh
owed heavily to the state treasury and was not able to clear his dues. He was therefore in debt
to the state. In addition to this the growing law and order problem in Marwar could have been
a contributory factor for Aurangzeb’s decision.

Jadunath Sarkar saw this as an ideological conflict attributed to the orthodoxy of Aurangzeb
who wanted to deprive Marwar of any effective leadership by taking control. Marwar was
strategically located and he wanted it to be in the hands of someone more loyal than Jaswant
Singh had been. Sarkar says that this was meant to avenge the role played by Jaswant Singh

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in the War of Succession, when he supported Dara Shikoh. Thus, Aurangzeb’s move has been
viewed by scholars like Sarkar as an annexation on religious and personal grounds.

Sarkar's conclusions have been contested by a number of historians, especially in the light of
the two contemporary sources - Waqai Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambhor and the Hukumat-ri-
Bahi. Firstly, it has been argued that if Aurangzeb wanted to punish Jaswant Singh, why
would he have waited for more than 20 years. Moreover, Aurangzeb had actually pardoned
him and retained him in the Mughal court.

It is seen that Aurangzeb did not break any Mughal precedent in converting Marwar into
khalisa land. Rani Hadi, the chief queen of Jaswant Singh, was not prepared to surrender
Jodhpur although she had no objection to the rest of Marwar being taken into khalisa. She
wanted to postpone the issue and awaited the birth of Jaswant Singh’s child. The claim of
Rani Hadi was supported by a number of Rathores and by the Rana of Mewar. When Rani
Hadi refused to surrender Jodhpur Aurangzeb decided to strike a blow and Marwar was
subdued. Mughal officers were posted at Jodhpur but Rani Hadi retained the fort.

Meanwhile two posthumous sons were born to the Ranis of Jaswant Singh. As the rival
claimants were at loggerheads, Aurangzeb bestowed the gaddi of Marwar on Indra Singh,
which came as a big surprise to the Rathores. Earlier Rani Hadi had made a secret offer that
the Rathores would themselves destroy all the temples in Marwar if the gaddi was given to a
son of Jaswant Singh. Though Aurangzeb duly rejected it, it shows the extent to which his
motives were being misunderstood by the Rajputs as well as his own officials. As a last
resort, Rani Hadi urged that rather than Jodhpur being conferred upon Indra Singh, it should
remain in khalisa. According to Jadunath Sarkar, if Aurangzeb was being guided by religious
orthodoxy and had desired to annex Marwar in order to further his objective of the forcible
conversion of Hindus, he would have kept Marwar in khalisa. He could have administered it
through an imperial nominee till the sons of Jaswant Singh came of age. However the Rajputs
feared that Indra Singh’s accession would establish an unhealthy precedent that the Mughal
Emperor wouldn’t consider the claims of a direct descendent of the Raja arbitrarily. The two
minor sons of Jaswant Singh were brought to Delhi and the Mir Bakshi backed their claims.
The Rajputs again pressed the claims of the two sons with great vehemence. However,
Aurangzeb had already decided to partition the kingdom in order to satisfy the claims of both
sides. Tika was to be given to Indra Singh, and Ajit Singh (son of Jaswant Singh) was offered
a mansab. This was meant to weaken Jodhpur as a part of Aurangzeb’s policy of restraint in
promoting the Rajputs. The Rathores rejected this compromise, which they felt was against
the interests of the state. Angered at the rejection of his offer, Aurangzeb decided to put the
two minor sons of Jaswant Singh and their mothers in confinement, which in turn became the
immediate cause of the flight of the Rajputs and the beginning of the Rathore uprising against
the Mughals.

This alarmed the Rathores who managed to escape Delhi with Ajit Singh. Their arrival in
Jodhpur marked the beginning of a Rathore uprising against the Mughals. Amid great
rejoicing the tika was given to Ajit Singh. Factions supporting Ajit Singh openly attacked the
Mughals and they were forced to retaliate by using force against them. Aurangzeb decided
that the Rajputs needed to be taught a stern lesson. He deputed a strong force and heavy
reinforcements were called in. Aurangzeb also removed Indra Singh from the gaddi on
grounds of incompetence. Ajit Singh was accused of being an imposter and Aurangzeb ruled

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out any negotiations with him. After the initial sharp engagement, the Rathores did not risk
any further battles with the Mughals and retreated. For the time being, resistance in Marwar
had been crushed and the Rathore capital, Jodhpur occupied. This episode shows the
weakening of the Mughal Rajput relations.

If the Rathores had not received active help and encouragement from Rana Raj Singh of
Mewar from the outset, it is likely that their resistance to Aurangzeb would have collapsed.
As far as the Rana’s involvement is concerned it was not because of any opposition to
Aurangzeb’s orthodoxy but that the Rana had certain vested interests that he hoped to fulfill
through intervention. He viewed the disputed succession in Marwar as an opportunity for
reasserting the importance of Mewar in Rajput affairs and to establish itself as the premier
state of Rajastan. He may have also hoped to gain some territories.

As an increasing number of Mughal forces came to be stationed in Marwar, the proximity of

Mewar to Jodhpur and the formidable military strength of the Mughals in the vicinity could
have created uneasiness in Rana Raj Singh’s mind. The Emperor’s decision to personally
direct the operations against Marwar from Ajmer created further apprehension in the Mewar
state. Aurangzeb struck the first blow and in November 1678 and advanced upon Mewar. The
Rana abandoned the plains and even his capital and was bottled up by Aurangzeb in the hills.
With the outbreak of the Mewar war, Marwar became a secondary sector for the Mughals
though sporadic Rathore resistance continued. This was the situation when Rana Raj Singh
passed away in September 1680. Aurangzeb now formed a plan of bringing Mewar to its
knees, but the new Rana, Jai Singh proposed to the Mughals to come to terms. Thus the war
with Mewar lasted till 1681. By now both parties desired peace as the Rajputs were tired of
war, and the Emperor because matters had taken a serious turn in the south and required his
urgent presence there. As a result, the Treaty of Rajsamudra was signed, according to which
Jai Singh was acknowledged as the Rana of Mewar and given a mansab of 5000. In return, the
Rana was forced to cede the parganas of Mandal & Bidnur in lieu of Jaziya, and to promise
not to support the Rathores. The treaty proved to be the basis of a lasting peace between the
Rajputs of Mewar and the Mughals. These cordial relations continued under Jai Singh’s
successor Rana Amar Singh, who ruled from 1698-1707.

The problems between the Mughals and Marwar continued and a number of secret Rajput
emissaries entreated Prince Akbar, who had been left in charge of this campaign in 1680 to
rebel against his father and seize the throne with Rajput support. It was these attempts and
their subsequent results that suddenly converted what had been merely an awkward rebellion
by the Rathores to a full-blown imperial crisis. However, during the period 1681-1707, the
war continued to be waged intermittently and with varying degrees of intensity. After the
failure of Prince Akbar’s rebellion, most of the Rathores returned to Marwar and decided to
accept imperial rule and attempted to obtain positions in the Mughal administration of the
state. The effect of the breach with Marwar and Mewar on the Mughal Empire should not be
overestimated. The scale of the Mughal military operations in the area after the treaty with the
Rana in 1681 was too small to affect the Mughal operations elsewhere, or to constitute a
serious drain. However, the inability to settle the issues concerning these states affected the
prestige of the empire and increased the area of lawlessness. Above all, it created doubts
about the political sagacity of Aurangzeb as well as his hard line attitude in his dealings with
non-Muslims. This helped to swell the tide of political disaffection and religious discord in
the country, and was also reflected in the efforts of various royal princes to intrigue with the

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Rajput rajas, and to form their own groups and factions. Nonetheless, Aurangzeb's breach
with Marwar and Mewar does not signify his breach with the Rajputs as such. The rebellion
had only involved the Rathores and Sisodias. The other clans had not only remained aloof, but
had also served under the Mughals.

Thus, to conclude, the Mughal-Rajput relations during the reign of Aurangzeb focus
specifically on the rebellions of the rulers of Mewar and Marwar and in general with the other
ruling houses of the Rajputana. It is quite obvious that despite the rebellions by the Sisodias
and the Rathores, the Mughal relations with the other Rajputs were hardly affected.

NATURE OF DECCAN POLITICS AND ITS

IMPACT ON 17th CENTURY MUGHAL
IMPERIAL POLICY
The nature of politics in the Deccan region forms an integral part of the history of the Mughal
Empire, and highlights the major difficulties as well as successes in the Mughal campaigns
towards the south. Beni Prashad looked at the issue as the result of 2000 years worth of
history, and focused on North-South relations mostly. He also stated that the Mughal policy
towards the Deccan began to take shape after the quelling of the Uzbek rebellions in the
North, giving the Emperors a chance to expand the Empire southwards.

The situation in the Deccan since the Bahmani kingdom collapsed saw the rise of three new
and powerful states in the region, that of the Nizam Shahi dynasty (Ahmednagar), the Adil
Shahi dynasty (Bijapur) and the Qutub Shahi dynasty (Golconda). These sultanates were in
constant conflict with each other, but united in the face of a common enemy, evident in their
defeat of the Vijaynagara empire at Talikota in 1565. However, they were largely unlikely to
come together for a cause.

Another important group that emerges in the Deccan are the Marathas. The Marathas began to
achieve prominence in the Deccan in the 16 th and 17th centuries, and played an important part
in the policy and army of the three Deccani sultanates. By the 1670s, however, they emerged
as an independent force, able to hold their own against the Mughal Empire.

The Deccan policy of the Mughals began with Emperor Akbar, who sent diplomatic missions
to the region from 1591 onwards asking the states to accept nominal sovereignty of the
Mughal state, which they refused. The failure of Akbar’s diplomatic offensive postulated a
more active intervention in the Deccan. His aim was to assert Mughal suzerainty over the area
and, if possible, conquer the state of Ahmednagar.

In 1595, Ahmednagar faced a political crisis of succession after the death of the incumbent
Nizam Shahi ruler, prompting the intervention of the Mughals as well as Bijapur. Through

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Chand Bibi, the sister of the deceased ruler and the widow of the Bijapur ruler, the Adil
Shahis manipulated political affairs in Ahmednagar. However, noticing this state of
weakness, Akbar launched an offensive upon Bijapur under the leadership of Abdul Rahim
Khan-i-Khanan. Abu’l Fazl justifies the attack as necessary to bring all of Hindustan under
the benevolent leadership of Akbar.

Despite strong resistance from Ahmednagar, they were defeated and the Treaty of 1596 was
signed whereby Mughal suzerainty was accepted, Berar was ceded and an infant king was
placed on the throne of Ahmednagar under the regency of Chand Bibi. However, this treaty
could not contain the unresolved issues between both sides, and it was clear that no one would
be satisfied with the agreement.

In 1597, the combined armies of the Deccani sultanates attacked the Mughal army, but were
comprehensively defeated and the Mughals sieged Ahmednagar. Subsequently, the Treaty of
1600 was signed, through which Ahmednagar fort and its surrounding areas were surrendered
to the Mughals. Once again, however, tensions were still high. Abdul Rahim Khan-i-Khanan
went into negotiations with Malik Ambar, the Prime Minister of Ahmednagar state, in order
to reach a solution. After back-to-back defeats at the hands of the Mughal forces, Malik
Ambar agreed to a compromise, and the terms of the previous treaty signed were reinforced.

At the death of Akbar in 1605, the Mughal position in the Deccan looked unclear, and
Jahangir’s accession saw the reassertion of the Mughal objectives as envisaged in the Treaty
of 1600. In this period, Malik Ambar rose to prominence as well. His ability to keep the
Ahmednagar state together despite being on the brink of collapse has led many historians to
take notice. Under him, a united Deccan front once again sought to break free from the
Mughals, and led to a number of setbacks for the Mughals. Notable, this was the period in
which a number of Marathas began to be inducted by Malik Amber, who were instrumental in
his recapturing of most lost territories from the Mughals in 1611.

With the Mughal position weak in the Deccan, the Emperor sought a policy decision. Khan-i-
Khanan, the former governor of the region, wanted to attack and defeat Bijapur and then to
annex Ahmednagar. Mirza Aziz Koka, however, felt that Bijapuri help should be sought to
defeat Ahmednagar. Numerous Marathas also came over to his side, and in the combined
Deccan attack in 1616-17, they assisted in bring about their defeat.

Jahangir’s position was strong at this point, but unique in that he did not seek to enlarge the
conquests made by Akbar after his victories over the combined Deccan powers. He was still
hopeful that his moderation would enable the Deccani states to settle down and live in peace
with the Mughals. His negotiations were conducted by Prince Khurram, who in this time was
given the title, ‘Shah Jahan’.

By 1621-22, another treaty was signed by Jahangir after another Malik Ambar led force
failed. The Deccani states were forced to pay a huge indemnity, and according to Satish
Chandra, old rivalries came to the fore. At this point both Bijapur and Ahmednagar sought a
Mughal alliance, looking to gain support from a powerful partner in order to defeat the other.
Finally, the Mughals entered into alliance with Bijapur as they felt that for the stabilization of
the situation in the Deccan it was necessary to isolate Malik Ambar.

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Shah Jahan’s ascension to the throne, however, marked a new phase in Deccan politics that
marked a departure from the policies of Akbar and Jahangir. He wanted to annex
Ahmednagar directly. He attempted to recover lost territories from the Nizam Shahis but the
leader of his force, Khan-i-Jahan Lodhi failed to do so, after which he defected to the court of
Murtaza II of Ahmednagar. Shah Jahan, hence, came to the conclusion that there would be no
peace in the Deccan unless Ahmednagar was annexed.

His alliance with Bijapur with the intention of partitioning Ahmednagar between them led
factions to arise in the Bijapur court, with heated debate as to whether to ally with the
Mughals or Ahmednagar, the latter supported by leaders such as Murari Pandit and Khawas
Khan The Mughal offer was initially accepted, but over time Bijapur got suspicious.

Meanwhile, Fateh Khan, son of Malik Ambar, entered into secret negotiations with the
Mughals leading to the murder of the Nizam Shahi ruler and the placement of a puppet on the
throne. He also read the Khutbah and issued coins in the name of Shah Jahan. In return, Fateh
Khan was inducted as a mansabdar and the jagir of Poona, previously allotted to Shahji
Bhonsle, was transferred to him, leading to Shahji’s defection from the Mughal side.

Shah Jahan’s early phase of Deccan relations managed to fulfill its initial aims but in doing so
also made an enemy of out Shahji Bhonsle, who allied with the local Nizam Shahi nobles.
Mahabat Khan, who was left in charge of Ahmednagar after Shah Jahan’s departure, faced
some difficulties from them as well as Bijapur. Eventually, Bijapur and Shahji Bhonsle
recaptured Ahmednagar’s fort, before Mahabat Khan defeated them.

With the return of Shah Jahan to the Deccan, his aim became to subjugate Ahmednagar
permanently and deal with Bijapur. He launched a three-pronged attack on the Deccani
sultanates, but offered Bijapur the chance to revive the earlier accord by which they could
divide up Ahmednagar. Despite opposition form the anti-Mughal faction at court, Bijapur
agreed, leading to the Treaty of 1636.

The Treaty of 1636 was an important document, also known as the Inquiyadnama or
Document of Submission. This document formalized the end of Ahmednagar as an
independent state, and led to the subordination of Golconda and Bijapur in two separate
treaties, where each had to pay much indemnity, cede territories to the Mughals, and take
advice from the Mughal viceroy in the Deccan in case of any conflict between the states. It is
clear that the Treaty of 1636 changed the equation of Mughal – Deccan relations. Earlier, the
strategy of the Mughals was to ally with Bijapur, as it was the most powerful state in the
Deccan. With the disintegration of Ahmednagar, the way was paved for the Mughal conquest
of Bijapur. However, subsequent events showed that the Treaty of 1636 proved more
advantageous to the Deccan states than to the Mughals.

After the disintegration of the Nizam Shahi state, the remaining Deccani sultanates expanded
southwards into the fertile Krishna tract. At this point, powerful new figures emerged in both
courts – Mir Jumla in the Golconda court, and Shahji Bhonsle, who had been promoted for
his contribution to the Bijapur court. Upon hearing this, the Mughals brought into their
employ both Mir Jumla and Shahji Bhonsle, and their benevolent attitude towards the Deccan
states changed rapidly, leading to the invasions of Bijapur and Golconda in 1656-57.

Final Mughal India Revision 11

With Aurangzeb as Governor of the Deccan, the Mughal states modus operandi was to annex
both Golconda and Bijapur, and by the Treaty of 1657, any territorial gains made by
Golconda and Bijapur in the Treaty of 1636 would be ceded to the Mughals. By Shah Jahan’s
deposition in 1658, there was great uncertainty in the Deccan region, as both sultanates were
alienated and alarmed, and the Treaty of 1636 was effectively dead and buried.

Aurangzeb’s reign, according to Satish Chandra saw three major phases of Deccan related
policies. The first, from 1658 – 68, had a goal to attempt to recover the Ahmednagar
territories from Bijapur. The second, till 1684, saw the shift in energies towards the Marathas,
and Aurangzeb pressurizing Bijapur and Golconda to unite in an effort to defeat Shivaji and
Sambhaji. The final phase, beginning in 1684, saw Aurangzeb realize that in order to destroy
the Marathas, it was first necessary to conquer Golconda and Bijapur.

Aurangzeb, in his first phase, appointed Jai Singh as the Governor of the Deccan, who
adopted a policy of divide and rule, looking to ally with the Marathas against the Deccan
kingdoms before looking to defeat them. Therefore, after Shivaji was defeated in 1665 by the
Mughals, the Treaty of Purandar was signed, whereby he had to surrender 23 our of the 35
forts he captured, in return for some Nizam Shahi territory. However, this alliance did not
materialize after Aurangzeb’s nobles resisted it. By this time, at the insistence of Jai Singh,
Aurangzeb launched a campaign against Bijapur. However, due to the strong guerilla tactics
employed by the Deccan states, the Mughals from this campaign gained nothing. There was
evidence at the time of Aurangzeb’s desire to limit Mughal advance in the Deccan. Thus in
1668, when Aurangzeb succeeded in obtaining Sholapur, the last Nizam Shahi outpost in
Bijapur, it marked the end of the first phase of Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy.

The death of Ali Adil Shah, the accession of Sikandar Adil Shah, a minor, the court intrigues
in Bijapur and the appointment of Bahadur Khan as the Governor of the Deccan marked the
beginning of the second phase of Aurangzeb’s policy in the Deccan. In the beginning,
Bahadur Khan adopted a cautious and conciliatory policy and started by winning over
Bijapuri nobles. He entered into negotiations with Khawas Khan, the leader of the Deccani
Party and suggested a Mughal-Bijapuri alliance against Shivaji. In return, the Mughals
promised to help Khawas Khan pay off the rebellious Afghan soldiers. But before it could
materialize, Bahlol Khan, the leader of the Afghan Party, overthrew him. This was the
immediate background to Bahadur Khan’s invasion of Bijapur in 1676.

A new factor during this phase was the rise of Madanna and Akhanna in Golconda. The
Brahmin ministers followed a policy of trying to establish a tripartite alliance between
Golconda, Bijapur and Shivaji. In 1676, Madanna negotiated a subsidiary treaty with Shivaji,
promising an annual sum of one-lakh huns for the defence of Golconda. Simultaneously, at
the instance of Akhanna, Shivaji concluded a treaty with Bijapur of three lakh rupees as a
contribution and one lakh huns annually as a subsidy in order to protect Bijapur. This was
followed by Golconda’s support to Shivaji in his Karnataka campaign. However this policy
was periodically disturbed.

The Mughals opened hostilities in 1676 by invading Bijapur and Bahadur Khan succeeded in
acquiring Gulbarga and Naldurg. However Aurangzeb was dissatisfied with these limited
successes and replaced Bahadur Khan with Diler Khan in the Deccan. Diler Khan reversed
Bahadur Khan’s policy of allying with the Deccani party at Bijapur against the Afghans. He

Final Mughal India Revision 12

listened to Bahlol Khan’s plea for a joint expedition against Golconda and then jointly
crushing Shivaji. The invasion of 1677 failed and only furthered the policy of Madanna and
Akhanna in building up a united front of the Deccani powers against the Mughals.

In 1679, Diler Khan made an all out bid to capture Bijapur. Thanks to the timely and effective
Maratha intervention, he failed abjectly. On a whole the Mughal record in the Deccan
between 1660-1680, was pretty dismal. The arrival of Aurangzeb in the Deccan in 1680 in
pursuit of Prince Akbar did not lead to any immediate change in the Mughal position in the
Deccani states. Aurangzeb concentrated on the Marathas and tried to pressurize the Deccani
states in giving assistance to the Mughals against them. The above developments formed the
base for the third phase.

By 1684, Aurangzeb felt that he could not achieve his objective without undertaking the
outright annexation of one or both of the Deccani states. This marked the third phase of
Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy. Till this time, Aurangzeb had resisted the idea of a rapid
extension of the Mughal dominions in the Deccan since he was apprehensive that it would
have adverse consequences and imply sustained and prolonged campaigning in the Deccan.

During 1682-83, the Mughals ravaged Bijapur territory and tried to capture Bijapur itself but
failed. In 1684, Aurangzeb put forward the following demands before Adil Shah – to supply
provisions to the imperial army, allow the Mughal armies free passage through Bijapur and
supply a contingent for the war against the Marathas. He also demanded that Sharza Khan, the
leading Bijapuri noble be expelled. An open rupture was now inevitable and the Adil Shah
appealed for help to Golconda and Sambhaji. The combined forces of the Deccani states
could not withstand the full strength of the Mughal army and such a situation further widened
the gap between the Mughals and Bijapur. After 18 months of siege, Bijapur finally fell in
1686 and was made a part of the Mughal Empire.

A campaign against Golconda was inevitable following the downfall of Bijapur. Aurangzeb
wasn’t happy over the developments in Golconda. Qutub Shah had given supreme power to
the infidels Madanna and Akhanna and helped Shivaji on many occasions. He had been
financially helping Sambhaji and sent 40000 men to aid Bijapur, despite Aurangzeb’s
warning. In 1686, he ordered Prince Muazzam to raid Golconda and after the fall of Bijapur,
Aurangzeb decided to settle scores with the Qutub Shah once in for all. The siege opened
early in 1687 and after more than six months of campaigning the Golconda fort fell. Qutub
Shah was imprisoned and the Mughal Empire annexed Golconda.

It became clear that Aurangzeb’s decision of the annexation of Bijapur and Golconda had
created more difficulties than it had solved. He was now able to concentrate all his forces
against the Marathas and put them on the defensive. He virtually sealed off the routes so that
the Marathas couldn’t help Bijapur and Golconda. Sambhaji’s preoccupation with internal
enemies also aided Aurangzeb. In 1689, Sambhaji was attacked and executed as a rebel. This
was a major political mistake on the part of Aurangzeb as he not only threw away a chance at
compromise but also provided the Marathas a cause.

At the moment, Aurangzeb was at the height of his power having triumphed over all his
enemies with a large part of the Deccan came under his control. Convinced that the Maratha
power had been crushed, after 1690 Aurangzeb concentrated on annexing the extensive

Final Mughal India Revision 13

Karnataka tract and to settle the administration of the two conquered kingdoms. He
encountered the problem of consolidating his position, controlling local elements and
organizing revenue. Since the Maratha Movement was not cohesive, Aurangzeb temporarily
subdued the Marathas. Soon Maratha power began to revive with multiple centers of Maratha
resistance that led to a series of Mughal reverses.

Aurangzeb’s decision regarding the outright annexation of Bijapur and Golconda led to
serious questioning in the minds of observers and nobles about the sagacity and wisdom of
Aurangzeb as a ruler. A more important reason for Aurangzeb’s failure to consolidate his
position in the Deccan was his inability to comprehend the nature of the Maratha movement.
For Aurangzeb, Shivaji was an upstart and he undermined the infant Maratha state created by
Shivaji. This was demonstrated by the treatment meted out by him to Sambhaji and the
rejection of Raja Ram’s offer to open negotiations with the Mughals. He hesitated in 1700 to
come to terms with Tara Bai, the widow of Raja Ram and with Shahu in 1703. It seems that
Aurangzeb was still confident of his ability to crush the Marathas. This attitude may also
explain his decision, to undertake personal campaigns to try to beat the Marathas by
conquering all their important forts. However by 1706, he was convinced of the futility of his
effort to capture all the Maratha forts and retreated to Aurangabad shortly before his death in
1707.

Aurangzeb’s excessive reliance on military might and his inability to comprehend the nature
of the Maratha and other movements which had a popular base were in part due to his failure
to understand the complex Indian social reality which provided a basis for such movements.
This contributed to a crisis that had been developing and which along with fratricidal wars;
factionalism in the nobility and the Mughal state becoming too vast led to the decline of the
Empire shortly after Aurangzeb’s death.

Therefore it is seen that the evolution of the Mughal policy towards the Deccan was
determined by the needs of the contemporary situation rather than by the mere personal
desires of the rulers. Different factors – social, economic, administrative and political, guided
their attitude towards the Deccan state. Their occasional failure in the Deccan was not only
because of their lack of understanding the Deccan problem but the factional fighting of the
Mughal nobles as well as their questionable loyalty was equally responsible for the debacle in
the Deccan affairs.

Final Mughal India Revision 14

 BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF THE
MARATHA MOVEMENT IN THE 17th
CENTURY
The Marathas dominated Deccan politics in the 17 th and 18th centuries, and rose to
prominence on the heels of the Mughal presence in the Deccan. Though it is difficult to typify
the Marathas into a coherent movement, the setting up of an independent Maratha state in
1674 and the rise of Shivaji led to many setbacks for the Mughals who were making inroads
into the Deccan territory. However, the background to the Maratha movement is not entirely
clear, as it is steeped in the background of the Marathas themselves, whose origins are
difficult to pin point. Sabhasad, the sole contemporary source of the time, suggests that the
Marathas were those who occupied the region of Maval or Ghatmal, and made a clear
distinction between them and the Brahmins. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to understand the
background to the Maratha movement and the causes for its rise.

Traditional historians such as Jadunath Sarkar emphasize the role of Shivaji in the emergence
of the Maratha movement. These historians feel that it was Shivaji and his creation of the
Maratha state in 1674 that led to the actual rise of the Maratha movement. However, this view
has been critiqued by many historians, who feel that though Shivaji was indeed instrumental
in the rise of the Maratha state, one cannot overlook other factors that might have played a
part in the rise of the movement. They feel that placing the rise of an entire movement on one
man would be a gross overstatement, and that other factors must be understood in order to
fully grasp the rise of the movement.

European historian Grant Duff attributed the rise of the Marathas to favourable circumstances
in the Deccan. Duff terms the Marathas as freebooters and plunderers who were driven by the
lure of wealth. It was their cunning nature, plundering activities and the decline of the Deccan
sultanates that led to the emergence of the Marathas. However, Duff gave only a cursory

Final Mughal India Revision 15

review of the period of the rise of Shivaji and thus downplayed continuities with prior
kingdoms in Maharashtra.

Many historians feel that the rise of the Marathas was not a sudden event, but a long drawn
process. It is true that the emergence of the Marathas as an independent state took place under
Shivaji, but one must look at the groundwork laid by the earlier Maratha chiefs such as Shahji
Bhonsle, Shivaji’s father. The political texture of 17 th century Maharashtra and the specific
events of the Deccani sultanates set the stage for the rise of the Marathas and Shivaji, the
founder of the Maratha polity.

The recruitment of Marathas into the administration of the Deccani kingdoms started in the
Yadav period, continued into the Bahmani period and under Bijapur and Ahmednagar, they
were recruited in large numbers in the service of the state. There was constant conflict
amongst the kingdoms that created a need for the use of the Marathas, who knew the terrain
well and were adept at employing guerilla tactics. Maratha families like the Mores, Bhonsles
and Nimalkars all came into prominence and exercised local authority in many areas. Their
position improved as the various kingdoms and the Mughals competed for their support.

Shivaji’s family rose to prominence under Malik Ambar, who granted the Mokasa or revenue
rights of Sholapur and Poona to Shahji Bhonsle in 1622. In 1630, Shahji defected to the side
of the Mughals after the murder of some of his family members as well as his patrons, but this
alliance was short lived after Fateh Khan was given Poona as his jagir by the Mughals.
Subsequently, he defected to Bijapur and emerged as the kingmaker in the Nizam Shahi
dynasty. However, after the treaty of Bijapur with the Mughals in 1636, Shahji had to give up
the areas of Ahmednagar he dominated, and joined Bijapuri service in accordance with an
important clause that he would be posted as far away from the Mughal territories as possible.

The post-1636 period saw the rise of Shivaji as an important political force and this
background is important for understanding the rise of the Marathas and how the Bhonsles
moved from being kingmakers to independent kings. Thus, the Marathas were able to use this
state of affairs to strengthen their position, add lands, and build armies to an extent that
Shivaji was able to consolidate his territory, and establish the Maratha kingdom in 1674.

One of the most popular theories regarding the rise of the Marathas was presented by the
Nationalist historians R.C. Majumdar and D.R. Sardesai, who viewed it as a reaction to the
religious policies of Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb followed a policy that was intolerant and bigoted.
Later day Maratha sources also emphasized a religious angle to the rise of the Marathas. The
only contemporary account, that of Sabhasad, mentions Shivaji as being an incarnation of
Lord Shiva. Such sources are used by Sardesai to affirm that Shivaji adopted the title of
‘haindava-dharmoddaraka’ or redeemer of the Hindu dharma.

However, this view has been critiqued by a number of historians. Firstly, Majumdar and
Sardesai overlooked the socio-political factors and overemphasized Aurangzeb’s bigotry. It is
believed that Aurangzeb wanted to build an alliance with the Marathas but other elements in
his court such as Jahanara and Shaista Khan opposed this. Secondly, according to Satish
Chandra, the nationalist theory lacked historical basis. The early phase of Maratha expansion
occurred during the reign of Shah Jahan and Jahangir, which was a period when the state
followed a policy of religious tolerance. Although Shivaji assumed the title of ‘handava-

Final Mughal India Revision 16

dharmoddaraka’, there is no reason to think he was setting himself up as a champion of the
Hindus, intent to fight the narrow religious policies of Aurangzeb. In fact, the titles adopted
by Shivaji were to gain legitimacy over the Hindus population.

M.G. Ranade presented the rise of the Maratha movement as a result of the rise of a
nationalist movement. He held that in the 17 th century, the Marathas emerged from a political,
social and religious renaissance. They represented an incipient nationalism and Shivaji’s
resistance to the Mughal Empire was that of an emerging nation to foreign domination.
However, this theory was criticized on numerous grounds. Firstly, it would be problematic to
label the Mughals as foreigners, because if the former case holds true, why then did they
accept the rule of the Bijapur and Ahmednagar sultans who were as foreign as the Mughals?
Satish Chandra suggest that this period was marked by the absence of a strong middle class,
which is generally associated with a nationalist movement. Lastly, nationalism is a modern
concept and therefore cannot be applied so easily to the context of the 17 th century. However,
one cannot deny a regional feeling or a sense of brotherhood grew amongst the Marathas.

Satish Chandra tried to trace the rise of the Marathas in terms of social conditions. According
to him, Maratha society was deeply fragmented and the polity was a highly decentralized one.
He spoke of the social base of Shivaji’s supporters, which included several prominent
Maratha chiefs, and their families who were initially associated with the Deccani kingdoms.
Once the decline of the Deccani kingdoms set in, these chiefs rallied around Shivaji, who had
to content with decentralization as well as increased revenue farming by zamindars, thus
establishing links with the peasantry. He destroyed the forts of strong Deshmukh and
Deshpande clans, and was successful in controlling the bigger Deshmukhs.

Sardesai is of the opinion that although Shivaji was opposing the bigger Deshmukhs on the
political front, at the social level he adopted a conciliatory policy facilitated by matrimonial
alliances. Satish Chandra suggests that the acceptance of these alliances pointed to the
growing influence of Shivaji. It was also noteworthy that apart from Brahmin landowners, the
two other major castes in the region were Kumbis and Kolis, who were part of the deprived
sections of society and, like the Marathas who were seeking Kshatriya status, aspired for
higher jatis, resulting in the growth of a cadre for Shivaji.

Andre Wink suggests that the rise of the Marathas was the result of a fitna or the practice of
forging alliances. He felt that it was the ability of the Marathas to forge favourable alliances at
various stages of the 17th century that provided an impetus for their rise.

Some historians considered the Bhakti movement an ideological basis for the Maratha
movement. It shunned the caste system and emphasized the equality of all men before God.
There was a rise in the popularity of Bhakti saints such as Tukaram, Dyaneshwar, Namdev
and Gyandas, who promoted the use of the vernacular leading to the development of
vernacular literature and cultural homogeneity. This fostered a sense of unity amont the
Marathas.

Finally, M. Athar Ali and Irfan Habib looked upon the movement as a peasant movement
stirred by an agrarian crisis in the 17 th century. There was a great famine in 1630 that forced a
large section of the peasantry to migrate to other areas with some of them joining Shivaji in
the prospect of wealth and an improvement in social status. Habib suggests that an

Final Mughal India Revision 17

abandonment of cultivation led to the rise of the Marathas as a fall out of the inherent
contradictions of the agrarian system.

The advent of the Marathas in the 17 th century was not a mono causal event. It cannot be
dismissed as a result of chance circumstances or attributed to a single figure of Shivaji. It is
true that Shivaji gave the Maratha state a concrete shape but the rise was dictated by a number
of factors that played specific roles in strengthening the movement.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NATURE OF THE

MARATHA STATE
The Marathas emerged as a fierce and potent force and remained the most prominent political
and military force in India from the decline of the Mughals till their eventual defeat at the
hands of the British. However, there has been considerable debate as to the exact nature of the
movement, focusing on whether it was an organized movement or merely a robber state, and
whether it was composed of peasants or the landed elites. A number of historians have
presented their viewpoints on the nature of the Maratha movement.

Colonial writers like Vincent Smith felt that the Marathas never had an organized state. The
chief ambition of the Maratha chieftains was to gather as much plunder as possible. Thus
Smith characterized the Maratha state as a robber state. Jadunath Sarkar called it a war state
and said that it was an artificial unity of people attracted by plunder.

The Aligarh School historians such as Athar Ali and Irfan Habib put forward the view that
there was no fully-fledged Maratha state and that the Marathas were freebooters, adventurers
and plunderers, an assertion also made by European historian Grant Duff. According to Athar
Ali, the Marathas were primarily landed elements or zamindars rather than rulers and
remained so despite the formal coronation of Shivaji. In Irfan Habib’s view, the Maratha
movement was an armed resistance against the broader context of agrarian rebellions facing
the Mughal state in the 17th century. The Marathas represented the zamindari element of these
rebellions and therefore Shivaji did not develop an evolved administration.

Ali and Habib who studied the Mughal state structure looked for this model in the
organization of the Maratha state as Maratha history was seen as an offshoot of Mughal
history. The absence of all Mughal institutions such as the mansabdari and jagirdari system,

Final Mughal India Revision 18

law, coinage, land revenue system and well developed checks and balances led them to look
upon the Marathas as mere plunderers. They therefore said that there was no state under the
Marathas denied them an administration and state structure. However one cannot deny that
Shivaji did have a territorial base and a state structure.

Andre Wink critiques the above view and points out that there was some sort of authority and
state structure. He said that there was a notion of swarajya or self rule in the Maratha state as
opposed to parajya or no rule. According to Wink, swaraj was a fluid term, as the Maratha
state didn’t have a fixed territorial boundary. In some areas, swaraj implied full political and
territorial control while in other areas it meant the exercise of zamindari claims. In this regard
he brought in his theory of fitna, which the Marathas indigenized to a Maratha term fitwa. He
said that fitna which meant the forging of alliances, played an important role in the emergence
of the Maratha state. The Maratha notion of fitna can also be found in Kautilya’s
Arthashastra, which while referring to different forms of political domination talks of sva-
visaya or ruler’s own dominion and par-visaya or the enemy’s dominion. The Arthashastra
said that a ruler who exercised self rule could exercise his authority over the enemy’s
dominion through dana or gift giving, sama or conciliation, bhed or sedition and dand or
force. Wink says that these were the four means by which a state could extend authority and
thus the Marathas did so through alliances or fitna wherein they got people to accept their
sovereignty without conquest. Wink held that sovereignty was not always a result of
administrative, political and territorial control but a result of alliances.
The Marathas established their own sovereignty or swaraj, but they did so without denying
the legitimacy of the Mughal universal domain and not shedding the claim of zamindar.

Thus, fitna came to be coincident with processes of social mobility and ‘gentrification’ for a
variety of groups. While the role of alliances in the rise of Marathas needs to be
acknowledged, it needs to be qualified by the fact that given the fluidity of Deccan politics,
the alliances forged were never stable. In the case of Marathas one sees a bifurcation of
sovereignty into two forms, in terms of – 1) absolute authority over certain territories 2)
nominal authority over regions where tribute was extracted and the Marathas were accepted
as sardeshmukh or zamindar figures. Therefore this was the manner of state formation under
the Marathas along with sedition and military force to expand power. Thus Wink’s argument
was seen to be valuable a critique of Irfan Habib and Athar Ali’s views.

Historians have not been able to come to a compromise regarding the nature of the Maratha
movement. However, it is certain that whether this movement was organized or not, it
definitely left an impression on the Mughal state, and its system of administration was
appreciated even by the British colonial rulers who displaced them a century later.

Final Mughal India Revision 19

 NATURE OF ZAMINDARI RIGHTS IN
MUGHAL INDIA
In the study of agrarian relations in Mughal India, economic historians look to understand not
only the practices of revenue collection and taxes imposed on the peasantry, but also the role
of landed intermediaries in the process of extraction. The question of Zamindars and
Zamindari rights has been host to much debate amongst historians, specifically as to who they
were and what exactly the nature of their land rights was. It is also important to analyze the
relationship shared by these landed elements and the imperial administration, thereby giving a
better picture of the state of the agrarian settlement in Mughal India.

Irfan Habib conducted a detailed study on Zamindars in the Mughal period, and wrote that
while in the 14th century the word was used for a chief of a territory or landed intermediary, in
the Mughal period the official use during Akbar’s reign was for any person with hereditary
claims to a direct share in produce. It was a term interchangeable with a number of other
titles, including maliki/malikiyat (Arabic for ownership), due to their having rights over a
share of produce.

W.H. Moreland and P. Saran, in their study of Mughal revenue systems, did not attach much
importance to zamindars and labeled them vassal chiefs who accepted Mughal rule. However,
this view was critiqued by historians such as Irfan Habib and S. Nurul Hasan, who argued that
zamindars couldn’t have been vassal chiefs as they were found in villages and even in areas
directly under Mughal control. They said that zamindars were even found in khalisa and
paibaqi lands as well, thus refuting Moreland’s claim.

Final Mughal India Revision 20

In terms of land rights, Irfan Habib notes that zamindari rights were derived from fiscal
claims, which survived from the pre-Mughal period. He says they existed primarily in the
form of certain levies, which the zamindars imposed on the peasants over and above the land
revenue assessment. These were hereditary claims. These claims were originally distinct from
land revenue, but over a period of time, with the assignment of revenue collection rights to
the Zamindar, this distinction blurred. Very often this would lead to the Zamindar being
responsible for revenue collection by the state, causing him to extract the state demand as
well as the demand on his own land from the peasants. In certain other areas, the Zamindar
would handle revenue collection in exchange for an allowance (nakar) paid to him by the
state.

Habib identified three types of zamindars, as they were by no means a homogenous class.
These were the semi-autonomous, the intermediary and the primary or village level
zamindars. These categories, however, were not exclusive, and there was much mobility
between them. The first category consisted of hereditary rulers of territories who had titles
such as Rana or Rawat, and commanded vast powers as well as military and fiscal resources
and thus proving to be a threat to the Mughal state. B.R. Grover suggests that these zamindars
were usually the dominant group in a tribe or clan that over time established regional socio-
economic and political territorialism. Thus, they could be tribal chiefs who slowly became
territorial chiefs e.g. The Rajput ruling clans.

In Akbar’s period, the state realized the importance of controlling these chiefs, and divided
them into two categories – the zamindar-i-zortalab (recalcitrant chiefs) and the zamindar-i-
rayati (loyal chiefs). Akbar evolved an administrative policy to control them by entering into
alliances, offering them administrative positions and granting them local autonomy over their
untransferable watan jagir. In return, the chiefs had to fulfill certain conditions, some having
to pay peshkash (tribute) to the Mughal ruler, while others having to perform military service
for the Mughal state and aid in revenue collection. Some were granted mansabs, while others
only accepted Mughal suzerainty and had no obligations to the state.
The Mughals also retained certain powers such as the right to decide succession in disputed
cases in these regions, as well as imposing imperial rules regarding trade, peasantry, etc. on
the zamindars. In this way, the state sought to control the zamindars.

The second category, or the intermediary zamindars, did not proclaim proprietary rights like
the aforementioned category. They only received a share in the produce known as malikara.
They collected revenue from primary zamindars and passed it on to the semi-autonomous
zamindars. They were granted malikana or a hereditary right to a share of the produce, usually
1/10th of the total produce, and also retained military contingents and forts, usually aspiring to
become semi-autonomous.

The final category was that of the primary zamindars or the khudkhasht (subsistence)
zamindars. Their rights were historically created over time by virtue of them being the
original colonizers of the land or long-term occupiers. They retained the hereditary right to
malikiyat, which implied a share in revenue but not proprietary rights. B. R. Grover argued
that malikiyat differed from region to region, and depended not only on the productivity of
the land but local custom as well.

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Grover also pointed out that there was another category of zamindar at the primary level
which comprised of zamindars created by the state. As land was abundant in Mughal times,
the state granted rights to those who agreed to colonize new land, generally giving them
banjar (waste land) or forest land, with initially low revenue rates. These zamindars were also
created in order to oppose recalcitrant landed elements. A common practice of subletting
these lands to peasants also emerged.

Apart form revenue collection, almost all zamindars had to maintain extensive records, law
and order and expand cultivation. They would also provide loans and lend implements to
poorer farmers, and because of this practice they could often exploit and coerce the peasantry.
According to Grover, they also retained rights to transfer, mortgage or sell their rights, a
practice which became common to such an extent that the rates of sale increased
exponentially, outstripping the rate of land revenue as well. This also led to the erosion of the
apparent social homogeneity of the zamindars in the later Mughal period.

In the 17th century there was an emergence of two new kinds of zamindars, i.e. Taluqdars and
Ijaradars. The word taluqdar means holder of a taluq. Taluq means land yet in this period it
denoted zamindari rights. The nature of these zamindari rights too varied from region to
region. 18th century documents such as Yasir’s dictionary define taluqdar as a revenue farmer
or a zamindar or both. There are also clear references to Taluqdari rights from Bengal and
Awadh from the 18th century on. From these references, taluqdars of two categories can be
seen - those who paid revenue to the zamindar and those who paid revenue directly to the
State.

The first category seems to predominate and thus it seems the position of the taluqdars was
inferior to that of zamindars as in this case Taluqdari rights were purchased from the
zamindar who sold part of his zamindari rights over a part of his land. This was also because
the taluqdar was not usually in direct dealing with the state, but dealt with a zamindar who
was his superior.

This superior zamindar was the interface with the state and collected revenue from his own
zamindari and from the taluqdar, who in turn collected revenue from cultivators. Thus the
taluqdar was a sort of petty zamindar who was entitled to a malikana for collecting revenue
and could sell and purchase taluqdari rights. This type of taluqdar was seen in Bengal.

In the second case seen in some regions of north India such as Allahabad and Awadh,
taluqdars were in direct relation with the State, which endowed taluqdari rights on them and
thus were in a better position. They collected revenue from their own taluq and revenue from
other zamindars in the region. This was because of the hereditary nature of zamindari rights
which led to a decrease zamindar’s holdings, thus in these regions the State preferred to deal
with the taluqdar, who in this case collected revenue from the petty zamindars. In north India
thus the zamindars were entitled to malikana and the taluqdars to nankar (allowance), unlike
in the first case.

The Ijaradars emerged due to the growing practice of auctioning off of revenue rights or
revenue farming. The Mughal State didn’t look upon this practice favourably, yet by the 17-
18th century it became prevalent. This practice first developed in the jagir land and was seen
in khalisa lands. However the earliest instance of ijara was from Mohammad Bin Tughlaq’s

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time, when the state gave ijara for increasing the area of land under cultivation, and later for
the purpose of revenue collection. The people required for negotiating revenue collection
under the ijara system were the bidder and the guarantor. Ijara was given to local zamindars,
as outsiders who had no local links find it very hard to carry out revenue collection.

N.A. Sadiqui critiques this and says ijaradars comprised of non local landlords as well as
absentee landlords too. Yet he is only referring to 18 th century Bengal, thus his view is
tenuous. According to Irfan Habib 75% of ijaradars were locals and 25% from neighbouring
villages.

The local bankers or mahajans and merchants acted as guarantors and not bidders usually. Yet
this changed by the late 17th century, when bankers and merchants began to bid themselves.
Ijaradars had to provide certain documents at the time of bid, such as a surety of the banker or
another petty zamindar. Even if the zamindar was prominent he needed a guarantor. The
guarantor was also assured a share in the revenue. In a situation where the crop failed the
ijaradar could make an appeal to the State for help.

Regarding the duties of the ijaradar the amount of revenue to be collected by him was set by
State officials and he couldn’t extract more or less. Thus he didn’t have the right to collect the
malikana or the nankar. He also had to maintain revenue records, expand land under
cultivation and sometimes maintain a military contingent.

The impact of the ijara system was that initially ijara rights were meant to be given for a short
term basis, but gradually they began to be given for long terms. By the 18 th century Ijaradars
were also given faujadari rights. These changes resulted in the erosion of Mughal authority,
the emergence of a new zamindar class which eliminated the old zamindars and led to greater
exploitation of the peasantry. Yet exploitation of the peasantry depended on the strength of
the village community. However, with increased exploitation peasants always had the option
of migrating.

Ijara led to the growth of a limited money economy, yet money was not invested and nor was
any new technology introduced. Despite the existence of money and potential for growth,
investments in land were not to improve production but for social prestige. In conclusion the
practice of Ijara contributed to the breakdown of imperial authority at various levels, just as
the crisis in the jagir system and reaction of the zamindars also contributed to this decline.

Over all the zamindari system which evolved from the time of Akbar, and was marked by the
creation of two new classes of zamindars called ijaradars and taluqdars, which, by
Aurangzeb’s time, was vital to the Mughal State so as to maintain a link with the peasantry
and effectively extract revenue. In terms of the zamindari class as a whole, although they
came to play a major role in revenue collection for the state, often times there were a series of
conflicts, and some historians look at the role of the zamindars in the decline of the Mughal
Empire as being a significant one.

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