SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 202756. April 6, 2016.]

HEIRS OF CORAZON AFABLE SALUD, represented by DEOGRACIAS

A. SALUD, NAPOLA Y. SALUD, JOSEPH Y. SALUD, and JOE VINCENT
Y. SALUD , petitioners, vs. RURAL BANK OF SALINAS, INC. , respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO , J : p

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside: 1) the February 23,
2012 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90854 which reversed
and set aside the November 15, 2007 Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite
City, Branch 16 in Civil Case No. N-7469, and reinstated the RTC's June 8, 2007
Decision; 4 and 2) the CA's July 12, 2012 Resolution 5 denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. 6
Factual Antecedents
Corazon Afable Salud (Corazon) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
with building (the Silver Coin Bldg.) in Marseilla Street, Rosario, Cavite (the subject
property), covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RT-19394 (TCT RT-19394). 7 On
May 30, 1998 or at the age of 80, she passed away leaving behind as her heirs her two
adopted children, petitioner Deogracias A. Salud (Deogracias) and Carmencita Salud
Condol (Carmencita). Deogracias is married to Napola Y. Salud (Napola); Joseph Y.
Salud (Joseph) and Joe Vincent Y. Salud (Vincent) are their children.
On January 8, 2004, Deogracias, Napola, Joseph and Vincent instituted Civil Case
No. N-7469 against respondent Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. (RBSI), Carmencita, the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Of cio Sheriff of the RTC-Cavite City, and the Cavite Register of Deeds.
In their Complaint 8 for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Mortgage, Special Power of
Attorney, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Certi cate of Sale and Damages, with injunctive
relief, they essentially claimed that in 2000, Deogracias and Napola learned that
Carmencita obtained a P2 million loan from RBSI secured by three Deeds of Mortgage 9
over the subject property executed by Carmencita on August 20, October 8 and
October 31, 1996; that RBSI granted the loan on the basis of a pro forma bank Special
Power of Attorney 10 (August 20 SPA) purportedly executed and signed by Corazon on
August 20, 1996, speci cally authorizing Carmencita to utilize the subject property as
security for any loan/s obtained by the latter from RBSI; that they immediately informed
RBSI President and Manager Teodoro G. Salud (Teodoro) who is their close relative
that Corazon never authorized Carmencita to mortgage the subject property, and that
Corazon's signature on the August 20 SPA was a forgery; that they showed Teodoro
another special power of attorney (SPA) dated August 23, 1996 11 executed by
Corazon which contained her true and genuine signature, and which authorized
Deogracias to 1) speci cally collect the rentals from tenants of the Silver Coin Bldg.
and another building, 2) represent Corazon in any transaction with said tenants and the
utility companies, and 3) execute and sign any paper or document relating to the
tenants and utility companies; that in 1990, the subject property was duly constituted
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 as their family home as inscribed in TCT RT-19394; 12 that for Carmencita's failure to
pay her loan obligation, the subject property was unduly foreclosed upon and sold to
RBSI in 2002; that the foreclosure process was defective in that a) notice of
extrajudicial sale was not given to Corazon, b) the notice of sale was not posted in a
conspicuous place, and c) the certi cate of posting was executed only after the auction
sale; 13 that it is evident from the Promissory Notes 14 executed by Carmencita that the
loan she secured from RBSI is her sole obligation and responsibility, and Corazon did
not obtain any bene t or advantage therefrom; that RBSI is in possession of the
certi cate of title to the subject property, and refused to surrender the same despite
demand; and that the defendants were acting with malice and bad faith in committing
and perpetrating a forgery. Petitioners thus prayed that injunctive relief be issued to
enjoin RBSI from consolidating title; that the mortgage deeds, August 20 SPA, and
foreclosure and sale proceedings be nulli ed and voided; that RBSI be ordered to
surrender TCT RT-19394 to them; and that P1 million as moral damages, P250,000.00
as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorney's fees plus appearance fees,
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses, and costs be awarded to them. AScHCD

In its Answer, RBSI essentially alleged that Carmencita was duly authorized by
Corazon to secure a loan and mortgage the subject property in August 1996; that the
proceeds of the loan was used to repair Corazon's 10-door apartment building in
Makati and to pay for her medical and hospital expenses; and that Corazon's signature
on the questioned August 20 SPA was genuine and true.
On January 8, 2004, or after the ling of the Complaint, a 72-hour Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) was issued enjoining the Cavite Register of Deeds from acting
on RBSI's application for consolidation of ownership and from canceling TCT RT-
19394. The TRO was extended until January 28, 2004.
After Civil Case No. N-7469 was raf ed to Branch 16, the application for
injunctive relief was heard. On January 27, 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved in
the case is whether the signature of Corazon appearing on the August 20 SPA was
genuine, and that the August 20 SPA shall be subjected to examination by a National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) handwriting expert whose nding shall be binding upon
them. 15
On April 29, 2005, the designated NBI Documents Examiner, Jennifer Dominguez
(Dominguez), issued Questioned Document Report No. 231-405 (NBI report) with the
conclusion that the questioned signature of Corazon on the August 20 SPA and her
standard signatures on sample documents submitted for comparison "were not written
by one and the same person." 16 The NBI report was based on 19 sample signatures
submitted by petitioners, but one of the two that were submitted by RBSI was
disregarded by Dominguez. 17
During trial, Deogracias admitted that the signature appearing on one of the
sample documents submitted by RBSI tagged as sample "S-D-2" and also marked as
Exhibit "5-A" for RBSI was affixed by Corazon. 18
Napola testified on the issue of damages and attorney's fees. 19
For the defense, Teodoro testi ed among others that Corazon has been a
borrower of RBSI even prior to 1996; that in 1996, he was approached by Corazon and
Carmencita who indicated their desire to apply for another loan with the subject
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 property as collateral; that Corazon asked him if she can allow Carmencita to be the
borrower so that she would not have to keep going to the bank; that he later informed
Corazon that the RBSI board of directors agreed to approve her loan application; that
one week thereafter or on August 20, 1996, Corazon and Carmencita returned and lled
out a P1 million loan application; that Corazon signed the August 20 SPA in his
presence; that thereafter, he directed the bank's loan supervisor to process the
necessary loan documents and have the same notarized; that later on, Deogracias
approached him on several occasions and signi ed his intention to pay the loan but he
was unable to do so and instead, Deogracias led the instant case; and that RBSI was
compelled to hire legal counsel to prosecute Civil Case No. N-7469. 20
Atty. Gregorio M. Trias (Atty. Trias), the notary public who notarized the August
20 SPA, testi ed that on August 20, 1996, Corazon appeared before him to have the
August 20 SPA notarized although when the said document was brought to him the
same was already signed by Corazon; that he knew Corazon because in the past he
notarized documents signed by her; and that when he notarized the August 20 SPA, he
did not inquire whether the signature thereon was Corazon's nor did he ask whether she
understood what the document meant. 21
Dominguez, the NBI Document Examiner, testi ed and essentially reiterated her
original nding that there exist signi cant differences between Corazon's questioned
signature on the August 20 SPA and the standard sample signatures submitted for
comparison, and that her signature on the August 20 SPA and the sample documents
submitted were not written by one and the same person. 22 At the same time, she also
admitted that the signature on RBSI's "S-D-2" or Exhibit "5-A" and that appearing on the
questioned August 20 SPA could have been written by one and the same person. 23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On June 8, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision, dismissing the complaint, viz.:
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. In the examination of forged documents, the expertise of
questioned documents examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful,
they are indispensable [sic] 24 in examining or comparing handwriting. Hence, a
nding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting
experts. . . .
In the instant case, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails
over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of
the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the
contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of Dominguez
constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. . . . Teodoro Salud, the
witness to the special power of attorney con rmed the genuineness,
authenticity and due execution thereof. Said witness having been physically
present to see the decedent Corazon . . . af x her signature to the questioned
document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of defendants.
xxx xxx xxx
It is emphasized that it was never denied by the plaintiffs that the subject
Special Power of Attorney was in fact notarized by Atty. Gregorio M. Trias, a
Notary Public, and the same was registered in his notarial book. As Atty. Trias
had testi ed, Corazon Salud appeared before him on August 20, 1996, the date
of the special power of attorney . . . .
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 xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint for declaration
of nullity of deeds of mortgage, special power of attorney, extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, certi cate of sale and damages is, as it is hereby, ordered
DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary injunction is likewise DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 which was granted by the RTC in
its November 15, 2007 Order. The trial court held that since the parties agreed to abide
by, and submit the case for decision based on, the NBI ndings, then the resolution of
this case should hinge on the NBI ndings. The RTC recalled that based on the NBI
report, the questioned signature in the August 20 SPA and the standard/sample
signatures of Corazon were not written by one and the same person. As regards
Dominguez's failure to include Exhibit "5" and "S-D-2" in her examination, the RTC
brushed aside the same for being inconsequential.
In addition, the RTC ruled that based on its own examination there were indeed
striking differences in the August 20 SPA signature vis-à-vis Corazon's standard
signatures. Thus, it concluded that Corazon's signature in the August 20 SPA was a
forgery.
Moreover, the RTC ruled as follows:
Since the Court has already found that the SPA is a forged document, it
is useless to further ventilate on the invalidity of the notarization made by Atty.
Trias. It must be stated, nonetheless, that by notarizing this forged document,
Atty. Trias committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court to be misled
by an artifice.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the Court doubts the impartiality of Atty. Trias. When he
notarized the forged SPA, he was working for defendant bank and was holding
of ce at defendant bank's premises for more than ten (10) years . . . His
testimony is therefore tainted with manifest bias and partiality. . . .
AcICHD

While Teodoro maintained that the SPA was signed by Corazon in his
presence, save from this bare allegation, however, there is no iota of proof to
support his claim. It has not been shown that he af xed his signature as
witness to the execution of the SPA and no one among the attesting witnesses
came forward to corroborate his claim. Even Carmencita, who was allegedly
present when the SPA was signed by Corazon, failed to appear to substantiate
Teodoro's claim. The Court notes that Carmencita was impleaded as defendant
in this case, but she neither led her Answer nor came forward to refute
plaintiffs' charges. As it were, Teodoro's testimony should be taken with utmost
circumspection. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
More importantly, the act of requiring Corazon to execute an SPA in favor
of Carmencita for a loan that would be processed and released on the same day
defies reason and common sense. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All told, although the special power of attorney was a public document
having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption was
adequately refuted by competent witnesses and this Court's visual analysis of
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 the documents. Due to its knowledge of the defect of the questioned document
which it did not question, defendant bank could not be considered a mortgagee
in good faith. Though it is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation
on the history of the mortgagor's title, it cannot be excused from the duty of
exercising the due diligence required of a banking institution. Banks are
expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their
dealings, even those that involve registered lands, for their business is affected
with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by plaintiffs, the Decision dated June 8, 2007
is reconsidered and set aside. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In an appeal to the CA, RBSI asserted that the RTC erred in reconsidering its
original Decision; that the trial court disregarded the sample signatures it submitted
(Exhibits "5" and "S-D-2"); that the NBI's Dominguez herself admitted that the
questioned signature and its Exhibits "5" and "S-D-2" could have been written by one and
the same person; and that as a public document and with the testimonies of Teodoro
and Atty. Trias, the August 20 SPA must be presumed to be regular.
On February 23, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision nding merit in the
appeal. It held that the opinions of handwriting experts are merely persuasive and not
conclusive hence not binding on the courts.
Based on its own assessment, the CA found that petitioners failed to overcome
the presumption that Corazon's signature in the August 20 SPA was genuine and not
forged. The CA observed that petitioners submitted 19 sample signatures of Corazon,
denominated as "S-1" through "S-19," while the respondent presented two signatures
tagged as "S-D-1" and "S-D-2." However, Dominguez failed to include in her examination
"S-D-2." The CA observed that the RTC failed to take into account that during her cross-
examination, Dominguez admitted that the signatures appearing on "S-D-2" and the
August 20 SPA could be written by one and the same person. More important, even
Deogracias admitted that the signature on "S-D-2" was Corazon's.
In addition, the CA held that the NBI handwriting expert herself admitted that age
and health conditions could affect one's handwriting. In fact, in her February 21, 1995
letter, Corazon expressed that she had dif culty in writing because she was suffering
from tremors. The CA pointed out that Corazon was 77 years old when she wrote the
letter, or one year before the execution of the questioned August 20 SPA. According to
the CA, slight dissimilarities in handwriting are only natural and not indicative of forgery.
Moreover, the CA declared that the case should not be resolved based solely on
the NBI report. It noted that petitioner's claim of forgery hinged exclusively on the NBI
report whereas RSBI erected its case not only on the sample signatures of Corazon but
also on the testimonies of Teodoro, who testi ed that Corazon signed the August 20
SPA in his presence, and of Atty. Trias who claimed that Corazon and Carmencita
appeared before him when he notarized the documents. As a notarized document, the
August 20 SPA is presumed valid and regular; petitioners failed to submit convincing
proof of its falsity or nullity.
Finally, the appellate court took note of Deogracias's admissions that Corazon
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 had on previous occasion constituted Carmencita as her attorney-in-fact in selling her
property; that Carmencita took care of Corazon during her hospital con nement in late
1996 until her death in 1998; and that Carmencita paid Corazon's hospital bills
amounting to more than P5 million. The CA concluded that based on the foregoing, the
likelihood that Corazon executed the August 20 SPA in favor of Carmencita, is not
remote.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated November 15,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 in Civil Case No. N-
7469 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 8, 2007 of
the same court is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 28
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in its July 12, 2012 Resolution, the CA
stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in this Petition:
22. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the pre-trial
agreement that the petitioners and respondent Bank are bound by the result of
the NBI's document examination.
23. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners as
plaintiffs below failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove that the
signature on the Special Power of Attorney purportedly belonging to Corazon
Afable Salud was forged. Particularly:
a. NBI Document Examiner Jennifer Dominguez was
not categorical in her nding that the subject signature was
forged, all because it was "possible" that an alleged standard
signature of Corazon Afable Salud (Exhibit "5" or Exhibit "S-D-2")
and the subject signature were written by one and the same
person. TAIaHE

b. The NBI Document Examiner did not rule out that

several factors could affect an individual's handwriting.
c. The testimony of respondent Bank's Manager,
Teodoro Salud, that he saw Corazon Afable Salud signing the
Special Power of Attorney is a credible direct evidence of the
authenticity of the subject signature.
d. The Special Power of Attorney is a notarized
document and is therefore presumed regular and genuine.
e. Petitioner Deogracias Salud admitted that Corazon
Afable Salud appointed in the past Carmencita Salud Condol as
her attorney-in-fact and thus it was not improbable that she
appointed her for this particular transaction.
f. Petitioner Deogracias Salud admitted that
Carmencita Salud Condol paid for Corazon Afable Salud's
hospital expenses, the funding for which could not have been but
the proceeds of the transaction involved in this case. 29
Petitioners' Arguments
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 In their Petition and Reply, 30 petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA
dispositions and reinstatement of the RTC's November 15, 2007 Order, arguing that
RBSI is estopped from questioning or rejecting the NBI report since it agreed during the
pre-trial proceedings to abide by the results of the NBI examination; that RBSI is bound
by such stipulation and agreement made during pre-trial which thus constitutes a
judicial admission of the ndings contained in the NBI report. Petitioners also argue
that the NBI report deserves great weight and probative value; that Dominguez's
admission that there is a possibility that Exhibit "5-A" and the August 20 SPA could have
been signed by one and the same person should be disregarded, because the
preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Carmencita forged Corazon's
signature in the August 20 SPA in order to offer the subject property as collateral, thus
insuring that her personal loan application would be approved; that Deogracias's
testimony to the effect that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that Carmencita
forged her signature and mortgaged the subject property for a personal loan, and that
Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off her hospital bills since she had P14
million, and that it was Carmencita who actually paid for the RBSI loans, cannot simply
be ignored.
Petitioners add that it was erroneous for the CA to have considered RBSI's
Exhibit "5-A" or "S-D-2" since Dominguez herself did not utilize the same in her
examination of Corazon's signature as it was already doubtful in the rst place; that
even if Deogracias admitted that the signature (RBSI's Exhibit "5-A") was Corazon's, his
opinion does not count as against that of Dominguez's, which is scienti c and more
credible; that Teodoro's testimony is doubtful; that it made no sense that while
Corazon's property was being mortgaged, she was not named as one of the principal
debtors; that if Teodoro wanted to spare Corazon the trouble of having to come to the
bank since she was then already old, then he should have asked her to execute a SPA
when she and Carmencita rst came to the bank, instead of asking her to return as she
did one week later or on August 20, 1996; and that the presumption of regularity
attached to a notarized document is not absolute, as such document may be shown to
be a forgery instead.
Petitioners further contend that Atty. Trias's testimony is suspect, since he was
negligent in his duties as a notary public in failing to check the veracity of the entries in
the bank documents submitted to him for notarization and in not verifying Corazon's
signature on the August 20 SPA when she appeared before him; that Atty. Trias's
impartiality is questionable considering that he was connected with RBSI and held
of ce at the bank; and that as against the accounts of Teodoro and Atty. Trias,
Dominguez's is more credible as she is a disinterested witness, while the two work for
RBSI and are interested in securing a favorable judgment for the bank.
Petitioners add that the circumstances surrounding Carmencita's loan
application are suspicious in that her loan was granted and released in just one day:
when Corazon and Carmencita returned to the bank on August 20, 1996 and submitted
the required documents, the promissory note, real estate mortgage and SPA were
simultaneously executed and notarized, and the loan proceeds were released. Corazon
was not made a co-debtor and the proceeds were released to Carmencita instead of
Corazon who is supposedly the beneficiary of the loan.
Finally, petitioners observed that since the CA did not make its own independent
assessment of the signatures in question, it was not in a position to reverse the RTC's
findings thereon.
Respondent's Arguments
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 On the other hand, respondent argues in its Comment 31 that while it was agreed
during pre-trial that the parties shall abide by the ndings of the NBI, still, forgery
cannot be presumed, and it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence during
trial; that the opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon the courts since they
are not conclusive and are merely persuasive; that the CA correctly relied on Exhibit "5-
A"/"S-D-2" which is genuine and authentic as it was con rmed by Deogracias himself to
be Corazon's signature; that the NBI report cannot be relied upon completely in view of
the fact that the signature (Exhibit "5-A") in one of the sample documents (Exhibit "5")
was intentionally disregarded, and yet Dominguez later testi ed and admitted that the
signature thereon and that on the questioned August 20 SPA could have been af xed
by one and the same person; that the NBI report was defective in that it utilized an
erroneous methodology since Dominguez disregarded the sample signatures
submitted by RBSI; and that if Dominguez did not disregard Exhibit "5-A"/"S-D-2," the
conclusion in the NBI report would have been different; instead, the only and inevitable
conclusion would have been that the questioned signature of Corazon in the August 20
SPA is genuine and not a forgery.
Respondent adds that in arriving at its conclusions, the CA carefully considered:
a) the applicable provisions of law; b) the inaccurate, inconclusive and unreliable
ndings of the NBI; c) the apparent con ict between the conclusion in the NBI report
and Dominguez's admission on the witness stand; and d) that petitioners' evidence
failed to defeat the August 20 SPA, a notarized public document which enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It further contends that the issue of Corazon's signature may
not be the subject of stipulation and instead, the parties should be allowed to test the
NBI report and Dominguez's competence.
Consequently, respondent prays for the denial of the instant Petition and
affirmance of the assailed CA dispositions.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Considering that the trial and appellate courts rendered diametrically opposed
opinions, the Court must examine the case at length.
Pursuant to Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write , or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." 32 cDHAES

Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be

proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his
opinion thereon, such opinion being an exception to the opinion rule;
(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and
admitted genuine specimen thereof; and
(4) Expert evidence.

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 The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between
the different means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person. It is
likewise clear from the foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative
value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to
handwriting experts is not mandatory. 33
While RBSI may have agreed to abide by the conclusions in the NBI report relative
to Corazon's signature, the courts may not be compelled to adopt such ndings.
Besides, RBSI's evidence does not depend upon the NBI report and Dominguez's
testimony; expert testimony is irrelevant to RBSI in view of positive testimony from its
witnesses to the effect that Corazon appeared before them and signed the questioned
August 20 SPA. Besides, the questioned August 20 SPA is a notarized document. Only
petitioners are entirely dependent on the NBI report and Dominguez's testimony, since
they have no other way of proving that Corazon did not sign the questioned SPA.
Essentially, petitioners' evidence relative to Corazon's handwriting consists of: a)
Deogracias' testimony to the effect that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that
Carmencita forged her signature, that Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off
her hospital bills since she had P14 million, and that it was Carmencita who actually
paid for the RBSI loan; b) the NBI report which concludes that the questioned signature
of Corazon on the August 20 SPA and her standard signatures on sample documents
submitted for comparison "were not written by one and the same person"; and c)
Dominguez's testimony.
For respondent, evidence consists primarily of the testimonies of Teodoro and
Atty. Trias.
After due consideration of the evidence, this Court nds that on August 20, 1996,
Corazon was present at the RBSI premises with Carmencita who applied for a loan. It is
also established that prior to the transaction in question, Corazon has been a borrower
of RBSI and was not a stranger to the bank and its loan arrangements; and annotations
on TCT RT-19394 reveal that the subject property was mortgaged twice in 1992 and
1993 to secure loans obtained by her from RBSI. 34 It likewise appears that one week
prior to August 20, 1996 Corazon and Carmencita met with Teodoro to explore the
possibility of Corazon taking out another loan which thus prompted Teodoro to seek
prior approval from the bank's board of directors. Since Corazon was not a rst-time
borrower or client of the bank, Teodoro who is also a close relative of the family as
admitted by Deogracias himself in his Complaint was able to secure prior board
approval of a credit accommodation for her, such that when Corazon and Carmencita
returned to the RBSI on August 20, 1996, the bank was able to complete all the loan
documentation and release the proceeds that same day. During the documentation
process, Corazon executed and signed the questioned August 20 SPA in Teodoro's
presence. Thereafter, the said document and other loan documents were submitted to
Atty. Trias for notarization. Corazon appeared before Atty. Trias who then notarized the
August 20 SPA and other loan documents without inquiring whether the signature
af xed on the SPA was hers indeed or that the said document was her free act and
deed, although he knew her very well as he has dealt with her in the past when he
notarized the loan, mortgage, and mortgage cancellation documents relative to the two
previous loan and mortgage transactions executed by Corazon in 1992 and 1993. 35
There is no reason to doubt the testimonies of Teodoro and Atty. Trias. They are
straightforward, candid, and in some respects, they are supported by admissions made
by petitioners themselves. Notable is the undisputed fact and fundamental premise
that Corazon was physically present at RBSI on August 20, 1996, when the questioned
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 August 20 SPA was purportedly executed. Since she was at the bank premises on said
date, there is no reason to doubt RBSI's claim that she executed and signed the August
20 SPA and in Teodoro's presence, and that thereafter the said document was
notarized by Atty. Trias in the presence of Corazon; there was no need for Carmencita
to forge her signature because Corazon was already there. It is more in accord with
experience and logic to conclude that since Corazon was already inside the bank, then
she voluntarily executed and signed the August 20 SPA in Teodoro and Carmencita's
presence; any supposition that Carmencita had to forge her signature on such
document becomes unnecessary and absurd.
As petitioners themselves claim in their Complaint, Teodoro is a close relative; as
such, he is more inclined toward telling the truth rather than fabricate lies to prejudice
petitioners. His loyalty is foremost to his family and to his employer or business merely
secondary. Either way, his actions on August 20, 1996 betray his delity to his clients
who are also his relatives and to RBSI his employer. It may be added that contrary to
petitioners' assertions, there is nothing unusual in the procedure taken by the bank in
approving and releasing the loan posthaste. Quite the contrary, from a business point
of view, Teodoro's actions in performing service to a valued client with alacrity were
laudable; at the same time he created good business for RBSI at record speed. As
Corazon was a valued client and with her valuable property put up as suf cient
collateral, there is no reason to delay Carmencita's loan application.
For his part, Atty. Trias was equally candid in his testimony. Against his own
interest, he admitted that he failed to inquire if the signature appearing on the August
20 SPA was Corazon's but that this was so because he already knew Corazon very well
for having dealt with her in the past. Indeed, what matters is that the party who
executed these documents appeared before him and that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he/she is the same person who
executed it and acknowledged that the same is his/her free act and deed. Thus, while
Atty. Trias did not verify Corazon's identity and signature, he already knew her well as he
had dealt with her in the past; and from an examination of the loan documents, he
would have known that the party involved therein was Corazon who was then present in
person before him. Indeed, Corazon was a valued RBSI client who was well-known by
the bank of cers and staff. The fact that she is a prominent businessperson and
individual in the community; that Teodoro was her close relative; and that her million-
peso loan was pre-approved by the RBSI board even before she could submit a loan
application betray her stature as such.
Apart from being candid and credible, it may be said as well that Atty. Trias has
no reason to fabricate his testimony in order to favor RBSI or Corazon. The little bene t
he may obtain from doing so is not enough for him to gamble his vocation as a lawyer.
His testimony forms part of a credible chain that extends to Teodoro's convincing
account of Corazon's whereabouts and actions on August 20, 1996. Thus, while Atty.
Trias was remiss in his duties as a notary, this does not affect the Court's conclusion;
the preponderance of evidence still points toward the direction of RBSI. Atty. Trias
should be reminded, however, not to repeat the same mistake, or else the
corresponding sanctions shall be meted upon him. Indeed, care should be taken by
notaries in the notarization process because at the extreme, "[a] defective notarization
will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.
Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is
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 preponderance of evidence." 36
Petitioners argue that it was more in keeping with logic and common sense that
Corazon should have made herself a co-maker in the loan transaction. They cite in the
instant Petition that the "Special Power of Attorney was unnecessary in the perfection
and consummation of the (loan) transaction because all it took for respondent Bank to
release the loan proceeds was just a day from the time the loan was applied for and
allegedly Corazon . . . was in the Bank's premises when the entire transaction, from start
to nish, was being done." 37 The opposite, however, is true. Since Corazon permitted
the subject property to be put up as collateral through a special power of attorney
issued to Carmencita, there was no need to make her a co-maker of the loan.
Petitioners concede that Teodoro wanted to spare Corazon the trouble of having to
personally appear at the bank each time a loan is applied for and processed, since she
was then already old. 38 If this is the case, then making her a co-maker of the loan
defeats the declared purpose.
Also, the fact that Carmencita was the sole bene ciary of the loan suggests
nothing. Three days after the August 20 SPA was executed and loan proceeds were
released to Carmencita, or on August 23, 1996, Deogracias was himself granted a SPA
by Corazon authorizing him to collect the rentals due from tenants of the Silver Coin
Bldg. and another building that his mother owned. If there is anything that may be seen
from these circumstances, it is that Corazon loved her adopted children dearly and
gave to them generously. Besides, the fact that Deogracias himself was issued a SPA
by Corazon lends credence to the fact that Carmencita was herself granted one just
three days before. ASEcHI

While Deogracias testi ed that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that
Carmencita forged her signature, that Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off
her hospital bills since she had P14 million, and that it was Carmencita who actually
paid for the RBSI loan, his testimony cannot thwart the accounts of Teodoro and Atty.
Trias. Their testimonies are credible while that of Deogracias is uncorroborated and
self-serving. The fact remains that Corazon freely and voluntarily accompanied
Carmencita to RBSI with the intention of assisting the latter in securing a loan by
offering her property as collateral. The motive for securing the loan is irrelevant.
As for the NBI report and Dominguez's testimony, the Court agrees with the CA's
pronouncement that with Dominguez's admission during cross-examination that the
questioned signature on the August 20 SPA and Exhibit "5-A"/"S-D-2" could have been
written by one and the same person, and that with the changing circumstances such as
age and health of the individual whose signature is placed in issue, the handwriting or
signature could change, but that such change does not necessarily equate with forgery.
With these ndings, the NBI report is consequently rendered inconclusive and thus
unreliable. Resultantly as well, petitioners' main piece of evidence has been debunked
and discredited; their cause of action has no leg to stand on. Even then, "[t]he opinion of
handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion." 39
Finally, since the Court has found that Corazon was then physically present at
RBSI on August 20, 1996, where she voluntarily executed and signed the August 20 SPA
in favor of Carmencita and in the presence of the bank's President and Manager, and
thereafter she personally caused the same to be notarized before the bank's notary
public, then there is no need to further examine and analyze her signature. The issue of
the CA's failure to conduct its own independent examination of Corazon's questioned
signature is rendered moot and academic.
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 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 23, 2012 Decision and July 12,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90854 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 10-49.

2. Id. at 51-64; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.

3. Id. at 142-166; penned by Judge Manuel A. Mayo.

4. Id. at 112-128.
5. Id. at 66.

6. Id. at 167-190.
7. Id. at 87-91.

8. Id. at 73-85.

9. Id. at 95-100.
10. Id. at 101.

11. Id. at 102.

12. Id. at 90.

13. Id. at 103-111.

14. Id. at 93-94.

15. Id. at 54; 204-208, April 5, 2004 Pre-Trial Order in Civil Case No. N-7469.

16. Id. at 56; 121; 150; 210.

17. Id. at 32-33; 59; 218-220; 274; 277.

18. Id. at 60; 273-274.

19. Id. at 117-118; 122-124.

20. Id. at 118-119; 226-228.

21. Id. at 37; 119-120; 126; 229-231.

22. Id. at 209-223.

23. Id. at 59-60; 275-276.

24. Should be "not indispensable."

25. Rollo, pp. 125-128.

26. Id. at 129-141.

27. Id. at 158-166.
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 28. Id. at 64.
29. Id. at 23-24.

30. Id. at 303-316.

31. Id. at 269-290.

32. Emphasis supplied.

33. Domingo v. Domingo, 495 Phil. 213, 219-220 (2005).

34. Rollo, pp. 89-90.

35. Id.
36. Meneses v. Venturozo , 675 Phil. 641, 652 (2011), citing Fuentes v. Roca , 633 Phil. 9
(2010), and Dela Rama v. Papa, 597 Phil. 227 (2009).

37. Rollo, p. 21.

38. Id. at 35.

39. Gepulle-Garbo v. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015.

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