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 ABSTRACT
In many respects the 21st Century's New World Order will not be
so "new" or so "orderly". The increasing rich/poor dichotomy,
overpopulation, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation and
disease and rising nationalism will render the international
arena more volatile and unstable. Into this morass U.S. troops
will be employed to deter and/or fight insurgency, terrorism,
proxy warfare and drug trafficking. To support them in this
environment, signals intelligence must bury its classical
separations which have divided it into four disciplines during
the Cold War and must provide fused, operational and technical
intelligence covering the entire electromagnetic spectrum. On-
going and currently planned programs are leading to such
increased capabilities and interoperability -- the key is to
not let them become new collection programs, but maintain their
emphasis on information processing and dissemination which will
provide focused, fused, friendly intelligence -- the "cheaper"
force multiplier of the 21st Century.

1
 1993
Executive Research Project
A76

Operational and Technical

Sigint--2020 Foresight?

Colonel
Lewis S. Henderson
U.S. Air Force

Faculty ResearchAdvisor
Dr. Abraham Singer

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

•iN 94-08049
94 3 11 008
V

1993
Executive Research Project
A76

Operational and Technical

Sigint--2020 Foresight?

Colonel
Lewis S. Henderson
U.S. Air Force

FacultyResearch Advisor
Dr. Abraham Singer

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
 DISCLAIMER

This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily
reflect the official opinion of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National
Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be
reproduced in whole or in part for distribution outside the federal executive branch
without permission of the Director of Research and Publications, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000.

Aocession For
I TIS R&
DTIC T-i El

l al..-
s ,e-ý-
J
,Dist
 ABSTRACT
In many respects the 21st Century's New World Order will not be
so "new" or so "orderly". The increasing rich/poor dichotomy,
overpopulation, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation and
disease and rising nationalism will render the international
arena more volatile and unstable. Into this morass U.S. troops
will be employed to deter and/or fight insurgency, terrorism,
proxy warfare and drug trafficking. To support them in this
environment, signals intelligence must bury its classical
separations which have divided it into four disciplines during
the Cold War and must provide fused, operational and technical
intelligence covering the entire electromagnetic spectrum. On-
going and currently planned programs are leading to such
increased capabilities and interoperability -- the key is to
not let them become new collection programs, but maintain their
emphasis on information processing and dissemination which will
provide focused, fused, friendly intelligence -- the "cheapera
force multiplier of the 21st Century.
*0

The reason the enlightened sovereign and the wise general

often win the battle when they move, and their achievements
surpass those of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. -- Sun Tzu

The next war will be won by the side that best explo_ s the
electromagnetic spectrum. -- Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov,
former commander of the Soviet Navy

A BATTLEFIELD IN THE FUTURE

The cavalry platoon leader views the tactical situation on

his reconnaissance/strike vehicle's visual display. Along with
his semi-autonomous, robotic outrigger vehicles, he has coalition

company. The green blip two kilometers to his right is a vehicle

from his cavalry regiment. The blue symbol on his left is

. another vehicle from one of the allied armies in

operation.
On this totally blacked out night,
this combined

the mission is to

reconnoiter and disable any forces found in the sector ahead and
report back any reconnaissance over the real time video link to

higher headquarters. A constant stream of intelligence

information is pouring into each vehicle from headquarters,

airborne intelligence platforms and satellite broadcasts. Only
seconds to minutes old, the reconnaissance vehicle's vetronics'
now displays red symbols behind the hills 4000 meters ahead. 2

Automatic cross-correlation of data identifies the enemy as a

squadron of tanks and supporting forces on the move, which must

be destroyed. The highly automated targeting and weapon system

on this two person vehicle has already computed firing parameters

2
and will soon give a cue on the screen when the target is within

the firing envelope.

Already coordination with the J-STARS battlefield

surveillance aircraft and the All Source Identification System

(ASIS) has automatically re-verified that the target will not

become a fratricide statistic. As the target comes within firing

range, the intelligence data streams identify and confirm a

company's worth of enemy vehicles approaching a vital river

junction.
The tactical situation display in the airborne command
post shows the same ground targets, as well as displaying the

combined forces aircraft streaking to pounce on them in near real

time. As the reconnaissance/strike vehicles fire their long
range, millimeter wave, terminal homing rounds at the lead
vehicles, the fighter pilots launch their long range stand-off

attack weapons which will also guide themselves to their

individual targets while the aircraft stay out of the range of

defensive fire. Meanwhile, an airborne jamming aircraft hooked
into the tactical situation net jams the enemy's counter battery

radar systems to mask the position of the reconnaissance/strike

vehicles.
Near real time weapons damage assessment collected and
transmitted back from unmanned air vehicles and other sources

simultaneously confirms to all parties that the enemy formation

has been destroyed or disabled.

While the above scenario is postulated to occur

3
. sometime around 2020, all of the technologies used above are

available today. The biggest challenge is to collect and fuse

diverse intelligence data , particularly those dealing with

target acquisition and identification, and disseminate that

information to the proper individuals in the desired format in

near real time.

ORGANIZATION OF PAPER
The central focus of this paper is that Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) must bury its classical separations which have divided

it into four disciplines during the Cold War. In the future,

intelligence professionals must provide fused, operational and

.
technical intelligence of which SIGINT plays a large part. The
intelligence user, particularly operational commanders and

"shooters", will not care from what source that his information
comes, only that it be readily available to him with coverage of
the entire electromagnetic spectrum. Operational commanders and
planners will also demand detailed, all source analysis of the

capabilities and vulnerabilities of the opponents they face.

Thus SIGINT must continue to evolve and expand its horizons into
the 21st century to provide a comprehensive SIGINT picture of the

order of battle.
We will first briefly look at what SIGINT is currently, to
serve as background for what changes should occur for it to
remain a viable intelligence input in the 21st Century.

Next I will present a picture of what the operational and

4
technical SIGINT requirements might be in the year 2020., through
postulating some generic, future weapon system characteristics

and what those characteristics imply for signals intelligence.

Lastly I will propose some changes that need to be made in

the intelligence community to improve and facilitate operational

and technical intelligence needs 20-30 years hence.

In God We Trust --
All others we monitor. -- noted in one
National Security Agency briefing.

What is SIGINT?

SIGINT is knowledge derived from the interception and

processing of communications and non-communications signals. It

is composed of four elements. Communications Intelligence

(COMINT) is the interception and analysis of communications

signals. Foreign Instrumentation Signals (FIS) Intelligence

(FISINT) makes up another portion of the SIGINT discipline.

FISINT attempts to collect and interpret the data from telemetry

and instrumentation systems in order to derive system

capabilities and activities. For strategic arms control, the

U.S. could count numbers principally through the use of photo

satellites, "But the chief means of monitoring the capabilities

of these missiles was interception of Soviet missile test
telemetry by signals intelligence satellites and ground

stations." I
"Proforma" or data link signals make up another SIGINT

5
 category which is growing in importance. These are hybrid
signals containing tr.e characteristics of both COMINT and

Electronic Inteliigence (ELINT) signals.

ELINT is defined as, ".. .intelligence information that is
the product of activities in the collection and processing, for
subsequent intelligence purposes, of potentially hostile, non-

communications electromagnetic radiations which emanate from

4
other than nuclear detonations and radioactive sources."

To hopefully clarify that rather turgid definition permit

me to highlight and expand several phrases. ELINT deals with non-

communication signals which separates it from COMINT. Basic
ELINT targets are all types of radars as well as navigation
systems, command and telemetry links and data links as opposed to
S telephones, radios, teletypes, television, etc.

Non-nuclear and non-radioactive sources mean that the

signals are transmitted from some system, a radar, a navigation

system, etc. Electromagnetic refers to the type of wave

phenomena, in this case we generally think of radio waves used by

common radio systems and radars, but the total spectrum of

electromagnetic waves covers much more -- extending all the way

through visible light, infrared light and ultra-violet (purple)

light.
We do not have to imagine some forms of electromagnetic
energy, because we can see it with our eyes in the form
of light, we can feel its effect with our skin as heat,
and we can hear sounds that have been carried over the
air by electromagnetic energy. ... In battle,
electromagnetic energy is fired, reflected, absorbed,
suppressed, magnified, and used for a great number of
* military purposes.5
6
 ... the side who wins the next war will be the side with the
last antenna standing. -- Norman Augustine, former
Undersecretary of the U.S. Army and CEO of Martin Marietta Corp.

21st Century EnvJronment

In many respects the 21st Century will look much like the
20th. The New World Order will not be so "new" or so "orderly".
"The general level of instability in the Third World is

increasing," because of the increasing dichotomy between rich and

poor (15% of the population will control two-thirds of the
wealth), just and unjust governments and quests for freedom and

democracy. 6 "Overpopulation, rapid urbanization, environmental

degradation and disease, rising nationalism and other phenomena
will place severe strains on institutions, governments and

alliances. Widely available and sophisticated conventional and

nuclear armaments, coupled with new means to deliver them, will
7
render the international arena even more volatile and unstable."

The most likely of these instabilities will be "low-cost, low-

risk and high visibility " indirect aggressions, e.g. terrorism,
insurgency, proxy warfare and drug trafficking. 8
We have no crystal ball with which to plan for this future

chaos, but ignorance of the future in detail is not a problem or

weakness in planning, just a permanent condition. 9 Given such

chronic uncertainty, we need a new framework that will help

7
strategically plan for future intelligence needs.

This new paradigm will be based on "uncertainty-pulled"

instead of "threat driven" criteria, which died with the cold

war. The U.S. will be pulled towards, "...generic kinds of

challenges--intervention in regional conflict an ocean away,...."

vice driven by detailed threats."0

We won't know whom, where, or when we'll fight again, but as

noted above, multipolar relations and emerging nation-states may

and probably will conflict." The Marine Corps has published a
watch list for their probable involvement as shown in Table 1.

WESTERN MIDDLE EAST/ AFRICA ASIA/ EUROPE/

HEMISPHERE SOUTHWEST ASIA PACIFIC MEDITERRANEAN

Argentina Bahrain Algeria Afghanistan Denmark

Bolivia Egypt Angola Bangladesh Greece
Brazil Iran Djibouti Brunei Italy
Colombia Iraq Ethiopia Burma Norway
Costa Rica Israel Kenya Cambodia Poland
Cuba Jordan Liberia India Turkey
Dominican Kuwait Madagascar* Indonesia Yugoslavia
Republic Lebanon Morocco Japan
EC Salvador Libya Mozambique Laos
Grenada Oman Namibia Malaysia
Guatemala Qatar Somalia N. Korea
Haiti Saudi Arabia S. Africa Pakistan
Honduras Syria Sudan Papua N.G.
Jamaica U. Arab E. Tunisia Philippines
Mexico Yemen Uganda PRC (Coast)
Nicaragua Zaire Hong Kong
Panama Zimbabwe Taiwan
Peru Singapore
Suriname S. Korea
Venezuela S. Pacific-'
Spratly Is.-''
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam

19 15 17 22 07

* Include%Se}chelle, and Mzuriliu-

"Include%FijL Kirihati. Vinuatu. New Ctledonia. Solomon Is. aind the general viinit) of
Australia and New Ze&UlnJ
"Claimedby -even nauion,
2
Table 1: Expeditionary Environment Watchlist'

8
 The consensus seems to be that future conflicts will occur on
regional battlefields versus the Cold War planning for large-

scale European conflict.' 3 With that as a very general statement

of the future world environment, let's briefly turn our attention
to our national interests and priorities in 2020.

Interests, Priorities and Paradigms

With little hesitation, I will assert that our national
inte-,-"ts over the next 30 years will look very much like those

of today. Thus we will still be seeking:

1. The survival of the United States

2. A healthy and growing economy

3. A stable and secure world
4. Good relations with friends and allies"4
From those continuing national interests military planners will

derive the national military strategy and priorities. As Colin

Gray has noted, while they will not know what the exact future
demands will be, they can know the kinds of demands which will

probably look much like today's, although the emphasis on

particular aspects may be greater or lesser than today.' 5 To

protect the homeland, strategic nuclear and space forces,
including ballistic missile defense, will continue to have first
claim on our resources, even though the emphasis on the nuclear

forces will continue to decline relative to today. Defense

against whatever weapons of mass destruction exist will be

foremost.

9
.4

With the continuing trend of declining U.S. forces overseas

and fewer overseas bases, the second priority will emphasize
long-range maritime and air forces for long range power

projection. Without them we will not be able to remain a world

power and player to back up our other non-lethal means of

national power.
Thirdly, we will still require some ground and tactical air

forces, many unmanned, with which to conduct regional military

operations. 6. -The principle players will probably be special
forces for short notice contingencies to deter and, if necessary,
fight small regional conflicts, terrorism, insurgencies and drug

trafficking. 17 These forces will fight along side friends and

.
allies whenever possible, but will need the capability to effect
forced entry into an area if needed. These special forces will be
backed up by more "conventional" forces, having much improved

capabilities and mobility, but reduced manpower from the

conventional forces of today. We must assume that such forces
will face armies employing all of the technologies and weapons

deployed today and most systems, if not all, that are in advanced

development.
So while the national interests and priorities will show
little, if any, change, the national military strategy and forces
to support them will change considerably. They will drive

demands for the future further explored below.

10
 Those who minimize intelligence and think too much
operationallymay win opening set-piece battles, but the leaders
who continually seek intelligence and then, with logistics
constantly in mind, fashion their operations are the ones who win
the tough campaigns and wars. -- BGen Hittle, USMC(Ret)

Future Force Drivers

Several factors will drive how the forces of the future will
look in 2020. Current force composition, employment
concepts/strategies, and technology will all play a part.
U.S. Force Composition. Since the military planning
perspective extends 20 years out, our newest forces today and
those currently on the drawingboard will make up the oldest

forces in the inventory by 2020. Given a 10-20 year procurement

cycle, the primary weapons will be those beginning development at

the turn of the century.

With economic cuts probably continuing, this means that the
military will have far fewer major weapons platforms, but they
will have much greater complexity and cost. However, these
systems will not be the classical tanks, manned aircraft or large
capital ships, but smaller, more mobile, more costly and far more

capable weapons. These vehicles will be complemented by a vast

array of autonomous and nearly autonomous systems which will be

even more mobile, smaller and less expensive, but still more
sophisticated than today's weapons. Nearly all of these land,
air and sea vehicles/platforms will require a combat
identification system and active countermeasures to counteract

electromagnetic guided munitions. Passive detection will

11
 predominate.' 8 Thus self defense will continue and probably
increase in importance as assets become fewer in number and

higher in value.
The U.S. force drawdown will reduce European and Pacific

presence, and decrease forward-deployed, terrestrial support

systems. "... [T]he next conflict may be a come-as-you-are war."

where smaller, primarily U.S. based, expeditionary forces deploy

not to reinforce, but to project global reach and power.19

The future air superiority fighter (F-22) now in initial

flight test, will not be fielded until 2015 and will thus form

the backbone of the air force in 2020. This aircraft is

specified to have a first-look, first-kill capability. That will
require a long-range,

.
non-cooperative target identification

system which must employ near-real-time tactical fusion of on-

board sensors as well as correlation with incoming intelligence

information. The F-22 will also have an on-board self-protection

suite with a passive detection capability since it can expect to

face highly developed air defense systems. 2" Both capabilities
will require equipment providing excellent situation awareness --

multi-source, fused information for beyond visual range threat

and target identification, confirmation and targeting.

Stealthy vehicles, be they air, land or sea, won't want
to highlight themselves until absolutely necessary. This will

call for fewer emissions while maintaining high situational

awareness and warning. Aircraft are already beginning to employ

missile approach warning systems (MAWS) that rely on hard to

12
detect, low probability of intercept signals. Follow-on systems
to these embryonic efforts will complement "end-game" deceptions
and off-board countermeasures. "End-game" generally refers to

the last few seconds of a missile's flight before impact on a

target. "Off-board" countermeasures are expendable

countermeasures which are released/ejected from the defending
vehicle and produce their desired effect in the vicinity of the

target, generally in the last few seconds before impact.

Increasingly effective and lethal enemy defenses and higher

value machines will continue to drive the development of stand-

off attack weapons like the Joint Stand-Off Weapon now in

development with an initial operational capability currently

specified for 2003. This will often preclude aircraft from having
to fly into the heart of the defensive threat envelope, greatly

enhancing survivability. These precision guided, autonomous

weapons will hasten the demise of the manned aircraft for

missions against locatable ground targets, reconnaissance and

battle damage assessment.

Moreover, non-lethal weapons, those which exist now and

those in development, may be employed. But these non-lethal,

disabling weapons have a price, and that price is increased

reliance on timely, focused targeting intelligence -- better than

that received in the Gulf War. 21 The down side to all of this is

that there are,

... limitations to what can be done with realistic

resource availability to completely satisfy the natural
desire of military commanders to have up-to-date
intelligence on all enemy activities.. .The United
13
 States will never be able to maintain a large enough
group of ... signals intelligence processing personnel
to deal with the flood of data produced by U.S.
reconnaissance systems. Developments in computer
processing of such data may help alleviate the problem,
but even that is by no means a certainty.22
Employment concepts/strategies. To achieve the continuing

desire to operate "... within the decision cycle of his

adversary, tommorrow's commander must be able to observe the

battlefield,..." which requires the identification of his

opponents's order of battle, determining the status of his

forces, and understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of his

adversary(ies). While some of this information can be gathered

in peacetime, the majority must be continually updated during the
warfighting. 23 Or, as one author has put it,
Because information is so central in modern warfare,
every little technological or tactical issue that
affects the speedy gathering, sharing and exploitation
of information is of great importance.2'
Thus the contest for information will dominate all aspects

of warfare, with high tech war becoming a race to destroy the

enemy's Command, Control, Communications, Computers and

Intelligence (C41) network before losin,r one's own to chaos,

25
explosives and jamming.
To win the contest, we must obtain and maintain control of

air and space, which will be critical to preventing enemy

reconnaissance and securing our own resources. 26 The U.S. or
perhaps even a world body/international organization, ". .. will

rely on space-based interceptors to negate threatening

missiles,..." and will need a space based surveillance-and-

14
warning network to support it."
The battlefield commander's key needs will focus on real-

time intelligence to determine the threat on a more timely basis

and rapid battle damage assessment (BDA). Achieving that will
require a complementary mix of national level and tactical

collection assets. 23 We must have combined sensors, those using

diverse technologies or different portions of the frequency
spectrum, to defeat jamming. Identification systems must allow
for earlier, longer range identification of friend and foe.

Direction finding will need to be improved at the tactical level

I
for long-range weapons applications. On the ground these things
will allow indirect fire weapons, long range artillery and
rockets, to work more effectively when keyed by long-range

sensors. 29 However, such weapons will require precise

geolocacion data to cue their on-board sensors. Present

"kilometer" accuracies will not suffice. Advanced precision

guided munitions will need routine accuracies to a few meters,

presently only available from imagery. Herein lies a significant
challenge for operational SIGINT.

In the air, General Loh, the commander of Air Combat

Command, has postulated a series of models to generally describe

the environment and requirements when air forces are employed.

This general paradigm will probably still hold for all air
operations through 2020. In the aggregate the model calls for:

1. Probably fighting outnumbered and mainly deploying

from the U.S. to reinforce an ally and any forces in theater.

15
 2. Rapidly establishing a command, control,
0 communications and intelligence (C31) network in an immature
theater.
3. Aircraft deploying within 24 hours of notification
and perhaps defending themselves during theater entry.
4. Air forces would have to detect and destroy
numerically superior enemy forces while avoiding surface-to-air

threats.

5. They would operate autonomously or in conjunction

with airborne and ground command and control (C2) elements. 0

The keys to survival in all of this will be -- mobility,

dispersion, stealth and defensive countermeasures. The

inseparable duo of communications and intelligence will be the
* critical factors in achieving all of them. 3"

However, one of the greatest difficulties for the tactical

commander will be "...separating the wheat from the chaff." What
32
within the flood of information is really critical to him?

Moreover, operating in conjunction with allies will require

policy decisions and guidance on how to provide raw, or half-

assessed national intelligence to multinational coalition staffs.

33
We will need quick, but adequate sanitization of sources.

This high technology, information dependent warfare has

already been conceptualized by the Chief of the Ground Forces of

the old Soviet General Staff, Col Gen Grinkevich. His ideas on
"Reconnaissance-Fire/Strike Complexes" exemplify the tight

coordination required of intelligence, firepower and electronic

0 16
combat,

The side that can count on victory is the side that

first detects a target and attacks, is first able to
make an aimed shot or volley, that is faster at
completing its maneuver and overcoming obstacles, and
that uses the results of weapons strikes without
delay.3

Marshal Ogarkov, ex-Chief of the old Soviet General Staff has

even gone further to suggest that,
Rapid changes in the development of conventional means
of destruction and the emergence in the developed
countries of automated search and destroy complexes,
long-range, high-accuracy terminally guided combat
systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively
new electronic control systems make many types of
weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase
(by at least one order of magnitude) the destructive
potential of conventional weapons, bringing them
closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction
[nuclear and chemical weapons] in terms of
effectiveness.3
This concept of warfare I expect to evolve over the next 20-

30 years. It will involve far fewer numbers of weapons systems,

but ones which are far more complex, costly and integrated. They
will rely far more on each other and on an integrated, highly

automated and "smart" C31 system to bring about this combat

synergism and thus leverage. As the Soviets have prophesied,

they may indeed replace armored divisions with much smaller units
which, however, may function and cost as much as their

predecessors.
Regardless of all else, however, ground or airborne

operators will still want to know the very basics of:

Where is my target?
How do I get to it?
17
 Did I kill it?
Technology Drivers. "During the 1990s, technological
research and development will concentrate on multi-source data

fusion;..."; the integration of databases, artificial

intelligence and neural network technologies to solve the problem

of information overload. 36

One area which will receive a significant portion of this

technological focus will be space systems that provide user

friendly data streams. Microminiaturization and nanosecond

computing will enable far more on-board signal processing, and
therefore less reliance on terrestrial ground-processing and

infrastructure. Such miniaturization and computation will also

.satellite
facilitate needed advancements, techniques and equipment, to fuse
data streams tc;'ther at the collector source. 37

Another technological effort, and probable recipient of data

from the satellites mentioned above, will be the soldier's
computer. This will be a pocket sized device with a helmet
display which will include a radio function for communications

and navigation as well as a combat identification capability to

aide targeting and reduce fratricide.

From the mid-80s Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL)

suite of communications' protocols and standards, to today's
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, improved and
integrated communications systems have been evolving.

The next generation is exemplified by the Navy's Copernicus

Architecture which will "... acquire, standardize and concentrate

18
shore-based sensor and other data for Navy and joint uses. [It
will be] ... a 21st century force-multiplier effect stemming from

the ability to concentrate sensors and data that is analogous to

concentration of forces." 39 This kind of open communications

architecture points to what VADM Macke of the Joint Staff has

termed the "Infosphere". His concept visualizes a unified
Pentagon data network which would handle most any type of data --

imagery, voice, data link, etc.. .that would be needed by U.S.

forces deployed to crisis points.

"Standard-issue portable communications gear would
allow a commander easy access to this data from anywhere in the
world. 'When he goes out there, he kind of plugs in, like an

electric light,'..."4 He could turn on the intelligence data

spigot and tap out only what he needs.

"Infosphere" would be a system of systems architecture

allowing data and information to pass to any user, regardless of

location or service. It would rely heavily on commercial,
cellular-phone network technology and not be all satellite based,

but also depend on long haul, wide bandwidth fiber optics. 41

Motorola Corporation has already announced plans to launch

77 low-earth orbiting satellites to provide cellular voice and

data capability by 1996 with their Iridium project. These

"...will provide users with multimedia communication services on

a mobile basis, employing handheld transceivers no larger than

42
today's cellular telephones."
As new technologies expand to new portions of the

19
electromagnetic spectrum, we may be able to use ". .. computer-
based artificial intelligence systems to-help analyze the

mountains of data..." 43 The Advanced Planning System will take

advantage of artificial intelligence, by using it to turn data
(threat, terrain, order of battle, imagery, weather, etc.) into
visual information, thereby reducing the 72 hour manual Air
Tasking Order planning cycle by 75 percent, planning 2500 sorties

every two hours."

By the end of the century, laser weapons will be widespread

throughout the world's armies. Very powerful laser weapons

will be capable of destroying enemy armored vehicles sometime in

the future. They will eventually sweep unprotected infantry,

sensors, and vehicles from the high-technology battlefield.'
Signal trends expected over the next couple of decades

continue to point to the increased use of:

Millimeter waves (very high frequencies)

Very wide bandwidths

More complicated pulse patterns

Frequency modulations on each pulse

Pulse-to-pulse RF agility
Phased arrays using complex scans

Better sidelobe suppression

Radar internetting
Wartime reserved modes of operation
Very secure encryption devices/algorithms

A profusion of fiber optic and satellite communications

20
 Mostly digital communications
These advanced, digitally based technologies will make signals
more complex and harder to detect and identify than at present;

artificial intelligence systems will be required to help overcome

these advances. 4 7
Already in 1992 the Services are planning aircraft warning
systems which detect missile approaches using laser, millimeter-
wave, infra-red and ultraviolet technologies. In the future we

will have to fully integrate radar, IR, laser detection, warning

and countermeasures into a coherent, multi-spectral warning and

defensive system.4
Furthermore, we will have to seek ways to combine electronic
combat and combat identification to overcome smart munitions and
fratricide, especially in combat vehicles. The possibility of
employing a laser bar code for identification purposes could well

drive some ELINT/ESM needs. Nevertheless, on combat vehicles as

well as aircraft, multi-sensor platforms with on-board data

fusion capabilities for surveillance will be the order of the

day.4

Thus technology will in part drive the future high

technology battlefield. The growth of computer workstations and

sophisticated sensors will have made global surveillance a real

possibility. 5" But as VADM Tuttle, Director of the Navy's Space

and Electronic Warfare Directorate, has noted, one of the biggest

challenges we face as we move into the 21st century, will be to

develop new technologies to integrate sensors and solve

21
 communications capacity problems.51
As we have seen, our current and planned force composition,
future warfare demands and technology pushes will have a profound

impact upon the kind intelligence system that we will require in

the future. Let us now more directly turn our attention on how
those futuristic factors will shape and impact on that system.

What in your long military service was your biggest

problem? ... trying to determine what was on the other side of
the hill. -- Duke of Wellington

Impact on Intelligence
Before we examine how future warfighting concepts and
technologies will impact upon intelligence,
.
let us digress to
look at intelligence lessons learned from the last war.
Gulf War Lessons Learned. "The Gulf War was fought with
more intelligence information and materials available to the
tactical commanders than any other war in U.S. history. The
problem was that it was not always in the right hands at the
right time and place." General Schwarzkopf stated that we

"...just didn't have a responsive intelligence capability that

will give the theater commander near real time information as he

personally needs to make a decision."n52

The primary criticism centered around processing and

dissemination, that there must be far better intelligence system

interoperability to more quickly collate and disseminate
. information to commanders, particularly at echelons below

22
corps/numbered air force. There were too many people handling,
53
reformatting and passing info, slowing things down.
Part of the solution is a priority emphasis placed on

"...secure intra-theater data communications capable of

supporting simultaneous transmission of order of battle, threat

and target data to all nodes and units."5
The initial successes of providing tailored, broadcast
intelligence information services were undertaken with the
Constant Source' and the Theater Intelligence Broadcast System
(TIBS). These two systems provided near-real-time, multi-source

signals intelligence by receiving and decoding satellite and RC-

135 aircraft broadcasts of intelligence information. Such data
helped aircrews locate Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries and fighter
bases within 10 minutes of detection by signals intelligence

collectors. 55 Another system, which used Air Force missile

warning satellites, broadcast reports on Iraqi missile launches

and relayed that information to Patriot missile batteries. 56

Thus, as one author has put it, '"...intelligence broadcast[s] to

users through C41 [Command, Control, Communications, Computers

and Intelligence] must be now regarded as a battlefield force

multiplier; ... that must, in the final analysis, be concentrated
57
on the battlefield to win the battle."
Following up on this experience the Air Force "... is

Air Force's Constant Source, Army's SuccessSThe

Radio and
the Navy's TRAP/TRE all refer to the same broadcast system based
on the Navy's earlier development work. Constant Source will be
used in this paper to refer to any one of these equipments.

23
* planning to procure 300 Constant Source terminals by 1998, half
of them airborne equipment due to become available in 1993."58

Meanwhile the Army will upgrade its airborne, tactical

SIGINT collector (Guardrail) and its current Commander's Tactical
Terminal (CTT), which displays intelligence information to the
ground commander. The upgraded version of the Improved Guardrail

V, called Guardrail/Common sensor, will integrate COMINT & ELINT

collection and processing. 59 The CTT-Hybrid upgrade program will
merge Constant Source data into CTT displays along with the

Guardrail and other data.w

As a result of the war the Air Force is creating an improved

intelligence system to provide widespread and more timely

.
dissemination of intelligence data via on-board collector
processing and near-real-time broadcast systems from collector

and all source organizations.k1 A part of that system will be-a

Tactical Air Force Linked Operations/Intelligence Center to
provide a baseline,- "...graphic display of the ground situation

through correlation and aggregation of all-source

intelligence." 62 It will be designed to be interoperable with

the Army's similarly functioning All Source Analysis System

(ASAS).

As the Department of Defense's final report on the Gulf War

acknowledged, "... [C]ompletely eliminating all the [intelligence]

short-comings is not possible within existing budgetary and

personnel limitations." However, the report goes on to say that

the "'...detail desired in some cases was, and will continue to

24
be, beyond the capabilities of the intelligence system.'"63
These above observations and challenges we will take into

the 21st Century. As we reorient our strategy from a post-WWII,

Cold War containment outlook, to one based on regionally
oriented, expeditionary forces, one general on the Joint Staff
has articulated several key issues that must be addressed--

1. Readiness
2. Collective security
3. Arms control
4. Power projection

5. Technical/technological superiority
These will form a framework on which I will attempt to hang some

intelligence challenges for the future.

Readiness. For the intelligence community, readiness will
imply very short tactical warning time while satisfying increased

demand for more intelligence information on non-Soviet targets."

While we believe that strategic warning for major conflict will

be substantially longer, regional conflict and subsequent U.S.

deployment will continue to occur on a reduced time scale.
Indeed, as Gen Loh envisioned, aircraft would be airborne in 24

hours. This will require that peacetime databases which support

operational forces, must be continuously kept updated on far more

diverse targets and geographic areas than under the Soviet

monolith. It also implies that the intelligence system must

orient itself so that it can provide real time updates (SIGINT
and IMINT) to forces enroute, while they are still airborne.

25
 The efforts with Constant Source and TIBS to date, and their

successor, the Multi-Function Advanced Tactical Terminal, are

steps in the right direction, but must be refined and evolved to

a much higher degree of information sophistication (spelled

integration, correlation and fusion) while becoming far more user

friendly in the future. Most users, especially the "shooters",

will not care what source gave them the information or the

tremendous technical and political challenges neede- to get it to

them. They just want up to date information when they request

it.

One senior NSA official has articulated this problem as

shown in Figure 1. The figure shows the relationships between

loot ----------------------------------------------
THING
95%

ALL TUAE

NRT REPORTING
COLLECT

PEACE < > CONFLICT

Figure 1. Collection and Reporting Continuum

the continuum from peace to conflict on the bottom axis with the

26
percentage of reported information along the vertical axis. The
figure was built on ELINT data, but could be extrapolated in a
general sense to all source reporting. As the figure depicts, in
peacetime the goal should be to pluck everything out of the

ether, but report only a small percentage in either near-real-

time or all the time. The difference being that the user will
want a small number of signals reported regardless of how often

they occur or don't appear to change. The vast majority of the

data will be stored up in on-line data bases so that operational
and technical analysis can be performed on it as required.
As one transitions to a conflict, the amount of information
to be reported out increases, but the overall collection take
focuses down to a smaller area of interest and hence, less
overall collection. Thus we must tailor and refine intelligence
broadcasts so that they can usefully and graphically be displayed
in near-real-time and reduce the significant amount of
ambiguous and useless data that we are now transmitting over such

broadcasts through advanced signal correlation techniques.

Nevertheless, until artificial intelligence can catch up to its
hype for real performance, we must have trained operators at the

receive terminals of our intelligence broadcast systems to ferret

out bogus signals, collector vagaries and apply professional

intelligence and tactical operations judgement. A combination of
electronic warfare and intelligence disciplines is required.
More information transmitted more quickly implies more room for

errors and ambiguities. It is especially important for Constant

27
 Source and TIBS to have these smart operators select out

duplicate reports and remove emitter data which is no longer

valid or desired. Even with true data fusion and other
technological marvels, all of these advanced intelligence systems

serve only, ". .. to assist intelligence specialists, not to

65
replace them."
Readiness also requires that intelligence analysts
undertake a more "opportunity-oriented analysis" approach. Such
analysis complements purely descriptive analysis by focusing on
vulnerabilities suggested by the information. One author claims
that this more complex and risky form of analysis has been

undertaken only rarely and generally reluctantly, but with a few

.
exceptions such as, ". .. analytical products that anticipate

defensive countermeasures an enemy might use." These analyses

have been produced and do highlight and key on vulnerabilities,

but are rare gems indeed.6 Quick reaction, especially Special

Operations Forces, will live or die by these vulnerabilities

assessments and airborne updates, especially during forced entry

scenarios.
Collective Security. As stated in the United States
strategy, we seek to share global leadership and global
responsibilities. Thus we expect to fight along-side allies who
will demand and need critical intelligence that only the United

States can provide. As noted earlier, one of the critical

questions will be how to sanitize and share intelligence with

new/non-traditional allies while protecting sources. We must

28
plan for that eventuality, not hide our heads in the sand and

hope that we can ad hoc the situation at the time.

A part of that sanitization problem has not only to do with

allies, but also our own forces, since even U.S. operators bemoan
the fact that the higher the classification, the less useful it
is to them. A corollary also states that the longer an

intelligence report is, the less likely it is to be read. 6'

Succinct, sanitized, but all source, non-paper reports will be
the order of the day. Indeed, provision of such intelligence

support may be one of our principal contributions to future

61
coalitions while keeping our manpower commitments low.
Arms Control, As Anne Armstrong, Chairman of the National

Foreign Intelligence Board, has noted, the START and INF

treaties, "...will require new investments in technical
intelligence collection capabilities." 69 While the primary
impact has been upon imagery intelligence, signals intelligence
will play an increasingly important role, not only using FISINT,

but other COMINT and ELINT inputs can be expected to have

significant impact. But even in this area, the key will remain
the correlation and fusion of intelligence.
Power Proiection. When U.S. forces are deployed and

employed into regional crises, the reconnaissance/strike concept

will require user friendly, fused, near-real-time intelligence
support which is focused on critical targets. While ELINT will
continue to be a vital tactical input, what is really needed is
data fusion. We can presently collate and consolidate data well,

29
O but,
b:...there is no known technique of taking
multiple
inputs and 'doing something with them in a black box,
and they come out and tell you all you want to know
about the target, and that's what fusion is.' True data
fusion will require a technological breakthrough in
order to give commanders and operators the composite,
graphical view of their piece of the battlefield that
they will require.7 0

In this quest air intelligence is the toughest challenge

since, "[uinder a centralized intelligence structure spread out

over hundreds of miles, dissemination becomes absolutely

critical.,71
As intelligence becomes more responsive to operational

users, operations and intelligence functions and their interface

become ever more dependent on electronic pathways." The

communications system needed to disseminate this data will be
just as important as the collection, processing and analysis of

the data itself. A dedicated, secure C41 system, probably based

on a forward deployed SATCOM link, will be needed to carry a high
volume of ops immediate, all source material. The system must
have enough capacity to simultaneously handle secure voice,

fax/imagery, teleprinter and data link. Above all else,

however, it must be a reliable, secure broadcast system for user
nodes at all levels, tactical to national, since data access will

be required from mobile ground stations, ships or aircraft.

Technical/Technological Superiority. I have postulated that
future forces will employ fewer, higher value systems. For

.h
conventional weapons, this will imply more modifications and
evolutions, furthering the already present trend of adding

30
adjunct sensors or targeting systems to complement a weapon that

already exists. Such "...qualitative changes are much more

difficult to assess than quantitative ones" and will thus make
the intelligence analyst's job that much more difficult,

especially when such equipment will be a blend of foreign and

friendly manufacture."
As vehicles begin to routinely employ missile approach
warning systems (MAWS), "end-game" and "off-board"

countermeasures, what does this portend for classical technical

SIGINT? And more specifically ELINT? MAWS will reduce the
reliance on ELINT and even fused SIGINT to provide immediate
missile launch warning. Until such time that high powered

microwave or laser weapons technologies are employable on combat

vehicles to destroy these incoming weapons, the only defenses to
counter these threats will rely on technical intelligence

collection and analysis. How much SIGINT will provide is

debatable, since "end game" information is very difficult to
collect. Perhaps HUMINT and the exploitation of foreign and
friendly systems will play the bigger part.

Another major factor contributing to a stealthy vehicle's

success is its avoiding threats as much as possible. Stealth

does not make a vehicle invisible to radar, but reduces that
signature in various ways. Thus the pattern that a threat radar

has as a function of its design is of great interest to stealthy

vehicle mission planners in order to reduce the vulnerability of

their limited number of very high value assets. Here, only ELINT

310
 can deliver the needed technical data.
As sensors and weapons systems evolve to more exotic

technologies, laser, ultraviolet, high power microwaves, etc.,

less information on these technologies is known in general so
that there are fewer analogues with which to compare and
reference intelligence estimates. Since these technologies are
generally less observable, hence one of the reasons for their

evolution, there will be greater difficulty in collecting and

understanding what is collected. 74

Greater technological complexity will force analysts to be

much more explicit in expressing "...what they know, what they do

not, and how they came to know what they think they know." in
technical assessments. They will not just be able to gather
S facts and infer trends, but must make more explicit their

analytical bases and paradigms, ensuring that users are aware,

"... what premises underlie major analytical products."75

Whether it's keeping track on international narcotics

trafficking, weapons proliferation ih Third World
countries, or supporting a war in an unexpected place,
the demands placed upon intelligence have never been
greater. Sen Boren -- ex-Chairman of the Senate
76
Select Committee on Intelligence

Intelligence Futures

If the United States is going to be a global actor in the

.
new world order, it will need a global intelligence system. We
now stand at a crossroads driven by fiscal austerity and

32
political "hostility" toward intelligence organizations. Without
prudent leadership and analytical thought about what intelligence

will really be needed in the decades ahead, we could cut programs

that would take decades to rebuild. Perhaps the greatest key

fa,. Dr is the need to plan for global flexibility in

intelligence. Such flexible capacity, will not be based on a

threat.' Instead, again invoking Collin Grey's idea, we won't

know what specific threats there will be, but only that there
will be certain kinds of threats.

In this new world order, some foresee a "911" syndrome,

where the U.S. response is the only viable one. This will be the
hardest intelligence mission of all, since as our forces shrink,

ever more capable intelligence support to operations will be

required. This calls for extreme caution in cutting intelligence

institutions, manpower and programs.

In the future, strategic intelligence will largely

focus on "intentions" of adversaries real and potential. The

priorities over at least the next decade will center on the
following issues which are not listed in any particular priority

order:
1. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

their delivery systems

2. Counter terrorism

3. Counter narcotics
4. Counter intelligence

5. Economic and trade issues

33
 6. Technology developments which could damage U.S.

interests.
7. Russia and FSU nuclear states

8. Key countries -- Germany, Japan, France, etc.7s

Our future collection systems must be designed with growth

potential -- the ability to rapidly tailor themselves through

technology insertion and reprogramming. They must cover not only

known frequency ranges, but also commercial emitters that might
be employed off the shelf. 7' It must be a system of systems
since no one system can cover all threats. Some of these like
the Army's Guardrail system, will be directly tasked by the local

commander. Others will belong to or be tasked by higher echelons

up through the national level. The key requirement is that all
P must be based on a common architecture and components so that

they are able to inter-operate in real time."

Not all of the answers to future intelligence challenges

will be found in the flexible capacity of our systems or their

infusion of technological improvements. Some cultural changes in

the way we organize and view intelligence organizations will also

have to evolve. As noted in the FY 91 Intelligence Authorization

Bill,
... The tactical and national Intelligence Communities
appear to be excessively isolated from one another,
leaving each free to pursue self-sufficiency in their
particular realms. Military commanders seek self-
sufficiency through organic systems and organizations
on the argument that national systems or civilian
systems cannot be relied upon for support. The
national community, likewise, emphasizes its peacetime
missions and pays scant attention to the commander's
p needs.S3
34
 While I feel that there is too much isolation from one

another, despite improvements during and after Desert Storm, I

would also assert that we will need both a "strategic" or

"national" intelligence component as well "tactical" or

"operational" support.
The local commander must have some organic assets which he

can task and control for his immediate intelligence needs.

Likewise our national command authorities, the President,
National Security Council, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs,
need "national" level organizations to filter through the myriads
of military, political, economic and social information which
have strategic impact on all types of national policies and which
respond to their needs. We must overcome the cultural bias that
"control" of an asset does not limit information access to
intelligence derived from that asset. Thus the local commander's
intelligence systems, while tasked and controlled by him for his

purposes, need to funnel resulting intelligence upward all the

way to national level databases and analysts, without being

driven/tasked by them. The emphasis must be on support to the

local commander, but reporting to the larger system. On the

other hand, national, "strategic" assets would emphasize

satisfying needs of national decision makers, but

report/broadcast information to the local commander which

complements his organic assets. This would especially be true of

near-real-time broadcasts as described earlier. There must

continue to be a blending of these complementary assets and

35
 missions. They must be interoperable with common formats and
. communications architectures, but must also be culled of
competing functions and capabilities where it no longer makes
sense to fund such duplication. As noted in post-WWII and DIA
reports, there are strengths in both -- both are needed. The

amount or level of each and their reporting and tasking are the

real issues.

Conclusion
Most, if not all of the areas discussed above, are not new
and there are many programs already underway to tackle most of

these problems. The momentum initiated by these programs must

be continued. But intelligence processing and dissemination

.
systems and their accompanying programs are not "sexy". A
Congressman can't point to a fiber optic cable or a computer
switching network and gain home town votes on the nightly news.

They don't have the verve like a new, classified DOD payload
a.k.a. intelligence "spy" satellite or an alleged SR-71 follow-on
reconnaissance aircraft called Aurora. They are most similar to
water and sewer projects which build infrastructure. But let
them get neglected and unfunded, and wait for the howl from

commanders who decry that they can't get the intelligence they
need and don't understand why they can't have it.

But assuming that at least some of these programs survive,

the key is to not let them become new collection programs, but

maintain their emphasis on the processing and dissemination which

will provide the force multiplier.

36
 We can't afford a plethora of tactical intelligence systems

in the field. Tactical forces can't afford the cost, volume or

weight of numerous, non-interoperable intelligence tools and

systems. We need a common set of displays, user tailorable,

hosted on a processor with multiple feeds and ideally using a
common format/bit stream. Format and interface standards are a

must. Hopefully the fourth generation follow-on to Constant

Source/TIBS, which is in the design stages, will solve the

problem of having a single system to fuse all source information

into a single integrated display and processor.

The intelligence community needs to practice data

dissemination and fusion with operations folks on daily basis.

Intelligence personnel can't wait until crises to "turn on the

intelligence spigot from behind the green door" and expect

operators to know what they want, how to use it and trust the
information they're getting, without building up a body of

experience and trust in their intelligence systems and

personnel. This means providing real world collection and

information on a regular basis.

Furthermore, all intelligence organizations need to exercise

and surge their collection, analysis and dissemination

capabilities just like military units surge and exercise to

operate their systems and people under stress. Even with

intelligence reorganizations to aline peacetime/wartime

functions, no stress on the systems/organizations makes for re-

learning previous "lessons learned".

i
37
 To keep the emphasis on interoperability, national agencies
should research and develop national systems and define the

intelligence architectural standards for their intelligence

collection discipline -- HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT. The Director of
Central Intelligence should define and enforce community-wide

standards which will ensure the interoperability within and

across each collection discipline as well as across all data

dissemination systems.

Another rule which the intelligence community must learn to

apply to their product is the 80 per cent rule. Just like in the
acquisition community, the last 20 per cent of performance
improvement will take an inordinate amount of time and dollar

.
investment. For intelligence, time is the greatest enemy.
Perfect intelligence next week is useless to a commander who
needs an answer, a best judgement, today. The intelligence
community must focus on providing an 80 per cent solution, with

some judgmental risk, and train our leaders that that is the
situation.

As budget cuts continue, intelligence professionals must

well articulate the need for technical intelligence, as well as
operational intelligence in support to military operations.

Technical intelligence is the whole life policy -- we pay a

premium/cost over the long term in peacetime to guard against

sudden death, technological surprise. We must pay the price if
we are going to avoid technological surprise and continue to

field and use countermeasures for fewer, higher value systems.

38
One must not forget that much of the technical victory in Desert
Storm was built upon 20 years of technical intelligence analysis

of Soviet, Chinese and western manufactured weapons systems.

To continue to leverage ourselves by employing technology in

lieu of U.S. lives in battle, the U.S. must stay technologically

ahead both militarily and commercially. Militarily this means

that we must have early alerts of new and/or modified systems.

New tip offs and alerting keys are required since old paradigms

are not translatable to the future. Commercially, we must stay

one step ahead of the friendly competition (Western Europe, New
Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia, and Israel) for

economic well being/competitiveness and two steps ahead of the

rest of the world.
There are systems out there now which look the same on

imagery, but emit greatly different signals. There are systems

for which technical data, exploitation and HUMINT sources say

operates in some fashion X, but it really operates in different
modes X,Y, and Z. Sometimes these modes are even unknown to the

design engineers of the system! Technical SIGINT can provide

those answers, sometimes to questions that haven't even been

formulated, but are critical.

HUMINT, foreign materiel exploitation, and IMINT may give a

base line, but SIGINT can determine some modifications to

systems. It can key HUMINT and IMINT to re-look and further

collect info on a system which has been modified from a previous

baseline. In many cases only technical SIGINT will provide the

39S
 ground truth for threat receiver and countermeasures development.
As one expert has put it, "If it radiates, we need to confirm
it." It will tell you what the signal really looks like, not
what someone/something says it looks like. But it can't do
everything since there is little to no information derived from
SIGINT on the receivers and data processors of systems. Thus, in
technical intelligence, like its operational complement, fusion
of all data sources is needed.
The future belongs to focused, fused, friendly intelligence
-- the "cheaper" force multiplier of the 21st Century. The

challenge will be to keep the systems and organizations focused

on interoperability while providing technical and operational

support to the warfighter as well as satisfying national

. consumers.

40
 S 1. "Vetronics is
vehicle electronic systems --
the term given to the integration of all
digital, audio, video, electrical
power distribution and computer resources." Bustin, p. 82.
2. Tapscott, 46.
3. Munro, 158.

4. Schleher, 8.
5. Munro, 2.
6. Locher, 11.
7. Locher, 11.
8. Ibid.

9. Gray, 19.
10. Gray, 18-19.
11. Moorman, 17.
12. Steele, 74.
. 13. Loh, 6.
14. The White House, 3.

15. Gray, 22.

16. Gray, 21.

17. Locher, 12.

18. Ackerman, 35.

19. Loh, 6 and Moorman, 18,19.
20. Loh, 12.

21. Ricks, 1.
22. Richelson, 37.

23. Hamel, 11.

24. Munro, ix.

25. Munro, 275, 257.

41
26. Munro, 305.
27. Moorman, 21.
28. Gagner, 41 and "Combat Commanders' Needs Color Intelligence
Planning" ,45.
29. Munro, 307.
30. Loh, 9,10.

31. Munro, 305.

32. Hughes-Wilson, 43 and Tapscott, 25.

33. Hughes-Wilson, 42.
34. Munro, 189.
35. Munro, 189-90.

36. Lok, 1031.

37. Moorman, 21.

38. Griffin, 52.

39. Loescher, 89.

40. Grier, 113.

41. Grier, 115.
42. Banford, 90.

43. Godson, 54.

44. Struck, 28.
45. Ricks, 1.
46. Munro, 40 and Richardson.

47. Richardson.

48. Richardson, 408.

49. Struck, 33.

50. Loescher, 86.

51. Loescher, 86.
42
 52. Leonhardt, 21.
53. Starr, 636.

54. Clapper, 79.

55. Buenneke, 23; Clapper,77; Richelson, 36.

56. Buenneke, 23.

57. Hughes-Wilson, 43.

58. Chenard, 4.

59. Struck, 31.

60. Richelson, 36.

61. Clapper, 79.
62. Clapper, 80.
63. Richelson, 37.
64. Godson, 52.

S 65. Jenkins, 17.

66. Godson, 49.

67. Steele, 73.

68. Seaquist, 48.

69. Armstrong, 25.

70. Williams, 69.
71. Ingram, 65.

72. Banford, 91.

73. Godson, 53.

74. Godson, 53.
75. Godson, 50.

76. Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the

United States Senate, 2.
. 77. The White House, 19.
43
78. "Intelligence Reorganization Springs From Inside Forces", 28;
and Williams, 33.

79. Campbell, 45.

80. Campbell, 46.
81. Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
United States Senate, One Hundred second Congress, ist
session on review of Intelligence Organization, 3.

44
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48
 COLONEL LEWIS S. HENDERSON, III

Colonel Lewis S. Henderson, III is a student at the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
Colonel Henderson was born on 12 Nov 50, in Pensacola, Florida, and
graduated from Parsons High School, Parsons, Kansas, in 1968. He earned
a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the United
States Air Force Academy in 1972, and a Master of Science Degree in
engineering from the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, in 1983. He
completed Squadron Officer School in 1974, Air Command and Staff College
in 1981, and the Air War College in 1987.

After receiving his commission, Colonel Henderson served as a Deputy

Missile Combat Crew Commander, Deputy Flight Commander, and Wing
Standardization/Evaluation Examiner in the 351st Strategic Missile Wing,
Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. After navigator and electronic
warfare officer training at Mather Air Force Base, California, 1974-76,
he was assigned as a Remotely Piloted Vehicle Launch Control Officer with
the 349th Strategic r..:onnaissance Wing, Davis Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona. He subsequently served as an RPV Remote Control Officer, Senior
Instructor, and Drone Mission Commander in the 43d Tactical Drone Group.

From June 1979 to July 1981, Colonel Henderson was attached to the
Air Force Flight Test Center, Detachment 3, as the Officer in Charge of
Flight Test Operations for a presidentially-directed Joint Test Force
special access program. Selected to attend graduate school under the
senior commanders' education program, he graduated in 1983, and became a
Branch Chief in the Electronic Warfare Staff at the National Security
Agency (NSA), Fort Meade, Maryland. He subsequently became the Deputy

S Chief of the Electronic Warfare Technology and Support Staff.

In 1987 he moved to the 65th Air Division, Lindsey AS, Germany where
he served as Chief, Combat Intelligence and Requirements, and as
Assistant Director and Director of Operations. Colonel Henderson took
command of the 7580th Operations Squadron, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany,
in June 1989. He moved up to become the Deputy Commander for Operations,
66th Electronic Combat Wing, Sembach Air Base, Germany in September 1990.
Returning from overseas, he returned to NSA in 1991 as the Deputy
Chief of the Defensive and Ground Weapons Systems Division, Office of
Weapons and Space Technology. He assumed his present duties in August
1992.

Colonel Henderson is a master navigator/electronic warfare officer

with over 1,000 flying hours. His decorations include the Joint
Meritorious. Service Medal, Air Force Meritorious Service Medal with two
oak leaf clusters, Aerial Achievement Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal
with two oak leaf clusters, and the Combat Readiness Medal.
Colonel Henderson is married to the former Cheryl A. Williams of
Sacramento, California. They have three children, Brianna, Bradley, and
Benjamin.